tv U.S.- Transatlantic Relations CSPAN September 16, 2017 1:51am-4:26am EDT
only on c-span 3. deny thatis going to dr. melvin gave all these trips on his private jet or that the campaign contributions were made . no one is really going to deny that menendez did lobby with various executive branch officials. but why he did it, white happened. the government is alleging that, because of this corrupt relationship they had, menendez was acting in exchange for gifts. q&a, randallht on allies send talks about the ongoing trial of senator bob politicalnd other corruption cases sunday night at 8:00 eastern on c-span's q&a. the brookings institution
held a discussion on the state of u.s.-transatlantic relations and had different european countries are addressing issues, including russian aggression, trade, and immigration. this is an hour and a half. >> good morning, everybody. thank you for joining us here. my name is rick jones, vice-president and director of the program here a the brookings. it's my pleasure to welcome you for today's event hosted by the brookings center. this event is part of expanding with our partnership with the brookings transatlantic initiative. this is a multi-year platform that will spur a range of new activities not only on global issues, but that the transatlantic partners can get together.
we're grateful they recognize that the value that brookings brings to this is our in depth high quality and independent research. we're pleased to be able to announce a fellow that will be joining us and add capacity to our team in answering questions in the relationship and as you see in today's discussions those are substantial. challenges faced in europe are numerous from an upsurge in nationalism and populism to turmoil following the brexit decision and concerns after the financial crisis and great exit crisis, slow growth, high unemployment. russia efforts to destabilize eastern europe and the ongoing refugee crisis. of course, the united states has a variety of its own issues to be working through which adds to the complexity of the challenge. we're approaching a pivotal european election in germany.
and these issues are shaping up not only to be central to those politics, but to the broader european debate as a whole and would i say in both cases, both in the united states and europe, these debates are con straining in the way we're working in the world and tackling global issues. so i think the discussion today is extraordinarily timely and underscored the need for this expanded efforts on the transatlantic relationship and on the work we can do together. we are going to be building on that effort here at brookings. as you know, our team has had changes. fiona hill, director for center for europe and the united states, joined the white house for senator -- senior development. i'm pleased they found new leadership in tom wright and he has a book in which the transatlantic relationship is located. and we have a couple of other folks joining our team, which is
terrific. victoria newland, who until recently was assistant secretary of state for europe, will be joining the team. so will our current president, he sits down later in the fall and jamie and nicole have joined the team and our french visiting fellow who joins the team now. so as you can see, we're adding considerable intellectual and power to power power-- now i am i'll turn it over to my friend and partner who will say a few remarks and we'll get under way with the meat of the day. christian. [applause]
>> thank you, bruce. our distinguished panelists, ladies and gentlemen, a very warm welcome from my side and a big thank you to our colleagues at brookings for hosting us here today in d.c. my name is christian. i'm at -- it is a pleasure to see so many guests and members and familiar faces at the transatlantic community for our initial tich or in short the bbti. when asked about the state of transatlantic partnership, recently told press there has quote, unquote never been so much uncertainty in the history of the german-american relationship as there is at the moment.
whether or not you agree with the statement i think it's beyond doubt we're facing one of the most difficult periods for transatlantic relationships in decades. this is among many reasons why the brookings institute have expanded our cooperation and under the roof of the bbti and it's two pillars, high quality research and programming, brookings scholars are scaling up research and analysis on the most pressing transatlantic issues and challenges of our time. over the course of the next year, our two institutions will host a series of events on both sides of the atlantic, to build and expand a resilient transatlantic work, contribute between the united states and europe and to reinvigorate the transatlantic cooperation on global issues and social cohesion. which is an issue, a challenge, not only in europe, but also in
the u.s., i guess. the topic of today's panel, the future of europe as bruce has said could not be more timely. the challenges that the eu currently faces are enormous and as current german foreign minister recently put it, have brought the historic project of the eu to the brink of collapse. in the economics sphere, lingering concerns about the future of the euro zone and pro growth and persistently high unemployment rates and many eu countries continue to put pressure on politicians and the european project. and the foreign policy externals like increasing authoritarian governments of turkey and russia and trans national terrorism, on this day, another sad note with the events unfolding in the city of london. all of these challenges test the european union.
one of europe's biggest concerns is the large flow of refugees and migrants from africa and the middle east. since 2011 civil war sent the implosion of the europe's neighborhoods, with a massive refugee crisis with several million people headed to the european union. one dimensional populous politics, of fear as well as tendency of national isolation slovakia, looked at the fair distribution of refugees among the eu countries and ultimate contributed to brexit and other parties some of which harbor strong anti-eu and xenophobic sentiments. in germany current polls show the right wing alternative for germany to possibly rank third in the upcoming federal election later this month.
but, i mean, giving the somewhat uncertainty of polls these days, fifth or sixth place would be possible as well. -- fifth or sixth place would be possible as well. this continues to challenge of the project from within. even the relevance of the relationship is being contested. it is only consequential that the bbt i's focused topic must nationalism and xenophobia in european politics with the comparative perspective on similar developments in the u.s. in order to assess the character and dynamics behind them and the constraints they place on transatlantic relations. notll not cool -- i will come to an end without some hope
and optimism. we might not have a sense of humor, but we can be very optimistic. ins year's elections austria, france, and the netherlands proved that many citizens don't believe in the european project as a promise for a better peaceful future, and therefore i am looking forward to the german elections now, because even candidate might come in third place and finally have to face the democratic parties on the established platforms of the democratic system, which i think will be something to look forward to, we still have the that the germany choice is between two real europeans and two democrats who run for chancellor.
i look forward to today's insight from the panel discussion as well as the following keynote conversation. do, i thankher a you very much for your attention and look forward to an engaging, thought-provoking day. thank you. [applause] thank you, christian and to bruce. we are excited to be working together over the next few years. my name is tom wright. i'm delighted to tear a terrific panel on the future of europe and looking at the transatlantic relationship and looking forward to the conversation after this. we have a terrific lineup. i will briefly introduce everyone. biographies,ong
which i will not get into. the newased to welcome visiting fellow in the center for the u.s. and europe and with the planning staff in france. we are excited to have her for this program, the first of many in the next few years. william drozdiak has a new book out this week. yet, but iead it encourage everybody to do so. it is a terrific look at the state of the eu and where it might be headed, his thoughts on
that in a few minutes. kemal kirisci is the director of the turkey project at brookings. without further or do, let's , because you have a new imported book out this week. you took many years talking to the senior leaders in europe, many officials about this thatkable set of crisis affected the eu over the last five years. there were many people who said, in washington, -- how do you think about it today in terms of the optimism and pessimism?
rebound thisa year, that it might be about to turn the corner? >> i think there is a slight mood of optimism premeeting to an today thanks economic recovery that has been taking place over the last few months. i think the landscape is more fragmented than ever. the income gap between north and south is worse than ever. exacerbated by the economic crisis over the past 10 years, and there is a split between , as we have seen the worsening relations between with polandermany asking for more reparations, which is a very raw, emotional subject. also, the battles that poland and hungary has been having with brussels.
they seem to be turning their on democratic values in terms of cracking down on free press and the judiciary. there is going to be a continuing struggle to sort this out, even after the german election. there is a presumption that chancellor merkel will get a fourth term. crises,ed to the recent the refugee flows have been stopped from turkey into greece, but they have continued from andh africa into italy spain, which is creating a lot of xenophobia and tension. to get russia to play a more cooperative role is still continuing. there is a new resurgence and belligerent russia this week. conducting wargames in and around belarus, which has
troubled a lot of people at nato. four users ago, it was a prelude to their military involvement in eastern ukraine. is ad that, there difficult negotiations with britain on the exit from the european union. there have been some -- there has been some buyers remorse in britain, but i don't think it has reached a level where it reach awhere they will new referendum and possibly stop the removal. chose, which has the fastest growing economy in europe of the past 10 years, the wave of populism is not really the populist
movement still remains entrenched power. the classic divisions between right and left are being replaced in europe between populist nationalists and globalists. just as the weight is in the u.s. this is the big challenge over the coming years for the west. west isthe fate of the at stake, and it is going to take great political courage to get this resolved. >> thank you. some people say that germany has an incredibly boring election. very little excitement, which i think everyone in the britain -- in britain and the u.s. would trade for in a heartbeat. there is a question about what
chancellor merkel, presumed she is to be reelected, will do in the next four years, particularly with france. could you talk to us about how you see germany's role and the wider context in europe? >> thank you very much. i am glad to see everybody here. i take that as a complement to europe any transatlantic relationship. i think you can say it is a boring on the surface, but germans are always a little bit nervous about their own country. i am feeling nervous. the asd --ct that afd is now an explicitly anti-immigrant and in some ways has-semitic party and
refused all called -- all calls to distance itself from the more openly right-wing extremist movements, the fact that it is even about to enter with dozens of members is, frankly, deeply disturbing to me, although christian, i agree with you that having them exposed to the glare of public certainly, having them working with others is probably going to reveal a lot of their weaknesses. in the course of the last food years, they have made it into 11 out of 16 state legislators. case, their is the performance as legislators has been abysmal. some of their most egregious figures are also members of the european parliament, like other
movements. they are collecting hefty salaries, made raucous statements, and contributed very little or nothing at all to the business of governance. think the world is coming to an end because of that, but it will change the nature of german politics. goingnow, they have been from single digits where they have been in the polls throughout the summer, and in fact german polls could have been said to be rocksolid until recently. now, the spd is plummeting to 20. i have friends taking bets they could go down as far down as 18. fd has been moving up to 12% or so.
