tv Politics and Public Policy Today CSPAN November 29, 2016 12:00am-3:01am EST
oft can deprive our enemies advantages they might gain from that kind of rhetoric? sayist of all, i would there are a range of things said about various issues, wars and registries, which depending on the day of the week is very different. but honestly, the system, with all the complaints about the system, how slow it is, the framers in their genius designed it that way. it does limit your ability to really say extreme things. speaking of the wall, we have built about a 600 mile fence. it took a long time to do, and we did it in years you should do
it. so, i look at some of these things and i think it is very unlikely they will be carried out. however, i do agree that the message has to be counteracted. and i think the only way to do it is to have people acting in a way that counters the message because in the end, it is all done at a micro level at the community level. react more tok, of individual interaction the speech. so, i am hopeful that -- i think that most americans, if you ask, did not sign on to the most extreme version of some of the rhetoric that was said. downnk as things settle and emotions cool, the space for more measured tones will be present. >> april walls, department of
state. thank you for your comments. particularly online in general chat rooms, dating sites, and on other social media places, the role of the private sector in combating extremism and radicalization has become a news topics, whether in san bernardino or elsewhere. the private sector has been somewhat concerned about the slippery slope associated with getting involved in government. and i wondered if you had any specific acts you would make that would straddle the line that the private sector would be able to get on board for? mean, i believe in the first amendment. however, i think there is a space where the government can provide information assistance that does not impose on the first amendment.
and maybe we get overly nervous at times that if media platforms do anything directive at all that somehow that is violating some principle and to be honest with you, to me, even my own thought processes are changing. but i will say this. many platforms are spending enormous amount of time and effort selling his stuff. they have no problem directing you or incentivizing you to click on things, which they get paid for. and i is just in order to make money. if public spirited people, without being told they had to, but being encouraged, what if they began to use those resources to see if they could direct people away from extremist behavior and thought? you can argue there are some things that you could shut down. that is not protected by the first amendment. but even before you get to that, are there ways to essentially
blunt some of the messaging by using some of the same skills? to me, i think this is well worth at least thinking about. publicvate sector has a spirited element as well. but they also have their long-term self-interests. one thing they do not want to do is cook the goose that laid the golden egg. >> a couple of things. i feel like i paid you to ask the question. i am quite passionate about it. i wanted to say a couple things in relation to the private sector. you are specifically talking about the technology sector. i want to be super clear and make sure everybody remembers -- people do not get radicalized in only one way. it is an online and off-line thing that happens. i think that these ideas that you just go to your smartphone and you watch something and boom, switches are thrown in another direction.
something is happening to that person outside and on their smartphone. the issue of where the private sector broadly can make a difference. certainly, everything the secretary just said about expertise in that particular sector that can help move people in a different direction can provide new content at scale at a pace where we really need them to see it to do a lot of other things with the algorithms, to change the nature of the experience for that young person. but there is something else outside of those things that we never talk about and i want to use this opportunity to mention it. the first is, government money to work on issues countering violent extremism comes with an optic that is very hard for nonprofits to bear. when a nonprofit takes u.s. government money, there is this idea that the government is telling me what to do. the most credible money comes from the community, a community
of individuals and philanthropists, as well as a business, that says we need stable and safe communities and we as a business are going to put our money where our mouth is and we are going to help both of the same way we fight poverty and hiv, the same way businesses invest in another host of human problems. so, the private sector has not paid attention to this issue in a way that allows them to think about this differently. and give their money and expertise to it in a different way. and the final point is, i think the most important. it goes to your point. this issue of people getting radicalized and moving towards a group like isis is a community problem. this is not just a muslim problem. this is not just a law enforcement problem. this is our problem, which means that all of us have solutions there. and i think that there is great hope and great promise in the private sector in the united states of america that can make a difference with small
businesses, as well as global corporations that can activate the way we activated around hiv-aids, because it took everybody in the community over 25 years to put that attention to their disease so that in 25 years we were in a very different place. led with the question, what happens if the private sector applies itself to this issue in the same way? >> i would say, going with the theme of going from the strategic to the operational and tactical, i will give the tactical example. i meet with many of the community, many of those private sector organizations, but on large properties. i amsually when i go there preceded or followed by some kind of active shooter training or something like that. from aage to them technical perspective is, all
these people are in our community. eight hours of those days they are in your community. you should know them just as well as everybody else. engage with your people. note is going on with your know what is going on with your coworkers. we are in a world now where we are disassociated with people because of the ability to go online and do other things like that. know who was working for you. know what they are doing. have managers, leaders in your organization understand, where are the people in your organization? know your people. that's the bottom line. if you know your people you can identify these things early before they become larger problems. so, sticking with the tactical side of this, which i will gladly pull out that end of it, as i talk to groups before we get to an active shooter situation, he should have known that this person had a propensity to perhaps, go in that direction. you should be able to see it. mr. shanker: we only have 90
seconds left and i promised to end on time. i have three gigantic thank yous. to the council for once again hosting a very educational and intriguing discussion and most law, to our three experts who share their time and wisdom with us. thank you all. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2016] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org]
>> the house returns from their thanksgiving break tomorrow. in the morning, we will hear from majority leader kevin mccarthy on his party's legislative priorities for the lame-duck session. that is live at 8:00 a.m. eastern on c-span 2. chris coons and any, shot set down the republican senator to talk about the upcoming 115th
congress and the trump administration. live at six ago p.m. eastern on c-span 3. -- live at 6:00 p.m. eastern on c-span 3. >> earlier on "washington journal" we took a look at the future of nato and washington's role in the organization. >> do you still fear for the safety of the west of donald trump was elected? faced on thent was election campaign. specific statement was of
particular concern, namely that he raised doubts about the american commitment. that was on the campaign trail. thehe has become president elect. i hope he understands that as president he cannot raise such doubts because that would undermine nato. sowhat has his appointments far for those national security posts mentor to you? what signals are you seeing in general michael flynn, congress and mike pompeo -- congressman mike pompeo, the retired general as defense secretary? >> i think he has picked, and on the rumors who he might take as secretary of defense and maybe also, secretary of state, are promising.
we know these people. we know they are reasonable people. i think it could be considered a reassurance at large, which i think under the current circumstances are very important. >> what is the proper role for the united states when it comes to nato? >> well, we take leadership. that is a general statement from my side. recently i published a book called "the will to lead," where my main point is that if the united states retreats from the world, or even if the u.s. is perceived to retreat, he will leave behind a vacuum, a security vacuum. this would be filled by the bad guys. this is what we have seen. nato, we also need american leadership and we need who will actually
use nato. >> what does america get out of the commitment that it gives to nato? >> we get a lot. i would say nato is the best defense field that you have ever share withe you other countries. and while i fully agree with president-elect trump that the europeans should pay much more for the common security, it is a fact that the europeans have actually contributed a lot. but also, in other places in the troopswe have deployed and we have helped the united states. for a relatively low cost, you get a lot of advantages. >> does nato need to evolve? >> absolutely. >> how? >> well, you have just seen how
nato has responded to the russian aggression in eastern europe. after the russian attack on ukraine, nato decided to reinforce the territorial defense by deploying more troops in the east. personally, i also think nato could put a much stronger role in north africa and italy, an area where i do believe that a trump administration could use nato much more. >> we are talking with the former secretary-general of nato 2014.009 to 2 we will be talking about nato in the last 30 minutes of our program. he is here to answer your questions and comments. democrats, [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2016] democrats, [captions
copyright national cable satellite corp. 2016] democrats, 202-748-8000. 202-748-8001. >> i am tired of donald trump being compared. as far as with nato. >> i think it was a color that made that comparison, not our guest. but go ahead with your comment about nato. >> i have about the same opinion of what i have with the united nations. the united states supplies most of the troops, almost all of the money, and all we get is a big bill and a lot of problems. amount youy the same
know, as what we do and put in the same number of troops as we do and let them handle themselves like that, instead of the united states having to be the police force for europe, asia, all of the middle east and everything else. i am tired of the united states having to do all of this stuff. these people should start coming up and giving up their share of the money. well.nderstand very as i indicated, i fully agree that the europeans could and should pay more for our common security. that ined two years ago the nato summit, all nato allies mark, which is they will invest 2% at least of gdp in defense. >> how many countries actually do that right now? >> actually, it is only five
out of 28 that do that right now. 2016e notknow that in already, many countries invested more in defense than they did in 2015. in that respect, president putin's aggressive behavior has really convinced the europeans they should pay more. having said that, i do not agree with you when you say that the u.s. should let others handle things themselves. whethero say directly, you like it or not, i think the u.s. should be the world's policeman. i know it is not a popular message in all camps, but it requires a policeman to restore international law and order. and whether you like it or not, superpower the only
with a global writ, and with that responsibility also comes -- or with the exceptional profession also comes responsibilities. self-interest.s. actually, to be the world's policeman because if you do not go abroad, if you do not go overseas and strike your enemies there, they will have you in the showedd that is what we on 9/11. use your self-interest to demonstrate that leadership. >> brandon, a republican is next. >> a guest mentioned the buildup in the nato forces after the russian involvement in ukraine. but expensive wargaming analysis and simulations show that russia could speak to baltic states in a matter of hours.
that is my first point. the second point was, where is nato with regards to the immigration crisis in terms of keeping the bad people from disguising themselves among the innocent when they are fleeing to europe. , we have really strengthened the vetting procedures in europe. obviously, we cannot give a 100% guarantee. it is an evolving project, but i am still pretty short that we takes to prevent those people from entering europe. >> what are some examples of that? what will it take and how much will it cost to do that? cost,l, i do not know the i suppose.
i do not know the figure. host: a massive new investment by the united states? of course it will be an investment. actually, i do believe that this is an area where we need more europe. i would suggest that in europe, we hand over the external border controls to the european union because the problem in europe is that we cannot uphold the free movement in europe if you do not trust the external border control. so, i would suggest a strengthened external border control and handing it over to the european union. that is a very controversial question, but it would be similar to the system you have in the u.s.. i think we could learn from that. host: the first question was about russia and its abilities, especially in the baltic states.
if they make a true effort to take over that territory, how could we stop that? >> and this is the reason why we have adopted a so-called action plan within nato,. a core point in that is a spearhead force, a very rapid reaction force that can be activated within two to three days. and when the rapid reaction force has been deployed, it will be followed by more massive troops contingent. so, we have done what is necessary here now, but i agree that it is a situation that should be closely monitored and ia lso also think we need to te further steps if the russians continue their aggressive behavior.
