tv Jeh Johnson Testifies at Election Security Task Force Hearing CSPAN September 29, 2017 1:22pm-2:24pm EDT
really implemented. there is no culture of enforcement. whats why i've argued that we are facing in this country is what amounts to an epidemic of behavior health malpractice, even if it is not acknowledged as such within the legal system, in part because the reality of malpractice attorneys is they don't take the case unless someone has died. >> watch after words sunday night. next on c-span, house democrats talking about the 2016 presidential election cycle. former homeland security secretary jeh johnson discusses ways to prevent foreign interference in future elections and makes security recommendations for the 2018 and 2020 election cycles.
this is our congressional task force on election security. body to lookd this at some issues around what happened during the last election. a lot of us are concerned about it. we are kind of looking forward rather than backward. if we to figure out missed something, can we use this as an opportunity to fix things for the future? , the cochair,sly who is a ranking member on the house administration. a comment for the record, as the cochair, in the interest of time, i'm just going to submit it for the record. we are joined here by former
secretary of homeland security, jeh johnson, and former undersecretary for -- for the department, suzanne spaulding. welcome. we are going to allow you to begin. mr. johnson: thank you for having us, for inviting us. i accepted this invitation because it is an opportunity for me to reconnect with undersecretary spalding i am here --. i'm here because of the respect i have for the members of
congress who have invited me to be here, and because of the importance of the issue. i intend to speak my mind as a withrned private citizen the experience of having been secretary of homeland security for 37 months. knows, in this country, we elect our national leadership through the electoral college. case, ass that is the long as that is the constitutional requirement, and given our politics, national elections will be decided in key precincts in key states. , the integrity of our election outcomes on a national level dances on the head of a pin. if writers of the tv series house of cards could figure that out, then a lot of other people could do the same.
last year's experience was a wake-up call. as i sit here, i know of no evidence that last year, ballots were altered or votes were suppressed through a cyber attempt. but last year's experience exposed certain cyber vulnerabilities in our election infrastructure. it was a wake-up call. the question now is what do we do? what do we do in washington and at the state and local level? andope is this task force the other committees of congress looking into this question find answers about what we do. aroundknow, beginning august 2016, we began to see scanning and a probing of various state election
officials' systems. including but not limited to, voter registration databases. as i testified before the house intelligence committee in june, i issued public statements about this threat. on august 15, september 16, october 1, october 7, october 10 about this thread. -- about this threat. the director of national intelligence and died, on and i, on october 7, took the step of formally attempting the russian government of attempting to interfere. thanks to the leadership of undersecretary spalding and others, by election time, 33 states had come to us to seek our cyber security assistance in the run-up to the election. 36 cities and counties have done the same.
we were able to identify a number of vulnerabilities in providing that assistance, and of course, on january 6, 2017, utilizing my authority as secretary of homeland security, i designated election infrastructure in our country as critical infrastructure. regarded asmust be efforts to in our shore up the cyber security of election infrastructure. my understanding is that some progress on the state level has been made, but there is more to do. i look forward to our discussion. thank you, mr. secretary. mrs. spalding. we appreciate -- i appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss with
you the important subject of election security. it's a great pleasure to be here with my former boss, secretary jeh johnson who has ably laid out the steps that we've taken to the run-up to the elections last year. i would like to focus my brief remarks on the lessons i think and be learned from our experience. first, as the undersecretary for the national protection and programs director, i found it extremely valuable to bring together what i call our cyber , as well as our infrastructure experts from our office of infrastructure protection, who have developed relationships with state and local officials over many years. cyber andfice of infrastructure analysis, which are created in 2014, to give us a holistic approach to understanding cyber and non-cyber elements of election infrastructure. this helps us prioritize those risks and develop technical and
non-technical ways to reduce those risks. as we've seen in so many other , having -- contexts them under one roof is key to effectively managing these kinds of risks. that said, another lesson we've learned is that the hadtionships that it developed were with the governors and their offices, and we did not fully appreciate the degree to which some secretaries of state offices are separate , politically, administratively, and sometimes even technically, with separate networks. it leads to another important lesson. and localstate election officials needs to begin early. by the time we were getting the reports and engaging with secretaries of state last summer , they were already well into their countdown for the election
. most said it was too late to make significant changes. have a why we need to strong sense of urgency with regard to upcoming elections. i was glad to see the dhs has been working closely with virginia in the run-up to their gubernatorial election this november. onneed to be focusing now the midterm elections next november and the election in 2020. timely, theto being effort to secure our election needs to be bipartisan. i am pleased to be on the board of harvard university's defending digital democracy project, led by the bipartisan team -- of hillary clinton's campaign manager and mitt romney's campaign manager. along with outstanding national security and technology experts.
noted in our recent workshop for state and local election officials, one thing democrats and republicans can agree on is that foreign adversaries have no place in our domestic politics. the defending digital democracy project aims to identify and recommend strategies, tools, technology to protect the democratic prospects -- process informationnd attacks. the key message we are sharing with state election officials is that as important as all of the upfront security measures taken in advance of an election are, postelection measures are also vitally important. if an adversary attempts to sow doubt of the integrity of elections, making sure you have a way to audit the results in a way that can resort -- that can restore confidence, it is may be
as important as keeping the bad guys out to begin with. i'm glad to see that virginia, earlier this month, decided to mandate that all precincts must use paperback voting machines. securing elections is vital for security. but it is also important to recognize russia's interference -- it did not begin or end with elections. long-termengaged in a effort to undermine democracy, both tactically, to weaken the west, and strategically, to reduce liberal democracy's appeal, not just in the united states but to russia's own population, and others in central and eastern europe and around the world where russia competes for influence and power. these measures are designed to affect elections and so chaos and discord generally.
