tv Discussion Focuses on U.S.- Turkey Relations CSPAN August 31, 2016 3:33am-4:37am EDT
secretaries, secretaries bp to instantly get asia and? the other question is what happens in the middle east and russia? how much bandwidth will the next president have to continue this work? i'm optimistic, actually. >> i will add briefly, i think it will be enduring, although a lot will depend on the new leadership coming in with the new administration, as mike says. i see within or decisions, within the pentagon but within other agencies as well just a real shift in focus on priorities and programs in real frameworks and agreements towards southeast asia in particular compared to previous administrations. to take defense, for example, first of all he do have a very knowledgeable and committed leader in secretary carter. but over the last couple of years it hasn't just been secretary carter's engagement of president obama's engagement on defense and secure the cooperation. it's been the whole of the department, a combination to baltimore to a focus on southeast asia and asean in particular.
we develop new frameworks with particular country. we negotiated access to grants with the philippines and with australia. we're doing more than we've ever done before with countries like malaysia and indonesia and india. we've broken new ground with countries like vietnam in defense cooperation. so these are real gains that, of course they need to be that momentum needs to be maintained, and energy and attention that will be needed to move those things forward.
i think the new administration is inheriting a much more robust set of relationships with across the region, and there's a real regional demand signal for maintaining those relationships and framework are i think it will probably carry forward. i think the one real, as already been mentioned from the wonderful affiliates on the economic side because we have made a lot of real gains on the secure decide, on the economic side we negotiated this very complex and landmark agreement in the tpp but it's now quite vulnerable and so we will have to wait and see whether the u.s. can pass it. >> angela with bloomberg. one thing i didn't hear you mention is cybersecurity, clear that something of interest with some of the bilateral relationships. there's a group of senators that are pressuring obama to try to make cybercrime's a priority with the g20 discussions. we are teaching that will play both in the g20 summit broadly as well as in the bilateral, special with china and russia?
>> our cyber expert isn't jim lewis. the four of us sort of semi-managed to make the iphone's work. but politically, i'll speak for myself, i don't manage -- politically -- very, very significant problem. with china is a significant problem. i think you'll have some fact sheets. the initiation is not going to make announcements on u.s.china relations the way they did the first few years. there are too many negative, difficult places to be celebratory. the view on cyber is quite divided it by between the state department and the pentagon. the pentagon's view, i would summarize this as being we are already in a state of cyber warfare with china and russia in real-time. the state of humble focus on cyber dialogues. and efforts to talk about cyber. i think the reality relies more and the pentagon field what's happening in china but i don't think it's likely the administration will come out at the end with any kind of workable framework with china on cyber at all. part of that is because they deterrence side, the cost to
china has sent been established. i think russia is probably an even bigger problem but have you can explain. >> i certainly hope president obama raises the cyber question. clearly u.s. government is struggling over the dnc hacks, getting from attribution to cost imposition. very much as they struggle with the opm act as well. its deliberation upon deliberation to speak of our colleague who has just written a piece on the. he placed the cost imposition should be swift, if it in fact is attributable and understood. so far russia, it is clearly a tool of statecraft to influence, to shape them into the worst, to confuse. we've seen this across europe in particular, whether it's information operations. they can also be critical infrastructure as we have been seeing in ukraine in december when the grid was taken been. these are great challenges and influence how our societies function. to get our arms around this but being extremely clear, particularly with russia, that
these acts will have costs i think is vital. the question of how president obama will approach that, what decision will be reached, i think an informal meeting the would not be an enormous amount that may be able to be a message publicly but i certainly hope there's some strong messages privately. >> administrations in the last six months historically are loath to impose costs. for two reasons. one, the tissue is creating a crisis for your successor and in responsible sort of foreign policy doesn't want to do that. the second thing it can ruin your legacy. if the other side retaliates in your final months in office. so personally i'd be surprised if it can cost imposition were talking about becomes a feature of our policy in in the next,
you know, nine months or so. >> my name is sally. i have a question for mr. goodman. so you have some experience working in the white house. can you share your expectation or prediction this time obama travels to asia 4g 20, can actually generate any legacies of his administration in terms of years of china relations? >> well, mike also worked in the
white house and both amy and heather also worked in administration and dealt with some of these issues but i think mike lee did a fairly nicely what the overall legacy in asia is, and i agree with almost everything he said. i think u.s.china relations are a centerpiece of what this president and the last seven presidents have spent a lot of time focused on addressing the president going to china, i've forgotten the last count how may times but it's been a lease for five times as president, is trying to leave a relationship in which we are engaging constructively to try to both promote areas we can cooperate, and there are a number of those. climate change has been mentioned by several of us and that's what do what you think white house wants to emphasize. and by the way, g20 and working together in 2008-2000 to try to prevent this global meltdown.