half of the voters are not decided yet. there is earned for surprises. surprises. room for because we have a multiparty system, it is highly unlikely the next chancellor is not going to be -- angela merkel. that is of intense concern to her own party and everybody who wants to be her successor and two germans, but it what everybody is would like to know is, what is germany going to do on the front of european and transatlantic politics? waiting a huge it into -- there is a huge agenda -- there is a huge agenda waiting period the job of restarting the european project in the transatlantic alliance, sutent -- to some degree starts next.
merkel wouldly stay? have term doesn't limits in its constitution, but it would be the only other chancellor who has never tried for a fifth term. then, he said the position of the german president had been clearly underrated and had more power and he was going to run for that. since he was already into his 80's at that time, i think his party told him that was not going to happen. merkel isat susceptible to the kind of delusions that he was subject to. i think she is not going to do that. there has been speculation about her jumping off to some other position. i don't think she would do that. would serve to the end of my something happened to stop her. then, she would step down. to know about
angela merkel that differentiates her from other career politicians in the world is that she is not meeting. -- is not needy. i don't think she needs the spotlight to exist. i don't think there is a switch in her that this switched -- that gets switched by the spotlight of public attention. she genuinely thinks she has a job to do. we will be looking at this affection -- the secession debate. happens to the centerleft --?he social democrats successful triangulation that angela merkel , it is kind of a third wave -- it is kind of a third wave, and will be elements that
want to do that prevail, or will be conservative elements that want to occupy the place that is ,ow being occupied by the afd will they try and regain that? >> one thing we might come back to is the fate of the spd is the fate of other european centerleft parties. kemal, turkey's relations and germany have not been in great shape of the last year. broader than that, there is the big question about turkey's -- 10 years ago, people were talking about pathways to e.u. membership. what is your perspective on this debate and how does turkey fit
hanging in the balance, which way it will go? >> not a day goes by without some excitement from turkey. relations-turkish have been -- for some time. i would like to draw some parallels. if we were to go back 20, 22 years into the mid-1990's, there was a similar situation then, too. countries wereen terrible. germany was reluctant to do arms purchases because the humans rights record of turkey with terrible. -- was terrible. there was a member of the referring toe time
ladies. of the distance between then and now is that, at the time, there was a chance of community and including the united states. that had a big agenda for turkey. into the it transatlantic community through the european union, this is the time of the customs union was adopted. this is a time when the clinton administration turned over the leader of the pkk. clearly, some bargaining behind closed doors. to introduceurkey some reforms, and eventually led and thecome a candidate negotiations started. , one, theence now
commitment to anchoring turkey has been weakened. what was shocking for me from between marshals an article angela merkel is that social democrats should be turkey. poor relations with one person while half of the country has against those .mendments and referendums that is one important difference, the lack of commitment. the second one is that turkey of the time has still a western vocation. very critical using bigger
language towards the eu, the west, but at the same time, this was a turkey that was part and parcel of the project of moving along into the western world. this is where the difference lives right now. -- ledis led by leader by a leader and it is difficult to talk about who was around him. party thatnymore the he had founded. then, it of what was is not there anymore. it is a very strange political ,arty that has, in some ways to thethe founders extent of removing them from and the list of
founders. this is significant. at the same time, there is also therkey that is resisting drift away from the west. in turkey, we use the analogy of the train that is moving towards the west. the people inside it are rushing toward the east. that depiction is a good institutionally. turkey is solidly inside the west. economy, especially in the last couple years, its trade with the eu has been expanding. the only area to which its exports are growing is the eu and the united states, not russia. direct investments are still
coming into turkey, overwhelmingly from the west, and turkish fti is going in the other direction. there is a recognition of it in the cabinet as well. wherever there is a flareup, pointingnet leaders out the importance of the vocation towards the european union and its relations with the west. right now, the picture is one where turkey is dropping away its leader is and burning with anti-western is him. nism.th anti-wester rep, -- edges in the
from the edges of europe, there is a serious challenge there. it would be great if the west, eu, and the united states were able to pull up his stock and bring back that agenda of the 1990's. i think there would be people prepared to play that role. at the beginning of the year, i was a petrified by marine le pen becoming president of france. a lot of people were putting on ofes of a candidate in terms turning things around. you have just come from serving in the french government. how does it look from france? what are people's expectations in emmanuel macron? when you look at the relationship between him and chancellor merkel, after the
german election, assuming she is reelected, how realistic is a bargain between the two that helps them achieve his objectives? >> i am delighted to be here for this the first event. you mentioned the campaign, and it was a very exciting campaign. quite different from the german campaign. >> a happy ending. forappy ending, depending him, because the two main parties were utterly destroyed, especially the socialist party from which emmanuel macron was coming from. what happened is that macron rent -- ran a campaign on a pro-european-based, and many people pointed out that he was waving european flags during meetings. hefamously remember that walked on the european anthem on the night of his victory.
he did something that french politicians hadn't done for acades, which is running pro-european campaign. a sort of european pride, if you want. beforehand, for years, french politicians and many other politicians were just happy to explain the difficulties in europe were coming from brussels . toanuel macron decided not -- to do that. win in thempressive following weeks where he got a huge majority in the parliamentary election and once again crashed the other parties, he had a rough summer, and he is now facing difficulties at home. inis down 22 points appreciation polls and is now down to a 40% of favorability
rating in france. that is quite low. it is not terrible. it could be lower. facing because he is now the tough challenges. he wants to reform the labor laws. he is getting into the very difficulty of governing from the center and making everybody unhappy. he is not on the left, not on the right. have a general opposition to his policies. what is interesting is that, at the same time he is doing that, he is running a very ambitious europe, on the front of on relaunching europe. on thes a macron moment european stage. mostly because there is nobody else to put forward a european ,arrative, a vision for europe
mostly because the germans are busy with their run election, because the brakes are busy with brexit -- because the brits are busy with brexit. trump is not bringing forward a global narrative. so, he can be the one really putting out new ideas, and he just did several times. athens, he talked about european sovereignty. this concept is interesting. european sovereignty, he is nationalism and national sovereignty, and he basically, once again, confronting populists and nationalists and putting everything at the european level. this concept of european sovereignty comes with some a europe that should be proud of itself, a europe that protects its models
and citizens, and he has specific ideas on that. -- fourple, he is elections. you will have seats opening and he wants to do across europe a list of parliamentarians. he is also talking about europe of cultural heritage. he is providing answers on the identity front. he has been forward ideas on the eurozone, eurozone budget, eurozone finance minister. also, new ideas out there, and now it is the turn of others to say what they think of it. workinge a close relationship with angela merkel, who has seemed to be warming up a little bit on these ideas. she knows that because of the fractured europe, she needed to do more, especially on the
eurozone topic. ownker just launched his vision. about convergence on the monetary and economic front. has theat the moment, possibility of being heard on this topic. let's see if that works out. >> one of the interesting things ,bout what macron is proposing what people expect chancellor merkel to do, is to try to deepen european migration in certain areas. europe is not united on that. many people pointed the u.k. as the country that was objecting to that. they are not the only once. we see in central and eastern europe this different narrative of europe where they want to see
less integration, but at the toy least they don't want deepen integration on immigration and border control is another issue. recentesident trump's visit, it highlighted the distinction between the polish and the more western european vision. let's come back to you. how significant is the divide that is emerging between central and eastern europe and western europe? does it have implications for where europe is headed? should we be worried about the future of democratic institutions in parts of the eu? >> i think that is right. after the german election, we are likely to see an effort by chancellor merkel and president macron to relaunch the effort toward greater integration in europe.
that would involve some difficult decisions about how to complete the banking union, strengthening the eurozone. you were going to see the 19 members of the eurozone attempting to move faster, and those that are left out, the other remaining eight countries after britain, will feel they are being left behind. this idea of a multi-city europe has been kicking around for quite some time, but i think after this becomes more evident, you are going to see a resistance from central and eastern european countries who feel that they will be demoted to second class, their class citizens. is going to lead to paralysis of the european process, because so many decisions have to be taken on the basis.
