tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN September 29, 2016 12:00am-2:01am EDT
japan and south korea about the accelerating tempo of north korea's policy the selectivity. -- ballistic activity. and ability to work with the nazi to promote military interoperability, information sharing, joint exercises in a variety of other defense-related programs that are increasing our ability to deter and defend against the significant threat. i want to thank his work on the legislation. >> thank you for holding the hearing. i want to offend -- commend you on your active leadership. together on the policy and has been act. i appreciate that. that is under the calls we are using to try to push back against north korea's promotion
of its nuclear weaponry and my concern of proliferation. gather as i was having getings, what is it that we -- need to do to get china. one of the things i'm convinced we are unwilling to do and it is from my experience as one of the authors of the iran sanctions universe sanction the of financial transactions because that would lead to chinese banks. has someo that, that of the toughest and most consequential actions on iran. theave not pursued financial transaction center as an element of getting those who want to facilitate north korea's actions and cream pressure on
them at the were created pressure on iran from this engaging with it financially. freed, have we contemplated the type of financial sanctions that we levied against iran as it relates to those who would be doing business with north korea and he would be pretty them access to their banking centers? -- permitting them access to their banking centers? >> we are looking at all possible points of leverage and pressure against north korea. we have abundant tools. you're quite right. the financial sanctions against iran combined with the oil and gas sanctions were powerful. there is no question about that. i did not ask about all
tools, masking specifically about these tools. it seems that we are reticent to pursue the type of financial transactions because they would largely to chinese banks. in the absence of doing that, one of the most powerful tools you might have left to get north korea to observe international norms and the will of the international community is missing peers why is it that the administration has not come forward and sought specifically that type of either two or implement if they have the power to do so themselves? ? we have designated a number of north korean banks. the action which the imagination took on monday demonstrates that we are willing to take the next step of
designating third country entities which are cooperating with designated north korean banks. we have crossed that line and we are actively looking and actively looking at additional targets. which chinese banks have you sanctioned? >> chinese financial institutions this monday sanctioned by the treasury have,ment and i think you the four chinese nationals and one entity complicit in the sanctions. >> i'm talking about institutions. i would like to know whether you have all the authorities you need to go after chinese banks that are engaged in dealing with financial transactions that north korea would ultimately need. to sum it up if we are going after those banks that that is an incredibly powerful tool.
if you can expose only tell me, to have all the authorities that you need and if so, is it the intention of the administration to use this authorities against the for bank as it relates to transactions of north korea? >> yes, we believe we have the authorities we need. yes we are looking at all possible pressure points including financial. thehen the onus is on administration to not congress to provide you additional authorities. one of my main concerns is north korea's level about sharing and transfer nuclear technology. north korea has successfully subverted sanctions and exported import controls to falsely flagging cargo ships. i want to get a sense from you taking, whate we steps are international partners
taking since march to more rigorously monitor and ensure that all countries are complying with the strict controls of the un security council passed in march. because proliferation is a paramount concern of the obama administration, we are working through a variety of intelligence and law enforcement channels to significantly dprkce the monitoring of activities to establish telltales and tripwires for the purpose of making it harder and harder for the dpr k to successfully sell or transfer trynology or material and to ensure that we are able to detect efforts and may undertake to do that.
that involves close cooperation with north korea's neighbors and constrainedt it is in terms of its ability to move forward -- move ships, cargo and planes and people. and increased scrutiny as international airports, greater verification a password information, requirement to be says as well as close government to government information sharing among the steps we are taking. add to your point about china, we're working our way through the suite of options in terms of steps we can take towards china's behavior towards north korea. we have begun with the goal of this persuading china to take more and more action in part because china can do far more effectively from our point of
view then we can achieve indirectly through direct sanctions against china. as my colleague mentioned, we alked at bought -- b taking direct action against chinese people when evidence is there. we make a point of bringing information to the chinese and encouraging the chinese to act on that information. as they develop it further in their own law enforcement, they have abundant tools of their own to put restrictions on the dpr k. i'm not in the business of defending china. we think there is much more that they need to do. president obama stood up and china and made that point directly and exquisitely in public as he has in private. that the trendline dprk,nese actionk against
liberation and the trendline of their cooperation with the international community generally through the u.n. and with united states and bilateral basis is improving. rubio. >> the recent study by the center called in china shadow. basically it is clear from this report that china -- allowed to conduct 532 my dollars in trade volume. the report identified -- you discussed this ancient against one. why did treasury only designate one of the six companies? we are actively looking at all possible targets. i will not speak for treasury and its individual decisions. in my experience, treasury is
both effective and aggressive and identify targets and pursuing them. have sufficient evidence to me treasuries legal threshold. i will tell you that we are in the mode of gathering information and will go with the information texas. takesre the information us. i don't want to talk about a specific company and specific designation in the session. >> why? they are named. everyone knows who the companies are. it is on a mister. -- mystery. >> as a general rule, it is best not to talk about current investigations. this is an open, reported,
this is other for the report to see. this is not a secret. >> i will consult with my treasury colleagues and try to get whatever we can. oftent is why they are so hard to sit through. i do me to be disrespectful. don't mean to be disrespectful. everyone can see what this is. we are afraid to press the case against too many chinese companies because of the broader situation between china and the essays. have the white house were state department ever pressured the justice department to delay designations to avoid embarrassing china? >> not to my knowledge. the other department of justice indictment unsealed, colonel indictment list put millions of u.s. dollars go on the back to 2009 where these front companies
served as financial , it was on in order to evade restrictions on u.s. dollar transaction. from 2000 wait -- 9-2016, why did we wait to act? beyond the issues of sanctions come we have the issue of pressure because of the broader situation with china and foreign policy. this looks to me like an administration that is saying, let's not go too hard because it will destabilize our water relationship with china a series of other topics. broader relationships with china on a series of other topics. can anyone disrupt me the reason for this discrepancy? why the summary more iran
designated bank north korea is patients when north korea has finally developed weapons but our chemistry tenet and using it tests.sorts of cap's -- why the discrepancies ? the administered his acts of the money to designate the chinese banks was an important step. as ii said earlier, -- said earlier, we are at a number of targets. ofh respect to the numbers comparing iran and north korea, the iranian economy is both much larger and much more connected to the rest of the world and the north korean company and the north korean economy was despite , is areas of various hidden generally lower -- more open.
is theer but i think administration shares congress's view that the north korean threat and actions including the recent nuclear tests compels us to intensify our pressure campaign working both the u.n. with third countries such as the japanese-south koreans, canadians and using our national authority and accorded fashion to increase the pressure. welcomed the legislation earlier. we put it to good use. ourntend to bring to current targets >>. what this looks like is we are as we involved in a provocation response cycle with north korea
and you talk about the sanctions, and my comes up. you talk about the bill that congress passed. it was only until then that we finally designated north korea as a primary moneylender. -- money launder. this looks like a company shall things. sanctionsding back on . north korean template is brilliantly. buying time for themselves to reach the point average. the other is, what this looks like. the united states is trying to -- holding us diplomatic fire in such as fire on some of these issues for fear of impacting our relationship with china. in our fear of offending the chinese government going after these were also involved in other sorts of inventors -- endeavors.
