tv Stephen Lovegrove Discusses British Defense Strategy CSPAN March 13, 2017 12:34am-1:31am EDT
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america's cable television companies, and it's brought you today by your cable or satellite provider. next, the uk's permanent secretary at the ministry of defense talks about defense strategy and relations with nato, the u.s., and european union. from the atlantic council, this is just under an hour. >> good afternoon, and welcome to the atlantic council. for those of you who don't know me, i'm frank miller. i'm a member of the board here at the council. and the principal of the group. we're all very pleased today to have the opportunity to hear from steven lovegrove, the permanent secretary at the ministry of defense in london. steven became the permanent secretary in april of 2016.
prior to that he was the permanent secretary for the department of energy and climate change and had distinguished career before that both in government and in the private sector. for those of you who don't know, the permanent secretary is the government's principle adviser on defense and has responsibility for policy, finance and planning as a departmental accounting officer. the permanent secretary sets strategy for defense, including corporate strategy, heads the department of state in the m.o.d. civil service and the overall organization management and staffing of defense. so for those of you who are americans and don't understand that you can actually as a civil servant rise to a very senior positions and have real authority, you're seeing someone who actually does that in london.
we appear to be approaching a crossroads in the history of the transatlantic relationship or so the pundits would have us believe. we're seeing protoe nationalism in many nato and european countries. we're certainly seeing proto-nationalism in russia and aggressive sense of trying to assert itself throughout the european space. we are seeing renewed efforts in the united states, the united kingdom to make large defense companies more responsive to both costs and schedule. and all of this is occurring in the midst of a great challenge, to the rules' based order which emerged from world war ii and it is in this context we'll hear from the permanent secretary. i've been asked to be a paid public announcement before he
comes on, which is to say for those of you who are here and watching on computers, please join the conversation by following @acskocroff and using the #poundspecialrelationship. and with that, i give you steven lovegrove, the permanent secretary of the ministry of defense in london. [applause] >> well, thank you, frank. i'm delighted to be here at the atlantic council with such a distinguished audience. i'm going to talk today about britain's place in a rapidly changing world and offer some thoughts on the implications for us all. but before that,i should perhaps begin to build on a little of what frank talked about in my rather archaic title of in fact fully permanent undersecretary of state, which doesn't really translate very well into american english. i don't need to tell this audience that there are some important differences between our constitutions.
an example from 1962, president kennedy and prime minister mcmilan in nassau with the main business of polaris out of the way, failed to talk of other matters. the president asked the prime minister how his budget was going. fine, thanks, said mcmilan. no trouble in the house of the commons, asked the president? no, no, no replied mcmilan. we write the budget, throw it over the wall and the majority approves it. well, said kennedy, wonderingly, anyone could run a country like that. so, another distinction, though, is that virtually all of our ministries are led by secretaries of state who are also members of parliament. so the members of the cabinet
and a handful of more junior ministers who support them in leading their departments interact with their fellow parliamentarians nearly every single day. everyone below those ministers is a career official. we have no political appointees like in your system, although i am aware you have rather fewer than you're used to. we always have only a very few political advisers and a handful in the prime ministers political advisers can't issue instructions to civil servants at all. the role of the permanent secretary as frank outlined, my job is to lead the department as it supports the government of the day on the principle policy and management adviser to the defense secretary. by working close with the defense secretary's principal military adviser. day by day i run the department. the cds gives strategic directions to operations and we come together to try to make it all add up. together the cds and i are the
defense voice at the national security council official meetings and we jointly chair the defense strategy group. we jointly lead integrated teams of career civil servants and military offices working jointly. and that is an absolutely key characteristic of our system. and that is one of our most enormous strengths and one i suspect we don't make enough of or talk about enough in public. as frank says, i was an investment banker for a very long period of my career. i don't expect any sympathy as a result of that. but i can say that from that van -- vantage point and also from the vantage point of not seeing the defense a huge amount of my career, the strengths that we
have in the uk system have served us incredibly well and will continue to serve us incredibly well in the future. i could discuss the civil service and parliament for a lot longer, but it's time for bigger things. it's traditional to begin these discussions with threats and challenges. i want to briefly mention some positives. u.k. is the fifth largest economy in the world. we are a uniquely connected nation with alliances and partnerships the world over. we are the most trade dependent member of the g20 and we consider that a strength. the language of shakespeare remains the language of the world over. we are second only to the united states in our technological base and by that i mean human , academic and industrial. the uk the well positioned to deliver 21st century defense and we continue to be the home of some of the greatest high end manufacturing companies in the world and more on that later.
