tv FBI Director James Comey Addresses Concerns Over Voter Database Breaches CSPAN August 30, 2016 8:01pm-8:48pm EDT
introduction and the opportunity to share some thoughts with you. thankingart by symantec for putting this event on and for the work you do and the attendees to keep so many of threats wem the worry about every day. i want to give you a sense of how the fbi is thinking about those threats. sums ends from our perspective as to what we think all of us and how we'rer trying to contribute to reducing the threats across a variety of bad actors. i want to share because they can get on the stage without talking a little bit about the problem we call going dark, which is encryption. then i would like to take your questions. i hope you think of a question that has something to do other than secretary clinton e-mails. [laughter] let me start with the threat.
how do we slice up the stack of actors that all of us in this world have to worry about? we start at the top of the stack with the nation-states. think china, russia, iran, north korea, entities that are getting much more sophisticated, much more aggressive in state-sponsored intrusion activity which i will say more about in a minute. next level down the stack we would put the multinational criminal syndicates that are getting increasingly specialized in their roles and increasingly sophisticated. people are interested in stealing information is to make money, to sell it to the highest bidder the way criminals have always been the next level down in the stack would be the purveyors of rent somewhere which is spreading from our object like a virus all across this country and all across the world. where for people running a business it becomes a challenge between choosing paying to get on with your business or resisting the spread of the virus and helping us fight it and rooted out the next level down we put the hacktivists which is a motley crew of people with all men and motivation, political, personal, philosophical, some that are hard to figure out at all who are interested in information to embarrass, to expose in their view, to send messages and it's
not about money for the. at the bottom of the stack which may surprise you, we would put terrorists. the reason there at the bottom of our stack is terrorist organizations around the world, especially the group that called itself the islamic state, are proficient at using the internet to spread their message of hate, to recruit, to connecticut for operational purposes. they are literally able to buzz in the pockets of fellow travelers or would be terrorists 24 hours a day, and that has an enormous impact on the fbi's counterterrorism work. but what we don't see them doing yet, and i underline yet, is moving towards and developing the capability for computer intrusions. logic tells us that that has to be the future of terrorism, as we make it harder and harder for
them to get physically into this country to kill people and to do damage. surely they are going to turn to try to come in as a photon and doing damage to the internet. so that's our stack of actors that we worry about. let me say a few words about how we see them operating. over arching theme is increasingly sophisticated, large-scale attacks from all of those actors. combining multiple techniques and especially combining inside knowledge that's harvested through social media, that's harvested through all the ways to come to understand the potential human factors that they might use to get into our organizations. all of you in this room know this. as we make our systems harder and harder for people to get in from the outside, the weakling always remains our people. the threat actors know that is so they spend a tremendous amount of time trying to understand how they might get in
through human beings, through spoofing, the existence of a particular human being or actually recruiting someone who is disgruntled, he was unhappy, who's looking to damage an employer or maybe to make extra dough on the side. what is this stack after? that's obvious but they are after information, access, advantage whether that is political or economic or ideological. and we are worried of course not just about the loss of data in pursuit of those goals, but we worry every day about the potential for the manipulation of data to accomplish the same illicit ends. and impact the attacks, your industry because you understand the impact of these attacks
level spent a lot of time on this. they are more than just attacks on our infrastructure. they are attacks on our employees and our customers. they are attacks on our reputation, on our economy, on our security, on our basic freedom. the sony attack was an attack aimed at free expression to it was the act of a bully looking to silence speech in the united states and around the world by intimidation and harassment, in that case, of sony pictures. so what can we do? we can't possibly prevent every attack. especially the more sophisticated actors, but we believe that this behavior, no matter where it comes from and the threat stack, is deterrable. these are not people who are committing computer intrusions high on crack or inflame by having found their significant other in the arms of a stranger. these are people who are thinking coldly and dispassionately at a keyboard as the act.