i don't know what had is taken so long. just a surprise rep. pompeo: today. you mentioned the trap of the provocation the song cycle -- response cycle. that is not what we're doing. workingr especially, through the u.n. and other channels, we are in a position pressureifying independent of a provocation response cycle. earnest. we intend to increase pressure on north korea. to do so, we also have to work around the world with third countries and with the chinese. that is our intention. i agree that a provocation
response cycle and staying within such a cycle would not be the right approach. that is not our approach. add that if it for the administration's policy to tiptoe around china in dealing with the north korean threat, we would never have decided with republic of korea to deploy the system. we would never have designated chinese entity a chinese national. we would never have taken the decision to send the b-1 bomber or aircraft carrier to the korean peninsula. it is very much the case that we seek active chinese corporation. we recognize that a change in china's behavior is a prerequisite to getting change in north korea's behavior and the president, secretary of
state and others have made to china that we think there is much more that china needs to do and can do and should do to tighten the screws on the dprk given the significant leverage. >> all those bizarre party. we're talking about section two. -- we section one country -- company. there are multiple companies. we have just as much evidence against them. everyone knows who they are. when you look at how long it has taken to get to this point, you look at the limitation that have been placed, only one company has been designated under are multiple companies of equal status and some are called in more of these deals. it starts to look like we're trying to not do too much too notion of as standard of proof, i understand about that. from this perspective, it is a difference of tuition. this is not a secret. the world knows.
take great steps to hide it. they don't want to see a regime collapse in going to people we knowver the border who these countries are. -- companies are. there are plenty of targets of opportunity. >> under the senses we passed, these are mandatory investigations required. you intend to provide us with waivers of companies are investigating? >> no. >> why have we only designated one company? as i said earlier, the
treasury department, state department and our intelligence inmunity are all involved investigations. as assistant secretary russell preferredourse the option is for china itself to do more as we think it should. option is to have chinese companies independently come to the conclusion that it would be a lot better for them if they avoided interaction with north korea and companies. -- korean companies. our actions on monday in the claim -- indicate we are willing to section chinese companies who are evading unr u.s. sanctions. we are pursuing all of these avenues.
we know that kim jong-un's goal is to die is a very old man. that does not work for him. warhere an all-out nuclear as he will probably not become a very old man. plans whichs the are in place to use preemptive force against north korea's nuclear arsenal or its leadership which could increase the risk of accidental nuclear war in the crisis. south korea's defense minister informed that they have forces on standby and are ready to assassinate kim jong-il and if they feel threatened by nuclear weapons. he said this, south korea has a plan to use precision missile
capabilities to target the enemies facilities in major areas as well as a limitation the enemies leadership. if north korea fears that south korea tennessee's productive force to kill its leader, then back increasing pressures for him to delegate control over his nuclear weapons to frontline whate'er commanders. military commanders. if they believe this, that could create pressure to use the nuclear weapons. both of these pressures to drastically increase the risk of inadvertent nuclear war on the peninsula. riskur view, is there a that military plans focused on preventive attacks on north korea's leadership and nuclear arsenal could increase the risk of uncontrolled nuclear escalation?as part of your strategy for managing the fed, as the a administration working on plans
to deescalate in military crisis so that it does not spiral out of control? do you foresee potential arrangements for crisis communications with the north korean regime to defuse and deescalate such a situation that could lead to an accidental nuclear war? >> the short answer is yes. lest there beed an escort torry cycle on the korean peninsula. we have in place very serious counter escalation plans in the u.s. rok alliance. the commander of the combined america's best is, as his predecessors have been, working with the rok
leadershipd national on a day in and day out basis hasa very -- the alliance very specific plans to deal with a variety of contingencies with andew to de-escalate defusing. this is been a big part of our joint defense strategy. there is a loss of hyperbole and frederick -- lots of hyperbole in thederick -- rhetoric way the north korea speaks and the way that south korean officials occasionally speak when they are testifying or speaking before the press. the comments that of the defense minister taken by
themselves represent on intent on the part of the republic of korea to take provocative action. the northern is koreans react to it. whether or not south korea intends is separate from the paranoia reduced -- induced. that is full we were concerned about during the cold war. was about escalation of frederick that could be used by those that with think that nuclear weapons are usable. that is always a concern. in followingeeing the 2013 nuclear test, found that 66% of the south korean public favored acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent at the north korea's test in january of this year, a senior
south korean figure suggested that south korea should acquire its own nuclear weapons, referring to our nuclear umbrella that we provide he said, we can't borrow umbrellas next door every time it rains repletion were a raincoat of its own. -- our own. how would you address pressures and south korean society to a nuclear weapons -- acquire nuclear weapons and japanese society? what actions are we taking to reduce the likelihood of a move in that direction? >> i think that the pressure in the mainstream political society in either the republic of korea or japan to contemplate the acquisition of nuclear weapons is directly commensurate with
their faith in america's commitment as an ally to the defense and the extended deterrence and nuclear umbrella provided by their alliance with united states. believewould have to that if there was a nuclear attack on south korea that we would then launch a nuclear attack on north korea? >> if the japanese and the korean public and their leaders lost faith in america's resolve, and are absolute determination to use all of the tools of andonal security to deter defend against an attack from north korea, then yes. >> how do you interpret this
poll that's a 66% of the south korean public favors acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent? does that not indicate there are some increasing lack of confidence in the american nuclear umbrella? or even a biological or nuclear attack? >> i can't speak to a particular poll. i think there's an end and flow among korean public. certainly the concerns driven by pattern of testing is driving anxiety. however, steps by the united states such as a strong message of reaffirmation of our alliance commitments that president obama made in his immediate phone calls to those -- the deployment
of our strategic bombers to the korean peninsula, the plans for bilateral and trilateral exercises and the other manifestations of america's unshakable determination to defend and protect ourselves and our allies, i believe keeps that kind of thinking. >> you are saying we are sending strong signal that we would use nuclear bombs on north korea and that we are assuring the south koreans that they don't have to have their own nuclear deterrent because we would use them in the event that there was a nuclear attack, is that what you're saying? >> no. what i'm saying is we are giving enough confidence to our allies -- >> that we would do what? >> that are deterrence -- >> our nuclear bombs -- >> our willingness to utilize
the full range -- >> we are giving them confidence we would use nuclear mr. russel: i'm not going to say. i leave it to the president to decide if and when the united states is going to using nuclear weapon. >> that is what i'm hearing you say. those are the words you are using. you are not saying nuclear bomb, but you are using every other word but that to describe the use of a nuclear bomb. mr. russel: the way, senator, then i think it should be understood is that the certainty -- thepart of the dvr k dprk that the united states would either prevent their use of nuclear weapons or retaliate
in a devastating manner, is an effective deterrent, and the credibility of the u.s. deterrent is such that neither government intends to pursue -- >> i guess what i should say is we should really intensify our efforts to make sure there is no accidental situation that could increase tensions, that we are creating close communications with the north korean government in terms of the deployment of their weapons, so we don't have that accident and we don't have to use a nuclear weapon ourselves against the north koreans, because we don't know where that would end. thank you, mr. chairman. sen. gardner: senator udall. sen. udall: thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for being here. retired admiral mullen recently made recommendations with regard to how to deal with the threat
from north korea. these included recommendations for how to get north korea back to the negotiating table. how has the state department reviewed these recommendations, and do you believe it is possible to restart negotiations? mr. russel: thank you, senator. i recently sat down with admiral mullen, with whom i had previously worked when he was chairman, and senator nunn, to work through their recommendations and they report. theme been in touch with during the process of writing the report as well as with other important members of the committee. i think that we see things in generally consistent manner. policy has been
to try to engineer negotiations with north korea over t been to try toheir nuclear program, on the simple grounds that that is the only peaceful way forward to achieve de-nuclearization. but the terms of those negotiations are very important. there's not only no valuing talk for talk's sake, but the experience of the first bush presidency, the clinton presidency, the bush 44 presidency, and our own experience, has demonstrated that unless the negotiations are about north korea's nuclear program, and unless they include iaea accesson of and monitoring, north korea simply can't be trusted to honor its promises.
