tv CSIS Discussion on U.S. and China Relations CSPAN July 6, 2017 1:04pm-3:46pm EDT
>> ok folks. good afternoon. my name is john hammering. i am very pleased to have you all come, today. we will have a wonderful afternoon together. i look forward to this important conference. but i just say we have a little safety announcement for everyone. if we do have an incident where i have to ask you to get up and leave and follow me, the exits are right behind me. there are three doors. the stairs that take us to the street are closest to this door right here. we will no downstairs and meet across at national geographic and get some ice cream or something. just follow me if we need to do something. i need to give a bit of background for this project so that you understand what you are going to hear.
this is a remarkably important thing because of the context of where we work. ago, may, chairwoman fu ying, chairwoman of the foreign relations committee for the people's congress came to me and said we think that the time is right for a serious study done by chinese think tank scholars and american think tank scholars to look at the future of this china-u.s.ip, the relationship. is meant to be very broadly scaled. it was not just one think tank working with another think tank, this was supposed to be a very broadly scaled inquiry which is
part of the reason why you see the strangest publication you will ever see in a think tank, because it represents the collective work of about seven or eight institutions that came together on this project as we donated scholars and worked on it, together. this was a project that we began, last summer before the presidential election. we did not have any idea who was going to be elected. iswere looking to say what the future of this relationship, independent of a particular outcome of the election? important,t is more today because we are at a stage where we need to be thinking about the fundamentals of this relationship. i think that is what comes through. there are two sets of parallel papers. this is the publication our chinese friends produced for their papers and this is the publication of the american
papers. they are parallel. to be ae not meant study in unison singing. it was meant to be a case of singing in harmony and can we together look at these questions anything,garcoating being very objective, can we look to see what should guide this relationship going forward? i think both sets of papers really come to the same endpoint. this is a enormously important relationship. how america and china will work together over the next 20 years, or years, will fundamentally shape the well-being of the human community. we have to figure out how we will work together. it could go badly if we don't work together because there are
so many forces in both of our respective countries that are pulling us in the wrong direction. so many forces that could pull us into a path where we are going to have a difficult conflicted, contentious relationship. we have to be active in managing this relationship with the spirit of candor. we have serious differences. away from being honest and vocal with each other about those differences, but we also have to be constructive to find solutions. not only for the well-being of our country and china, but for the well-being of the rest of humanity. we are going to explore this, today. i am delighted that all of you would take your afternoon to join us. we will start right in and let me ask dr. michael green who will be the moderator for this first session to take it from here. thank you for coming.
[applause] dr. green: thank you very much. i am the senior vice president and a professor at georgetown. we had five issue papers with authors for each paper or papers of each subject from the u.s. and china. we split the panels up so that this panel will address the papers on u.s. and chinese strategy and interests in the asia-pacific region and also u.s.-china military issues. the next panel will cover economics, global issues and politics. scott kennedy will chair that session. we had a number of participants who helped to write the papers or joined us in study groups to review the papers. this is a representative group.
some of the key authors for each of the papers we are going to address in the panels. and director of our china power project will talk about the asia-pacific papers. we will ask the panelists not to summarize the papers but to notify the issues of convergence , divergence and some .ecommendations my friend will present on the asia-pacific issue after donnie -- after bonnie. david finkelstein and -- from the chinese foundation for international security studies will address the areas of convergence, divergence and implication of what we wentified in military spears
endeavored to make these papers that would be based on the u.s. natural -- national interest and strategy on our side and on the chinese national interest and chinese strategy on the chinese side. we did these in consultation with each other. bonnie and i and they talked about what keith teams we would try to address -- what key things we would try to address. it had to be an honest and forthright explanation of interest and strategy from that country's perspective. we informed and talked to our governments, but the u.s. government and chinese government did not review or approved these papers. they are independent. scholars. independent
what we presented is not u.s. or chinese government policy. we do think it represents a pretty good consensus point about how these issues are viewed in each country. there are multiple views about military affairs, global issues, north korea in both china and the united states. the american on side, three authors on the chinese side and a group between six and 15 other experts who weighed in. on the asia-pacific paper, and a think this was true on our paper, there was a lot of consensus from experts hailing from think tanks across the ideological spectrum. between the u.s. and chinese papers, there were some common themes. one was that we should strive to
be -- to avoid becoming adversaries. that was consistent for both sides. there was a theme in all the papers that we should seek out and try to build patterns of cooperation between the u.s. and china on every area. many of the papers concluded that the united states and china need a honest and far-reaching strategic dialogue where each side does not cover up its fundamental interest or concerns and presents those and goes from there, to see what can be done. there are obvious structural differences. these are not differences that can be solved with a different six character label or 120 character tweet or whatever you choose. they are fundamental and structured. they are historic.
we spent a lot of time on the history of these issues. for example, there are between the two papers on asia-pacific, some different assumptions about the future orientation of the korean peninsula. it is not just disagreements on tactics, there are fundamental issues about the u.s. and china view the peninsula and where it is going in the long-term. there are some fundamental differences in terms of the south china sea on the first island chain that encompasses japan and taiwan and the philippines. about what it means to have influence, control. there were differences about how strong american alliances should be. very basic differences. how strong should u.s. alliances be in asia? there were differences about what china should be doing to assert its sovereignty.
what it be able to do to assert its sovereignty and what is destabilizing and what is not. there were differences on both ades on what constitutes reasonable and acceptable level of defense capability. i don't think either side true that yardstick the same. there were differences about how we should think about the future order of east asia. there was more enthusiasm on the chinese side about some kind of arrangement to manage the future of asia. there was less in two zs them on the u.s. side. even within the two sides, there was debate and disagreement. i will let my colleagues go into more detail on these areas and conclude for now by saying when you read the papers, you will find that these are papers that
stand the test of time. they are not based on today's or tomorrow's news or the korean problem. in some ways, they may be a to try to find ways to minimize complication and be realistic about fundamental differences that we have unearthed. with that, i will turn it over to bonnie. we printed out as many papers as we thought would have audience. we were short by about 50%. this is online as well. you can get it online and check it out in chinese and english. ms. glaser thank you, mike. this is a very interesting project and i would urge you all to read these papers very
carefully. it is a privilege to be part of this. ofhave a very short period time, each speaker. i will hit on some highlights. andome of the convergences divergences, both of these papers on asia-pacific security says there is a need for a rules-based order. that is a good start. we should have rules. of course there are differences over what those rules should be, but whether or not the international community is likely to allow or welcome china's participation in the process of shaping the rules. the u.s. is quite clear on that. it says it is not calling on china to simply sign on to rules that have been written in the past but that the international community will write these rules up together and that china will
be involved. the chinese paper is very skeptical of the u.s. willingness to do that. how can these rules be defined in light of the changing situations, etc. a lot of suspicion. the chineseoughout paper that there was a lot of skepticism about u.s. willingness to include china even know i would underscore that i think the current administration, prior administrations have welcomed china to be a responsible stakeholder in this rules-based order and that goes back as far as the george w. bush administration, who coined that phrase. muchhinese paper very contends that the u.s. alliance system is increasingly targeting china and it calls for the united states to give up that attempt to build this sort of anti-china coalition. favors anthat china
open and inclusive security system rather than alliance-based system, but says china can tolerate the alliances as long as they are not targeted at china. there,e bit of ambiguity whether ultimately alliances can be part of the system, but the bottom line is that the u.s. led withnce system can coexist an increasingly influential china in the region, if the u.s. gives up that effort. for the u.s., this paper does -- in anyy any way way, the alliances as aimed at china. it talks about the alliances as the basis for our regional position. it lists several threats that our alliances are trying to deal with such as north korea's emerging nuclear capabilities and maritime conflicts. a very good -- a very different discussion of alliances.
