tv Council on Foreign Relations Examines State of U.S- China Ties CSPAN June 13, 2017 4:15am-5:17am EDT
c-span.org. c-span radio the app. >> attorney general jeff is expected to discuss his contact with russian officials during between 2016 campaign. it is his first time testifying before congress since being appointed attorney general. >> now, a look at the history and future of u.s.-china relations. this runs one hour. conversation]
pressure toward confrontation. the pressure of history. a ruling power in day rising power in conversation -- confrontation. the larger question is, what do we do about it? requests.ousekeeping please turn off your phones, do not turn it to vibrate because it could interrupt the sound system. themeeting today is on record, we will talk for about 30 minutes happy or and then -- up here and then turn it over to questions. on the right, one of the great china specialists. co-founder and researcher. she keeps her eye on the macroeconomics of a range of subjects. then, the maurice greenberg senior fellow.
national security adviser to vice president biden with special focus on china policy. and, our distinguished visitor from cambridge. graham allison. teacher, adviser, director of the center for science and national affairs at the kennedy school. author of the new book "destined for war: can america and china escape the ?"ap if you want to know why -- is trending on twitter, you have to credit him. captured theas
imagination on both sides of the pacific. even before his book was out. we will ask our panelists today to give us a few words at the beginning on how they conceptualize u.s.-china relations from their relative vintage points. where is this headed. . start with you. >> thank you very much for this opportunity. lens that concept or helps us understands the relation between the u.s. and china today. i think there is. we are trying to look through the noise of the day, whether it
climate going from me pact or missile tests or potential conflict in the south china sea. becoming -- we look through that to the structural and even sub-structural reality. rising poweris a threatening to disrupt. helps ishat picture put the rest of the things in place. the notcept is called trap but theaham
that in instances where nobody wants war, that does not mean more cannot occur. in cases where war would be catastrophic that does not mean we cannot averted. the case i think of most is the case on 1914. i do not think you can study world war i too much. it is still dazzling to imagine. after the war, someone was asked -- how did this happen? and he said, if we only knew. so how in the world can and art in surrey syria go -- ago become -- the end of world war i, every leader of the principal actors
had lost what they cared about most. trying to hold together an empire. the russians were trying to back up the serbs. kaiser in germany, trying to back up his buddy and the anna. he is gone. the french are trying to support the russians whom they have a treaty with. creditedwhich has been war, nobodyd of the would have chosen it. but war came. the lesson i draw is of important nuances. do notspect that people want war. particularly in instances like
inherent,re is this deep structural stress reflected in what the book calls the rising power syndrome. i deserve more say, more sway. the current arrangement seems can whining because they were sent in place before i became bigger and stronger. the rolling power becomes anxious. fearful. maybe even paranoid. magnifiesces and misunderstanding so everything anybody else does looks menacing. impact exaggerates the of external events that would otherwise be inconsequential. events reminder of this, that otherwise would be unmanageable,l or like in sparta, a conflict was
the reason for us to have a great war, at the end of which we are both destroyed? no, terrible idea. at the third produces an action which is a reaction at the end of which you are somewhere nobody wants to go. so that is the fear i have of the third situation. agent of have been an the ruling power, probably so. what you make of this and how much does it inform how you think about it? >> thank you. so great to see many friends here today. having spent many years now china andhe rise of think tanks, the white house situation room, i have come to the believe that every argument over u.s. policy related to china is what i would call a proxy war over our underlying assumptions about the rise of china. where you land on these
assumptions determines how you come out on loc issues. up at the lifted front of this conversation or otherwise they will float behind. we have two different perspectives. i was reading graham's comment describing china's unstoppable and and a and, to my left, described chinese economy has the world's largest pyramid scheme. in other words, the chinese economy won't be very important to the world in a short amount of time. is, iser question china's rise good for the united states and for the world? some believe it is the nine, the effects will not the much different. they will want what we want, or we will want what they want. there is a different school i ascribe to that would suggest not the china's rise is a bad
thing but there are elements that pose quite severe challenges to the vital interest of the united states and where you come down on that or the nature of the character of chinese rise is fundamental. it is worth bringing those out in the discussion. in relation to the trap, cyberspace, nuclear weapons, the effects could be absolutely incredible and we should not be complacent about that but i do not think we are complacent. we have a deeply engaged relationship with china, military-to-military. ae fact that we have not had
major military crisis between the united states and china of the last seven years is a testament to the fact that this type of engagement is keeping us away from the rest of his of conflict. where i have concern is not in graham's argument. this concern about avoiding confrontation with china, lowering tensions, has been in u.s. strategy. the relationship, keeping it happy. keeping it healthy. keeping it good. tensions. avoiding confrontation. it has become an end in and of itself. it is what i consider to be endemic to this a version of the environment. chinese liberalism, the biggest threat today and asia is not the fact we are on the brink of a
great power war but we are on the brink of chinese hegemony, chinese influence. what everyone to call it. a china-led order in asia in which china will win. i think this risk-a version, when we set our strategy around avoiding war is leading us down a dangerous path and we ought not ignore that. the last relay's to tethering our strategic lens around us. there are other very important competitive express. -- aspects. reasons, ideological competition getting more fears. that is my sense of where the u.s. competition lies. if we think about the central feature, it is the military.
