tv Senators Press FBI for Answers on Wiretapping Claim at Hearing on Russian... CSPAN March 15, 2017 10:27pm-12:29am EDT
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provided as a public service of our cable and satellite affiliates across the nation. >> a senate hearing today looked into russian efforts to influence democratic countries through propaganda, cyber attacks, money laundering, and military threats. witnesses included a former president of estonia and former state and homeland security department officials. this is two hours.
>> senator whitehouse and how we worked together to get here and all the subcommittee members who will participate. a little housekeeping. i will soon announce our panel and mess your names up so i apologize if i butcher your names, i'll apologize in advance. we'll do seven-minute rounds. i'll swear in the panel just in a second. but i wanted to kind of make an announcement. apparently we're informed by the f.b.i. just a few minutes ago that they would be responding to our letter, the letter that ser whitehouse and myself sent to the department of justice and to the director of the f.b.i. march 8, 2017, that they would be responding with a classified briefing, i think, to the chair and ranking member. we will give you more details as they become available to us, but this letter was a pretty simple
request. was there a warrant issued by any court anywhere in the united states allowing the surveillance of the trump campaign, trump tower or any trump operative during the 2016 election? and please provide the information that was used to obtain a warrant. if a warrant was requested and denied, we'd also like to know that. so apparently the f.b.i. has contacted my staff that they will be at some date in the future providing us an answer to this in a classified manner. and with that i'll turn it over to senator whitehouse if he'd like to respond for a second before we move forward. enator whitehouse: i think one of the things that we have tried
to do here is to proceed outside of a classified setting. the intelligence committees are working in a classified setting. the added value i think that this subcommittee's work provides is to be able to have a public discussion. if a small town wakes up one morning to find that all the shop windows on main street have een smashed, it is appropriate nd indeed it is incumbent on the police chief to reassure the town that law enforcement will be looking into that ncident. it's even legitimate to say, here are the people i have assigned to it, and it's certainly legitimate to say, and we intend to get to the bottom
of this. in my mind, the unclassified ntelligence committee -- intelligence community report is smashed windows all up and down main street. and it is now not only appropriate but incumbent upon law enforcement to say, we are ooking at this, we intend to get to the bottom of this and we have these resources dedicated to accomplishing that purpose. that is an entirely appropriate act for law enforcement in those circumstances. it has added significance when you are dealing within our constitutional separation of owers. it is not, in my view, appropriate for the executive branch of government to either tell or suggest to a legislative
investigative subcommittee that they should hold back or not roceed or otherwise restrain themselvr in outimate investigative function, one which president wilson years ago said indeed was to be even preferred to our legislative function in order to not compromise ongoing law enforcement investigations and at the same time not confirm that law enforcement investigations are ongoing. hat is a recipe for having the ball plopped between the second baseman and the shortstop. we are entitled to investigate under the constitution. they have executive responsibilities, and if we are only connecting with one another in a classified fashion, i don't think that serves the public nterest.
so we will pursue this further, but that's my initial reaction to this news. senator graham: and i will just build on that. senator grassley and feinstein, the chair and ranking member of the committee, have been very supportive of this ubcommittee. i spoke to senator grassley a moment ago. we need to get answers to the american people appropriately in our appropriate fashion. so what are we trying to do? the current president says that he believes that the former president, maybe not personally, but the former president through the government surveiled his campaign in 2016. they said they are extremely confident there was some kind of surveillance of the campaign. i have no evidence of that but i can tell you this. that question needs to be answered because i don't think it's ever been raised before, and the bottom line, there are a lot of americans wondering what's going on here. so what i am trying to do is get answers to the questions raised y president trump.
he's aed us to investigate, and we will. and to me it's very reasonable to ask the f.b.i. and the department of justice, did you ever seek a warrant? was a warrant obtained from any court anywhere about the trump ampaign? if the answer is no, then we'll know that didn't happen. if the answer is yes, that would be pretty stunning to me because they would have to have probable cause. i don't know what the answer is, but i know it's the right question to ask. the second thing, we met with the director, i think, on march 8 and we said, senator whitehouse and myself, we want to know if there is a kremlin investigation of the trump campaign and ties to russia because we are about to launch an investigation into all things russia regarding the 2016 lection. i don't want to compromise your investigation. i don't want to get in the way of your investigation, but the congress is proceeding fairly blindly here. i think we would all be better off as a body if we knew that there was an investigation or not. there's not one, we'll take that
into consideration about how we might do things differently. if there is one we don't want to run afoul of it. i don't think that is an unfair thing to ask. we gave the director until today to answer that question. and all i can say is i still don't have the answers to those questions. i like the director at the f.b.i., comey. i think he's a fine man. the department of justice has responsibility here too. i just want to let the american eople know that this subcommittee with support of the chairman and the ranking member of the committee to get an answer whether the trump campaign was surveiled, was a warrant ever requested, was there one issued and i hope to be able to answer a question, is there an active investigation on the criminal side of the trump campaign regarding ties to ussia. director of national
intelligence clapper said he had no evidence of collaboration between the trump campaign and russia. but the best way to find out definitively is to have people in charge today with that responsibility to tell us. and we're going to get there. i don't know how we get there but we are going to get there together. we are going to do it as republicans and democrats. we have a ranking member and a chairman who support us. now, the hearing today is to explain to the american people what russia's up to. russian officials have been on television pretty fiercely in the last couple days saying that we, the congress, are demonizing he russian government. what i'm trying to explain to the american people that the russian government in putin's hands has been up to no good in a lot of places for a long time when it comes to breaking the back of democracy. what happened here, and i am convinced that the russians are involved in hacking into the d.n.c. and emails. it wasn't a 400-pound guy sitting on the bed. it was russian intelligence services. i am confident they gave it to wikileaks. and to my republican colleagues it could happen to us next. so my goal is to make a case that we're not demonizing
russia, we're exposing what they do and their efforts to break apart democracies all over the world that would make a case for what we should make a case they should be punished what happened in 2016 to deter other foreign powers who may want to interfere in other elections. we have a great panel. if you all would please rise. >> let me make my statement. >> oh, i'm sorry. >> do the swearing. senator graham: raise your right hand. do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth so help you god. thank you. now senator whitehouse. senator whitehouse: espionage, blackmail, subverions, the 21st entury versions of these are fake news, hacking, political capture. the russians have been at this for a long time. they have adopted old methods to new technologies making use of social media, malware and
complex financial ransactions. but the purposes themselves are timeless. over the course of the last decade we've seen russia manipulate the politics of other countries, undermine faith in western institutions and attempt to fracture euro-atlantic consensus. last month, at the munich security conference, the russian minister didn't mince words when he looked for the creation of a post-west world order. is that is a russia influenced order that stands opposed both to democratic ideals and free arket economies. senator graham and i scheduled this hearing to begin a public conversation about the means and methods russia uses to undermine democratic government. their too box includes cultivating politicians through corrupt business deals and then threatening to expose the illicit arrangements. it includes acquiring control like energy to control dependent governments.
