tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN September 6, 2016 10:31pm-12:01am EDT
votes. scott clementi is the polling director for the washington post. they give for being with us. >> to be here. 50-stateplained this survey, and what you're looking for and what you found. scott: we were trying to piece together the results from national surveys we have done, but also a handful of state surveys done by all kinds of firms. surveymonkey to do a large survey. over 74,000 registered voters across the country which gave us the ability to look at the vote in every state and also how subgroups are voting. women, white, nonwhite, to help us piece together the dynamics of the election. we found a number of surprises. what of the big themes of this share has been a deep division of whites with college-educated
whites being reap held by trial. -- being repelled by trial. particularly in the midwest. >> su you look at some of these example, arizona, georgia, texas. in the past there been republican states. with nine weeks to go before election day, these are areas donald trump needs to win if he has any home to getting to 270. but he is struggling. scott: that is exactly right. we have had close races and all of those states. those were big surprises. it goes without saying that trump is performing in a number of republican strongholds, notably utah. he leads by only 11 points there. in arizona, we found clinton
plus one. in texas we also found clinton plus one. those are contests uphill battles for clinton. they might tilt back to drop. it signals the overall enthusiasm issue for trial about republicans. she has struggled to align the candidacy behind the party. and it is starting to show. >> let's talk about florida, a state in which the democrats and republicans put attention. onlyry is ahead but slightly. trump says he can wed. scott: it is a must-wed for trial. for trial.-win -- for trump. it is a tossup. clinton is up by only two.
if clinton wins and blocks off a viable path to the nomination. divisionsdemographic between white, latinos, african-americans, as well as between those with college degrees and without. one of the big think this poll does not answer but provides some further questions going forward, is how the turnout will fare about these groups. it wouldy found that focus more on voters to figure out which voters are likely to turn out at higher rates. it is not simple calculus this year because both clinton and travel are relied on relatively low turnout groups as their base. >> has donald trump consolidated the republican vote? scott: he has not. across all the states where we have conducted surveys, clinton
had over 90% of the vote for a majority of them while only about a dozen did trump have 90% or more of the republican vote. national pollsng across the country where he struggled to unite. vast majority of republicans are still supportive of him but the challenge is getting to that 90% standard that has really become consistent in recent presidential elections. >> too high profile third-party candidates, jill stein for the green party end gary johnson for the libertarian party, either one of them breaking through? : in some states they are. gary johnson is running a really fascinating campaign that is wherevery well in states he served as governor. new mexico, 20% supported that
state ent is only a few points is inere donald trump that state, clinton holds a small lead. 15%all, he gets at least support in 15 states. that is the threshold that the presidential debate is put on whether he can participate. we are focused on national surveys but he clearly is gaining significant support across a number of these states. he does less well in the deep south that he does in the upper wanted states. i should mention jill stein, also she does a bit worse than johnson in single digits in nearly every states. the one where she does very well is vermont. 10% support there. that of course is the hope to senator bernie sanders -- is the home to senator bernie sanders.
could at least cause a little but of trouble for hillary clinton supporters. >> finally, a potential bright spot for donald trump it is cap and in the upper west, notably wisconsin and michigan. what did you find there? scott: he can run the table of the upper midwest or at least take off some of the democratic every states. clinton leads by four points but that is slimmer than what we see another public surveys. in michigan, clinton leads by two, wisconsin by two, in ohio trump leads by three. a narrow margin. in iowa, trump leads by four. those are good if you are a trip supporter that they signaled these states are in play. some servers are shown clinton with smaller leads in ohio in iowa they had elsewhere but the bulk of the states have gone democratic for the last five or six elections and that signals to important these have been
democrats. this fairly narrow rick perry. to pullway for trump off some of the electoral vote seems to be through those states. >> as you put it, it is a long road to the white house and so the washington post pulling all 50 states to find out what each candidate needs to do to get there. reporting ofand scott clement available online and in today's newspaper. the q4 being with us. scott: thank you. bomb blasts hit kabul, afghanistan this week. , a look at the political and security situation of high give -- in afghanistan. after that, president obama and laos. after that, senator tim kaine campaigns in north carolina will supreme court justice
ruth bader ginsburg will talk to first-year students at towards town university law center tomorrow. watch live coverage at 5:00 p.m. eastern on c-span3. >> at c-span.org, you can watch our public affairs and political programming at your convenience on your desktop, laptop, or mobile device. here's how. look on the video library search bar. type in the name of face beaker, sponsor of a bill, or the event topic. results list of search and click on the program like to watch or refine your search with our committee-search tool. our homepage has many programs ready for your immediate you and such as today's washington journal or the events we covered that day. c-span.org is a public service of your cattle -- cable or satellite provider. check us out at c-span.org.
>> now, retired marine corps general john allen part of the conversation about the situation in afghanistan. posted by the brookings institution, this is one hour 40 minutes. michael: good morning, everyone. welcome to brookings, i'm mike here to and i am discuss afghanistan. in one sense it's still a hopeful time of the year. the redskins haven't lost a name -- lost a game and the nationals are still in first place. so we're all hopeful. on the other hand, 15 years into the afghanistan mission and 15 years after 9/11 we know that there is an ongoing, very difficult struggle throughout the broader middle east and certainly not least within afghanistan itself. and we're glad you came to join us in this discussion. i know there are a couple of
words of introduction i want to say before introducing the panelists. by the way the basic approach we'll take here is to have a broad question framed by me to each of them and then get a few basic ideas on the table. we'll talk amid ourselves for a bit and halfway through we'll go to you. first i know we all not just on the panel but in the room want to commemorate and mourn the victims of 9/11, the families, the soldiers, airmen, marines, and sailors, and everyone else in the intelligence community, elsewhere who have worked so hard, often at great sacrifice, sometimes being hurt along wait, their families, communities, just day and moment to reflect and honor them since we're again approaching 9/11 and i know this is on all our minds. second in the same vein of commemorating a big event, i want to thank my colleague who has been our communications
director in the foreign policy program for almost a decade is leaving brookings after today. we collected a few of the little statistics that give some small indication to the extent you can ever use metrics whether in counter insurgency or think tankdom to address progress. in her time at brookings on her watch, the monthly web hits for the foreign policy program have more than tripled. she has organized -- helped organize some 1,500 events like this one. and she has supervised and orchestrated some 5,000 television or radio spots by her various scholars over that period of time. and she's going off to work on the important issue of refugees in the future. we greatly respect her commitment to public policy and to her fellow human being and what she's done for all of us. i want to thank her and her team that have worked with her closely over the years. thank you for giving me a chance to mention that.