and it offers us an opportunity to change behavior. that is an audience that is potentially deterrable because they're not drug addicted or desperate in a way that a bank robber might be or a mugger might be. to do that, we need to be more predictive, less reactive. and we as a government need to recognize that the answer is not just us, it's the government at all of our private sector partners. we think there are 3 joint goals that all of us have in this regard, three things we all must do together, and then want to talk to about how i think the fbi in particular can contribute. all of us together can do three things. we can reduce vulnerabilities. we in the government can equip you and the private sector to understand hackers and cyber criminals and their techniques, their tactics and procedures. you in the private sector can help those of us in the government understand the same thing. together we can use that information to harden our targets. we can make with that information i decisions of
cybersecurity be a priority at all levels in our organizations. there is a risk that leaders sometimes will think of cybersecurity as something that is i want among other risk factors. it's kind of off to the site side and we turn and have a conversation about it at our quarterly meetings. folks need to understand that cybersecurity must be an
integral part of everything we do come in any kind of enterprise whether it's government or private. no matter what type of work we do, because we are living our lives in the digital space. cybersecurity affects every aspect of an enterprise. it is not just about our systemsit's about our people, about our processes, about our technology, about the way in which we interact with world. cybersecurity has to be part of every single thing we do and should be part of nearly every conversation in an enterprise. that's the first thing we can all do together is try to share information to raise the focus and reduce our vulnerabilities. second, we think we can all work together to do a better job of reducing the threat of the reasons i said. we think this is behavior that is deterrable, that we can, by together, holding people accountable in a way that will change behavior. i was a more in the second of the fbi's time to do that. we think we can do a better job at mitigating the damage. we in the government and in the private sector can help people understand better quickly what just happened, what's the path back to restore our processes and our business. so that's what we think everybody can share in terms of goals. the pieces that we in the fbi can uniquely contribute, we break down into 5 parts of our strategy and i want to share that with you now. the first thing we're trying to do is focus better on people. we mean this in two different respects. focus better and deploy a smarter way to people who
it happen, and wherever it happen, whether that's a bank robbery or a fraud or a drug deal for a payoff to a corrupt official, that's where we do the work. the bank robbery happened in the chicago suburbs, and so the chicago field office will be responsible for the bank robbery, and that makes good sense and has made good sense for a century. the challenge we face today with the threat that comes at us at the speed of light from anywhere in the world is that physical place isn't such a meaningful way to assign work any longer. so where does it happen when you're talking about an intrusion that's coming out of some other side of the globe into multiple enterprises either simultaneously or in sequence? that it is different than it ever was before. so we changed the way we are signing work. we have now created a cyberthreat teen model where we assigned the work in the fbi based on the ability. which field office has shown the chop to go after which slice of the threat we face, that stack. and then assign it there. and this is two things for us. it allows us to put the work with the expertise is, integrates a healthy competition inside the fbi. because everybody wants to be at the front of the list to a important threats that come at us. and so we assign in a cyberthreat teen model a particular threat, let's imagine it's a particular threat that comes at us from a certain nation-state actor. we assign that to the little rock division because the little rock division has demonstrated tremendous ability against that threat. but we are not fools about
important physical manifestations. because that the threat is what it does particular enterprises around the country, and the ceos of both enterprise and the boards are going to want to know as the fbi be new to talk to us, and what's the nature of the investigation and how is it going? so to make sure we accommodate
that need we are going to allow up to four other officers to help the team that is assigned to the threat in little rock. so if a company based in indianapolis and one is in seattle and one in miami, those few officers will also be able to assist in the investigation, but the lead will be in little rock. in the air traffic control from all that to make sure we're not duplicating efforts or sending confusing messages will come from the cyber division at headquarters. we are trying to dig we've been doing it now for about a year and a half. seems to be working pretty well. it is set up very, very healthy competition inside the fbi which is good for us. but we are confronting a challenge and i went to work with have never seen before. so we are eager to get feedback, and in it a rate. we are not, iterate. we want to be humble enough to understand that just as our world has been canceled in our lifetimes, the way in which we do our work is being transformed. we have to be open to changing when it makes sense. so the cyberthreat teen model is at the core of our response. also at the core of our response is a team of experts with the because the recall the captain to the cyber action team. just as in terrorism, we have preassigned fools of expertise that can jump on airplane and go -- tools of expertise that can jump on airplane and go anywhere in the world in response to a terrorism threat. we believe that an adult that same typical with respect to cyber. so that if there is a particular intrusion, let's say sony in los angeles, we have the talent, the
