tv 2016 Coup Attempt in Turkey Panel 1 CSPAN July 10, 2017 11:18pm-12:44am EDT
no further than the dnc who actually coordinated opposition ukrainian th the industry. nobody in this room had a problem with that. the only problem i see is the people that leaked the information on the meeting after it was voluntarily disclosed. i'd also like to add donald trump jr. has made a statement on this. the president's outside counsel has made a statement and i have as well. i'm not going to add anything further. >> c-span, where history unfolds daily. in 1979 c-span was created as a public service by america's and television companies is brought to you today by your cable or satellite provider. >> it's been one year since turkey faced a coup attempt led by a faction of the turkish military. now a look at that event and its impact hosted by the seta
foundation for political, economic, and social research. >> good morning everyone. distinguished guests, friends, and colleagues, welcome. i'm the executive director of the seta foundation at washington, d.c. we would like to welcome you all on behalf of our institution. thank you for joining us today important conference of the july 15 coup attempt. this conference will debate a subject that continues to define turkey's domestic and foreign policy in significant ways. the last year's coup attempt exposed the extent to which the followers went to grab power at the expense of popular will. the attempt made it clear for turkey that this organization as no longer a moment with
networks in the state democracy but now apply terror as a means to achieve its goals by attacking its own people. turkey continues to fight .gainst this unique challenge today it will be fortunate and a unique opportunity to hear from the general guler among us in the audience the commander of the gendarmerie forces in turkey. i'll get a chance to talk to him more before the speech. he was an eyewitness to the unfolding coup attempt and one of the people at the highest level at the time. we would like to welcome
general guler and appreciate his team's efforts to make him available for this meeting in washington, d.c. we do recognize it wasn't easy. a unique account to hear what happened on that night on that fateful day. we have two panels with very high qualified experts and distinguished speakers who will discuss the implications of the failed coup attempt. the first panel will be focused on the coups in turkey, the history of the coups and the july 15 coup attempt and we will proceed to the keynote by general yasar guler. the second panel will talk about the security and foreign policy implications. i would like to welcome you all and particularly thank
our washington team and my colleague, our research director kilic kanat. without his help this wouldn't have been possible. i very much appreciate it. and our research assistants i would like to thank as well. i'd like tony: vite the first panel of speakers --. i'd like to invite the first panel of speakers. hank you very much for coming.
thank you very much for coming today and we'll start our first panel over the coups in turkey and specifically on the july 15 coup attempt. we have four qualified speeshers on the issue of the coups and the last coup attempt. i would not spend time with the introductions because they are well known. we will start the panel immediately. i will not wait any time at this point. will start with professor yavuz, a professor at utah university and is preparing a book on the coup attempt which will be published and we'll have his perspective on the july 15 coup attempt and then continue with the other panelists. professor yavuz: thank you. what i would like to discuss today is four different competing and conflicting
about the coup in turkey. there are four different perspectives. one, let me summarize the four perspectives and then examine ach and provide my own interterptation because most of my work, what i did since my ph.d dissertation is very much islamic movements in turkey, the movement and i'll examine and bring the perspective of the movement and its evolution, its networks, and its role in the coup. claims that one they, themselves organized and through t the coup the networks in the police
force and also within the military as well. the second perspective -- the first one is very much accepted the current government. the second argument is that the coup was carried out by a coalition, a faction within the military. within the second perspective there are two views. first, our views that, yes, it was an action of a coalition of but within the military they were the glue and organized and brought the .ifferent groups together later on the view was changed a little but in his book about
this in july, still you will see he based it on the coalition within the military which carries out the coup but he also argues that the gulenists were critical in their formation of the coalition. a second, promoted by military analyst, retired he argues the coup was carried out by an action coalition of groups within the military. gulenists were not playing that prominent role. you have nationalists and the capitalists, some opportunists including the gulenists. but what brought this actually together within the military was they were anti -- the glue which kept the coalition forces