what the north koreans has done is to, number one, abandon the six party talks, renounce the commitments they've made under those talks, reject and defy international law in the form of the human security council resolutions, and continue their occasionallyile offering to hold discussions with the united states about the withdrawal of u.s. forces from south korea. that is an utterly unacceptable basis for talks. we have worked consistently to show the north koreans that we want to negotiate, that we are willing to talk, that the door is open to a process that can net them the benefits that were on the table in 2005, in the six party talks process, which includes discussions about a successor agreement to an
armistice. that includes the process of diplomatic normalization, economic assistance, and so on. secretary kerry has gone out of his way, publicly ending international meetings where the north korean foreign minister was present, to emphasize our willingness to negotiate. sen. udall: do you have any additional comments on that? how can we strengthen our monitoring capabilities to prevent north korea from obtaining nuclear materials and equipment that it could use to create additional nuclear weapons? does congress need to invest more in technology and equipment to better monitor such transfers? senator, monitoring the materials that go into north korea and that come out of north korea, monitoring the movement
officialsientists and who might be involved in proliferation, is a top priority for our national security agencies, as it is for those of japan, korea, and i believe, china. we are working to share information, we're working to tighten the safeguards and monitoring. as for what additional funding authorities for congressional effort,ould assist that i would have to consult with my colleagues in other agencies and propose they respond in a classified setting. sen. udall: ok. thank you very much. thank you, mr. chairman. mr. russel: thank you. -- sen. gardner: thank you, senator udall.
we will go to a second around of questioning. senator menendez. sen. menendez: i pride myself on the preparation for these hearings. i went back to my office after your answer. the statement of monday. you said in response to my question, we just sanctioned the bank on monday. fac's statementa that they imposed sanctions on the industrial development company and four individuals. is that company a bank? mr. fried: it is not a bank. it is a financial company that worked with a sanctioned north korean bank. sen. menendez: different than saying you sanctioned a bank. you did not sanction a bank on monday. mr. fried: we sanctioned a chinese financial corporation. let me ask you
this. has the banks administration sanctioned as it relates to north korea? do you mean banks in general or chinese banks? sen. menendez: let's talk about chinese banks. mr. fried: no chinese banks, not in china. sen. menendez: that is my point. that is the point i was trying to drive at. you have sanctioned no chinese banks at the end of the day and they are probably the major financial institutions for north korea. what this company as i understand did was make purchases of sugar and fertilizer on behalf of the designated korean bank. it is a trading company, not a financial company. when i take testimony as a member of this committee, i need to make sure that testimony is
accurate, because i make decisions based upon it. i must say that the information you gave me is not accurate. this was not a bank. this is a trading company. finally i got the answer i wanted to hear, that you sanctioned no chinese banks as it relates to north korea. it is our hesitancy to do so that takes away one of the major instruments possible to change chinese thinking. i'm all for persuasion can achieve it, but you can't, and north korea continues to advance its nuclear program in a way that becomes more menacing, and it many a richer -- its miniaturization and its missile technology, i don't know at what point we can think we can stop them when they are on their way and we allow them to continue to do so.
that you didn't give me the right information. one final question to you, mr. secretary. chairman had a separate private panel that suggested the chinese have basically created a preference over stability in the korean peninsula versus the challenge thisrth korea pursuing nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and missile technology. i'm never for nuclear proliferation, but do you agree that is the view that china has estimate -- that china has? mr. russel: what i've heard xi jinping say repeatedly is that china's three no's are no war, no chaos, and no nuclear weapons on the korean peninsula.
i think they have multiple objectives that are in conflict with each other. part depending on north korean behavior, in part depending on the pressure for the persuasion from the united shifts in the chinese from a bias towards maintaining stability and preventing -- sen. menendez: in my mind, equally the same to some degree. when you have war, you generally have some degree of chaos. no nuclear weapons. there are some that suggest that if that is their dynamic, then allowing south korea to pursue the possibility of nuclear power , nuclear weapons, changes china dynamics as to how far it is willing to push north korea. mr. russel: i think the chinese are very mindful of the risk that either south korea or japan might distance itself from the
u.s. nuclear umbrella and pursue their own capabilities. that, i believe, what to motivate china to redouble its efforts to push back on the north koreans. that is only one of many examples of why we believe it is so in the best interest of china to tighten up on the north, to expand their cooperation with us, and to really abandon an old pattern of tolerating a significant amount of provocative and dangerous behavior by the dprk. the greatest driver of instability in northeast asia is north korea's nuclear and missile program. the actions the united states is taking and will take, hand in allies, that china opposes, which china perceives
as somehow containing it, are all driven by the growing threat from the dprk. secretary kerry has said again and again, if that threat diminishes, if that threat is eliminated, the rationale for the united states to take a more robust northeast asia policy goes with it. sen. gardner: thank you, senator menendez. i want to follow up. perhaps you can refresh my memory. the stick and -- the statement was made that north korea is exporting about $1 billion worth of coal to china that is benefiting north korean nuclear activity. mr. fried: that is our belief. thatgardner: let's assume $1 billion is coming in, give or take, to north korea from china for the purchase of coal that is
benefiting the nuclear program. i assume they are using chinese banks. is that correct? for this coal and the importation and payment? mr. fried: the north korean export of coal is certainly a large, and the largest single generator of foreign currency for the north korean economy generally. it is a slightly different weston as to whether that money directly funds its nuclear weapons and missile programs. for the purposes of our difference ist not -- sen. gardner: are they using chinese banks? mr. fried: we are looking into whichhe the mechanisms by
the coal goes from north korea to china. specificallyto say the role of banks versus the role of trading companies or other institutions. but we are looking hard and actively at the coal trade generally. sen. gardner: earlier in this conversation, i asked if we were actively investigating chinese entities. so we are actively investigating chinese entities. so we can and should expect sanctions to be issued against a number of chinese entities, is that correct? and if that is not correct, when will the administration descending waivers to congress? -- be sending waivers to congress? you said we do not anticipate waivers. when can we anticipate these sanctions? mr. fried: as my colleague and i
said, the best option, the most effective way to put sustained and sustainable pressure on north korea, which is our objective, is to have china itself decide for its own purposes that this is where it wants to go. proceed is too convince chinese companies, including banks, that it would be in their best interest not to deal with sanctioned or sanctionable activities. the option of directly sanctioning chinese entities is available. sen. gardner: and mandatory if they violate the terms of our legislation. mr. fried: that is right. what we're looking at is the most effective means to achieve this end. our purpose is to put pressure
on north korea. the purpose of sanctions is to support a policy. my colleagues has spoken of the .olicy i'm the sanctions. we are looking at all the tools. that includes sanctions. that includes high-level discussions with the chinese. i look forward to getting in touch with you, with your committee, about our thinking as this progresses. i can tell you that this is not motions"ough the exercise. we are serious about this. sen. gardner: let me ask you this next question. has the administration designated any actors, entities,
north korea for their cyber actions, cyber attacks against the united states? mr. fried: not specifically for cyber. however, some of our designations are some broad, i suspect they capture. sen. gardner: do we plan to issue any cyber sanctions under the terms of section 209 of the legislation, the north korea sanctions aspect? mr. russel: mr. chairman, the administration did levy sanctions against a number of north korean individuals and entities in the lake of the sony hack under our own presidential executive order that preceded of theption and signing north korea sanctions act. caseven't yet developed a
against north korean cyber actors, but we are working toward that. there is no question that north both's cyber activities, those that emanate directly from north korea and from servers in third countries, represent a serious threat to us and to others. we are on it. sen. gardner: has reported this summer, north korea hackers steal blueprints for u.s. fighter jets. have they been sanctioned, these actors? mr. russel: the intelligence and the law enforcement community the u.s. government is looking at and seeking to develop cases in order to sanction north korean actors for any trans russian.