agent an who attempted and the talent, the technical talent that's already assigned to the cyber action team that is agreed and is ready to deploy in a moment's notice to literally fly to los angeles to support the investigation. second, we are focusing on trying to skew people. you were trying to hire. to be able to staff those cyber action teams and the cyberthreat the market a good way we used out there this is enormous challenge for us because we don't have the dough. we cannot compete on go pick a good is if we can compete on nation. we tried to portray our private sector colleagues as soulless and exercise, and then convince their taliban to come to good for a living. we are seeing how that's going. we've met with limited success so far but the good news is, the more we show people the nature of our mission, and just how fun it is and how rewarding it is,
to have your mission as the fbi does protecting the american people and uphold the constitution of the united states, that attracts a lot of talent there one of my children describes me what our problem is in recruiting. she said the problem is you are the man. i thought that was the consummate so i said thank you, i really appreciate that. she said i don't mean that in a good way. i mean you are the man. who would want to work for the man? i think she's right but i said to her, if people saw what this man and woman of the fbi was like, and what we do and the challenges we face, i think they would want to come work for us. so i don't want to share too much about our recruiting strategy because our interests are not fully aligned, was the work for the government or for a private entity in this room, but we are working much harder to
make sure people understand what it might be like to work for this man and this woman, ma and do this for a living. then we are working very hard inside the fbi when we get that kind of talent to demonstrate more agility than we have, that we might not to demonstrate when you're 108-years-old. there is a challenge when you're 108, when a smart young kid comes in with a wonderful way of approaching a problem or approaching no problem in any way, you might try to crush a person spirit by saying no, we have never done it that way. we are working very hard to work a whole lot cooler than you may think we are. we are not the bean bags and for no and a lot of whiteboards yet we are working very hard in marching in that direction so that when this content into our organization, we are open to having them make us better. and a way that connects us and them to our mission more closely. we are also doing things like, the we've never done before.
we will hire a senior level data such as. someone who knows how to think deeply about the technical challenges we face together, and the talent, technology, process but we're looking to hire that person, bring them in at the shoulder of the assistant director of our cyber division. obviously, we're trying to higher lots more cyber talent in our special agents. here's our challenge. to have a cyber special agent unique three buckets that you beat. you need integrity which is nonnegotiable. you need physicality. wewe're going to give you a gun on behalf of the united states of america. you need to be able to run, fight and shoot. so there's a physicality required. obviously, there's an intelligence we need for any special agent, but to be a cyber special agent we need a highly sophisticated specialized technical expertise. those three buckets are rare to find innocent human being in nature. we will find people of great integrity who of technical talent and can't squeeze out more than two or three push-ups.
we may find people of great technical talent who want to smoke weed on the way to the interview. and so we are staring at that asking ourselves are there other ways to find this talent, to equip this talent, to go discover? if we find people of integrity and physicality and it intelligence, can we grow our own cyber expertise inside the organization? or can we change speed we are leaving fbi director comes remarks not for a moment for a quick pro forma session of the u.s. senate. the senate finishing a brief pro
you may have read the president usually issued presidential policy 41, which is fabulous mostly for people outside the makesment because it clear to you all outside the government what he wills of the road are so you understand and the president has said he will have to lead through the fbi and the national cyber investigative joint task force in responding to threats and investigating threats. dhs given your incredible capability with respect to threats you will be responsible for threat mitigation.
he will work to reduce impact, mitigate vulnerability, intensify and assess risks, director of national intelligence, your job, you will be the lead for intelligence support, making sure the best thinking is pushed into threat response and mitigation efforts. this is the most important message. it shouldn't matter to anybody outside the government who you call when you have a problem. our job should be to figure out who should do what and this clarifies for us exactly what the lames of the road are and we evolved over the last several
years on our own. the second point we are trying to shrink the world, trying to forward deployed far more cyberagent that cyber analysts and have them sit with foreign partners so though we face a digital threat moving at the speed of light, the human connection between investigators, shrinking the world so we can detect and incapacitate bad guys better, the core of our strategy. third thing we are trying to do is impose costs, we think this behavior, this intrusion activity by nationstates or activists or thugs and criminals is deterrable. we want to lock people up to send a message that it is not a freebie to kick in the door of an american company or private citizen and steel what matters to them. if we can't lock people up, we want to call out, name and shame through indictment or sanctions or public relations campaign, who is doing this and exactly what we are doing. the department of justice first indicted chinese actors, and that seems like an empty gesture.