together. the third perspective argues that the coup was, again, within the third perspective you have two arguments. e argues that the coup was aged by the current person -- an argument promoted in his interviews, he argues that this was staged. this was organized by aslam and they compared it to german parliament of 1933 that hitler according to some historians carried it out in 1933 to suspend the german constitution and also violate the basic human rights. within the same group they argue that, yes, something like
the german situation happened but it only provided an opportunity to expand his powers. by fire was not organized himself. these are two somewhat similar but competing arguments within the third perspective. the fourth perspective promoted current opposition leader of turkey, kemal, he in es -- there was an op-ed yesterday's "new york times", very clear that coup was carried out by the gulenists within the military but he says he intelligence and military
with the information and support of the government tried to control the coup and also use the coup to expand their powers. these are four different perspectives about the coup. i want to try to explain the pros and cons on the basis of the evidence. this is still an ongoing debate how this happened. i think it will take five to six years to find out what really happened. as far as the first perspective is concerned that the gulen organized, carried out the it is would argue that
a more plausible argument and more likely that the gulen was aware, because of what took place within the military, there are several reasons for this. networks very much there are three stages of the gulen movement. period of -- second, from 1970 to 1993 under the former president. the second stage is the more t becomes a much ublic network and subtle activities. moved from being a religious
activism to a political tivism and became more clear -- turkey had that period of coalition government, weak government. that provided an opportunity for the gulen and his network to penetrate the police force. the police force, especially the police academy, i would the re critical in vement and that started with when the gulen were able to control the police academy. when the police academy in ankara became the operational center of the gulen movement it ecame much clearer in 2002
with the government and i would say more or less allowing the guleners to run the government. minister of interior, minister of education, ministry of justice. it put a coalition between the gulen movement and the party. the party didn't have the trained bureaucracy or the man power so they more or less relied on the gulenist movement. the police academy is critical because by definition the job of the police is criminal activity. so the gulenist movement by controlling the police academy penetrated nah the police also penetrated nah the gulen movement. you have mutual penetration and in that the mentality of the police activity, police work, very much dominated the gulen movement. in 2002, especially between
the antipolice force -- the entire police force was more or less controlled by the gulen network. he first period of the gulen became more or less business, political, crim national network. that period, that transformation starts with the coalition with the party unfortunately. these are the realities we need .o come from and face what i would say, the gulen movement went through three major transformations. the last stage more or less . aped by the close ties
so after 2002 the gulen movement came to the conclusion it is more powerful than the party and in the 2011 election the guleners wanted 100 seats in the parliament. that was rejected and i would ay that was a reason the conflict and confrontation between the two groups, the guleners on one hand and the party on the other hand that the guleners had too much to lose in the confrontation but hey were also somewhat confident they would win this confrontation against the overnment. i would argue even the transformation of the movement, even in 2000 -- after 2007 crisis the guleners became much more powerful. in 2010, constitutional -- the
guleners totally controlled the justice system in turkey. it was totally in their own hands and they used the police force and justice to carry out their network and within the military with the support. so we have the section of the military and through the court cases i would say very much carried out with the police and judiciary with the help of the fighters, we had really a sad, unfortunate development and situation in turkey. there is one thing about the coup. i do not consider it a military coup. it is a civilian coup. it is a civilian coup carried out, organized by the imam or
the gulenist imams and they used the military to implement what they wanted. it is a civilian coup carried out, organized by the imam, carried out by the military, and this is one of the reasons i would say the coup failed. if you compare the previous ups in turkey, always it was organized and carried out by the military. there was no civilian intervention. the is case in the case of y and critical imam, now disappeared, no one knows where he is, but he and a number of other civilian imams played an important role. there is no single military imam. this is something very important. head of the are
divinity schools in turkey and -- the here is this gulenist movement i would say is very different than the rest of the islamic movements in turkey that in the contemporary turkey if you take it from the census to present, this is just a footnote to my argument, you ave the movement which is very different. econd, you have the movement krb -- the kurds. they were very loyal to the ottman empire. the state -- they were very loyal to the turkish republic.