i do believe the time has come to consider the establishment of a permanent basis in the east, because eventually, that is the only way to prevent a sort of russian attack. host: wanda is in california, a republican. wanda coming you are on with anders fogh rasmussen. >> i just want to say, how good is nato when nato can't even protect europe? it lost its will to exist. they have not even acknowledged the fact that there is an innovation happening all over europe right now that is going to islamicize the entire continent. so, what good is nato anyhow? >> yeah, i do believe that nato is and will remain the bedrock uro-atlantic security, in
in europ europe and in the u.s. this is why many european countries have already joined nato i. in 2004, the massively enlarged nato because they know ,the european countries know that they are better defended within nato than outside nato. so, i don't think it is that europetate has lost its will to exist. on the contrary, you still have countries in europe cueing up to become members of nato. if you ask ukrainians and georgians, the people living in ukraine and georgia, they would very much like to join nato.
they cannot at the moment, but maybe once in the future. so, i think, the fact that we have enlarged nato, the fact that a lot of countries are killing up to become members of nato are a testament to the fact that europeans know at least how important nato is for security. host: we would be interested in hearing from a few callers outside of the united states in this segment. if you are out of the united .tates, 202-748-8003 democrats, 202- 748-8001. -- democrats, 202-748-8000. 202-748-8001.ww.c-span.or
>> actually, i did not know until the very last moment when it would be possible because one nation, namely turkey was strongly opposed to my election as secretary-general of nato. host: why? >> i don't know. maybe some of you recall that in 2006 we had the so-called cartoon crisis in denmark. because a danish youth paper had published some caricatures, some drawings of the prophet muhammad. many muslims were strongly opposed to it. that incurred a lot of violence. at least that was what the turks publicly used to oppose
my candidacy. but eventually, they exempted. host: does it have to be unanimous? >> yes, and that is another important feature of nato. all decisions must be taken unanimously. which means that you cannot act in nato without accept from all 28 allies. that also goes for the elections of the secretary-general. host: is that slow things down? >> bs, in a way it does. -- yes, in a way it does. but on the other hand, once you have that consensus, you can move. excellent example of that. once it was taken, then nato actually moved. twome answer this, you have
pillars. have the military pillar in the civilian pillar. usually, always, an military pillar is led by american. military person -- is led by american four-star military person. and the civilian pillar is led by a european. him before me, it would they man from the netherlands. so, it is a rotational system, but always based on unanimous decisions within nato. host: mike is from kentucky and a republican. >> yes. good morning and thank you for taking my call. i was cheering you earlier about
how you said it was in our best interest as americans to have military bases set up in your country. and if you said that if we that they of there would be confrontation about that. you are indicating that we have to be there or he will go to the enemy? paying for our protection, you want to priebus us?ibe >> no, i'm not driving anybody, at least not the americans. on the contrary, i really appreciate all your contributions to our security from the second world war until now. but what i do say is, when i nee d americans who are reluctant to
accept their role as the world leader, i say, you have a self interest in actually demonstrating that leadership. firstly, it is in your self-interest to avoid being hit on your own soil and by go the enemies, hit on their soil as you did in afghanistan. bettery, prevention is and cheaper than cure or treatment. it is in america's self-interest to prevent and knockdown comic while they are stil conflicts while they are still small and preventable. otherwise, they would grow bigger and they care. his is what we saw in the
1930's, which led to the second world war and you paid a high price. finally, i will also mention what we call the american world order. the american-led space world order was introduced after the second world war by president truman. presidents, until george w. bush, adhered to that principle that america should continue to be the leader of that world order. and it is in your self-interest to make sure you maintain a world that is peaceful, where you can trade freely, all over the world. so, for these reasons, i think, despite the fact that it is a hard job to be the world's
policeman, it is in your self-interest. host: we will mention the title of the book again, "the will to lead: america's indispensable role in the global fight for freedom." the author is with us, the former secretary general of nato. here for the next 20 minutes. ay is in lake dallas, texas, democrat. >> good morning. i love c-span. thank you so much. and thank you for your extraordinary service. i have a question and i will try to oversimplify this somewhat, but hopefully, you will be able to bisect it. structured,urrently it is by country, i believe, as it is still. would it be to the european union's advantage to classify nato under the european union
and thereby, you know, those nations would of course, join the european union and therefore, when sharing comes into play, that would mean the european union as a whole could pony up their fair share would be, as opposed to the united states equally, and leave it to the european union to figure out and sort out what those countries are, how much they could pony up, how much they could put in, based on their ability. i understand that not all countries can put the same amount up. i think trying to say that every country will be able to put up the same amount of their gdp is going to be very difficult, especially in hard times. realize that i am oversimplifying this, but i think you understand where i'm going. also, with declaring -- here is
my second question and i am probably going to get this wrong. whenever a country in nato has been attacked, let's say for example, when the terrorists attacked france, could they not -- i mean, why would there not be a reason for them to declare title v under nato and then we all come together and now we are all together under nato and are all fighting isis. that is one part. the other point is, in my estimation, isis has already declared themselves a caliphate. -- you know,ave you understand the issues that even under president bush he had in trying to capture the bad guys and try to put them under a military tribunal, which did not work. that just one belly up pretty
quickly. host: you bring up a lot of topics. let's give anders rasmussen an opportunity to tackle them. >> the first part of your question, if i understand you correctly, is a question about evolving the eu more. so to speak. to the eu ite nato don't think would be realistic. i do think it would be the right way forward, but i agree with you that it would be a good idea if the members of the european union would invest more in defense. and that would be a much better in some of the current efforts within the eu, according to which, they want to develop an independent defense
keep ability within the eu. i do believe that is the wrong way. i think the eu should be able to assets when the european union decides to take action, for instance, in africa. if nato does not want to take action, the eu could take action and use nato assets to do that. because the fact is, nations have only one set of military capabilities. so, they cannot spend their money on both eu defense and then, on nato. so, i think the other way forward would be the best. secondly, you mentioned that for some countries it is hard economically. well, let me mention one example
that it can be done, if you have the right balances. estonia was fairly hit by the economic crisis some years ago, but in estonia, they have carried out the necessary reforms and they have decided to spend 2% of gdp on defense. so, when estonia can do that, i would argue that all nations within the european union could do that. now, on the second part of your question -- host: it involves the fight against isis and the use of nato tos going to try to respond. >> yes. i think it would be a good idea. i have noted that when france
was hit severely by the terrorist attacks last year, france decided not to invoke nato.e five of remind us what article five does. statescle v within nato that we consider an attack on one an attack on all. in other words, we will help each other. if the russians or isis, or any other, hit you and you requested that we invoke article v, then we will come to your aid. but france didn't. they asked the european union for assistance. the fact is, they did not get anything. the fact is, when it comes to
hard security, nato is the only show in town. also mention something with respect to this that is quite interesting. the only example in the history of nato when nato has invoked article v was after 9/11. the united respect, states is the only member of nato which has profited from this solidarity clause, article v. host: let's go to michigan. greg is a republican. >> good morning. i would like to ask this question. it seems to me that the only reason nato can exist as a functioning body is because the united states is in nato. if we were to withdraw from nato, the united states itself would still be safe. we have two oceans, a massive
nuclear arsenal, and ten carrier battle groups. i with respect, have to say with our economy the way it is, i don't see how we can continue to be in nato. it is great that estonia spent 2% of its income, being a small country as it is, on defense, but it is also on the border of russia. we have been left with a situation where we can get dragged into wars for things that are less and less in the vital interest of the united states. thank you both very much. i hope you have a good morning. >> thank you very much. i fully agree with you, if the u.s. were to withdraw from nato, nato would cease to exist. you are completely right. but i am sure that argument also misses the point that nato was established back in 1949
exactly because the americans realized that it was necessary to create this security organization to protect europe from attacks from the soviet union and in that respect, also help the united states itself. and that is my point. if you were to withdraw from nato and nato ceased to exist, you could be sure president and russia wouldutin advance in europe. not because the european defense is weaker than the u.s. defense, but also because the europeans are not in full agreement with how to approach russia. some are more accommodating than others. host: what is the right approach in your mind? >> a tough hand.
i know from many meetings with president putin the as much as he likes to cultivate his own image as a strong man, he also respects the language of power when he meets it. you have to be very firm. you have to demonstrate unity. you have to negotiate with him from a position of strength. host: do you think donald trump will do that? >> i hope so. i hope you will realize how important it is. and i think he will realize it is necessary. president george w. bush also started by trying to elaborate on a better relationship with russia. you have to realize that in 2008, putin invaded georgia. president obama started also by resetting the relations with russia, just to realize that in
2014 he invaded ukraine. of them realize that mr. putin had not changed at all. i am not opposed to trying to improve the relationship with russia. all thesh mr. trump luck in that respect. but i do believe that if he does not exercise a firm policy towards the kremlin, he will make exactly the same experience, like his two predecessors. now, my point, back to the question, my point is, it is in the u.s. self-interest to make sure that you have a peaceful and friendly europe and not a hostile europe. and that is exactly the lesson
the second world war. the american leadership realized that it is not in america's interest to have a hostile europe. you need friends on the eastern shores of the atlantic ocean. that's also the case today, in my opinion. this is the reason why it is in interest tolf uphold and develop nato. host: the book is called "the world elite." and came out in september. anders rasmussen is the author. just a few minutes left. houston, texas. russell is up, a democrat. >> hello. host: go ahead. anders is,ion for
nato protects the atlantic. is there any chance of a merger with the pacific fleet to form a global group? thank you. >> first of all, nato is a regional organization. according to the treaty, you can only accept european countries as members of nato, except of course, for the u.s. and canada in north america. when it comes to the pacific region, i think we should go in the other direction and in my book, i suggest that the u.s. president uses his convening power and assembled all the world's democracies and creates an alliance for democracy. only allld count not nato countries, but like-minded
democracies across the globe. japan, south korea, new zealand, india, etc. and while of course, democracies do not all agree on everything, i do believe that like-minded democracies should go the extra mile. host: to the point, dd fredericks on twitter notes that an attack against one is all and the more members, the more likely we end up in a war defending somebody. >> of course. [laughter] >> put that is exactly what the u.s. learned during the second world war. if you take the debate in the u.s. in the 1920's and 1930's, it was an isolationist debate you had. people thought they were well
protected. somebody asked me the question this morning, we have mexico and canada and the atlantic and pacific ocean. we are surrounded by friendly neighbors and fish. we are well protected. an i think, pearl harbor was example, you are not well protected. 9/11 is another example. you have to go overseas and fight the enemy. take the fight to the enemy. lead, ande will to then to make america great, to put america's interests first is also to have the will to lead. host: mike from florida, a democrat. >> good morning. i am looking at a map. of the black sea. crimea, if i'm not
mistaken, is also showing up as interests in syria. it is pushed against by the ukraine and he is pushed against georgia. how trustworthy ally,key as a nato because if we lose turkey, that would allow an increased influence in the mediterranean? >> i think from a strategic point of view, we have a vital interest in keeping turkey as a member of nato. we also need to continue negotiations between turkey and the european union to make sure that the western forces in turkey will continue their past
ath towards our western institutions. having said that, i share your concerns regarding human rights, regardingfree speech, other civil liberties in turkey. but i think we should use these critical andin a constructive dialogue with turkey. we cannot compromise, of course, on our democratic principles. but we cannot and out, so to speak turkey to the russian interest. host: again, a lot of these topics are covered in your book, "the will to lead." if you want to follow anders .asmussen on twitter i appreciate your time this morning on "the washington journal." >> c-span's "washington
journal," live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. morning, thesday committee on health ranking member and budget committee member on the future of the affordable care act under president-elect trump, as well as his opinions on trump administration appointments. and then the presidenof americans for tax reforms talks about president elect trump's fiscal policy. be sure to watch "washington journal," live at 7:00 a.m. eastern on tuesday morning. join the discussion. in the morning, the southern poverty law center holds a press conference with civil rights leaders to announce acts of hate in the u.s.. we will be there live at 9:00 a.m. eastern on c-span 3, c-span
online, and the free c-span radio app. a little later, "new york times" correspondent tom freeman on the global economy and trade. >> now, a look at the future of american's alliances around the world. from the center of strategic and international studies in washington. this is about one hour and a half. >> good afternoon. it is a real delight today to hold this rollout for a new
being led byis, the former national security advisor to prime minister tony abbott. he is a long record of distinguished service in that same government, including as advisors to previous prime minister's. andrew joined us here at csis and together with myself and others, conceived of and design this project, which is to look at american leadership and alliances. the two of course, go to gather. -- go together. we are to point of tribulation, questioning, given events around the world, given domestic alliances, here and abroad, even the presidential transition. it seems a good time to get back to some of the fundamentals as to why we built this alliance system over 50 years ago, what sustains it, what is in it for
are theur allies, what things we have to do to make it more effective for all of us. andrew will do this and i am going to introduce him now. looking at the fundamentals, the mechanics, the strategy. it over now to the director for this project am a andrew tell us about the rest of today. >> thank you, mike. and thank you, everyone, for coming. in particular, i would like to thank you for your support in this project, which is important and comes at an important time. mike has not only been a great colleague, but as we like to say, a good mate.