that was a signature accomplishment. at the same time this engagement also have to be to manage competition. because we have competition and our relationship, as an economist competition doesn't bother me on one level. i think it's something you have to deal with to make yourself stronger. but honestly of course there are also aspects to this competition that are troubling and problematic and the president is going to want to be very clear to president xi and two prime minister lee when he sees him at the east asia summit, that went to find a way of resolving these
issues and manage them. i think there's going to be a very short message on the concerned about maritime issues, about cybersecurity, about a trade and investment challenges in the relationship which are heating up as well. >> can i ask a follow-up question with heather? the g20 is supposed to be the platform for economic cooperation. so how important is the voices that emerging markets in the current context? >> maybe matt is a better place to ask. for me it is watching the last several years the evolution of previous, and i think in some ways there's a focus on bringing
in new voices to help enlarge this conversation, has been very, very important. what's been interesting for me to watch the evolution as europe is becoming much more active and needs to be more active in asia with emerging economies. this is work that the obama administration has been pursuing to try to get other larger developed powers to work with engaged in the architecture, the economic architecture. because we are seen the index in emerging economies. for me brexit is an example of that, that we are so interconnected. we just are struggling with our geometry, if you will, of the right balance of voices that can shape it. i would almost argue in watching this g7 that the g7 more of a political security body that talk of economics. i wouldn't be surprised if the g20, will go into new political as because again it's a table of new voices to wrestle with these larger more complex issues. >> two quick additions. one, if pittsburgh when he is hosted the third some in the fall of 2009, the g20 agreed under u.s. leadership that the g20 would become the preeminent forum for our international economic cooperation. this is just to coordinate among the countries that are actually
in the room and not to impose on others. but the point is there was a conscious decision by the obama administration to embrace a broader table setting in which emerging economies, including china, were very much empowered in equal part of the the second point is china is hosting. china is again the largest, fastest growing emerging market in the world, and it is hosting this forum so that i think speaks for itself, that emerging market in the world, and it is hosting this forum so that i think speaks for itself, that emerging countries have a lot more voice.
>> howard, "christian science monitor." michael, i'd like to ask you, you talked a lot about the scratchy the state of u.s.-china relations and as this is, in the context of a presidential campaign, especially if you go back to the primary. there was a lot of talk about need for tougher stance with china, both economically and in terms of security, south china sea and this president has sort of paved the way and not done much to stand up to china. and i wonder if you expect to see sort of that context, any messaging back to the u.s. electorate, to the american people to kind of address that that characterization of the administration. >> we always say these summits, half of it is what's being
messaged back to the domestic audience. >> right. you know, in the end china may dodge that bullet because of the quality of the rhetoric between the two leading presidential candidates has become so base in so low that china actually can get a free pass in this election, who knows. i've traveled in asia a lot as to my colleagues, and i don't mind saying broadly that there is deep, deep anxiety about donald trump, especially among our allies. but even in beijing. beijing are mixed. some see it as an opportunity because donald trump never mentions human rights, criticizes our allies and so
forth. others, chinese of investment in the united states. hillary clinton will be tougher on them than secretary kerry or than president obama's. she gave a speech in 1995 that was will receive internationally very scratchy and uncomfortable and controversial for the chinese. the chinese scholars and journalists attribute the troubles in u.s.china relations to the rebalance and they usually blame her. there was an op-ed in the people's daily when secretary kerry announced welcome him because he would be wise enough not to meddle in the far east like hillary clinton. so across the region i think there's probably an expectation teams will be tougher with china. but this is an election that has unnerved everyone. secretary clinton's opposition to tpp has gone deeper than i think in australia or japan and the other tpp partners expected. they are all nervous if she wins she may try to force the renegotiation.
