tv CSIS Hosts Discussion on U.S. Alliances CSPAN November 28, 2016 2:00pm-3:31pm EST
to succeed. these lengthyof u.n.rsations take place, the administration stood by the things president obama has said on the campaign trail. after those conversations, do you still stand by those? >> are not aware that the president's assessment has changed, but the election is over and the presidents focus is on the constitutional abilities he has as president of the united states to preside over this mood -- smooth transfer, even though the president didn't support him politically. >> many people feel that the election is not over, as there are recount efforts. some are calling it far-fetched and frivolous. during the campaign the president expressed his integrity of the the electoral system and his doubts that there could be
hacking or widespread illegality, anything like that. like then't sound stance that would support a recount. given what he has said about integrity and how the system is run, does he feel like these efforts might be too much? >> the president does have confidence in the way that the election system in this country is run. part of what is required of any election system is providing for a recount. when the law stimulates that one can be requested. the presidents expectation is the smoothwith functioning of our election system on election day, ensuring that the recount system functions smoothly, according to by anw, when justified
narrow victory by one side of the other. the presidents expectation is that everyone will follow the rules and regulations. >> live coverage of the white house briefing continues on c-span.org. here we take you to a discussion on u.s. alliances and -- around the world. just getting underway at the center for strategic and international studies. >> -- with a long record of distinguished service in government, including his advisers to previous prime ministers. andrew joined us at csi s and together with others they designed this project, to look at american leadership and alliances. the two of them of course go a point ofd are at some transition, turbulence,
questioning, given events around the world. given the pressures of globalization and other things here and abroad, the presidential transition, it seems a good time to get back to some of the fundamentals of why we built this alliance system over 50 years ago and what sustains it, what's in it for us and our allies. the things that we have to do to make it more effective for all of us. andrew is going to do this -- i will introduce and now, looking at the fundamentals, mechanics, and strategy, beginning with this event today and this distinct panel. i am turning it over now to the director of the project and let andrew tell us about the discussion for today. thank you. andrew: thank you, mike. thank you, everyone for coming.
-- everyone, for coming. in particular i would like to thank you for your support in this project, which i think is important and comes at an important time. has been not only a great colleague, but as we like to say, a good mate and i would like to thank him for that. i would also like to knowledge this afternoon the support for project.dent of csis's we have been able to pull together to support this project and my colleagues are helping me out on the project. following the catastrophe of the second world war, farsighted american-statesman worked with counterparts around the world to build and maintain a global alliances regional unsurpassed in human history. starting with nato in europe,
rimming the western pacific, for 70 years these alliances have supported the quarter with possible and unprecedented stability and prosperity, contributing measurably to american security. over time the united states alliances have been augmented by formal security platforms. none of it, however, was preordained. isolationism has been merged span offlict in a american politics and foreign policy. coming to the surface in the 1930's, early 1950's, and mid-1970's. and of course, at a different time it was domestic politics in allied companies -- countries
that royal alliances across europe, asia, and the middle east. despite the intention and the significant cost of the alliances, they have enjoyed bipartisan political support in the united states. notwithstanding, a bitterly contested election campaign in which president-elect trump openly questioned the value of nato and the united states most important alliance, and sitting president barack obama publicly , a recent allies survey by the chicago council of local affairs shows that the american public overwhelmingly supported american leadership in the world. 90% of americans, including many trump supporters, consider maintaining existing alliances and effective way to achieving
american foreign-policy goals. support nurturing and renewing this support. today the united states and its allies face and unprecedented range of threats. these include russian aggression of eastern europe and adventurism in the middle east. north korea's rapidly developing nuclear ballistic missile programs. assertiveness in the western pacific. continuing support for terrorism , and theding influence metastasizing threat proposed by isil around the world. yet the united states and its allies are neither psychologically nor materially prepared. an element of complacency and society about the threats that we face and the
loss of perspective of our prosperity. alliances require sustained hard work, investment, and give-and-take on both sides. the former u.s. secretary of state used to call this the alliance in the garden. today, however, owing to inertia, resource constraints and sequester in the united states, as well as internal challenges. in europe these popular forces unleashed brexit, and are popular in other nato countries. in asia the u.s. allied with thatand following country's most recent military takeover. the implication of the political crisis engulfing the administration in south korea is
not clear. ,he future alignment of turkey long a critical partner of the crossroads between europe, the middle east, and asia, is also unclear, while israel and traditional allies in the middle east are alienated. credibility as a security guarantor has meant damaged by the failure to inform the red line and by threat unlesst's they pay more for their defense. everywhere there is a sense that the west is in retreat and that the liberal international order is fraying. this is the jumping off point for the project. to examine the role and relevance of these alliances back to the earliest days of the cold war. and how they can adapt to meet the very different challenges that we face.
is that thelliances sum is more than the part. enhanced security combining ally military power and increasing corporation. they also play an important role in supporting the international order and in restraining allies in a relationship that works in both corrections. alliances building interoperability, relationships, thatutual trust over time ad hoc coalitions simply cannot replicate. the incoming trump administration foreign-policy team and policy directions are a work in progress. but allies should welcome some of these early signs. the president-elect has spoken with many allied leaders. his administration is likely to work with congress to restore u.s. defense, build a larger navy, and modern art --
modernize u.s. nuclear arsenal. important fits that will increase safety and reassure allies. for the first time in decades america's alliance and the future of that system is at issue. the united states was so dominant for decades that allies , and even american policymakers , often tended to see the alliance makers as some sort of free international public good. allies as opposed to an extent it was. united states is still the world's dominant military power, but rivals like china are closing the economic cap. in this environment the united states will be instinctively flirt with unilateralism and deals of convenience with regional powers and perhaps a more transactional approach to alliances.