to threaten dependent governments. it includes fake news and social media attacks often based on network penetrations and the information illegally gathered from them. the declassified intelligence assessment released in january asserts that russia, quote, ordered and influenced campaign 2016 aimed at the u.s. presidential election. senator graham and i intend to hold public hearings to nderstand how russia operates, what objectives it is pursuing, how those objectives may threaten our political system and democracy and how this may or may not violate u.s. law. gaps in our laws make us susceptible to many of the tactics we will discuss today. i'm pleased that president ilves is here, that ms. conley and dr. buchanan and mr. wainstein is here. i want to particularly recognize the senator for center for strategic and international studies has done, "the kremlin
playbook" of which ms. conley was the principal author, is a very significant and telling document. and let me welcome ken back to this committee. we have worked together on many issues. e's -- was an adversary on some, i will say, but a principled and honorable adversary and i am delighted to have him back. senator graham: thank you. we do have a great panel here. his excellency toomas hendrik ilves is the former president of estonia from 2006 to 2016. he now works for advisor for international studies incorporations. i can't say the name. bernard and susan -- how do you say it? ok. let's see. center for international security and cooperation. and he's also at the institute for international studies. and as i said, the former president of estonia. he'll tell you what it's like to live in estonia when the ussians are next door.
heather conley is the europe program director, center for strategic and international studies and she wrote the book, "the kremlin playbook," and we're in it. dr. ben buchanan, postdoctoral fellow, cyber security project, lfer center for science and international affairs at harvard. and mr. wainstein has been ntroduced, former advisor to george w. bush, former assistant attorney general for national security in the bush administration. welcome all. we'll start with you. r. ilves: thank you. honorable, chairman of the committee. in my prepared remarks, i reviewed the tools that have disrupted democracy as have been used. first, in my part of the world, eastern europe and western europe and ultimately elsewhere. to sum up my written testimony, we are under attack, an attack
against western democracies and on the institutions that bind them, the e.u. and nato. this attack was once symmetrical yet ideologically promiscuous. an he latter, i mean that authoritarian regime has both extreme left and extreme right parties which are on both sides anti-e.u., anti-nato and anti-u.s. and it does what it can to undermine centrists parties and centrists politicians. it is asymmetrical because our democratic institutions, free and fair elections, rule of law, fundamental rights, especially freedom of the press, do not allow us to respond in kind. these tactics, disruption of the internet, hacking into parliaments, political parties and candidates and more importantly doxing, or publishing private correspondence and ultimately spreading false stories or fake news represent a new form of gession.
and i say it is aggression. one said almost 200 years ago, war is a continuation of policy y other means. so why engage in military conflict if you can change democratic governments in order to follow policies you favor? such as, for example, lifting of sanctions for its occupation and annexation of crimea. if the unity of the european union remained sanctions or stand up to corruption stymies your foreign policy, if nato is willing -- is willing to stand up for the security of easternmost allies, why not foment anti-e.u. and anti-nato and anti-american sentiment by supporting fringe parties that share that view? we should be concerned. this year we shall see elections of three of the four remaining large e.u. countries, france and germany and as most observers
predict, italy. the netherlands, a crucial partner in nato and the e.u., holds elections today as we speak. i should add that the dutch are so fear of disruption they have gone back to paper ballots. acking, fake stories have been used in these countries to support far left and far left anti-e.u., anti-nato, nti-u.s. candidates and trans-- ms. merkel. only in the past several weeks we have seen the foreign minister of canada to also come under fake attack. the age of the internet has allowed these practices to flourish, especially isinformation. statistics in europe are not yet out, but buzzfeed here in the u.s. reported within the last three months leading up to the u.s. election, fake news stories
were shared on facebook 8.7 million times, surpassing main street -- shared mainstream news by 1.4 million shares. meanwhile, the pew center reported last summer that 62% of americans get their news from social media. there's no reason to think the statistics and other advanced democratic countries that are facing elections should differ rom what we have seen in the u.s. and secondly, in conclusion, this -- the utter dilemma we face is these threats from authoritarian regimes are symmetric. that is to say we can't do to them what they do to us. authoritarian regimes control the press. they are not afraid of hacks, doxing that would show the corruption of their rulers. people never see that news. fake news, as deplorable as they may be, has no traction there when the press is ontrolled.
and ultimately, it doesn't eally matter anyway if you count the votes in the end. fake news, interference in electoral processes we observed already a long time ago in eastern europe are new to our nato allies in the west. we used to have to jump hoops to prove fake stories about us were in fact fake but now, i don't want to use the german word, but now in some senses we feel redeemed seeing that now more western countries are facing what we faced for a quarter of a century. i want to give a quote from the director of the ministry of efense think tank in london, quote, we spent 20 years telling the eastern europeans they were paranoid, living in the past, that they should treat russia as a normal country. now it turns out they were right.
to prevent this from becoming a rift to keep former communist countries still believing in the alliance, nato is going to need to do a lot of clever footwork, unquote. thank you very much. senator graham: well, i'm impressed how well i understand estonia. that was excellent. ms. conley. ms. conley: thank you, mr. chairman, ranking member, and members of the subcommittee. thank you for this opportunity to testify. it is absolutely vital that we understand russia's strategy of influence, how it works in our democracies and to develop an effective strategy to combat it. it's so important that we recognize not only the tools that russia uses but we have to educate americans on how to recognize these tools and to defeat their influence. russia's strategy of influence is contained in russia's doctrine "new generation warfare" of which its primary goal is to break the internal coherence of the enemy system. russian influence works through a variety of political channels
and adapts to specific national situations, including biased news outlets, intelligence networks, russian financed nongovernmental organizations, business linkages and friendly politicians. while all of these tactical elements need to be understood in their own right, we can't lose sight of their cumulative effect and their overarching strategic objective, and that is the weakening of u.s. global leadership and its dominance of the international system. it's the weakening and ultimate collapse of nato and the european union, and finally, it is about the breakdown of the internal coherence, credibility and moral authority of western democracies. and once this coherence and cohesion is broken, a post-western world can in fact be achieved. so let's be clear, russia does not engineer the entire framework in its it conducts its strategy. it takes advantage of pre-existing condition institutional, political and governance weaknesses and exploits them.
so in fact, we must look to ourselves, and our rules and our laws to help defeat russian influence. so csis in cooperation with our bulgarian partner, the center for study of democracy, focused on how russian economic influence impacts five european countries. i asked that a copy of the report be submitted for the record. we describe russian tactics as a circle of influence. it takes hold of democratic societies through two channels -- political and economic influence. the political influence can come through anti-european and fringe parties. it can go through individuals, possibly businessmen who turned politicians, nongovernmental organizations. it can spread through information wars and even the russian orthodox church. the economic channel is more powerful in some respects. it works through a network of kremlin insiders, former intelligence officers and local
ligarchs to manipulate and dominate strategic sectors of a country's economy. and our report looked at how both of these channels, both the political and the economic work together and what we found is that corruption is the key and principal conduit for the impact of russian influence. and the reason that they go after those strategic sectors like energy, like finance, is that's where there are the biggest opportunities to exploit and use corruption. but what has allowed russia's strategy to be so successful is western susceptibility and in some ways complicitness with russia's exploitation. and we found this over and over where we're not influencing and impacting our laws, beneficial ownership, abuse for funding for political party financing and nongovernmental organizations. it's in fact in our power to top these russian tactics.
so in our report, we recommend that our first line of defense is strengthening western democratic institutions and societies. we believe that the treasury department will play a critical role in how we combat russian economic influence by tracking and tracing illicit russian inked financial flows. we encourage strongly a very robust cooperation with the european union in fighting these corrupt practices, strengthening the independent judiciary and independent media and governance practices of our nato allies. building and strengthening financial transparency requirements and beneficial ownership will go to an extraordinary way to prevent these corrupt practices to further russian influence.