we will miss the other part of the competition if we focus on that. i was reading a chinese academic talking about the relationship between the united states and china and he said it would become let's hot but more profound and widespread. as we think about how to manage this critical issue and the avoidance of war, we ought not let that result in risk aversion or other elements of competition. endemic.hough it is an camp, over to you. >> the big question is, why am i here because i focus on economics and finance and i think there is a very good reason i'm here and that is because chinese ambitions are
financial. the evidence is that china has no geo-strategic lands or designs to become a great world power strategically. what it does have designs on is extending its economic strength route the world. collecting tribute. elting states along its borders that have relationship of andomic dependence on an building its own private channels of the economic and financial communication. dr. allison's heuristic, it is above my pay grade but although it is an interesting characteristic, there are others it can be just as useful. of -- exactly.
perhaps an interesting paradigm to use is the great multiethnic empires that have all perished except for china. persians, even the romans which to some extent were expansionist stick but expansionist stick mostly in expansionist but mostly in economic ways to find new sources of income. that is what we need to focus on with china. the effort to build dedicated, less transparent channels. the money transfer system china has tried to build. the infrastructure banks. the road systems to sort of bypass the world bank and multilevel institutions. the trade arrangements with southeast asia. yes, they are sending military
power into southeast asia but i would say that is more about military power than invasion or anything like that. problem, theat the issue of taiwan and hong kong and their relationship to the mainland is being underestimated for their risk. but that the strategy for china is not -- i think the china's quite determined to recapture taiwan in one way or another but militarily. that would not benefit china in any possible way. china's very dependent on the technological strength of taiwan. industry.. almost as dependent as it is on the financial industry and hong kong. i think one should think more about the special zone concept that has been used in the past. perhaps extending the one country, two systems system
toward taiwan. , youaps trying to get know, provincial representation in the mainland onto taiwan as happened under the campy. a co-opt strategy rather than a military strategy. that is where we should be focused. anyway, more to say but i will not say it now. >> in other words, were without bullets. graham, i suspect you will want to respond to a couple things. take us to the next question, what do we do about it. what are the policy implications? you state that effectively the stakes. the risks of what history suggests. the hard question is, what do we do? how much can and should the united states accommodate chinese rise and how much is assertive policy a check against
war or does it hasten war? >> big topic. let me make three points. partly responding. the difference that is more clarifying. i will go to the point. i will come back to the point. basically i say at the conclusion of the book, this book will be very unsatisfactory for washingtonians. in washington, you have to describe the solution in the same sentence as the problem. the doctor says, do not just in their, do something. i am supposed to in the last chapter unfolding new strategy with a snap a -- nappy title, 32-do's. this is not a subject for a washington fix. >> that brings us to chapter two. >> volume two will be written by whobody in your generation
is likely more imaginative than old cold war warriors like me. and whose minds are not as encumbered by the constraints because i think that our current discussion about strategy towards china has been basically mosh. this -- i was in in the clinton administration. i was disappointed with the obama administration. there is a great moniker that excludes everything but includes everything. go with the flow. i can explain why hedging, engaging at the defense department. the treasury can pursue engagement or concessions. so i would think that this has been the absence of a strategy that allows is to go with the flow of whatever happens. i go back to the first point.