maybe i'm wrong, there are always side letters in these trade agreements. there may be ways to do this but they are starting to realize if it doesn't get through in the lame duck, it will be hard for her to the vet back to the position she had as secretary of state. so this election has unnerved friends and allies, and it's going to be so that i think president obama will have very much in mind i'm sure it will come up among friends like the singaporeans or japan, australia, europeans -- i'm sure it will but he always had that happened in the last meeting. i don't think he can reach her by commenting on the election publicly very much. if i were advising and i was able to the opinion polls americans have about free trade and allies in asia.
they haven't been dented by this election. i would point to the continuity we talk about. and i think for the most part our tpp partners are not giving up on us. and are in for the long haul. they don't have much of a choice. but it is definitely to be a factor in this trip that the president is going to have to really think about and reassured without, you know, overstepping and ending up becoming sort of debatere destructive back here. >> can i make just one point since tpp has come up a few times? i don't disagree that our tpp partners will stick with us for a few years because everyone recognizes the tremendous potential, and so if we have to stall, it's definitely a suboptimal outcome but do what i think will walk away from the table right away. however, i want to underscore that for many of these countries, vietnam and malaysia and japan, they have put their leadership has put some real things on the table in the
negotiations that have come with some real political cost and political risk. and so it's going to be tremendously damaging to u.s. credibility, the sensor uses reliable partner if we look like, that we're willing to walk away from tpp. i just think we need to bear that in mind that it puts countries like vietnam for example, in a really difficult position. >> go to the side of the room. >> good morning. i wonder what you could comment case and the u.s. reaction to that. put it in a broader perspective. apple is not the most popular
company in this town as we know. but the reaction of the treasury department was very clear but also very needed, how you see try going for the german government assessment is tpp is day. is this just another death knell for ttip? >> certainly i share with the callee, the u.s. and eu have gotten into a negative cycle on trade, economic investment and we need to stop and try to return to a more positive dynamic. clearly secretary lew last week -- they knew this was coming and the u.s. has already registered its increasing concern about the direction and clearly we all woke up to this shock of 13 billion euro. for me, as an individual, equal shock at the level of taxes that apple paid as well and that gets back to the g20 agenda of tax evasion and how challenging this is in a globalized context for multinational firms that are
able to use with is not a level playing field, and we know irish corporatecorporate tax rates have been a cause for concern for the eu for many, many years. i think the question is this is the best way to address it? and i think increasingly it's not just in the apple case but it's been a whole series of anti-competition measures, particularly for american i.t. firms. we are really struggling. we've always i think look, the u.s. and europe have been friendly competitors at tried to bring our values but get great economic growth and some of that cycle began to change, and now we are seeing each other as increasing obstacles to this. we've got to get out of this dynamic quickly. i think the u.s. house is but a little more time engaging europe in this conversation. it's a very complex conversation dealing a at both the national and european level. it's not easy but i think we see now the stakes are enormous. i'm increasingly concerned, we are a year out from german parliament elections and the
germans are acting a little american-like in campaign.tion they are starting too early and we're seeing a great division within his social democratic party and with the vice chancellor has been saying, not only on ttip but on russia, on migration, on turkey. there's a very important that i think the basic dynamic that is occurring within the coalition government. a the stakes are high on some of the the chance of getting those results while she's in asia, we will see how this dynamic works out. the fact of the matter is on ttip, the electoral calendar has always worked against this. it's clear to me that there is no possibility of moving on ttip until the french presidential elections and the german parliament elections occur in 2017.
well then in 2018,we get to our midterm elections and implementing european parliament elections in 2020 about the general elections. so unless we change the dynamic among our publics about trade and in the german context i think it's become a vehicle for anti-americanism in general with a lot of specific concerns. in france it's more protectionism. in the u.s. it's just anger against trade in general. we have to change the dynamic where everyone sees there are benefits to trade, not just a group and until we change that i hardert's going to get election cycles to support ratifying these important free trade agreements.