[applause] michael: as you know we have an outstanding panel. i want to say a brief word about each of my colleagues. it's a treat to not only honor gail but recognize who we have up here. one of the most diligent and intrepid and brilliant field researchers that i have ever met. and been going to afghanistan for i think over a decade now going back to her dissertation days wrote a book called "shooting up" which talked about afghanistan and one of her main case studies the nexus between counter insurgency and counter narcotic strategies which remains a big issue there. continues to travel often to afghanistan and wrote one of the best books on the subject, "aspiration and the ambivalence," which i recommend to anyone who hasn't yet read it. gets at a lot of the difficult period of the last 15 years in
the u.s.-led mission there. and speaking of that mission, next to her is general john allen, who, as you know, is a brookings senior fellow. he was the commander of the international security assistance force in afghanistan from the summer of 2011 until the winter of 2013. a 19-month stretch which was crucial. before i say a few words about that tenure, i want to let you know this is a lifelong marine who did a lot of other things in the marine corps beginning with helping create the fabled infantry officer corps at quantico, which is the signature event for training officers in infantry in the u.s. marine corps which did not exist in the current form prior to his role in that as major back in the 1990's. and then we know the marines trusted him. the real impressive thing is the navy entrusted him and gave him, admittedly he was a graduate of annapolis himself, but they gave him the job of commandant of the midshipman at the u.s. naval
academy. the first time a marine was asked to be responsible for sailors in that institution and capacity. that tells you something about how much the navy like all of us had high regard for general allen. he then spent his one star appointment or period of time working on east asia issues at the pentagon in the early 2000s before deploying with the marines to anbar province and being one of our two or three key marines in the surge. from that point many other jobs in the central command theater, including being david petraeus' deputy at central command. being acting commander there. and ultimately stepping down from government last fall in the civilian role as the coordinator for the president and secretary kerry in the campaign against isis. so in afghanistan as many of you know, let me say one word to situate in the debate, in afghanistan he was there during the initial downsizing. i think he commented once or twice to his friend by comparison petraeus had it easy because he was there when the forces came up, as soon as they
peaked, he left and general allen was asked to start implementing the drawdown. but the good news for today's discussion for all of us is that that meant that general allen was involved in transferring responsibility to the afghan security forces, which of course is in many ways the main issue for security today because that's the main fighting force at a time when the united states has downsized by 90% and we're down to roughly 10,000 u.s. military personnel in-country. bruce riedel was asked by president obama to coordinate the initial 2009 policy review on afghanistan-pakistan. a role he played along with richard holbrooke and michelle flournoy, and they produced the initial obama thinking on what to do about the entire region. and that was after a number of years he had spent already at brookings where he is also a senior fellow today. he was a 30-year veteran of the c.i.a.
also commented numerous times on the national security council where he played a key role in things such as defusing indo pakistani crises in the late 1990's among other roles. also very involved in the middle east process which allen was as well. and bruce in his time here has written at least two very well received books related to the pakistan question. one of them called "deadly embrace," and the other, "avoiding armageddon." that sets him up extremely well to help us understand pakistan's role in the ongoing afghanistan theater. thank you for your indulgence. i wanted to do proper justice to framing the issue to thanking colleagues and setting the stage. so now i'm finally going to pose a question. we start with general allen and go to vanda and bruce. what i want to ask general allen is for his overall take on the security situation before i give him the baton, also let you know in a minute here i'm going to ask our newly arrived army colonel -- we have very good fortune of having military intelligence coast guard fellows
here each year, active duty officers who -- analysts who are going back to their agency but are spending a year with us. colonel j.b. was the senior american mentoring and advising the afghan 201st and 203rd corps in the eastern part of the country until last fall and he stayed in close touch with those corps headquarters since that time. he can give us an update. and i'll call on him to share his thoughts. first we'll get started. general allen, again, thank you for your service and what you did in afghanistan. i wondered now looking back three years later, but i know you're tracking it carefully on a day when there had been numerous acts of violence and explosions in afghanistan, just today, how you see the situation, the good and bad and ugly, how do you feel about the prognostication of the past
-- of the path going forward as well? general allen: it's great to be back on the panel here with you, mike. this is a very important subject, obviously, coming up on the 15th anniversary. i was the deputy commandant of the naval academy. then became the commandant the day we were attacked on 9/11 so i remember it well. i remember being with those midshipmen that day as they were trying to figure out where life was going to take them. i knew where it was going to take them and i knew where it was going to take me, 10 years later i would be commanding the war effort in afghanistan. i have said before if you can depart but you can never leave it. from that moment where i took command in july of 2011 to today, it's been a very special place to me. as we come up on the 15th anniversary here in a couple days, i'll take a moment and recall all of our troops and allied troops and importantly to recall the sacrifices of the afghan forces.