for the costs and challenges posed by alliances and managing allies, america needs to think hard today about how attractive a world without allies really would be. nothing thatere is russia, china, and iran would like more than to see the dismantling of america's alliances in europe, asia, and the middle east. that reality alone should give serious pause. the percy spender, the former australian foreign minister along with john foster dallas, observed that it is difficult and at times exceedingly so, to understand precisely what the united states thinking is. i have no doubt that many diplomatic representatives here are struggling over there reporting cables and will agree that this is certainly one of those times. for the purpose of this project is to provide answers to some of those questions.
based around three research themes. the first theme is alliance, institution, leadership. what role do these alliances play today in supporting the international order and allies. is this still a viable concept of the west? alliances how do uphold it? alliance institutions, do they need to be overhauled? how can they inform the security partnership in tribute. what is the role of u.s. leadership at home and abroad building support for alliances? the second theme is about alliances in operation. their day-to-day management. which allies are pulling their weight and in which areas do they need to raise their game. how can they build military interoperability and address certain capability gaps?
weaponsld where nuclear are making an unfortunate come back. what approaches should they take in combating co-version, threats, and cyber attacks, expanding intelligence and increasing intense industrial collaborations. what challenges are we likely to confront and how could we do more? some of the most important research is about understanding and engaging public opinion. notwithstanding the positive polling earlier, we cannot take continuing public support for granted. in the united states or in allied countries. interview with the atlantic, henry kissinger pointed to a gap in foreign-policy, where polls and a number of countries, including my own country, australia, anxiety butegree of
the future direction of american policy and alliance. we have to do a better job of andrstanding public opinion not just here at washington, d.c. it's time that we rediscovered but the former secretary of state used to call the duty to , bringing us full circle back to the crucial importance of leadership. today's event is the first in a program of public events, policy roundtables, and publications that will examine these important questions in an attempt to provide answers to stimulate discussion to guide american and allied policymakers. we hope you will stay involved in this project and in particular the input and engagement of allied governments will be essential. ladies and gentlemen, it is now my pleasure and honor to
introduce our guest speaker today. is aal russ had distinguished military fellow in one of the united states most -- and one of the united states must distinguish officers. the recipient of numerous foreign awards. introducing numerous technological innovations. commandsix operational working closely with allies in the pacific, europe and the middle east. person regarding the role of alliances and the american military. after his remarks we will briefly reconfigure the podium and a panel of experts is going
to drill down into alliance dynamics in more detail. for now i would like to invite admiral roughead. [applause] admiral roughead: well, thank you, andrew. thanks to csis for the opportunity to share some alliances in american leadership. i particularly look forward to the american panelist point of view as i think it will be a great discussion. my interest in this topic is not simply because of recent campaign rhetoric that has raised questions regarding the relevance and efficacy of our alliance relationships, nor is it about all of the speculations in his new administration is it -- form. take full like so many here, i served in a military that shaped by alliance relationships.
i cut my teeth on very large nato exercises and operations and i continued throughout my career to operate in our alliance. i also have the privilege of commanding large allied commands. but those consequential alliances were forged decades ago, as andrew mentioned. time has moved on. the geopolitical and geoeconomic landscapes are changing rapidly, particularly in europe, the middle east. the order in the regions the grounded those alliances is slipping away. the decades plus war in the middle east has brought wariness and much of the population and a move towards isolationism by some.
in a way, it's ironic that america's most globally connected generation in history appears to want to step away from the hard work and the cost that global influence and responsibility demands. that's across the political spectrum. i find that this is an uncomfortable and regrettable, even perilous trend. whether in uniform or civilian policy positions, those of us who have been there have seen the strength and mutual benefit that comes from these relationships. we have experienced the necessary attention needed and at times, the frustration that's an experienced in nurturing those relationships. as we ponder the state of our alliances and their future, those of us who have been in the arena in the policy community, their responsibility for the alliance question is taking place today.
most here value our alliances. whether nato or those without allies. brought thenot broader security interest conversation into how alliances can enhance those interests. within our policy circles in the u.s. we have a vibrant, thoughtful conversation going on, and that's good. but in many ways it's a very close self talk that can be drowned out or negated by a handful of tweets or posts that provide a very different point of view. the public view in the u.s. regarding national security has narrowed. because of isis in the violence in the middle east and avoiding another 9/11. and that's understandable. for over a decade, this has been the american fixation.