finally, i'd like to say in our u.s. embassies, we need to start thinking of our legal a much attches as a critical role as our defense attaches. our national security and the security of america's most important allies rests on russia's influence and thus far we have failed. thank you. dr. buchanan: thank you, mr. chairman, mr. ranking member. and members of the subcommittee. the primary focus of my academic research at harvard and at the woodrow wilson international of scholars is examining how nations use their capabilities for attack and espionage in cyberspace and the strategies that drive that usage. it goes without saying that russia is a key player in this regard. so i'd like to make three points here to begin the discussion. first, we think of russian hacking as something that's new and different, but to do so is to be ignorant of history. here's a demonstrated part stretching back several decades at this point. one major early case sometimes referred to as moonlight maze
as espionage purposes into american political, military and economic institutions. that operation and the operation since then has shown a depthness in several ways. perhaps most significant is that they demonstrate how the russians developed new digital methods to accomplish old tasks. the series of espionage cases shows the aptitude using computer hacking. the 2007 attack in estonia and the 2008 attack on georgia are an example how they use cyber operations against democratic states. the 2015 blackout in ukraine, the first-ever publicly known case of a power outage caused by a cyberattacks which appear to be russian in origin. in the 2016 election interference demonstrated the russians married their long-standing history of operations within the more recently developed capacity for hacking.
the threat deserve great scrutiny and often resistance. second there's a damaging persistence that is impossible to understand who is responsible for activities in cyberspace. this is called the attribution problem. alongside thomas rid of kings college london, i spent a year investigating how it is possible to do attribution in cyberspace. after studies and computer forensic experts and multiple intelligence agencies we conclude that attribution is possible but they do it regularly. it is possible by relying on forensics data such as language indicators, time zone, expert indicators among many others. human and singles intelligent urces can have other intentions and can confirm this
high pop theus. hypothesis. they try to mislead investigators. nationals the united states intelligence community and private sector firms have overcome the attribution problem and have developed a strong understanding of how various neighs including russia operate in cyberspace as early as the middle of last summer the technical evidence vongly indicates that they're responseable against the democratic national committee and the related entities. it gives me greater confidence in this assessment. when it comes to russian cyber activities, attribution is not an issue. third, i'd like to close by taking a broader view. we would do well to remember that context when we analyze them and consider responses. old sta tee jick ideas such as deterrence do not go away when
it comes to this new motive. they are often at first difficult to trance late. many of the russian activities occur, i believe because russia has developed the capability to act senses an opportunity to do so and calculates the benefits of the operation will exceed the cost. in short we have not yet been able to devise a deterrence in cyberspace that extends the kinds of activities we are discussing today. establishing deterrence with their own cyber capabilities have proven challenging because we are worried about further escalation. the difficulties are important and deserve strategic information. we must defend our compute systems denying adversaries to attack. we must communicate those clearly. i am mindful of history, the offend one another.
i read how this can deal with cyberspace. we must have a strategy that does not unduely threaten other nations. calibrating a response is not an easy task but is a vital one. after what has happened this year few issues are more important than this right now. thank you very much. >> ranking memberwhite house. thank you for the invitation to appear before you today. your doing real service by having this hearing and highlighting what has gotten lost in much of the political controversy since last fall's election which is today we are facing an unprecedented a growing threat to democratic institutions around the globe. we testified this threat is real and has manifested itself in a number of different countries around the world including in the nations of central and eastern europin estonia, in the nation of georgia and here
in the united states where the intelligence community assesses that elements of the russian government directed an influence campaign against our political system in 2016 that involved the cyber intrusions in the state and local systems the penetration of the d.n.c. and the influence of the campaign, internet trolls and the launching of a general propaganda campaign to spread their preferred narrative around the world. given the purr received success, we should expect to see more of them in future elections not only from russia but also from other hostile country like iran and north korea. so the threat is real and growing. the next question is how should we respond to the threat? the government has a number of tools. first it has all the national security like fisa court, national security letters as well as the criminal tools that kit use to detect these influence activities. second it has the ability to bring a criminal prosecution
against the perpetrators under the computer fraud and abuse act for hacking into protected computer systems or under the foreign agent registration act for those who engage in domestic political activities on behalf of a foreign party without registering as foreign agents. criminal prosecution can have a deterring effect like we saw in 2015 when the chinese were chard with threat charged with stealing american trade secrets. the tariffs can be achieved to economic and trade sanctions such as when president obama imposed sanctions on russia's two leading intelligent services and four russian intelligence officials. deterrence can be achieved to the country's official staff and the united states such as when the president ejected 35 intelligence operatives and closed to russian facilities at the same time they imposed sanctions.
another option is to prevent foreign nationals and interests from contributing to u.s. campaigns. with the recent report of russian funding for party presidential candidate allegedly in part for supporting in crimea, there's similar attempts to sway elections with finance funding and contributions. the purpose behind d.h.s.'s announcement this year that election processes were henceforth were designated as critical infrastructures and other political structures that received federal protection and assistance. those are the number of tools and capability to meet the threat. we need to think of ways to strengthen those tools. i would like to flag three such ways. the first is to give the justice department to to take over
network and computers as we saw russia do in estonia. >> the authors of that bill, the chairman and i hardly agree. >> i thought you would, sir. the second is to have the foreign registration act by giving justice department authorities to turn over records o show whether they are or not working on behalf of foreign interests and the third one is to seriously consider under the international law conceptf countermeasures which are unwf measures that a victim nation can take in order to stop a nation to stop victimizing. hacking back to persuade another country to stop hacking them. while this approach raise as host of difficult questions, i would agree with the many commentators as a means to deterring future foreign in our elections. so to conclude we have a number of tools to meet this threat. the real question is whether we
have the will and the focus to do so. all too often we've been slow to mobilize in the face of a looming threat such as we were with al-qaeda in the 1990's and with the cyber threat in 2000's. this hearing is an important step but it's critical that we follow with a resolute and decisive action. the threat is real and is not an overstatement to say that there is a lot at stake no less than the continuing viability of democratic process cease around the world. -- processes around the world. i thank you for allowing me to speak about this important topic and i look forward for any question you may have. senator graham: would you like to say anything? or would you like to go first? [inaudible] without objection. >> i have a question of dr. buchanan. in your testimony you asserted that accurate attribution for a
cyber operation is possible. in other words, it's possible to figure out who is behind an attack. is that true even if a sophisticated country is the attacker as opposed to a terror group or a criminal organization opportunities. i ask this i would guess that countries like russia, china, and even our own country have complex ways of trying to cover their tracks in the cyber world. so help me understand how it's possible to accurately attribute to a tack to one of those types f countries? >> thank you, senator. it is possible to attribute those actions. this relies on technical means for example one of the strong indications that the russians were behind the breach of the d.n.c. this summer was the reuse it appears of an i.p. dress.
sensually an address relating to a computer between that intrusion and to a previous intrusion in the particlement in 2015. so we look at these technical indicators and private sector firms have done a very good job of bring those indicators out into public view. it also bears noting that nations such as the united states have the capacity to collect intelligence of our own using sources of methods in the intelligence community which can be enormously useful in confirming the intentions or the ultimate responsibility of who ordered a particular cyber activity. d that is set up tools not available to the private sector. though attribution behind closed doors. >> i thank you for that white house and senator white house and senator graham for your leadership in this. i thank you very much. very important that you do this.