i would like to acknowledge the support for the project under dr. john hammond. we have been able to pull together the support this project needs, and my colleagues, who are helping me out on the project team. catastrophe of the second world war, farsighted american-statesman worked with their counterparts around the world to build and maintain a global network of regional and bilateral alliances unsurpassed in human history. europe, with nato in including the western pacific and encompassing the most powerful arab states in the middle east, for 70 years, these alliances have supported the international order through stability and prosperity and contributed immeasurably to american security. over time, the united states had
of informal security projects. , the will to withdraw from any conflict abroad has been a strain on american politics and foreign policy since the earliest days of the republic. coming to the surface in the 1930's, the early 1950's, and the mid-1970's after the war in vietnam. and of course, at different times over the same period, it was domestic policies in allied countries, rather than america, that boiled alliances across europe, asia, and the middle east. despite these periods of enjoyedentension we have bipartisan political support with the united states and solid project making for decades.
notwithstanding a bitterly contested election campaign in which president-elect trump openly questioned the value of nato and the united states' most important alliances in asia, and sitting president barack obama publicly criticized the allies of free riding, a recent survey by the chicago council on global affairs shows that the american public still overwhelmingly supports the
alliances and american leadership in the world. 90% of americans, including many trump supporters, consider maintaining existing alliances an effective way to achieving american foreign-policy goals. nearly as many support building new alliances with other countries. nurturing and renewing this support is vital because today, the united states and its allies face an unprecedented range of threats. these include russian aggression in eastern europe and adventurism in the middle east. north korea's rapidly developing nuclear and ballistic missile programs. china's increasing assertiveness in the western pacific. iran's missile development, continuing support for terrorism, and spreading influence and metastasizing of the threat posed by isil and other terror networks around the world. yet the united states and its allies are neither psychologically nor materially prepared for these threats. there is an element of complacency in our societies about the threats that we face and a loss of perspective about the real underpinnings of our freedom of choice and prosperity. alliances require sustained hard work, investment, and give-and-take on both sides.
former u.s. secretary of state george shultz used to call this tending the garden. today, however, our alliances are not keeping pace, with inertia, resource constraints -- the sequester in united states -- and internal challenges. in europe, the popular forces that unleashed brexit are present today in many other nato countries. in asia, the u.s. alliance with iran remains in the deep freeze following that country's most recent military takeover. in the philippines, president duterte has declared the country's separation from the united states. the implications of the political crisis engulfing the administration in south korea is not clear. the future alignment of turkey, long a critical partner of the crossroads between europe, the middle east, and asia, is also unclear, while israel and traditional arab allies in the middle east are alienated by the u.s. nuclear deal with iran. america's credibility as a security guarantor has been
damaged by the failure to enforce president obama's syria redline and by president-elect donald trump's threat to revoke alliances unless they pay more for their defense. everywhere there is a sense that the west is in retreat and that the liberal international order is fraying. this is the jumping off point for the project, to go back to first principles and examine the role and relevance of these alliances that date back to the earliest days of the cold war. whether the cost will offset the benefits today and how they can adapt to meet the very different challenges that we face. the key to alliances is that the sum is more than the part. alliances enhance security by combining allies' military power and increasing their cooperation. they also play an important role in supporting the international order and in restraining allies in relationships that work in
both directions. alliances build interoperability, relationships, and mutual trust over time that ad hoc coalitions simply cannot replicate. the incoming trump administration's foreign-policy team and policy direction are a work in progress. but allies should welcome some of the early signs. the president-elect has spoken with many allied leaders. his administration is likely to work with congress to restore u.s. defense spending, build a larger navy, and modernize the u.s. nuclear arsenal. all important fits that will increase deterrence and should reassure america's allies. for the first time in decades, america's alliance and the future of that system is at issue. for decades, the united states was so dominant globally that allies and even american
policymakers often tended to see the alliance system as some sort of free international public good. particularly for allies, to an extent, it was. today seems very different. the united states is still the world's dominant military power, but rivals like china are closing the economic gap. in this environment, the united states will be instinctively tempted to flirt with unilateralism and deals of convenience with regional powers and perhaps a more transactional approach to alliances. but for all the costs and challenges posed by alliances and managing allies, america needs to think hard today about how attractive a world without allies really would be. after all, there is nothing that russia, china, and iran would like more than to see the dismantling of america's alliances in europe, asia, and the middle east.
that reality alone should give serious pause. percy spender, the former australian foreign minister, along with john foster dallas, observed that it is difficult and at times exceedingly so to understand precisely what the united states thinking is. i have no doubt that many diplomatic representatives who are struggling over their reporting cables will agree that this is certainly one of those times. the purpose of this project is to provide answers to some of these questions, based around three research themes. the first theme is alliance, institution, leadership. what role do alliances play today in deterring threats, supporting the international order, and restraining allies? is this still a viable concept in the west? and if so, what part do alliances play in upholding it? how do alliances advance u.s.
interests today? do alliances institutions need to be overhauled? how can they inform the security partnership? what is the role of u.s. leadership at home and abroad and in building support for alliances? the second theme is about alliances in operation. their day-to-day management. which allies are pulling their weight and in which areas do allies need to lift their game? how can they build military interoperability and address certain capability gaps? how can they boost security in a world where nuclear weapons are making an unfortunate comeback? what approaches should alliances take in combating corruption, threats, and cyber attacks, expanding intelligence and increasing defense industrial collaborations? what challenges are we likely to confront and how could we
overcome them? the third, and in some ways most important, research theme is about understanding and engaging public opinion. notwithstanding the positive polling i stated earlier, we cannot take continuing public support for alliances for granted, in the united states or in allied countries. in a recent interview with "the atlantic," henry kissinger pointed to a gap in foreign-policy perception between the american public and others. polls in a number of countries, including australia, suggested a degree of anxiety about the future direction of american policy and alliance. we have to do a better job of understanding public opinion and making the case for alliances, not just here in washington, d.c. it's time that we rediscovered what a former secretary of state used to call our duty to explain.
this brings us full circle, back to the crucial importance of leadership. today's event is the first in a program of public events, policy roundtables, and publications that will examine these important questions and seek to provide answers that will stimulate discussion and guide american and allied policymakers to navigate the challenging international environment. we hope you will stay involved in this project and in particular, the input and engagement of allied governments will be essential. ladies and gentlemen, it is now my pleasure and honor to introduce our guest speaker today. admiral gary roughead. admiral roughead is a distinguished military fellow and one of the united states' most distinguished senior officers. he is the recipient of numerous u.s. and foreign awards. he led important organizational
reforms and introduced numerous technological innovations. previously and perhaps most relevant today, he held six operational commands and operated closely with american allies in the pacific, europe, and the middle east. he is one of the only two officers in the navy history to have commanded both atlantic and pacific fleets, which makes him the ideal person to talk today about the role of alliances in america's global military strategy. after his remarks, we will briefly reconfigure the podium, and a panel of csis experts is going to drill down into alliance dynamics in more detail. now, i would like to invite admiral roughead. [applause] admiral roughead: well, thank you, andrew. thanks to csis for the opportunity to share some
thoughts on alliances and american leadership. i particularly look forward to the panelists that are going to be up here later, because i think it is going to be a great discussion. my interest in this topic is not simply because of recent campaign rhetoric that has raised questions regarding the relevance and efficacy of our alliance relationships, nor is it about all of the speculation swirling about as our new administration begins to take form. like so many here, i served in a military that shaped by alliance relationships and objectives for the entire time that i spent there. i cut my teeth on very large nato naval exercises and operations, and i continued throughout my career to operate in our alliances, both in the east and west. i also had the privilege of commanding large allied commands.