enormous sacrifices of the afghan forces and sacrifice of the afghan civilians as well in this conflict. we said before on this stage and many other places that the success, the long-term success of afghanistan, whether it's a political success or economic success or whether conjoined incredible ways the community of nations is going to be a function of the security environment and the capacity of the afghan national security forces to provide that security over a long time. we can go back and do the forensics and postmortem, etc., on all the recommendation that is had been made on numbers and how those numbers ultimately were implemented and where they are. i will finish my remarks about where we're today with the numbers because numbers don't really tell the story. but we have in the aftermath of the departure of isaf and closing down of that mission and
establishment of the nato mission called resolute support, we have had about 13,000 nato forces in theater, 9,500 or so have been u.s. at this point for some period of time. of that number about 2,800 or so are special operators anti-rest are trainers and advisors. situation on the ground in afghanistan has changed from time to time. and today there are a lot of debates about how you would articulate the situation on the ground. i would definitely use the term "challenging." the situation has, in fact, become more challenging. perhaps even worrisome. in the last several months over the last year. it's not something which i think will be beyond the capacity of the afghan forces to hold over time. and to deal with over time. very close to those forces for the better part of a year and a half. having seen afghan troops in combat, having seen many of their leaders lead their troops credibly, not just at the small unit level but increasingly at the larger unit level, brigade
size, operations, regular brigade size operations, i do and i still have confidence that the afghan national security forces can pull this out over time. that said, we have seen the taliban resurgence be problematic in the last year or so. the taliban in the north have become a challenge. we had that brief moment near humiliation for the national security forces, but ultimately they were able to take it back but not insignificant human price. we had the disaster of the friendly fire on the hospital
there for which we all still regret those casualties. we have also seen a resurgence in afghan taliban activity in the helmund province as well. i do believe we will see the number reversed. a loss of a number of the districts which has forced both the american commander in conjunction with the afghan leadership to put additional american forces on the ground in the helmund province to at least hold the district capital. i do believe we'll see that negative trend reversed. largely because, in fact, the leadership in the 215th corps, the corps that sits upon that particular area, helmund, just west of kandahar, had been replaced and i think we're going to see some improvement in relatively near future. the previous commander was largely incompetent. i think the challenge we face going ahead will be the stabilizing of our numbers for the long period of time to continue to affect the kind of
relationship we need to have with the afghans not just in a training role but in an advisory role to include now providing additional air support to the afghan national security forces, in particular the afghan army, in ways we were unable to do before. that i think is going to be of a lot of assistance to us to secure the environment, maintain control of the population centers, not to give up any more of the districts. at this point the number of districts have gone into the hands of the taliban more than we would certainly want. but i do believe that over time they'll be able to take them back. let me talk briefly about the u.s. decisionmaking. the numbers that we had originally recommended and ultimately were put on the ground varied to some extent, as i said it's history, we went in with 9,500 or so, and another 3,000 or so non-u.s. nato troops, that number was both probably too small and too short a period of time in terms of the initial obligation to those forces. as late as june of this year,
all of the former afghan -- former american commanders in afghanistan and all the former american ambassadors to afghanistan wrote an open letter to the president asking that we cease all drawdown of american forces in afghanistan until such time as the new president after this election can have the time to study the situation to determine whether additional drawdown requirements should be met. whether we should stabilize for some period of time. whether we should even go up in numbers. my conversations which continue with our allied partners, many our allied partners still on the ground, about 40 u.s. and other partners on the ground today in resolute support, whether we need to go up in numbers over time. the bottom line for us was in june of this year we asked that we stop the drawdown to permit the next president, whoever that's going to be, who will own the outcome in afghanistan, the
opportunity to thoroughly study the relationship between the security environment, the political environment, and the economic environment. because they are all linked. study the relationship between the three of those to determine whether the nato commitment is satisfactory both in numbers and in capabilities and in timeline to support the continued training and operational capabilities of the afghan national security forces over an extended period. we'll see papers coming out of brookings that continue to be a result of the combined efforts of the generals and the ambassadors and scholars who are attentive to this. so the security environment is essential as a platform. we're going forward both politically and economically. that security platform is definitely challenged today. i don't believe the afghan national security forces are losing, but i do believe that a
resurgent taliban believing that we were going down to a number which could permit them to effect a tipping point with the afghans i believe that we have foiled that plan. by staying at the number we're today, which would be somewhere around 8,400. even with the president conceivably going up in the number or changing our capabilities or increasing our firepower in support of the afghan security forces i believe we'll hold what we got, change the momentum, and i'm as i always am, i am pragmatic. i'm not optimistic or pessimistic. i'm pragmatic. if the afghans are sufficiently discriminating in who they permit to lead the various corps and i think colonel, where are you, good to see you, 201st 203rd corps have always been strong. they are in the east and northeast. that's where the biggest fight s
outfit.hat's a big the 20 corps has had a strong commander. the 215 corps, the helmund area, the heart and soul of the tally band, that has always been problematic. always been a tough fight. they have fired more than 70 general officers from the afghan forces and the police. that's a good start, but we have a lot more to do. and until leadership and command in afghanistan truly is determined on meritocracy and not patronage, we're going to have this challenge. it's not that uncommon for that part of the world to have that challenge and we need to recognize t we recognize it by stabilizing our numbers, appearance, ensuring our capabilities are the best suited for the needs of the afghan national security sources. and i think we'll be ok. thanks. mike: thank you. vanda, i wanted to ask you about politics and economics and will i in a second, because the security situation is so paramount and on our minds today with the recent attacks, i want
to give you a second to comment on how you see things there. it is obviously a complex mosaic , there is a lot of good in and a lot of bad. i wanted to see what you thought. vanda: good morning. i would underscore general allen's comment that the security is challenging. i might add very challenging. probably most challenging that it has been any time since 2002. certainly challenging from the perspective of the afghan people, but also from the perspective of international civilians who are in the country and very much enable or assist in delivering governance as well as economic growth. afghanistan has become very permissive in a difficult environment with few people who live in kabul being able to travel out of kabul. it is not just the internationals. it is also afghans.
traveling between cities is a major risk going up north, has become impermissible for many afghans. so what we see today is a government that is in deep ways, a corps community cut out, or cut off from large parts of the country. the level of civilian casualties is the greatest that it has ever been. none of this means that it cannot be reversed, but vanda: none of this means it cannot be reversed, but nonetheless, the security undermines orly outright eviscerates many elements of economic development and many elevenths -- many elements of governance. it creates very much a state of
security mentality in the country. i have been communicating were -- with friends in kabul for the past 24 hours and it's been quite disturbing to see their reactions to the series of attacks. my thoughts are very much with them. just the level of going back everyday issues that have been at the core of challenges and problems for afghans, many who aided us, is becoming a major issue for people in cities. of course those security situations, it's not just about the taliban and -- it's also very much about criminality and politics. indeed, a very significant element of security hampering daily life and something that
the taliban can exploit is the level of kidnappings that's going on in the country by many criminal networks, some deeply connected to powerful patronage networks and powerful politicians. those targets international very much target also afghan businessmen. what we're probably seeing is something that at one point happened in colombia at the height of the crisis when the numbers of people who were targeted for kidnapping or the type of people targeted for kidnapping was going down from simply very rich businessmen to white middle class people would be vulnerable. and that again compounded the deep sense of insecurity and paralysis of everyday life. so it's very important and very imperative that the government takes on these kidnapping networks, takes on the pervasive criminality that is both an end for the taliban but debilitating
everyday life. i started saying this is all linked to politics. we're at the moment of interesting and challenging situation in afghanistan. the initial configuration of the current afghan government with the president for the last two years, and then there was to be a reconciliation of that arrangement. at various points and various --mulation, president the president said it would be elementary and district elections helped and perhaps more longer term resolutions of the relationship. that has not happened. there have not been
parliamentary elections, and electoral reform has been stuck for over a year. there are voices saying the government should come to an end, that there is no longer a space for dr. abdulla in his ceo role. his view was that by now he would be appointed prime minister and the system would be changed through parliamentary systems. that was not necessarily something that the president bought into. very different initial understanding of what would happen in the two years to start with. they are now being compounded by many voices outside the government. with former president karzai having repeatedly called for -- to give a new message to the government.