-- talk to witt about china's concern about alliances in regional security and architecture. i think this is the difference that the u.s. and the chinese have about whether alliances should be part of this rules-based order. concern.tify areas of you got north korea, taiwan, maritime issues. paperth korea, the u.s. states that china does not recognize the new level of threat presented by the regime and a think as we sit here, events that have transpired in the last couple of days and months really provide evidence of that. the united states is incredibly concerned about the launch of an icbm by north korea. very upset about how u.s. citizens are being treated.
the most recent being the very tragic death of otto warbier. -- warmbier. recognizesna's paper the threat but acknowledges that sanctions cannot be used alone, that diplomacy is needed. had somepaper interesting policy recommendations in this regard, calling for not only more dialogue, but very specifically on things like knocking back evacuation operations, interdiction of north korea's weapons proliferation. the chinese paper does not have any of these very specific areas of contextual cooperation. i would underscore the need for discussions on crisis response in the event of instability in north korea. that is something the u.s. has tried to do with china for
several administrations. there are solutions put forward by both sides and i want to highlight some of the convergences and divergences. both insist on peaceful resolution of disputes, avoiding military conflict. the u.s. paper focuses much more than the chinese paper on the need to manage differences. i think that is a common position. both papers called for more candid discussion on strategic dialogue. the chinese paper proposes an institutionalized and regular communication mechanism between china and the u.s. led alliance system. this is interesting and we should recall that there has been consideration in the past for examples of a trilateral -japan- u.s.-china
dialogue which was supposed to take place in 2009. waysd we consider again, that we can offer china reassurances about our alliance is engaged in trouble out -- trilateral dialogue. a couple final comments on the differences between the two sides in terms of the recommendation. as mike mentioned, the chinese authors do not rule out a g-2. they see -- they say either a g-2 or other forms of security cooperation, china and the u.s. needs to establish a joint vision for the region that is inclusive and based on mutual consensus. i think that would be a very difficult thing to do. i don't know if we can establish a joint vision, but certainly the u.s. paper and i think reflecting mainstream views in the u.s., ruling out such an arraignment. the u.s. paper says that washington is not interested in
any sort of condominium that implies an exclusive great power relationship. the chinese paper continues to call for a hearing to the components of the new type of great power relationship. it says we should adhere to the principles of no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation. accurately reflects the way obama administration as well as where the trump administration has come to after its first several months of power. americans in general don't like a bumper sticker phrase, and there continues to be a norm is discomfort with some of the implications of this new model of great power relations, including the components. the u.s. shares the goal of avoiding conflict, but it worries that emphasis on core
interests may be an attempt to create spears of influence -- spheres of influence and that could be the stabilizing -- destabilizing to the region. >> thank you for your leadership. it impressedtly, me and encouraged me to our we are working together and with reports,her reflection- it is a of a shared spirituality, shared vision on how the regional ready can evolve in a way that is compatible with both sides.
a couple things i would like to pick up in responding to bonnie's presentation. divergence and convergence. ofting through some sort very accurate reality checking. we like consider some sort of accuracy or reality checking to so thatk to the history we use it as some sort of interesting study point. this is been a very positive security inquiry in the region. matters, iow china think in the long run, china benefits a lot from a very steady and constructive regional ponderings. that kind of reality is a bigger one, bearing on the chinese side. i think if we look at the
for causing some sort of collision between the three powers, what is the element to create or drive back into virgins then we have to say itis not a status, it is -- is not status driven, it is issue driven. for the moment, the leading challenge is that china is coming after the transition. it is a fallacy. chinese nationalists may see it that way. maybe you can read some sort of recently published book. simply from a historical , i think that for
scholars, ithinese is totally gone. there is some sort of power shift compared to 20 years ago, 30 years ago. china says such a disparity is truly significant. but the u.s. has a very solid hold of power. we don't think in the coming disparityyour power is getting undercut tremendously. perspective,ese thereia-pacific area is
are a lot of interests in some sort of collision and we are competing on some sort of a path taking solution and path-taking solutions and methodologies. ofwe get to some sort central pace it to be behind the strategy, then we prefer to see -- it is also adequate and reasonable and issue-driven. it is not status driven. of chinese some sort [indiscernible] important is very testing ground to have a serious examination of china's fall it .- foreign policy redirection
chinese methodology in the region remains largely some sort of china domestic transition, not a power computing base. for example, [indiscernible] china consideration of dprk has been consistent and smart. it is very hard for china, a policy, reason into china's [indiscernible] before china can become some sort of very successfully transform the power, china
remains runnable at large. it would be some sort of way of computing place for china some sort of inherent assertiveness. is, as weint consider, no matter how we diverge our strategy and , it's not just history oriented. there is a lot of speculation overshadowing power relations between washington and beijing. many believe the chinese and americans will be rival ring and getting into some in evitable conflict. they sensationalist book called "destined for war."
we can jointly create some sort of new modeling of power relations. i have to seek chinese reports in the is a veryic area interesting challenge for us. on the one hand, we have to balance [indiscernible] some sort of china's traditional policy narrative. on the other hand, we like to bring about some sort of new, aspiring points. it is not an e.g. job -- it's not an easy job. it's not how we can just poweron some sort of storage in the region, but how ofna can overcome some sort shortcomings before china can be a real popular power in the
region. let me stop here. thanks. you contrasted our papers well in eight minutes and you fitted in three book reviews. [laughter] well done. appreciate it. over to the military side of this panel to david. david: thanks again to jon hamm refer providing the leadership of the american steering group without the glue of the american side, it would be in a hot state of entropy. thanks for that and scott kennedy. three of us comprise the military and defense writing team. myself, randy schreiber and phil saunders. all three engaged in our capacities. private i would be remiss if i did not state nothing in the paper or anything i stay today reflects the views of cna or any of its sponsors. if they were here, i'm sure they
would provide the same caveats. as you heard, we are not supposed to summarize our papers. ours is 25 to 26 pages long. it.can take a look at i feel the need to at least provide you a sense of our overall assessment. the reason i feel the need to do that, our assessment of the state and trend in u.s.-china military and defense relations, is because this is the major area where the u.s. and chinese convergence,e some recognizing some of the positives and recognizing some of the negatives. a -- agive you a just just of the u.s. state of being. at the moment, relations between the u.s. and chinese militaries are more stable than they have been in decades. the two militaries are engaged in a wide range of unprecedented number of interactions, from the strategic level down to the tactical level, which they have never done since relations were
established in 1980. both militaries are working together at risk reduction, to make sure that highly contentious issues do not result in muscat collision. the u.s. team assesses that neither military seeks a it in their sees nation's interest to resolve differences between us by military means. however, all is not necessarily well in the military and defense dimensions of the u.s.-china relationship. writing team has judged let the competitive aspects of the military and defense relationship are growing and intensifying.both sides have deepening concerns about the other's defense and military policies as well as uncertainty over the others future intentions. the competitive dimensions are most intense in the asia-pacific region, where traditional yours dominance in the maritime, aerospace and military domains and china's expanding offshore reach and increasing military
capabilities are intersecting. isategically, the u.s. determined to sustain its long-standing military predominance in the region through forward military presence and its system of partnerships. we ask for its part, the china, from the u.s. perspective, is u.s.sely developing military bandages to weaken the u.s. alliance structure in some instances. operationally, this competition is being characterized by the development of weapons and technologies aimed at a growing advantage by doctrinal adjustments and by shifting force postures and the planets. the odd asia, in other -- and deployment spiri. as china's military footprint around the world steadily
increases, the potential for more ends -- new misunderstandings the on the asia-pacific region cannot be discounted. because of this intensifying competition, managing the military dimensions of the u.s.-china relationship has to be a top priority. the chances of confrontation and ensure that military tensions do not overtake other areas in the relationship that are cooperative in nature. those are the u.s. side bottom lines. if you read the two papers, you will not see a lot of daylight between them. on convergence and a virgins, both sides of -- on convergence devergence, the u.s. and chinese militaries are increasingly wary and suspicious of each other's intentions and both militaries are in fact hedging against each other
operationally. on this account, the chinese paper was a bit starker, maybe then the u.s. paper, where my paper talks about intensifying competition. the chinese paper talks about concerns that "for the potential for a clashes over security interests between the two countries has grown rapidly." both writing teams did log the efforts of the pentagon and the pla to introduce confidence-making efforts into the relationship. both sides agree that a military conflict would derail larger domestic and strategic objectives. they both acknowledge that each side is presenting significant security challenges to the other and both are exacerbating each other six -- each other's situation in the region. gence, they do do verge in many ways in explaining motivations and impact.