i think we have managed to send an important wind through that. you might have to go abroad yourself, spending your kids to be educated, and see those kids. maybe they are not all that smart, but it took them 50 years to give up on db cooper who jumped out of an airplane on washington state. the long arm of the law is very patient. trying to send that chilly wind is the same reason against iranian actor, and, all of this helps us grapple with a set of norms, it is the way we understand the framework. there are people who were series people with whom we have a series framework, nationstates gather intelligence, they always have. we are trying to get information about other countries and others about us, we try to detect it and stop it.
that is outside the framework of acceptable nationstate activity and we are making progress making people understand that is a framework that makes sense is whether through indictment or sanctionable publicity we are working hard to make people at keyboard feel our breath on their neck to change that behavior. we got to get to a point where we can reach them as easily as they can reach us and change behavior by that reach out. we must help state and local partners be more effective to and responding to all manner of complaints to citizens about fibercrime, and and training and equipment and task forces, responding to the cry for criticisms for help. people every day are asking about money in nigeria. i am not the president of the federal bureau of investigation,
i am not in nigeria, do not wire me money but there are citizens every day scanned in similar ways, we have to help our partners give them justice. the last thing we need to do should be obvious to you. we have to work better with the private sector to address these things. all the information and evidence we need sits in private hands in the united states and that is a wonderful thing but an enormous challenge. we have discovered the majority of our private partners do not turn to law enforcement when they face in intrusion so that is a big problem. it is fine to turn to be excellent private-sector entities and with remediation, that is good but we have to get to the point where it is routine for people who are victimized to turn to our assistance. we know your primary concern is getting back to normal, when you run any kind of enterprise, for profit business but we need to figure out who is behind that attack and it is in your interests.
people sometimes think my interests are not aligned with the federal government, i need to get this over with and get on with my business. people think even if it involves paying ransom, our long-term interests are the same. you are kidding yourself if you think that problem will go away and not return to victimize you. we must work together to defeat these threats. what is our strategy for getting you, the private sector, to talk to us in the private sector more? we are going to hound you and explain to you over and over again why it is in your interests as a matter of practice we can work well together. we are going to convince you we will not re-victimize you if you contact us and seek help and we
will treat you as we have for a century as victims of crime. in working with all victims, our paramount goal is not to re-victimize this poor person whether it is a victim of sexual assault of a robbery victim or a company that suffered in intrusion. we also understand concerns about competitive advantage. we know you are trying to get out from under the burden that disrupted operations that affected the supply chain and risks affecting your reputation, and employees and customers. we understand, i understand your concerns about liability given i was general counsel of two countries before coming back to this work which is better than private-sector work. we have been at this a long time. we strive to be humble and we have gotten good at it was we are good at minimizing your disruption and pain to your
employees and protecting your privacy and legitimate concerns about competitive advantage. we do not share your data about employees or operations. we will have adult conversations with you to tell you what we will do with information you give us. will make risk-benefit decisions that you give us. we will not allow you to be blindsided. we understand if we do that you won't talk to us anymore. what do we need you to do? we need you to talk to us, to get to know us, to understand what we are like and how we do this work. we need to make sure you understand how important it is to your competitive advantage to integrate the fbi into your risk
assessment plan. you spend a lot of time no matter where your facility is making sure the fire department has a basic understanding of the layout of your building so in the event of a disaster they can save lives. i suggest you do the same with respect to cyberthreats and risk assessment plans. we were able to respond to help sony investigate, attribute and the mitigate because they had taken time before the fire to get to know us, not the details of their business plan, not any secret of their proprietary information. we knew the basics of their network, with the key people were, and the facilities and locations. armed with that in a situation with smoke all over the place, and get the work done quickly. it is in your competitive advantage to make sure we have the opportunity if a disaster hits your company. if you are in a private enterprise and you do not know
someone, every single fbi officer has a significant presence, you are not doing your job well enough. we are waiting for those phone calls to build those experiences. there is a journey we went through with the fbi and the cia over the last 25 years. law on theong a books that allowed criminal prosecutors and agents to protect the equities in the event there was a criminal prosecution that touched on intelligence equities. the classified information procedures act was passed in the 1980's, and they thought they solved that problem, the friction between intelligence and law enforcement. nonsense. it required trust building,
case-by-case, and person by person, so that the cia understood that the fbi would not earn their equities. a great example occurred in the summer of 1998 with the attacks on the american embassies in kenya and tanzania. the investigation that followed that involved both agency people and federal bureau of investigation people. was, thee did it people went on searches together to do search warrant in east africa, we send people from both organizations. so if something was found that later would be useful in a criminal case, the fbi agents could testify about it. it never would be necessary to talk about the cia's activities or its presence. consistent with the law, but required trust-building to get there. later, fbi personnel testified about those searches in a federal courtroom in manhattan. and the cia did not have to be involved, consistent with law
and discovery operations. those types of things build a culture of trust. it is not enough to say come these other roles of the road. we have to demonstrate a person by person, case-by-case. you will see that from us, trying to work with you place by , enterprise by enterprise, incident by incident, to demonstrate that we know how to do this and do it well. a brief word, because i cannot resist much of talk about encryption and going dark. the issue of going dark, the term we use to describe our increasing inability with a judicial authority to get access to information that fits on a device or is traveling in real time. at the challenge we face is that the advent of default, ubiquitous, strong encryption is making more and more of the room we are charged to investigate with, dark.