that would be unconstitutional and would not be helpful to the political process. so we're in this state of watching for the next few weeks how this agreement will be resolved and whether the government will stay in this current constellation or there will be changes. certainly there cannot be a constitutional election held and there will not be elections probably for at least half a year, likely more than that. meanwhile, there are other politics in kabul and outside of kabul. relations between president ghani and the government and several governors, some of whom he tried to fire, but has not been able to accomplish that, others on whose loyalties he crucially depends, but where he relationshipuneasy -- sensed an uneasy
relationship, and that some of these tension gave way on friday to actual firefight between supporters of one group over another. i raise that because although it had no lasting impact on the stability of the government or impact on the stability of the government or security in afghanistan, but at the same time, the firefight again simulated in afghanistan a sense that this might be a preview of much deeper disintegration and much deeper political unraveling of the country. it raised fears and memories of the 1990's. i believe that there is an opportunity and difficult elements for the afghan government. in fact, for afghan politicians and afghan people. for too long, there was a sense among many afghan politician
s that they can conduct governance by working the ship of state as much as possible to milk greater political appointments and other forms of pay offs. and that politics can be about constant brinksmanship and crisis making. afghanistan cannot afford that anymore. politics has to be about governance, about governance that secures people and governance that improves their lives. for very long time, afghan politicians would say it can never disintegrate into the 1990's. it can never go back to the civil war. well maybe the firefight is a , wake up call that their mode of politics needs to fundamentally change, and that once the government gets out of the current crisis, whether this is later this month or in october or even later than that, and there is a new government, that this new government has an opportunity to work with others on political power brokerage with other politicians to
, actually start delivering governance in a moreau bust way -- in a more robust way and less corrupt way that has been the case so far. michael: thank you, i'm half tempted to ask if you think the state of afghan politics is better or worse than ours, but i'll leave that one -- i'll come back to you in a little bit on some of the specific questions on my mind about afghan politics and the economy. i'll get bruce here engaged as well and just ask, bruce, your take especially on the pakistan angle. anything you want to talk about, of course. i know that when you did your policy review for president obama 7.5 years ago, you had certain understanding of history, a lot of dealing with it probably certain , assumptions about how things would evolve. i would be curious if things have gone as you expected. how does that change calculus here? how much does the pakistani role in this conflict, the central determinant as some would allege how much is it more of a , secondary factor? bruce: thank you for organizing this. pleasure to be here with john
and vanda and all of you. i'm going to come to the specifics you mentioned. let me start with a piece of good news which is going to be rare today. i'm going to come to the when president obama announced his strategy in march of 2009, he was very clear about what the top goal and priority of the american policy in afghanistan and pakistan was. that was what we called the "three d's," to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al qaeda in afghanistan and pakistan. in 2009, that meant primarily in pakistan. 2001, american intervention in afghanistan essentially moved al qaeda from one side of the line to the other line. 2008-2009, the al qaeda core in pakistan was robust fully recovered from the 2001 intervention, and engaged in a global terrorist operation. remember, in 2003, we had the
madrid attack, the deadliest terrorist attack in western europe since the beginning of the 9/11 era. we had the london attack in 2005. led an attack by al qaeda in 2006 to simultaneously blow up seven jumbo jets blowing up the atlantic coming out of heathrow. imagine what that would have done to the economy in 2006. we now know that in 2009 al qaeda was planning a massive attack on the new york city subway system which was foiled largely due to the national security agency. al qaeda, in short, was the proper goal of the united states in 2009. 7.5 years later al qaeda in pakistan is not destroyed. but it has been substantially degraded and substantially put on the back foot. it requires continued monitoring. it requires continued surveillance, but the situation today is much improved over what
it was in 2008-2009 when president obama campaigned and came into office. i think there are significant lessons learned, to be learned from that episode. one of them is that the united states has to be offensive as well as defensive in how it solves problems in afghanistan and pakistan. i would characterize our strategy in afghanistan for the last 50 years as largely defensive. we have been trying to shore up the afghan government, to shore up the national security forces. that's difficult to do when you basically cede to the opposition, to the afghan taliban, that they will have an open and permanent sanctuary next door in afghanistan -- in pakistan. the afghan taliban for at least 14 of the last 15 years has been able to operate not with impunity in pakistan but the patronship of the pakistani army. this goes beyond simply
providing a sanctuary and safe haven for the leadership of the afghan taliban and their families. this goes to active patronage and support. we know that the pakistani army, particularly pakistani intelligence services actively , engaged in training the afghan taliban, helping them fund their operations, and in planning attacks, including attacks inside kabul. i think we have to learn lessons about this as the next president starts thinking about where we go forward. in may of this year, president obama authorized what has so far been a one off. a drawn operation against the afghan taliban leadership, in particular in this case the head of the taliban. we never had a drone operation before. at least a drone operation with the actual use of a missile there before.
that mission is very controversial. you'll hear people on different sides say it killed the peace process. you'll hear people on the other side say there was no peace process to kill. there was a terrorist leader to go after. i think it should become a that mission is very controversial. model. i think the next president ought to consider this and look back an how we have progressed against al qaeda in thinking about how we have progressed against al qaeda, and afghanistan, afghan taliban. by that i think we ought to think about carrying out operations like the operation in other parts of pakistan in the future. we do not need to have the tempo of operations that we had against al qaeda in pakistan. we're not going to destroy the afghan taliban through drone operations, nor should we try to, but we should try to disrupt and to seriously dismantle the sanctuaries and safe haven. in essence, we ought to take the safety out of the safe haven. i think that's one recommendation i would make to the next president. the second would also be an offensive operation.
monsouronths -- provides -- mullah monsour's passport was confiscated. it was provided to him by the pakistani arm, a false name. inside it showed he had made 18 trips from karachi to dubai over the course of the last five years and several other trips to bahrain and probably to other gulf states. what was the purpose of 18 trips to dubai? the afghan taliban has told us. fundraising. some of the fundraising is in drug smuggling. the biggest part of the fundraising is in raising funds from sympathetic audiences in the gulf state. i think we need to target that as well. i think we need an aggressive move by the department of treasury working with our gulf
state partners to prevent that kind of fundraising from continuing in the future. again, we're not going to stop at 100%. we are not going to destroy the afghan taliban through that. we should bring about a situation in which afghan taliban fundraising is as difficult to do today as al qaeda fundraising is difficult to do in gulf states. we had significant progress over 15 years in persuading the saudis, u.a.e., and others to get out of the business of letting their private individuals support al qaeda. we had progress on the islamic state. we need to do the same thing with the afghan taliban. we of course have other objectives and goals in pakistan as well. one of the most important is to support the entrenchment of pakistani democracy. in here, i think i also would say there is good news. seven years after, 15 years after september 11. pakistan today has a thriving free press. it's not always a responsible free press, but it's certainly a thriving free press.