>> we are coming up a little bit against time so i will try to get in a few more questions. the gentleman in the back. >> thank you very much. about south china sea issue, china have already declared that are not -- any internationally. can the president did any political reaction from president xi? it's on a steady increase in the east china sea in south china sea and the big move by china would be to do and proclamation. you will see it first on a mti. that would be a big move, the 4g204 china. very self-defeating and could be before the election, but we are moving largely indifferent directions picked the administration in the philippines and others are remaining calm and not to victorious about the decision in the hope to get traction going, but i hope-- he talks about the tract in the idea that rising power seems to fight and if you want to avoid that you need to agree to this new model and make concessions to china. the operations, the caliber of
weapons on the chinese side are on the increase in the east china sea into the south china is she. the south china sea. you will see it first on a mti, our website. that would be a very move for china. -- andself-the feeding it could be before the -- a very .elf-defeating wisely, the philippines and others in the hope they can get some traction going.
i think what president xi ping -- if youthe idea want to avoid that you need to agree to this new model and make some concessions to china. the president will talk about the things amy said and come out of this with essentially no resolution and then it depends upon how much risk xi jinping wants to take. and there is a variable in this in die think despite what he is saying, his government is pretty much on the same track. i think amy would agree with that. from nhk. i would like to ask a question about tpp. of the asian countries are wondering whether president obama can pass tpp in congress and i think a lot of
people are watching his speech. the asian convince leaders that he can make this case? make this tpp? >> i have not said anything about this. tpp is absolutely essential to event, the rebalancing strategy. it is essential to the u.s. position in asia. it is essential to our economic strategy of the last 70 years of china to create a champion, a rules-based ordering and that is very important. self-advertising, i am doing a piece today about that. it is critical. was agreed & it does a significant
accomplishment. a lot of people think that was impossible. optimistways been an and everything that was supposed to have happened has happened as long as you did not pick a date. i will met pick a date but i think tpp will ultimately be ratified by all 12 members including the united states and i think the president will try to assure leaders in asia that that is his belief in his strong intention and he will work as hard as he can before he leaves office to try to get this ratified. i personally think it's going to be a long shot, as mike said, to get it done, but i think it is possible so i will leave an optimistic note. anything's possible in politics. politicians can decide and say things today that they decide-- they feel differently about on another day and so i would listen, not to what politicians are saying today, but what they say november 9, the day after the election.
>> at the very back there. >> thank you. cg us. -- cg press. highly integrated relationships somethingk. and eu is for the international economic society, but the interests among, you know, europe and the u.k. are a little different. i wonder how president obama is going to push this discussion in g-20 meeting and how we can expect accomplishment in that end of discussion. also, i wonder when we can expect some statement or discussion on monetary policy or
the exchange rate situation. don't imagine that brexit will be a part of any of the formal conversations at the g-20. i would suspect it would be left to the informal bilateral conversations. in fact, prime minister may will sit down with her three key cabinet ministers to talk about the different options. we do not know what these negotiations will look like because the british government has not pronounced how it wishes to proceed, and the european union is allowing the british government to help understand that, but clearly -- and we won't know the full impact, the economic data will be very delayed until we really understand, but it was not as awful and catastrophic that some predicted after the markets got over the initial shock of the decision. but this will be a different
relationship, regardless of the process that they proceed. what i found so interestin about the u.s. government when president obama visited, there was a message of punishment, that the queue,uld go back to the and then the day after the referendum, we want to see the political relationship. maybe it is not just politicians theodore obviously our position has just a. there will be -- has shifted. the g-20,ght now for it is to make sure the brexit is not have an immediate short-term a global stability. i think we have asked that marker. now the question is the long-term and then to get to monetary policy and the bank of england, so this decision as whetherthe ecb's --
negative interest rates, very, policy.modative that great account surplus in the saber nations are being punished for $13 trillion of value and negative interest rates. >> i think actually brexit will still be talked about in the g-20 not so much because of the financial impact -- i agree about the worry about it, and the immediate impact is past, but is still a pretty big growth the imf's forecast, it will shave something like almost 1% off british growth. by the way, people forget that it is the fifth-largest economy in the world. reminded my friends it is a huge economy that has a big impact.