there was always a corner of the room that was dark. sophisticated actors could always get access to devices or live streams. since i have been director, post-snowden, especially through default encryption, that shadow is a spreading through more and more of the room. the conversation we have been trying to have has dipped below public consciousness him and that is fine. because we want to collect information this year so that next year, we can have an adult conversation in this country. here is why i think it requires an adult conversation. our nation's founders struck a bargain 240 years ago. in our great country, we have a reasonable expectation of privacy, in all of our private spaces. in our houses, cars, safe-deposit boxes, devices. and that is a very important part of being an american.
the government cannot invade our private spaces without good reason. good reason that is reveal a bull in court. revealable in court. but that also means that people of the u.s., through judges and law enforcement, can invade our private spaces. that bargain has been at the heart of our liberty since the nation was settled. to take the most common example. if law enforcement has probable cause to believe there is evidence of a crime in some space you control, whether that is your bedroom, your car, we're safe deposit box, or your judge, they can go to a make a showing of probable cause, and get a war and that is consistent with the fourth amendment to the u.s. constitution. and then, go through your stuff. they can search wherever the judge says they can search, your closet, your dresser drawers, under your bed.
they can take whatever the judge says they can take. are not memories absolutely private in the united states. even our communications with our spouses, lawyers, clergy, medical professionals, are not absolutely private. there is a judge in certain makemstances that can those testify about what they saw or heard. there are really important constraints on that, but the general principle is one we have always accepted and has been at the core of our country. there is no such thing as absolute privacy in america. there is no place outside of judicial authority. that allowed us to achieve two things we all love dearly, privacy, and security. encryptiondefault changes that bargain. in my view, i think it shatters a bargain at the center of our country.
there is something seductive about the notion of absolute privacy. even when i hear it, i love it. i have an instagram account with nine followers, they are all related to me. -- i do not want anyone looking at those pictures. it is nothing inappropriate, but it is private to me. it is seductive when i hear someone say that absolute privacy is a paramount value. to come our devices are made support privacy. i stop and step back and realize, we have never lived that way. that is a different way to live. it changes something at the center of our country, that is really important. in our case, it affects our national security investigations and criminal investigations. we believe at the fbi that we have to talk about it. our role is limited. at the fbi's role is not to tell the american people had to live or govern themselves, our role is to say those tools you are counting on us to use to find
people in criminal cases and national security cases, they are less and less effective every day because of this challenge. the job of tech companies. as wonderful as they are, to tell the people -- to tell the american people have to live. andr job is to innovate celist grade equipment. the american people should decide, how do we want to live? how do you want to govern ourselves? and you have a conversation in a mature way, we need space and time and information. we need to understand in the fbi, how is this exactly affecting our work? and then, share that with folks. in thislenges conversation is the intensity of emotion around the issue that makes it hard for people to avoid demonizing each other, and you have a thoughtful exchange. some like to say we are trying to weaken encryption, that we
are trying to build backdoors into everybody's devices. believe the we issue is not strong versus weak encryption. we love strong encryption at the fbi. it enables us to better protect -- thieves,the, hackers, spies, terrorists. but we believe absolute control of data is not a requirement for encryption. a whole lot of organizations, including our own, issues personal electronic devices to employees, and so retain some control over those devices for security and business reasons. if those organizations, including my own, is served with a warrant, those organizations are able to access the information and comply with the warned. the ability to do so by design does not require weak encryption. that is why i often describe this as a really hard problem, but not a technical problem so
much as a business model problem. that does not make it easier to solve, but it is a fair description of the challenge we face. we believe in the fbi that we need a conversation. if the american people say we are ok with that portion of the room being dark, then we are ok come to use an example, in the first 10 months of this year, we and locals from state law-enforcement and were requested to open them. unable devices we were to open. that is criminals not caught, evidence not found, sentences of far shorter for pedophiles and others because judges cannot see all their activity. placeuld not drift to a where a wide a swath of america is off-limits to the judicial party. last year wrote a letter to the president that i found honestly, depressing and