graham: thank you. when you were first in office you took down a statue of who? it was no a statue of the soviet but it was one in the town that was causing lots of disruption. >> so you removed a statue in the center of town and what happened? >> well, we moved it to actually a military cemetery which is more appropriate for statue of a olier. i mean, all kinds of things in happened. there were street protests but what happened is that none of our governments -- our major government sights, our own line were not ur banks
working but then we realized that we were in distributed denial of service attack which generally done by bot nets. most of them send out viagra spam. you can redirect them to focus on single servers which overloads them and then they basically shut down. and that's where i said given that they are criminal gangs and the time was bought that this was a unique form of private partnerships in which we've seen numerous examples of them and most recently today with the announcement of the attorney general about people involved in hacking for money and for stealing money who are at the
same time employees of the f.s.b. >> sit fair to say that you were under constant attack in different forms by russia? >> we've seen attacks on germany, most notely the liza case of last year where there was a fake news story. senator lindsay: what do you think the consequence could be. and very briefly if you could if the united states decided to forgive and forget what russia did in our election, what kind of consequence would that be?
and what kind of signal would that send to putin? >> well, i believe, sir, it would encourage them to continue because it is precisely the goal f >> they do have limited applicability i think for the u.s. and european sanctions, the penalties on russian long-term access to financial capital beyond 30 days has been important to it. but there have to be a full spectrum of deterrence measures ranging from the military
deterrence and the fact that there's a nato back tallian going to estonia is as important as sending messages to anti-corruption and we will fight the lack of transparency. >> you think it would be appropriate for congress to impose new sanctions for russia for what they have done in our election? would that be right from your point of view? >> i recommend a full review of the entire spectrum of u.s. policy responses to russia. meaning we tend to silo our policy responses. we have to look holisticly we have to look at what the long-term operations would be. sanctions are a powerful tool. they're an important tool. if you do them just for every issue whether that's ukraine, the election, i think you're missing looking at a comprehensive approach. >> the problems we see with russia, do other countries have similar capabilities to
interfere with us? >> i think it's fair to say that russian capables are advanced but it's also worth noting that there are countries such as china that can use cyber capables not against elections per se but ainst a range of american targets. , do you forgave russia think that would embolden them? >> i think it would. >> the trajectory is pretty unnerving. what have you seen when it comes to all things russia and democracy from the time you were in the bush administration to now. would you agree in the concept that whatever we've been doing
in the past realy hasn't worked nough? mr. wainstein: i would definitely agree with that statement. that we haven't done enough. but i would say that you sort of have to look at the historical progression. the russians have been consistent. the russians back to the soviets have been consist went their approach. in a geopolitical sense, what's bad for the u.s. is good for russia. in their eyes. i think what we've seen change over the years is there's now the technological means to intrude and interfere in internal elections processes, in ways they couldn't before. because the development of the internet. so we now have an ability to do what maybe they didn't have the ability to do back in the cold war. you also have an area of opportunity now. they see possible daylight between us and some of our partners. so i think they're methodically looking at that daylight and trying to expand it so they can bring countries back into their sphere of influence and divide our allies. mr. whitehouse: thank you. your testimony focuses really effectively and kind of captures
the kremlin handbook report. with respect to russia's efforts to infiltrate, corrupt, degrade and discredit democracies. with the last election, we know we've been added to that list. you described that there are two key channels for that operation. one is a political influence channel, which might include things like fake news or trolling or using corruption to support those. the second is economic influence. bribery, corruption, money laundering, various wheel or dealings that either buys or puts people in the threat of being divulged as having been bought, people of consequence. in your view, if a country has experienced one of those two
techniques, how alert should it be to look for the second technique? ms. conley: what we found on the economic footprint, if in the countries we analyd, if russia's economic presence was greater than 12% of a country's gross domestic product, it was more likely that economic means for the primary channel of influence. now there were variations to that. lower fact, there were a economic presence, that would mean the political channel would e the most viable. again, these countries still have the networks, both the business, the intelligence and security networks, that were used to effect. in certain countries we cite bulgaria as an example where both channels were used to such
an effect that one led to the other, that it led to state capture. mr. whitehouse: if you're a country that has experienced this russian effort through one channel, should you be looking for the same effort on the other channel? is one an indicator to look out, because they might be coming at ou with both channels? mr. conley: one channel supports the involvement of the other until they come together and become all encompassing. mr. whitehouse: so it would be putin for a country that has sustained an attack on one channel to be highly alert and look for signs of how the other channel might have been deployed also? ms. conley: absolutely. mr. whitehouse: ok. and in terms of investigating the economic channel. are financial and tax credits important in putting together the cases that can uproot the systems of economic influence? ms. conley: transparency is absolutely critical to breaking
the strategy of influence. understanding where those sources of funding come from. they are designed to be hidden, they are designed to be opaque. for instance, if you look at bulgaria, the country that is the most significant provider of foreign direct very, -- mr. whitehouse: let me jump away -- i love bulgaria, but let's look at the united states for a inute. you talked about the weaknesses that russia exploits. would one of those preexisting weaknesses include legal structures that are nontransparent or to use your words, have lax ownership disclosure requirements? ms. conley: it's extremely vital to understand beneficial ownership of companies that are participating in major procurements, that is certainly an important vehicle. it's very important to understand where -- mr. whitehouse: in terms of money laundering, understanding beneficial ownership so you can penetrate shell corporations is also important, correct? ms. conley: yes, it is. mr. whitehouse: are you familiar
with what the e.u. has done with respect to shell orporations? ms. conley: yes, we do follow the e.u. mr. whitehouse: they've recently cleaned that up considerably, haven't they? ms. conley: they are working on in, in fact it's a g-20 initiative to help open that up. investigative journalism has done an extraordinary amount. the panama papers were very illuminating. in particular to our report. mr. whitehouse: you recommend we strengthen financial transparency requirements. ms. conley: absolutely. it has to be an international effort. mr. whitehouse: part of what you recommend is it's important to investigate money laundering, if you're going to investigate money laundering, you have to have access to financial records, correct? mr. ilves: absolutely. mr. whitehouse: it would help to have access to tax records to get the picture of individuals who might be involved in the matter. mr. ilves: true. mr. whitehouse: and shell corporations whose true ownership is indeterminable, how
do they function? are they a hazard or do you need to be able to look at beneficial ownership, true ownership of corporations in order to understand the economic manipulations? mr. ilves: absolutely. because you don't know why something is happening unless you know who is the owner. we've seen cases across europe. not only in, say, the energy field, but also in real estate. but also even in the media. where we're not sure. who owns a newspaper, for example. mr. whitehouse: in your work at the department of justice and elsewhere, you understand that economic influence and corruption is a russian tactic ere. you say in your testimony, i understand, that it's important, to use your words, to acquire relevant records such as financial records, in order to effectively understand the danger of the tactic of corruption, is that correct?