if they try to come up with the new treaty, this would be stalled for years and years. there is a recognition that this is going to be a very difficult nut to crack in terms of how central and eastern european countries get on board in terms of the european project. say they of europeans want the european union, to remain members of the european union, only 34% of them think europe is going in the right direction. this is across the board in eastern and western europe. challenges lot of facing the leadership. i think this is where chancellor merkel recognizing that recognizes that the next phase of powers going to be her most difficult. >> i take all of these divisions
seriously. i think berlin should take them seriously. at the same time, i would say there is also some enthusiasm and on it -- in unexpected places for further integration. all three countries are quite gung ho for deeper integration. they became members of the eurozone at a time when that was, shall we say, and unfashionable thing to do. painfult through austerity measures to do so. that had a larger political rightlynd, and they saw europe as a political project of signing up. the other country that is more enthusiastic than you could possibly know because they never turn up at international conferences is the spanish. spanishyou see a diplomat to washington, they
talk the integration game more than the french, in my experience. >> even though their own country made this integrate with -- >> let's wait and see, i would say. it is possible. it's not impossible that would happen, i think, but at the same time, i think the spanish have and-- have really benefited they know that. you don't really have a significant populist movement, interestingly. i think the independence movement is seen in the west of with a lot of distance. i am also not quite sure if they
would get a lot of joy out of it. i say this, because the spanish federalism provides for more autonomy for spanish provinces than most other federalist forms of government in europe. we will see. october 1 is the date of the referendum. the other thing that a lot of , that there are other problems that can be solved otherwise. whether you do that by kicking the can up to the european level or you do that on and intervention -- intergovernmental level, i don't think it's the issue it once was. i think most people are willing to tackle it pragmatically. introduced what she called the intergovernmental union method, which was code for, let's make government more intergovernmental 10 years ago in a famous speech in bruges.
i wish the french project well. i think there are a lot of good ideas there. i think the germans may apply a break on some of them. i am hoping we find a reasonable compromise. at the end of the day, my guess is there will be more integration. one of the predictions people have had about europe is there would be more exit movements. it hasn't come to pass. i don't see that happening right now. that is the trump affect us all. >> we will come to him in a little bit. did you want to come in on this? on what was reflect said. throwaning academics and european integration people, we assumed this was a linear process. to the point of even turkey becominga member of -- a member of the european union.
this assumption collapsed with the financial crisis. i am not sure we still have a good grasp of why it collapsed and what the implications and consequences are out there. the reason why i wanted to come in is, the way in which bill described how this europe can be eternally destructive on itself, the dynamics in turkey, today i wanted to explain how we came this far. there are many factors, but one inthe critical factors, 2006, the european council decided to suspend negotiations on a set of chapters. i won't go into the details of you can seediately how politicians begin to play on it.
also, public opinions dropping their shoulders and beginning to look for alternatives. it is a point i think needs to be addressed and taken up precisely at the time when alternative products are put forward, including in the upcoming elections in germany, and resolving that i think is not going to be an easy exercise and to me be on the shoulders of a younger generation to think about and come up with the kinds of ideas that the founding fathers of the european union had come up with just after the second world war. in terms of how president pushing the deep integration mind, how does he think about the polls? he must be aware of this
division between eastern and western europe. is he worried about the new europe, old europe divide and how the big differences there, or does he basically believe that the eurozone can push on ahead, regardless of what others think? >> different have always been of a attached to the idea core of europe that would move forward, may be quicker than others. there were never really into -- and the first place. it was the confrontation between the deep meaning of europe or the enlargement of your with two different groups. what macron exactly things of poland, but what i can
see is that, he seems to want to replicate his method for confronting french populists on the national stage and replicated on the european states. that, what he did during his campaign was confronted marine le pen and the national front, and by pushing against her by accepting the debate with her in the second round, which has never happened before, and by demonstrating that he was mistaken by going point by point by showing her incompetence, and by also putting forward a ,ositive pro-european message once again, of european pride that nobody had done before. it seems to have worked. he wants to replicate that. he seems to be doing that at the moment on the european stage. it is fantastic. it is very impressive. charismatic, but i
think there is a risk of their. it is a risk i called the obama trap. it is believing that because your election was so symbolic, so strong and so powerful, that your words will be meaningful to other people. charisma,by your own you will take people and have them follow you in the direction you want to go. he did this several great speeches on europe, and you can see already there is a risk of wishful thinking, exactly like obama did in 2009, putting forward a very ambitious new plan for europe but then not necessarily having the people on the other side responding to that. >> in some ways trump believed the same thing, the other should follow suit.
i think it follows the parallel that every president comes in having won an election. >> if i may, on the obama thing, the idea of having democratic conventions in the first half of 2018 in france on the future of europe, but he is proposing that other countries do so at the same time. he is saying there should be more transparency over the discussion of the future of europe, that it should not be discussed behind closed doors, et cetera. that's a fantastic ideas but it sounds a lot like the town hall that obama organized around obamacare idea, which actually was a moment where the opposition could go together and strengthened together and you had the emergence of the tea party. there is a risk there that,
macron, by being so ambitious he could solidify in opposition against him. >> i find that democratic conventions to be a little bit weird because i thought that's what parliament was. to have the conventions were people will come and be represented and talk about the issues of the day and policy that's where the parliament. france has one of those. >> a weakling. >> we want to pivot to brexit. >> i just wanted to point out, i think the most frightening similarity to trump selection and the rise of the populace nationalists are these angry disenchanted voters who feel they been left behind by globalization, and that in europe, particularly among young people, it's striking that 40% of young people under 25 had voted for marine le pen. there is a lot of worry that if
president macron's policy doesn't succeed, who will be next. you mentioned earlier the central left, the social democrats have been swept away not just in france but their message has been diminished in many other countries as a result of their success. everybody accepts universal healthcare, the role of the state and in a way angela merkel has stolen a lot of ideas of the social democrats for her own such as gay marriage. >> triangulation. >> that's right. i think the mainstream ruling parties seem to be in a state of political bankruptcy. nobody seems to have a compelling message to move forward, and this opens up the space for populace on both the
-- four populists on both the far right in the far left. >> i know you want to comment on this, but also answer this, just pivoting to brexit because i was going to come to you next about that. obviously, british politics is on a very unexpected state following the election. the negotiations seem to be running into trouble and most people believe, ultimately, this could be a deal between the leaders. there hasn't been much space to do this before the german election. the question is how bad is this going to get after september when people really get down to talking about the details, in germany from chancellor merkel, what's the probability of a reasonable outcome and are we likely to see 2018 being dominated
by negotiations and a real possibility with no deal? >> okay, brexit. i don't know how many of you have seen the recent editorial, the british tabloid, "the sun" had a great idea of publishing a pro brexit editorial in what they thought was german. [laughter] german commentators have said this is worse than google translate. it describes juncker as a cognac -soaked something or other and the chiefarney, negotiator as a puffed up dandy. it's actually extremely funny. the germans have a sense of
humor. >> in this case, it's a pun. the thing is that, apart from these farcical the, brexit isn't funny. -- apart from these farcical elements, brexit isn't funny. i think it's a tragedy for europe. i expected to be a tragedy for britain and specifically those people who voted for because they thought their lives were going to become better and i think the fiscal data we are seeing from britain paints a very different picture. honestly, i deeply regret that. in my ideal world, brexit would have never happened, but i don't think there is an exit from brexit.
i don't see that happening despite the fact that some people seem to be hoping that. i think there would be a public revolt if anyone tries that in britain, so we are going to see on the european side an attempt to get this done as cleanly as possible. i am not sure we have yet seen the outlines of a persuasive deal from britain. if you want to divorce, just go ahead and do it, we have a household to run in a family to -- and a family to raise, but the one ray of light that i have seen last week, which i thought was quite interesting, was this new british proposal on contributing more than 5 million pounds to the european defense fund, which has just been created as part of the defense integration. that i think is really good news.
the ideas around that is good news, because they can become the basis for british eu defense and security corporations in ways that are both pragmatic and effective. i think we have more of that on other topics we would be a lot better off. it behooves all of us to say, great idea, how can we work on this? also to say, how can we extend this attitude of pragmatism and trying to solve problems together while we are pursuing this negotiation which we understand is final and is going to happen. that would be my take on this. the larger point i wanted to make is that i think what were what we are -- what we are looking at in europe, after this last election is over, is a series of structural changes in european politics which has been touched on with reference to democratic conventions. i think we are seeing the demise of the party system as we know it and possibly the demise of democratic republican structures.