i am reminded of your question about whether their free press is as responsible as ours, mike. we'll leave that question for others to think about. we have also seen in pakistan in the last few years the , transition from one democratically elected government to another. that is a milestone in the history of pakistan democracy that shouldn't be overlooked. we have also seen pakistan seriously address the problem of its own taliban, the pakistan taliban and and go after it in , way which we have never seen before. pakistan today is a unique country. it is a country that is a victim of terrorism. there are horrendous acts of terrorism being carried out in pakistan nearly every day. unfortunately the pakistani army , continues to be a patron of terrorism in other parts of the world and particularly patron of the afghan taliban. that calculation was going to be difficult to do, but i think that's one of the priorities
that the next president is going to have to focus on when he or she thinks about what to do with the afghan-pakistan situation. michael: thank you. i'm going to put and have a -- go down the row and have a question for each of you. i think i will go to the colonel. let me go by way of asking him two or three minutes what he saw with the afghan forces. for those of you who don't study this thing full-time, let me remind you of the different numbers we're talking about. people can correct me if i get one wrong. but basically, the afghan army is organized into six main core. these each have a geographic zone. one wrong. you can sort of imagine doing a clockwise circle in your head. starting in the northeast along the pakistan border, in the very mountainous zone, kunar region etc. is the 201st core. southward to the 203rd. over in kandahar, 205th. helmund was added later so it got it's out of sequence numbering of 215. then there's 207 and 209 coming back around.
and so, the colonel was the lead u.s. mentor in a team of several hundred americans deployed to talibad if i have it right. he'll correct what i get wrong. through last fall. these were the largest formations the united states still had deployed in the field. most of the other formations were these counterterrorism teams that would be available on demand or central training teams in kabul or intelligence and other kind of institution building mentors in the capital city and other major cities. colonel was essentially in the most forward of the kind of units the united states still has in afghanistan today. that's what makes up this 10,000 strong force that general allen was mentioning which is a total of close to 15,000 if you add the rest of our nato partners in other countries as well. with that as quick background, i want to see if the colonel would like to add to his discussion with both the security situation in the east and also the progress of the afghan army.
sir. stand up if you'd like. whatever is convenient. >> i'll sit down. i don't want to obstruct the views for people of the panel. as mike mentioned, i am and an infantry officer, for 25 years in the army. i'll give you a perspective having been in three combat deployments in afghanistan for the past 12 years. from some of the earl will i days to the middle, during the surge, until i left the country in october of last year, all different missions. this is also my first day at brookings as a federal executive fellow with my peers. >> welcome aboard. col. vowell: i hope i will not be greeted too harshly. afghanistan is hard, and it is hard all the time. for all the things the panel mentioned, the human terrain, the physical geography, issues
of social and cultural change, endemic corruption, illicit trade, etc., etc., it seems to be more than just the graveyard of empires. it's that crossroad of conquest. for things that change, that has to happen over very long periods of time. so evolutionary change is my perspective in the last 12 years. i'll keep the comments focused upon when i was an infantry during the surge. in 2010, we were there to partner with the afghan security forces in a counterinsurgency to help the government reach and in 2010, we were there to extend its nation reach to the people at the provential and district level and also to help provide efficient and effective fighting forces in the field with our effort as a model on missions and operations throughout the country. a lot of experiences during that surge. very kinetic, very heavy.
our initial main effort to work with district and local governance were the main effort, the people that contacted their government took a lot of effort. it's not three cups of tea in that country. it's three gallons of tea, and that discussion and dialogue was very important. i learned a couple of lessons that year. some of which i'll describe here. one, there's no better instrument for counterinsurgency in that country than their own afghan national security forces. in the meetings with governors, district governors political , officials, the military officials, the afghan security forces could lead that in a supportive role. a lot of problem solving that happens happens between the security forces and their government. without coalition intervention. that was pretty good. however, during that year, i noticed the particularly troubling problem that without coalition involvement, without coalition partnership, without coalition enabling capabilities, afghan national security forces
were very troubled, were very hard to get in the field and fight. so i left that combat deployment in 2011 with kind of a you can't want it more than they do. they have to have the leadership. they have to have the systems. they have to have the support, but there's going to be a requirement for security forces to plan, prepare, execute, assess their operations, recover from those and transition to their next campaign. i left thinking that would never happen. we spent a long time in western europe, long time in the far east after world war ii helping to develop and build those countries. if any model like that had to exist, we were not on that path in afghanistan. so in january of last year, i deployed with about a third of my brigade combat team. that was from third brigade hundred and first. so the perspective is three combat tours. i had been at bagram and a brigade leader in the east. what i thought in 2011 was impossible. i did not think the security
forces would be able to take the lead, take responsibility for their battle space, the terrain and the people and the problem sets on their own with just us advising from behind in the offices. last year, we didn't go in the field with them very often. we stayed at the core level. as mike articulated with the six cores, there is about 12 to 16,000 -- 12000 and 16,000 in each corps. that's about on par with the height of the surge forces the coalition had in the country in the first place. so now they own the problem and then this happens. these district centers start getting overrun. there is pressure from a emergent and resurgent taliban effort. what we saw on our watch, isil in the khorasan province which is a good thing because they're competing in open field warfare village-to-village for the same population. the people that picked up on that real quick were the afghan
forces. they said, that's the best thing that could happen to us. they realized how bad both groups are and we could sit back and watch. in 2011, these forces from the afghan national security apparatus had a problem holding checkpoints, had a problem holding district centers without u.s. or coalition efforts. after the setbacks with helmand, and a significant national support from the nugani government and reorganization of his national security apparatus they were able to go back in and , resiege these objectives in places that were taken with difficulty. but i looked around in the east where we were and kunar, in nangahar, paktia where the terrain is contentious, the population has been compliant and you are on the duran line ,, if it actually exists with , the border sanctuary that the doctor spoke about. very contentious area. why weren't the checkpoints being overrun? why weren't the districts being overrun and taken?