bonnie or mike raised it already. differences in respective views on the motivations beat hind the u.s. alliance or on the chinese -- very different views between the two sides on what those are all about. overall, the two papers, if you read them, will provide readers theund appreciation for strategic perception gap that exists between the two countries on a wide range of security issues. readers should come away with an appreciation that the military tensions are a reflection of mpd national interests and .undamental policy decisions it is much broader than just military issues. on future cooperation, if you look at the paper, we saw many ways where we can be cooperating a nontraditional security.
some folks mentioned that already. the most important thing to zero in on is what both teams did zero in on and that is cooperation on the very difficult issue of north korea. papers, bothhe teams cited the need to engage in crisis management. that is an important potential ,pening that we need to pursue either at a track 1 or track 2 level peer going for, -- going -- track 2 level. the military dimensions of the relationship are no different. some of us are concerned that the competitive dimensions are in the ascendancy.
it is clear that leaders in both capitals today recognize this and areive problem tempting to manage the two sides of this relationship. one of the nations in our paper was to conduct an assessment of of the military and security dialogs to determine whether they are serving a good purpose. leaders in washington and beijing have voted on that account, having created the new with itssive dialogue diplomatic and security dialogue that had its first meeting two weeks ago. security defense and dialogue, secretary mattis commented that the idea of the new venue is to elevate and focus the discussions. doing that is a pretty good idea. there is a new start to these discussions. whether there will be new server
-- new solutions remains an open question. >> i will be focusing on two points. first, my viewpoints about the two reports. i think there is a lot of consensus and similar observations in the two reports. it isides believe complicated with cooperation and competition. both sides believe the corrections in the suspicions have been increasing, especially
in the west pacific region. triesr six conflicts and to resolve conflict by force. another example is both reports believe, in recent years, the military relationship is the highlight of the whole bilateral relationship. this is not only reflected in crisis management, but in talks, cooperationd more on security.
interests, we must have [indiscernible] china is a rising power. the u.s. is an existing power. aggravation led to of military frictions. how can both militaries close their differences or manage them while exploring areas for corporation? have raised -- areas for cooperation? both reports have raised proposals. we must always keep and expand dialogs, military dialogs and
exchanges. especially, we should have new new strategic domains, like the nuclear talks and space talks. way, we can increase the ,nderstanding of both countries decrease in misunderstanding. must put reduction of risks, operational safety, crisis management at the center of our efforts to stabilize military relationship and avoid military conflict. third is that we must -- nontraditional security cooperation.
my second point is about bilateral military relations in the first half of this year. in the first half of this year, generally speaking, the relationship is stable. we keep talks and expanded new talks. and especially, earlier this year, when the two presidents meet each other, they reached in the korean pacific insular. korean pacific peninsula. [indiscernible]
the u.s. has twice -- the so-called freedom of navigation in the south china sea and declared military arms sales to taiwan again. about an active impact on the relationship. the ge two leaders are at 20 conference. both leaders will meet each other. firstoon, we will have talks between the two joints of staff. president trump will visit china in the second half of this year. i hope these efforts will stabilize the relationship and stabilize the overall relationship of our two countries. it will be beneficial for the regional peace and stability.
i will stop here. thank you. >> thank you. let mask one or two questions of the panel and then we will open it up. we covered a lot of issues in these papers. all the military and defense issues and different domains. let me focus first on one area which is very much in the news, north korea. of all the issues we looked at in the paper, including cyber, ailuding ai ivy -- including ib the korean peninsula, is the one where the united states and china could, because of our interactions on the north korea problem, in a few years, become much more trusting of each other across every issue or truly sensing that we are adversaries, as we were when the korean peninsula was at war.
it seems to me that is the one issue you could have the biggest sense of the overall whether we are adversaries or we can work together on hard problems that affect her security. and we are not in a good -- affect our security. and we are not in a good place with north korea. the president announced his disappointment that the chinese side could not do anything. probably, xi jinping is doing more than has been done before. for it is clearly not enough to convince the u.s. side. me start with bonnie and ask you there concrete things you can do? by now, russia and china are blocking the u.s. in the security council. the u.s. has announced it will sanctions onary banks because the chinese side has not policed and crack down on these sanctions violators
themselves. are we stuck on these specific set of issues? it has brought you political applications on what our relationship looks like. can we expect more out of north korea cooperation than we are getting? president jinping and trump met at mar-a-lago and agreed in principle to cooperate, after that meeting, the chinese tried to identify what it was that the u.s. really wanted. first, the chinese interpretation was compliance with existing u.n. sanctions. chinese always opposed any unilateral secondary sanctions. imports fromned north korea after reaching the cap under the un security council resolution passed at the end of last year. chinese also told the u.s. it was tightening up in terms of
border inspections. but i think there has been a failure on the chinese side to identify what it was that would really satisfy the united states, not meet all of our expectations, because that was not in the cards anyway, and it goes to the issue of banks operating in northeast china that are facilitating north korea's access to the international financial system and enabling north korea to engage in these illicit activities. so there has been efforts by the trump administration to provide evidence on banks and companies who are enabling north korea. the reaction, as i understand it, from china, was not sufficient. at sign we saw this 311 action last week. but there can be a way forward. china can take action against these banks. if not, i suspect what we see is that of of the aspirant. we have only seen one side --
tip of the iceberg. is better if china does this rather than the united states. in particular because these ranks and companies do business in currency other than u.s. dollars and are beyond the reach of sanctions, like those we and pose under 311. so there is a potential way forward. made -- maybe when president trump called xi jinping on sunday, if xi jinping can deliver some of those things in hamburg, maybe there is a positive pathway. i think neither government really wants the relationship to sour over this issue. the best outcome for the united states is more cooperation from china on north korea. i think the best outcome for xi theing, as he has towards annual meetings, the 1940 congress, and trump's visit to
china later this year, he wants the u.s.-china relationship heading in a positive trajectory also. so i think there is a way forward. we will see whether we get there. >> the raised a very important question. of course, china and the u.s. could do a lot more to cooperate. measure, howw to to define china's cooperation. president trump [indiscernible] they will notg, overwhelm only cut off trade relations because trade with the prk is chinese leverage.
preemption.s normal relations is the chinese way to keep some [indiscernible] it is not easy for china to cut off all trade relations with the dprk overnight. the dprk issue has become some leadinglading point -- point that could be significantly and exactly crystallized. just imagine, after the korean north korea [indiscernible]
now, there will be a second korean war. the overwhelming majority of chinese say no. it would be crazy. china will reach out and help him? no. change.big strategic we are also getting close to some sort of judgment of what the dprk is. get is a threat not to the u.s.. it is not a threat to china either. we need to figure out some sort of joint contingency plan to dprk. gauge the where's the starting point? how can we move firmly but
notably, going beyond some sort of historical inheritance, on the way to better cooperation? ideology,tory, dprk's dprk's treaty, dprk is also some personal, emotional connections. it is not easy. things can beto serving as a very decisive criteria. one, if there is one [indiscernible] i really hope the chinese government gives them a bigger punch. decide suspension for all your provisions.
second, if kim jong-un really to go back to international appeal, to de-escalate tensions, and to end missile tests, we also have to give them a pinch economically and commercially. i put a lot of hope in the trump-xi jinping summit meeting. we see both sides heading to a more specified and measurable cooperation. >>. thank you. i personally think that china is supposed to -- north korea is not what it was a year ago and it wasn't -- and it is not what it was 20 years ago. the changes are in clementa though -- the changes are
incremental. for our chinese friends, i can if the chinese security services turned over several containers of centrifuges are precursors for down insing were shut very specific ways, back accounts in about a dozen banks, having worked this issue in the white house refiners five years, boy, would that have a huge impact. huge impact on how the administration, any administration, thought about how trusting the chinese were on this problem. i want to give the audience a chance for one or two questions now. raise your hand. we have microphones. briefly who you are and then your question. gentleman in the blue shirt right here.