disheartening. it was a letter that wonderfully ofcribed the benefits encryption. as i read it paragraph after paragraph i thought, absolutely, that is important. the letter ended without any acknowledgment of the costs of widespread, ubiquitous, strong encryption, especially by default. my reaction to that was, either they do not see the costs, or they are not being fair-minded about technology and the costs, which will make the conversation even harder, and that is a bit depressing. so, we need a conversation. it needs to start from a place where we recognize that there are no evil people in this conversation. we share the same values, we all care deeply about the same things. privacy on the one hand, security and safety on the other. them indifferently,
i may see it differently from someone who lives in silicon valley, but we have the same values. that should allow us to have a thoughtful conversation, without demonizing anybody or trying to bumper sticker anybody. i hope you will participate in that conversation, and we can have it next year, when we are not engaged in an election. to finish, i do not know where whether -- whether we can stay ahead of the cyber threat. we can reduce it, send messages that change behavior. in the face of a threat unlike any we have seen before, we need enough humility to be agile, enough humility to take feedback from our partners to figure out how we can be better. we definitely need each other. part ofu for being that, thank you for the help you have already given to the fbi, for the advice, feedback, and assistance.
together, we will make our world a safer place. i look forward to your questions. [applause] >> we have time for one or two questions. we already have a couple people up. go ahead. you mentioned the sony hacked several times. one of the reasons that was considered significant is that it was a foreign entity attacking a constitutionally protected speech. now we have confirmation that potentially foreign actors have conducted an intrusion on two state election systems. how would you characterize an incident like that? and also, as we head into the november elections, is this something that would require immediate action on behalf of the federal government, securely on dhs?
mr. comey: that is an important question. it will not surprise you that a that i will not give an answer on a particular matter. but we take very seriously any actor,by any after -- including nationstates that moves beyond the collection of information about our country, and offers the prospect of an effort to influence the conduct of affairs in our country. that is an election or something else, i do not want to comment on the particulars. arethose kinds of things something we take very seriously and work hard to understand so we can equip the rest of our government with options for how to deal with it. that is all i will say at this point. you talk about deterrence, and along the same lines, a year agreement toned an
how to not have intellectual property theft. as far asou saying what we have seen from the chinese in the past year? like you're trying to change their behavior through an agreement like that. i was wondering what you had to say about that. also, how you think we should react to the russians -- have we done anything along those lines in the administration to react to that? mr. comey: i will only answer the first part of that come up for the reasons i said earlier. i will not comment on anything early, but we see encouraging signs in the way our chinese counterparts are talking
about and understanding the framework that i discussed that nation gazed -- nationstates do not engage in theft for commercial purposes. and there areght, early indications of efforts to cooperate with us in investigating and bringing to justice people who have done that. that said, it is early. and it is a process that takes a long time. and particularly because of the heart of it, we are trying to understand if people are stealing information for intelligence purposes to make ,oney, and that is complicated so i do not want to paint a picture that the problem assault, but there are encouraging signs. thiswill have to cut short. on behalf of all the attendees from our state and local government, talking about the collaboration and partnership, it is a very key one. thank you for your time and kicking off a great day for us.
[applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2016] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> primaries today in arizona and florida. the lytic overreporting on the senate contests in florida. theo and murphy when florida senate primaries. he will face murphy, they both won today. patrick murphy, 59% over congressman jason -- grayson. schultz, in the democratic primary, just 7.4% reporting so far. leadas a leave their -- there. it has not stopped people from gathering in florida, waiting to
hear from her. in fact, the congresswoman has arrived at -- arrived, but is not speaking it. we will have live coverage when she talks. arizonae coverage from from john mccain. it will be has six consecutive term. live coverage of speeches and your reactions on the phone and by twitter, when it all gets underway shortly on c-span. in the meantime, we will show you a news conference from the house judiciary policing working group in detroit. they held a news conference there. this was cochaired by bob goodlatte and john conyers of michigan.