we spend our money wisely. we've increased investments in defense at the same time as reducing overall government spending. we're proud to meet the nato target of spending 2%, 2.21% actually of our gdp on defense. the government is committed to increased defense spending by .5% above inflation in each year of this parliament running out to 2020. and we are also proud of spending .7% of our national income on overseas development aid. reducing the risk of future conflicts. in fact, we are the only country in the world to hit both that 2% nato target and the .7% overseas development target. we remain an outward-looking nation. as the prime minister said in
january, the u.k. is and shall remain a secure prosperous, tolerant country, a magnet for international talent and a home to the pioneers and innovators who will shape the world ahead. the british government reaffirmed those spending commitments along with publishing our strategic defense and review in 2015. we're proud of that strategy document, both in the judgments that we made, many of which have proved perhaps regrettably prescient and in the progress we've made since delivering our objectives. i don't need to rehearse and i won't rehearse the increasing challenging and increasingly challenging global security context for this audience. but briefly our sdsr concluded that the u.k. defense and security needed to respond to four main challenges. first, the increased threat
posed by terrorism extremism and instability, second the resurgence of state-based threats and intensifying wider state competition. third, the impact of technology, especially cyber and network issues and wider technological developments and fourth the erosion of the rules based international order, which makes it harder to build consensus and to tackle global threats. some of those challenges are very much as they were in 2015. we have found no magic bullet to fix weak and failing states. we know it takes decades of toil, treasure, political commitment and sometimes blood to develop economies, democracies, and resilient societies. even as we deny them safe havens around the world, we know that the ambitions of daesh, al qaeda to poison mayhem have not diminished. the uk is committed to playing a leading role in the global
counter daesh coalition contributing all the arms of government, economic, diplomatic, development and defense. but some things have changed. most notably the threat from state actors has crystallized in more ways and more rapidly than perhaps we anticipated. as the defense secretary set out in his recent speech at st. andrews university, we have a very clear-eyed view of russian behavior. alexander was murdered on british soil in 2006. in 2015, the annexation of crimea and the shooting down of mh 17 in 2014 then its intervention in syria all showed how russia had become more aggressive. but 2016 saw a further step change in russian behavior. it is seeking to expand its sphere of influence. destabilize countries and weaken the alliance. it seeks to weaken today's international rules based system, to write a new set of
rule on their terms and reflecting their values. we are responding as an alliance to dissuade and to deter. and also to engage. as the prime minister has said last week, we stand ready to engage with russia, but we are aware. the scale and breadth of those challenges, the speed and change in some other events, not least the uk's decision to leave the european union leads some distinguished and voices to suggest that we need to rewrite our sdsr. we disagree. we got those threats right and we built a robust and flexible plan to take them on. and as you all know, rewriting a strategy is an excellent excuse to avoid executing it. but that does not mean that we should not constantly test and adjust our planning. indeed, it would be a grave error to do anything else. and when we do that, we need to remember the guiding principles of sdsr which are to be
and iational, innovative, in turn.ck those we decided to make our defense policy and plans international by design. our armed forces have almost always operate aid long side allies and partners. and first and foremost, with nato, the strongest military alliance the world has ever seen. nato knows what it must now do. it must deliver greater resources, most particularly from member states not yet meeting the 2% target. efficiency is not a substitute for commitment. we need both. with resources nato must also reform. nato has begun that journey and the uk is determined to lead the effort. today, nato has embarked on a new defense and terror posture. -- and deterrence posture. we have a greater focus on our higher readiness forces and we are starting to develop new responses to hybrid threats, nuclear blackmail and cyberattack.