both of those are dangerous. they are the result of elected politicians will go along the around the structures of democracy and use social media and other forms of appeal to the electorate without going through what the institution provided for. i think in doing so, i understand the temptation that social media provides and certainly the possible example of how to use it successfully, but therein lies a huge danger to our constitutional orders in europe and thereby to the stability of democracy and the stability of the european project, and so that is
something worth discussing in greater depth. >> let's comment on this. we're going to go to the audience in about 10 minutes. i also want to touch briefly on vladimir putin, trump and iran. on brexit. >> a quick follow-up on brexit, as a point out, there was a remarkable meeting three weeks before the referendum when angela merkel met with david cameron. is there some kind of package of concessions or attractive ideas that would perhaps sway the vote in favor of remaining and she said there can be no jury -- there can be no cherry picking and we can't do this.
by the way, why did you schedule the referendum thursday in the week of the final exams for university students, and on the eve of the biggest pop music festival at glastonbury, which meant young people were either going to go out partying or they were studying for their exams. sure enough, the turnout of young people who had the most at stake in this referendum was down around 30%, and that's what cost the votes. i think this is a succession of tactical blunders, and the tragedy is that the people who will pay the most are young people who avoid this. whether there is a small chance that this can be reversed, perhaps a second referendum, and on the question of whether they have leverage, given the fact that they are the strongest military power, i think they need to be very careful in how they play that card because that
could be something that could generate. from the european partner. >> so we haven't mentioned yet putin, which is quite interesting since they are masters of social media and russia has played a very active role in the politics of europe and the u.s., sort of looking ahead over the four or five year period, is there a possibility of sort of leveling off european russia relations, or are we likely to see a continuation of tension and sort of a cold war of sorts between the two? what does the geopolitical picture look like? what is vladimir putin role and how does turkey play into that? >> we just mentioned there event
that we are going to have between turkey and russia. >> papers had come out. >> >> the way i look at it is that theoretically you would think that turkey would be deeply uncomfortable with the policies that vladimir putin has been following in its neighborhood, including the annexation of crimea and what's going on in syria. the reason for it is that turkey is a country traditionally deeply at attached to integrity -- to territorial integrity, and yet what we see is two leaders are getting closer and closer to
each other and one of them is more enthusiastic than the other as reflected in the purchase deal, it's very difficult to fit into the traditional turkish stagecraft. i think this may be the opportunity to vladimir putin's agility and flexibility that lacks on the western side. he used the coup attempt very successfully. the very issue that played to the heart of the president of turkey at a time when they had just started to build bridges over the fighter plane. while the united states, the obama administration and the eu remained absolutely paralyzed, partly because they were unable to cash in on the way in which the public hit the streets and
defended democracy and attitudes toward erdogan. by remaining paralyzed, the west has allowed them to hijack the whole thing and even refer to the cool as a gift from god, and that's where we are here. this aspect of pollutant putins aspect of frightens me, the way in which he successfully swaying a whole country, if you wish, but it's government and public opinion. there is a turkish university who has been running public opinion poles regularly over the past couple of years and is using it to see how public opinion perceptions from russia is lower than the united states. when the plane was down and sanctions came up, it peaked and it has come down. the united states is hovering at frightening levels.
i think the root of it lies in the mismanagement of the coup attempt, my point in this is that vladimir putin has this ability to cash in on what occurred in their neighborhood and they enjoy that they play along with him and it will remain a challenge to managing it. >> thank you. one more question before we go to the audience. we have about 15 or 20 minutes. i wanted to talk about iran deal because president trump has said he is determined not to certify in october. we'll see if that transpires transpires. not to certify that iran is in compliance. nikki haley made a speech next door on aei a week or two ago about how the u.s. may pull out of the deal. others have been speculating how
that might happen. france has obviously been a leading player on the koran deal. -- on the iran deal. how would europe react and what transatlantic problems might arise if there was a fundamental split over iran nuclear issue? >> on iran deal, the first thing we have to say is we have a double gain here. -- a double game here. it's as much ideological gain around iran, letting go of the iran deal, he wants to do it. he will in a way, try to do it in one way or another. pulled out of the climate change. the court, he will want to find a way to show his electoral base that he has done something on the matter. at the same time, there's another game playing between the
white house and congress where leaders where there is a game of chicken where nikki haley is saying we are going to be on the right side and say that iran is not complying and then push congress to make a decision, whether they continue waiving sanctions or reinstate sanctions. and so, congress is trying to not do that, to not be in a position of being the one for pragmatic and realistic reasons continuing waiving the sanctions or being the one destroying the deal. that's on the american side. it's still very uncertain and i think we will see it play out over the next few weeks. they are always mentioning this sanction and that sanction might not be waived and then it is waived, so it still quite uncertain. the reality is that it's going to be a big bone of contention between the u.s. and france and the u.s. and europe in general. not only because france was at
the table during the negotiations, but also because france and other european countries consider it important deal for middle east and also for regional stability, thinking of the case of syria, he said -- macron has said several times he wants to open the door to discussions, possible discussions with the iranians on the future of syria, and this cannot happen if you have the disruption of the iran nuclear deal. it would put all of that into question. it will be as much as climate change deal is a big bone of contention. >> thank you. >> i just wanted to add, following what they said on
vladimir putin, because i think relations going forward are going to be one of the biggest points of contention in europe. chancellor merkel, last the principal message she was trying to deliver said one of the great diplomatic achievements of postwar germany was to build peaceful relations with all nine of its neighbors. why can't you, russia, realize that building a similar kind of peaceful and prosper but you do seem to be destabilizing your neighbors and you need the west because it's your strategic challenge that's come from the east. islamic radicalism from the
south. she said one of the most frustrating was that she could never get vladimir putin to engage or respond to that question. it basically, as we all know, in using the hostility toward the west as a way of whipping up support for the islam regime. >> let's go to the audience to take questions. keep it short and make sure it's a question. let's go here and then on down. >> i'm peggy yorke, the correspondent for the hispanic outlet. it seems clear that i'm behind brexit and almost all of these difficult these, the migration problem you have not mention that at all, italy is dying right now with all their immigrants, and i don't know, there's some talk about italian exit because of not recognizing the national sovereignties, the
natural right to decide who can come in and who can't. what do you think about that? >> one of the european storylines is that france loved the european community and the eu as long as it can run it, but now it's the junior partner has alluded to germany having the keys, both in terms of influence of authority and money to potentially put the brakes on some of my crowns ideas so how is this german, french partnership going to work. >> good morning. the explanation you have delivered, be it economic inequality or migration are all similarly hitting the country.
the one that seems distinguishing to me is the level of hyper bipartisanship in the media and i wonder if that's in the case of france comparing it to germany or my own country austria which is way more extreme. thank you. >> [laughter] >> you want to come in first. >> so many jokes about austrian germany. all right. on the france german mortar, i think it's up to france and if i've ever seen a french president willing and determined to take up that challenge i think it's the crown. i say goodbye to him but i would
really like this to be a more balanced partnership and i like not all of his ideas but i like a lot of them and i suspect a lot of my fellow germans including german policymakers think the same thing and would love to have an excuse from some of the more rigid policies of the german finance ministry. i actually, i think he can give us cover. the austrian problem is actually a real one. i agree with you. austria has been flirting with russia and had a really close in the last election. i worry about that. it's not to say there isn't an austrian civil society on the other side of all that, there is, but i think that austrian commitment to western-style democracy is looking a little tenuous these days.
it appears to be closer to the thinking. i would like to say a word on vladimir putin. i think we upsets too much about him. i think what we should really be worried about is the fact of the aggression in this internal affairs of western democracy, hours and yours and europe. it is not going to stop until russia becomes a different kind of country. and because it is, that is a very difficult and perhaps impossible proposition that that kind of action by russia is going to remain a challenge for us for the foreseeable future and because we no longer have an iron curtain between russia and us, the impact of these actions
and their direct effect on us is going to be much more tangible. it already is much more tangible and has been for the past ten decades than ever could have been during the cold war which is why i think this metaphor is also very unhelpful. i think that it prevents the single biggest coherence, trust and resilience challenge to the european project and indeed to independent european states that we currently have on the agenda. that's a challenge our generation needs to rise to and it will occupy us for the restaurant working lives. thank you. >> i would like to take up the? migration in italy because i think it relates nicely to some of the themes we were discussing and brought up. moving forward, this is the issue i think is even more important than the banking union union, in the sense that the
european union seems to be trying to divvy up common integration. it's kind of becoming marginally deeper and deeper but it hasn't crossed the threshold and because it hasn't crossed the threshold and there's no central authority that can take asylum-seekers and process the application from the center and then implement the decisions that have been taken up by the central body, countries on the edge of the european union, like greece and spain end up carrying the burden more and more, and it really single eyes as the tension between the desire to expand deeply integration and
domestic politics that are also at the center of this area. i'm afraid they will continue to bear the brunt for a while to come. >> i'd like to point out, europe's neighborhood policy was supposed to be a great leap forward in terms of making europe a more strategic minded entity and one of the focuses was on a developed in north africa, the way to stop immigration was to build up industries and sources of income so that people would be willing to stay home rather than across the mediterranean. when they tried to do this, it was the agricultural lobbies in europe. you have morocco, tunisia, luscious tomatoes that they were willing to export into europe in
january and february, were blocked by the european union because the farm lobby in the netherlands where they grow these tomatoes as hard as baseballs wanted to keep the market for themselves and so this shows you, look, we know all about lobbies in this country. the same thing has gone on in europe. morocco and tunisia became the two biggest sources of recruitment for isis which. a lot of the terrorists that went to the middle east came from there and just as we saw the terrorist attack in catalonia was carried out by syrian that went to spain. it was even more the case of striking right after brexit where it seems friends had to
face germany on a one-on-one basis, but i still think there are a few elements that makes this relationship possible to involve with an equal relationship because france made an interesting historical role in the construction of europe and also because it has a few elements that germany doesn't have any more. a few advantages. one of them is to be extremely credible on the security side. we know that in all the reform area, the relaunching area that wants to be put forward for the european union, one of them is defensive europe security and there you have france taking the lead on all of those. the other point is that it plays
the role, sort of a bridge between germany and south of europe. at least that's what's macron is trying to do when he went to greece. there was a message there, i understand the greeks, i understand your problems with germany and he is taking the mantle of the one being able to reconcile europe or make a bridge between these two sides of europe. on the migration question, i just want to point out that it's not only a question of all these people arriving and link to unemployment, there's a question of prosperity, will they take my job, et cetera, but it's also very much a question of identity. from the french perspective,
it's harder to understand, even if we have a very high extreme right and xenophobic movement, we still are a very diverse country with waves of immigrant dating from the 60s, and decades of society, it's changing very much with 12 or 15% muslim population, integrated to the highest level of society and i understand that it's not the case for other european country. it's different ethnic backgrounds and different immigration, so this will create a divide between east and west and different countries, and this will not be solved overnight. you have behind it all cultural and identity question.