then the third religious movement, the third wave of islamism, is the gulen movement. very different. less islam. t is more about the power that is more control. the gulen movement also represents the success of kamalism in turkey, another contradiction we need to unpack. second ove to the argument that it is a work of a coalition of forces, i would say the second argument doesn't make sense, because the ulenists would never trust kemalists or nationalists to even organize something of such importance. one of the key terms in the , to be very aution
careful, and gulenists would never sit together with the kemalist officers to discuss or organize or the nationalists, such a critical thing. not f the arguments do make much sense by knowing how the guleners' networks function. but this are some generals, i think, or a number of other people, they didn't know what to do. i would never consider him a gulenist or what i read of his background is very much a social democrat oriented general. so you do have a number of people in jail because they didn't know what to do at that moment of the critical period. i am hoping eventually this
will become clear. when you go to the third this is bout something like the german fire of the parliament of 1933 i would say this coup was not organized by aslem because there was no power to organize the coup to expand his power because he is very much in control of the parliament, the local power himself so to risk he, himself, running away from an assassination attempt, the coup was very much attempted to kill him. but there was the second part of the argument that this coup was used by the government to get rid of the opposition, there is a ground for that, unfortunately, today in turkey what we are seeing that some people are using this environment to silence opposition. --. nk this is
the he third argument, first doesn't make much sense. we analyze it in the book in more detail but the second art, the exploitation or using the coup more or less more or less it makes sense, unfortunately. now, when we look at the fourth rgument, a controlled coup promoted by the opposition leaders, i would say that argument also doesn't make sense. because who controls something -- i would say it was not a controlled coup. it is a loss of control. the military knew around 5:00 p.m. the turkish intelligence was aware of the coup around 3:00 p.m. all of that high school shows the weakness and
inept situation of the political institutions in the country. they lost control in a way. they could not try to take proper measures to stop the coup and the controlled coup so requires that you would know would be the next stage. what we know from the events of the coup, there was no control and everyone was shocked in the way the events went. to conclude since i don't have much time, the coup carries out -- carried out by the civilian coup could ay the only be given by the gulen himself. knowing how the networks evolved historically the gulen was fully aware this doesn't
mean every teacher, every doctor who was a member of the movement in germany or the united states was aware of the coup. we need to be very careful not o treat the entire movement or equate and treat them all as criminal activity. i think that is one of the mistakes made by the government as well. but the gulen made the decision. the coup very much carried out by the civilian, the order planned by the civilian imams, nd it was carried out by the gulenists within their military. they were very much -- each officer had some imam he was working with, and they didn't know each other, so, also,
there is an incredible success story of the gulen movement, how it works, what is the police force, and the military, a lot to be learned, unfortunately, how these networks use both the religion and the modern networks and to e such a powerful glue shape the future of the country. i will end here. oderator kanat: thank you. the second panelist will probably answer some of your questions because she was on the committee for investigating , 2016 coup attempt. >> thank you very much. it is nice to be here. maybe we need to take a step back and look at how this all started. when we were in the committee investigating the coup attempt
and also how it came about, how did they come about, how did it form, and how it came to the day of the coup attempt and the aftermath, when we were investigating it, we went back to 40 years, documented, and maybe there's more that's not documented. back in turkish history. as e see the first report hakan mentioned, we see this first report about members of the gulenist movement. i would definitely not call it an islamic movement. if i were to define it, i would mentality.s a cult it is definitely a cult. and can utilize anything that it can in order to pursue -- persuade people to do things, to brain wash them, or to blackmail them into doing it. so, if they need to look
religious at some point, then they utilize religious terminology. if they need to look secular, then they utilize secular terminology. anything goes because when we look at their lives, we see they may be religious people, but everything they do is against the rules of the religion. so i would definitely not put it together with islamic movement. it is a movement, a cult movement that utilizes religious terminology to influence people and other methods that they use, among other methods they use as well. so when we look at 1990's we the he first report in police force that if they're not stopped, they may take over the police force. one thing that's important, and we have a lot of discussions
related to this in the committee and a lot of rguments if i may say with distinguished members of the opposition party as well. this does not start without fighting. this started four years before. whoever was in power, it doesn't matter whether their ideology matched or overlapped, they worked with them. we see it, unfortunately, at the end of the 1990's. we see it. this is another report prepared n 1999 by the secret service and ankara -- i cannot think of the name -- so prepared in ankara saying that they need to e stopped.