but those consequential alliances were forged decades ago, as andrew mentioned. and time has moved on. the geopolitical and geoeconomic landscapes are changing rapidly, particularly in europe, the middle east, and asia. the order in those regions that grounded our alliances is slipping away. the decade plus war in the middle east has generated an intervention wariness and weariness in much of the population and a move towards isolationism by some. in a way, it's ironic that america's most globally connected generation in history appears to want to step away from the hard work and the cost that global influence and responsibility demands. that's across the political spectrum. i find that this is an
uncomfortable and regrettable and even perilous trend. whether in uniform or civilian policy positions, those of us who have been there have seen the strength and mutual benefit that comes from alliance relationships. we have experienced the necessary attention that is needed, and at times, the frustration that is experienced in nurturing those relationships. as we ponder the state of our alliances and their future, those of us who have been in the arena and in the policy community bear responsibility for the alliance question that is taking place today. most here value our alliances, whether nato or those with our asian allies, yet we have not caused a national conversation on how broader security interest conversation into how alliances can enhance those interests. within our policy circles in the u.s., we have a vibrant, thoughtful conversation going
on, and that's good. but in many ways, it is a very close self-talk that can be drowned out or negated by a handful of tweets and posts that provide a very different point of view to thousands and even millions. the public's field of view in the u.s. regarding national security has narrowed. it is about isis and the violence in the middle east and avoiding another 9/11. and that's understandable. for over a decade, this has been the american fixation. the view of security is also formed by events and not trends.
we think about the ukraine and maybe some rattling up in the baltics. the east china sea, the south china sea, north korea. or it's often about people, leaders. it is about putin or assad or kim jong-un. it is not about the values that bind alliances together. we have also been cavalier, blurring the distinction of the word ally. we have allowed it to apply to others who perhaps are aligned with us, who fortunately fight with us, and they are all seemingly equal in our security lexicon. we have not made clear that there are allies, with the associated commitments and obligations, and there are others -- valued, to be sure -- but without the status of allies.
we have not articulated the common cause based on the interests and values and qualities. the coverage and discussion is too often about what allies are not doing rather than what they are doing, and what we do to help allies as opposed to how our relationship with them enables and facilitates shaping the environment consistent with our interests and to our advantage. in a wider context, we fail to address the broader dimensions of national security and fixate on the military, neglecting economics, important trade relationships, and the industrial benefits that can accrue with those who are in these special alliance relationships. even the terms we use, in my opinion, blur the discussion. we do not talk about the beneficial obligatory contributions fundamental to the capability and capacity of credibility. we are simple in our math, highlighting how much or how little the host nation is spending. we neglect the costs saved by being able to maintain american forces forward. in the case of the navy, we calculate capital and personnel
costs through place forward deployed forces in japan. the rule of thumb is four or five to one. if you consider that cost as something that needs to be factored in, it changes the equation. we prefer to focus and grade on the aggregate budget numbers and percentages and are not exact or critical enough in defining the real contribution in a military capability capacity. we have not thoughtfully adjusted command and control structures for increased integration in this fast-paced world in which we live. the operational command and control models are essentially the same as they were when i was an ensign in the navy. related to that, we have been neglectful in emphasizing personnel integration and embedding among allies. this, too, was largely due to
the exchanges that i experienced when i was a young officer. we have not optimized our foreign area officer programs to our alliance interests. how many chinese born area officers have been produced, compared to foreign area officers focused on japan, korea, thailand, the philippines, turkey? could they have made a difference in the case of the latter three countries that are drifting a bit? while recognizing respective national interests, we have not made our alliance structures the nuclei around which others can operate easily. such integration is challenging because of the information space in which we live and operate. there are rational concerns affecting sensitive national information. there are complexities regarding the security of integrated networks. all of this becomes more complex as other nations join in, but we
must be able to do this -- reshape our alliances for a new time. there are personnel factors. the cost of posting more servicemen and women and their families in other countries, the cultural adjustments that may be initially awkward in those assignments, but overwhelmingly lead to greater respect, affinity, and affection. there are realities in the numbers -- where do you get people if you want to have a more robust interaction? where are they to be drawn from? although i think this is a good opportunity to bleed some of the excess people from our overinflated headquarters, and that would be a good place to start. these are some details in how the garden of the alliances are tended. we must not forget that alliances are really about the fundamental values of the like-minded collectively and the
shared obligations of those particular nations that they undertake together to ensure that those values define our future. i applaud csis and mike green for seeing the importance of alliances in our future. but as andrew mentioned, above all, we have to keep in mind that we in the policy world are not really the audience. there is a far more broad conversation that must be continued. thank you very much. [applause] [inaudible]
important issue to kick off our project. now, i'm delighted to introduce the all-star csis panel. what we are going to look to do now is really drill down into alliance dynamics in different regions and also some of the defense mentions of alliances. -- defensive dimensions of alliances. i'm going to briefly introduce the panelists, then asked them to speak, then open up for questions toward the end. the first panelist is dr. michael green, senior vice president here at csis. he served on the staff of the national security council from 2001 to 2005 as the director of asian affairs, when i met him the first time, then as special assistant to the president of national security affairs and senior director for asia.
heather conley is senior vice president for europe, eurasia, and the arctic and director of the europe program here at csis. from 2001 to 2005, she was a deputy secretary of state at the bureau for european and eurasian affairs. jon alterman, on my left, another senior vice president, holds the chair in global security ngo strategy and is the director of the middle east program here at csis. before joining csis, he was a member of the policy planning staff for the u.s. department of state. finally, a kissinger chair and director, kathleen served as the deputy undersecretary for planning and forces.
we have got a terrific lineup and we look forward to hearing your remarks. michael: ok, we are still using the hand mic. thank you, andrew. congratulations on launching this project. it is both overdue and extremely timely, given eventa around the -- given events around the world and events here at home. i should mention, john is not here because we had to hide him in an undisclosed location, but he will be heavily involved and has given us great guidance. let me talk about our allies in the asia-pacific region. generally, because of the rise of china and the north korean nuclear threat, the return of 19th and 20th century style geopolitics to that region, there is a clarity of thought about alliances in asia and about our alliances from asia
that has generally made the alliances stronger over the past few years. but still, there are big questions, and over the last few months, some of the developments in the region, as andrew mentioned, have made things seem more acute. first, the good news, though. japan, our largest ally in the region -- measured by defense, budget, or hosting of u.s. forces or gdp -- this year is introducing the highest defense budget in its postwar history. it pays over $4 billion in host nation support. the japan maritime self-defense
courses are measured by budget or tonnage. [inaudible] mike: the light was on. so, japan, as i said when the electronics failed us, has a navy now that by most measurements is larger -- with different kinds of firepower, of course -- but larger than the royal or french navy. the prime minister has now introduced changes to the definition of what the japanese forces can do that are historic, that increase not only japan's role but frankly their width. we should not be measuring just dollars and cents. we should also consider the enormous savings to us and also the risks that our allies incur
by doing more with us, which i think is how one could define what prime minister abe is doing. korea has also introduced their largest defense budget. it pays 40% of u.s. costs, and like japan, korea is tightening our alliance with more joint planning for different contingencies, more interoperability and more joining. in australia, recent poll showed that close to 90% of australians are strongly or somewhat in favor. in our partnership with india, our strategic framework agreement with singapore, reconnecting with new zealand and the new partners of southeast asia, all demonstrate
that our security relationships and core alliances have been strengthening over the past decade or so. public opinion toward the u.s. and all these countries is quite high and polling in the u.s. about alliances is high. we have done polling that shows significant majorities in all these countries much prefer a u.s.-led system in asia than a chinese-led or some other version of events. a lot of tailwind and support for an alliance structure that, as we heard, was essentially designed during the korean war. there are also some troubling developments. whether these are systemic, one - offs, fault of the u.s., internal politics, that can be debated. one factor is that all of our allies everywhere -- am i? one source of uncertainty constantly in our alliances everywhere, particularly in asia
with the bilateral allowances, is the old dilemma that allies have with larger partners. they don't want to get so close to the big ally that they get trapped in conflicts they don't want. but they don't want to be so independent that they risk being abandoned by the larger partner, the u.s., in the face of a dangerous threat or rising power. all of our allies -- japan, australia -- all of them are constantly negotiating this dilemma on how tight to be while still maintaining some autonomy, but not so independent that they risk being left alone. that is complicated in asia by the fact that none of our allies want to choose between the u.s. and china. so you see constant hedging and positioning. the question is, how much do we make of that? how much does it matter? is it deep systemic or just the adjustment that a deep bilateral network of alliances will have?
there is great turbulence in our alliances over the past few months in asia. fundamental support for the u.s.-korea alliance is still strong, but weak political leadership is usually a recipe for difficulty coordinating strategy and managing burden sharing. duterte in the philippines -- support for the alliance is very high, but the president clearly has a different hymnal from which he is singing. malaysia and vietnam have both taken significant steps. was it too much? were they uncertain about the commitment?
something that came before the election? with questions about our commitment on the south china and east china sea? was it the election or the difficulty of tpp? i think there is no single answer. it is a combination of internal politics, external questions about the u.s. -- in some cases, confidence in the u.s. when an ally is confident, that is more room for the opposition to challenge and question american leadership. but it does all occur right now in a way that needs fundamental re-examination of the basis for our alliances, what our allies get, what we get, and how to make them more effective. i would conclude by saying that at least in the asia-pacific region, there are six brief things, guidelines we should focus on. i learned this largely from admiral roughead, but it bears repeating. the answer to all these challenges we face is not distancing from allies, not
controlling our allies, not any of those things. if we want to deter aggressive action by other actors, reassure our allies, and ensure that we have significant say over the strategies our allies take, then the common denominator for these is more joint operability. it occurs against the multiplier effect for your effort, it gives you more tightness as you work together. the saying goes, we go together, which, in 1953 or 1954 when that came up, meant that we go together and don't go alone. we do this together. the second principle, the measure of the alliance contribution should be the effectiveness of the alliance. the carter administration tried under congressional pressure to emphasize with other allies in the pacific, a burden sharing matrix. in the 1970's and 1980's, legislation required frequent
reporting on how much allies were paying. it was very counterproductive because to our allies it looked like we were seeking economic gains. it looks like we were seeking advantage for ourselves in terms of dollars. dollars matter, but what the reagan administration found was that joint interoperability and measuring the deterrent effect that we want and then building an alliance where both sides contribute significantly, which in many cases means our allies do more. we need to think more with australia about how we deal with chinese encroachment in the south china sea. the debate is not fully developed yet. korea has to do more to have a sustainable command and control infrastructure. there are a lot of things we have to do. some of it will cost money, but not all of it. the third principle is, as we approach allies and partners in
the asia-pacific region, we need to remember that we do not have a collective security organization like nato. these were created as bilateral alliances because there was such diversity of political systems, levels of development, levels of contribution, particularly since all of these countries invested in china, we were not going to get a collective security system. we need to embrace a certain amount of diversity in our alliances. some will be highly valuable. some are important, but perhaps getting the right answers out of our allies is not as important as keeping generally aligned in a larger goal of stabilizing the system, shoring up the existing rules and norms. of course, we don't do enough -- heather i hope will speak on this -- to connect our key alliances in europe and asia. there is time for the kind of
williamsburg summit, where thatcher and reagan and others got together and agreed without debate about what values we were trying to protect in the west. we can't call it the west anymore. there is too much of the east in this mix, but there is something we stand for, the first principle, and it's global. fifth, as admiral roughead said, history of alliances in asia and europe is a history of economic policy. tpp negotiations have been blown off the rails by this election, but i don't think there is a single governor in this country that doesn't want free trade agreements. finally, the education process of the american public, which goes beyond think tanks,
congress, governors across the country. they will have to be critical partners. heather: thanks, andrew. congratulations on this great initiative. i love the dean acheson quote -- our duty to explain. i think that needs to be the think tank mission statement as well. it is an opportunity. i know during the campaign, nato does not often crop up as a top issue for discussion. we talk about the hot spots in the world, but not necessarily alliances. it was with great shock -- i was sitting at my desk, and my phone rang and it was a reporter. the question was, how would the united states withdraw from nato? i said, i beg your pardon? i got out the washington treaty and looked at it and went -- well -- it was never -- it was never a thought i thought we would ever have. president-elect trump introduced
a conversation about nato. it would not be the one that i would choose, but i'm going to take the opportunity. i think in some ways, we have, for a long time, been confusing price with value. that is i think what, mike, you are talking about, and the burden sharing -- it is always about, how much have you paid? what is your fair share? you are a free rider. it comes down to the price. for far too long, we have not talked about the value of our alliances. what the united states gets out of it, how it serves our u.s. interests. i like the fact that in your remarks, andrew, instead of burden sharing, we talk about our obligation, our duty to alliance. that is what sharing the duty is all about. i think we have also confused transactionalism with the value of a long-standing relationship and partnership.