i think on the monetary issues, there is general agreement that monetary policy -- people criticize where we are in certain countries, negative interest rates, the fed's positions -- but i think there is broad agreement that monetary policy has gone nearly as far as it can in addressing the fundamental growth story, if not completely gone beyond where it should become hostile everyone has agreed on that. then the question is -- should the emphasis be put on more fiscal-based stimulus versus structural reform? that is really the u.s.-germany debate to a large extent. i think that will be the main focus of contention and the difference in the room in the g-20. >> ok, folks, we are coming up against time. anyone has a final question. >>'s questions for heather,
cyberly, specifically security and russians. you said there was concern about the fact that these russian hackers were targeted toward the dnc and the democratic organization, however, they were also targeting organizations like cfis. is there a greater concern that these russian hackers are attacking outside groups, groups on the periphery, groups not subjected to government, or just label organizations -- just political organizations? thank you. >> we take exception to the term that we are on the periphery. [laughter] heather: i think the challenge for the u.s. government -- and just speaking for the dnc hacks, when it gets to sort of the heart of the democratic processes in our election, we have to make a decision about
attribution and then deciding if that, if insts to fact attribution is made with confidence and then action. i think the longer we debate over what to do and whether it gets caught up in legacy, it is a difficult thing to do at the end of the administration. the problem is our lack of resolve messages to those who keep using the tools -- keep pushing the envelope, keep pushing the boundaries, there is not that cost. that is the cycle we get into. in some ways, the goodness has been -- there has been an enormous amount of investigative journalism and transparency into this, and putting more focus on aware thaticans are this type of behavior is going on, so it is exposing it. but then it is finding those tools to address it, and some of those tools we may be aware of publicly. i am sure most of those tools we are not aware of. there is that reaction. are not immune to
these types of attacks. specifically when we talk about and our research exposes this type of activity and makes policy recommendations on how to stop it. this is where we are really entering what i would consider unchartered territory where you have state actors trying outcomes,nd influence and we had better get a quick handle on this before it does some significant damage. ever,g more so than americans are aware of the challenge feared as a government, we have to be aware of what to do about it. >> ok, folks, please leave it there. take a look in your inbox later today, we will be sending a transcript. please get in touch with myself, i am colin quinn, also andrew
schwartz. two i very much. thank you murray much. very much. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2016] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> treasury secretary jack lew talks about the global economy and previous the upcoming g20 summit in china on september 4 and fifth live coverage today from the brookings institution
at 8:30 a.m. eastern on c-span 2. uci is part ofuta the discussion on the spread of the zika virus in the u.s. live coverage from georgetown university at 1:20 eastern also on sees into -- on c-span2. with the house and senate returning from their summer break next week, on thursday at 8:00 p.m. eastern, we will preview four key issues facing congress this fall. federal funding to combat the zika virus. >> women in america today want to make sure that they have the ability to not get pregnant -- why? because mosquitoes ravage pregnant women. >> but today, they turned down the very money that they argued for last may, and they decided to gamble with the lives of children like this. >> the annual defense policy and programs bill.
are very these votes vital to the future of this andon in a time of turmoil a time of the greatest number of refugees since the end of world war ii. >> gun violence legislation and criminal justice reform. speaker ryan: every member of this body, every republican and every democrat, once to see less gun violence. >> we must continue the work of nonviolence and demand an end to senseless killing everywhere. >> and the resolutions from congress to impeach the irs commissioner. house bill and teaching john -- johnosten, the andrew cost cakoskinen. >> susan ferruccio joins us.
congress this fall, thursday night at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. itthe c-span radio app makes easy to follow the 2016 election wherever you are. it is free to download from the apple app store or google play. get audio coverage and up to the minute schedule information for c-span radio and c-span television, plus podcast times affairs,opular public books, and history program spirit stay up-to-date on the election coverage. see's fans app means you always have c-span on the go. >> turkey has attained a former lease chief, several governors, and a number of journalists since a failed attempt to topple the government last month. on the, an update political situation in turkey and u.s. relations with the country. it is hosted by the bipartisan policy center. >> good morning, everyone.