the view of security is also trends.y defense, not we think about the ukraine and the rattling up in the balkans. the east china sea, the south china sea, north korea. or it's often about people, .eaders it's not about the values that find alliances together. ,e have also been cavalier blurring the distinction of the word ally. allowed it to apply to who only fight with us, but they are all deemed equal. we have not made it clear that they are allies, with the associated commitments and and others who are
valuable to be sure without the status of ally. we have not articulated the common cause based on the holidays the benefit the coverage and discussion that is too often about what allies are not doing, rather than what they are doing. and what we do to help them as opposed to how our relationship with them enables the facilitating of shaping the environment consistent with our interest in to our advantage. in a wider context we neglected economics ignoring these relationships that can accrue to those who are in these special relationships. that we use, in my opinion, it skews the discussion, rather than beneficial obligatory conversations fundamental to the capability and capacity of
credibility. and appear military since we are simple in our math, highlighting how much or how little the host nation is spending. itneglect the costs of lloyd by being able to maintain american forces. in the case of the navy, calculate capital and personnel forwardrough place deployed forces in japan. the rule of thumb is four or five. theou consider that cost something that needs to be factored in, it changes the equation. we prefer to focus in grade on the aggregate budget numbers and percentages and are not exact or critical enough in defining the in a militaryion capability capacity. we have not properly adjusted
command and control structures for increased integration in this fast-paced world in which we live. the operational command and control models are essentially the same as they were when i was an ensign in the navy. related to that, we have been neglectful in the embedding among allies. largely due to the exchanges that i experienced when i was a young officer. have not optimized our officer programs. how many chinese born area officers have been produced compared to foreign area korears focused on japan, , thailand, the philippines? could they have made a difference in the case of the later three countries? while recognizing respective we have noterests, made our alliance structures the nuclei around which others can
operate easily. such integration is challenging because of the information space in which we live and operate. there are rational concerns affecting sensitive national information. there are complexities regarding security. all of this becomes more complex but we must bes able to do this to reshape alliances for a new time. there are personnel factors. the cost of posting more servicemen and women, the cultural adjustments in the assignment that is overwhelmingly leading to the greater respective affinity. where do you get people if you want to have a more robust interaction? wears it drawn from? although i think this is a good
opportunity to bleed some of the excess people from our overinflated headquarters, now would be a good place to start. this would be good for the details in which the garden of the alliance's shape. it's really about the fundamental values of the collectively, and the shared obligations of those particular nations that they undertake together to ensure that those values apply to the future. as andrew mentioned, above all, we have to keep in mind that we in the policy world are not really the audience. there is a far more broad conversation must be continued. thank you very much.
[inaudible] andrew: thank you, admiral, for that terrific presentation to kick things off. you for speaking on this important issue to kick off the project. now, i'm delighted to introduce the full staff, csis panel. what we are going to look to do now is really drill down into alliance dynamics in different regions. mentions of the science. i'm going to briefly introduce panelists, then we will ask them to speak and open up for questions toward the end. first panelist is dr. marco
grain. before his time at csis he served on the staff of the national security council from 2001 to 2005 as the director of operational affairs. then as special assistant to the president of national security affairs and senior director for asia. heather connolly, also on my right, this easier -- senior vice president of the europe program here at csi s. from 2001 to 2005 which he -- he was a deputy secretary of state at the european affairs. john alderman, on my left, holding the big new chair in global security and strategy and is the director of the middle .ast program here at csis
before joining he was a member forhe policy planning staff the secretary of state. finally, director of the henry kathleen served forhe deputy undersecretary planning and forces. we look forward to hearing your remarks. >> ok, we are still using the hand mic. thank you, andrew. androject is overdue extremely timely, given the events around the world and the transition we have here at home. i should mention that john is not here because of the senior vice president's, we had to hide him in an undisclosed location, but he will be involved and has given us great guidance.
let me talk about our allies in the asia-pacific region. generally because of the rise of china and the north korean the return of, 19th and 20th century style geopolitics to that region, there is a clarity of thought about alliances in asia and alliances from asia that have generally made the alliances stronger over the past few years. still, there are big questions and over the last few months some of the developments in the ,egion, as andrew mentioned have made things seem more acute . the good news first. japan, our largest ally in the region, measured by defense budget or host forces, this year introducing the highest defense budget in its postwar history. paying over $4 billion in host
nation support. the self-defense courses are measured by budget or tonnage. [no audio] [inaudible] predecessors [indiscernible] the light was on? japan, as i said when the electronics failed us, has a navy now that i most , withements is larger different kinds of firepower, but larger than the royal or french navy. the prime minister has now introduced changes torces can d,
the increase not only the .apanese role, but their wits we should not be measuring just dollars and cents. it is also to consider, as he said, the enormous savings bluff and risks that are allies incurred by doing more in doing more with us, which is how i think one could actually declined what the prime minister is doing. largest defense budget. like japan, korea is tightening alliances with more joint planning. more interoperability in the that is combined. in australia the recent polls show that close to 90% of are, in our
partnership with india, our strategic framework agreement with singapore, reconnecting with new zealand and the new partners of southeast asia, all demonstrating our security relationships are strengthening over the past decade or so. public opinion toward the u.s., these countries, quite high. we have done elite polling to choose significant majorities through all of these countries, much referring a us-led system in asia than a chinese lead or multipolarity system. a lot of tailwind and support for an alliance structure that, as we heard, was essentially designed during the korean war. there are also some troubling developments. whether these are systemic, one offs, fault of the u.s.,
internal politics, that can be debated. one factor is that all of our -- mi?everywhere one source of uncertainty in asia, with the bilateral allowances, is the dilemma that allies have larger partners. they don't want to get so close to the big ally that they get trapped in conflicts they don't want. but they don't want to be so independent that they risk being abandoned by the larger partner in the face of a dangerous threat or rising power. all of our allies in asia are constantly negotiating this dilemma on how tight to be while still maintaining some autonomy, but not so independent that they risk being left alone.