for this, there is bipartisan guilt. we have always been going to our alliances -- we need this for afghanistan. we need this for iraq, this for libya. but we have not done very much -- we have not tended the garden. we haven't talked about the long -term relationships and the values that we share. what's important? why are you participating in operations in afghanistan if you don't have national interest? why? because you are supporting the values of this alliance. when we speak only on the transactional, we erode credibility, trust, and the foundations of the relationship. what's so important about our duty to explain is why we created nato in the first place. in some ways, this is world history and civics rolled into
one -- why did 12 countries gather in washington, d.c. in 1949 to sign the washington treaty? very much as it is today, they came together for a unifying ideal of collective dissent. that is what they are doing today. but instead of 12, there are 28, almost 29 members of nato. and so exactly, we have to put this context, these same principles, into a 21st century context. again, it is so important to underscore -- nato was designed for and by u.s. leadership. that is why it was signed here. that's why we are the repository. it was designed for u.s. national interests and u.s. engagement. many say, after the cold war, why did nato exist? its reason ended. but curiously, they have always found so many more operational missions to do.
immediately after welcoming new members in 1999, it went to war in kosovo. it has served in afghanistan and continues to serve after 15 years. ask any expert in the first time in article five, an attack against one is an attack against all. obligation was the support of the united states. that was unthought of, unheard-of, yet it was invoked, and today, nato forces -- over 1000 nato forces have lost their lives in afghanistan supporting u.s. activities and interests. then came 2014 -- the russian annexation of crimea and its incursion into eastern ukraine. this is where nato's founding principles became very clear in the 2014 and continue through to
today. but this is not your grandfather's nato. this is a nato focusing on cyber security, missile defense, looking at hybrid activities. its operations are in the aegean sea helping to prevent access to the sea because of migration. it's got a robust agenda, militarily. but i will offer some notes of caution, as mike did as well. this is not an easy alliance. it was not easy at 12, it sure is not easy at 28, soon 29. there are group dynamics in such a large alliance that there is no shared threat assessment or perception. if you live on nato's eastern flank, you have one threat, russia. if you live on the southern flank, you have one threat -- and migration, isis, terrorism, the instability from the middle east.
miraculously, this large, cumbersome alliance has found a balance and has been able to respond to the east as well as the south. the problem with nato is that it has been so focused on the operational and the military, it has forgotten that it is a political military alliance. my hope for nato in the future would be that it tends its own garden, its own health. as we see a rise of populism, nationalism, and extremism in europe. that is as much of a threat to alliance solidarity and unity as a resurgent russia or attacks by isis. that is what we have to start focusing on. it is shocking to me that after the events on july 15 in turkey , that there has been no discussion of the north atlantic council, about the coup, what happened and what is happening inside one of nato's most vibrant and vital members.
it is surprising that at a very successful nato summit in warsaw, poland, president obama had to raise bilaterally very uncomfortable questions about poland's constitutional court and its internal democracy and health. those are the issues that are so tough for an alliance. it's going to mean that the alliance cannot be as strong as possible. i will close on a note that goes back to the public knowledge and public support. nato is not the most popular in many nato countries. what i find in the u.s., we talk about the united states and nato. no, it is always a we. we are nato. the u.s. airman, soldier, sailor, marine is a nato soldier, sailor, marine. we have to start talking about this as it lives inside of us.
what i found so interesting in public support -- i was involved at the state department during the 2002-2004 nato enlargement, when we brought in seven countries in central and eastern europe. we went across the country explaining why that was important, to build support. we need to do that everyday, not just build up for when an important ratification happens. we have to start talking to the american people about why nato is important. its values, its role. colleagues, its role is as important today as it was in 1949. mr. putin is reminding us of that everyday. thank you. jon: europe seems clean and easy compared to the middle east. quite frankly, we have not had the same kind of partnership
that we have had in europe and asia. the middle east has had external security guarantors for half of a millennium, 500 years. we have been the most recent of them. the u.s. came into the middle east after world war ii with a deep sense that we would do external security guaranteeing right. we would protect the region from communism, doing it in part not by directly governing but by encouraging these states to adopt more democratic modes of government. whereas democratic governance was the anti-communism of 1950's, 1960's, 1970's, it became human rights, and then it became the way we are fighting radicalism, by promoting more democratic governance. there has always been this difficult balance from the u.s. perspective of how to guarantee security for a place that does not do a good job promoting its own security. for more than half of the century, we have seen a
governance component to that. government component to that. -- component to that. it has always been an element of tension because we have developed very good relationships with virtually every government in the middle east -- we have positive relationships with every government except syria and iran. we are not protecting governments from each other. there were a few bad actors in the region. for the most part, we are trying to promote more security, and by doing that, we are getting into the domestic governance of all these countries and, in many cases, not winning over the population. but we are very popular among the government. it's a very strange situation we have gotten ourselves into. turkey, in the csis context, is another problem to work out. as we think about the middle east states, it seems to me we have three different kinds of alliance relationships in the middle east.
on the one hand, we have this very generous relationship with israel, which is in many ways our closest relationship, but also the most complicated. we work intimately with israel in military intelligence, but regional hostility means we don't operate publicly on regional security matters. we don't base in israel or use forward position equipment, though israel can use equipment in its own situations. israel has not taken part in the broad regional alliances. israel also is not part of the way that the u.s. thinks about the middle east, militarily. the u.s. supplies about 20% to 25% of israel's defense fund. for an alliance, that is an interesting relationship. the u.s. is also bound by law to ensure israel maintains a qualitative military edge over any potential enemy or collection of enemies in the region.
you could argue that this is a good relationship or that israel is milking the united states. i've have heard both arguments made in washington. it seems to me that this is a complicated relationship not replicated anywhere else in the world. and it is an important part of how the u.s. thinks about alliance relationships in the middle east. israel's also a major non-nato ally. but in point of fact, we have a lot of major non-nato allies in the middle east. most of them are distinguished by not being very major. really, you do have egypt, a big country, but our other major non-nato allies are jordan, bahrain, kuwait, morocco, and tunisia, none of which are the military powers. we fight together, we do some cooperative training, basing there, but our major non-nato allies are not really major in any way. the major relationships are countries with whom we don't have formal alliance
relationships, principally the u.e. and saudi arabia. we sell them tens of billions of dollars in military equipment, we do training, logistics, support. we have sold them some of our most capable equipment. the block systems, the battle tank, guided missiles. we have spent tens of billions of dollars ourselves, we have committed troops. we have done all kinds of things. but it is not under the rubric of the formal kinds of relationships that we think about when we think about alliances. in the middle east context, this complicates your perimeter, andrew. we have a relationship with israel that doesn't fit anything we do anywhere else in the world. we have treaty relationships which are not our biggest relationships in the middle east, and we have non-treaty relationships that are the biggest relationships we have in the middle east. as a commercial venture, this works.
we sell tens of billions of dollars in equipment. sales have helped to keep production lines for u.s. jets open, because we're not buying so many jets ourselves, but our gulf allies are. that keeps production lines open, but also perpetuates a certain dependency, that these states rely on united states to provide security, arguably perpetuating conflict in the region. people say, well, these states are armed to the teeth, letting them be more adventurous than they would otherwise be, creating a need for more u.s. weapons, and that the u.s., rather than contributing to security, is contributing to tension. this comes out to be a sort of moral hazard argument of the u.s. creating the very problem it is aiming to address. the fact is that while the obama administration made an effort to allow the middle east to reach
its own new equilibrium between the sunni states and iran, there is no new equilibrium to be found at all. for more than two decades, the u.s. has tried to take a set of bilateral relationships in the middle east and make them more multilateral. this has roots in the 1950's. it did not work in the 1990's and 2000's. we have tried to do things like shared missile defense, which makes a lot of sense. if you have small states in the gulf, close to each other, it makes sense to share the information. but they don't trust each other to do what they want. they want a close bilateral relationship with the united states, not a broader multilateral relationship where they think the united states would be less committed to them. that creates all kinds of problems for the united states
for what does the u.s. commitment need to be. how many are the normal u.s. troop commitment? is it what it was at the time we deposed saddam hussein? is it was what it was five years after? what is the right level? i think we have lost sight, and the gulf states have certainly lost sight of what the norms should be. we can't avoid giving them a sense of abandonment because we are diminishing our troops. trump has come in talking about the importance -- it is very unclear any middle east context. what our gulfted allies are doing in yemen in the last several years. in many cases, the u.s. has not
been as directly in the fight as they have been. they have acted in ways you -- using u.s. equipment. deleverag inu.s. thise relationship? can you avoid responsibility if the u.s. does not act? if it doesn't act, then it is tied to the decisions of others with which the u.s. might not agree. i think we are going to have to find a way over the next five to 10 years to find out our new model of relationships is going to be. the old model, it seems to me, as we go forward -- is the new model yemen? is yemen a desirable new model? are we going to be able to
maintain consensus with our allies? i think there are a whole series of questions about how we and our allies will try to come together to deal with a whole range of challenges and threats posed by the government of iran, which is going to make the issue of alliances in the middle east one that will get more complicated. kathleen: well, thank you to andrew and michael for assembling this group. i know that i'm sitting to the far left. i don't think i represent the far left but i represent the left of center so i appreciate the effort to be inclusive on that. i was asked to speak specifically to the military aspect of alliances. many of the things i would talk about been touched on. i will try to hit a few points that either were overlooked or maybe require us to stop here and there.