mr. wainstein: absolutely, sir. mr. whitehouse: it's also important to be able to produce business records, to be able to look through and see what's going on? mr. wainstein: absolutely. mr. whitehouse: would tax records be a form of financial and business records that are seful to investigators as they try to determine the scope of the economic influence operation? mr. wainstein: sure. tax records are a very sensitive topic and there are special rules about the handling and availability of tax records for prosecutors. mr. whitehouse: from an investigative point of view, they're pretty vital. mr. wainstein: they're obviously helpful. and shell corporations who's true ownership can't be determined is that a good thing to have in this world? >> the more you know about the entities out there that might be doing some wrongdoing the more you know the better, no question. and as you know from your
prosecutorial experience someone with a mail line purpose will run their line through a shell corporation behind a shell corporation behind a shell corporation to hide their hand. >> a lot of them are multi-layered. and often you're just not able to. the perpetrator succeeds. >> and if they're trying to hack our democracy, that's pretty darn serious. >> serious. >> mr. president, can you help us understand your timeline and to what degree do you think the europeans understand what his objectives are with regard to ato? mr. ilves: it's hard to say what the time line is. but the goal is clear that as long as the e.u. and equally and more importantly nato is united and has maintained this current
membership then policies of an entity that is much larger, much richer, much more powerful than -- at leaves russia in a a disadvantage. if you break up nato, then every country except for the united states is going to be smaller than russia. if you break up the e.u. then you're -- the largest country in the e.u. with 80 mf plus million people is germany and compared to russia again, it's small. and then when you think of nato with countries like mine then we're really -- we're quite my nisscule and would be at a distinct disadvantage. that's the goal i would argue and has been the goal for a while. because when you read yelts sin era the op-ed pieces or opinion
pieces, russia does not wish to deal with a european union but bilaterally and nato has been a bit more ever since 1949. so again, it's hard to say what the time line is but certainly with the amount of pressure that we see today put to crucial elections this year in europe where support is going every e.u. to anti-nato, anti-- and anti-u.s. fringe parties basically and with success that this is part of the plan and were you to for example get france to step out of nato and the european union that would be a death blow or near-death blow to both organizations. >> do you think there's been an acceleration in trying to cause panic and paranoia among smaller
ar neighbors to triking -- near europe? >> i think he was surprised by the success that they met with the ukrainian crisis in which they actually managed to penetrate serious so-called objective news source us -- sources where you saw the b.b.c. repeating propaganda linesrom ukine to so-called balance reporting from ukraine. so repeating stories that were purely fake as sort of the -- as the kind of balancing side. and i think that encouraged them saying it works. it really does work. >> thank you. ms. conley i would like to ask you some questions. i would like the chairman to reset my five-minute clock. i'm going to use all o my extra time. >> absolutely. only for you. >> ms. conley, can you tell us about putin's political
constraints. are there shades of gray of some of his crony who are worried about the adventurism and think that an industry x, y, or z this is more dangerous than people who like his distraction tactics to prop himself back at home ith the adventurism? mrs. conley: it has stabilized the economy for now. the long-term trajectory is quite dire. t appears that the siloviki, the inner circle of their business interest have remained fairly stable. there is certainly change, cannibalization of different countries to maintained benefits but the economy is under great strain. what we found in our report, interesting in all of these russian flunes there is a connection to president putin's inner circle so certainly enriching and continuing to enrich that small inner circle
is very important. i think there's a myth in some ways that the sanctions have had a devastating impact on the russian economy. they have hurt them. but they have stabilized. he is working very hard -- president putin understands he's now having to harden. he knows things are going to get very rough. bute stabilizi the economic situation. he's ready for the long-term and making sure that inner circle which there have been changes. there's generational changes going on right now. he's passing leadership from his peers to another generation. he's sculpting them. their further enrichment is very important. but we're seeing lack to payment to pensions and teachers. the social economic system is crumbling but the inner circle is being maintained. >> how rich is putin? >> i have no idea, sir. >> mr. president, you're not usually bashful.
>> well, the report says $100 billion but who knows? but certainly it's a lot. >> and just to be clear for the record, this is a guy who is a public sector bureaucrat for most of his life and we think he might be worth on the order of $100 billion. stake in private service? >> we have press secretaries with $30,000 swiss watches. >> mr. wanesteen are you going to jump in there? do you know history on the guy? >> no, i'm a little perplexed how a public servant gets $100 billion. >> i don't see that spreading to the congress. >> how likely do you think it is that congressional i.t. systems have been infiltrated by russian security systems? >> unless you use two factors of
authentication of almost certain. >> dr. buchanan? dr. buchanan: i would be very concerned. if you put me in charge of i.t. tomorrow, i would not send my first action looking outward, i would like inwar. that is true. find the intruders who are on the inside. >> thank you all for your work. senator der bin? >> thank you very much for this hearing. i said it this other day when we head our meeting with the foreign ops. it is refreshing to have this kind of bipartisan conversation and i hope we have many more of them. thank you for your leadership. president ilves, when you were attacked in 2007 by the russians, you basically said at the time, this was an attack on nato because estonia was new to nato.
do you think the other nato countries felt it was an attack on them as well. mr. ilves: thank you. i can say that at the time this did not get much traction. at the time, of course, people had not fully understood the nature of cyber attacks and their debilitating consequences. and -- i mean, just to keep things in perspective, 2011, four years later was the first time that the munich security conference actually had a panel on cyber. >> 2011? >> 2011. yet in 2016 nato duclaired it as a fourth domain of warfare. so we've seen considerable progress and one of the few russian goals we had been lobbying for a long time for a
nato certain on cyber security toward which much of nato is very skeptical but after a cyber attacks, a number of countries came onboard and it has now been in operation for some seven years, eight years. but initially, i don't think countries understood the full impact or the power of digital weaponry. >> the interesting thing in ukraine is that the russian military attack together with the hybrid war, the propaganda attack, the cyber war has really moved ukraine closer to europe, closer to the west. e polls are showing it. the people of ukraine feel that's where they're going. when i was in poland four weeks ago, one of the leaders said something i would like you to comment on. he said we're watching you in the united states. we want to say how you react to the invasion of vladimir putin in your presidential election
because it's a signal to us of how you would react if our country was invaded by putin. >> i couldn't disagree. isean, i would say that that's how lots of countries that i felt under threat subliminally feel. they may not always say it. but certainly, i think it is a common feeling. this is something the other panelists can refer to. the outrageous fake news. to stop what pruden was trying
to achieve to the most obvious source. >> the fine of 50 million euros for social media spreading fake news. this is going to be a tough one. between the security and our fundamental values of freedom of the press. and how we navigate this will be a tough on in a lot of countries. >> and would like you to respond to that. >> russian tactics are designed to what -- to be what we call below threshold. not to cause nato to respond. they arehem feel like alone and something that they have to deal with bilaterally with russia.
that helps us understand these tactics and i find our own knowledge about europe and european political dynamics and our own strength of purpose with our allies. congressional visits like years or so important. it is fake or false news that are blatantly wrong stories designed to put pressure on the government and create hysteria. andleaks of in paris information designed to discredit government officials. , the moreou discredit false news. ownership of the media. i argue the central european media market is decreasing -- increasingly becoming russian
owned. it gets back to beneficial ownership who is owning these media companies. >> russian oligarchs. don't want to be conspiratorial here. i wonder what is happening here with this kind of export of wealth. we are seeing more and more of that. is coming on the asymmetrical issue. is the degreeake to which these influence operations are enabled by exploitation and by hacking. that --triking to me things wasimmediate
the cyber security practices. that is used. >> it will pick up where senator off.n left -- picked of in estonia, which is a beautiful country. latvia, lithuania, ukraine, and georgia. i was struck by the stories of all of the hacking. months, just today, to russian spies and some hackers indicted for hacking into yahoo!