that is complicated in asia by the fact that none of our allies once to choose between the u.s. and china. so, you see constant hedging and positioning. the question is, how much do we make of that? is it deep systemic or just the adjustment that a deep bilateral alliance will have? turbulence in the past months in asia. 4% in the polls. fundamental support is strong, but weak political leadership provides difficulty coordinating strategy and managing burden sharing. in the philippines, support for the alliances very high. a differentas hymnal from which he is singing.
enough to invite them back in. was it too much? were they uncertain about the commitment? something that came before the election? questions about our commitment on the south china and east china sea. --the election or difficulty i think there is no single answer. it is a combination of internal politics, external questions about the u.s. -- and in some cases confidence in the u.s.. when an ally is confident, that is more room for the ally to question american leadership areas but it does all occur right now in a way that needs fundamental re-examination. the basis for our -- for our alliances and how to make them more effective. saying thatlude by
at least in the asia-pacific region, there are six things we should focus on. guidelines that we should have. i learned is largely from , but it bearsad repeating. the answer to these challenges is not distance from our allies. aggressiveto deter action by other actors in reassure our allies and make sure that we have some say, a significant say over the strategies are allies take, the common denominator for these is more joint operability. the multiplier effect for your effort, it gives you more tightness as you work together. 54, when that or came up, meant that we go together and don't go alone. we do this together.
the second and support, and gary touched on this, the measure of the alliance contribution should be the effectiveness of the alliance. the partner administration tried under congressional pressure to emphasize with other allies in the pacific, a burden sharing matrix. in the 70's and 80 plus legislation required frequent report on how much allies were burnishing. it was very counterproductive because to our allies it look like we were seeking economic gains. did make advantages for ourselves in terms of dollars. dollars matter. what the reagan administration found was that joint interoperability and measuring the deterrent effect that we want and then building alliance for both sides will in the case of many alliances mean that they do more.
we need to think more with australia about how we deal with the south china sea. the debate in cambodia is not fully developed yet. they have to do more to have a sustainable command and control infrastructure. there are a lot of things that we have to do. some of it will cost money, but not all of it. the third principle is that as we approach allies and partners we need to remember that we do not have a collective security organization like nato. these were created as bilateral alliances because there was such diversity of political systems, levels of contribution, particularly since all of these countries invested in china, we were not going to get a collective security system. we needed to embrace certain amount of security. some will be highly valuable. some are important, but perhaps getting the right answers out of our allies is not as important
as keeping them in a larger goal of stabilizing the system with the existing rules and norms. enough to we don't do connect our key alliances in europe and asia. there is time for the kind of williamsburg summit, where thatcher and ring -- thatcher and reagan got together and agreed without debate about what values we were trying to protect in the west. we can't call it the west anymore. but there is something that we stand for, and it's global. head, as admiral rough ind, history of alliances asia and europe is a history of economic policy.
our transatlantic and transpacific grade negotiations were blown off the rails by the selection, but i don't think there is a single governor in this country that doesn't want free trade agreements. finally, the education process of the american public, which goes beyond think tanks, congress, governors across the country. heather: thanks, andrew. congratulations on this great initiative. our duty is to explain. think that needs to be the mission statement. it is an opportunity. nato does not often crop up as a top issue for discussion during the campaign. we talk about the hot spots in the world, but not necessarily alliances.
it was with great shock that i was sitting at my desk. the question was -- how would the united states withdraw from nato? . said -- of a your pardon i got out the treaty and i looked at it and i thought -- well -- it was never -- it was never a thought i thought we would ever have. president-elect trump introduced a conversation about nato. it would not be the one that i would choose, but i'm going to take the opportunity. in some ways we have, for a long time, then confusing price with value. i think that's what you are talking about. as burden sharing it's always about -- how much have you paid? what is your fair share? you are a free rider. down to the price. for far too long we have not talked about the value of our alliances. what the united states gets out of it.
how it serves our u.s. interests. i like the fact that in your remarks, andrew, instead of burden sharing we talk about our obligation. our duty to alliance. that is what sharing the duty is all about. we have also confused transactional is with the value of a long-standing relationship and partnership. for this there is bipartisan guilt. we have always been going to our allies -- we need this -- we .eed this -- we need this what we haven't done very much schultz, wetary have intended the garden. we haven't talked about the long relationships of the values that we share. what's important? why are you participating in operations in afghanistan if you don't have national interest? why? because you are supporting the
values of this alliance. when we speak only on the transactional, we erode credibility, trust, and the foundations of the relationship. what's so important about our duty to explain is why we created nato in the first place. all rolled into one, why did these 12 countries gather in 1949 to sign the washington treaty? it is today, the came together for a unifying ideal of collective dissent. are doingat they today. instead of 12, there are 28, almost 29 members of nato. exactly, we have to put this context, these same principles, into a 21st century context. it's so important to underscore that nato was designed for and
by u.s. leaders. science -- that's why it was signed here. that's why we are the repository. it was designed for u.s. national engagement. many say -- after the cold war, why did nato exist? curiously they have always found so many more operational positions to do. immediately after welcoming new members, we went to war in xhosa vote it has served in afghanistan. it continues to serve, after 15 years. ask any expert in the first time in article five, an attack against one being an attack thenst all, obligation was importance of the united states. it was on thought of, unheard of . yet it was invoked and nato forces, over a thousand have lost their lives in afghanistan
