tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN September 29, 2016 6:00am-7:01am EDT
robust. my view is they don't have a hack for these states. they just need one swing state, one or two or maybe a few counties and one swing state. so why do challenge that somehow we are robust and my question is is very focused to make sure we do everything we can to make sure it is protected. >> the rest of the community is focused on all the states not just the swing states because we feel all the votes are valuable in that sort of realm. the basic premise of this is that if someone goes into a polling place and attempts to influence the election that is a
federal crime and they should be prosecuted. so we are basically asking for people to be vigilant and serve on the front lines. you would still need a tremendous amount of people to go to any polling place to try to influence. we have troubling reports on how these can be hacked. symantec corporation? for research purposes? >> let me put this in the back or do there is a bloomberg
article dated september 19 saying the states asked for cybersecurity scans and i'm just going to read this in a recent voting machin machine of its poe to change the data. if i could enter this into the record. can you explain how and if there is any reason why, what didn't we always want a backup in case something was happening? >> the machine is abc advantage used in a few counties in pennsylvania and other states.
the computer program is mounted in a socket on the motherboard. you would have to remove that from the socket on which you've prepared the program. the program that i've prepared as an extra 100 lines of code that changes some votes in the machine and it changes the log. to install that the attacker just needs to have copies of this chip in for each voting machine to remove the panel that covers the motherboard containing the legitimate program and install the chip inp containing the fraudulent
program. other kinds of machines or their computer program in the flash memory and this can be updated under the control of whatever program happens to be running in the machine. it can be without physically changing any hardware in the machine just by installing a software upgrade memory card in the same slot within one would normally install the ballot definition. in this particular attack was demonstrated by my colleague at princeton in about 2007 working with graduate students. there's many kind of voting machines and the same kind that are applicable and have been demonstrated at several other universities including the university of connecticut, johns hopkins, michigan one of the
things i want to make sure it is clear is that one of the reasons it doesn't allow people with disabilities to verify their vote and handle that. someone that has a dexterity disability but there are machines that allow for the verification of ballots were better able to be used by those with disabilities. >> can i just briefly respond? we launched a rocket that landed on the barge that actually you
can have both a paper ballot and some sort of input and have both, so it's not like it can't be done. my hope is that we don't have any more without the paper ballots. i would like to recognize congresswoman kelly. >> i meant to do my opening statement about the hackers attacking the voter registration database in illinois and arizona and i would like to take a moment to understand wha that te attacks are and are not. was the cyber attack on the voting machines were the voting database? >> in arizona and illinois they seem to have been intended to copy the data on the systems
possibly for the purposes of the personal information so we haven't seen intrusions intended in any way to impact individuals in the voting. >> by fees than the actual machine? >> it is in part to ease the registration process. it is because they are connected to the internet they are more susceptible to the intrusions. >> it seems that it would be difficult to succeed in the system and regained that results in an undetected they is that correct?
>> that's correct because the different layers of security in the system even though the different parts may be vulnerable we have different parts in the system. >> what are they doing to help the state secured the database is? >> we'v >> we've recently released the best practice document focusing particularly on the voting registration systems. we have a host of resources available to the governments that are applicable to the voting registration systems and others outside of the voting process. >> and is it correct that there are at least 40 states with the network defense device similar to that used by federal
agencies? >> the majority of states i don't know the exact number take advantage of a service we offer which provides network protection. >> is a it the same production level. >> it is a different capability just suited to that which the networks offer. there is one key difference. we made that available in a different way for the state and local governments but what butn say is overall we made those protections available through one mechanism or another. >> what is your agency doing to help secure the system's?