the trap is not about only the military competition. versus about athens sparta, most of the reason crazy wasoke sparta the economy, culture, invention of everything. i mean, read what the corinthian ambassador tries to explain to the spartans in why they can't live with the athenians. he says they are out of their minds. they invent something new every morning and if it doesn't work and then something new the next day. they are never happy to let happy in their country and they are not happy in their country. athenians had actually invented everything. history,ilosophy, professional navy, architecture.
i mean, look. these guys are just kind of zooming. in the chinese case, you are going to see end are seeing china everywhere, it in every domain. it is in the book. the thing i give to my harvard class. 26 indicators. the question is, when will china become number one and students a calm in 2040, maybe in 2050. the second chart says, already. already the biggest automobile for it. already the biggest mark phone reduce it. already the biggest economy. across the whole range. they think, wow. never before has anybody been this fast in all. thucydides trap says it is
everywhere. some people interpret from the t hucydidian trap that the only way to avoid war is to concede. i think before the problem we thucydides trap is to avoid. i think the thing is not to concede in every setting. if you look at the story, i read aps for memorial day on what should be the big take away, is we think about what we owe to people who gave so we could debate and decide what we decide. i would say, avoid unnecessary
wars. i would say, most people think this is about iraq or something. unnecessary wars we should've avoided were world war i and world war ii. people think, no not world war ii. winston churchill was the greatest orator. he tells the story in his book that at one point fdr asks, what should we call this war, and i told him we should call this "the unnecessary war." and he was shocked. i told him, how was it a and he said, if hitler's had militarized, the thing we should do and france and britain, hitler's, the germans who thought this was a crazy idea anyhow would have turned hitler's out. himmler would not have been the ruler and we would not have had
the world war ii. you do not get where you are without conceding work confronting. what i see in the last chapter is what i think what we need now is a discussion and debate among the whole strategic community that says, wait a minute. problem, this issue, this diagnosis that i tried to illuminate through thucydides's wins. there we on a trajectory to unnecessary war? >> right now i think we are on a trajectory of a china-led asia if we continue on the path we are on now. i mean, i think, to answer the question on how to reset the tate -- resss the
fewstate, i think a principles and to this will draw a contrast with the current administration but looking forward as well. i mean, the element of what u.s. policy should look like, with the u.s. government should look like in relation to asia and china, the first is get your team in place. this will require a much higher level. we cannot have senior officials coming into the national security adviser as secretary of defense or going to learn about the south china sea for the first time or be traveling to japan for the first time. it is a level we need to take seriously that this is a central challenge of not the central challenge in u.s. foreign policy. our personnel and institutions will have to reflect that and the absolutely do not. there will have to be a reformation within the intelligence department, state department.
that is the first thing i would say. the second, again, this is going to be obvious to everyone in this room but u.s. strategy in asia has to be copper and the. right now the trump administration is talking about peace through strength, dual carrier operations in the china sea, secretary mattis will beginning a big speech tomorrow morning. cut it.l not no amount of military power will revive american leadership and interest in the face of this challenge. there has to be an economic and institutional component and is on is the region believes china's the future economically, our military will not be able to bend that perception. there has to be a major economic investment and trade initiative associated with u.s. policy in asia. the third peas, i think the principle critique of the trump ofinistration today in terms
criticism has been the transactional nature of the way the president has talked about his approach to asia. very focused on north korea. saying, what am i going to do, start a trade war? before a call the president of taiwan again i will have to check with the president helping out in north korea. lots of rumors about navigation operations because of desires to lower tensions with china because they are helping on north korea. as someone who has worked on this issue for many years now, i think many would agree that is exactly the wrong approach. with the united states should be being firm across the board rather than somehow signifying that the united states is for sale. the chinese will have done somehow groping the united states right around that.