against supporting u.s. activities. then came 2014. crimeasian annexation of and the incursion into eastern ukraine. this is where the founding principles of nato became very clear in 2014 and continue through to today. but this is not your grandfather's nato. it is focusing on cyber security, missile defense, looking at hybrid activities. the operations are helping to access because of migration. it's got a robust agenda, militarily. i will offer notes of caution. this is not an easy alliance. there are group dynamics such a
large alliance, there is no shared threat assessment or perception. if you live on the eastern flank, you have one friend, that would be -- one threat, that would be russia. if you live on the southern flank, you would have isis, terrorism, the instability from the middle east. miraculously, this large cumbersome alliances found a balance and has been able to respond to the east as well as the south. the problem with nato is that it has been so focused on the operational, it has forgotten that it is a political military alliance. my hope for them in the future would be that they tend their own garden, their own health. as we see a rise of populism, nationalism, and extremism in europe, that is as much of a threat to the solidarity
community. that is what we have to start focusing on. it is shocking to me that after the events of july 15 in turkey that there has been no discussion of the north atlantic council, about what happened inside one of nato's most vibrant and vital members. it is surprising that at a very successful nato summit in warsaw , poland, president obama had to raise bilaterally uncomfortable questions about the importance of polish internal democracy. those are the issues that are so tough for an alliance. it's going to mean that the alliance cannot be as strong as possible. i will close on a note that goes back to the public knowledge and public support. .ato is not the most popular
what i find in the u.s., we talk about the united states and nato. it's always a week. we are nato. soldier sailor marine is a nato soldier, sailor, marine. we have to start talking about this as it gets inside that lives inside of us. what i found so interesting in public support -- i was involved at the state department during enlargement,4 nato when we brought in seven countries in central and eastern europe. we went to -- we went across the .ountry we need to do that everyday. not just build up for when an important ratification happens. we have to start talking to the american people about why nato is important.
colleagues, its role is as important today as it was in 1949. and we are reminded of that everyday. thank you. europe seems clean and easy compared to the least. frankly, we have not had the same kind of partnership there like the one we talked about in asia. the middle east has had external security guarantors for half of the millennium, 500 years. we have been the most recent of them. the u.s. came into the middle east after world war ii with a deep sense that we would do external security guarantees right, protecting the region from communism, done in part not by directly governing but by encouraging these states to adopt more democratic loads of government. whereas democratic governance was the anti-communism of
70's, it became human rights and the way we are fighting rock -- radicalism. there has always been this difficult balance from the u.s. perspective. for more than half of the century we have seen a government component to that. we have positive relationships with almost every government, except iran and syria. there were a few bad actors in the region, but for the most art we are getting into the domestic governance of all of these countries.
it's a very strange situation gotten into. turkey, in this context, is another problem to work out. as we think about the middle east thing, it seems to me we have three different kinds of alliance relationships in the middle east. on the one hand, we have this very sui generis relationship with israel that is in many ways our closest relationship, but also the most complicated. we work intimately with them, but regional hostility means we don't operate publicly and regional security master -- matters means we don't use the forward position equipment in israel. can be used in extremists in its own situation. israel has taken plate that taken part in his broad regional alliances so far. part of the way that
the u.s. thinks about the middle east, militarily. they provide 20% to 25% of the defense fund. for an alliance that is an interesting relationship. the u.s. is bound by law to make sure israel maintains a overtative military edge enemies or collections of enemies in the region. you could argue that this is a good relationship and that israel is bilking the united states. i have heard both arguments. it seems to me that this is a complicated relationship not replicated anywhere else in the world. and it is an important part of how the u.s. thinks about alliance relationships in the middle east. israel's also a major non-nato ally. in point of fact, we have a lot of those. most of them are distinguished by not being in the nature. egypt, a bigo have country, but are other major non-nato allies are jordan,
kuwait, and tunisia, none of which of the military powers. we fight together, we do some basing their, but our major allies are not really major in anyways. the major relationships are countries with whom we don't have formal alliance relationships. principally saudi arabia. we sell them tens of billions of dollars in military equipment, training, logistics. we have sold them some of our most capable equipment. the block systems, the battle tank, the missiles. we have spent tens of billions of dollars in committed troops. we have done all kinds of things . ,ut it is not under the rubric but it is not the formal
relationship that we think about with alliances. in the middle east subtext, to complicate your priorities, andrew, we have a relationship with israel that doesn't fit anything we do anywhere else in the world. we have non-treaty relationships that are the biggest relationships we have in the middle east. as a commercial venture, this we sell tens of billions of dollars in equipment. sales have helped to keep production lines for u.s. jets open, because we're not buying so many ourselves, but our global allies are. perpetuates the thinking that these states rely on the united states to provide security, arguably perpetuating conflict in the region. people say -- well, these states are armed to the teeth, letting them be more adventurous,
creating a need for more u.s. weapons and that the u.s., rather than contribute into security, is contributing to tension. this comes out to be a sort of moral hazard argument of the u.s., creating the very problem it is aiming to address. the fact is that while the obama made an effort to allow the middle east to reach its own new equilibrium between these states and iran, there is no new equilibrium to be found at all. principally trying to take bilateral relationships in the middle east and make them multimodal. with roots in the 50's. we have tried to do things like shared missile defense. small states in the gulf. it makes sense to share the
information. but they don't trust each other they don'tthey want want a broader multilateral relationship in the united states. that creates all kinds of for what it needs to be. how many are the normal u.s. troop commitment? is it what it was at the time? with it on -- saddam hussein? is it was what it was five years after? the gulf states have certainly lost sight of what the norms should be. they can't avoid giving the sense of abandonment.