>> will do one lightning round. gentlemen here, two rows in the back and the lady appear. very quickly. >> thank you very much. in light of the fact that somebody said 34% of europe feel that they are headed in the wrong direction, what does that say for liberal democracy overall, especially in light of migration, income inequality and social media impacts. is liberal democracy threatened? >> thank you. the lady appear. thank you. >> i would like to mention briefly the transatlantic relationship and most specifically the relationship between the u.s. and the eu.
we know the situation is quite difficult these days and i have an equation. over the summer we saw macron was able to build some sort of good relationship with france. he came to the still day so do you think that he could be some kind of bridge builder between the eu and the u.s. to allow the europeans may be to bring their messages to the white house thanks to the french president. thank you. >> the final question, yes, there on the other side, and then the panel has about 30 seconds each to answer all of the question. >> thank you very much. i was curious, can we see ratification of the european patent court and why germany seems to be holding it up.
the common patent court. >> we have about four minutes. the panelist can answer any of those you choose and any other reflections. you sort of see the glasses helpful or half empty in terms, it would be nicely to see if the corner has been turned. when we go in reverse order, if that's okay. >> yes, take this one question regarding macron trump and the state of the transatlantic relationship in general. there are many things that are pretty obviously ideologically in the way they behave in the way they talk, but when they met twice already, there was no personality clash.
on the contrary. they are both new animals in the political sphere, they have never been elected to any elected office before winning the presidency, they both came in one and destroyed either their party or the system where they come from. in a way, they saw each other in each other and their personality clicked. i think when macron. it served a purpose for both of them but it was very good for trump's image that he would be valued enough to be invited there, he appreciated that very much and was very solemn. at the same time from her crown it shows that he can talk to anybody, he's taking on the biggest challenges, even donald trump. but more generally, on the french, how the french see the
transatlantic relationship, i think in a way the french had thought of donald trump before donald trump even existed. i think they realized the american guarantees would not always be there. they would have a restricted vision of their strategic interest and will not care about the safety of europe. they had integrated this idea and had been saying for years that you are up should have its own defense, u.s. [inaudible] so now donald trump is just embodying this idea and is living proof that the french were right all along, and we love to be right so it's wonderful. the climate change and the iran deal are still going to be tense over there. >> i would like to reflect on the first question and the challenges of liberal democracy
faces. i think we danced around this issue and came out in the context of brexit. you have two types of politics. one politics that takes place around the constitution, and the way in which society, for almost centuries democratic politics, and what i am seeing in the last decade or so is that we need to reach more and more majority and populism. i personally am a little bit familiar with european history. i get very nervous and very scared of referendums. turkey was not a country accustomed to referendums and now we have a president that's pushing them, one after the
other and we are seeing the consequences of that in a very creative manner. moving forward, it will be important that the establishment against which it seems there is revolt, institutions are still able to maintain that relationship and hopefully defend that liberal democratic project that took off right after the second world war and brought us the kind of prosperity and security that we were once accustomed to and took it for granted. >> thank you. >> although i am a lawyer, i know nothing about. i will say one thing, patents are just about that it's about biotech and medical technology.
huge amounts of money are involved in this. there is something of a world war going on between the american legal system and european laws on regulations. american law firms have been ruthless in trying to impose their standards on the european markets for these things. that's a really interesting topic. let me put it that way. it's one that isn't generally discussed. whatever is established there is going to be really important. one sentence because we're just about out of time. there are many enemies out there, most of them are in our countries and that's what we have to when chancellor merkel >> when chancellor merkel
returned home after her last meeting with donald trump, she said she told the political audience it's time for we europeans to take destiny in our own hands. she pointed out that for the first time in seven years, she's dealing with a president who sees europe as a commercial rival rather than a strategic ally. i think in terms of the big picture story, going forward, we could well be at a hinge moment in history where europe feels the need to move forward to find its own way and remove itself from the strategic umbrella and security protections of the united states. >> thank you very much but i would like to thank our panel for the terrific conversation on the future of europe and we look forward to our keynote conversations in ten minutes.
isy personal note, and that for a little-- more than a quarter of a century, which means we got together in what was another millennium, it sure feels like another millennium. she was an extraordinary friend and colleague, and i, along with my colleagues here at brookings and foreign-policy, are so glad that once again she will be a colleague. and i think the timing of this part of the program fits very well with the panel that we have just heard from. and perhaps you were there for
although close to about half of it and you heard a number of observations about what's going on in europe, in the eu particularly. my sense is that there was a feeling that may be the troubles of the eu are bottoming out, and the eu is getting its act together again with, of course, the leadership of two countries in particular, and that is germany and france. how did you react to the conversation which we just heard? >> thanks, strobe. i am so delighted to be at brookings in this next chapter of my life. america's number one think tank
for the last decade or more under the leadership of -- the last millennium. exactly, exactly. we will see how we do in this millennium. before i jump into your questions, stroke, i want to start on a a personal note. as strobe has said we'd been colleagues and collaborators in government and outside of government for a very, very long time, and i'm grateful to strobe for many things including his friendship and his decency and his integrity out there in the world. but one of the things i am most grateful to strobe is that i met him, he came into government having been a journalist, when i was a young diplomat. i was just coming out of moscow. and i was trained in the very strict conformity of ways of foreign service training. and along comes a strobe with his personal relationship with the president at an enormously important moment in history as
the soviet union was breaking up in russia was trying to find itself. and he taught me so many things about u.s. leadership that were different from the tight constraints that we learned in diplomatic school, but among them to start from u.s. values, to start from u.s. interests, but that it's about people,, it's about human beings and relationships that we form with them. but it's also about taking risks for the right thing and not just doing the expected thing. and that inform everything that i try to do in government after, so thank you, strobe. in terms of the conversation today, i was glad to hear most of the big issues teased out in the conversation, whether it is how brexit gets managed, how the eu now at 27 adjusts, and how it addresses the structural issues
that are holding back the and other things. i actually think that for europe, and for the uk, it may not be, it can be an exciting and positive plastic moment. my only regret is that the u.s. is not playing its role as the third leg of the stool if you will in trying to ensure that we come out of this time now with economic growth on both sides of the atlantic, in a stronger place as a liberal democratic family. so from the eu perspective, we touched on it in the last panel in talking about the issues of migration. i think there's a great challenge now in doing the same thing with schengen that the eu has begun with monetary union,
namely, fixing the holes in the boat that make it leaky. so when eu countries pull sovereignty around a bunch of schengen borders but don't address the issues of a border security force, a shared intelligence service to know what's happening in that common space and collaborate, a common approach to refugees and the burden sharing, then you end up with a kind of explications and difficulties that we've seen. but i think these problems have been now identified. the question is whether in the context of what an eu in 27 looks like, those countries countries who are in schengen can really work strongly together to make that schengen space fair and tolerant and open to the appropriate kind of emigration with the burden sharing among them, and really make it a no go space for
terrorists, and can collaborate in citizen security, please, intelligence sharing, etc. i think that is possible but it's going to take a lot more work. on the brexit side, obviously the united states benefited enormously from the fact that the uk was in the eu. i don't think it needs to be an existential crisis on either side of the channel, that the relationship will change but only if both sides of the channel are responsible in the way they handle it. so from the eu side, while i appreciate that the rules are that you break relationship first and then you rebuild it, i don't understand how even in a divorce context you would never sort of just walk out if they get later what happens to the children and the money at that this and that that. i really think that it is in the
interest of both sides, and, frankly, in the interest of the united states to talk about that simply how the crack up happen but we want to be were posted to the channel want to be on the end of this and work backwards. on the uk side, the uk is making that case strongly, but has not yet put forward a vision of the in-state that it once the transition period that it needs, what it's willing to pay for, what aspects of the relationship and wants to keep. so i frankly think there is a positive way forward here, but both sides will have to do a lot more work. and again i just wish that the united states was playing a larger good offices role in the context because it matters to us fundamentally. you can make america great again if our greatest allies are not getting stronger and if we don't create that affirmative three-legged stool, or four-legged if you include canada on trade come on