but we now need to press the accelerator. the institutions of nato shape, act, the joint forces command, and so on, all need to play a part in the transformation of nato to a genuinely agile, flexible organization. one in which we can have confidence that can respond quickly enough to those who wish us harm. such an organization requires nato to be adaptable and responseive to the changing environment. we need to strive for an alliance that is less bureaucratic, better at prioritizing, more capable of taking difficult decisions quickly. we must empower senior officials to draw on their experience and insight to prioritize and resource the most pressing issues for its member states. enhanced resources and effective reform in nato need to be
married with a restored state and sense of residents -- relevance. nato must demonstrate through action that it contributes to tackling our challenges, including terrorism. that contribution to counter terrorism needs to be broad-based. but also operations capacity building, partnership, awareness, and intelligence. one final word on nato and that is to record two of the most important words in the treaty, north atlantic. --o is not an organization's organization purely about euro-atlantic security. it is also about the waters and between. we are perhaps going to comfortable considering our shared ocean is safe. it is no longer
a b nine environment. it is becoming a contested space and we must continue to work together to protected and the trade and community communication channels to which it is home. we could explore that in other domains as well but perhaps another time. first the most important part of an international response but it cannot be the whole answer. against more complex problems, we must bring together military and nonmilitary responses and that means making the most of at warsaw last year to reinvigorate the relationship between nato and the you. that includes roosting -- the between the nato and e.u.. significantay is a contributor to e.u. missions around the world. e.u., but weg the are committed to european security and we will continue to be a supporter of the efforts to
peace and security. will continue to communicate with our partners for a supportive relationship between nato and the e.u., which is an hour and all other nations security interest. finally, our international emphasis must include our most important i o relationships. the extraordinary scope of the-u.s. defense relationship. it is worth dwelling on a couple very conspicuous examples. sometime in the 20 30's, they will undertake their respective first patrols. they will each be the first of the new nuclear deterrent submarines responsible for providing the 90's of our national security against the most existential threats. at their heart, each of these classes of submarines will carry trident d5 missiles.
the warheads have the assets of our countries and the firing change to lunch some. the missiles are coming up the common stock. a missile coming off the production line does not know if it is destined for a u.k. or a u.s. submarine. they will be stored in a common missile department identical in u.s. into u.k. subgrades that has been developed by a few navies in our industry parliament. just well on that. -- holstered in a common missile compartment. or havetrust each other the ability to do that. another example. we have agreed that the u.s. wille corps strike aerials
will fly on their first operational deployment. it will be another potent, ourtched commitment of depth of commitment to work together to threats of our shared security. that relationship and that commitment and the recognition of the historical and joint endeavors by our respective defense secretaries is transparently and powerfully genuine. on the f-35hip program provides us both with an unmatched fifth generation air capability. it also provides us with considerable economic benefits and there can be no defense without the sustainable industrial base. today, u.k. andy u.s. companies constitute a single defense space. lockheed martin is a u.k. company. we should recognize and build on that reality, delivering a truly
two-way street for defense procurement cooperation. you all know that innovation is the day job for any tactical commander. it's the day job for our engineers and laboratory staff laboring to create new capabilities to keep us safe. it's a day job for the defense industry seeking to provide capabilities we need at prices we can afford. innovation is foundational to everything about defense. the u.k. is good at innovation. we're number three on the global innovation index and in the hindsight we can see this is dispute the actions of government rather than because of them. we became comfortable with the idea that we would have technological superiority. we missed early on that cyber would present our opponents to do us harm. so innovation is the second
strand of our strategic response. the u.k. is not precisely pursuing a third strategy of the sort that the deputy has spoken about in the last few years. our ambition instead is to fundamentally change how we go about our business in pursuit of military advantage now and in the future. we also recognize that today technological innovation happens primarily in private enterprise rather than in government so we've established the defense and security excelaccelerator. to bring novel ideas from individuals and companies without previous defense experience. it is something we can learn a lot from the u.s. about. we realize the world changes faster so we need to invest in thessing scanning because life of any defense is going to get shorter and in before anything new comes along. we have set up the in -- innovation and research unit,
better known as iris. we have established an 800 pound innovation fund to support suppliers with great new ideas and bringing them from concept to capability. we know that inside the department we need to be held to account for innovation, so we have a defense innovation advisory panel that is had by the former defense chairman to advise the defense secretary drawing on the u.k. uk's world-class capabilities and we haven't 70 sectors. technology, >> and we are doing all of this internationally including cooperating with the dod to bring new technologies into defense. international and integration is of the integrative challenges call for integrated solutions. you know russia is using all the levers of state power to pursue