in the military as well. so all of these at that time because we have a turkey with lots of coalitions and, unfortunately, there is no democracy, as democracy with its ups and downs, pluses and minuses, compared to the democracy we have today. we still have military rule. any time there is a democratic change or a move toward democracy, we have the political elite working with the military and then they give a signal and then the elected officials take a step back. so we still have an over shadowing of the political elite over the turkish democracy. so we cannot call that a turkish democracy when we come to the end of the 1990's. then what happens? women don't like to tell their ges but i tell people i just am in the tenth anniversary of my 35th birthday.
so i'm old enough to remember the 19 -- to remember this. i listened to my grandparents the first few years of the republic, the challenges they had after the war of independence and things that they suffered through after 60 and everything, democratization process, within my family i see the human rights violations and how did it come to this state? o after 2001 we see that there are many different factions in the society. we see a party come out and then they gradually gain power and there is a struggle trying get within also the and ratization process
ven more when we look at 2007-2008 we see the party faces a closure case against them. when you look at really the party gaining power maybe it's like the third term, 2011, that is when they start to get power and, like you said, that is when the struggle starts. in turkey, in current turkey, any democratic group, if they want to be a part of the democratic system, they are more than welcome to come and political ections, parties, there is much more freedom compared to turkey i grew up in. anybody can establish a political party and they have the opportunity to be part of the political system. but now you have this group, seems like a nice group. they have schools. isn't it nice to have schools?
they have schools all over the world. and then they have people, nice people who speak good english, good foreign languages, and they are good communicators. they look like they're humanitarian people. and then when you have these people take orders, not from their -- not from their superiors in the government or the military or the police force but taking orders from civilians from outside and orders that are ordering them o do illegal things like blackmailing people, like threatening people, like causing them to lose their jobs or causing them -- making them -- forcing them to close their businesses, now we have a problem. then there's a struggle. it is not a democratic struggle. it's a power struggle. so the clash starts. during december
of 2016 -- >> 2015. >> 2013. and before that also the day when that is one of the new steps is out again discussed a lot in the media as well, the talking of the trust -- the trucks bringing aid. it was national security services trucks being stopped by factions in the military. so these things do not add up. so the problems started. but when we come to -- i don't know how much time i have left so i'll have to pass forward and jump ahead. when we come to the day of july 15, i was there. i wasn't -- i will always regret the fact that i rushed to istanbul from ankara after the parliament worked till the
morning on july 15 because i wanted to see my daughter. we would only have that weekend. i wanted to spend time with her. and i wasn't there in bombed.nt when it got ok. imagine having f-15's fly over the capitol when the congress is in session. imagine them bombing. imagine men in u.s. air force uniforms, your uniforms, your country's uniforms, shooting at you. imagine tanks out on the streets. so this is something my generation remembered vividly. but this was something the new turkey -- children the age of my daughter, 20 years old, they didn't know. they had no idea about something like this could happen. they couldn't imagine. it was something they could see on the movies.