the first is just a history of the u.s. use of alliances and our military approach. it is probably self-evident that the u.s. had alliances at the center of its military strategies since come at the minimum, or world war ii coming forward. we have never fought truly alone since that time. there is debate about whether that history is coming to a close. maybe that is the operation and -- that was the aberration and the norm is something that looks more isolationist for the united states. we will see. i would simply point out that the challenges of the world are getting more complicated and interconnected, not less. there's no real way in a truly dystopian future to reverse that. i'm not arguing for a dystopian future, by the way. isolationism isn't able to manage the challenges we see -- nuclear proliferation,
terrorism, cyberattacks -- to not wall off physically geographical locations and stop security threats we face. even if you thought we could , it is important to remember that much of our economy depends on u.s. companies and institutions being overseas. we can think of the u.s. as here and others as there, and it turns out a lot of u.s. citizens are there and u.s. companies are there. it is complicated to look out for defense and security in an isolationist sense and think of economic security in an international sense. it is an inevitable truth of that this administration coming in will learn, just like every other administration has learned, even if they don't enjoy it -- i point to andrew's mention of the president obama interview in "the atlantic." he does not enjoy being reminded routinely of the importance of
these relationships, but it is a reality. how will that reality dawned upon the new administration? will it come with a low-pain threshold or high-pain threshold along the way? let's talk about the roles of military allies. obviously, the first and most well-considered and thought through and the first to come to people's minds -- first and last time in nato history, it was declared in mutual defense of the united states, and it was undertaken vis-a-vis action inside afghanistan, and that continues good we are talking about host nations as well. we think of the south koreans
fighting in defense of south korea. should that contingency occur? we think of east european countries fighting alongside us. should that occur? in addition to the direct way in which we think about allies fighting next to us, we think about their role they play in terms of providing capacity often, but not always talking about ground force capacity. there are specific capabilities where the u.s. has essentially hedged by virtue of having less investment. one obvious example are the british, who have invested in minesweepers, where the u.s. has largely divested itself. there are cases where we need allies in particular kinds of possible scenarios because of the capabilities they bring. and quite obvious is the
location aspect, the here and the there. if we want to be able to provide our course in an economical and -- our force in an economical and efficient and effective point, we have to at times the close enough to the place we want to fight to make that possible. that means those bases in places where the united states maintains relationships, in order to be as effective as we can be in the execution of our common defense. the last thing i will point out which gets underplayed is the intelligence aspect. many americans do not realize how dependent we are on intelligence provided by partners and allies. the u.s. really cannot, at least today, substitute for the huge, vast global network we are able to tap into, and pretty uniquely tap into, private among nations. there are also nontraditional
res. -- sphe certainly intelligence, as i said, is one that crosses over. but things like governance capacity, the ability to help build out long-term institutional capacity and countries, places like jordan where we want to make sure there's security over the long-term, requires investment in not just military capability but institutions of government. local knowledge, culture, language. thinking about the french and their role in north africa, where there is a unique advantage that the military ally can provide where the u.s. does not have the depth of experience and aptitude. areas where there is border crossing -- self-evident, as i said, that the world as we look at it, from the proliferation security initiative of the bush
administration on the high seas to the counter-isil efforts today, we need to have our allies look at things like nuclear proliferation, the flow of funds across borders, those sorts of security threats rely on alliances. and then finally, also probably understated today, but i know true for my co-panelists, is the view that every administration i know of has looked to allies as a source of legitimacy in the international environment. that can change. we could have a united states that no longer cares about the rule of law. but the fact of the matter is, historically, going forward, it is hard to imagine the united states will not have the rule of law at the center of its foreign policy and a national security interests as it has had for the 20th century forward at a minimum.
let me talk about adaptations to threats. i will simply say obviously, we , have a lot of work to do across particular relationships and formal alliances and less formal partnerships. it is a tending the garden approach where we have a constant effort, and the value is there to undertake them. but i do think that sometimes americans live up to our reputation for impatience. we tend to think of others as being slower than we are. i want to give you a couple examples of where we maybe are not so good but we tend to talk about others. for someone, the u.s. government approach the cybersecurity can many people don't see that as a wild success. when we think about nato, where they quickly moved to adopting cybersecurity as a part of article five. there is a lot of work to do to figure out how to implement that. there's just as much work to do on the u.s. side.
another example might be the approach to the north korean nuclear challenge, or the u.s. along with the republic of korea and japan, australia, and others have been grappling with the implications. let's look at the u.s. approach, where we are all behind the curve in terms of thinking through how to manage the u.s. approach to a nuclear with korea and moving beyond the more comfortable planning parameters that may have made sense in the 20th century. and then as jon mentioned, we think about the missile challenge vis-a-vis iran, where it requires the sharing of data. that is not there because there isn't this strong desire to share information that would enable collective defense. the u.s. doesn't like to share a lot of its missile data a lot,
as well. these are small examples but you could probably think of many more where we should look inward , as well as outward, because both are problems. but they are not uniquely problems of alliance structure, and our own decision-making can seem at least as sclerotic. the last thing that andrew asked me to talk a little bit about is the u.s. defense trajectory under the trump administration, which is a challenging topic. the quick answer is i don't know. i do think there is the potential for a little bit of "back to the future" in terms of alliances, meaning, as we had secretary rumsfeld, i was in the pentagon then come and his approach to the u.s. posture and allies is very much power projection approach. i think it is possible that you have the view, as admiral
roughead pointed out -- if you actually want to be able to use that force. if you don't want to use that force, you can park it nebraska and say, ok. but if you need to projected into asia, eastern europe, and routinely do so, that is going to be a very costly approach. and more generally, i think the idea of how you grow the defense budget will be very important. i think many allies inside the u.s. understand the connection between the health of the economy and defense. you don't want to have, if you will, so much investment in defense done in a way that threatens your economy that you actually drive down some of the value you have as an ally. so how the u.s. increases expense, meaning how much of the u.s. deficit-spends will become very important. what, if anything, it ends up having to sacrifice in other investment areas.
i do think -- really quickly, my analogy to rumsfeld has extreme limits in the sense that ct was not foremost in his mind, and i think that is the central core challenge motivating the incoming trump administration, how long it will stay the court challenge they look at, particularly isis, versus a broadened array of challenges, will depend in part on how they encounter the environment, how ,he environment encounters them :he actions of others may take russia, china, iran. i think there will be heavy scrutiny, as there is in many administrations, on combine activities and exercises, the extent to which they contribute to u.s. war fighting, how you want to quantify and link the
value of what we often here in washington called building partnership capacity. there are questions about defense grade policy. yes, you have a relatively protectionist administration we , think, coming in. but as has been pointed out, military sales are important to the defense industry and the stocks are doing well with the trump president-elect. their ability to export effectively depends, in part, on the relationship coming back the other way, in terms of the trade back and forth, etc. and i think the last thing i would say is that as we open up the issue, if the next administration really opens up this issue and sets up alliances and the terms, if you will, of the deal we have gotten, there is a strong risk that others are already looking at how to make
their end of the deal better. we should not assume that we would get the better end of the follow-on renegotiation on terms of various alliances. we should keep that in mind going forward and how that will affect the alliances and the sector, more generally that , currently exists for us. it is a big question. let me end by saying that thursday, we have a global security forum and there is a panel that focuses on global opinion and elite opinion and goes beyond alliances to talk about foreign security policy and there is a more isolationist viewpoint all the way to the standard csis bullish alliance, folks like us here. i hope you can join us online, if not in person, for that.
-- thanks. andrew: thanks, kathleen, and all the panel for giving us terrific texture and adding extra complexity and really, i think, making the problem more real. i will open it up to the audience, but before i do, i just want to come back to something that mike raised, that is this question of the west, and whether it is the west. and if it is not the west, i guess my question -- starting with mike, but more generally for the panel, if it is not the west, what is the organizing construct? is it possible to have an organizing construct given the complexities jon talked about in the middle east? and i guess, you know, if you could wave your institutional magic wand and change an aspect of alliance institutions in a region or more broadly, what changes would you make? michael: well, the concept of
the west, as i said, is more complicated because if you look at distributions among , ascracies, real democracy opposed to early postwar period, you include korea, indonesia, india, and at the end of world war ii, australia and new zealand were the democracies on that side of the pacific. today almost all the major , powers, with one major exception, are democratic. not without their flaws, but frankly, who are we right now to insist on perfection? that was a bipartisan statement, by the way. i think you also have to embrace certain diversity. you don't want to define the global network of alliances and the core protectors of our way of life and values, so rigidly
that you lose diversity. foreign policy has been a challenge for a long time. john foster dulles had a very rigid approach to nonalignment. john f. kennedy said no, we need to make the world safe not only against communism. we needed to make it safe for diversity. i think he was right on that one. we need to make it safe to develop norms and democracy but we want to be doing it in a way that our number one priority is making sure that states are not coerced from outside. that is sort of the first priority. then we work on improving governments and democracy. that, to me, suggests a greater core function for perhaps the g7, but i think more likely, a core group of like-minded states that care about rules and norms, then i thinknse, on some of the challenges we
face with respect to hybrid warfare coercion, frankly, this is a discussion that japan and korea, nato, the gulf states, maybe should be having. although it is little green men russia and little blue chips in the pacific, the questions we face are similar. kathleen and i have a piece on this in a couple months. to take a first stab at it. the combination is not one-size-fits-all. heather: it is a great question -- what is our new organizing principle? we have been in search of one, to be honest with you. after 9/11, there was the global war on terror. that had very different manifestations. president obama said don't do stupid stuff, stay out of things more than getting yourself involved in them, reaching out to adversaries to try to bring them back into the tent. this is the question.
what is the new organizing principle? for me, it is who is going to enforce all of these international laws we think are great and stabilizing and important? if you don't have an enforcement mechanism, if you don't have a military power with the military will to enforce or punish, whether it is sanctions or military angst, that is the conundrum. we can sit back and watch and say, boy, that is a terrible thing to happen but not in our interest or we are not affected or we can wait until we are affected or our national interests are that, to me, is the overarching question that we really haven't had a lot of thinking about. we react to events but we don't put forward that vision. the truman doctrine was a vision about the world and how we use it. that is what we need and we need -- now from leadership perspective we are less able to articulate it.