with millions of americans as victims. bestdo you see is the deterrent? >> it has yet to determine cyber capability with another cyber capability. it to provide deterrence into different kind. cost and position. if a nation takes an activity we don't like, we will punish the nation. andcost has to be credible we have to communicate that. activities beyond power outages and so forth. we probably do a better job of generating cost and position options. the other thing is deterrence by denial.
making it worth the time to break into the videos. those of our allies is vitally important. fake news has been discussed at length. my favorite stories what sheldon and i heard in munich. and senator graham heard the story of the norwegian prime minister that russia has been running stories that their economy is in the tank and that they ran out of fruits and vegetables. russians would come to visit their friends and relatives with bags of fruits and vegetables because they believed these stories, that there were no fruits and no vegetables. example.is an amazing there are so many serious ones. and myon is trying to -- state, people believe when they see things. possible that they
the become more educated thing that senator durbin brought up. >> education in general, it is something that is vital. comes of bad things on social media and for children. countries, our especially the baltic countries have taken, there you go again. become fundamentally endured. what has changed is that before you guys believed it, now you
don't either. >> quickly, i read the whole playbook. about the things you talk is a lack of transparency and campaign finance and how money can be funneled in. we have it hundred million dollars spent in outside money that's not tracked. should we be concerned about this? >> transparency is absolutely vital. it also increasingly becomes important for how funds are being spent. these organizations appearing overnight, advocating for a position that may be in russia's interest. how many experts are funded.
the more transparency, the better. >> that would be an argument trying to improve reporting and disclosure. that is one of their modus operandi, right? >> it is. and it is not designed to be opaque and complex. >> that is how they hide it. >> one of the things that you talked about in your testimony it relies on the state and local election processes, and we must protect our own infrastructure. like those we experienced last november. and one of the areas of our jurisdiction is elections and oversight.
russian interference with cyber networks and what we should be doing to help our state and local governments get the best election protected equipment. the question of protecting state and local electoral , those are constitutionally invested in the states. the state and local jurisdiction runs their own elections. it became a big issue. there is no uniformity there. it doesn't mean there's not a place for the federal government. designated itly as part of the critical infrastructure. and really provide information sharing among 50 different states.
may malware and the like. thatf the saving graces is the systems were not typically online. ability to penetrate, those systems adjust the mentality. it did get into the voter registration databases and the like. ways thatconceivable they can undermine the credibility of the elections. >> i fought to get the state and local election officials together thinking about these threats and making them aware of the specific threats the community is seeing down the road. >> i am grateful to both of you for convening this hearing. like several other members of i have ledee,
bipartisan delegation with a chance to meet one of the last days of your service as -- in estonia. we saw and heard the things my colleagues a detailed about a long-term persistent engaged russian campaign to undermine democracy. and to divide us from each other. and in august, ranking member white house and i, given some of the developments, it sent a letter to senator cruz that the timeless chair of the oversight subcommittee. expressing our grave concern about mounting interference. we asked for an oversight hearing. to see if it sufficiently addressed conduct related to foreign entities. i would like to enter this in
the record. chairman cruz declined to conduct a hearing. i can't help but wonder if we got an earlier start. in my view, it is critical that our nfrontation of russia's and declare i do, focused, and bipartisan. grahamto thank senator for making sure congress has a chance to weigh in. i am proud to be a cosponsor. me in arubio joined bipartisan way about the threat of russian aggression. there is a lot more we need to know about russia's interference. if i might -- a smite -- small
number of motivated individuals can leverage against entire nations eights. the u.s. and her allies it is our owns asymmetrical advantages. can you express the strongest advantages in combating russian infiltration and how we can most effectively utilize it? >> thank you. certainat how much figures enjoy being in miami or in london or paris. that is an asymmetrical advantage that the west has. i recall that senator mccain was barred from entering russia. that he wouldn't be able to go vacation somewhere in siberia. one thing we have that they don't. the other thing is parking money. if you don't have a rule of law
always have your bank account emptied. without any due process. so these two things, parking odd money here, i find it but typical that one of the leading proponents of the adoption ban for russian children by americans also has a huge multimillion dollar condo complex in miami. at the one hand, it decries the united states. they enjoy the full benefits of it. decrying the west by serge when his daughter goes to my university, columbia, is also kind of odd. let us not forget. reason in montenegrin
that they were going to assassinate the prime minister. in 1948,f that we saw that is still there. >> d think the campaign finance laws are sufficient to prevent inappropriate financial influence by foreign actors? a line of inquiry. i'll sort to ask your badger's cyber. over don'tber challenges respect borders and they don't respect committee jurisdiction. literally half of the committees of the senate arguably have some jurisdiction. you think we should be considering jurisdiction over cyber? it would create in his specific committee to pull those strands together.
>> there are few that are dangerous to get in the middle of a jurisdictional fight on the hill. discretion is the better part of valor on this one. the principal is an important one. it's within the executive branch as well. when do the responsibilities for cyber lie? difficult as it spans over many areas. it is particularly difficult so manyit affects aspects of our governance. diplomacy. the economy. it is certainly something that requires some study. same kind of overlapping issue. was -- it isestion sufficient to prevent
appropriate influence. they have seen successful attempts by russia to influence elections with dark money. >> there are serious first amendment concerns. addressing this as an , clearly, it is a concern of campaign finance. the rest is very sophisticated and adept at right where the and acting there. appears that russia views cyber as a way to stay below the threshold and equalize its military and economic disparity. approache change the to more numbly respond to their ongoing provocative cyber
attacks? >> this gets into the area of the financial tools. about perhapsion the venting russia's access to the swift financial system. their responses that it would be similar to a nuclear attack. them porton's of the access to the financial system. that is why you see many of the russian funds that are safely funding and protect a rule of law situation. we have to begin assigning a cost. they must play by those rules. some ofave to prevent that access in order to have them to return to that rules-based approach. the so limitation is also another important area.
>> i apologize for coming in late. and having to go back out. again.od to see you how important is it for our and thedership political parties being united and pushing back against russian interference in our elections? dispel thisto information propaganda. >> i think that is a very important question. hearing,tance of this a politicalk it's issue.
as with her today, reasoning with the russians, just like reasoning on cyber theft isn't going to do it. you're going to have a resolute and strong pushback. critically important that they see we are united across the board. countries thater know or see the implications of russia doing exactly that in their countries. >> and they want to see us being unified and resolute about it. area, they recognize president till this. and miss conley. would you agree with me that it
is extremely important that all not be very honest in speaking about what is happening in this regard? and that we have accurate reporting in the press about it? >> the problem is that not everyone understands the nature of these things. not only ing must accurate but it must also be informed. when it comes to something a little bit more technical, you get a lot of sheer nonsense written by people who don't understand the technical side of issues. it is both reporting and quality. >> your questions are very much linked.
bipartisanship is key because division is a weakness that russia is exploiting. we cannot understand what is going on if we don't have transparency. we can't rebuild trust with our leaders. that is what is being exploited through false news and the leaks. that is what is critical. we have to rebuild that trust. it can only happen through honesty, transparency, and a strong bipartisan sentiment. >> i think there is value in unity, showing that in public. ranking member on the best method to do that. of a heartened by comments public discussion of what happened in 2016.
divisions tow the continue and we don't respond to , are we ready to say that this plays right into russia's interest? >> it continues to create a narrative for russia that they are growing their success which is increasing their boldness. the comment about what has occurred in montenegrin is perhaps the boldest thing we have seen, which means they are taking their views and their cues that they have much weakness to exploit. backntil they are pushed on this effort, they will continue to exploit that. that is the difficulty of it. >> absolutely. since i can't really comment on american domestic politics -- >> go ahead. we all do it. equally important is
international unity among liberal democracies. that today, up till now, we have security,ally-based the north atlantic treaty organization. everything is based on bomber range and tank would just ask. today, there are no distances. there are liberal democracies that are under threat. maybe next time japan. distance doesn't matter which means liberal democracies do really need to hangogether. especially when dr. b cannon mentioned abt 28 which attacks the dac server was also found in the german bundestag. is, the threats affect all of us. >> you don't think this is a one-time operation?