their interest. requires abrid model full government response. we realized most of our security challenges coming from a weak and failing states. we established a stabilization unit to take on this challenge is in a holistic and strategic way. today the state was asian unit brings together members of the armed forces, police officers and a civil services -- civil servants from 12 government bonds. we brought together policy officials from the foreign office and energy. there is one team led by one official reporting to two secretaries of state. we need a less conventional relationships. once we can go on operations knowing the homeland was secure
and resilient. tackling threats as range so we don't have to at home. there is less and less distinction between home and away and peace and war. we must respond to that reality. our strategy is international, -- theiron and identification will not deliver a lasting peace but they can guide us as we review our plan strategically, safely to a changing world including the destabilizing, aggressive actions of russia and other state. and separately and together these principles remind us in the u.k. how important it is to take on challenges in harness with the united states. we think alike but we are not the same. we deeply understand each other
but we can still offer a different perspective. there is no other country that can play the role of the united states in the rules-based international system and there is no closer u.s. ally than the u.k. orthe un security council anywhere else, we can help you achieve your goals. there is no other country's technology sector can drive the kind of innovation required to deliver 21st century defense and there is no closer u.s. ally helped oure who radar, the designs for the first a jet engine and the blueprints for the nuclear bomb. our people were together, trained together, studied together, deployed together, and to die together. military and civilian, government and industry, they are the very best of their generation. across all that we do, we have
been, we are, we will remain the very closest of allies. we think the more challenging future, we have a plan to respond and that is to do so together. with that, i'm delighted to take your questions. >> let me begin stephen by thanking you for those remarks. for underlining the special relationship. let me begin by asking you about brexit. we hear a great deal since the june from self-serving people suggesting that the brexit means that the u.k. basically opted out of european defense and that this requires a separate european defense identity.
this in yourn remarks but i would like you to say a little bit more about that allegation. >> it is an allegation that has been made and it really could not be further from the truth. we are leaving the european union and i don't think anyone should labor under the misapprehension that will not happen. but we are profoundly european. the u.k. is partial europe. we cannot throw ourselves into the middle of the atlantic and pretend we are not. theink the idea that european union is going to ofehow re-create the kind protective umbrella that nato has been capable of providing over the last 70-80 years is nonsensical.
if i look at the enhanced for the presence missions that are coming into action this year, eu,e are all members of the latvia, lithuania and poland. they are all there to guarantee a the ultimate guarantor -- really tangible symbol of how nato guarantees european safety and security. if we had left already, three of those missions would be led by non-eu countries. though the u.s., canada and the u.k.. that is a sense in which the eu is very important but the interconnections between our various countries go much deeper than that and anyone who
imagines that somehow or another leaving the european community is going to change that i think has it profoundly wrong. >> thank you. let me ask you a bit of an unfair question which is to what degree do you think the president's call, echoed by secretaries mathis and tillerson for european members of the alliance to increase their defense spending has had any residence or will have any effect on defense spending in the comment -- on the continent? >> i think it has had quite a lot of residence. nance.o it is a subject of conversation maybe not in all of the saloon bars in europe but certainly where it had not been a proper
conversation and it had become so in the last a few months really. and in particular i think that the secretary of defense's comments about europe needing to show as much commitment to the people of europe as america had done has resonated extremely powerfully from someone who was a former supreme commander of nato. i think it has made a difference. originalwas one of the authors of those kinds of commitments. they are having more by now than they have hitherto for. there will be a moment coming up when we need to think quite carefully about what 2% means
for each of the members of the nato. certain elements of spending which certain countries may choose to do which would be more helpful than other types of spending. we need to fairly soon get into a more granular discussion about where those points of difference actually are so that nato as a whole can operate in a more holistic way with the right level of capabilities and skills. 2%'s concentrate on the #of and let's not forget the 20% of the miniature on equivalent as well. that is a really important part of those commitments. we would like to see this. >> let me turn to the audience. there are faces i recognize. but there are microphones on either side and when i call and you will you please stand and at
least identify yourself so that we all know who is asking the questions. thank you for your presentation. i would like to get your advice. i'm from the atlantic council. it was not entirely clear what the obama administration strategy was to either russia or the islamic state. it is less clear what the trump administration strategy is towards that. the obama administration first -- buty was to deter when you asked that question you didn't get an answer. would you think the tenets of strategy towards russia ought to be and how should we be addressing the islamic state in ways we are not doing? the approach to