security, all of it going forward. >> let me pick up on the last thing that you said. you said the united states,, if i can put it this way, is more a part of the problem than the solution. i think you are referring to the policies of the united states government particularly, the executive branch. but the united states is a lot more than the government. this beating today of course is -- meeting -- is part of our partnership. you guys are part of the international civil society. we are part of civil society, and we can do stuff together. you mentioned just a very quickly before we came in here that you have some thoughts about the digital age and cyber. do you want to say a little bit about that group? >> sure, but before we do that
i'm not letting off the hook here as just a question or someone to turn it back on you and then we will come to digital. how about that? >> okay. >> all right. >> see what it's been like for the last 25 years? [laughter] and what is going to be for like the next i hope some period of time. >> strobe, you have throughout the time i've known you and i think probably for your whole life been the embodiment of global integration, somebody who has believed that the more we work together, the more we depend on multilateral institutions, the stronger we will all be. i don't want to use the global governance word, but -- but you did. i did, i did. i said that i was saddened to see brexit but not existentially
panicked. do you think that there's a way to go forward in the context of brexit? >> well, i think speedy i mean come in the sense that this is this is a trend with regard to global governance rather than an integrated one. i am very, i have many, many friends in the uk. and some by the way who were levers. but both seem overwhelmingly convinced that there's no stopping brexit itself. i cling, and it's probably wishful thinking but i can also imagine ways for practical reasons that might come into
stop it before it goes all the way. we all know paradox. you get halfway through a goal and then halfway and halfway and have come but you never cross the line. i would like to think that as this extraordinarily complicated process, and dangerous process in some ways, goes forward, there might be a way of putting brexit as a bad idea in the past, that wiser heads have decided not to do. however, if that happens, and going back to the conversation we heard in the last panel, there's going to be a difficulty with europe itself. because i can't imagine the uk
being passionate about more europe, i would think that the uk position would probably be less europe, while the continentals would be, would want more. and that will be a very tough compromise. >> but isn't it the case that not all the continentals want all, the some of want the flexibility to not join the euro, i i guess they're all part of schengen, but this larger question of multispeed or variable geometry within europe and interlocking sets? to me that strikes as a way to balance the benefits of state sovereignty and the benefits of unity if countries can opt into those pool sovereignty clubs, whether it's monitored unit,
whether it's shaken or whatever comes next, a higher degree of security, integration and those that -- schengen -- those the want to be in the family but not sitting at every single meal table could choose a different way. >> may be when we open up to the audience, celia and constanze in particular might carry a a little further some of the points that they made in the course of the panel. so digital, cyber. >> well, as strobe nose and as many of you know, one of the last huge issues that we tackled in the obama administration at the very end was the russian states hacking of the u.s. electoral process and its efforts to put its finger on the scale of u.s. politics.
so that combined with my going concern about tensions between the big u.s. high-tech companies, and the eu, both the commission and the member states, has led me to do quite a bit of thinking about how the liberal democratic world can lead in this new era. and there are so many issues here from the deterrence and protection of our free spaces from malign actors. state sponsors or nonstate sponsored, to the issue of processes of services, to how you maintain privacy while allowing governments and companies the ability to chase
bad guys and malign actors within the network. so there's been quite a lot of thinking in the community and i been learning quite a bit about the sense of that government but i'm increasingly convinced that if those of us in the free world don't now start collaborating on setting some floor standards in these areas, that those who want to abuse the internet, either to control their own societies forward to invade privacy or to create security threats, will set the rules. so the question i've been asking is whether there's a way we can gather, there been efforts at global governance on this issue, but they always run across these different interests between the liberal democracies and the autocracies on these issues.
so is a a time for those of us in our open free community to take the lead in what i like to call sort of a bretton woods in the digital sphere, in which others are calling a digital geneva convention? and gather ourselves, we could do this not necessarily as committee as a whole, that interested governments and companies could start in the others to join like we did with the proliferation security initiative. microsoft and its ceo brad smith the start to think about this. we will be having some beatings with governments have been -- governors next week and i'll be excited to file a low brainpower and hope we can apply some brookings and some bosch brainpower to it as well. >> governments. i doubt that the russian government would be in the vanguard of this enterprise.
>> on the contrary. theriot in the vanguard of making the world safe for digital auto charissa. we want to get ahead of that rather than have it swamp us or set the standards. and then in china of course, they are in the process of monopolizing control over their own citizens' information because they are the alliance between the companies and the government that a, blocks out demands , and b, citizens share as much with government as they do with each other. that is a standard i don't think we want to set. >> in so far as you are comfortable in sharing with not only the group, but the public, when you were in the government, which was not that long ago, you had a lot of contacts with the russians. what is their line, if i can t it, on cyber, that
obviously protects what they are doing and what all the world knows that they have been doing? >> well, in terms of this question of whether we should have a cyber compact, the russian government has said of course, but they want to set the rules that maintains kremlin control over their own citizenry, but is less in keeping with the bargain that we would set between citizens and government. but on the question of did they do it, and what did they do, and awful those things, the president of russia has said show us some proof. by the way, some russians are very talented on this subject. so as he did in the early days in ukraine, when he was admiring of the little green men, but not taking responsibility for them, and as
he did in the early days in syria when he was admiring of -- assad ad strengthenings without taking responsibility, he is nicely having his cake and eating it, too. but that takes us to russia and the question that we have been asking each other and that was asked by the russians themselves of themselves for more than a century. as you look at where we are in relationship with both sides saying it is now at an all-time low, which we can take a little professional comfort in because we were accused of it being at an all-time low, and now it seems to be even lower. who do you hold responsible? what is to be done? what can we now move forward? is there a role for europe to
play? and is there a difference between what the russian government and the kremlin are proposing and where the russian eople want to be themselves? >> the very few people in the room who don't know russian, i will translate the first two words. the first word means who/whom. it was actually coined by stalin from a slightly longer i would say imperative for russian, and that is who is able to prevail over whom? as any government or any leader would feel, he or that government wants to be the who nd not the whom.
and gloria also added two other favorite russian questions. one is who is to blame, and it is of course never themselves. and third, what is to be done? i think in all three categories , russia has lost its way. i am sort of preempting another question, which is who lost russia? i think nobody has ever lost russia. russia sets its own course. it has its own dynamics. the last a point in two decades of the last millennium when russian leaders
reformist leaders, with significant support from much of the population, felt that the system, the soviet communist system, was simply not getting the job done in erms of this great country's ability to integrate with the rest of the world and to take care of its own people. and we all know who started that. it was a fluke, a miraculous uke, that in march of 1985 e politbureau said we just can't have funerals in red
square every year or half year, and they took a chance on somebody who was convinced that he, with other reformers could reform the system. , gorbachev, failed in a number of respects, but succeeded in a number of respects, and that was to open up to the rest of the world -- drozdiak at bill right now. bill in the previous conversation made two very, very important points. ne, russia through the ages, czars, commisars, and up until now again, they have a unique
ability to make their neighbors frightened, and therefore, in a way, very vulnerable enemies, hich is tough on russia itself . it has often been said that russia doesn't feel completely secure unless everybody else is insecure, and that blows back into their own interests. bill also pointed out what i think is an objective fact. there is a geopolitical threat to the russian state, it is not coming from the north pole, it is not coming from the west. it is coming from the south, and it is coming, over the
decades to come, from the east, . d in particular in china of russia, if he had a map of his giant country and had to look at it every day and say what do we really have to worry about down the road, it would be the strength in rms of people power of china nd the poverty of people power in the eastern part of the russian federation. but that is just not the mindset there. on my own hope -- my own hope
is that the reformist period of the late 80's, up until -- actually it went into the early putin years -- will turn out to have been the new russia, and what we are going through now adavistic on, an return to a system that didn't . rk before and one work now picking on something that you said in the context of europe, i wish the united states government had a set of policies that would from the outside create an international context for russia's continuing evolution more than it is doing right now.