welcome to today's discussion ,bout turkey after the coup ally, partner, or something else. , and i'm pleased to be joined by two of my esteemed colleagues and world-renowned turko logists, if i may call them that. obviously in the past couple of days, we have had significant developments turkey's southern border when it comes to syria as well. we will talk about that. before we launch into the discussion, i want to lay some groundwork the coast i think what we will talk about today did not really start on july 15 or is not so much a series of
recent event as developments in a long line in illusion of u.s. and turkey relations that arbitrarily speaking i will date that to late may of 2013 when we saw protests break out in istanbul that were subsequently put down in a violent and oppressive manner, which sparked what some had seen, and we definitely had the bipartisan policy he center had written about, as an authoritarian turn by turkey's ruling party, the akp, and its leader and prime recep tie up it were erdogan, and now president erdogan. at the same time, we have seen changes in turkey's domestic politics and foreign policy that have led some to question as we did in the paper last year whether turkey is an undependable ally in the main bone of contention there has
been policy where the united states and turkey, who have long differed on what the priorities in syria should we with the u.s. focusing on the defeat of ice is isis and turkey alternating between focusing on removing the a side regime and limiting the ambitions of the syrian kurds. in the form of the people's protection unit, the ypg. both of those, when it comes to turkey domestic politics, they have obviously played out in the past couple of days. to discuss that with me, i'm pleased to have to my immediate left, alan makovsky, perhaps most notably former senior professional staff over here at the house foreign affairs committee but also now a fellow with the center of american progress and a member of the bipartisan policy center's turkey task force. and senior policy analyst nick danforth, an historian of all
things turkish and ottoman. before i go any further, i would like to thank the house foreign affairs committee and the chairman of the european subcommittee, congressman dana , for hosting us today. nick, why don't i take it over to you first and talk about what happened july 15 and how we got to that situation in the first place. >> is this better? [no audio] mr. makovsky: all right, is this better? excellent. obviously, before july 15, there had been a number of people who confidently predicted that the
era of coups in turkey was over. the massive outpouring of public opposition to the military when it tried to seize power on july 15 was i think strong evidence of that. where many analysts, including myself, had erred was thinking that everyone in the military had gotten the message as well. there was certainly significant, we do not quite know what percentage, of the military leadership in turkey then, maybe out of sheer desperation, but one way or another had come to the conclusion, erroneously, that they would be able to succeed in toppling the government through military force. when that failed, well, first of all, i guess there was a moment of intense crisis when the coup itself started, and many people thought this was the worst case scenario, that the best case scenario is no coup at all, but even worse than a successful coup would be a partial coup that would push the country into civil war.
that said, once that was over, once the initial, immediate threat to turkey's stability had passed, then unfortunately the real crisis for u.s.-turkish relations began. there was a best case scenario where after the failed coup, the turkish government came to the conclusion that they had masterminded it. we might have hoped for a situation in which everyone proceeded calmly, that government tried to marshal the best available evidence to explain what actually happened, and then provided that evidence to the united states, if that
evidence contained inclusive proof of the involvement in the coup, the united states would have extradited him, he would have received a fair trial in turkey, and things could have proceeded in a calm manner. it became clear very quickly that that was not what was going to happen immediately. after the coup, while the united states did as early as the night of the coup say that it was on the side of the democratic government, condemned the coup attempt itself, that government e turkish government immediately began launching accusations at the united states for having been complicit in the coup, and then subsequently when the united states pointed out before gulen would be extradited, we need see evidence of guilt, it was seen as further evidence of
america's complicity in the coup. this dynamic created a particularly unhelpful situation that we find ourselves in now where again, would have been handled as a matter of legality and joint u.s.-turkish efforts to get to the bottom of what happened and help solidify turkish democracy in the wake of this disruptive event, it has now turned into an adversarial process where again, turkey is launching at the united states, and the united states, many people in washington have come to see extraditing as almost a confession to erdogan and his government. i think the question for people in this room and people dealing with this in washington is how to move this act onto a track of two countries trying to deal with what is an enormously destructive and dangerous situation in turkey but deal with it in a healthy and bilateral manner.
mr. misztal: alan, a couple of questions stemming from that for you, it strikes me that if turkey really wanted us to extradite and they seem to be going about it and all the wrong ways, and this anti-americanism come a push to extradite without the concern for due process, i think the prime minister said, who needs evidence? the u.s. did not need evidence after 9/11, all of these statements that seem to misunderstand how the process works here and then seemed to antagonize the u.s., it seems to suggest they're not really serious about it or they do not know how to go about it. can you explain a little bit about why you think there is that divergence, and secondly, a lot of that rhetoric seems to be driven by the beliefs about the state of facts that the u.s. did not come out quickly enough. to support the turkish government against the coup.