the west is not a geographic location. it is an idea, an ideal, and an aspiration. it is what we have been imperfectly trying to work it. international law is great, but when it is broken, who is enforcing the rules? and no one is interested in doing that, we have a very different organizing principle. jon: very briefly, we don't have alliances in the middle east like we have in the pacific. we do it on behalf of our alliances in europe and asia. it has consequences for how our allies see us in the world. i had an interesting discussion with scholars from china who are interested in what the future u.s. policy is in the middle east. and one of the questions they
ask is does this mean the u.s. , wants china to play greater role in security in the middle east? and i can't tell you what the trump administration's view on that is going to be but i can tell you it will be consequential, for the united states as well as the middle east as well as china. kathleen: i think that what i would say is that there is -- are some constants -- there are constants thematically, and they are the ability to deal with fluidity across multiple types of challenges, probably multiple regions, and that includes fluidity across different alliance relationships. you already see a lot of that were we use the construct that is most useful to the most important players at the time, whether it is nato or the u.s. and alliance or bilateral or quadrilateral. i think that is good. it is good to have that fluidity and flexibility because the challenges we face will require it.
i also think they require it because that bilateral construct, that cold war era construct, has broken down to the point where there can be partnerships of convenience on different issues at different times. that is not necessarily ideal for the u.s., but it is the reality. you can call it the rise of multi-clarity or in terms of the loosening of the strictures on security that bind countries into one of 2 camps. that may be a temporary period of time to be followed by a new arrangement, but i do think we are in that fluid period, possibly waiting until a new set eitherngements that are caused by u.s. decision-making along with that of others or by longer-term demographic,
technological, and other trends. andrew: thanks. and now i would like to open it up to the audience. there is a question back there. >> thank you. i am an advisor to aipac. since jon said turkey -- [indiscernible] you said there was no consultation in nato. if there were consultation today and you were there, what would you advise nato to do? heather: thank you. [laughter] first and foremost, i think the turkish government should talk to its allies about what happened. and particularly, its operations in syria as well as iraq. this is a nato ally, now entered a very complex operation of which another nato member is
also involved. and so, i think -- again the , alliance has worked itself into a habit of not talking about what the alliance and its members are doing. it is easier to talk about a military in -- military operation perhaps in afghanistan to have an honest and candid reflection of what is going on inside our own country. first and foremost, it would just be an example of doing a briefing -- whether many members around the atlantic table would agree with presentation offered, it is the government's formal position to also understand what future is going to happen -- particularly, i'm a little concerned about the future of the general staff and the general officers, 200 of whom are in jail right now, and what that means for military leadership moving forward with in turkey.
the changes that are undertaken right now within turkey require a very intense dialogue, military to military but also politically. i'm hopeful can achieve that. nato just dances around the issues. i would like to focus on them square on deal with them forthrightly. i think it is important as well for other nato members particularly as we are getting , towards a very important election season within europe, the french elections, german elections, to make sure that members are fully aware of the implications and policy, european defense spending, nato operations, and russia policy. it is equally important. nato should be focused internally as well as external threats. >> thank you.
i am a u.s. citizen, member of the reagan foundation. i have a hypothetical question, and that is, now that new president is coming in, expecting asian countries to be more independent -- that is what i hear -- my question is, what if japan and south korea go nuclear? should we support it, or would we support it? hypothetical question. michael: i can only speak for myself when i say it is probably not in our interest for japan and korea to go nuclear.
its probably not in japan or korea's interests. its probably several have made the point now that the nuclear capability will put pressure on our extended nuclear umbrella. it is one of the many areas where our alliance and dialogue has not kept up with the realities we now face. i think if we have a serious dialogue with seoul and tokyo -- about how we maintain the credibility -- one problem we have had is that too many people in washington forget that extended deterrence is defined by the deterred but also by , people being protected. and if our allies don't think its credible even if the reasons , aren't good, we have to take that seriously. and often washington has been too dismissive of korean and japanese concerns. we should have dialogue and if we do, 90%, 95% be asked will be
the best we can take to reinforce confidence in deterrence. if either japan or korea started moving in the direction of nuclear weapons, it would go through the interim staff, some kind of jointly control system, like we have had in the past with germany and britain, some kind of jointly commanding control, or jointly combined. even that, i think, is a very remote possibility. if we are serious about dialogue with our allies, alliances are not about telling us what to do. .hey will have demands on us to make them work, you have to listen. we find that allies are talking to each other about how to get more out of us. that is another dimension to this dynamic that people haven't really thought about. jon: the other aspect that it is important to note the connection between asia and the middle east, when president obama talked about how the syrian government's use of chemical weapons would be a red line in
syria, and then decided not to go to war in syria, it was noted quite closely in asia as here is , a demonstration case of what violates the red line. if we look at what happens in north korea, everyone will say what does that mean about iran? everyone looks at iran to see how the u.s. will deal with north korea. there is a certain way in which our allies look to other u.s. alliance relations to understand the nature of their own alliance relations with the united states. i think there is a connection there they certainly see we don't. because mike is on a whole different floor than me. it is impossible to have a conversation -- michael: we do watch you. [laughter] andrew: up the back, please. >> united states of africa, task force. i am from africa originally.
i'm 73 years old. when i hear people talk about what was created after world war ii, american leadership in the world and the international liberal order, international order. i always wondered, people who don't look like me, and people in the rest of the world don't look like you, do you get their authority, their consent? i see this project is an attempt to continue european domination of the world, and we're not going to have it, you better stop it ok? , andrew: thank you for that view. time for one more question. >> thank you. reporter from voice of america. i have 2 related questions and i wonder if the panelists would like to comment on
president-elect trump's peace through strength strategy, and also the future of the rebalance to asia. thank you. andrew: could you repeat the second part of the question? >> yes, the pivot asia. rebalance of asia. michael: so i can't resist the earlier question, which is a fair question. from the gentleman with the hat. one of the strengths we have is that this system of rules and norms, broadly, is now embraced in my part of the world basically from the south asian continent to hawaii. that is billions of people.
it is contested, it is debated. is there anti-americanism in places? definitely. do we make mistakes? definitely. i hear about it all the time. this may have been as the british and anglo-american and nato-centered, but it is a model that many parts of the world, certainly my part of the world, asia, people prefer, and we see that in opinion polls. but it does, enforce the point that we need to reflect the diversity of alliances and actors and players who have a stake in the system and listen to them. on peace through strength, great line -- reagan used it, eisenhower, probably john quincy adams -- look, the odds are very high that the defense budget and the supplemental will go up $50 million, $60 million. one of my criticisms of the
rebalance, which is the right strategy, is it wasn't resourced enough. i don't think the name "pivot" or "rebalance" will not get much play, but the impulse for it was not a purely democratic or obama administration impulse. it was built during the bush years and george herbert walker years and it reflects the fact that over half of americans say that asia is the most important region to us, fastest, most growing region of the world. governors care, state legislators care, small and medium-sized enterprises care. exporters in ohio and western pennsylvania care. this thing just has momentum. the question is, as heather said, how quickly will the new administration sort out the strategies and the framing? look every administration since , the cold war has declared its number one threat and priority and none of them have followed
through on it. clinton was global challenges but mostly focused on geopolitics. bush was geopolitics, and we had to deal with 9/11. obama was climate change and they were confronted with geopolitics. however it is framed in the campaign, the grand strategy that evolves six months or a year or two or three will be based around a different reality. asia, i'm quite confident, and i think our alliances will be part of that. but we have fundamental questions that merit addressing but also how we make our alliances more effective. -- more effective than they have been. andrew: thanks, mike. that has really brought us full circle, and it remains to me to thank everyone for coming today. if you will like to follow the project, you can do it on the website. and finally, i would like you to join me in thanking admiral roughead and the panel.
[applause] [auditorium] >> the house returns from its thanksgiving break tomorrow. we will hear from kevin mccarthy on his parties take on the lame-duck. later, we sit down with james lankford to talk about the upcoming 115th congress and the trump administration. live at 6:00 p.m. eastern on c-span three. you can also watch it on www.c-span.org and listen live on the free c-span radio app.
we have a special webpage at c-span.org to help you follow the supreme court. and select-span.org the supreme court on the right-hand top of this page. once on the page, you will see four of the most recent oral arguments heard by the court this term. click on the view all link to hurt all of the arguments covered by c-span. you can watch justices in their own words, including one on one interviews in the past few months with justices kagan, thomas and ginsburg. there is also a calendar for this term. a list of all current justices with links to see all of their appearances on c-span. as well as many other supreme court videos on demand. follow the supreme court on c-span.org. burks, u.s. local aids court nader, was among those who
talked about the role of public finance in the global fight against hiv and aids. on a panel hosted by the center for global development. from washington, this is about one hour and a half. >> welcome to the center for global development. i am the director of global policy here. closer to ending hiv-aids as a public health threat. our program has been a
born from a pipe partisan content is -- consents -- consensus and it has been that way to start. -- toing life-saving almost 7 million people. supporting 7 million people. we also have to recognize that our current approach to financing the fight against hiv-aids has not created clear support or incentive to decrease to take one partner more direct responsibility for financing. by fiscal sustainability requires epidemic control. reach the other 44%,
we are going to have a growing number of hiv-infected people requiring treatment or the foreseeable future. it is calculated there will be a doubling of the infected population every 25 years unless we get serious to stop. fundersexternal currently shoulder an important share of the financing of hiv programs. are --don't know -- they some analyses suggest the fiscal ability is limited. there is -- that greater domestic funding should be a priority. today the two challenges
is this new partnership between the u.s. department of the treasury and the program to support finance ministries. you have everyone's bios, i think you pick them up as you win in. let's start with ambassador and we will end with the economic counselor at msu. thank you very much. thank you, amanda. we have lots of great people. the first slide -- i know you -- buty can't see these today, it is very much about
accountability, transparency and impact. fiscal stageut the and the negotiations with ministries of finance. it is the clarity about where those dollars are going and the impact to expect that is extraordinarily important. because it was getting more difficult to constantly translate our data. we put all of our data up online and it is age and sex aggregated. any minister of finance can quickly utilize this to see the impact it has had. that is a partnership between the government, communities and the program. we felt we needed to model what behaviors we got all ministries should have in showing your work. really around transparency, accountability and impact. we will be announcing the first three impact surveys that have been in the field this past year.