russia is going to be manyfold and i will pick out some of the that the british government feels strongly about. i believe the american government to develop its own policies. the invasion of crimea and the thexation of crimea was first forcible seizure in europe sense of the -- seizure of land in europe since the second world war. the u.k. government is committed to keeping sanctions and other restrictions on russia for as long as it takes to rectify that position. well,not want to go to a
let's move on, thank you very much. that is the view that most of our european allies hold firm to as well and we hope the new american administration will say the same. engage we do want to with russia, i think it is important that the line of communication is open so we can understand how their doctrine is evolving and it has evolved. it is involved quite a lot more and the west half. i want to make sure nobody would ever accuse people in the west of falling into the trap of miscalculation or not understanding where russia is coming from. i mentioned what the prime minister said about engaged but aware, i think that is what we are doing. my colleagues went over to see his colleagues last week in order to make some of those
points and to generate a -- our foreignat secretary is going to meet mr. lavrov as well. we are engaged but in a very measured fashion. nato issay that presently there in order to ensure the stability and security of the north atlantic and europe to a certain extent but the north atlantic as well and the biggest threat for that is russia. i think nato needs to be configured to meet that threat. this is not an aggressive posture but we do need to make sure it is proper for the threat. isis, i think we can
progress on the ground now to feel confident that that that ground or will -- wonnd war will be won and relatively soon. the task will then turn to make sure upstream interventions will not allow insurgents or that kind of violence in the future. i talked about the .7% that we spend on international development. for sure we need to think very carefully with our colleagues in further -- foreign offices in international development so we can set direct funds to make sure this scourge does not reappear. trying to exterminate every single last element of it to the exclusion of looking beyond
understated.ably >> chris mcnulty from replied futures. you spoke about the various threats we are facing and called them hybrid threats and said they had to have hybrid responses. do you interpret the american partiallye unconventional warfare similar to the hybrid threats. you mentioned the destabilization the destabilization unit which contains a different organizations within the government. do you see that as perhaps the whole of government
approach and you think we should be doing something similar? threat. a hybrid is it the same, that is how we are thinking about it. doctrine isnding of being developed by some of our potential adversaries as a phase is more advanced than ours but we are intensely aware of some of the things we might be confronting when we deploy to latvia. playbookhat a bit of a looks like as a result of crimea. all of these things are very much within the scope of what i was talking about there. certainly the ministry of defense does not have all the answers.
we have been spending time picking the brains of other departments. the communications challenge and propaganda challenge is we recognize that we don't have all of the answers. that is where the whole of government approach need to be applied. on stabilization, there is no question about that. we can see in a whole host of different places, sub-saharan africa, bangladesh, many places --und the globe threats emerging that are not susceptible to straightforward military intervention or military advice. and we are absolutely committed
to building up those joint units such as that they don't feel small, they do feel the go to places for the subject matter they are dealing with. one that i dealt with when i worked for the ngo on climate change, the whole of my unit and the front office put together it was put together just before the oil price collapse. was a very good example of the practice coming good. whether or not it is a model follow -- i should
would be a bit surprised if it did not make sense for you to pool what i expect may be duplicated resources around the to make the whole greater of the some of heart. i don't know how difficult or easy that is to do in institutional terms. -- we can do it we can have certainly seen real advantage from it. yes sir? >> thank you. i am the president of the global policy institute. on a slightly different geographic area, iran, does the u.k. government believe the nuclear deal reached by the obama administration is the best thing that could be achieved and
do you see to that, any of the expectations on the obama administration tying up positive new arrangement with the west on the nuclear affairs has actually delivered on the expectation that iran's foreign policy would and how youmellow view and that respect the future of syria and the possibility of iran gaining a permanent foothold and joining with hezbollah and its influence in syria. have you view the whole thing? upon thetainly do look hope for as the best bringing enron into -- of
an into the position of being a responsible, nuclear, non-armed country. we supported the deal and we support it now. i'm not sure where the american position has landed on it at the moment. we will be seeking to convince the administration that this isn't the right to deal to do. lot of onuse is a on the ukrainians themselves -- iranians themselves to make of themost of the freedoms -- listing of some of the restrictions that it exhibits five and in bodies. that i expect--
has a way to go. -- some of the restrictions that embodies.ts and in that when you ask the question, can you therefore see you ron behaving more nponsored believe -- irann behaving more responsibly, i think the answer to that is not very much. i think the situation in syria is no extreme and they haven't chosen to play in that arena in a way that means we cannot see just now. i think it will be for the next ran ision to work out if i living up to its side of the bargain. >> ambassador. >> thank you.