sen. gardner: has the administration initiated investigations for designation of air courier? does it believe it is eligible for designation? in this setting, mr. chairman, i don't want to discuss specific investigations. it is true that we and our itses have curtailed activities and restricted its ability. third governments have restricted its ability to land. i don't want to discuss in this open session particular investigations. but we are well aware of air courier is role in the north korean system. sen. gardner: secretary russel, we talked earlier in the hearing
about united nations security resolutions. can you tell me more about china's implementation as it relates to coal? fried.assador mr. russel: i'll make a general comment. the general comment is that i would characterize china's implementation of 2270 as incomplete. as a mixed bag. we have seen some clear indications that china is strengthened sanctions in sportsman -- sanctions enforcement. the chinese have publicly and unequivocallyrted that they consider themselves fully bound by the terms of 2270. repeatedly," it
president obama and secretary think there ise much more they can do. i've had quite a number of conversations with a variety of chinese counterparts on the subject, both in china and elsewhere. they point out the not inconsiderable challenges they extent of the chinese-north korean border, and the degree of commerce, and their concern about the livelihood and wealth of north korean people. so they say. but right now, mr. chairman, i think our principal focus is the next generation of sanctions that we're seeking to obtain through a new un security council resolution in new york. that includes making some adjustments to provisions under
2270, to address some of the problems that you have flagged. sen. gardner: ambassador fried, in our briefing material, it talked about china's announcement, instructions to businesses on implementation of you and security council resolution. it talked about the sample letter that an entity could provide to the government to basically claim the livelihood exemption. it basically says, my company is importing blank product. this transaction is with no documentation required. when it gets to the second security resolution, what will it do to change china's behavior so that it can fully implement sanctions and deprive the regime of foreign currency used to
further develop its nuclear program? mr. fried: your question, mr. chairman is the right one. because this involves chinese, is with the can't predict where we will come out. security council resolutions are the gold standard in sanctions because they are universal. they have unchallenged legitimacy and they are binding. but we are not bound by what the security council will accept. we have our sanctions. prefer to see an -- address this issue. options.e have as i said earlier today, we are actively developing our options. sen. gardner: options.
do those options involve actions at the united nations? enforcece mechanisms to -- certainly, we worked through the u.n. north korean sanctions community. we worked with them on a regular basis. i spent a day with them on a very detailed session with experts from treasury, state department, other agencies. certainly we do that. we have to pursue all the avenues. sen. gardner: i want to get to those in a second. does that committee have the ability to determine what nations are and are not in 2270? mr. fried: the sanctions committee does issue reports and governments submit to that committee reports on their own implementation of 2270. sen. gardner: what is the finding of that report in regards to the country that is
responsible for 90% of north korea's economy? i would say assistant secretary russel summed that up pretty well. in mixed picture. far better in action than before, there is a way to go. sen. gardner: farther mechanisms within the united nations to enforce the resolution, and has the united states utilized those mechanisms, and do we intend to? mr. fried: we intend to use all avenues to identify sanctionable improve, to use this everyone's enforcement -- first, recognition of the provisions of
2270, and the enforcement of it. sen. gardner: could you address some of the other options you referred to in your answer? mr. fried: certainly. what i said earlier about convincing chinese companies it is in their best interest to avoid sanctionable activity is not just a phrase. our actions on monday indicate that chinese companies, the financial company and the individuals, the chinese persons , legal and physical, are not off-limits. that news will spread around the chinese committee. we can also use various means to get the word out to chinese businesses and banks that we are serious. the congress has given us, and
we have given ourselves, wide authorities. to act against sanctionable activity. the vast sanctions are those that don't have to be used because the activity stops. the purpose of sanctions is not to punish, but to change behavior. if sanctions serve their purpose and behavior changes, to be specific, the exports of coal diminish because the cost and risks of doing so increases, so much the better. but the credibility of that kind of message will grow as our determination he come apparent -- becomes apparent. when the congress and the
executive branch are pointed in the same direction, we are at our most powerful. which is why the legislation is so useful to us. we intend, in the coming weeks, and in the life of this all oftration, to pursue these avenues with the objective the north korean economy in the service of the political objective that my colleague talked about. mr. russel: mr. chairman, in addition to coal, north korea has other revenue streams that we target. an important one is overseas workers,e export of both in restaurants and in forestry and agriculture, etc., which generates significant
revenue for the country and for the regime. we have under our executive orders the authority to target north korea's export of labor on a unilateral basis. we also launched an effort to persuade recipient countries, contracting countries and companies, to end this practice and forgo the use of north korean labor. we have had some successes. the media has also covered the defection of some of the north korean restaurant workers, which has forced north koreans to double down on their security restrictions and limit themselves and who they sent and how many they said. this is another area where we are continuing to work to close
off a revenue stream. >> what more can be done on the human trafficking, labor trafficking fronts? i think that is a serious issue that a number of countries are involved in, perhaps unwittingly but most likely knowingly. what more can the united states to? do you have all the authorities we need through the u.n. and u.s. law to intercede? >> a number of countries are sensitive to this issue. when a light is shined on it, they reacted well. state department and treasury and us have been going around to third country -- third-party governments. we are working with third governments about this. we also intend to pursue this with the chinese and the russians.
they are significant importers of north korean labor. we are prepared to advance this issue, just as my colleague said. we have the authorities we need, but since you asked, it would be useful, i think, if you were sending similar messages. and were happy to stay in touch about this. . sending messages to third countries. very clearve made it that we condemn any such activity, especially the access that those workers encounter abroad as well as the contributions that they are unintentionally providing to the north korean regime's did -- regime's illicit missile program. mr. fried: i couldn't agree
more. it is enormously helpful when andexecutive branch congress are pointed in the same direction. sen. gardner: do you believe you need additional authorities? mr. fried: i don't think we do. we need to continue work with potentially cooperative third governments. that is what we are doing. we are working closely with the japanese and south korea's to approach other governments. issue working through the of chinese and russian labor. sen. gardner: china and russia -- what other allies do we had a close working relationship? mr. fried: there are governments in the middle east and a couple in europe. but, some of them have started taking action already partly
because they were responsive to our concerns and, i believe, yours. sen. gardner: the issue of labor, has been extended into other -- restaurants, you talked about -- has extended into other fields that perhaps we were worried about other considerations? mr. fried: i believe so. we are looking into the details of the use of north korean labor. i don't want to -- some of this is classified and i am happy to discuss it in another setting. as we discover specific information, we may have opportunities to approach both governments and companies. could youer: elaborate further, a little bit, but any ongoing or continuing cooperation between north korea and iran, and their ballistic
missile programs? we monitor and review all information, open source and intelligence information, on potential wmd activities and actions by both north korea and iran, and definitely any potential nexus whereby either would seek to acquire proliferation-sensitive information or materials from the other. well, the un security council resolution prohibits the sale or transfer for ballistic missiles and related items. we have unilateral and other multilateral sanctions.