>> thank you. chinese student from the university of washington. i have a question about the north korean situation.we have been talking a long time about putting plans to solve this crisis. i want to post for the panelists. >> a brief scenario? brief. how about having china to have the kind of dominant control over north korea nuclear scenario and having the united states internationally recognized north korea so we can solve the denuclearization problem? thank you. >> dictate a cup -- we will take a couple more. yes, ma'am. >> hi, my name is jamie. ago, north days
korea launched a missile and landed in japan sea. i was wondering how far it will let it go security was in building that momentum before figuring out something with what actually should be done and letting north korea keep testing missiles in the sea? more. yes, sir. we will make our interns run. cameron. my name is i am in international relations student at miami university.the question is regarding the idea restraintlly assured and whether that is a viable option considering the papers' viewpoint and military channels? >> ok. let's start.
we will work this way. how to deal with north korea nuclear issue. china's position is very clear. is in the interest of china, not just to try [indiscernible] became de facto nuclear state, it will be a disaster for china. for example, north korea is the number one country from mpt. > there is so much pressure that it became a nuclear state. it is a very bad example to the other countries. then the mpt [indiscernible] many people will follow suit.
so many nuclear states will surround china. it is not in the interest of china. the military can't face the risk of this. it is very high. nor can any country saw the issues by military means. if there is misjudgment, there could be [indiscernible] war at the a nuclear border of china. so it's terrible. thirdly, even without war, but because of the tensions, u.s. will increase military presence, strengthen the military alliances. so it is also not in the interest of china. i think the china is determined.
we must have cooperation with the united states. without the coordination and the cooperation, we cannot achieve anything. north korea will make some compromise. we also cannot achieve anything. in the future, the chinese policy is clear. thet, the declan it -- nuclearization and freeze the nuclear program should be the first step. denuclearization and freeze the nuclear program should be the first step. if north korea refuses to go back to the negotiating table, if they make it six nuclear tests, we should put more pressure on them. chance there is still a
for resuming talks. we should have a try. anyway, we should also not just pressure, put pressure on them, but we should also give some parent to them. it depends on the pressure. but if they refuse to go back to the negotiating table, we must prepare for the worst case scenario. at that time, especially after six nuclear tests, may be china and the u.s. and north korea should have a talk about how to deal with the contingency. it's in the interest of all the countries. it is also a kind of signals and north korea. you can't go further.
we should strive for the best. we should care for the worst. should prepare for the worst. this is the only way to deal with this crisis. >> can i follow up and pick up the question that was asked over here about how much the international community should tolerate? so for my sins, i have been working on this north korea problem for 20 years and others here longer. every time i hear someone say we have to give north korea one more chance, it reminds me of bars in japan. inside the door, there is a sign saying "starting tomorrow, no drinking." [laughter] everyone felt very good about themselves when they drank. realizepoint do we north korea is not serious about negotiating away its nuclear program? that is basically what you are asking.
is it your view this is the last chance? trymuch more do we have two this thing that has knowledge for 20 some years? >> you see now that north korea hasn't totally realized the weaponization, nuclear weaponization. years,n two or three they will go totally go across the nuclear threshold, becoming a de facto nuclear state like india, pakistan and israel. at that time, there is no way to force him to go back. but before that, there is still a chance we can do something, if the international community can [indiscernible] cooperation.re
peopledaily lives, some make a decision. we have to do something. but it must be successful. the objective condition is very important. if we can unite, we can persuade them to change their wrong idea. we can force them to change their idea. so there is still a chance. but if we can't resume talks in think thise years, i issue will be very pessimistic. finally, we should prepare for the worst case scenario. a future military conflict and even war. that is a very bad situation. we should still have a try. that is my point.
i am a little bit more pessimistic. i don't think kim jong-un would ,ike to negotiate in exchange by dismissing their nuclear weapons. -- in the minds of piñon, the nuclear weapon is the last resort to secure the region 's security or secure the regime's safety and national security. the second is the nuclear bomb is probably on the way for kim jong-un to magnify how holy, howard marvel he is to be the top leader of the dprk. by all means, negotiation,
yes, we should leave the option .here unless two conditions happen, there is no way dprk will abandon their nuclear weapons through negotiation. , the majorhonest strike is coming over. the second condition is china is unbelievably clear in signaling tipping young test of pyongyang that we are not going to abandon you. yes, i consider negotiation is always operable. history is telling in the past three decades. we need to be more serious. aboutcond question is mutually assured restraint.
we should have a bottom-line mentality. bottom-linees, a mentality and accommodating each other, such a mutually assured restraint will be achievable. thanks. i don't know what i can possibly add to all this, except to say the visual of president clinton and president xi jinping calling for the dual suspension approach to korea does not give me a lot of confidence that the gentlem prospect of taking the lead with north korea has any legs. that is a nonstarter and does not give me a lot of confidence. deserved ancountry award for strategic patience, it
should be china with north korea. if you look at the last 70 years, were it not for north korea and kim il-sung, china would probably have owned taiwan in 1950. and if you don't believe me, you can ask professor warned: in the -- professor warren c ohen in the front row. been for those missiles, north korean missiles, you would not have had japan providing billions of dollars for the very ballistic missile defense that china sees as a threat to itself.and there would be no rationale for 30,000 troops, u.s. american forces, in china's neighborhood, which is viewed by china as not a good thing. so how much is enough? we will leave that different in china to deal with. the third thing i would point
out, dealing with north korea, it is returning to a land of bad policy options. not just for the united states, but for china, too. chinese decision-makers and policy makers and leaders must be struggling with the monumental implications of what they are being faced with at the moment because of north korea. now, china hasl not had to choose between north korea and south korea. china has been able to have it both ways to a certain degree. sooner or later, china will have to lean toward the -- to one side on this issue. and how it leads to one side in this issue will say a lot about its aspirations for world leadership. this is not just a tough decision for the u.s.. user to policy decisions for leaders and friends in china as well. i am honest to god glad i don't have to make a decision on this because there are no good option at the moment. if you had the time, i could give you 15 minutes on why
secretary mattis says a conflict in korea would be the most disastrous departure we have had in the century. the question that this gentleman in the literal -- in thatiddle asked suggest what we will do that will satisfy north korea. may be a useful conversation is what does north korea really want? you say u.s. recognize north korea. is that really what north korea wants? north korea wants to be recognized as a nuclear weapons state, not just diplomatic ties with the united states. i don't think china wants to take over the north korea problem. but i'm confident north korea doesn't want china to take over the problem.
maybe that would have worked 06.ore it 20 it's clear to me that what the north koreans want is a nuclear weapons capability. they have it. they want to be able to deliver it to the continental united states. the u.s. and china and russia will have to work out how to test.fy this recent from the u.s. point of view, if it were a standard trajectory, it would have traveled approximately 6000 miles. that is icbm range. the north koreans have already miniaturized a nuclear warhead. that.eople believe it may have mastered reentry capability without the warhead burning up. we are probably far closer to this goal.
deterrent,clear which is something else, but having a deliverable nuclear weapons capability. one very specific point that goes back to the issue of north korea using chinese banks and why this is so important to address. and 20,2009 approximately $300 million was laundered through these banks in the u.s. financial system. supportey is going to the wmd programs in north korea. so this is a place to start. we can also cut down the north korean laborers. a portion of their salary is going to north korea's elite. i think we should take a look at issues like crude oil. for northhave to wait korea to do its sixth nuclear test to cut back on crude oil? this is where china has enormous leverage. there's more that we can do.
overall trade will be on the trump administration's agenda. korea's trade with the international community is with china.that is a sensitive issue with beijing . but it will be discussed, too. i hope our two countries can have a more serious discussion about what is really doable and not just talk about suspension for suspension or things that frankly are knowledgeable at this point. we really reached a very critical turning point with this icbm test. >> i want to thank the panel and fellow authors and working group members who are not on the stage. this was a good discussion.