>> one of the things i would like to include in the record is a checklist for securing the voter registration data and about as a number of things from access control to the making sure that we document everything and everyone and i would like to make that available for the record. >> without objection. >> can you describe how widespread the problem is? >> i would echo the comments already made but because voting machines aren't on the internet that is an important distinction to be made between machines and that we are voting on election day and it's generally connected to the internet. in terms of the vulnerabilities again i would say my concern is
mostly about the fact that the equipment is getting old and as the equipment gets older, we are more likely to see failures and again i am particularly worried about this and the age of social media we saw this in 2012 touchscreen machines in virginia there was an instance where the glue between the screen and the machine itself was degrading and as a result, the kind of thing that happens, i'm sure you've seen the videos of this before, somebody selects one candidate and another shows up. that isn't very good for the voting confidence and when that is posted on youtube as it inevitably is, the more we see especially in the context of hearing about the voting syste
systems, data can b that can bey dangerous thing and that has to get taken out of service. there was a study from researchers at harvard and mit that estimated between 500,000 to 700,000 that were not able to vote in 2012 because of the long line. i think that is a huge risk to the integrity. >> if anybody knows the machines that are still being used. >> they are probably among the oldest in new jersey. i would say ironically i think that some of the oldest machines probably have less of the need of replacement in the newer systems that we bought because systems particularly just after the help america vote act was passed that were designed in the '90s were essentially laptops
from the 1990s and those were not built to last much longer then ten or 15 years. >> i think some of the oldest electronic voting machines in this country were from the late 1980s. some of those machines are still reliable in the sense of not breaking down. my concern with the machine is more can i be without a paper trail that would let you cover the election? aesthetic one of the things we are doing now is working on the guidelines so they were done before the iphone and we want to make sure that we incorporate technologies that are here today looking for tomorrow so we are asking for anyone to join the public working groups to give
their input to make sure it is basically the best standards that we put out. >> i would just add i know we have been signaled out with our voting equipment being fairly old, early 20005 just remind the representatives this is an equipment used to were three maybe four times a year we have policies and procedures in the state where the counties have certain way ways they have to ce for the equipment and they have held up well so i think it's important to realize that even though the technology may be old, it doesn't mean it's bad. we actually do an assessment
after because we have a less than 1% failure rate so if that changes it would raise a red flag that right now, we have not seen that. >> we always ask how can congress help to make things better, but where do you think any of you can answer this, where should that priority be to make sure they are secure and that the public does have confidence in ho and how can cos help? >> i spent 11 years on the hill and i know the difficulties the members face also having a financial responsibility to that and i think that's my role now is one to give congress the best advice i can to move things
forward so in my own opinion i'm looking at voting machines like a fire truck will still be out there and they need to be used d in if there's a fire they have to be used but until a new truck can be purchased, you have to use the old one so what can you do, we are making sure that we give the best guidance in terms of managing those things so on the website we have ten things to do on managing the voting equipment. in the future i would say if the congress wants to look at how much it would cost you replace these machines but also to look at other aspects to say do we want to start talking about this third rail but also we want to make sure that when we look at the military and overseas voters as well because they don't have the same options of using the
apartment we have here looking at the disability groups into the aging population as well so there's a lot of things and i would be happy to come up here any time to discuss these topics. >> i think that is a good question and there's a couple things that come to mind for me. i would encourage the congress to put the states remain flexible. there is a great value and i know the national conference of state legislators agree with that assessment as well but i would also urge you to work with the national association of secretaries of state with the commissioner and his colleagues for many of the meetings we have in dc i think i can pretty much 100% speak on behalf of the organization we would love to have any member of congress or
maybe even to assess during that meeting where you can hear different perspective because it is different. one size doesn't fit all. we would welcome and encourage that. >> the chair notes the presence of the colleague from georgia we appreciate your interest in this topic and i ask unanimous consent the congressman be allowed to fully participate in today's hearing. >> without objection, so ordered. i know you hav have a time deade but we should be done and i would like to recognize the congressman for five minutes. >> thank you. appreciate you letting me be a part of this.