president-elect trump has come in talking about the importance of burden sharing. complicated.lly our global partners in the middle east, in syria and yemen, for the last several years, in many cases the u.s. has not been directly in the fight as they have been. they have acted in ways using u.s. equipment that the u.s. objected to. do you want to maintain leverage and have responsibility? itself,.s. doesn't act it's not in a decision-making role. if it doesn't, it's part of the decisions of others with which the u.s. might not agree.
i think we are going to have to find a way over the next five to 10 years to find out our new model of relationships is going to be. the old model, it seems to me, as we go forward -- is the new model you? -- yemen? is yemen a desirable new model? i think there are a whole series of questions about how we and our allies will try to come together to deal with a whole range of challenges and threats ,osed by the government of iran which is going to make the issue of alliances in the middle east one that will get more complicated. kathleen: well, thank you to michael and andrew. i know that i'm sitting to the far left. i don't think i represent the far left but i represent the
left of center so i appreciate the effort to be inclusive on that. i was asked to speak specifically to the military aspect of alliances. many of the things i would talk about been touched on. i will try to hit a few points that either were overlooked or maybe require us to stop here and there. the first is just a history of the u.s. use of alliances and our military approach. it is probably self-evident that the u.s. had alliances at the center of its military strategies since come at the minimum, or to coming forward. -- world war ii coming forward. we have never fought truly alone since that time. there is debate about whether that history is coming to a close. maybe that is the operation and the norm is something that looks more isolationist for the united states. we will see. i would simply point out that
the challenges of the world are getting more complicated and interconnected, not less. there's no real way in a truly dystopian future to reverse that. i'm not arguing for a dystopian future come by the way. isolationism isn't able to manage the challenges we see -- nuclear proliferation, terrorism, cyberattacks -- to not wall off physically geographical locations and stop security threats we face. even if you thought we could come it is important to remember that much of our economy depends on u.s. companies and institutions being overseas. heren think of the u.s. as and others as there, and it turns out a lot of u.s. citizens are there and u.s. companies are there. it is complicated to look out for defense and security in an isolationist sense and think of
international security in an international sense. it is an inevitable truth of that this administration coming in will learn, just like every other administration has learned them even if they don't enjoy it -- i point to andrew's mention of the president obama interview in "the atlantic." he does not enjoy being reminded routinely of the importance of these relationships, but it is a reality. how will that reality dawned upon the new administration? the come with a low-pain threshold or high-pain threshold along the way? obviously, the first and most were considered unpopular and the first to come to people's minds -- considered and thought through in the first to firsto people's minds -- and last time in nato history, it was declared in mutual
defense of the united states, and it was undertaken these of the action inside afghanistan, a-vis action inside afghanistan, and that continues good we are talking about hallucinations as well. -- posted nations as well. -- host nations as well. we think of the south koreans fighting in defense of south korea. occur?that contingency we think of east european countries fighting alongside us. should that occur? in addition to the direct way in which we think about allies fighting asked to us we think -- next to us, we think about their role they play in terms of providing capacity often, but not always talking about ground force capacity. there are specific capabilities where the u.s. has essentially had by virtue of having-- hedged
by virtue of having less investment. one obvious example are the british, who have invested in minesweepers, where the u.s. has largely divested itself. there are cases where we need allies in particular kinds of possible scenarios because of the capabilities they bring. and quite obvious is the location aspect, the here and the there. provident to be able to our course in an economical and efficient and effective point, we have to at times the close enough to the place we want to fight to make that possible. that means those bases in places where the united states maintains relationships, in order to be as effective as we can be in the execution of our common defense. the last thing i will point out which gets underplayed is the intelligence aspect. many americans do not realize how dependent we are on
intelligence provided by partners and allies. the u.s. really cannot, at least today, substitute for the huge, vast global network we are able to tap into command pretty uniquely cap into, private among nations. there are also nontraditional fears. certainly intelligence, as i said, is one that crosses over. but things like governance the ability to help build out long-term institutional capacity and countries, places like jordan where we want to make sure there's security over the long-term, requires investment in not just military capability but institutions of government. local knowledge, culture, language could thinking about the french and their role in , where there is a
unique advantage that the military ally can provide where the u.s. does not have the depth of experience and aptitude. areas where there is border crossing -- self-evident, as i said, that the world as we look at it, from the proliferation security initiative of the bush administration on the high seas l effortsunter-isi today, we need to have our allies look at things like nuclear proliferation, the flow of funds across borders, those sorts of security threats rely on alliances. and then finally, also probably understated today, but i know is ther my co-panelists, view that every administration i know of has looked to allies as a source of legitimacy in the international environment. that can change. we could have a united states that no longer cares about the
rule of law. the fact of the matter is, historically, going forward, it is hard to imagine the united states will not have the rule of law at the center of its foreign policy and a national security interests as it has had for the 20 century. let me talk about added patience defense. -- added patience to threats. -- adaptations to threats. obviously, we have a lot of work to do across particular relationships and formal alliances and less formal partnerships. it is a tending the garden approach where we have a constant effort, and the value is there to undertake them. i think that sometimes americans live up to our reputation for impatience. we tend to think of others as being slower than we are. i want to give you a couple examples where we maybe are not so good but we tend to talk about others.