so july 15 coup attempt was a violation of basic human rights. the most basic human right is the right to live. of 80 million turkish citizens and also citizens of other nations like the 3 million syrians that we support physically and within our borders and outside as well and other people all over the world who were looking up to turkey for humanitarian help or some other form of support. so this was one the biggest attacks any democratic country, aybe within the modern history, has come under and survived. so what was not logical was -- i mean, i'm not a person who likes guns. i grew up in texas so i get a feel about this. i have a feel. but it's not logical for people to run toward guns and tanks
and bombs. it's not logical. but then say the turkish people, and this is something for cultural scientists to discuss, they redefine the concept of struggling, fighting for democracy. all the previous definitions i'm so sorry, there are lots of very distinguished academics here, all the previous definitions are no longer valid. and i'm saying this as a politician, not as a politician but also as a student of international relations. and political science. ok. what happened afterward? immediately, unfortunately, ery, very disappointingly, our wonderful, wonderful allies and friends were waiting it out. some of them are the very
allies and friends who would immediately travel to turkey when they hear about some kinds of human rights violations or some kinds of violence, they ould immediately be there. they would be ready to criticize turkey harshly. sometimes maybe rightfully. but no. we did not hear anything. this was very, very disappointing for the turkish people to see. and then the aftermath of the coup attempt. yes. it is difficult to understand the numbers may seem big, but turkey is not as i mentioned, it's an 80 million population. there are those who want to establish the argument that there is no rule of law, but believe me, the rule of law is
upheld in turkey. and it is not just about gaining more power or punishing the opposition. believe me. i work with them. we have pretty good opposition in the parliament and outside as well. but no matter what your position is, and i'll end with this, no matter what your position is, you could be a doctor, you could be a lawyer, you could be a journalist, you could be an academic, you could be a high level military official, you could be a member of parliament, or you could be a doorkeeper in the building -- nobody is above the law. t is not acceptable to promote terrorism no matter what your position is. thousandth of this
happened in the united states, and i was here on september 11 for those horrible attacks, or if it happens in a european ountry, things would be much worse. so the court cases were following this, are going on for the coup attempt, and in addition to the people who are either suspended or they are being -- having to go through the court system, there is also a great number of people who are released or reinstated to their positions. but, unfortunately, we don't hear about that in the u.s. and ndia or in the european media. we hear about certain parts of the story i. i just wanted to tell about our part. i had a lot of notes but i'll try to get back to them. so thank you.
>> thank you very much for your presentation. nd our third speaker, necdet .zcelic, research fellow at >> thank you for having me. i would like to deal with two important issues regarding the urkish armed forces. sensitive issues, how the people are so effective in the turkish armed forces and how so, there was a big problem of understanding who carried these military attempt, the military part of the attempt in turkey.
there was not a consortium of hitters that remember. many unfortunate people in the forces, more than got involved in the coup attempt. the main body or the driving body of the military coup was the members of the military. explain thery to infiltration into the turkish armed versus. -- armed forces. all, the strategy --
the first was targeting personal status of the turkish armed forces. what i mean is the turkish armed forces lands on a personal system on different status. seo -- officer, in nco's. membersnk that the invested in the strategy in the operational status by the turkish armed forces. started in the high schools and continued until they promoted to general. it is a long investment for those members. they contracted specialists, the service members are mostly
technical people. the members did not put too much on those people to hire. members just worked in the turkish armed forces. how suffering, they know how to get promoted, to get the commissions or be an officer in turkey. it is a long effort. targeting the command forces -- there are some military branches, there are some military command forces, and lawe is a military
enforcement branch. this operatedsee under the interior ministry, and it was targeted. because of the proximity to the civilian people. then we have intelligence supremacy, comparing to the forcesraditional command in the fight. they are law enforcement military people. the forces, the primary target to get infiltrated. they take the air force because of the technical capacity,
maneuverability. land forces, it becomes deterred. is it special forces? coupinvolved in the attempt? because of their unique training, unique capacity of operations. special we saw special axes soldiers -- special forces soldiers, troops in headquarters and detaining high-ranking generals. so the key positions, this is how they got into the turkish armed forces.
at the high levels at headquarters, we see the personal assistance for the high-ranking generals. soldiers and the , they wereps fulfilling important roles in the military. positionss took those to be close to the commanding operate theto personal strategy in turkish and therces and the -- intelligent strategy, as well. at the general stuff
headquarters, there is a personal management director. under that director, there is a small branch of that. that branch is responsible for generals, sending the military people, appointing and assigning them to foreign nato.ies, to that is a key location, and imported for the coup attempt. they were able to seize that office. a man served in that office for many years. after he got promoted, he got the status of being an officer.