you think that's true? could we have done more? taking your second question first, the coup started roughly 3:00 p.m. our time, a little after, and the white house statement came out at 7:02 p.m. i think by the time it came out, it seemed that the tide was turning against the coupists, so let's say in a conspiracy -minded society, that was only inevitably going to feed conspiracy thinking. i do not for a minute think that anyone in the white house wanted the coup to succeed, but it would have been very useful to have come out immediately, as soon as it was obvious there was something going on in turkey, and opposed it.
instead, unfortunately, the first statement was made by secretary kerry when he came out from a meeting and he had just been informed about it and he said he hoped for peace and continuity, which, you know, instead of just saying flat-out, we are against what is happening and the military ought to get back to the barracks, i think, i do not think the obama administration can be given any a+ on this one. i think the statement should have gotten out earlier and meanwhile, russia, iran jumped in opposing the coup. i think no matter what, based on my experience with turkey, there would have been conspiracy there is about the united states'
involvement in it. i think the fact that we were probably a couple of hours too late to the game for those conspiracies. mr. misztal: given the we are dynamically have with turkey -- and democracy had been eroding for at least the past three years and has eroded significantly in the aftermath of the coup, talking about tens of thousands of people who have been detained or fired who presumably could have had no direct involvement in the coup, how do you balance this on the one hand support the turkish government, because they are democratically elected, and on the other hand, try to push them to rein in their authoritarian? mr. makovsky: it is a difficult
balance. there is no doubt. we do not know how many of these people are guilty and we really do not know anything at his point. we know what the accusations are. i think we caught people by surprise here is the fact that so many tens of thousands of civil servants, including judges , prosecutors, and police, were so rapidly rounded up and fired and rounded up the next day, i think had it been confined to the military, even extraordinary measures taken, i think that would have been understood here. but i think there is reason to be suspicious that so many people could have been involved in coup making. and of course there is a history here. enmity against
did not begin the day after the coup or the moment of the coup. you can date it in 2010, from february of 2012, when there was a judicial effort to prosecute, ahead of turkish intelligence, hich an air to one man -- erdogan felt- and -inspired, but what we know, when the gloves were dropped, and you know, the shirts were off, and it was an irrevocable fight, is when the judiciary when after akp ministers in december 2013, and erdogan was convinced that their goal was to topple his government. and since then, i think that has been with the fight was about. i think that has cast a shadow over the current government
claims that gülenists were behind the coup. i did not fully answer your question on extradition. i apologize for that. in fact, i cannot answer it at all. i do not think turkey does itself any favors b politicizing this and demanding that they be be extradited now when they know full well it is a long process. i suspect that is gülen wants to appeal the process down the road and prove this is all a political witch hunt, he will be able to cite some of the statements in u.s. court. but at the end of the day, this is primarily a decision of the u.s. courts, and it will be done on legal grounds based on the quality of the evidence that the turks supply.
and they have not yet done it. they have made an extradition request for gülen before the coup, but they have not yet made one post coup. they are preparing that and will send their justice and foreign affairs ministers when they do so, they say. we will see then. it poisoned the atmosphere the way they have gone about it, but at the end of the day, this is a judicial process that the secretary of state has to sign off on. by the way, the center for american progress where i work will have a paper issued that really looks into the issue of how the extradition process works. in the meantime, nick, maybe you could walk us through that in the graphic is on the table for people to look
at. mr. danforth: the key point about the extradition process is that there is a political and legal component. the political will has to be there in the legal evidence has to be there. what has happened unfortunately is in the absence of providing any legal evidence, turkey has gradually eroded the political will for this. there are two assets to the legal side of this. the first is that in order to secure the extradition, turkey provides evidence to the state department, which, if the political will is there, passes it along to the judiciary, which can pass it to a federal judge. the standard at that point is probable cause, the same standard required for a judge to issue an arrest warrant for a u.s. citizen. so the real question in the case of the gülen extradition is going to be what evidence turkey
can provide not just in the involvement of gülen's followers in the military in the coup, but evidence that gülen himself personally gave some sort of approval or support for what happened. this is the part that legally is going to be the most difficult. one would assume that even if gülen did personally authorize this, he would not have sent an e-mail and would not have done it over the phone. it might have been a matter of him nodding to someone over a year ago. that would be incredibly difficult in even the best-case scenario for turkey to provide evidence of. and the accusations and conspiracy theories have made it harder. there is also the issue, given this challenge of improving proving gülen's personal involvement, the most obvious source of evidence would be essentially confessions from people involved in the coup. this is another area where turkey is doing itself no favors.