i think the united states has to take more risk in asia. there is a perception -- again -- not war which it we should be conscious of but there is a concept in of -- a concept of china save face. i will tell you in almost every single incident, some of which are public and many of which are not in which the united states into the chinese government, stop what you're doing. you are violating our interest. we are going to take a stand and if you do not there will be consequences, china has backed down on everything a location said there is not any evidence of this escalated to the thing with china. make are on her abilities them the risk-averse player and we ought to think about that in terms of how robust our interests are. >> that is what i wanted to talk about with you. the domestic picture. in a few minutes we will turn to
questions but before we do, frame for us the domestic scene politically and economically, how that informs their behavior and actions in the kind of dynamic that the others have described. to what degree is china feeling as if it wants to pursue a more risk-tolerant approach in the world and to what degree are we miss reading china from a broader view? say this. we know a lot about all of the chaos within the trump administration. can assume it is the same in the chinese administration and in many cases worse because we .re dealing with tactics they are in a year where they are going into the 19th party congress.
been -- zhi has been named basically as leader for life. the stakes could hardly be higher. everyone knows china is in a very, very risky economic position. the economic system has been pushed to the brink. there are backup plans within the government in case the financial system goes and close. there is a very high understanding of how much risk there is and there is very high risk. as part of the consequence of that i think the central government wants to project to the chinese people these senses of, well, you can't be quite as rich as it was said you would
be, you won't drive jug wires, you won have big apartments, but there is glorious china. you can use your renminbi internationally. you can go to milan to buy things. you will be able to be proud to be chinese. i think the messaging of the program is very important up thelly for shoring president and surrounding him with a crown of glory of the old communist party and he can carry the mantle forth into the future. >> very briefly, the story we tell each other is that as chinese economy slows it is more inclined to take an adventurous roster overseas. are we making false assumptions, or is that true? >> more adventurous posture?
>> trying to rally people around the flag. in the absence of delivering the trip to milan, will they be able ofdeliver the satisfaction punching somebody in the nose? >> i think they have relied on very high income streams to people. and as those decline, it becomes more difficult to do so. you have to look out around the world for other income streams and report -- reward people in other ways. i would point to the relationship with pakistan. you never find china talking about isis, right? you never hear them talking about terrorism, right? they prevent their own terrorists from leaving.
they closed their borders. they aren't interested in international terrorism. but they do things like going to muslim schools and force muslim children to eat during ramadan. forcing to shave beards. this can be very happy learned pakistan. theeed to be focusing on economic imperialism rather than on the ships going to vietnam. >> we're going to bring folks into the conversation. if you go around and raise your hand, we will get you a microphone. please state your name and organization. we will ask you to avoid comments and only ask one question. again, i am not a china -- larry has been
bearish on china. i have been bullish on china. every year we make a bet. every year i have one, that is not forever. you never know how things are going to do. if i am betting for next year, i would be happy for anyone who wants to make its because i keep they book, i would say will grow at three times the rate of the u.s. and three times the rate again the next year. >> i also have -- ] rosstalk >> historically when economies fail, rarely do governments blame themselves. problemsnalization of is quite common in a historical
pattern. therefore, the only other leg chinese leadership stance on is nationalism, we would expect a more assertive china. i want to give a quick answer to that and to your first point because it is my domain. let's do the thought experiment. imagine that the trump administration were successful in collecting a $10,000 tax from every person in the united states. thus, gathered 3 trillion? or 30 trillion? you use that three trillion dollars to build a wall around all the borders, canada, mexico, and kent everybody else. the u.s. gdp would rise 25%, roughly, next year. from the spending of the $3 trillion and building materials, etc.
when that be a good thing, valuable, would it be something that would sustain our growth into the future? this is a way to look at china. or 20 points with the auto and steel industry, and studies show we would exceed their production in the u.s., but the chinese exceeded ours. note that even noticed that, and you know why? because it doesn't convey value to the chinese people. >> we go there in the back, please. >> john from taiwan. for many years in washington, there were people who were saying that if the united states and china were ever going to war, it would probably be over taiwan. is that assertion still valid today?