i think that was 2003. he was in the position geared -- in that position. as a major he started, and right up to a brigadier general. that is incredible. got so -- directing and giving clinical recommendation -- political recommendations to high-ranking generals. it starts from the battalion level and goes all the way up to the force command headquarters. those two directors were captured, seized by the federal members, and the federal policy was directed through intelligence as a personal
they got tutored in the special houses. schooltheir military period, they kept their within a certain cell -- certain self. during the active period, that is the settlement -- actually. the retirement, discharges and resin nation -- and resignation. there are people who were discharged from the military. this is interesting. is to say --ension
the capacity of the administration. the turkish forces, that is just before the 1980's. survivaliltration and between 1980 and the year 2000. the mass infiltration begins in the 1980's. with these generals, who got involved in the military ofp were mostly at the rate brigadier general. that means they got in the military schools in the mid-1980's. , he isrson i mentioned one of them, as well. see that is right after the
and 2000, between 2000 2008. of people were discharged from the military service. because of their potential opposition for the federal members. between 2004 and 2008 , more than 500 special forces that went to regular army units. that is a big number, comparing the whole body of the turkish special forces it -- forces. activities of federal members.
[indiscernible] they saw such cases as an instrument for urging those people. was not the strategy, militaryreemptive action. the federal members were not able to reach their operational capacity to carry a full-scale coup d'etat in turkey. was a mirror of the strategy. that is why i'm calling it preemptive. the final thing i would like to put some notes on come how this affected the turkish combat readiness. military the turkish
know-how. the charge of the -- discharge of the federal members from the military eased their fight against terrorism. since july, there are almost 2000 members got killed. an incredible number. of course, there are some casualties. these operations are important. now notembers are organized in big numbers. them to act in the mountains. there out there.
[indiscernible] the turkish military and operations, the secret forces, got elections of from secured there is a -- election supremacy. there is a missing part, the fight against erdogan. be carriedy should together with the civil institutions. they give good -- thank you very much. >> our last speaker. >> thank you very much. i will try to keep it short. with the continue former military coups in turkey. first thing i would say is about the groups that were organized.
you look at this former military coups, you say they are not organized. that the the people beard -- the people. [indiscernible] they had a motivation. most of the time, to protect the state from the people. most of the time, they were civilians, politicians, from those politicians they thought the -- ofcting for the state. and they had their ideology. for example, the idea that half the state [indiscernible]
should be done. for example, for some attacks, they were claiming that their protective state is rising. for some time, they were claiming that they were protecting the state against radical leftists or against terror, or they were blaming politicians. is -- these did not, they had some roots in society. some people in turkey support those coup attempts because they had a certain connection with each one of those ideologies. patterns look at the of former military coups, you
can see the military was successful in taking control of the country. ther taking control of country, they fix what they felt was not working properly, and then they claim they restore to --and then they return military to his in turkey are not allowed to be used. said, those former military to his were against politicians, rather than against ordinary people in the streets. the leftyou look at coup attempt -- the last coup
attempt, what to see if it are an ideal inis not that sense. you have a criminal group, what you call now a terrorist group, but they do not have a certain ideology. for example, we cannot say they are leftist or that they are nationalists or say that they are islamist. in that sense, they do not have a certain ideology. was a will to power, it is our -- a desire for power. the july 16 coup attempt was ordinary people, not only in the sense that they killed more people, but also in thesense that they rejected right to exist without being a
member. they are an imaginary society. every, single individual should be a number. should share the idea of their group. they do not have space for different groups. so for example, for islamist or nationalist. how can i say this? it's is to attempt was successful, turkey would not be a better place for any of these groups. it would not be a better place, for a nationalist. it would only be a better place for their members. members, theheir
members of this community, this criminal community, the terror organization, it was successful, turkey will not be a better place for those people. continue? >> yes, four more minutes. that it istand something difficult to understand for an outsider. we talk about the secret organization, the speaker said they infiltrated for four years. -- 40 years. [indiscernible] if i lastly answer this question, i can say that it is radical policies in turkey.