>> so what would that look like? strode, you are king of the world. if the u.s. were to try to improve it now, what would the elements be? >> i think the elements would -- because of the adavism or the return to the past that russia is now -- that is the characteristic of russian policy both internally and externally, it is going to require us to go back to the remedies and the protections of our own interests, and i'm here talking about those of the olitical west. i guess ideal just preempt and say -- or give my own answer to the question. is this a new cold war? yes, it is a new cold war. it has got different
characterics, and we have to character sticks, and we are going to have to use things. one is containment and deterrents and other is engagement on those issues where there are genuinely shared interests on the part of hese contesting countries. i am thinking particularly on non-proliferation and arms control. just one point, and you know it very well. even in the really dark period the cold war, going back to the aftermath of the cuban missile crisis, the united states and the u.s.s.r. made in beating progress
ack the danger of therm nuke -- therm nuclear war. that edifice and that process is in very bad shape. while we strengthen nato, and i hope you well come back on that, having been our ambassador to nato, that despite the fact that we are going to have to beat back a lot of russian policies, we also need to return to arms control diplomacy. >> i certainly won't disagree with that. i think my -- without getting into who's guilty and all those questions, my concern -- and i ow you have a lot of fascination with and have spent
your life studying the russian people, history and culture, as i have. my concern is that in this effort to close russia down gain and re-establish the zero sum principles if others around us are doing well, we must be losing rather than seeking win-wins, is that the russian people themselves are the biggest losers, and that we are seeing that in the economic fragility. partly as a result of sanctions, partly as a result of isolation, and largely as a result of a lack of reform, that great nest egg of vereign wealth that had been built up in the sovereign years has been cut in half. for most russians, food prices are 30% higher than they used to be, and the general standard of living prices is 15% higher, while no attention has been
made internally to improving health care and education. i am worried we have lots of external adventures which are really expensive and violating of the standard principles of international law and comedy, but no attention to the russian people itself. i think it is becoming increasingly fragile in the sense that in those protests in the winter in 80 russian cities . they were small, but the protestors themselves were the 20 to 35-year-olds. they were the putin generation. they were young people who grew up not remembering the soviet union, but expecting that they were going to do better than their parents, expecting that they were going to be able to travel and go to school externally, and they were protesting the fact that they are now denied that while they
see leaders ripping off the country for personal gain. i think if those issues are not addressed, all the rest of it in terms of whether we can get back to win-wins with russia are going to be difficult. >> let me just pick up on one phrase you used. those issues have to be addressed. including the brittleness, the fragility of russian society, which is very, very different the early s of leaders, including stalin. we can't address those issues. russia is going to have to -- , we would hope russian would n its -- the degree of pluralism that has been part of
the last 25 years, that there will be a critical mass including in powerful circles as well as in the population, to get back on the right path. >> i mean i think we as a country, when we base our relationship with russia on values, on dissent of the rules of the road of the system which russia benefits from immensely from their entry into the w.t.o., the fact that we use the security council for every major thing, and we should come to iran. >> before we do, the current russia is making inroads into what we hoped would be part of the political west. i'm thinking in particular, turkey came up in the earlier
conversation. turkey is now sort of dinging us by buying or at least considering buying russian arms . and then there is hungary. do you have any thoughts on that? >> just continuing the previous thought on linking them together, this notion of standing on the side of those russians who want a more european, open, trading russia that is a positive contributor to the growing west, i think that is something we have to do at the same time that we stand very firmly, call it what you want, deterrence i think is a better word than containment, against violations of the basic rules of the road of the special system, whether it is or eizing countries ddling in elections or owe
violations of the i.n.f. treaty, which is very dangerous. we could wake up one day and have medium range missiles pointing at our allies if we don't address this. we did those and the putin years we started with medvedev but consent, so those issues have to -- i think it is incumbent upon us, whether it's in a relationship with turkey, in a relationship with hungary or even as poland is , constraining the democratic checks and balances in the system, to make the case that this is not as you said at the beginning been good for russia. they are not getting richer by adopting this tighter, more autocratic model by dismantling checks and balances by not having rule of law. people don't want to invest there. and that when you run, when your government is afraid of its own citizens, which is the net
effect of closing space for free media, closing democratic competition, it lives in a permanent state of tension, not the state of where it can focus on prosperity and integration and growth and opportunity for its citizens. so i think we've got to be firmer with, particularly i have found issue with the eu that it sets standards of admissions of countries like hungary and poland and then it needs to enforce them when you lose the democratic checks and balances in the justice system, free media, etc.. if they want to benefit from the club. but similarly with turkey, you know turkey is a hugely , important country on the as a hinge to a more stable middle east. it's also a country that's deeply divided in terms of whether support for a more open global turkey in support for a
tighter internal system. so we have to get in there and be in that conversation with citizens and that is why i hope for more activist transatlantic policy out of the administration. >> you wanted to say something about iran, which is important. then we will open it up to the audience. >> well, i think we had, i was gratified to see that the administration today i think, right? or was it yesterday? made a decision, made a decision to reserve a fundamental tenet of a.e jipo i think there are plenty of places to be critical and ex-essential issue that the transamerica mary needs to be working on, vis-a-vis iran, but if we throw out that we just
if we throughout the jpoa agreement, we just become a burden centrally as to who might want to know. get a fresh start. but if the president and the administration want to be worried about iran, they should be worried about other things and focus with the transatlantic community of the things, including his creation of a radical crescent in iran's neighborhood. it's exporting of terrorist policy its effort to dominate , politics in territory an event at her back, et cetera. this take you to why we need not simply a military policy in cleaning isis out of raqqa but we need to ensure that we are turning territories that would -- and that we free from isis, into experimental zones for a more liberally open tolerant syria, iraq, and etc.. otherwise, like russia and iran,
who does want a liberal government chosen by the people in either place, those are just going to rush into the breach and the net effect will be backed we'll put all her own blood and treasure into creating a serious that is safe for iran and for russia, et cetera, rather than say for the syrian people. -- safe for the syrian people and stable. >> over to you folks. yes, sir. please identify yourself. >> john hudson. great to be here. just a question for ambassador newland. ambassador, you probably will go down as one of the more influential assistant secretaries in recent years, and i just was hoping that you could sort of talk a little bit about, in hindsight, do you think, do you maybe have any regrets about so openly backing the ukrainian revolutionaries?
perhaps seeing the notion that this was an american backed coup even if that's an unfair , assumption which i think a lot of people, a lot of us would agree, do you ever think about those moments that came up, have any regrets at all? i would love to hear your perspective on that. thank you newland: for the compliment i was in there, that was not a compliment. [laughter] remind you where we were in december of 2013, january of 2014 and february, we had a ukrainian government under yanu chosenand people who had to associate with the european union, not join the eu but to have free travel, to a free -- free trade and etc.. that was a choice of the ukrainian people, of the ukraine
president at the time. and then you had this effort at financial blackmail because ukraine was also very fragile. and had not succeeded in what we were pushing at the time, reestablishing its relationship with the imf so that could have financial stability and financial freedom of choice even as it did this. you hadn't russia throwing its banner in and saying we don't , like any of this. and essentially bribing a $20 billionh gift, loan, whatever, to tell them not to do it. and in the country, the ukrainian people exploded underneath the government. so what we were doing, what the united states was doing in december and january was not was not backing a revolution, we were trying to mediate between yanukovych and his own people,
to help ukraine not have to choose between a reasonable relationship with russia, rather than a relationship of economic dependence, and a european path. we were working on whether there could be a technocratic government that could be a win-win for everybody. in fact, the deal that emerged on february 21 of 2014 that yanukovych in fact chose not to implement and chose to flee from instead that the europeans , midwife with the two ukrainian sides, the elements of that were things that the united states had been laying the feed for it were to offer many, many months. i do think it's important to remember what happened on that famous day of the sandwiches, not cookies. [laughter] i was in ukraine with cathy ashton. we were working together trying to negotiate justice, whether we
could get ukraine back on the path of european integration, in a way that would be a win-win. and potentially a win-win for russia itself. because if ukraine could invent a half to europe for some russian products, we were making the point for moscow. i had on, i think it was the tenth or something of december, been working with the opposition, the maidan leaders, kathy had been working with yanukovych and on the next they -- next day, we were going to switch and see for could bring something in together. that night we were awoken at 1:00 in the morning because that was the night that yanukovych took foreign advice and decided to put the militia on the street and encircle the maidan protesters and start squeezing. it was a very, very scary night. in the end the maidan protesters were able to push back, and these poor, young, 18-year-old paratroopers of ukraine were
following orders and they were traumatized as well. so before i went to my yanukovych meeting i went out to the square to see both sides, both the storm troopers and the protesters, to express empathy for the position that that leadership have put both of them in. and the pictures actually of me giving sandwiches to the protesters. so russia of course, and its own rewriting of history made much of this and used that little symbol to sort of declare that we had always had a secret plot that this was a color revolution. but it's not to do what happened at is not true to the desires of the ukrainian people and it does not tell the truth. at the end of the day it was yanukovych himself who would fail the vessel in all of this. >> [inaudible] . ambassador newland absolutely. : there are pictures to prove it, pictures to prove it. but i do think it speaks to the power of russian propaganda and
ability to pervert narrative, but that narrative has stuck. that it was all about me and i was on some sort of rogue policy. >> in the back? >> thank you, thanks. centralm the transatlantic relations on sabbatical in the netherlands. i had a question for you on to -- on the mention of poland and hungary and you said you took issue with the eu not doing more to uphold the law standard in these countries. i am all for that but i am wondering what else could be done, now that the european commission is suing these countries, throwing everything in his limited arsenal at them. there is a difference to the united states. despite what you read in some british tabloids there's no secret eu army that you could send in there, no national guard. could be done? what could the european institutions do?