a number ofeen confessions. some of them seem suspicious in the nature of what these people are confessing to and how quickly, and at the same time, most of these have been published in the newspaper alongside photographs of the people giving the confessions, badly bruised, blood streaming from their faces. this is not going to help convince the judge that these are reliable piece of evidence. i think the real disaster scenario for u.s.-turkish relations is a situation where they special evidence exists that suggests gülen was behind this. maybe there is unreliable but plausible evidence suggesting he is behind it but no legally convincing evidence that would enable a u.s. court to extradite
him. he has already made it clear that they both sincerely do not accept the idea of an independent judiciary in the united states. in part because that is not how things work in turkey and in exaggerated iney a misrepresentative way, they take samples guantanamo bay, take america's response to the question of evidence and rights after 9/11, being perhaps more representative of the united states system then it is here and what stands out when you look at the historical record, there are situations where, when we have written about, and i are ira member who unambiguously murdered a british soldier, fled to the united states, and the british government was eager to have him extradited. the reagan administration of the time was very close to it and thatcher, who was eager to extradite him as well, and the judge refused to allow to happen. and this was a source of extreme frustration. ultimately, begrudgingly, britain accepted this is how the
system worked and in that case, they eventually rewrote the treaty to make it possible to extradite this person. it is a striking example that even the case where there -- to was enough political will to make extradition happen for a ally, a judge blocked it. if that happened in the case of turkey would, i assume, be furious here that is a nightmare scenario for u.s. and turkey relations. mr. misztal: pivoting the question of foreign policy, you have the coup and the demand from turkey, obviously not the met immediately because of due process, and you have concerns by turkey that the u.s. has not been as wholesome in its support fullsome in its support for democracy, and then aired one goes to russia. what came of the meeting and why was it so concerning from the u.s. perspective, alan? or was it concerning?
met withsky: erdogan putin on august 9, which marked a milestone between turkey and russia following a crisis that began when turkish shot down a russian su24. which turkey said was briefly in its airspace on november 24. putin slapped a lot of sanctions on turkey. these are important trading partners. russia has more leverage and supplies over half, almost two thirds, of turkey's natural gas.
both countries are very important to one another. and putin made -- or the russian defense ministry made charges that the family was benefiting from oil trade with isis. the letter has never been made public. the russian said it contained an erdogan apology, and the turks said contained a deep regret. i think the concern here is that, at a time of deep and deepening tension with the united states, that turkey may be moving out of the western orbit, and in a more specific context, is it going to be coordinating with russia in syria? and sort of flip its policy, which has been doggedly against assad by coming to some sort of
agreement about the kurds and moving more toward the russian position on assad. i think those are really the concerns. let me quickly answer to both of those questions is no. i think it is using russia as well and no, i do not think to he is about to flip on assad but i think it has put those questions and play and it is something that policymakers now have to think about seriously. after all, there was a time before the falling out between russia and turkey when turkey was saying it wanted to join the shanghai coordination organization, which is basically
a russian-led sort of security/economic group. so erdogan has shown just enough seriousness about wanting to get close to russia. turkey is historic enemy russia. with whom there predecessor empires fought 14 worse. and for whom at a popular level, i think there is very little trust on either side but, i think it is at least put into play whether or not there is some sort of dramatic change about to take face in turkey's's attitude toward russia and consequently toward nato and the west. mr. misztal: go ahead. mr. danforth: it is almost when everyone went and met with kuhn when both people in the administration and the press almost seem so eager to point out to washington how worried they should be by all of this. it almost seemed like they were telegraphing a little too hard that this is something that