so, please rest assured that this is a focus of intense scrutiny on the part of u.s. national security agencies. sen. gardner: at this point, we don't believe there is any cooperation between iran and north korea on the ballistic missile program? i believe any deeper dive into this question should be done in a classified setting. aware ofself am not any evidence of cooperation nuclear or missile programs. ambassador -- sen. gardner: ambassador fried, do you wish to answer that? mr. fried: there may be -- a
closed session would be a better place to discuss the past relationship between north korea and iran and our current projections. sen. gardner: the new government in burma, the cooperation between activities and the new government in burma, how has that changed. there is not a change in terms of cooperation with the government of irma. -- of burma. to the extent that there is a change, it is for the better. the problem continues to be the cap between the government and the burmese military. for that reason, when need to factor leader of burma or myanmar was in washington just the u.s. senior
officials including the president underscored the importance of her and the duly -elected civilian government working with the burmese anytary to root out vestiges of cooperation and they have remained. talked to the burmese leadership about the d prk. i myself have met with the commander-in-chief during my visits to irma -- visits to burma. ambassador has met with him as well.
we think that there are potentially a few residual people in the burmese military who might have some ongoing interactions, but -- sen. gardner: ongoing interactions with -- in russel: with the dprk, effect leftovers of five years ago and the military dictatorship. we think that, as far as the government's return -- is concerned, and the military leadership is concerned, they are fully on board and this is something they are working to prevent and eradicate. i don't of the conversations we have had with burma recently talked about lifting of sanctions, the u.s.
lifting of sanctions. still doing business with north korea, that would be in violation of these sanctions. burmassel: any actor in found to be doing business with wouldrth korean military be in violation of our executive orders and the un security .ouncil resolution i believe that the government leadership in burma is firmly opposed to any of that activity and is actively seeking to ascertain whether it continues and if so to stop it. stickardner: i want to with the subject of burma as we close out the hearing.
to be ambassador to burma, i received a letter from the state department. " stated that, and i quote, the department is committed to timely consultation with you and your staff regarding policy in burma in general and sanctions policy in particular. particular." when the burmese president was visiting washington, president obama announced that he would lift the sanctions. it is believed this action was approved by the burmese leader. can you describe the timeframe with respect to lifting those restrictions on burma? my staff, including during the period i was traveling overseas, met with members of the committee staff and other senate and house staff situation in the
run-up to the visit. the actual decision by the to let the state of national emergency sanctions on were made within a couple of days of the arrival of aung san suu kyi. and, it was subject to confirmation that indeed was per request. this,n as i learned about i put in a phone call to you tosonally in an effort fulfill both that obligation but
also in light of the good cooperation that we have had to let you know where it was heading. the morning of aung san suu kyi 's meeting with president obama, she attended a breakfast meeting hosted by vice president biden corker, the chairman of the committee and the senate majority leader. -- and the senate majority leader in which they asked her very directly if she wanted the sanctions lifted. she said yes. in the subsequent meeting in the oval office, president obama announced, after confirming it with her personally, his intention to lift sanctions. sen. gardner: do you feel the
state department met the full robust and timely standards? mr. russel: what really matters is whether you feel it. if you don't, i will promise to do better. it is my firm intent and desire to be responsive and open in sharing with you our policy, and to ensure that there is an opportunity to consult with you and take your views into account. sen. gardner: i don't think breakfast and a phone call our full, robust, and timely. do you support sanctions on entities which aung san suu kyi herself that she supports. mr. russel: what i heard here say is that the time has come to lift all the sanctions and for the united states not to serve as a prop for burma but to be a
supporter of the civilian governments -- the civilian government's exercise of authority over the military. what we seek to do is to ensure programs and policies restrictions on and controls and the regulations pertaining to business activities by the military that the burmese government chooses to put into place. 2 sen. gardner: the -- sen. gardner: so you support continuing the sanctions on these military controlled
entities? mr. russel: i support finding cantical ways that we continue to discourage investment and business activities with entities like with thet to do so burmese government's own policies. sen. gardner: thank you very much, i appreciate your time. thanks to the committee for providing the testimony responses. the record will remain open until this friday, september 30. we asked the witnesses to respond as quickly as possible. i thank you very much for your service and thank you for the opportunity.
>> coming up, house debate on ,verriding the president's veto then cia director john brennan on global threats. later, secretary of state john kerry on the terms of a partnership trade deal. partnership.acific c-span's washington journal, live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. thursday morning, congressman david price on latest -- on the weight of shootings and the campaign. then congressman steve king from iowa on funding efforts and the 9/11 victims lawsuit bill. watch "washington journal," thursday morning. ceo testified at
his second consecutive -- second congressional hearing about unauthorized accounts. we will be live with the financial services committee at 10:00 a.m. eastern. deputy secretary of state testifies about the civil war in syria and its impact on other middle east countries. we allied with the senate foreign relations committee at 10:00 a.m. eastern on c-span3. you can also watch live at c-span.org or listen live on the radio app. >> what makes movies or stories about people in crisis or in a crisis, and the crisis either changes them or changes everybody else. if you don't show conflict or if you don't show flaws and if you don't show someone growing out of their flaws, you are seeing
something you can't really connect to and it doesn't quite have the same impact. "q&a," movieht on reviewer for the weekly standard talks about movies he has reviewed. >> the mu -- the movie itself about a classic update of the showbiz story about how the band come together -- how the band got together and recorded the big hits is effective. >> thursday, the house and senate put it to override president obama's veto of a bill allowing families of 9/11 victims to sue the saudi government. the override is the first in the obama presidency. house debate. the congress established. in contrast, jasta departs from
long standing standards and practice under our foreign sovereign immunities act and threatens to strip all foreign governments from immunity from judicial processes of the united states based solely upon allegations by private litigants that a foreign government's overseas conduct has some role or connection to a group or person that carried out a terrorist attack inside the united states. this would invite consequential decisions to be made based upon incomplete information and risk having different courts reaching different conclusions about the culpability of individual foreign governments and their role in terrorist activities directed against the united states. which is neither an effective nor coordinated way for us to respond to indications that a foreign government might have been behind a terrorist attack. second, jasta would upset long-standing international principles regarding sovereign immunity, putting in place rules that if applied globally could have serious implications
for u.s. national interests. the united states has a larger international presence by far than any other country, and sovereign immunity principles protect our nation and its armed forces, officials and assistant professionals from foreign court proceedings. these principles also protect u.s. government assets from attempted seizure by private litigants abroad. removing sovereign immunity in u.s. courts from foreign governments that are not designated as state sponsors of terrorism based solely on allegations that such foreign governments' actions abroad had a connection to terrorism-related injuries on u.s. soil threatens to undermine these long-standing principles that protect the united states, our forces and our personnel. indeed, reciprocity plays a substantial role in foreign relations, and numerous other countries already have laws that allow for the adjustment of a foreign state immunity based on the treatment their governments receive in the courts of other states.