>> no. >> let me close with this. nato has been mentioned here. that nato isagree important but there also has to be, within nato, an the unitedng that states stands strongly. is that correct? >> yes. if they see the united states able to be manipulated by russia doubts -- doese that so doubts in nato? >> we don't believe the united states is being manipulated by russia. but i guess we would be pretty nervous. do you agree with that?
that this operation of russia was a one-time operation or might we see this in the future? the operation regarding the 2016. -- 2016 election? absolutely, they will be emboldened. whether they had an effect on the outcome, they had an effect am a course of the election. they will come back even stronger and they will perfect their techniques in countries like north korea, iran, china. thatwould just add europe's election calendar this year, beginning today with the dutch elections. we are going to see the continued incubation of this encourages that we must have a strong dialogue to
understand both tactics and strategies to combat them. >> i appreciate the courtesy. the french election was into april. is that correct? -- first-rounded april 23, second round may 2. >> we should do something to punish russia for interfering in our election before the french elections. germany is in september. >> september 24. >> i view an attack on one party an attack on all parties by a foreign entity. we need kind of an article five response. senator franken. i i can't you how much appreciate that response and how much i appreciate you and the ranking member.
i want to express my jim grassley as well. what i am hearing here is that our response to this as a , as united states, our response to this attack is really important. this to happenw and don't respond to it, it will invite more and more of this. that is why this hearing is so important. commend to every american, read the kremlin playbook.
and i know something about selling books. and i'll help you. this -- i mean what the kremlin did here and how this works -- how this has worked in europe. ms. conley: the book is free. senator franken: then i wouldn't want to get involved. i'm a free market guy. can i have my time back, though? get this book, americans, because it tells you how this works.
and it's absolutely important that people begin to -- because you are talking about things being opaque. that this happens when their web of influence is so complex that it object scurs activities, am i right? that's exactly whatou are saying. and this is about cultivating an opaque network of patronage. but you talked about how important bipartisanship was and how important it is -- it's
important because we have to get at this when you are attacking the credibility of the media and you are spreading fake news and you have trolls from russia and there are 1,000 trolls operating and changing on google. so if you googled something, the russians would get you to see their first article. people need to read this and understand this. and what we need is transparency. and what we don't need, what we don't need is people accusing the media of spreading fake news. what we need is the american public to not get so drawn off off that they just say well, there is no such thing as the real news. and so they have a strategy of doing that in order to exploit that confusion. and so, transparency is incredibly important. now in this -- in your book, you talk about them co-opting or compromising individuals in business, in financial dealings, am i right? ms. conley: yes.
sen. franken: and corrupting them. and they may already be crut or may be a shady character and corrupting someone who has political ambitions say. ms. conley: yes. that is a method. senator franken: and is it important to have transparency in terms of people's financial dealings -- in terms of like the ranking member was talking about? ms. conley: it's vital to have as much transparency as the law allows to understand what forces are influencing political parties, particularly influential political leaders.
senator franken: that's why it is important to have transparency in our campaign finance laws. because we have this dark money that's in there that no one knows where it's coming from. and that is something that tells people, this is already -- this is all rigged. rigged.ng is i don't believe anything. and i think it's one of the things we need to have transparency in everything now in our politics. and this is something that i think is absolutely pernicious. and it undermines the trust that people have, and rightly so, in our political process. mr. buchanan, in your testimony, you note that the russian interference in our 2016 election demonstrates the russians have married two strategies, leveraging diplomatic or economic or military capabilities.
how do those work? mr. buchanan: the russians have a long history of influence operations in trying to shape the debate and the discussion and sometimes the government in foreign countries. this goes well back before computers were invented. what is significance significant -- what is significant about 2016, infused old tactics with information stolen through hacking into computer systems and stealing data and using that data as part of the influence campaign. this has enabled them to do more with techniques, an old tactic by relying on visual methods.
senator franken: the book is called "the kremlin playbook" and available for free for every american. senator graham: senator blumenthal. i think you for the-- i thank you for spirit what can be determined by an act of war. and i'm not saying that for the first time. in the armed services committee we held a hearing on cyberattacks, calling a different set of witnesses but reaching the same conclusion that we lack at present a coherent, cohesive strategy for
countering these acts of war against our democratic institutions and our nation needs to develop that. just as if we would have if we were attacked, militarily. and the russian doctrine is described as new generation warfare and we have to take it just as we would warfare not just as a cralnterprise. the indictment today of a couple of russian agents literally announced in connection with the yahoo! breach included one of those agents who had been indicted previously. so i begin with two points. number one, criminal prosecution alone is insufficient, even though there are criminal enterprises directed by russia.
and number two, the lack of a policy as to when we declare war contributes to the lack of deterrence. and let me ask you to comment on those two points, ms. conley. ms. conley: thank you, senator. the challenge is understanding this is a construct as part of warfare. this is part of official russian doctrine by the russian general staff and they have been very clear on that. it is a strategy to try to break
our internal coherence. so we have to treat it in it as a declaration of war. i want to pick up a point that dr. buchanan made and gets back to your cyber question. the attribution is easier, but the policy choices are so much harder because this is a warfare where our system is being used against us. and so we have to strengthen our own societal responses and part of that is educating and making people aware of when news is false and when it is true. it is creating the honesty and integrity and rebuilding trust. the delays of policy choices as we try to understand these responses, whether it's cyber, whether it's economic influence, that's what the challenge is. so the more we are clear and concise and open about what our response will be is an act that is taken will go a long way to prevent this type of influence. senator franken: you mentioned the opportunity for come just for complicity -- four complicity. policity. to what extent is that a danger or a phenomenon in this country? there is at least the need to
investigate complicity. ms. conley: we analyzed five european countries, but we found neither europe nor the united states is immune. so sometimes it is through legal means as using a business through a legal transaction, but then it translates into some potentially kickbacks. it can still contort the economic domination of a particular sector that it has such influence that it then begins to change the nature of the act itself. senator franken: in this country as well as others? ms. conley: we are not immune. their prevalence license are more in european countries.
sen. blumenthal: you mentioned that the western doctrine -- russian doctrine of attack and it is a military doctrine, but it works through nonmilitary actors, which make it more deniable, but no less traceable. and "new york times" reported i think earlier this week on -- and i am going to mangle the name in pronunciation, the hacker who is protected and rewarded by russian authorities for committing mass theft, so there is a $3 million award available for him. but russian protection evidently have defeated oueffos to apprehend him and prosecute him. ms. conley: we find again in these complex economic penetrations, there is a reward and award system, meaning to protect the economic gains and continue to award them as time goes on.