why wasn't large swaths of terrain being taken by the taliban and held in perpetuity? well, i got to go talk to one of the brigade commanders in kunar summer of last year and after , putting for some assets from the coalition, particularly airpower, which they're still trying to generate that kind of capability, he said, we can do it without you. we have too much ownership of this. this is our country. regardless what happens, we're not going to leave. so between 2011, when general allen came onboard and 2015, all the afghan national security forces by presidential decree occupied all of the coalition bases and outposts. all of them. and in our particular case, the two or third corps in gardez, they doubled down on that, they made more. for example, pech river valley in kunar, very contentious. we came out of that valley for the most part in 2011. when the afghan security forces
took ownership of the problem, they saw a different strategy and light in there. they built more roads. they built more combat outposts north into the water port to connect the two provinces together so the government could start having security where they never had that before. they wanted that. we told them not to do that from our experience. they had the initiative. they wanted that to happen. and lastly, in the east, corps get paid, and what they're for to so synchronize combined security forces to protect key terrain. the communication, the population centers, towns and villages and people from having absolute chaos going on. the corps were afforded an opportunity to plan, campaign throughout the country last year starting with helmand, going to
kunduz, and ashraf ghani they looked at the general on , v.t.c., yes, we have them doing v.t.c.'s every week on security planning and said what would you like to do and he said i want to clear terrain and want to make sure it's safe from the taliban coming up from the southwest because jalalabad had several car bombs and several pressures on the population. the united states did not plan this. coalition did not plan this. this was their effort. we advised them a little bit on some operations but they did it. they went forward with a tactical command and control element, the corps commander and a small staff forward, set up a base and had three brigades maneuver into battle space that was attacked and contested by both isil, k.p. and the taliban. their first operation in 48 hours, they cleared 167 i.e.d.'s by themselves with no fatalities. >> this is in the spring or summer of 2015? col. vowell: summer of last
year. so from the perspective of leaving in may of 2011 when they us to go with them on every mission and operation just about to afghan security forces leading a combined arms tactical effort in the field without much coalition assistance, they were using their own d-30 howitzers, their own aviation, and ground maneuver to include engineers, infantry, etc., in concert to succeed exceeding key train objectives from the enemy and holding that terrain with police to follow on the end. and governance at the district level to reach out to the people. that is counterinsurgency their way. so, i kind of left october of last year with, wow, we've gotten a lot further along than i would have thought possible. again to echo general allen's comment, it may be pragmatic but i would term it rationally optimistic. it will take enduring effort. it will take international support. it's going to take commitment to keep this effort going at about these levels and i think we'll be surprised what the outcome
michael: any questions? and it will take the president and chief to find, if they can, commanders of comparable ability and put them in position to another corps like the one you just described. we'll do a final quick round and go to you and i want to ask one question and starting with bruce. just following up on what you said about going after the safe areas. as we all know, the safe areas are not just north and south waziristan and this remote rugged terrain. , it's quetta and favorite spring break city, karachi. this is where people think now that taliban leadership is located as well. is there any way for them to go after them there? bruce: there is. it's difficult. it's not easy by any means. the may operation demonstrated that you can operate in baluchistan. the attack was for the obama administration to make it easier
for the government of pakistan to respond. now, drone operations are not going to be a feasible alternative in a major urban area like karachi but the good , news from the standpoint of thinking about how these safe havens and sanctuaries work, you can't run them efficiently if the leadership, the top leadership is all the time hiding in a safe house in kietev or karachi. similarly they have to go out in , the field, they have to go out and visit their commanders they , have to go out and see their troops and that's when there's a level of vulnerability. let me reiterate one point i made. we don't need the tempo of operations of that c.i.a. drones we were using against al qaeda in 2009, 2010, 2011. that would be an unnecessary effort. what we need is periodic, maybe once a quarter, maybe three,
four times a year, operations against senior afghan taliban leadership operating in the safe havens and sanctuaries to make it more difficult for them to do business as usual. if we allow them to operate and do business as usual as they have for the last 14, 15 years, i don't see how this operation is ever going to tilt in the direction that we want it to tilt. there's another reason for doing this as well. general allen mentioned the peace process and the afghan-taliban's assessment to the peace process. i think he got it absolutely right. the afghan-taliban said, why should we engage in the peace process? the enemy is leaving. sooner or later, the americans are all going to be gone and when they're all gone, time is going to be on our side. we have to change that calculation. i think the president's decision to leave the number of troops in was the right decision. i think now showing them that the safe havens and sanctuaries
are not as safe as they have been for 15 years also tips that calculation. it also tips the balance of power within the pakistani system. pakistan is an unusual country in a lot of ways. it has the civil militaryare noe been for 15 balance which is not imbalance. the military runs the afghan war. elected civilian leadership does not run the afghan war. we saw that in the peace process. the prime minister, i believe, was the sincere supporter of the afghan peace process. it is pretty clear that the chief of army staff was not a sincere supporter of that. in the end, his vote mattered more than the prime minister's. if we changed the balance of the safe haven and sanctuaries, i think we're also going to in the long run help the prime minister and the civilian government in making the case we can't go on this way we are not going to , secure victory through a military solution we need to , find some kind of military process. michael: excellent.