enactment of jasta could encourage foreign governments to actress prosally and allow their domestic courts to allow jurisdiction over the united states or u.s. officials, including our men and women in uniform. for allegedly causing injuries overseas via u.s. support to third parties. this could lead to suits against the united states or u.s. officials for actions taken by members of an armed group that received u.s. assistance, misuse of u.s. military equipment by foreign forces or abuses committed by police units that received u.s. training. even if the allegations at issue ultimately would be without merit, and if any of these litigants were to win judgments based on foreign domestic laws as applied by forpe courts, they'd begin to -- foreign courts, they'd begin to look at the u.s. assets held abroad to settle those judgments with serious financial consequences for the united states. hird, jasta threatens to
implicate relationships even with our closest partners. if jasta paren acted, courts could accuse u.s. allies or complicitity to be sufficient to open the door to litigation and wide-ranging discovery against a foreign country. for example, the country where an individual who later committed a terrorist attack traveled from or became radicalized. a number of our allies and partners have already contacted us with serious concerns about the bill. by exposing these allies and partners to this sort of litigation in u.s. courts, jasta threatens to limit their cooperation on key national security issues, including counterterrorism initiatives at a crucial time when we are trying to build coalitions, not create divisions. the 9/11 acts were the worst acts of terrorism on u.s. soil and they were met with an unprecedented u.s. government response. the united states has taken
robust and wide ranging actions to provide justice for the victims of the 9/11 attacks and keep americans safe from providing financial compensations for victims and their families to conducting worldwide counterterrorism programs to bring criminal charges against culpable individuals. i have continued and expanded upon these efforts. both to help victims of terrorism gain justice for the loss and suffering of their loved ones and to protect the united states from future attacks. the jasta, however, does not contribute to these goals, does not enhance the safety of americans from terrorist attacks and undermines core u.s. interest. for these reasons i must veto the bill. signed, barack obama, the white house, september 23, 2016. the speaker pro tempore: the objection to the president will be spread at large upon the journal. the question is will the house on reconsideration pass the bill, the objections of the
president to the contrary notwithstanding. the gentleman from virginia, mr. goodlatte, is recognized for one hour. mr. goodlatte: mr. speaker, for purposes of debate only, i yield the customary 30 minutes to the ranking member of the judiciary committee, the gentleman from michigan, pending which i yield myself such time as i may consume. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognized. mr. goodlatte: mr. speaker, i ask unanimous consent that all members may have five legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous materials on s. 2040, currently under consideration. the speaker pro tempore: without objection, so ordered. mr. goodlatte: mr. speaker, voted 97-1 to te override the president's veto. i urge my colleagues to follow the senate's action and vote to override this to seek redress against any foreign government that chooses to sponsor a terrorist attack on u.s. soil.
the question is whether we should allow those who harm our citizens to hide behind legal barriers not required by the constitution or international law or permit u.s. victims to hold those who sponsor terrorism in our country fully accountable in our courts. i think the answer to this question is clear and i hope my colleagues will join me in overwhelmingly overriding the president's veto of jasta. the changes it makes to existing law are not dramatic, nor are they sweeping. jasta amend the anti-terrorism act to make clear that any person who aids, abets or conspires with a state department foreign terrorist organization is subject to civil liability to injury to a u.s. person. it amends the foreign sovereign immupets act to add an exception to foreign sovereign immunity to
acts of international terrorism sponsored by a foreign government. the president objects this change to the law on the ground that it upsets principles of foreign sovereign immunity and by so doing our interests will be threatened. the president's objections, however, have no basis under u.s. or international law. the foreign sovereign immupets act already has nine exceptions, including the territorial tort exception. this exception provides that a foreign country is not immune from the jurisdiction of our courts for injuries that it causes that occur entirely within the united states. consistent with customary international law, jasta for terrorism cases removes the current requirement that the entire tort occur within the united states and replaces it with a rule that only the physical injury or death must occur on u.s. soil. jasta makes this change because
under current law, a foreign nation can provide financing and other substantial assistance for a terrorist attack in our country and escape liability so long as the support is provided overseas. for example, under current law, if the intelligence agency of a foreign government handed a terrorist a bag of money in new york city to support an attack on u.s. soil, the country would be liable under the foreign sovereign immupetsanth tort exception right now. however if we change the fact pattern slightly so rather giving a terrorist money in new york city, the money is provided in paris, the foreign state will not be subject to liability in u.s. courts. this is a troubling loophole in our anti-terrorism laws. when congress enacted the foreign sovereign immunities act it put in place exceptions, including an exception for tort
claims involving injuries that occur in the united states. however, the courts have not consistently interpreted those exceptions in such a manner that they cover the sponsoring of a terrorist attack on u.s. soil. jasta addresses this ininconsistency with a concrete rule that is consistent with the nine exceptions to fonch sovereign immunity. jasta ensures that those including foreign governments who sponsor terrorist attacks on u.s. soil are held accountable for their actions. we can no longer allow those who injury and kill americans to hide behind legal loopholes denying justice to the victims. i urge my colleagues to vote to override the president's veto and i reserve. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman reserves the balance of his time. the gentleman from michigan. mr. conyers: mr. speaker, i yield myself such time as i may
consume. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognized. mr. conyers: mr. speaker, the september 11, 2011 attacks on the united states constituted the deadliest foreign attack on american soil in our nation's history. their impact has been immeasureable as evidenced by the fact that we are still grappling with their cultural and policy with their policy implications. 15 years later, their powerful emotional effect on americans remains as strong as ever. those who lost loved ones or were injured as a result of this horrific attack deserve our deepest sympathy and our help. and it is in this vein that we consider whether to override the
2740, thes veto of s. justice against sponsors of terrorism act, which among other things amends the foreign sovereign immupets act of 1976 to create a new exception through the act's germ grant of foreign sovereign immunity. the bill's supporters present compelling and sympathetic arguments in favor of ensuring that the 9/11 families have access to a well-deserved day in court. in this veto message, however, the president raised a number of serious substantive concerns about the potential unintended
consequences of this legislation. first that the president stated undermine theould effectiveness of our nation's national security and counterterrorism efforts. african, other nations may become more reluctant to share sensitive intelligence in light of the greater risk that such information may be revealed in litigation. moreover the president raised the concern that this legislation would effectively allow nonexpert private litigants and courts rather than national security and foreign policy experts to determine key foreign and national security policy questions like which
states are sponsors of terrorism. econd the private -- the president's assertion that enactment of s. 2040 may lead to retaliation by other countries against the united states given the breadth of our interests and expansive reach of our global activities. while it seems likely at this juncture that s. 2040 will be enacted over the president's veto, i remain hopeful that we can continue to work toward the enactment of subsequent legislation to address the president's concerns. i understand that the moral imperative of enacting
legislation in this manner. but i am sensitive to the seriousness of the concerns that the president raised. i had expressed the hope during floor debate on this bill that congress and the president could work together to find a better balance that would still nabble 9/11 victims to seek justice while tempering the president's concerns. there is no doubt as to the passion of the bill's supporters through advocating -- bring to advocating the victims of the september 11, 2001 attacks, a passion that i share. as legislators, however, we must be given not only by understandable emotions, but by
thoughtful consideration of the long-term interests of our country. speaker, i reserve. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from virginia is recognized. mr. goodlatte: it's my pleasure to yield three minutes to the gentleman from new york, mr. king, the chief sponsor of this legislation. the speaker pro tempore: jarninged for three minutes. mr. king: i thank the gentleman from virginia, chairman of the judiciary committee for yielding and let me thank him for the outstanding work he has done in bringing this bill, this legislation to -- historic moment where i hope and urge the house of representatives to join the senate in overriding the president's veto of jasta.