zambia, zimbabwe. you will find the results exciting. we have known that we have had a tremendous impact on pediatric infections. the latest report, pediatric infections are down 70% over the last decade. he also realized we didn't have the same impact on adult infections. we have been exploring about what is that issue. ministers of finance -- when we talk about the minister of finance in mali about a year and a half ago. mind, what they believe the hiv-aids debate -- epidemic was, was family members and employees dying from hiv-aids. mind,one, people were dying an. there was no more visibility to the epidemic. ourlso worked clear about numbers. in 2000, you had 8000 new infections in kenya. you had 80,000 new infections
last year. but the makeup of those infections have dramatically shifted from being pediatric to 90% of adults. obviously, the program you need to expand and invest on and insurer as far as maintaining the program becomes critical. we also spent time working with governments to look where the resources work. there is a real issue between equal versus equity. to createreally hard equity. equity means that those who are in need of services receive the services. that is not equal. because visas are not equally represented. every health center doesn't have the same makeup of the same diseases. but if you send them the same -- innes, in some clinics other clinics you won't have enough. in kenya, there is a geographic that has hadvince expanding epidemics while others have been decreasing.
thanks to world bank and the accessibility of their data, we have been looking at the in africa -- demographics in africa. you can see in the decades since the hiv epidemic started between 1990 and 2020. there are twice as many adults. i draw your attention to the first set of bars where the number of infections in young women in the 15-24-year-old age range are particularly high. and data now shows that 24-year-old men and 60 -- 17-year-old young girls. that has been ongoing for the last decade. when you start looking at these surveys, this is a composite to get you interested in the announcement, you can see that in our groups under 25, they don't know their status. whereas we are reaching over 80% of people over 30 note or status
in these countries. 80% of adult populations no their status under getting referred to treatment. but less than half under 25 note or status. now you have three different epidemics going on. have the pediatric epidemic, which we believe is under control and continues to be decreasing. you have the over 30 epidemic where you are approaching almost, what we would call heard erdunity of the -- h immunity. then you have the 15-24-year-olds who have a huge demographic number ongoing transmission. and a health system where there is no binding fight. that is the discussion we need with ministers of finance. it is discussion investment and gender equity. the discussion is bigger than health.
i think that is why we are excited about the program we have in the field called dreams. i won't spend any time on that in light of the time. i conclude by saying we believe there is an amazing short-term opportunity with this new direction we have in our dialogue with the department of the treasury. when health people talk to the department of the treasury, we don't always get the words correct. we bring in the heavy hitters who understand the words and how to make a business case. that these kinds of investments willcondary education decrease pregnancy and hiv risk. and really show the value for that money invested. to have a dialogue about how you create a preventive health system for 10-25-year-olds, which we know no matter where you are on the world, don't interact well with the health system. it has to be better than their traditional childcare block. this discussion is really an exciting juncture to recognize
the progress we have made and hone in on the areas where we have difficulties and need to do more together. we are excited about this new partnership. thank you. [applause] >> good morning, everyone. i would especially like to thank amanda and the center for global development for hosting this forum on this very important pocket -- topic. panel formbers of our sharing their important insight. i would like to build on ambassador burks opening remarks and provide an update on our partnership. this is a collaboration that was launched in may, 2015. ministries inance low and middle income countries
to create health resources to fight hiv-aids. my remarks will outline the motivations of the partnership and the path forward. of all, let me address the issue of why this partnership? 2013, -- it will acquire efforts today. and effectiveness every forces devoted to fighting hiv. we are all aware of the need for more resources to finance the hiv-aids response. i some estimates, current annual spending will need to increase by almost 40%. $19 billion, $26 billion by 2020. donor countries alike must do their part to fund this effort. an environment of donor resources, artan or countries will need to take on an increased share of the response
and overtime, oversized -- more resources. it is more important than ever to maximize effectiveness of every dollar. the treasury collaborations motivated that finance industries have a key role to play in achieving these outcomes. today, finance ministries have been generally less involved in decisions around hiv-aids. primarily because the majority of the financing and donate has non--- finance ministries and health industries do not often speak the most -- same language, which can inhibit a ineffective collaboration. given the current financing environment for the hiv-aids -- effort and the key role finances play in the financial resources, it is urgent that these institutions work more closely with their health counterparts. in doing so, they will be better
positioned to maximize value for money in the hiv-aids response. betral to these efforts will the overcome challenges around how public financial management systems ensure that hiv is resourced. donors,g from donate -- are properly integrated into the regular institutional process government. in many cases, this requires strengthening the underlying financial management resources themselves. with an eye towards including -- theget formulation allocation of resources, developing robust budget execution systems, strengthening human capacity, and linking this systems to a systemwide improvement in strategic programming and planning areas. not only in hiv-aids, the broader health care sector and the broader governmental sector.
governments are are ready taking steps in syria. for instance, in zambia, a joint oversight working group was established on sustainable financing for hiv that will better coordinate and track resources from the government and developing party. to help address these challenges, u.s. treasury part -- leverages the departments relationships and policy with finance. providing technical assistance to government to improve overall resource mobilization and public financial management. treasury seeks the support finance ministries partner countries established three the pillars of a sustainable and successful financial response to hiv and aids. first, public management of precious health resources, second, improved engagement in coordination between health and
finance ministers. third, and effective mobilization of domestic resources over time in close collaboration. since the partnership's launch 18 months ago, the u.s. treasury has advanced these efforts by regularly incorporating these set of initiatives into our policy dialogues with finance ministers. most recently in october. in addition, the treasury has sent technical teams on fact-finding missions to several partner countries to ss and diagnose the challenges facing hiv-aids effort. held discussions with global funds and other implementing partners to discuss how it treasury to complement ongoing in country work. these discussions with our partners continue, partnership is also entering its next and most exciting phase. involving the formal
establishment of technical assistance programs between the u.s. treasury and partner countries. which will enable the partnership to begin the building foundation for a financial response. i am happy to announce that earlier this month, uganda's ministry of finance signed the terms of reference for the partnership's first technical assistance program. this has multiple objectives. it aims to bolster uganda's hiv aids response. through greater court mission and improvements in financial management systems, as well as supporting the government objective to form stronger links among the ministry of finance, health and the country's std aids program. or dedicatedup business unit monitor resources ballistic way.
caps in datall availability, build a better understanding of off and on budget donor support. and address other gaps that prevent uganda from maximizing fight -- ans in the advisor will be working alongside staff within the ministry of finance. therder to monitor country's resources. the advisor will also help the methodology for oversight and review of all these resources. recommend financial policies to ensure resources are allocated to high-impact activities, development the ministries costing analysis and recommend ways in which to incorporate off resources on and off into the financial management system. we hope this collaboration will support uganda's effort to make
the most informed decision possible about the allocation and use of the countries hiv resources and ultimately, save more lives. we look forward to collaborating with the finance ministry of uganda on this important issue and my colleague from the treasury's office of technical assistance will provide traditional -- additional details on this in the upcoming panel. we hope this project in uganda is the very beginning. i appreciate the work you are by doing to achieve the goal 2030. these are new frontiers for the u.s. treasury and we are interested in all the work you are doing to save lives. we look forward to continuing and partnership with papfar partner countries and look forward to updating you on our joint successes. thank you very much. [applause]
appreciates the needs for health , it also recognizes that -- the ministry of finance therefore unconditionally recognizes the importance of investing adequately in education from the economic development perspective. despite the efforts of the health sector, it is clear that domestic forces alone cannot combat hiv-aids, malaria and many other diseases and challenges in this health sector. , bernments should not
involved in appointing itself with the implementation of when the government funds are provided. any changes that arise during the year in terms of financing -- also ensuring accountability for donor funds. to encourage synergy between donor funds and government funds. -- up to datato on levels of assistance coming through states. government use in tracking hiv,
real-time data on evolution in terms of funding. the above, the minister of finance, working with the usa government, came up with -- the group meets monthly and reports a quarterly meeting to the secretary of treasury and the american ambassador to zambia. working on improving data flows on resources, development subprogram financing and overlaps. work and improve finance involvement. this advisor will support the oversight groups on finances,
financial analyses, to ensure efficient use of resources. the advisor would recommend financial policies and ensure resources as needed. and also provide capacity on financial analyses, costing and funding methodologies. reforms andort report on hiv and aids resources. he would develop and implement strategies at the four levels of government in a timely matter. improve financial reports, recommend a methodology that incorporates donor budget resources. provide advice and support
development of health strategies. during the course of the terminal reference, there may be other areas upon which the ministry of finance would like to focus. the advisor is expected to be a valuable asset. the minister of finance is in agreement. the work of the advisor is in vision of the group and brought enough to assist other areas that are equal in importance to public finance, financial management, but didn't -- not directly related to the technical advice. these are the notes from our minister of finance and our ministry of assisting management
of financing hiv aids research. [applause] >> thank you, minister. --hink we are going to have the secretary of treasury of south africa who will join us on video. why don't we change out our panel light we hear a little more. are there any key questions -- maybe i could ask one question before you go. one is that a lot of the measures you are thinking of taking with this partnership are obviously very relevant to the hiv-aids response, it would have huge implications for the rest of the health sector as well. is it the role of this treasury person to look together with the ministry of finance, beyond hiv-aids as well? i think one philosophy that
animates the initiative is that these programs need to be embedded in the overall business of government and the overall public management. if you look at the terms of reference that have been developed for uganda, it is basically embedded in the broader look at the national management system. similarly, in other recipient countries, the most sustainable interventions are going to be ones that are tailored to assessing the effectiveness of resources in the hiv-aids area, but also making sure the broader public financial management system is compatible with the objective of maximizing return on investment in public health and public education. i think these interventions will be tailored in greater detail about this, to the need of the
country. often those needs will be, in the broader context, in development. >> one question for you. when you think about one result that you want to see in a year or two years time, in terms of financial sustainability, what would you like to see? civil society, looking at this partnership and trying to assess whether it is making a difference, what should we look for? systems linked investments to outcomes and impact. whether that is investment in education, whether investment in the house itself, the ,aboratories that we invest in has to be linked to outcome. if we can help generate -- it will be tremendous. >> do you want to be -- and
anything questioner -- anything? >> very simple. [indiscernible] at a higher level, they can benefit. >> that speaks to the heart of efficiency. we don't know how we are necessarily spending every dollar, etc.. we will look into that. the key to our first panel. if we can get mark fletcher on string -- screen and the second panel to come up.
>> we will start off really panelists to respond a little bit to what they heard on the panel based on their work. and maybe we will start with mike ruffner at the end. you'll have to mine your response maybe we won't start -- with mike. let's start with you, laura. ok. we'll start with you, david. all right. because you are mike.