>> good afternoon. the first panel really did a stellar job of staying within the time limits. and in staying within the , looking for areas of convergence and the virgin's -- and divergence between the views particularlydes, with policy significance. our panel will deal with a waserent set of issues, that are actually also fundamentally important to the bilateral u.s.-china relationship -- economics. the is an area where
election campaign seem to be the most confrontational issue between china and the united states. exciting north korea issue, which gets a lot of the attention, the problem with the north korea problem is nobody knows what to do. there don't seem to be any good options. the administration thinks it has options for dealing with the trade imbalance of china and how the united states handles attitudes on economic issues has a potentially major impact on the bilateral relationship. global governance is another big issue. this has to do with -- is china really at two under the liberal world order that the united states set up after world war two? does it want to push us out of asia? issues?the governance what role is it playing in the relationship between the united states and china? and politics is fundamentally important.
attitudes in both countries, public attitudes, often do not support the declared policies of the government. polling shows attitudes towards the united states in china are more hostile than attitudes in the united states toward china. but when you think about it, you realize, of course. because, from china's stamp on, the united states is supporting countries who are making territorial claims against china. or we are supporting taiwan in ass that china sees interfering on a very important them.orial issue to and we don't have any territorial issues with china in the same way that the chinese see the issue. so it is not surprising that one side has a territorial issue, and that will affect public attitudes. public attitudes are very important and our panelists will get into the subject.
i willing kurds them to be equally diligent in sticking within the time limits. please, remember, we have one additional member of our panel, so that the pressure on us will be even greater. there was a chinese participant who was supposed to be commenting on the ike -- the economic side. on for chile, he could not be present. so the economics issue is the one where the united states will be dominating the presentation, although i'm sure that, if we say anything that the chinese feel has to be rebutted, they will not hesitate doing so. >> thank you very much. it is an honor to be a part of this project with everyone about the first panel and this one and all the other contributors. i wanted to talk about the economic relationship. the paper you have in the report , that we published today, was
written jointly by myself and this from the council on foreign relations. we had several other people who acted as advisors, who helped guide us along. but we are jointly responsible for what you like in a paper, as well as all the mistakes and challenges as well. we also want to -- i also want from pekingosan university school of business, who cannot be here today because of a family business, but he and the other authors in his team really should be commended for a thoughtful analysis, a serious discussion, presentation of evidence in their paper as well which is on the csi's website, which you can read. let me say a little bit about the differences -- similarities and differences in our analysis issues.mic and then similarities and differences where we come data terms of policy prescription.
i want to try to be as balanced can'tsible, even though i fully meet that idea, but i will try. in terms of our analysis, both sides agree that can't fully meet that idea, but i will the u.s.-china commercial relationship has been largely mutually beneficial. it has benefited both sides. despite the fact that there is this large trade deficit, bilaterally, that number shouldn't be the measure by which we judge whether the relationship is beneficial or not. on both sideseed of the united states economy faces a variety of challenges. not all of those challenges m&a from beijing or anywhere in china, but domestically underthings the united states needs to do to address those that don't involve china. we also agreed that china's economy is changing.
and china is still try to integrate itself into the global economy. i think we all agreed to that set of analysis. but we differed in a variety of other ways that are important. you willhe u.s. paper, find, if you look at it, what we see is the growing centrality of china's industrial policy and protectionism in managing its economy, and making life more difficult for those that want to export to china and those that do business in china. this is not a question of whether -- of how much it contributes to the u.s. trade deficit or not or jobs. but first, the question of basic unfairness and the difference between this behavior and chinese commitments, as well as the effect on companies that are competing with china in the u.s. and elsewhere.
but even beyond that, because of china's size, its unique size, chinese industrial policy is having a huge global effect on is this models, not just in china, but globally. it it is really important that we address this issue, not because we're trying to support one company winning over another but because of china's size and place. these are the benefits both sides gain from the relationship.
in addition, we don't see equivalency between the challenges in the foreign companies of the chinese market. access,ard to market things we are thinking of. i don't think there's much the u.s. has on the table, the ofsibility of coming close what the ongoing chinese market is. i think you see this difference in theoach and analysis current rhetorical fight between the united states and china where china is opposed protectionism in the united states most recently at the g7 and this weekend at the g 20 in germany, the opposition to trade sporting measures.
that is a good summary of the different overall visions of what is going on. what the ambassador a looted to when we got underway, we expected that after president trump came into office, the u.s. china relationship would be very contentious. in there were concerns obama administration, a growing need for a tougher approach to china. in the what we have seen first several months of the obama administration. we expected it is much more like
the idea. the effort to see cooperation, and pressure. we can't be sure because we are not clear what american policy toward china is overall or what the clear policy is on trade. but we will see, over this coming weekend, a discussion of the global forum and whether what is going on with chinese subsidies with stealing aluminum mediather we are seeing
coverage on trying to push things in a new way where if this is a substantial term. in terms of policy recommendations, this is where i will conclude. agreementot of common about the commercial relationship in terms of policy. we agreed that the u.s. should not engage in wholesale protectionism. to use the term, to punch the united states, for example. .he u.s. needs to do a lot china needs to continue to reform and open up. and china needs to resume that. direction is the the same on both sides. where we differed, and i think
again, the u.s. believes in our report that china isn't living up to its commitment. much more needs to be done to bring china back into compliance. and restart liberalization. there is a variety of things the u.s. can do. both carrots and sticks. and be proactive pushing for the outcome. into begin rigorously enforcing bilaterally and the wto. think that it is reasonable to strengthen the for considering if may havel investments concerns for national security.
within our group, there was no consensus about the term reciprocity. finally, it is extremely important. , chinang the problems needs to engage in multilateral forum, and theal u.s. needs to further engage its allies. this type of core strategic challenge. those itneeds to pick is going to cooperate with and engage china more effectively on these issues and achieve what we believe would be a more genuine win-win outcome.
>> will now move on to global governance. will leadoff.sor >> it has been a privilege, as others have said, to participate in this project. i think it's important to say that because this project demonstrates how much goodwill there is in each country, to work hard to try to get this complex u.s. china relationship on the best possible path. it has been good to participate in that and continue to participate in that. the topic of global governance is one that has been particularly disoriented by donald trump's election as u.s. president. and i will get to that in a few minutes. with thet to begin
report because it think the reports reflect and demonstrate a rather surprising amount of agreement. it is important to emphasize those agreements. we agree that global challenges require global solutions. introduces the most shared and the rules-based approaches are usually better than ad hoc responses. the second area of agreement, the main institutions of global governance established after
world war ii remain essential institutions in the system of global governance. chinese paper probably puts more emphasis on the united u.s.ns and criticizes the fromometimes departing u.n. processes and norms. the truth is, the yuan remains a strongly committed to the united nations and no country has a perfect record regarding the united nations. third, we agree that the established institutions of global governance need reforms. taking account of new power relations. taking account of new realities. there are differences on what those reforms might be. but there is a shared agreement we should be talking about what
those reforms are. want each other, both the u.s. and china want each other to be active players. there is some difference in the nuance.t -- and china by calling itself the developing country has sometimes seemed, to the u.s., to want it both ways. by both ways, i mean being a stakeholder but i don't think a concern. china has been stepping up. an understanding and ambitions playing a global role. it may be creating some problems.
china being a partial stakeholder. fifth. it we agree that the established institutions can be and already beingn good ways, supplemented by various multinational methods of government. the chinese have criticized the alliance system. especially in asia and certainly in asia, it has contributed to a stability of the whole region which has allowed china itself to prosper.
and recognizing that alliances come in a rather broad spectrum of different kinds of partnership and commitment. and china's greater contributions to global development, has expressed concerns about whether these chinese led institutions will develop norms of adequate transparency and government. those concerns led the u.s. to decline. as we indicated in the u.s. report, there has been a change. there are ways of cooperating.
and as you probably mostly know, the high-level u.s. government representative was recently sent to the forum in beijing. most complicated difference that has emerged concerns the phrase liberal international order and what that implies. that phrase, which is certainly widely used in the west characterizes the institutions after world war ii and after the fall of the soviet union. elements of emphasizing markets, international freedoms, rule of law, democracy. and china indicates that that is a western ideological mindset.