so, yes, there is an element of wanting to protect very lucrative ties either through criminality or other means and then there is a sense if it's discovered, it can also help destroy or erode the credibility of the country of which they were working in because they were able to work their trade craft so well. senator blumenthal: well this hacker has gained access to a million computers through malicious software to take credit card information but steal personal files such as business proposals and photographs. so the impact is not only on our democratic institutions but also on our financial and economic system and multiply that effect as in yahoo! to the tune of $500 million and taking what one military expert has described as
the greatest theft of intellectual property in the history of the world and also military leaders of our country almost with unanimity taking cyber as a great threat, this nation needs to be aware we are under attack and we are engaged in a war, perhaps undeclared, but it is a war directed again our democracy and our onomy on a scale would have been unimaginable a few years ago and still unimaginable to most americans, would you agree? thank you. senator graham: we are coming to the end here, but i think senator whitehouse a question.
sen. whitehouse: the first question. could you say a word about who gucifer 2.0 and the attribution of him or her as a russian hacker? mr. buchanan: after the d.n.c. hack was revealed a cybersecurity firm, a persona was found online within 24 hours and this persona claimed that he had done the hacking and nothing to do with russia. it seems fair to say that the story unravelled as the summer went on. initially, he claimed to be a romanian hacker and some journalist tried to speak to him in romainian and he wasn't able to respond.
there were elements of this story that didn't add up. and forensic investigation has indicated that this person is not what he claims to be and we have solid evidence in the d.n.c. case of russian involvement in particular, two groups which is a.p.t. 28 and a.p.t. 29. senator: so the russians are good but not that good. mr. wainstein, you referenced in your testimony the attorney agent registration act and either now or it's a question for the record, could you let us know how we could make that fit into our defense toolbox more effectively against the russian election manipulation toolbox, that has been the subject of this hearing?
mr. wainstein: we have a law on the books that says we can prosecute people who are unregistered foreign agents if they don't register, but we don't have an ability, at least an effective ability once we suspect a foreign agent to provide records to show whether he is working for a foreign entity or not. that's it. there is the civil investigative law that is used in a number of different areas in government investigations which would be applicable here. twice it was proposed in the 1990's that the c.i.d. authority be added but it never made it into law. there should be momentum again to bring that back up and that would help a lot because that would mean you have meaningful investigations on the front end
which would lead to grand jury investigations and lead to prosecutions and deterrence and more transparency. senator: thank you very much. senator graham: you really helped congress a lot to understand the nature of the challenge and some of the responses. if you forgive and forget russia, you'll regret it. as mr. buchanan said, other countries could do the same, maybe not at the same level, but we want to deter russia and other countries like iran and china that have checkered paths. -- checkered past. here's the state of play. march 8, senator whitehouse and myself wrote a letter to the director of the f.b.i. and department of justice to provide evidence of a warrant that was issued by against the trump campaign and whether a warrant was applied for. we have yet to get a response. we were told by the f.b.i. today there may be a classified briefing about the contents of this letter.
all i'm suggesting is that we are to the point now aa nation where the current president has accused a er president of surveilling his campaign and i would like to be able to inform the american people whether or not there was any validity to that. and i don't want to compromise sources and methods but i believe it's fair to have the government tell us was a warrant issued. i don't think that is going to compromise sources and methods. to my house colleagues in the intel committee, i'm impressed. the senate intelligence committee is working very well. they seem to indicate today that the house intel ranking member and chairman that there was no evidence of wiretapping. he talked about it and danced around it. with all due respect, i respect your bipartisanship. the letter we wrote was to the department of justice and to the f.b.i.
so for the good of the country, we need a response from the department of justice, from the f.b.i. so we can move on. and finally about a criminal investigation. director of national intelligence, the former director, mr. clapper said during his time he saw no evidence or collaboration between the trump campaign and the russians. he did not believe that a more -- that a warrant was issued. he would have known about it. i would like to get to the bottom of this. if there is an investigation covering time periods mr. clapper was not in charge of or something new came up, i just want to know about so we don't run afoul of it. we are not trying to impede an investigation but trying to make sure one can go forward without congress getting in the way. and the next hearing is how to protect an investigation from political influence, if there is one. i would imagine most americans would like to know the state of
play of what's going on in our country. count senator whitehouse and myself that we should provide you more than we have provided . have been veryy supportive. there will be another hearing about how to protect the investigation and hopefully before we have that hearing we will tell you if there is one to protect. if there is not one to protect, maybe we will change. end this with the idea from my point of view, russia is out to get us all and want to divide us in a fashion so their influence grows at our expense. i believe if we don't act against russia here in the united states, they will be more aggressive in france and germany. they have a pair of twos and we have a full house. putin is a thug and a bully, but russia is a country that is in
the hands of a man who has his self interests ahead of everybody else's in russia. i regret the russian people are living through this. i think he has stolen you blind. i don't know what the russian president makes, either he is the best investor or he is stealing money if he has $100 billion. i do believe people in russia who dissent meet a terrible fate and he is trying to break the back of nato and the european union. since world war ii, there has never been a major conflict on the continent because of nato and it is under siege and as to the ukraine, first time since world war ii, one nation by proxy force has taken the territory claimed by another. if you don't think it matters america, you are making a big mistake.
the ukrainians gave u200 nuclear weapons through the bupest accords. the understanding that the turned it over to russia that they would be protected and russia would not interfere and we signed that with the concept that if you give up your nuclear weapons, we'll protect you. this is a very big deal. this subcommittee will go wherever the evidence takes it, and to the american people, this is important, worthy of our time as a senate. to the witnesses, you have done more than i can ever thank you in terms of informing us of what we face as a nation. stay tuned. hearing is adjourned. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2017]
tonight on c-span, president trump speaks at a rally in detroit. then the department of justice announces charges against two russian intelligence officers and the 2014 hacking of yahoo!. later lawmakers give an update on the investigation of russian interference in the 2016 elections. >> anyone working in any hedge fund involved in short-term trading, meaning every day they stocks,ng in trading all those people want edge. edge,is this white useless for the purposes. there is the gray zone and then there is black edge which is the inside information. >> sunday night on cue and day, -- q&a, talks about the has case
against hedge fund manager in her book, black edge. inside information, dirty money and that clashed to bring down the most wanted man on wall street. >> the two central characters are these two former portfolio matthew for his fund, and michael steinberg. he is currently serving a very linking -- a very lengthy prison sentence. mr. steinberg was convicted but his conviction was overturned after an appeals court made a ruling that made it much harder to convict someone for insider trading. >> sunday night at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span's human day -- q&a. this saturday beginning at 9:00 a.m. eastern, american history tv is live from ford's theater
in washington, dc for our all-day coverage of the annual abraham lincoln symposium, explain the life, career and legacy of our 16th president. speakers include the author of lincoln and the politics of slavery. stephen ingle, the author of gathering to save a nation. alan goes up, author of redeeming the great a man's peter. jason silverman, the author of lincoln in the immigrant. and the coeditor of -- watch the symposium live from ford's theater, all-day saturday at 9:00 a.m. eastern on american history tv on c-span3. next, president trump delivers remarks at a rally in detroit, michigan, on his plan to boost the u.s. auto industry and job creation. this is 20 minutes. ♪