general allen, i want you to pick up on the pakistan angle and let us know your assessment as to whether we can be successful in the absence of some fairly big shift, either in pakistani behavior or in our ability to reach out and influence events maybe through greater use of drone or even afghan commando forces in pakistan, what have you? and secondly, because you worked abdulr. ghani, and dr. i'd be curious for your sense as , to whether they're likely to make this thing work. we've seen the discussion, and vanda added the long-standing challenge of this particular government structure that's been created to paper over the differences and uncertainties of the 2014 election. do you think these two gentlemen are likely to make it work, or do you sense that it is starting to fall apart? so, both questions if you're , willing. the frontier between pakistan and afghanistan is really
complex. gen. allen: when i was the commander, i thought i had a pretty good relationship with the chief of the army staff. and i remember well the day i spent with him alone in his office over the maps looking at the border with the intent that while i still had tens of thousands of maneuver troops to include this great battalion commander at the time in kunar we had options still to run joint operations along the border in a hammer and anvil manner to achieve effect that hadn't been achieved in previous opportunities. i woke up the next morning, roughly the 25th or so of november, 2011, and one of my special operations units had devastated two pakistani border posts. that did two things. it shut down the relationship with pakistan for the commander. it also shut down the ground
line of communications over which beattie percent of my support came. we never, during the period of time i commanded in afghanistan, the ability to achieve the potential energy of combine operations along the border that could have made the difference we had hoped to, the difference with the afghan taliban in afghanistan and us assisting the pakistanis to deal , their ownown afghan taliban problem in north and how waziristan -- south waziristan and baluchistan. i think more needs to be done and it leads over into the issue of leadership. we did have something called the trilateral commission, where periodically, i, until pakistan went silent after this crisis and came back up online leader in my command, where i and the chief of staff of the afghan national security forces and the chief of the army staff for a
day, periodically, and our subordinate leaders at key locations and key rings and functions would all meet together. the intent was, as i said, my the colonel said every well a moment ago, my hope is my great ambition is that at some point, there will only be two chairs at this table. we can create the environment of cooperation, the environment of relationships between afghanistan and pakistan, where eventually, as we do what will happen, to go to a very small number or a zero balance, the relationship is sufficiently robust, not just at a governmental level, but a sustainedevel for the security of their frontier. that was not happen during my command for a variety of reasons. i wish we had, because i had the maneuver forces i think to do that. int aspect is absent today
the relationship, and yes, we go through the motions of attempting to have a relationship with pakistan, the chief of staff of the afghan army attempting to have a conversation with her heel -- raheal sharil. the federally administered tribal areas, it will only occur a we are able to create viable relationship between the afghan national security forces and their counterpart pakistani forces across the border. agree entirely with bruce. as we began the process of to first stabilize our presence, to increase our support to the afghans, conceivably with a new president -- with theo
combination of nato forces with the secretary-general. having a relationship with the pakistani military and being at to strike those taliban leadership in the afghan pakistan, king able to strike on both sides of the border with precision will help us a great deal. with respect to the current configuration in afghanistan, i think we are stumbling along. i do not see over the long period of time under a presidential system that we can a relationship between a president and a chief executive officer. it was a band-aid to keep the outcome of the election several years ago from tearing the country apart. is exactlyda correct. we may be seeing the beginning of the crack in that process that will either, if we do not a
close attention to it and do something to try to reinforce either the current organization were shifted from the presidential system that it is today to the parliamentary system, we are liable to see this craft widen, and conflict -- those crocs widen and -- widen and potential conflict. this is an interrupt solution. it was never intended to be a permanent solution. this kind of interim solution under increasing pressure from the taliban makes it difficult to govern the country, make it difficult to get the economy on its feet and in exit difficult to command and control an afghan national security force which is still being trained, still been brought up to full operational capability under four pressure at the same time. it is a very difficult situation, and it is not optimal, was not intended to be permanent and we need to look to getting a permanent outcome. michael: thank you.
views of the state of the economy, which is obviously not great, but the production of opium, which is obviously not a great situation either. is there anything useful as i've dealing with these broader security and political questions that we can do to help the afghans mitigate the difficult situation, economics, and drug production runs? vanda: that we start by saying that this moment, afghanistan electionsrse the u.s. to new president, is a time perhaps ask again to what extent the effort in afghanistan is breaka military effort to , or defeat an enemy, and to about aent it is political process and political evolution in the country. i strongly believe that it is the lesser, and inevitably, even
any conceivable increase in u.s. military engagement in afghanistan in the next year will not be sufficient to operate on the basis that this war can be about simply wiping out taliban. requires very hard prioritize asia and of how u.s. prioritization of how u.s. forces are used. themselves need to come to the understanding and embrace it. say afghan security forces it is ok if the taliban and isis are killing each other, and we sit back and watch, that has profound political applications. discreditingntally
the toppled government -- the kabul government. it is very contestable government in taliban. ultimately, the government was not able to stay. we watched the fighting took place. a deep problem for the afghan government has been for the entire decade and a half, and continues to be today, in areas. delivered for many afghans, the taliban is tearoot of thuggish and to nonetheless, they provide more stable, predictable and culpable governance than governance that is either constantly contestable between militant groups, government that is weak, there is the asf that handed over to the alc and they cannot both. or governance that is mandatory.
let us remember that it was in the making of falling because for a decade and a half, it was problem,e most literally problematic, vicious, infighting place in afghanistan, and that has not been resolved after the city and just the city has been taken away from the taliban. the issue of pakistan is very important, but it is always used as an excuse by afghans not to focus on improving politics and governance they need to increase , they need to improve themselves. a convenient distraction on both sides perpetuating policies that are bad. targeting also need to become political. while it makes perfectly good sense to try to take away the said,of safety, as bruce
from the taliban in pakistan, we need to be asking about the political implications of that. kill thisout, if we taliban commander, whether it is on the afghan side or the pakistani side, what are the political repercussions within the movement #is it going to give rise to a more vicious element within the taliban? i wrote a piece in new york times after the killing of onsouf raising the questions. it impinges on and overlaps everything. political. our thinking about strategy in afghanistan and afghan thinking needs to be about political governance. answer to your question on the economy.
the economy is in difficult state. is vastly inadequate for a country of the level of underdevelopment problems and poverty that afghanistan faces. that other countries would love to have this. it is not sufficient for afghanistan. the massive economic shrinkage and contraction is simply no way out of it. sadly, that is one of the theons why recruitment for thecontinues to be high, vast retention losses. news, namely good that the finance ministry managed to raise the levels of tax revenues, very important economically, but also politically. it sent some signal that is not
complete impunity, not everything can be something stolen out of the country and hopefully the trend will continue. there is no easy way to break from the job shortage and essential economic stagnation we are seeing and that also generates the impression of refugees, some of whom go to europe or have been trying, or others who have been fighting iran sponsorship in syria. this is the level of often people face. options people face. equally, there are limited options as to what can be done. there are bad and disastrous options, and namely to try to ramp up some -- it is a caricature to say that -- about the taliban. off of otherey crucial linksng
to politics. this is the economic lifeline of the country. inevitably, if anyone wants to have political, minimal political support, they will likely minimum sponsor more deeply engaged with the opium poppy economy. one is to think, again politically, about targeting, and think about who are be dangerous actors and not just on taliban's side that should not have access to the poppy economy. that does not mean there will be any less opium poppy and heroine production in the country, but it is about who should have access and he should not have access, and who is less dangerous and having access. not about the holders
and stakeholders, not just the taliban, there are a whole variety of political actors who might become problematic, whose opium poppy stocks could go up in flames. aboution should really be -- it should be about enforcing the stability of a couple government rather than operating on the delusions they can alter flows in financing. the other crucial element, and one where the international community and the afghan government have objectively failed and not had to -- treatment options for afghans. , communicablee diseases related to injectable 42,ine, there are some perhaps, treatments that are , that are much more, very simple that that can be done on prevention, as well
as more robust treatment options. thank you very much. we have 25 minutes. we have a lot of you and a lot of expertise in the room. three questions at a time. as my colleagues to take good notes that ask my colleagues to take good notes. to takey colleagues good notes. ask one question apiece. we start with a woman in the second row and then over to harlan, and the women in the fourth row for around one. >> thank you so much. for a correspondent television network in afghanistan. i am from afghanistan, too. thank you so much for your hard job in afghanistan, the time you have been in afghanistan was very sensitive and tough at times. as you know, the pakistan policy never get changed. afghan people have high expectation from the u.s. authority. a self your opinion, that's
based off your opinion, what the policy of the united states supposed to take to pakistan? based off the situation in afghanistan, what are your expectations on the upcoming conference? michael: thank you. >> thank you for its obligation session. as people do not remember, we have been engaged in afghanistan since>> 1980. i would like to ask the panel use question that petra famously asked. president donald trump used that phrase loosely and that he is getting out of afghanistan is elected. president hillary clinton said she is going to double down about more forces into afghanistan. tommy what is right and wrong with both positions?