i used to be at a nato. can i press you a bit more on brexit. a lot of this goes beyond your withinut in britain's the european union has not just been the kinds of things we read about in the newspapers. part of it is to help the balance between the germans and the french. part of it is the nonmilitary aspects of dealing with security in europe including ukraine. part of it is at the trade issues within the union and across the atlantic. i reassured by what you said about continuing to take part in european union military activities when appropriate but do you really believe or if you do believe -- how would you go punch atng able to
your weight or above your weight if you are not going to be fully european union institution and a time of such a great stress? i don't have a perfect crystal ball. i don't know exactly how the u.k. will be positioned in 10 years time. i expect there will be areas where we will feel the loss of e.u. membership keenly. i expected there will be areas where we will think to ourselves we have been liberated from a whole bunch of things. we are doing exciting things that we would other five find -- we would otherwise find difficult to do. it is the decision the country has made and the resolution of the u.k. government is to make
the best of that decision which has opportunities as well as things we need to deal with. i think there are a whole host of areas where we are not going move away from broader european responsibilities. we talked about security but it has to do with policing across europe where our european partners are there he dependent on u.k. capabilities. also an area where we are going to play a full part. it is in our interests and their interest. -- we can take this idea that the u.k. is leaving the eu so far. there are lots of areas where we are not going to be.
where the u.k. is going to be in terms of the preferred -- of being the preferred partner in the eu, we will see. one of the g7.e we will be a powerful authority and voice on the world stage. we will have different types of trading relations and who knows what europe itself will look like in a few years time. >> indymac. >> hi, my name is andrew hanna. in your opening remarks you mentioned how the united kingdom is trying to boost european capability against hybrid threats. sure that those
efforts do not duplicate efforts already undertaken by nato? we are a member of the european union until we are not a member. the center inthat question is up and running, we will certainly be involved. we have the best technologists in this area in europe and we will want to make sure that european security benefits from that. we will want to stay close to that. i would imagine that when we leave the european union that may well be one of the types of cooperation that we will want to continue, frankly. code wires and cables and do not really respect international boundaries very obediently and as a result we need to recognize that as being a transnational threat that the
at the national interests are served by getting involved. i certainly would not want to capability.ed except insofar as it is in some form or another additives. on that basis i think that actually the question is more is a nato as an organization moving as quickly as it should be into that kind of area? is it a sensible strategy to leave this to national governments? my instinct on that is probably not. that is where i would put the focus of that. >> probably have time for one more question. let me then just say i hope as
you leave this room today you take two things the way from what stephen said in his prepared remarks. military,enormous technological, scientific capability which is united kingdom brings to our nato systems and to include which are on because of being deployed, the carriers, the f-35's, the ph controlled aircraft and the dreadnought class sbm. that is the first thing. the military, technical and scientific support that the u.k. provides the only organization that provides true defense, the north atlantic region against a major power threat. -- the seconding
thing is the special relationship. thousands of the brits and american working together in intelligence field, the scientific field, in all branches of the military services at the vatican -- di plomatic core. 70 years of ace vessel relationship. it doesn't matter what the tabloids focus on. years of a special relationship. it is something we have to has on to the next generation so we make sure the unique aspect of the relationship continues. thank you for being here. please join me in thanking stephen.
[applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2017] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> democratic senator amy klobuchar speaks tomorrow about the president's choice of picking neil gorsuch, to survive the supreme court and how his nomination could impact economic issues. that's a lie from the center for american progress at noon eastern here on c-span. and over on c-span2, a look at medicare costs and the role of
the independent payment advisory board, a 15 member agency created by the federal health care law. that is hosted by the health care leadership council. it also gets underway at noon eastern. >> monday night on "the communicators," michael powell, president and ceo of an cta, the internet and television association, talks about major issues facing the industry and what we might see from the new sec chair. -fc- fcc chair. he is interviewed by a tech and telecom reporter for bloomberg. >> can you speak more specifically on what this change in leadership from democrats and republicans -- what does that mean for your industry? focused on the concepts that we have heard from many years, with the exception of the last commission. the understanding that this
market moves at breakneck speed, is a huge amount of utility, and by the time they are over it will have shifted radically. ofy don't have the luxury sitting on decisions for six months, eight months, a year before they have to make decisions, and i think they are committed to that speed of action. >> watch "the >> u.n. ambassador nikki haley joined her japanese and south korean counterparts at the u.n. to discuss recent provocations by north korea and the u.s. and south korean response. this was after a closed-door meeting by the un security council. it is 20 minutes.