is the current stalemate in cross relations making u.s. china relations more difficult? thank you. >> eli, do you want to take that? eli: i guess there are are a couple different ways to answer that question. i don't think we are on the precipice of war with china over taiwan, but, of course, it is an area of potential conflict because xi himself seems quite intolerant on any moves of independence. i think the domestic politics in taiwan into the way the united states has, in my view, a very good team, a very strong team managing this issue to the point where it was not a central component of the u.s. china relationship. it is relatively well managed, and that could change in the event there was an unexpected turn and taiwanese politics. i don't think we are at a point where this is a defining issue in the u.s. china relationship. graham: in the book i have a
chapter about taiwan being a viable country. i think the things about taiwan that washington doesn't like, china will fight over taiwan independence. i think that is a fact. the u.s. has accepted that fact and they're not likely to fight over taiwan's independence. >> charles, right here in the front. >> thank you. i'm part of the u.s. china working group and capital counsel of asian research. i agreed as will play out in an economic sphere and as i watch the f and ed, i won't comment on what trump is doing with the new negotiation strategy. it seems they are more process oriented as time went on. it became more and more difficult to have results and to get chinese to commit.
given that a lot of this is going to play out in the institutional arena, and we have our breton woods institutions, do we need to rely on those and fight it there or propose new institutions to china? we missed an opportunity with the aaib. is there more we should do? what kind of institutions should we create to deal with this? eli: it is a very good question. let me answer that in a couple ways. i mean, number one, i do think we should be looking to create institutions with china. at the same time, in this environment, it is a perception that we have on the economic front of inevitability toward a
china-led order. i think it is important the united states provides alternatives to a liberal futures in the region. china wasn't excluded from the partnership, but it wasn't ready to be up member because it wasn't ready to meet the high standards of governance, transparency, and other associated rights in that agreement. even as we look to find a way to reach on into the system in a peaceful way, prosperous way, i think it is important to continue to maintain what we consider high liberal standards. first, i think we ought to not compromise our own view of where we want the region to go as we go about doing this. just a comment on aib and nelson road. -- belton road. if you watch the chinese media over the last couple of weeks, the rhetoric has gotten, this is the savior of humanity, a century long project, the defining issue around mankind will organize.
[laughter] >> no, literally. [laughter] >> now, they are adding the arctic. it is encompassing the world. it is hard to know what to make of this, because, in a sense, it is grand and visionary, but with the aaib we need to put it in perspective in terms of size and reality. they are doing some back of that calculations in my office today, because i had a chinese newspaper i brought back from a recent trip and it had a huge picture on the front saying aaib filling the infrastructure gap in asia. they estimated the infrastructure gap is $26 trillion over the next decade. the aaib has loaned about $2 million.
that is .00007% contribution to what is needed to fill that gap. you'll need 130,000 aaib's to fill it. i think it will be the same thing with the bolton road initiative you have a lot of promises, big dollars, but, what is actually new, we have to put in perspective. the last thing i will say, it is important, even if the numbers themselves or not that's a large, even if the economic facts are not themselves determinative. they give china authority. you see a number of leaders going to beijing and they will do it again. xi will produce its message and that has been the convening authority being as important as
the business done by the institution. china gets convening authority and they are shaping perception of the future of the order in asia. things like the bolton road initiative, or a aib. china is the future we better , make nice with china, that's will spill over into every other element of the international politics in asia. as an example, i was speaking to a southeast asia expert and he said to me, " i think we are at the point where there is no country in southeast asia that will be willing to entertain a new security initiative with the united states because of the perception of the economic side. " even as we assess the reality of the dollars and institutions, the profound effect they are having on politics is important.