i just want to say hello to you. it's always great to have some georgians appear and it's an honor to have you here thank you for participating and to the witnesses thank you for being here. let me go to the broad question that we are all concerned about and should be used regardless of how the shows. can you show some of the steps taken across-the-board? >> we have done a lot i know i've spoken a lot about the voting system not being connected and we have all kinds of policies and procedures about how we tie the number of votes on a specific machine that is counted with our paper tape inside the machine back to the
signed voter verification so i want to assure people that there is a way that we can tie that down but also it hasn't been talked about a lot but there is fraud that happens as well we have seen it in many local jurisdictions with absentee ballots. we have had elections that have been overturned and people manipulating the absentee ballot process in the municipal election where literally five to ten votes. one of the things we have done in georgia having good state walls on how the counties should handle the statewide voting system and training in that regard to protect the integrity of the election also as the
commissioner said we'vcommissiod for the public's help. not only is it the poll workers but we have got to stop voter fraud in the e-mail that we monitor unlike some other jurisdictions across the country we actually have a law-enforcement division. any complaints that we didn't can be something may be as small as there is a handicap lift that wasn't working correctly at a precinct where there's not or th parking where there's long lines. we will respond to every one of those cases to see if it warrants an investigation. so we would encourage those that may see something improper if they feel like their vote hasn't been cast properly if somebody was manipulating them in a precinct, whatever it is to report that and we strategically
put our investigators and inspectors around the state and the advanced period when we can respond very quickly. we had a lot of ways we try to stop voter fraud but contrary to some people not believing it happens, it actually does and we bring those individuals or counties if they are not following the rules and procedures to the state election board and we have a process we go through and we have had candidates that have paid heavy fines and have committed to never run for office again because of the actions we've taken. we treat every case the same. >> what about specifically when it involves electronic voting machines when someone offers a complaint what is your process?
>> as you can imagine that is something that is high on the radar. if we have and equipment problem we have emergency preparedness plans especially on the big elections like november 8 where we've coordinated with the state patrol and the department of public safety to have a helicopter and a troop on the state election center so let's say we have a server or go without which we had have been in a county if the results don't come in quickly than the public starts to ask the question why is that happening so we have the ability to either fly or drive a law-enforcement official equipment or if we have had times where there is a failure in the voting equipment we have had to send a technician out to get a memory card or something of that nature so there's a lot
of steps we take to investigate but also to respond quickly to those type of things. >> i want to yield back and thank you it is always great to see you. i would like to recognize the congressman for his five minutes. >> thank you mr. chairman and all of you for being here this is a very important subject all of us are concerned with. secretary, again it is great to see you. thank you for your work in georgia we appreciate all of your efforts in making sure the elections are run in a safe and effective manner. you've are doing a great job and i appreciate the opportunity to have worked with you in the general assembly and have memories of that.
i wanted you to provide us some insight in your position as the secretary of state and also as i understand cochair of the association of secretaries of state and also as a member of the new infrastructure cyber security working group. cybersecurity is something we talk a lot about. also as the chairman c he and i both serve on homeland security and we are very concerned about cybersecurity. mr. secretary, can you briefly describe your role as a member of the infrastructure cyber security working group can you tell me what you all do? >> it is a relatively new task force that was created by secretary johnson so that we can have collaboration between the states and the department of homeland security and i certainly applaud that.
i've had some people ask me why i would serve on math when i was so critical of the infrastructure definition, but i do feel very strongly that is the designation that shouldn't be put on the systems but also feel strongly that there are ways we can collaborate as secretary of state or officials with a lot of different branches of the federal government to make sure we are prepared that we are informed and that we can better protect our systems. the working group right now has been a series of phone calls to go over what the dhs ruled out for the need or that they may want to voluntarily take advantage of some of the things that have been talked about. right now from all i know unless we have some sort of other
events pop up, that's probably all that's going to happen other than the states knowing they can reach out to the dhs directly. from the state of georgia we are already doing a lot of things that have been offered so we don't have the need for the assistance. it's not that we are not grateful for it being out there it's just something that thankfully we have been working on this issue like you were saying cybersecurity for three years and they know the state house as well. we see that everyday not only in the secretary of state's office but across the state government in georgia and we are part of an information sharing and analysis center as well in georgia that is going through the technology of authority. >> let me shift gears for just a second. it's my understanding that the assistance commission is my understanding the association of secretaries of state called for
the elimination of that on several occasions in fact just recently i should say in july of 2015, as the secretary of state and georgia havin georgia have y interactions? >> i was one of those for full disclosure that supported the resolution several years ago. he may have a better understanding of that van me. i felt like the usefulness of the organization that time had passed that answer your question yes i've had dealings in part of this working group and i will say they havsee they have been y responsive in their role. >> do you now think they are unofficial? >> i definitely think they are beneficial. i have different thoughts about that that may be in a different setting i could spell out more
detailed but they have been more responsive than this issue. >> should we eliminate them or transfer that work to another group? >> i'm of the belief that we can do that at the state level. i will say that it's been great that we have commissioners that have been appointed where they can work on certain things required at this time. i want to thank the secretary for his support. one of the reasons i spend 11 years appears i spent four and a half years as a nominee. the longest serving nominee i was confirmed. >> who does the confirmation? >> we are doing all we can.