that's tell me what is right and wrong with both positions? >> fourth row. i am a random. i go to american university. i work for an afghan nonprofit. i have a question regarding opium. that opium -- net opium poppy is down. it is down by 40%. what do you think caused such a decline, and what factors do you think threaten the progress of ending afghanistan largely opium-based economy. >> we will see how we go from there. vanda: there is absolutely no short-term frame in which afghanistan opium poppy economy could end. our goal or baseline is when we bill and it, -- will will end
it, we will be disappointed. there are several countries that poppysfully ended opium cultivation. one of them is taiwan. there, it took 30 years. the maximum production was 90,000 actors. the war had ended. in all the other countries, we , it shifted to another country. conflict have ended. the longest conflict is on, there will be opium poppy. the fact that opium production went down by 19% does not mean very much. been fluctuating up and down largely irrespective of policy, driven by factors such as overproduction, disease, bad weather, and the market is still vastly oversupplied by the level of production.
the much more important and significant numbers that i would seek to look at is the extent of microeconomics dependence. those numbers have not budged. the wayiscuss off-line you measure, and what are the problems with that such as there is far more than the border value would really -- what really matters is the economic issues. there are places in afghanistan that opium poppy does not have to be, where there are other viable alternatives. some of those have returned to opium poppy as the result of insecurity. others have returned to opium poppy because people are trying begenerate profits that can filled quickly because they do not trust the financial system be acquiredat can
quickly because they do not trust the financial system. just to answer harlan question, at thedamental question, risk of sounding funny, i will go back to what i said before. will have to and through political process. i do not believe it can and through simply eliminating -- e nd through simply eliminating or letting out the taliban. theirlly because of expectation the momentum is on their side, they are treating all lot of their soldiers very much as cannon fodder, even missions that are not outright suicidal mission our missions in which a vast number of soldiers will not come back. there is a real limit to that policy. i think that is a significant one slow endhat is one where we hold long enough
and the afghan government holds long enough, until the taliban does itself in from its own mistakes. it is a very chancy policy. to run a foreign policy toward a country on hoping that your enemy will make enough mistakes is a risky proposition. the only other way it can end is through political process, and i don't mean it simply negotiations with the taliban, which is elusive and remote and no way going to come online in four months time. it is about politics within afghanistan. the constantnding brinkmanship, once and for all. most money and most powerfully for it all falls down, and when that mentality changes, no matter what we do with pakistan or the taliban, as long as governance continues to be pernicious from the perspective
of afghan people, the conflict will not end. michael: thank you. pakistan is a very complex, complicated place. pakistani policies towards afghanistan has multiple layers. bruce: the individual actors involved in pakistan's policy toward afghanistan have complicated layers. first, trying to get it down, i want to consummate harlan. i have been looking for months to find out what mr. trump's posture is on afghanistan. i had not been aware he indicated the u.s. was going to pull out. i thought that trunk policy on afghanistan was to make afghanistan great again, by building a large wall on its southern border. now it found out that is not indeed the case. [laughter] vanda.i agree with
politics is how it ends. politics with afghanistan and pakistan, tween the united states and pakistan, and regional politics more broadly. one of the flaws of the 2009lled strategy back in was that it was not a south asian strategy. we did not try to incorporate the views of india or iran, we did not try to incorporate the views of central asia in any serious way. the new american strategy needs to do all of those things. i laid out some of the specifics i think we need to do about pakistan. i think we need to be willing to ,ngage in more drawn operations not many of them, but some. we need to be much more decisive and trying to go after afghan funding, and a lot of that goes to pakistan at the end of the day. at the same time, we have to robust lee engaged the pakistanis, and that includes those the political leadership robustly engage
the pakistanis, and that includes political leadership. i would hope the next president of the united states will travel to pakistan on his or her watch and engage with the pakistanis there. hillary clinton wants to -- went to pakistan on numerous occasions. she repeatedly said that in her opinion, someone in the pakistani establishment knew exactly where osama bin laden was living, and i think in retrospect, she turns out to have been very precient on that. the next ohm ministration is not going to have some of the options the obama administration had. first two weeks of president obama's administration, he sent them were inaccessible 20,000 troops into afghanistan -- he sent somewhere in excess of 20,000
troops into afghanistan. trump has proven to be unpredictable and so many ways, who knows? he might be able to pull off something like that. i think it would be hard to pull off something like that. the press in this country would not be willing to go along. that option i think is pretty much off the table. i think you could make changes in the composition in american forces, you can change mission requirements, you can increase 1000, 2000, not be able to send for 2000, let alone have a third that the magnitude of president obama had a messy situation deteriorates. nothing else the president is not going to be able to do, that dental economic and military -- and that is substantial economic and military -- we saw a substantial increase. president
when president obama came into office, he was an enthusiastic supporter of increasing economic assistance to pakistan. president bush and president obama, over the course of the last 15 years, have provided of 25 billion dollars a military assistance, but it is not possible today. the mood on hill about pakistan has changed traumatically and has changed against providing assistance to pakistan, so that option will be off the table. maybe you can get some increases in aid in the economic field but i don't think you're going to be able to do it in any significant way and i think it will be hard to sway this congress to provide substantial military assistance for anything in that order. i think it's going to be a complicated action. we will have to engage very hard with the pakistani leadership. baz going to be a difficult and complicated conversation. >> thank