, andt has been invoking this paper in vaux, a different concept. the paper called inclusive no's and elsewhere i have seen the phrase "diversity." global institutions are not guided by a liberal mindset. , and are notuals about the business of changing lliberal institutions. the papers, you know those. that is part of why there is agreement.
they address current realities and problems in globalization. addressing issues of cyberspace, terrorism, and serious problems of climate change. that last example is a pivot to my closing observations. it climate change is an example. that a central problem in the moment currently in the field of global governance is that our american president has already taken a sharp turn away from the decades long path of american leadership. first, theis america climate accord, he scrapped tpp, he's criticized nato.
and he's given no sign of nurturing and focusing on the strengthening and building of institutions of global governance. we can start wondering what is the fate of this project. i want to close by simply thisoning reasons why current moment is not one that should prevent the effort of people like us to be developing and thinking through these ideas. it is early in the trump administration. we don't really know where this administration is going to go on these issues. is united states of america not just after his election
until the next one. we will have a long future and the issue of global governance is not a made up issue. it's a response to realities that require actual cooperation. the united states will have a future after donald trump which i believe will focus more again on issues of global growth. , the united states of a nationalnot just government. actors thaterous are working in spite of national government may be doing to develop, and be active. internationalign
treaties. ,hey are standing up particularly after the announced withdrawal of the paris climate agreement. take jerry brown, governor of california. 40 million people. he has organized other governors to take collective action to try to jointly meet the paris climate guidelines. beijing.th paying in there were headlines that said president xi eyes bigger role in california in u.s. china relations. interesting. invited california to join the belt and wrote initiative. states. don't forget about them. companies. businesses are active in the enterprise of global guidelines and global judgments.
play atly, ngos distinctively strong role in the united states in galvanizing public opinion, helping the implementation of rules. sometimes even sitting at the table. there is work to be done in the present regardless of what the national government is doing. even iner this project the small working group on global governance to be part of that. >> thank you, paul. dr. lee? >> thank you. good presentation. i'm working on global governance. i would like to see that both sides report a very positive and constructive -- >> nature you're are close enough to the microphone.
you are close enough to the microphone. >> china and the u.s., both countries have had great contribution to the global governance issues such as the protection of the environment cooperation of the global economy and the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. will play achina more active role in the future. china attaches great importance to bilateral corporations of this era. also reachedchina comments.
uncertainty on the continuation. --provides resolution resolutions and conclusions. we are all concerned about trump's policy focus from the global to domestic. domestic will have an effect on future corporations. and some conclusions are very different. in thepressed me most is u.s. reports, they were talking about the future of china that may have some uncertainty to the corporations.nce because it is developed and created by the developed countries.
u.s. rticularly the that is why in china's report, our team provides china side to try to understand -- how to understand the system of reform. people seesave two this area. area.ze this it is necessary. in the practical level, there are some specific mechanisms and some problems that they can't cope with emerging challenges. that is why sometimes we need to take some reform mayors to improve efficiency.
another key point is that there are reforms based on consensus. stakeholder can do all things. i think there are some differences from china and the u.s.. the future of challenges, both toes also take focus on how get differences and enhance our corporations. and the global governance issues. both provide some basic suggestions. i would like to conclude with four key words. d 2rom the u.s. side, an from china's side.
one is the mutual trust. shouldans both sides trust each other's global governance initiative based on the target objective, but not just on the ideological one. the second one is that consensus. it means whatever happens in governance, the system of reform, we cooperate worldwide and make some consensus. just focus and we will make some reforms. reform mayors. and the words from the china's side, practical. moreans we should meet
practical actions to do something. of just to stay on the stage arguing or planning which we all the process of governance, global governance, it is a process of rectus which has been proved is the most efficient way to enhance communications and improve corporations -- operation. cooperation. it should be the focus. it it means that we have a lot for china and for the aspects of resources and the governance is always limited. there are so many different global governance laws that we should allocate these resources effectively. different government issues.
so we should do something really efficient. with anotherto end -- maybe a little bit of eddie. we talk about this era's issue. we look forward to figure out thinke u.s. colleagues what is practical. actions. and theproject different global governance issues. that is why we spend a lot of time to discuss these questions. that is comparing with china's side, i think u.s. colleague make a very general conclusion on specific areas.
i would to learn more about the specific deterrence, the specific information about the in government issues. i would like to stop here. thank you. >> thank you. we will now move on to politics. evan, would you like to lead off? roy. thank you, ambassador i want to thank cs i.s. and my chinese colleagues. when we embarked on this project, we weren't sure exactly how it was going to go. i worked on collaborative roger x between american and chinese scholars many times before. and it is a challenge for the obvious reasons. as a result, they gave me the hardest topic of them all. it is the hardest because it is so sensitive. it is sensitive in america, but even more sensitive in china.
teams worked together, persevered, and were able to generate very credible products. i would like to make three points about how i think politics impacts the u.s. china relationship. thoughts and comments on the differences where views can converge divergent hopefully make policy relevant. when onepoint is that looks at the u.s. china relationship -- and i look at it from a very practical perspective. i was very fortunate enough to serve in the obama administration in the white house or years. i had six years where i got to sit at the control panel of the u.s. china relationship and the all the light flash and the buttons whirl and figure out how this big relationship operates. it was fascinating. and one of the lessons that i
took away from this. there are many lessons. yearstill digesting them later. this is a deeply mature relationship. as of 2017, this is a 38-year-old relationship. this is not a young kid or an adolescent. 38-year-old relationship. means america knows china and china knows america. it doesn't mean we don't have a lot to learn from one another. we are constantly changing and societies, as countries, as policies. but nevertheless, there is a big and rich data center that both sides can draw from and understanding the, sort of, the pace, the scope, the tenor of the u.s.-china relationship. and i think that the scope, the theh, and the quality of
papers in this particular project reflect that underlying maturity in the u.s.-china relationship. look no further than the current time of the u.s. china relationship. period. the u.s. took for major actions against china last week. taiwan, north korea, south can -- south china sea. to the bottom fallout? no. is the relationship in a rapid spiral downward? not really. both presidents talked a few days afterwards and they will meet on saturday. boundaries around this relationship that are shaped by politics. nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind the maturity of the relationship. that was point number one. point number two -- as we try and understand what these boundaries are and how we get things done, and in the case of
the work that myself and mr. dao and others did on politics, as we are try to understand how politics in both countries affect the u.s.-china relationship, i think there is one distinction that is critical to understanding how assess -- how to assess this relationship. it is a distinction that i have used before. some of you have heard me refer to. which is distinguishing between the structural features of the relationship -- in other words, those features of the relationship that are in during and probably aren't going to change and will have deep and profound effect on the ability to stabilize the relationship so ao shape it -- distention between the structural features of the relationship and the cyclical. the issues that
come up on a day-to-day basis. we talked a lot about a lot of them today. north korea, taiwan, south china sea. certainly, in the think tank community in washington, it is fun and exciting and engaging to talk about the cyclical issues. but sometimes they don't really have a long-term effect on the trajectory of the relationship. in particular, what is the shape of that curve look like -- what does the shape of that curve look like? it's an important distinction. when one takes about these issues of politics in the u.s. china relationship, that is deep structure. that is something that probably isn't going to change anytime soon. it is important that we not get caught up in the day-to-day debates about china, north korea, south china sea, taiwan, etc., and yet focus on the structural features.there are two that came out of our analysis , how politics impacts the relationship.