>> but overall for almost three years and then in the general counsel or the executive director a lot of that work wasn't getting done so when confirmed, we started to hit the ground running and so i think that most of the secretaries of state have changed their tune to figure we are more vulnerable now that the role is for others and the voters themselves and we are proving we are valuable and hopefully we will continue to do that. >> thank you for what you do. this is important and we appreciate your work and due diligence. >> the gentle man yields back the remainder of his time. mr. cummings. >> this summer there were reports that russia is attempting to compromise the
elections. this is a very grave an grave it threatens the foundation of our democracy. the ranking member dianne feinstein in the committee issued a joint statement that said, and i quote, based on the briefings we have received, we've concluded that the agencies are making a serious and concerted effort to influence the united states election. basically after careful consultation with the intelligence community, our community in fact i assume you have no reason to question the accuracy is that right? >> the executive branch hasn't attributed to these to any entity.
>> for some reason donald trump keeps defending russia against these allegations in fact monday night's debate he said he doesn't know if it was russia. it could be china or a 400 400-d person in their bed. the statements seem ridiculous to me. he has encouraged russia to conduct the hacking. doctor osmond plays a key role helping states protect their systems against cyber attacks is that right? >> we are there to support the states and local governments in the system. >> this morning the fbi director james comey told the house judiciary committee there's no doubt some bad actors have been poking around. without disclosing classified information have you seen an uptick by foreign adversaries?
.. we share information with state and local governments, and state and local governments are using that to more carefully monitor their systems. any time you more carefully monitor a system, you are going to see more bad guys poking and prodding at it, because they are always poking and prodding. what i can tell you is, i think it is safe to say that voter registration systems that are online will always be the subject of interest from bad guys, whether for just --
whether for stealing personal information by criminals or other various purposes. and that is why we think it is important that state and local governments constantly focus on the security of those systems. the security of the systems and we have published guidelines to help them secure the systems. on august 302016 i sent a letter to the ranking member of the committee on foreign affairs and homeland security and the fbi investigating troubling connections between members of the trump inner circle. i ask unanimous consent this letter be made part of the record mr. chairman. >> without objection so ordered. >> five director comey was asked about this letter before the house judiciary committee. comey said the fbi is trying to figure out quote just what mischief is russia up to in our election and he also said he would not at least at this stage
any individual working for mr. trump who are listed in this letter because he does not comment on ongoing investigations. i want to ask you a specific rest is about this but generally does it work with the fbi regarding foreign adversaries? >> in july the president released the role of the dhs and the fbi in investigating cyberincidents and you can think about is the significant cyber assistance equivalent of an arson in a rowboat and if you have an arson you want the firefighters. in this analogy the fbi are the cops. there are threats responders to lead one person agency. my organizations are lead firefighters so we focus on helping the victim and taking information to share with other victims to help them or other potential victims and help them protect themselves so we do collaborate closely with the fbi but the fbi ascertains who is
the perpetrator and bringing that perpetrator to justice. generally as you come across evidence that anyone in the united states was aware of the legal access or collaborated with foreign adversaries would you work with prosecutors and the fbi investigators? >> if at any time we come across any evidence of a crime unless we are prohibited from sharing that we would share it with law enforcement agencies. >> thank you. the ranking member in mr. hice thank you for your time and contribution to this hearing. i know you have two slip away and if you do please go ahead. >> i can't leave when my own congressman joe showed up. i can take five minutes. >> with that i would like to recognize my friend from the commonwealth of virginia mr. connolly for five minutes. >> i know mr. hicks is not
flying home. >> imax are going to iceland. >> thank you mr. chairman and good luck mr. hicks enjoy iceland. there republican secretary jeh johnson said we should consider whether our elections process is critical infrastructure like the financial sector, like the power grid. mr. ozment what does mr. johnson mean by that? >> first i should note that dhs did not formally designate the electoral system is critical infrastructure. we are focused right now in the immediate term on providing whatever resources and assistance we are able to provide the state and local governments and whichever resources in the business they want from us. longer term i think that's a conversation we want to have a state and local governments. under authorities there are additional capabilities that we can provide to those governments