for someone, the u.s. government approach the cybersecurity can many people don't see that as a wild success. we quickly moved to adopting cybersecurity as a part of article five. there is a lot of work to do to figure out how to implement that. there's just as much work to do on the u.s. side. another temple might be the approach to the north korean nuclear challenge, or the u.s. along with the republic of korea and japan australia, and others have been grappling with the applications -- implications. let's look at the u.s. approach, where we are all behind the curve in terms of thinking through how to manage the u.s. approach to nuclear with korea and moving beyond the more comfortable planning parameters that made sense in the 20th century. mentioned, wen think about the missile challenge vis-a-vis iran, where
the -- it requires the sharing of data. that is not there because there isn't this strong desire to share information that would enable collective defense. the u.s. does not like to share a lot of its missile data as well. but youe small examples could probably think of many more were we should look inward as well as outward, because both are problems. but they are not uniquely problems of alliance structure, and our own decision-making can seem at least as sclerotic. the last thing that andrew asked me to talk a little bit about is the use defense trajectory under the trump administration, which is a challenging topic. the quick answer is i don't know. i do think there is the potential for a little bit of "back to the future" in terms of
alliances, and as we had secretary rumsfeld, i was in the pentagon then come and his approach to the u.s. posture and allies is very much power projection approach. i think it is possible that you admiral ross, as rougheadmiral pointed out -- if you need to projected into asia, eastern europe, and routinely do so, that is going to be a very costly approach. and more generally, i think the idea of how you grow the defense budget will be very important. i think many allies inside the u.s. understand the connection between the health of the economy and defense. you don't want to have come if
you will, so much investment in defense done in a way that threatens your economy that you actually drive down some of the value you have as well -- as an ally. how much of the u.s. deficit-spends will become very important. what, if anything, it ends up having to sacrifice in other investment areas. myo think -- really quickly, analogy to rumsfeld has extreme ct was in the sense that not foremost in his mind, and i think that is the central challenge motivating the incoming trump administration, how long it will stay the court challenge they look at, particularly isis, versus are broadened and array of challenges come will depend in part on how they interpret the environment and how the environment encounters them terms of actions.
others might think russia, china, iran. i think there will be heavy scrutiny, as there is in many administrations, on combine activities and exercises, the extent to which they contribute to u.s. war fighting, how you want to quantify and link the value of what we in washington capacityding furniture -- building partnership capacity. yes, you have a relatively protectionist administration. -- we think, coming in. but as has been pointed out, military sales are important to the defense industry and the stocks are doing well with the trump president-elect. their ability to export effectively depends on the relationship coming back the other way, in terms of the trade etc. nd forth,
the last thing i would say is the issue open up come if the next administration opens up this issue and sets up alliances and the terms of the deal we have gotten, there is a strong risk that others are already looking at how to make their end of the deal better. we should not assume that we would get the better end of the terms-on renegotiation on of various alliances. we should keep that in mind going forward and how that will affect the alliances and the theor more generally currently exists for us it is a big question. by saying that there is a we have a global security foreign and there will be a panel that -- global security forum and there is a panel that
focuses on global opinion and elite opinion and ghost beyond alliances to talk about foreign security policy and there is a more isolationist viewpoint all the way to the standard csis bullish alliance, folks like us here. hope you can join us online if not in person for that. thanks. andrew: thanks, kathleen, and all the panel for giving us terrific texture and adding extra complexity and really, i think, making the problem more real. i will open it up to the audience, but before i do, i want to come back to something that might raised, and that -- mike raised, that is this question of the west, and if it is not the west, i guess my question -- starting with mike, but more generally for the panel, if it is not the west, what is the organizing construct? have anssible to organizing construct given the
complexities jon talked about in the middle east? youru could wave institutional magic wand and change an aspect of alliances and institutions, in a region or more broadly, what changes would you make? michael: well, the concept of the west is more complicated because if you look at this divisions among democracies -- distributions among democracies, early postwar period, you include korea, indonesia, india, and at the end of world war ii, australia and new zealand with the democracies on that side of the pacific. ,hey, also the major powers with one major exception, are democratic to not without flaws, but friendly, who are we right now to insist -- frankly, who
are we right entrances on perfection? -- who are we right now to insist on perfection? you also have to embrace certain diversity. you don't want to define the global network of alliances, the corporate actors of our way of -- core protectors of our way of life and values, so rigidly that you lose diversity. john foster dulles had a very rigid approach. john f. kennedy said no, we need to make the world safe not only against communism. we needed to make it safe for diversity. thatnk he was right on one. we need to make it safe to develop norms and democracy but in a way that our number one priority is making sure that states are not coerced from outside. that is the first priority. we work on improving governments and democracy. that, to me, suggests a greater g7, but iion for
think more likely, a core group of like-minded states that care about rules and norms come in a and then i think on some of the challenges we face with respect to hybrid warfare coercion, frankly, this is a discussion that japan and korea, nato, the gulf states, in addition to having -- maybe should be having. although it is little green men russia and chips in the pacific, the questions we face are similar. piece onand i have a this in a couple months. the combination is not one-size-fits-all. it is a great question -- what is our new organizing principle? 9/11, there was the global
war on terror. that had very different manifestations. president obama said don't do stupid stuff, stay out of things rather than getting yourself involved in them, reaching out to adversaries and trying to bring them back into the tent. this is the question. what is the new organizing principle? for me, who is going to enforce all of these international laws we think are great and stabilizing an important?-- and important? if you don't have an enforcement mechanism, if you don't have a military power with the military will to enforce or punish him whether it is sanctions or .ilitary, that is the conundrum we can't sit back and watch and say, boy, that is a terrible thing to happen but did not in our interest, or we can wait until our national interests are -- that commit to me, is the