the first is that it is clear and thepetition competitive aspects of the u.s.-china relationship are coming to the four. that's not meant to be a test coming to the fore -- coming to the fore. that is not meant to be a negative statement. -- this isot issues not a statement about issues we should shy away from. theeed to embrace competitive aspects of the relationship because that is the only way we are going to manage them. and fact, one of xi jinping's attributes is the fact he has been relatively frank and open about the fact that there are disagreements. we have to talk about them. they will generate competition. the question is not can we avoid competition?
what kind of competition is it? is a competition that leads us both to improve our game and raise our capabilities? or is it destructive competition, militarized competition that runs the risk of instability and militarized conflict? so competition is one structural aspect. is sort of what i refer to as resilience and stability in the relationship. there is a big difference. u.s.-chinad that the relationship is not always the most stable relationship, there is lots of disagreements. we disagree regularly, but it is a relationship that is quite resilient. even though there are disagreements, even though there is competition, there is this sort of core of stability at the has bounded that these disagreements and this competition from leading to a freefall.
that is something that could change, but something that -- i above all in the obama administration. it is a cyclical feature that could become structural, depending on how politics play out. what does that mean for my assessment of the papers? these papers are next one component. they do two very different things. they highlight different aspect of the relationship. the chinese paper was focused on and the wayology, in which those issues affect chinese perceptions of the u.s.-china relationship. the paper is a very good description of how china believes that ideology, in particular this feeling that china has been the victim, china has been wronged by the united states, and how that affects chinese perception of the u.s. and the u.s.-china relationship. it is clear from the paper the china really hold on to these. issues 2017, these
affect chinese perception of u.s. strategic intentions and the quality of cooperation that can begin to in the u.s.-china relationship. i have to admit i was surprised by the fact that there was so much discussion in the paper about the u.s. trying to change china's political system, that bet is -- that continues to a core fear at the heart of u.s.-china. relationship i say that, as someone who has spent six years in the white house, i was not in a single conversation with the president, the vice president, the national security adviser, where anybody said china split or system is a threat to american national security and we have to do everything possible to change it. never once, never even remotely close.
that said, of course, we have questions and concerns about human rights in china. the clampdown on political freedoms. because that is who we are and that is a structural feature of the u.s.-china relationship. but it's very different from the kind of claims addressed in the paper. the u.s. paper took a different approach. when mike and i were working on it, we focused less on history and ideology and more on anditutions, actors, changing american perception. changing set of institutions, the fact that the executive branch appears to be playing a much more consistently active role in both formulating and implementing china policy, the fact that there is a broader set of actors in the united states influencing the u.s.-china relationship, we talked about the business community. wallsked about ngo's and
gray presentation reminded me of the importance of subnational in the united, states, governor brown, for example, and the important example they can play and bounding competition, expanding cooperation. does that mean ideology and intory doesn't play a role the american perceptions of china? i would say no. in the u.s., we do not call it ideology. we call it international relations theory. there are different schools of thought in the united states about china's strategic intentions. you have the and all you -- you have the style i school of thought. youspectrum is much more -- have the stylized school of thought. the spectrum is much more diverse. china wants to re-create this sino centric treat terri system and will do everything possible
to become the hegemon in east asia. you have a group of china who try to point out a much moreas nuanced approach to the region.it is not trying to re-create a sino centric system, but rather to find greater space for its rise in east asia as it tries to protect itself, defining economic security interests.we have our own competing schools of thought . those have different influence on u.s. policy overtime. the chinese paper would benefit tom a greater attention actors, institutions, processes, and how those affect perception. and i think the u.s. paper would have benefited from more discussion on the range of schools of thought in the united states because we have our own ideological and
theoretical lenses that in form our approach. let me end with this point. what does this on me for the trajectory of the u.s.-china relationship? i am very much of the view that the evolution of the u.s.-china relationship is one that will be determined by a series of ad hoc sides.ns by both to put it differently, the future of the u.s.-china relationship is a constant strategic a stable, -- 70 many people wish you could have two leaders sit down, hash it out and move on. rather, it will be a series of ad hoc decisions.
the question is will the political institutions in both countries, institutions, actors, perceptions, filtered through ideology in history allow that series of actions to be one that takes the u.s. and china down a pathway toward a gradual convergence of interest, where there is cooperation and competition, or one where the pathway looks darker? thank you. and now. is hard for sleepy people to talk about politics. [laughter] am honored to participate in the writing of the chinese the great to attend panel here today.
politics. the u.s. it's a good chance to reconsider the u.s.-china relations. the -- i read the u.s. report very carefully. especially the u.s. congressional role in the u.s.-china policymaking. idea ofy agree with the ups and downs of congressional power. reports,with the two we are agreed that domestic politics is one of the most factors shaping u.s.-china relations. , when theieve that
two countries' political goals are consistent, relations will make significant progress. this is very important to consensus. personally, i think may be the two reports is the two sides seem to think about the world of politics in different ways. for the chinese report, we talk about politics as a very big issue, such as political systems, ideology, or even political stability. give me somereport impression that politics is about [indiscernible] the decision-making process,
especially the key players during this process. theseecause of differences, the chinese report politicalbigger background and culture of a u.s.-china relationship. talks about report animal to discussion about the key details, such as congress, such as community ngo, even personal factor of the leadership. for a lot of issues, detailsocus more on the , it is easy for people to find out some problems.
you pay more attention on the werall history trend, maybe may see a [indiscernible] so why is there some difference? the difference -- the reason for the difference is mutual trust. china and the u.s. still have doubts on how to look at each other, how to deal with each other. aboutis still worried so-called political involvement of the united states. and for the u.s. part, the diversity of the [indiscernible] more are more and different, even conflicting views on china, on chinese politics. , there is a long history of u.s.-china relations.
we have a long time to try to resolve the difference gradually. both of these reports mentioned that the subnational level -- tion, it's a chance for us to the subnational relation between the u.s. and tona, such as state province, said to to county of the local level. can notational relation only bypass the high politics disputes and maybe can improve a lot of people to people exchange, such as economy, trade
, technology, science, and so willnd may be it facilitate the basis for bilateral relations. mentioned,ese report there is a situation where the u.s. and china confront the same challenge, the same problem. but maybe the solution is not the same. as we know, china is continuing , welfare, and we know the trump administration concern about the economy, jobs, and other
domestic issues. foraybe there's more room some kind of mutual learning, mutual cooperation, mutual benefit between our two countries. ofthe new development political factors since trump took place, on the chinese side, there is no big change. there's.s. side, maybe new points that should be talked about. in af them is that politics of the trump white brings more insurgency to u.s. foreign policy making. the outside world totally has no or at what time
or how much your influence on which issue. it is a big uncertainty for united states. is, in case of trump's unclear policies, the u.s. congress seems to once more dominate some form policies. . for example, the taiwan policy. sponsored by marco rubio and stephen in the house. i think this is confusing to the stable development of u.s.-china relationships. my time is up. >> we have gone over our time.
someanelists have raised fascinating issues that we could usefully explore for the next hour or two. but rather than eating into the zu, if professor wanji panelists.our if you have questions, maybe you can call on members of the panel after the conclusion of our conference this afternoon. [applause] >> i want to thank the panel, especially the ambassador, who chaired and is part of the steering group.
the chinese also had a steering group with very distinguished scholars, diplomats, defense experts, and also produced an overview paper. the principal author was our closing speaker. you to sum up to and tell us what we do next. where do we go from here? wan.ssor >> i am not going to summarize.i am not going to tell you what to do . [laughter] i will have to say something. first of all, on behalf of the ambassador and all the members
on the chinese research group who want to -- we want to express our heartfelt congratulations on the release of your very comprehensive report. that is the u.s. side, the report on the u.s. side. we also want to express our csisrest appreciation to for its collaboration with us and support in our joint effort. two sets of report, parallel reports. the beginning of this joint 2016. was the spring of able stewardship of
the ambassador, we initiated research work on the future of u.s.-china relations. the initiative has been endorsed and financed by the chinese academy of social sciences global think tank. i don't remember the exact name of that. it is called something like global strategic studies think tank. and we have been in touch with chinese foreign ministry and other government agencies, senior diplomats, u.s. embassy in beijing, and various u.s. counterparts, individuals and csis.utions, especially toare very much indebted their advice and support. the research team on the chinese
composed of about 20 to 30 researchers, scholars and numerousalysts from china --hing tanks in think tanks in china. they include the chinese academy national sciences, the defense university, the pla academy of emission science -- of english and science, peking and [indiscernible] sciences, andl many others.