graham: i agree mostly with what eli said, but i would say, look in the book and you will say, here's a question, in in development aid today, compare the world bank to china's set of development banks and figure out in terms of loans this year and next couple years, which is bigger. you would be surprised. >> the chinese banks are larger. graham: four times. anne: it makes you wonder, what -- beltheld and wrote and road thing since the china development bank already has the three times the balance sheet of the world bank. what has china become, a glorious leader? not really. >> right here. >> thank you. simon henderson, the washington institute for your policy. i would like to ask the panel, which country does china look at as being its natural allies, and
why? if there aren't natural allies, doesn't need them and, if not, why not? graham: i would get one shot. the general washington view is russia and china cannot have a good relationship is russia is weak and they have a long border, and siberia doesn't have people. over the long run, this will be a very troubled relationship. over the short run, xi jinping's putin, and when they get together, what do they talk about? against the u.s.. what are they talking about? the u.s. undermining both of us. are they correct? the answer is yes. [laughter] >> i am interested in what you both think on this subject. anne: my thoughts will be briefer as it is not my area. i would say china takes an
instrumental and transactional approach to its alliances rather than having grand alliances. for example, you will find the u.k. very thrilled about its relationship with china right now, because china has promised to fund all these power plants that will disappear again if china does not or when the next round comes up. the same is true, i think china likes having north korea very on it, because it gives them a bargaining chip. china conceptualizes itself as a great ancient, ancient power with tributary states around it. it doesn't need alliances, but it needs the occasional relationship. eli: if you're thinking about military alliances, we're not at the point of china signing up for mutual defense treaties. it is expanding its military footprint. it has its first overseas
military base. it is shopping places in the world to add to that and, over time, we will see more people's liberation army in terms of access agreements and moving around. on the question, it is interesting, one thing that i think china will find out and starting to find out now is, it is easy to sit back and engage in a win-win economic relatonship with the world. once it starts to get out into the nasty competitive world of international politics, it will be able to play the game anymore. obviously, china has tried to develop close relationships with iran saudi arabia, palestinians, , israelis. that will only work up to a point. at some point, they want to be a major player in that area, then they will have to make really hard decisions on what side they want to be on. that is not the nature of chinese politics now. what i've seen over the past
couple of years, when they have gotten close to that, they have pulled back. we see that in the belt and road initiative. the economic corridor has touched on india's sovereignty concerns. all of a sudden, china's initiative is stepping on core sovereignty concerns. i think as she shaping -- as the chinaping starts stepping into the world, it will be much harder to conduct this win-win foreign policy and they will have to come down on some the things that they haven't been able to do today. in terms of xi jinping being daring and initiatives i think , it'll be really telling on the chinese policy debate on what point they take. graham: i want to thank anne for
mentioning a book i read 57 years ago. we are talking about the prospect of a clash. would any of you like to comment on some issues on which we cooperate? >> there was an event in paris, if i can remember. [laughter] in which the two greatest emitters of greenhouse gases had come to a consensus. managed to organize a good part of the rest of the world. i think it was a great success, maybe. i'm not sure. what else? >> it is a legitimate question. in the absence of climate change as a basis to talk about positive elements of the relationship, is that all there is? do we have anything at this point? can it be counter proliferation, isis, what are the areas or
opportunities? it is the question at the moment that we need to be thinking about. graham: the economic arena in principle could be won. -- could be one. i agree with eli's analysis on how the could be evolved. building up china because it was part of the cold war strategy. the reason why we opened relationship with china was not or china, not for the international order, not for all the reasons that are typically given today, but because we had one objective in mind. defeat of the evil empire. i was part of the process. i think that was the right idea. we built up china to that end. economically, militarily, and otherwise. at the end of the cold war, 1991, we took a holiday, victory lap where we declared that we don't need strategy anymore, everyone will be globalized and what's good for one is good for all. not quite recognizing china was getting bigger and stronger.
that china was most likely to be like china when it became bigger and stronger. it had been that way for a few thousand years and it was not likely that is was going to be washed out easily. i think we are seeing a reemergence of china that looks a lot like china. i agree that the chinese have a long time that hard time thinking about how to relate to some in the party. they say, there is nobody equal to me. other people relate to me as vassals. the way i understand the relationship with me is that, the extent at which they give me respect. in the hierarchical system, which is their concept of order, it is contrition versus a junction. you have to know your place. your place is not my place. my place is at the top of the pyramid in your place is somewhere adjusting to that. in terms of relationships, the ones that have to go along with
that picture. the chinese were never wanting to not mostly take over someone else's territory. they don't want other people to become chinese. we want everybody to become like americans. have democracy, human rights, this into that. the chinese say you're not worthy of becoming chinese. you can't become chinese. you can imitate us, but it won't be too close. the closer you come, the more i will give you a little bit. if you give me enough respect, i will give you a present. >> if we go to the question about the basis for potential meaningful cooperation, some sort of way out of the historical peril. the trump administration is putting a lot of weight on the joint of the peninsula saying , that korea may be the way in which we find a something. to what degree do you believe there is a opportunity there for a meaningful breakthrough?