if we designate the system as critical infrastructure. that includes additional protections and we provide information if for example you want to give and the conversation was told state and local government we can better protect the information that those vendors provide to us. we have, we can better prioritize the resources and improves our ability to for example offer clearances to folks involved in this process. i would like to highlight if you want to make that designation it does not give us any regulatory powers. all of our resources would still be voluntary and the state and local governments would remain in charge of elections. >> so if we did declare a critical infrastructure and think mr. appel said there are 12 states use touch screen
technology. i correct? >> some states use touch screen so i would say approximately 10 states. >> if we declare critical infrastructure we might be able to provide assistance if those states chose to move to paper or electronic ballots. >> we can offer assistance now if it would help in our ability to offer assistance that they would not for example be able to replace their system. we would be able to offer that. >> mr. kemp want to make sure and visit her testimony. a thought i heard you say that the election should he governed strictly by state and localities and it was not really the business of the federal government. >> well as a constitutional duty of the states to run elections. >> isn't also also however our concern of the government that federal elections have some uniformity to them for example
voting rights? >> certainly understanding your point but i think the whole argument is critical infrastructure just like mr. mr. ozment said protecting vendors information goes against the open process that we have now at the state level where when we test their voting equipment is advertised in the local legal newspaper. the local newspaper editor can watch that process. i think the idea of federalizing elections to where we have a one-size-fits-all voter registration system or mandating that states use of certain voting system or one type of voting system creates all kinds of problems and quite honestly i think it would make our system, make the system more vulnerable, not less. >> are you saying that from your
point of view the 50 different state systems plus tens of thousands of localities is just fine and we shouldn't even look at it at the federal level? >> i wouldn't say that you should look at it and everything is just fine. there are certainly jurisdictions out there that do better than others. we have that in the state of georgia but i believe that we are better suited as a state to provide solutions for that than the federal government is. >> what about the voting rights act? that was argument used back in the 1980s and 60s for the federal government to keep its no's out of state jurisdiction. frank is the federal government hadn't passed the voting rights act would still be disenfranchised including your home state. >> i would say the voting rights act is still intact. >> yes but it's the opposite of what you are asserting. an example of federalizing something.
>> i didn't say that. >> the states were actively suppressing the votes. you don't deny that, do you? >> i'm not sure i understand what that has to do the election system. >> in dealing with your assertion of the principle that we should conceptualize any aspect of this and i'm arguing that the voting rights act is a clear exception to your principle and that perhaps the federal government and federal elections at least have interests that override interest when it comes to protecting at the cyber level of integrity. >> that's certainly your opinion. mine differs. >> i yield back mr. chairman. >> thank you mr. connolly. i now would like to ask unanimous consent to letters from their good one from the national association of secretaries of state and an open
letter from the nation secretary of state to congress talking about how we can work together to share the facts about cybersecurity in our elections. the second letter is from the look tonic privacy information center about this hearing. without objection, so ordered. mr. hicks one of the things he said, one of the three points that the agency is responsible for is providing grants. it is their grant money available to help upgrade aging equipment? >> most of that money has already been accounted for so there is no money available to replace voting equipment. >> thank you and dr. ozment i just want to be clear this conversation about designating voting systems is critical infrastructure is off the table for this election, is that
correct? >> it's not what we are focused on in the near term. in the next three months of voting has started, voting is occurring in a number of jurisdictions across the u.s. for the next few months. we are focused on how we can help state and local government. >> i would just like to end with my takeaways from this is that pieces of our voting system more vulnerable and it's really hard to hack our voting systems. is there something that can be upgraded, we should never rest on outdated legacy systems and we should be looking at how we solve this problem working together and the resources within dhs for our states to voluntarily ask for and this is not forcing a particular program on an individual state. what i would like to do in my remaining three minutes, and love to go down the line and
everybody takes 30 seconds to give your final points. this is an important topic. i appreciate you all being here and this is your last conversation with the american people. let's start with you and work our way backwards. >> thank you chairman. i guess i would emphasize two things. what you said earlier i think is the most important thing we can do is ensure that there is confidence in the system. i think that the issues of access and competence and integrity of our voting system are all interdependent and linked to integrity represented as oppositional. i do think that there is a role for congress after the selection to start thinking about what investments the federal government can make to ensure