i take seriously the objections the president has raised but this bill wasn't drawn in a vacuum. prime aerially read by chairman demrat, congressman nadler, chief co-sponsor of the bill and leading sponsors in the senate, all of the president's rejections were addressed and changes were made and this bill is not going to put american soldiers at risk or diplomats at risk. what it is going to do is allow the 9/11 families to have their day in court and seek the justice they have been denied and if the government of saudi arabia has no involvement, no liability, they have nothing to worry about. the fact is, those of us who live in new york and new jersey, no matter where you live, know how much this affected all of us. think of how it affected those families, those who lost the husbands and wibes and children and grandchildren and mothers
and fathers. so it's essential that this house today stand on the side of those who seek justice, realizing we aren't doing anything at all to put america's lives at risk but seek justice against those who caused americans to die. i thank the senate. i thank chairman goodlatte. i thank jerry nadler, dan donovan who has done so much and urge the house of representatives to join with the senate and overriding the veto of the president of the united states. and i yield back. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from new york yields back. the gentleman from virginia reserves. the gentleman from michigan is recognized. mr. conyers: it's my pleasure now to recognize a senior member of judiciary committee, the honorable mr. nadler of new york five minutes. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from new york is recognized. mr. nadler: i want to start by thanking peter king and bob
goodlatte in bringing this bill to the floor. i rise in strong support of overriding the president's veto of jasta. jasta is a carefully crafted narrow bill that would hold accountable foreign governments that provide substantial assistance to a designated foreign terrorist organization that launches mr. allen: attack in the united states. december plight the overblown rhetoric, jasta will not be at peril. they would be protected because jasta applies only to governments. to the extent that a foreign government may pass broader legislation may make a person subject to liability, that country would be engaging in the unjustifiable act of aggression. the strength of the united states makes such action unlikely. attackgue states tend to united states.
we must not 9/11 families hostage. 15 years ago on september 11, we suffered the most deadliest terrorist attack on our soil. my district in new york was the epicenter and effects felt across the country and at the pentagon and in pennsylvania. we all have interests in ensuring that the families can bring to justice anyone who is responsible for the vicious attack. jasta simply reinstates what was understood to be the law for 30 years, that foreign states, not individuals, not soldiers, foreign states, may be brought to justice for aiding and abetting international terrorism that occur on american soil, whether or not the conduct that facilitated the attack occurred in the united states. some courts have held if a foreign government agent hands over a check to al qaeda in new york to fund a terror attack, that government can be sued in an american court. if the same foreign government funds the same attack by handing
over the same check in a cafe in geneva, the government is immune from suit. that makes no sense. and it flies in the face of what had been settled law for many years. language law provides jurisdiction to sue foreign states of injury on american soil. this is the international norman not prompted retall tar yore conduct. if a foreign state murders thousands of americans on american soil or provides substantial assistance to a designated terrorist group that murders thousands of americans on american soil, that government cannot hide from justice merely because the actions occurred abroad. this does not target a country. any government brought before a u.s. court will have relief available to it and protections to government privileges during discovery to protect against
disclosure of sensitive information. . . we have hypotheticals that they would target american citizens. again, if a foreign government uses legislation that mirrors jasta, americans would still be protected because jasta applies to governments and if a government is highly unlikely to -- if a rogue state does in fact authorize suits against american personnel abroad we have a well-established process for defending such actions. according to the office of foreign litigation at the department of justice, anytime foreign lawyers under the direct supervision represent the united states in approximately 1,000 lawsuits, pending in the courts of over 100 countries, closed quote. this is not a new issue for the united states, and we are well equipped to deal with any consequences. we are warned that saudi arabia will be very angry if we
approve this bill. that the saudis may retaliate against the united states. may perhaps withdraw some investments. history shows that the saudis will do what is in their interest. they need american support and american arms in the volatile middle east where they fear and fight iran and its proxies. they are not going to prefer their emotions to their interests and act against the united states. if the saudi government was not complicit in the attack on 9/11, the plaintiffs will fail to prove such complicitity in an american court, justice will have been served and the saudis will be vindicated after years of suspicion. but if it is proven in an american court that the saudi government was complicit in the attacks on 9/11, justice will have been served, and we, not the saudis, will have justification to be very angry. mr. speaker, this bill was carefully negotiated over more than six years. it passed the house and senate
unanimously and the senate ted 97-1 to override the president's veto. all that stands in the way for the 9/11 victims and their families is a vote in the house. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman's time has expired. the gentleman from michigan reserves. the gentleman from virginia is recognized. mr. goodlatte: mr. speaker, at this time it's my pleasure to yield three minutes to the gentleman from texas, mr. thornberry, chairman of the armed services committee. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from texas is recognized for three minutes. mr. thornberry: mr. speaker, i first want to thank the gentleman from virginia for yielding and, secondly, commend him for his work to try to tailor this measure in as narrow a way as possible. i also want to commend the gentleman from new york, mr. king, for his strong persistent advocacy for the families of the victims of 9/11. all of us share in their grief. we have not -- the country has
not gotten over that horrible incident, and all of us have contempt for those who carry out terrorist attacks and those who support them. my concern for in legislation, however, is more related to the unintended consequences that it may have because one of the key protections that the military, diplomats, intelligence community of the united states has around the world is this doctrine of sovereign immunity. and once that doctrine gets eroded, then there is less protection. and we, the united states, has more at stake in having our people protected than any other country because we have more people around the world than anyone else. so in this congress we can control the laws of the united states, and we can write them
narrowly in a fine tuned way to just achieve our objective, but then other countries respond. they may not have their laws narrowly defined in such a fine tuned way. they may make them broader. their practice may not have the protections that ours do. so the concern this starts a series of unintended consequences that will increase the risk to u.s. military personnel around the world, u.s. intelligence community personnel around the world and diplomats around the world, and that's the reason you have widespread concern that has been voiced in each of those communities for this legislation. let me just read briefly from a letter from the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff that has been available to all members that says, any legislation that risks reciprocal treatment by foreign governments increases the vulnerability of u.s. service members to foreign legal action while acting in an
official capacity. that's the concern, that we lower the protections that our people have around the world. and remember, when we send our military out, they got to follow orders. they are implementing u.s. policy. they have no choice, and if they are called before a foreign court, if they are required to give testimony in a foreign court, even if they're not the defendant, then they are jeopardized as is sensitive information from the united states. so my point, mr. speaker, is i understand totally the sympathies for the victims as people have esires to override this veto. but we should also keep in mind the longer term consequences for our military who serve our nation all around the world. if it has not already been
granted, i ask unanimous consent to include in the record a letter from the secretary of defense and a letter from the chairman of the joint chiefs on this issue. the speaker pro tempore: without objection. the gentleman's time has expired. the gentleman from virginia reserves. the gentleman from michigan is recognized. mr. conyers: mr. speaker, i'm pleased now to yield to a former member of the judiciary committee, now the ranking member on the education and labor committee, the gentleman from virginia, mr. scott. and i yield to him five minutes. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from virginia is recognized for five minutes. mr. scott: thank you, mr. speaker. i thank the gentleman for yielding. mr. speaker, the terrorist attacks perpetrated against our nation 15 years ago killed nearly 3,000 people. no one can fully fathom the grief still felt by families to lose their loved ones in such a horrific way. we understand the need to continue to seek justice against those who may have aided and abetted the individuals that orchestrated these attacks. however, this legislation is not the right way to go about