we held dozens of closed-door debates and discussions. sound more small group meetings. meetings withany our american counterparts in beijing, washington, d.c., or new york city. the end result is the chinese published in both chinese and english.we also want to thank csis for publicizing the chinese report. the chinese report in both english and already edited in the volume, which will be published by the chinese academy of social sciences publishing house. i hope it will come out pretty soon. in may this year, we launched a
rollout event in beijing, similar to the one we are holding today and washington, d.c. andad people from csis other think tanks from the united states. story, theply my chinese side of the story. equally important or even more important, after a few rounds of consultations, csis made the decision to help out and to coordinate american think tanks to write a report. -- the first idea is to write something called a joint report.
publicity of teamwork collaborated by both sides. but because of the lack of communication, we are separated so widely and we cannot reach consensus on everything -- every single issue, we decided to do something like they shanghai communique. we express our views and they express their views. notes. can compare we compared notes in the first place. two separatelt is and parallel reports reflecting our views of several dimensions, like trade and economics, asia-pacific, global governors, the impact on the bilateral
relationship, and military-to-military relations, and also an overview. we have frequent exchanges of views between the u.s. and chinese teams. we compared notes. we improved the quality of the papers. debated on thewe chinese side more than we publicized them. i mean, honestly, we have different views among the issues.on some we don't have identical views on issues like north korea or sensitive issues in chinese foreign-policy.
consensus.we have a but on specific issues, we don't have everything. a large group of 20 to 30 people, we could not agree on everything. but what is available is generally a consensus on the chinese side. but the consensus is not necessarily the government point of view. this is our think tanks doing the effort. we consulted the government, but we did not seek endorsement from government agencies. in our cooperation, i'm talking about the strategical oriented think tank, two things struck me. i speak for myself in this regard.
first, the frequent substantive and sustained dialogue. it is very useful. when we constructed the report, i cannot help of thinking about earlier episodes of the u.s.-china relationship in the the economicwith and cultural exchanges were influenced by the political storm in beijing. mid-1990's, our bilateral dialogue was suspended by a visit to the united states. in the late 1990's, there was the embassy bombing incident. changes between universities and think tanks of
the two countries was often interrupted by political events. since theially beginning of this century, we have very intensified and extensive changes of views between think tanks. speaking,ersonally the intensity and extensiveness of the sustained dialogue between the two sides exceeds what i know as the exchanges of views between china and other countries. we have strong ties with countries like russia and europe , and many other countries. think the intensive
less frequent than the exchanges of views within countries, we have from the relationship with, like russia. honest, if i very compared this relationship with our relationship with south korea or japan, in recent years, some times the exchanges of views as been -- have been events.ted by unhappy us? does this tell this tells us we have reached a new level of maturity. -- this reflects the resilience of the relationship. the second striking thing to me
is how much we are familiar with each other's views and how much we know each other, personally and individually. that includes some younger generation scholars and think tank people. because of the evening understanding -- deepening understanding of u.s. think tanks, agreements of chinese think tanks have been established in china in recent years. when we have specific issues to discuss or to debate, we know who we will talk to to seek advice from. mention ad like to
five i did with my friend years ago. report onored a distrust. strategic reflected in aas discussion of whether the united states wants to change china's political system. veryis what we see as a deep distrust. in the past five years, since we published that report, has the distrust been dispelled or reduced? my answer is no. this has deepened and become more expensive. at the same time, have the two closer tomoved
confrontation? again, my answer is no. why is that? that aree some reasons reflected in our joint report. our parallel report. first, we increase mutual understanding. a more balanced view, the think --k views, with larger respective domestic audiences. less influenced by, for instance, conspiracy theories because conspiracy, we can think about among the audience here, if they do not have conspiracy, i don't know where we can have those conspiracies. you know well, chinese people
and government officials much better than before. it is very difficult to believe in those conspiracy theories. i am not saying there is no , but not as widespread. second, we have more institutional languages, which are pushing against possible conflict between the sides. we are helping government agencies to construct crisis prevention and crisis management skills and devices. also, my friend has talked about that. continuingite the
mutual distrust, the two countries greatly enhanced their biological corporation and multilateral corporation, -- cooperation. onlected on the papers economic and trade relations. what is not talked too much about is the booming tourism between the countries. the united states is more interested in a one road initiative and china's best students continue to come to the united states for advanced studies. i am not extremely happy about that because i am losing some of my best students who i want them schoolsd our graduate
but instead they go to the best universities in the united states. at the same time, we have many very good students from the united states studying in china. somewhat more reason to be cautiously optimistic. i do not want to neglect the differences. and the pitfalls, difficulties ahead. what i see as a normal -- a new normal of the relationship by increased cooperation and increased competition. greater,know which is they are simultaneous. feature in the relationship is increased degree of influence from domestic politics on both sides.
next?hould we do i do not have any good advice but i am thinking about more substantive and more collaborative projects. for instance, we can be somewhat --e specific in discussing one aspect is investment. trade. and we can talk also about more extensive security -- multilateral security architecture in the asia-pacific region. there are already proposals in that regard. joint launch some on a great number of projects. we should also try to bring
countries like japan, south india, and russia into our collaboration. we can even think of our joint effort to analyze a situation in the middle east. this morning i read very carefully a publication by your vice president john altman on china and the united states in the united states -- in the middle east and that is something we can think about. the joint effort we have made so foundation up a good for think tank cooperation in the future. se will continue to rely on csi as our partner. we are trying very hard to reach out to other u.s. think tanks.
on our side, we want to reach out to other universities in china to bring them together to cooperate. thank you very much. [applause] >> on behalf of the american participants, i want to thank the ambassador who brought this idea to us over a year ago. ,veryone was interested probably a dozen think tanks and universities heard her idea. we were not sure how it would work, it was an experiment and i think it worked quite well for three reasons, one, the goodwill and candor of all the participants. number two, we structured it so each side would have to think hard about how they thought about the others relationship. third, because of maria sinclair the american
university graduates going to work for you. they herded these cats and we owe them a special thanks. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2017] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> c-span, where history unfolds daily. in 1979, c-span was created as a public service by america's cable television companies. and is brought to you today i
your cable or satellite provider. -- by your cable or satellite provider. >> the head of the u.s. government ethics office used his first ever tweet to announce his resignation. he says he is leaving the office of government ethics in about hisweeks and tweeted resignation letter to the present which is in part the great privilege of honor of my career has been to lead the staff and ethics professionals in the federal executive branch, they are committed to committed a trust,c service as requiring employees to place loyalty to the constitution, the law, and ethical principles above private gain. he will be joining the campaign legal center as a senior director. a nonpartisan campaign finance reform group. in prime time on c-span, remarks by hillary clinton on the role of women in modern diplomacy and international politics. here are some of her remarks.
the work donen: here at this institute at georgetown making the evidence-based case for the role of women and peace and security is incredibly important. it has always mattered, but today it is even more critical. grown, sostitute has has the body of evidence showing that when women participate in peacemaking and peacekeeping, we are all safer and more secure. go againhow, here i talking about research evidence and fact -- [cheers and applause]
hillary clinton: in fact, when women are included in peace negotiations, agreements are less likely to fail and more likely to last. state former secretary of speaking earlier this year at the ceremony of foreign award named in her honor at georgetown university in washington, d.c. watch her remarks in their entirety tonight at 8:00 eastern on c-span. today at 7:00 p.m. eastern, join american history tv for a live tour of the museum of the american revolution in philadelphia. the museum's president and ceo and collections and exhibitions vice president scott stevenson will introduce artifacts and exhibits throughout the exam, including george washington's work and and a piece of the old north bridge from the battle of concord. hear stories about the ameri