they agree to the structure for these members. religious identity is a very dominant pattern in turkey over the last few years. stents -- #'s,rp a critical stance against religious identity. claim themselves to thate a religious group turkish society support, and they take this up of ordinary people. the number one advantage in taking the state and taking support of ordinary people. let me stop you, i will continue
later. >> thank you to all of the panelists for all of the presentation. considering the number of participants today, i decided to open the floor for questions and have several questions. using my a few more privilege as moderator. can we move the microphone? >> thank you very much for a very good and informative panel. i have a couple of quick questions for the professor. you helped us understand basically the different narratives about who was involved, but it doesn't exactly address the issue of why was there an attempt by all of these
potential forces that sort of individually or for thisely to push kind of change via a military coup? why 2016? the second question is, there is no escaping the fact that the movement was not -- [indiscernible] in 2014. it does not help us understand the kind of influence they had in turkish society, and also the alliances they had until then. this is a question that needs to be answered. they were engaged in criminal
activities, but we need to understand the politics between them. and of course, the parting of ways. >> thank you. >> we can take another question. >> thank you very much. it was very informative. there were many occasions when one of the panelists used a term. i wonder when was it first used and who invented it? >> thank you. >> well, i think, i would consider the movement as an islamic movement because there is no one is long -- no one
islam. there is a variety. the reason our party aligned of the sharede identity of islam. the role of ignore actors,idging these two to understand the relationship. issues --e of the there is no one islam. different -- there are many different islams. just like christianity, i am coming from utah, even the mormon church has 20 different versions.
in this context, there are thousands of different interpretations. this movement was shipped by , andin traditions of islam they each need to be examined. what happened in 1970, the issue started in 2011. after 2010, the gulans were mobilized and delicate wanted in terms of the hegemony. they became a dominant force in the judiciary. they come to the conclusion that now we control turkey so that we can get oregon -- we can get erd
ogan to do it we want. i think that was the beginning of the struggle. the president realized there were trying to [indiscernible] some of his policies toward the kurds for the democratic station of the country. and there was a struggle. let me take a something. the movement, they really did not want to control any political party. yes, they started the [indiscernible] control did not want to any party. they wanted to control the state institutions and bureaucracy. they succeeded in doing that because of the rich political
party structure in turkey, especially after the death of the leader, there was instability. it was an opportunity for them. in 2012, they wanted to pressure the government through the court case against hunt down -- against the current leader of intelligence. they wanted to close the schools. [indiscernible] it was the main source of income for them. was a corruption probe, there were charges. they try to put the government in 2013.icult --
i think the confrontation took a different form after 2013. why 2017? council. a high usually it meets once a year to decide a promotion. it became clear in the june newspapers, they started cover the story about them, the military high council is going to plan these programs from the army. already moved from the force. they were about to be cleansed from the military. toy used their last bullet stop the process of cleansing of programs from the military.
>> you want to add anything? >> there was a question. i think i would like to get the -- it wast it would used before, but i can't remember who use the word the first time. especially after the coup attempt, it was used to a couple of things to add -- was used. i have a couple of things to add. i begged to differ on the argument this was an islamic moment. yes, they're different wasted practice the religion. there were different ways to practice the religion. to the end, you can use any means. think -- from doing things that are legal in the islamic
framework to doing things that are not legal in the technical, political term. anything could go. when does the first struggle maybe start in addition to what the professor said, when you start to do illegal activities. that was when the first struggle started. in order to have power, they did not care about who was in power as long as they had faith. it now, there was a more democratized turkey, there was a government in power that was not going to do anything it were asked to do. they were there to represent the people and do what they asked them to do. that is when the clashes started. actually, i was part of the reason that the coup attempt did what it did -- when did, because
we passed a law in parliament. the higher council would be meeting earlier than was expected. it related with the schedule, as well. >> thank you. i will have another question, then we have to finish up. thank you very much. a very interesting discussion. democracy, thet democratic institutions. in this country, for example, we have a president who has directly attacked the media, calling it the meat -- the any of the people. in turkey, you had the arrest of journalists, europe had colleagues of the president taking over the media.
editors of newspapers and so on. can you tell me what seems to be the current situation. what is happened to democracy and freedom of speech post-coup? now you have what seems to be accusations of illegal arevities that journalists doing. could you come in on that a little bit -- comment on that a little bit? yes. inre is a different question the united states and a different one in turkey. i will just give you a little bit. i'm not a philosopher. but there are limits to freedom. it would not be acceptable anywhere in the world to promote -- if you are a journalist, if
you are a politician, if you are who yout, no matter are, nobody could say something isis. support with that be considered part of freedom of speech? no. cases ofo follow the the journalists closely. whatever information is available to the public. they are not about the law -- above the law. this is noted, related with journalistic activities, but terrorist activities. and of course, there is this perspective, as well. production of knowledge is something interesting. what is terrorism? turkey, for instance, is dealing with terrorism.