that there is confidence in the system through research grants for innovation and for replacing some of the oldest equipment that really is a challenge and one last point i want to make is because so many states are leaving it to counties to purchase this equipment we are starting to see a two-tiered system in this country with counties with less money, less resources. they are often rural counties are left without a eating able to invest and replace their equipment and we are talking about local elections and also federal elections. >> mr. appel, 30 seconds. soon after the election i think it would be a very good thing for congress to find a way to assist and encourage those 10 states that primarily use touch screen machines and they switch
to optical scan machines. there many state darts in our american elections which have been explicitly discussed in this hearing in both have to do with the inherent transparency of the canvassing process in many states in the most dates were the result are announced in each precinct depending on how many votes each got in each precinct. they can see for themselves that those numbers add up to what the election officials are reporting in the precinct by precinct totals and that's a safeguard against the computer and county central to might be adding up those precincts. we should encourage measures that election participators are making transparent to precinct by precinct numbers in a way that we can see that they add up. >> secretary kemp. with the chairman yield per minute text to mr. appel's point, because we have a paper trail we were able to see an
anomaly and absentee alec casts. clearly there was an anomaly in one congressional district and it turned out there was a ballot box. the votes have not been counted. it made a difference. it was that this positive so what mr. appel is saying is critical in terms of getting results in our elections. >> i will add the kind of transparency you get from that makes it so you don't have to be a cybercybersecurity expert to understand that anomaly. >> general hurd thank you for having me and i appreciate the opportunity to be here. my 30 seconds i would just encourage you to continue to collaborate with the secretaries of state, lieutenant governors and other elections officials back home and asked them what they are doing, what they are doing to prepare. i would encourage all american citizens to do that as well. i think they it will be very
pleasantly surprised to see that the preparations that are going on across this country to make sure we have successful and fair elections in georgia. we appreciate any more collaboration that we can have with this committee or other members of congress and the national association of secretary of states to work together in the future. >> saturday marked 45 days before the election and on that day ballots were set out to our men and women overseas so that they could start casting their ballots back. early voting starts soon for many states and one of his message and the message i want to make sure it's clear today is that our elections are secure. we on our web site and throughout the nation when we have gone around this country have talked about our be ready 16 campaign to talk to states about how they can secure their elections and make sure that the ballots are being counted accurately and so forth. and come november 8 we
will have an election and the election will be secure. >> dr. ozment. >> we must be vigilant as we must always be in an area where there are cyber threats particularly as many states upgrade their voting systems over the next four years. we must build those systems and have more cybersecurity that stops not just the attacks of the day but the attacks of the future and will still be used in 2030 and 2040 but overall and right now we have confidence in the integrity of our electoral system. we have no indication that adversaries are planning cyber operations that would change the outcome of the election. we believe that the diversity at many different levels of checks and balances in our electoral system are sufficient that we should all have confidence in the integrity of the system and the election. >> thank you dr. ozment and i'd like to recognize ranking member
cummings. >> i'm concerned very much about the cyber situation but i'm also concerned about african-americans, hispanics and so many others who have been blocked from voting. i think i will go to my grave trying to do everything in my power to make it so that everybody gets the opportunity to vote. my parents were denied it over and over 10 and i've seen a lot of the same things happening today. mr. kemp you are secretary of state of georgia which is one of the three states that has allowed to modify citizenship in the state based on the unilateral decision to the eac executive director. stand he submitted a request for this modification but in addition to that date you or anyone in your office have communications with mr. newby or
anyone else at the eac relating to this request? >> i would have to look back and see if that was the case before are after. i know we had written letters asking for this issue to be treated like the eac had treated previous instances where we could simply treat the federal form the same way we treat the state warm in our state. >> we provide this committee with the copies of all e-mail or other communications between you or anyone in your office and anyone that the eac about this? would you do that for me? >> we can do that. >> mr. kemp were to do submit to the eac demonstrating that the modifications requested was necessary for the of elections in georgia? >> we were simply trying to as i said earlier match the state warm with the federal form.