what solutions are there? newland: well i'm of sending ar militia, that is not what i was intending. but i do know both countries continue to benefit from massive amounts of financial transfer, from central eu, cohesion funds, et cetera. there's been no effort to link usthis to democratic standards. desk to link those two democratic standards. you're going to tell me that eu rules don't allow that are perhaps they should. >> bill. >> thank you. i'd like to you elaborate a bit more about -- >> does anyone want to ask the question of strobe? >> you can deflect it. you mentioned technology and democracy, which also find a fascinating subject. a decade ago the internet was seen as a powerful tool to spread democracy around the world, help population circumvent censorship of the government, et cetera.
yet now, it seems like autocracies have used the internet much more effectively. the great firewall and china, etc.. area where europe seems to be taking the policy lead. germany and the eu pass laws saying that unless facebook or other social media giants remove hate speech and other objectionable things from the internet within 24 hours there will be subject to huge fines. so do you think this is some direction where the united states should go? that is, imposing the owners responsibility on these social media giants, facebook, google, democracy andpect work for government? or do you think this would then, as these companies argue, it
would hinder or violate american laws and hinder their own freedom of action? how do you work that double-edged sword? >> thank you for that question. i think there are two things here. the first is that one of the great powers of our democracy, and you saw it in the original bretton woods was that we had this very flexible ability to have dialogue between government, policymakers, and business, and industry when we are at our best. on this set of subjects, whether it's on the european side or whether it's on the u. s side, we need more of that. we need a single conversation about how you on one hand protect privacy but on the other hand allow law enforcement to operate. what's the responsibility of companies to police their platforms against abuse by state actors or tears or criminals?
-- or terrorists or criminals? what can government do to help them? what should legal standards be? ascan have that conversation compared to what is happening in russia and china, where governments are setting the standard in a very liberal way. i think we need to have it. i certainly felt in watching the hacking think mushroom in 2016, that what we needed was a united states unified interagency that was inviting all of the majors and some of the innovators in the international site to -- in the industrial side to address the problem together. that's point number one-third think we can take the lead on. the second thing is with that -- without getting into putting the government done without that conversation, i am very admiring particularly, of what france did to blunt, neutralize, deter hacking in the context of the presidential election. they did far better than we did
because they attributed in real time, because they exposed in real time, and i think germany is doing a better job as well, particularly after the garbage campaign about the young girl. so we need to learn from that, inand part of that goes to part of that goes to making, again, if you have that concert conversation between industry, governments by , government i mean both policy and intelligence, and the legal regulators you can move much , more quickly than we were able to move and we will have to. that takes the back to this bretton woods or digital geneva convention of us, let's set the standard with industry, not impose them on industry and met -- and let us show the world that liberal democracies can get the best out of these fabulous technologies, which have put us together.
i can tell a maidan story from this, that is a positive. while blunting the worst. so on that very night when they were encircling and trying to squeeze the protesters, the bells were ringing and the snow was coming down, and the protesters were singing to try to create some moral authority to push back the police. aboute united states, at 1:30 a.m., and secretary kerry's name, we put out a very strong statement calling what happened on the square disgusting. a translated into both russian and ukrainian in real-time. i literally sat in my hotel room in kiev having worked on this statement. the minute we push the button, within five minutes, all across maidan on tv could see them hold up their phones reading this statement and gaining strength from it. so without their cell phones that would not have happened. it was a direct relationship between us and the people.
>> last question, and very quick one. please. >> thank you, president. ambassador , i would like to ask you, first of all if you take a stance making an assessment about the past do you recognize the , mistakes that you may have done in monitoring the european affairs? what is the biggest disappointment that you had in collaboration with the europeans? what is the biggest disappointment from the europeans that you had while working with them? the last question for the president, and you also, what is the greatest fear and the greatest hope that you have in regards to the european union for the next 10 years? thank you so much. ambassador: i would have liked to react much more speedily to the annexation or effort to annex donbass and we were able
to. recognizing what those green men out, more pictures pictures of various kinds come i think we could have blunted it earlier. i think the greatest mistake we made together as a community, is when we began negotiating the implementation of the minsk agreements. we did it in parallel rather than doing it as a single negotiating structure, u.s. and europe. we had pushed for that as you know but for a variety of reasons it didn't come together and that just allowed space for those who didn't want to deal to get out of the way. i think the biggest, the thing that my heart still believes -- believed about was -- my heart still bleeds about syria.
as you know i was spokesperson of the state department in the first obama term under secretary clinton and i had to from the state department podium every day in 11 and 12 get up and justify what was going on, and i am certainly on the team that thinks that we should have done more in 2011 to we should have 2014. done more together with your and -- with europe and we might have prevented the refugee crisis. a whole bunch of dominoes fell but most importantly it matters to us in the transatlantic community that the middle east has a chance to organize itself liberally. and its citizens in the middle east have right to have a say in how they are governed and have opportunities that we have. it is not going to be stable and good for us without that, and syria is the linchpin strobe. >> my biggest fear, i'm sure shared by many, leaving the north korean issue aside, i do
worry about miscalculations on the part of russia as it probes and bullies and sends its military assets into the sovereign territory, and particularly maritime areas in the nordic region. i can see putin testing of the article v issue, and he might do so in a way that could either really undermine nato, or it could bring us to a very serious conflict. as for my hopes, i have always felt, even during these troubled years of the last five years or
so, since the recession, that the european project as such, which goes beyond the eu. bold plan tost successful in many many ways, experiment on a transnational if governance,ional which i think is absolutely imperative if you are going to -- i wasod century hurt and by much of what was said in the previous panel and i , hope that we can get to a point where there is a constituency both in the populations of these countries as well as the leaderships, that the big slogan should be let's
make globalization great again. [applause] >> thank you. next thank you. >> thank you to all of you. [applause] >> tori is coming to brookings. it's a great boom to us in a great boon to us and also to other institutions, that we are partnering with. i do think that your idea about a cyber project could be one that not only you will find colleagues here at brookings butr to work with you, other institutions. one thing i have noticed over
the last year or so is that the washington think tank community is reaching out in many ways to ,et out beyond the beltway particularly in puget sound silicon valley area. perhaps with our friends from there, we can find some partners on the other side of the atlantic. >> alright, go forth and be transatlantic. thanks. [applause] [inaudible conversations] .
morning, capitol hill bureau chief for the military times -- for the new york times talks about issues facing the military as congress debates funding. health care reporter know him -- noam levy talks about the future acthe american health care and other proposals discussed in congress this week. signs of addiction, how addiction affects the brain. be sure to for watch c-span's washington journal live at seven eastern this morning. join the discussion. eastern on10:00 afterward, david osborne on his book "reinventing american schools: creating a 21st century education system" is interviewed. >> might argument in the book -- my argument in the book is that
the places in the country that have embraced charters the most systematically, are also the fastest improving citizen the country. so i am not saying make every school public school a charter school, i am saying that if you look at the data, we know what works for kids, let us treat every public school like a charter. we can call it something else, we could call it a district school, a innervation school, a renaissance school, whatever. but let us give it the autonomy so that the people running the school can make the decisions and create a school model that will work for the kids that they have to teach. and, let us hold them accountable for their performance. if they do a great job, let us open another school. if they do a better job, let's replace them with a better operator. >> watch tonight at 10:00 eastern on c-span's book tv. >> next, see skins profile
interview with housing and development secretary than carson. he talked about the challenges he faced on in his childhood and what made you want to become a doctor. this is just over 30 minutes. >> secretary ben carson, i want to talk about your job at hud, but your other job is dr. ben carson. why did you decide to pursue a career in medicine? dr. carson: well, as a youngster, we used to hear these stories about missionary doctors, and they seems to me to people onthe most noble earth, bringing not only physical but also mental and spiritual healing to the people. was eight years old i decided that that was the path i was going to take. obviously, it changed. you know,