overarching question that we really haven't had a lot of thinking about. we react to events but we don't put forward that vision to the truman doctrine was a vision about the world and how we use it. that is what we need and we need -- now from leadership perspective we are less able to articulate it fit the west is not a geographic location. it is an idea, an ideal, and aspiration, what we have been in efectlyly trying-- impr trying to work it. international law is great, but when it is broken, who is enforcing the rules? when no one is doing that we have a different organizing principle. briefly, we don't have alliances in the middle east like we have in the pacific. we do it on behalf of our
asia -- europe and asia. it has consequences for how our allies see us. i had an interesting discussion with scholars from china who are interested in what the future u.s. policy is in the middle east. one of the questions they ask is does this mean the u.s. wants china to play greater role in security in the middle east? i can't tell you what the trump on that ision's view going to be but i can tell you it will be consequential, for the united states as well as the middle east. kathleen: i think that what i would say is that there is tically, and they are the ability to deal with fluidity across multiple types of challenges, probably multiple regions, and that includes fluidity across different alliance relationships. you already see a lot of that
were we use the construct that is most useful to the most important players at the time whether it is nato or the u.s. and alliance or bilateral or quadrilateral. i think that is good. it is good to have that fluidity and flexibility because the challenges we face will require it could i also think they require it because the bilateral , that cold war era construct, has broken down to the point where there can be partnerships of convenience on different issues at different times. that is not necessarily ideal for the u.s., but it is the reality. you can talk about it in terms of the loosening of the strictures on security that bind countries into one of 2 camps. periody be a temporary
of time to be followed by a new arrangement, but i think we are possiblyluid period, waiting until a new set of arrangements caused by u.s. decision-making along with that of others or fight longer-term -- or fight longer-term demographic, technological, and other trends. andrew: thanks. i would like to open it up to the audience. back there. .> thank you i am an advisor to aipac. since jon said turkey -- [indiscernible] you said there was no consultation in nato. if there were consultation today and you were there, what would you advise nato to do?
heather: thank you. [laughter] first and foremost, turkey should talk to its allies about what happened. now enteredto ally, a very complex operation of which another made out -- another nato member is also involved. the alliance has worked itself into a habit of not talking about what members are thinking and doing. it is easy to talk about a military operation perhaps in afghanistan to have an honest and candid reflection of what is going on inside our own country. first and foremost, it would just be an example of doing everything -- weather many members -- whether many members around the atlantic table would agree with presentation offered, it is the government's formal
position to also understand what the future is going to -- i'm a little concerned about the future of the general staff and the general officers, 200 of whom are in jail right now, and what that means for military leadership moving forward with in turkey. the changes that are undertaken requirew within turkey a very intense dialogue, military to military and also politically. i'm hopeful can achieve that. nato dances around the issues. on themlike to focus square on deal with them forthrightly. it is important as well for other nato members particularly as we are getting towards a very important election season within europe, the french elections, german elections, to make sure
that members are fully aware of the implications and policy, european defense spending, nato operations, russian policy. it is equally important. nato should be focused internally as well as external threats. >> thank you. on the u.s. citizen -- i am a u.s. citizen, member of the reagan foundation. i have a hypothetical question, and that is, now that new president is coming in, expecting asian countries to be more independent -- that is what , what -- my question is if japan and south korea go
nuclear? should we support it, or would question.thetical myself -- ianfor can only speak for myself when i say it is probably not in our interest for japan and korea to go nuclear. in japan ory not korea's interests. the nuclear capability will put pressure on our extended nuclear umbrella. it is one of the many areas where our alliance starlike is not kept up -- alliance and dialogue has not kept up with the realities we face. i think if we have a serious tokyo --with seoul and one problem we have had is that too many people in washington deterrence extended but alsod by deterred
by people being protected. even if the reasons aren't good, we have to take that seriously. washington has been too dismissive of korean and japanese concerns. we should have dialogue and if be asked, 95% will be the best we can take to reinforce confidence in deterrence. if japan or korea started moving in the direction of nuclear weapons, it would go through the interim staff, some kind of jointly control system, like we have had in the past with germany and britain, jointly combined. even that come i think, is a very remote possibility. if we are serious about dialogue , alliances are not telling people what to do. to make them work, you have to listen. we find that allies are talking
to each other about how to get more out of us. that is another dimension to this dynamic that people haven't really thought about. jon: the other aspect that it is important to note the connection between asia and the middle east, when president obama talked about how the syrian government's use of chemical weapons would be a red line in syria, and then decided not to go to war, it was noted quite closely in asia. here is a demonstration case of what violates the red line. if we look at what happens in north korea, everyone will say what does that mean about iran? at iran to see how the u.s. will deal with north korea. there is a sick way in which our way whichk -- certain our allies look to other u.s. alliance relations to understand their own alliance relations with the united states. there is a connection there they
certainly see we don't. it is impossible to have a conversation -- michael: we do watch you. [laughter] andrew: up the back, please. states of africa, task force. i'm 73 years old. when i hear people talk about what was created after world war leadership in the world, international liberal order, international order. i always wondered, if you don't look like me, and people in the rest of the world don't look like you, do you get their authority, their consent? tos project is an attempt continue european domination of the world