let's confine it to the u.s.-china relationship on the north korea question. >> let me back up. i think this is a good question. during the obama administration there was the climate deal, economic relationship and it's not been great. it seemed like it was heading in the wrong direction, so i think the question of the vacuum on the positive legislature and the small ball being put in that. obviously, there is constraints on some of the scientific space exploration, and other issues. i think the economic relationship concerns about the chinese industrial strategy is very dangerous trajectories to the extent the u.s.-china economic relationship has been the balance. i think that is not only going it is potentially
becoming the center point of the competition. it is hard to find the way back. on north korea call me cynical, , but i still think there is a gap between how far china is willing to go and the degree to which the demand of the united states in terms of applying enough pressure on north korea, either to cause kim jong-un to change his calculation or create dynamics in north korea that lead to a different decision makings within the leadership there. i don't think it is going to be a natural place of a meeting of interests. jinping will do enough of what he thinks he needs to do to get trump to back down and then trump will make a decision on trade or signals otherwise on whether he has to
push for more or whether that'll be enough. i don't think it will be because of a strategic overlap. it will be determined by other factors. anne: you are more diplomatic than i. i can't imagine a dumber strategy to the extent that the consideredegy can be a strategy. >> tell us what you really think. [laughter] anne: i didn't wear my "not my president t-shirt." i thought that the taiwan malt was a good idea. if it had been supported by strategy. i think the relationship is all about investment in trade and that is where we need to use our leverage. in manys gone backwards ways. we are using our leverage over audit data security, that is a disadvantageous to the united states, and we have nothing to say about it.
over the currency, to some extent. the management of currency. i think the current deal between the feds, all the different feds and the china at the woods , meeting last year was dumb and a bad idea and negative for the united states. there are a lot of levers that we don't use and that we should be using. it is all about investment in trade. not about -- on the margins climate and military , cooperation. we have excellent institutions, we just need leadership and we don't have it. i would argue we haven't had good leadership on china since clinton. graham: on north korea, to make north korea the defining issue in the relationship between the u.s. and china is strange. very strange. this is a problem that nobody else else has been able to solve. we have to put down this hot
potato -- i spent a couple of days with some of the folks doing postmortem and the notion was, the chinese survived. now we lifted this problem, if we are unable to solve it, who is going to be right? i wrote a piece this week in the times about this is a cuban missile crisis in slow motion. in the foreseeable future, next year, maybe even sooner, but not 4 years from now, on his current path, be able to attack san francisco and los angeles with a nuclear weapon. on the other hand, president trump said this will never happen. he tweeted to, never going to happen. you have the train going right toward a crash unless one of them die brits.
diverts. them i think the ways to tell the chinese, make sure this guy diverts. you didn't get them to divert when they were attacking japan with nuclear weapons, and now you're telling us, i have to solve this problem? i would say this is the train wreck to watch for. >> right there. barry wood, hong kong. is there -- i won't say that. how does japan fit into this in terms of japan-china relations and how it fits in with united states? >> graham, you will get the last one. graham: japan is one of the
fascinating differences. every one of the 16 cases is interestingly different. one of china's problems if you compared with the u.s., when we emerged as the dominant power, didn't have any neighbors that is that we didn't have any neighbors that were strong. japan is a strong neighbor. it is the third largest economy in the world. japan is a serious military power. if there were conflict in the east china sea between just the chinese and japanese navy it , would be bad for the chinese navy. question, if people see that it has changed -- atically that i think you will see the security relationships that we have built up in the philippines, y c