>> we provide a committee with all documents relating to that? >> we certainly can look into that. >> that's not what i asked you. i say would you provide us with the documents. >> i wouldn't be able to answer that question but i can certainly look into that and get back to you. >> i would like you to provide to the committee and they don't like him them is that you and your office have related to any analysis regarding the impact on eligible voters that your request would have. did you look into that? keep in mind at north carolina what they did is they systematically figured out when black people vote. they figured out how they vote and then with precision they made sure they did everything in their power to stop them from voting. i just want to make sure that we have documentation. i'm sure whatever you do this proper. i would just like to know what the congressional is on my part says as the son of people who could not vote can sit here and
half a form here not address this issue. >> representative it's really a pretty simple thing that we are trying to do. we were simply trying to make the federal form have the same questions as the state warm but i would tell you the state of georgia under my administration leadership we implemented on line voter registration for anybody that has a driver's license or state issued i.d. card to register to vote 24 hours a day, seven days a week and we have had over 367,000 people that use that system. right now we have a student in the masters program that we started last year with a palette of 14 high schools around the state and 150 kids. now ballooned to over 800 students in any kind of possibility can imagine across the state have. we have schools we are teaching
students in the schools to register their peers to vote so i can assure you anybody who meets the requirements and wants to register to vote in georgia they can do so. >> i'm glad to hear that. the court of appeals for the d.c. circuit temporarily halted and reversed the unilateral action by the eac executive director however prior to that do you know how many voters in georgia have tried to register using the federal form and were turned away because they did not provide proof of citizenship? >> i wouldn't be able to answer that question. >> how long will we need until you can get back to us? >> i will have to check him out and get back to you. >> mr. chairman as i said i'm concerned when justice ginsburg was talking about texas, i think it was in the shelby case and she was saying that 600,000 residents would not be able to
vote. i mean if we want to have an emergency that's what the emergency ought to be about. every single person i don't care whether they are tea party, green party democrat or republican i want to fight for their right to vote and i just want to thank you mr. chairman for your courtesy and i look forward to your responses attorney general secretary of state kemp. >> let me make just one point the while we were asking for the form to be changed we never stopped taking the federal form. >> i'm almost finished mr. chairman but can you understand why african-american people and hispanics and others might be upset when people are blocking -- i'm not saying you but blocking them from voting when they are paying taxes and working hard and doing everything they're supposed to do and not be able to vote? can you understand that?
>> i can understand but i can assure you that's not happening in georgia. we have seen minority participation increase in our state. >> thank you. >> i would like to thank her when this is for take in a time to appear before us today. if there is no further business without objection this subcommittee is adjourned. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]
[inaudible conve >> deputy secretary of state tony lincoln testifies about the civil war in syria and its impact on other middle east countries today. we are live with the senate foreign relations committee at 10:00 a.m. eastern on c-span 3. you can also watch live on c-span.org or listen live on the c-span radio are. -- app. >> the next president making appointments to the supreme court of the united states will be president donald trump. clinton in the white house, the rest of the world will never forget why they have always looked up to the united states of america. withmpaign 2016 continues,
the vice presidential debate between republican governor might hence -- mike pence and democratic senator tim kaine, tuesday night, live from farmville, virginia, beginning at 7:00 -- 7:30 p.m. eastern. at 9:00 p.m., live coverage of the debate, followed by viewer reaction. the 2016 vice presidential debate. watch live on c-span. watch anytime on demand at c-span.org, and listen on the free c-span radio app. >> live today, "washington journal" is next. wells fargo ceo john stumpf at the house financial services committee on unauthorized customer accounts. coming up in 45 minutes, north carolina congressman david price on government funding, recent police shootings, and the 2016 campaign. a: 30, iowa congressman steve
king about funding the federal government, the override of the 9/11 lawsuit bill veto, and protests over police shootings. ♪ host: good morning. it is thursday, september 29. congress sought to wrap up its legislative work before heading home to campaign ahead of the november election. resolutioncontinuing funds the government for 10 weeks until december 9. both the house and senate voted overwhelmingly yesterday to override president obama's veto allow citizens to sue a foreign g