we gave a huge exam, losing 260 and 494 people got wounded. deal with pk terrorism. we recognize -- this is a recognized terrorist organization by the u.k. and u.s. turkish politicians are not allowed to speak to the turkish citizens like germany and the netherlands. and we are dealing with isis terrorism on many levels. what is the definition of terrorist according to me now? i think anybody in the world would agree that isis is a terrorist organization. but when it comes to the issue of pkk, we live with them in turkey, they kill turkish
citizens, most of them are of turkish descent, and have grown up with pkk being a horrible terrorist organization. and still they get support internationally, political or otherwise. i think there is a very big discussion, but as far as journalists are concerned, they are not there for writing articles against the government or other activities. it is the court to decide. i keep hearing that the president arrests people. we are all intelligent people. president trump, no matter what he says, does he have the authority to go physically arrest people? believe me, we do have the rule of law in turkey. that is why we still have the court case is going on. have perfectat
evidence, and it is obvious they have killed innocent people on the streets, they are being tried in turkish courts with the families of the victims watching. so, i just wanted to ensure that the rule of law is intact. so many questions, but apologies, i have to be realistic on time. i will give half a minute for panelist to -- each give final remarks and we have to start the keynote immediately after. threere thing, panelists came from turkey, and one came from utah. it will be here all day long. if you have questions, they will probably accommodate and enjoy entertaining your questions. thehat i can tell about
prosecution of the attempt regarding the transformation of society and the security circles . and -- the turkish military turkish society now claims the democratic values more than it used to be. the most important part of the federal attempt. yes, there will be reconstruction of the security architecture in turkey, that will take some time. people, what the soldiers of the military and security circles are expecting, that should be run on a merit
system. >> thank you. >> i did want to say something about concerns about the democracy or freedom of each in turkey. it is good to see we have some friends that have concerns about democracy in turkey. but this image in the u.s. media , i can deftly say is not true. just one example. a few days ago, the leader of a march two is temple. he walked with hundreds of people, his last talk in his hundreds of people. his last talk, he organized thousands of students as they claim it. the police forces assisted them all the way, protected them
against provocations or terrorist attack. so yes, you may have some concerns about the democracy in turkey, that is good that we have friends that have concerns, but the image is not true. thank you. >> [indiscernible] -- i do need to make a point about professional knowledge. -- production of knowledge. we see a lot of production of knowledge. theresents turkey and president as the evil enemy. i find that very disappointing that, especially going back to the example of europe, do you know that our family and social affairs minister was not allowed to speak in the netherlands and she was not allowed to go into
the turkish embassy, as a omen minister, she was physically, mrs. against diplomatic etiquette and international law, she was physically removed and taken into custody, held until the morning until she was sent back to turkey. what happened to women's rights? minister turkish deserve? this was after international women's day. so let's check our sources. >> thank you. >> i think unfortunately, we have a problem with freedom of speech in turkey. unfortunately, the media is also limited in the country, but we have to understand why this is the case. i don't think anything would justify limiting freedom of speech. thinkk the media -- i
good media can challenge that media -- bad media. unfortunately we have a big problem with freedom of speech there. turkey does not deserve the image outside, as well. i am hoping that this is not going to be permanent, it will be temporary. but there is also a larger problem. that is the dehumanization of turkey and especially the president. think some of the people cannot analyze turkey properly because of this demonized ideological attitude. and behind this anti-turkey mood, i see it in the liberal is what i would say , orientalist, islamophobia
slant that takes a role. but we also need to question our self. yes, we have a major freedom of speech issue in the country. this is, i am again hoping, it will not be permanent. i think turkey has a major crisis right now. turkey did have a crisis in the past, as well. turkey usually muddles true. i'm hoping we will overcome with the support of the domestic forces in the country and some external support from outside, as well. >> think you very much. take you to the catalyst -- panaelists. [applause] >> we will take a five-minute break before setting the stage for the keynote.