achieving that justice. foreign sovereign immunity, there are several that recognizes it. jasta goes much further than any recognized practice of international law. mr. speaker, as the gentleman from texas just suggested, one fundamental indication of fairness of legislation is not how it would work for our benefit but what would we think of it if it was used against us? the united states allows our citizens to haul foreign nations into foreign courts, what will other nations enacting legislation allowing their citizens to do the same thing to us? obviously we would not want to put our diplomats, military and private companies at that risk. consider our nation's actions in iraq. while there may be questions about saudi arabia's indirect
involvement on 9/11, there's no question about who the state sponsored actor was in 2003 when we bombed baghdad and killed and injured hundreds of thousands of people with little to no evidence that iraq was any immediate threat to the united states or our allies. hat would we think if iraq enacted similar legislation to jasta, allowing them to sue the united states during the iraqi war, contractors living and working in iraq today could be hauled into iraqi court, tried by an iraqi judge, held responsible by an iraqi jury that would assess the amount of money owed to each and every iraqi citizen killed or maimed. furthermore, if they adopted similar legislation to this, other nations could sue the united states and our citizens for sponsoring organizations they deem as terrorist organizations. unfortunately, these discussions are already taking place in capitals around the
world because of this legislation. jasta does not make clear how the evidence would be gathered to help build a credible case against the foreign nation. would the plaintiffs be able to subpoena foreign officials or would the u.s. department of state officials have to testify? would we be required to expose sensitive materials in order to help american citizens prove their case? and, again, how would we feel about foreign judges and juries deciding whether or not the united states sponsored terrorism? there's also questions about how the judgment under jasta would be enforced. the legislation does not address how the court would enforce the judgment, could foreign assets be attached, how would this process work if other countries enacted similar legislation? would u.s. assets all over the world be subject to attachment to satisfy the foreign jury
verdicts? mr. speaker, there are more responsible mechanisms that this body could enact, their involvement in international terrorism without exposing the united states citizens to lawsuits around the world. mr. speaker, we should do the right thing and sustain the president's veto of this legislation. i yield back. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from virginia yields back. the gentleman from michigan reserves. the gentleman from virginia is recognized. mr. goodlatte: mr. speaker, i yield myself one minute to respond to the gentleman from virginia. first of all, with regard to some of the examples given by the gentleman from texas, i want to make clear that this is the foreign sovereign immune its act that's being amended. -- immunities act that's being amend. foreign sovereign. if they were to flip action to do something in their courts, it would only apply to governments, not to individuals. so with regard to the assertions made by the
gentleman from virginia, many countries have already done what we're proposing to do here today. the whole tort rule that's utilized in the united states, which says, just as an example, if you provide a bag of money to a terrorist in the united states, you can sue that foreign government and our country's right now -- and our courts would change if they provide the bag of money in paris you can do it. right now it's a loophole. guess what, any foreign government that wants to sponsor terrorism in the united states, what's the first thing they're going to do right now under current law? they're going to make sure the money is transferred outside of the united states so they're not subject to the jurisdiction of u.s. courts. customary international law does not seem to require the entire tort limitation. article 12 of the united nations -- i yield myself an additional minute. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognized. mr. goodlatte: article 12 of the united nations convention on jurisdictional immunities of states and their properties would apply the territorial
tort exception if the act or omission occurred in whole or in part in the territory of the state exercising jurisdiction. most nations that have codified the exception appeared to require some act or omission in their territories. but it is not clear that these nations have done so from a sense of international legal obligation rather than from comity. even if customary international law were properly read to preclude a nation from applying the territorial tort exception on the base of death or damage within its territory, the application of jasta to the 9/11 cases, as an example, would still not violate international law since the 9/11 attacks clearly involved tortious acts within the united states. and jasta require that the physical harm occur in the united states. but to have an exception that says that if people aid and abet from outside of the united states, their government -- the
government aids and abets from outside the united states -- i yield myself an additional 130ekds to point out one additional thing and that is under jasta of the president or his representative, the secretary of state can appear in the court where a lawsuit is brought and delay the proceedings for a period of time. but not forever. then, if that time expires and whatever effort the united states is making to resolve this with a foreign government does not change the circumstances, they can still go back to the court and they can require the court -- they can ask the court to delay it further. but then it's up to the court to make that decision. again, i urge my colleagues to override the president's veto. at this time i'm pleased to yield two minutes -- the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman's time has expired. but -- mr. goodlatte: i'll yield two minutes to the gentleman from new jersey, mr. lance. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from new jersey is recognized for two minutes. mr. lance: thank you, mr.
speaker. i rise today in strong support of overriding the president's veto of the justice against sponsors of terrorism act. this is our constitutional prerogative. we in congress can override the veto of a president and in this case a strong bipartisan majority disagrees with the president. earlier today, the senate of the united states voted 97-1 in favor of an override. if is right and just that the victims of the horrific terrorist attacks of september 11, 2001, be able to pursue full justice in our courts of law. i also represent a congressional district in new jersey that lost 81 people on 9/11. opposing views fear repercussions against the united states if this legislation becomes law. but the united states does not
support, finance, or condone international terrorism. we're the nation that historically has helped rid the world of evil and we have nothing to fear from truth and justice. nations around the world should recognize the fundamental justice in legal remedies against a terrorist network that killed nearly 3,000 americans. it is our duty to provide the victims of 9/11 this legislative remedy by which they can seek the facts and the federal government should be as transparent as possible with the evidence and the intelligence. the still grieving families of 9/11 deserve their day in court. they have waited long enough. and this narrowly tailored legislation will give them recourse for full justice and compensation. mr. speaker, any override of a presidential veto is a serious and sober matter. i do not advocate an override
lightly. i deeply respect the office of president of the united states. this president has never been overridden by the congress. i believe, however, that an override is the better public policy in this momentous situation. mr. speaker, i yield back the balance of my time. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman's time has expired. the gentleman from virginia reserves. the gentleman from michigan is recognized. mr. conyers: thank you, mr. speaker. i'm pleased now to recognize the distinguished gentlelady from texas, who serves both on homeland security and judiciary committee with great skill. i yield to her four minutes. the speaker pro tempore: the gentlewoman from texas is recognized for four minutes. ms. jackson lee: i thank the ranking member. i think it is important to state on the floor of the house that president obama has been an outstanding commander in chief.
i have served on the judiciary committee proudly for the tenure i have had in the united states congress and on homeland security since the tragedy of 9/11. i have and i'm committed to engaging in efforts to develop policies that anticipate and respond to new and emerging challenges to and curity of our nation peace and safety of the world. stood on the front steps of the capitol and saying with members of this congress, god bless america. visited the world trade center in months and weeks after this heinous tragedy. and grieved continuously each year as we commemorate sadly /11. the loss of these families will be painful and piercing.
just recently the judiciary committee heard justice against sponsors of terrorism in a hearing or had a hearing on the bill. and the supporters of the bill offered powerful and compelling testimony in favor of ensuring that 9/11 families have access to their day in court against the parties directly and vicariously libel for the injuries they suffered. i also take into consideration the concerns of the administration which deals with underlying sovereign immunity and open up u.s. diplomats and u.s. torges for legal action for see if foreign countries pass resip prokohl laws n addition the president has said it would upset long-standing