we need to broaden our focus to the way these measures undermine other fundamental pillars of democracy. including the press, and even our judicial system. to have a robust national strategy to counter threats from russia and other adversaries to our fundamental democratic institutions. developments of this strategy is long overdue. it must be led by the federal government, but must include -- response to this serious and determined threat. i urge congress to request such a strategy from the executive to enact anyve necessary legislation to -- this ofnot wait for the outcome various investigations. as important as they are, and as much light as they may shed on additional details, we know enough now to understand what
needs to be done. it is time to act. thank you very much i look forward to your questions. mr. thompson: thank you very much. if it is all right with my cochair, i'll start. secretary, you were in office when our collection -- our election system was identified as critical infrastructure. committed -- how ,ou arrived at that designation and what your expectations as secretary happen to be going forward with that designation? mr. johnson: yes, sir. 2016, we were looking proactively for ways to shore up the cyber security of our
collection infrastructure -- of our election infrastructure. we were beginning to see the activity around voter registration databases. we were alarmed by it, seeing a growing list of states that were the targets of scanning and probing activities, and we were also seeing a clearer intelligence picture about russian hacking of the dnc and other individuals. with my staff, and i'm sure that suzanne was part of this conversation about what we at dhs could do to encourage states to seek our assistance. i was told it was within the -- to declare it as critical infrastructure alongside the 16 existing critical infrastructure sectors. i said that is interesting, i'd like to hear more.
meanst basically is, it the dhs will prioritize providing cyber security assistance if the customer, in effect, asks. ofthe customer's part critical infrastructure. and if it is, it enjoys the protection of various international cyber security norms and it enables dhs and the to have confidential communications protected by law and regulation. i thought that was a good idea. i wanted to engage state election officials first to get their reaction. as i testified in june before the house intelligence committee , initially, the reaction was somewhere between neutral and negative. that was a misperception
critical infrastructure designation would somehow be a federal takeover of the election process itself. i laid those concerns -- i alla yed those concerns and addressed them the best i could. i realized this would be a hot button issue. the shorter term goal had to be getting those states to come in, theeek our -- to bring horse to water. i put the designation on the back burner until after the election. had said, a moment ago, we a large number of states common. i was concerned -- i was convinced it was the right thing to do, but i wanted to hear out the states one more time about their concerns and reservations. i heard them out and i was still convinced that it was a good
idea, so i made the designation on january 6. my expectation is that the things i mentioned earlier will now occur. that dhs prioritizes providing assistance to state election officials, that they will enjoy the protections of confidential communications, and that the election infrastructure will be part of our cyber security norms on an international basis. there is more work to do in the implementation of that designation. mr. thompson: thank you. a you know, there is quite bit of discussion about what our role as members of congress would be. mr. spalding, you talked a little bit about your work and , yourd -- ms. spalding talked about your bipartisan record. let me indicate that our hope initially was to have a bipartisan house committee look at it.
we were unsuccessful, however, we felt strong enough that we really needed to go forward and analyze the information that is available. that i thinkings we were looking at is whether or congress is a role for electionng infrastructure going forward. you have had some opportunity to look at this, and i would love to hear your opinion on it at this point. ms. spaulding: thank you. i do think there is a role for congress. a couple things that they could do, and i know there are underative packages consideration even now. certainly one area the states have made clear they would benefit from is additional resources to do the things they need to do.
that, for example, any kind of grant program to provide funding to the states. you might want to think about connecting that with a requirement that they do a full assessment of their system. example,shing off, for to invest in a lot of new technology, the missed framework framework that we share says start with the assessment, then move to prevention, detection, response, and recovery. i think that's an importance that. the department of homeland security has offered before the election last year to do assessments for states and local officials. but to common and do a full assessment is resource
intensive. it requires 2-3 weeks. give additional resources to staff up of those teams, but to the extent that states are nervous about having federal employees coming into their system, third-party entities could be certified as offering substantially the same services and perhaps there could to contract with those third-party companies, either by dhs or state and local officials. there is a resource issue that is important but assessments are equally important. another interesting recommendation that has been made by former leaders in the intelligence community and as recently as yesterday, by the former homeland security adviser in the bush administration, is to remove the politics from the threat assessment itself.
one of those suggestions would be for congress to put in a 100slative requirement that 20 days or 180 days out from the national election, that the intelligence community provide a threat assessment with regard to any threat activities they might see related to the elections. that helps to remove the implication that whatever administration is in place at the time is trying to put a farm on the scale or influence the thumb on the put a scale. it becomes a standard process that includes a requirement for updates if there is significant additional information. -- a are areas i can see useful role here. i think that if we had the money, that would go a long way. we respect the independence of each state and locality in the
conduct of its collections, and one of the challenges -- of it elections, and one of the faced is how to integrate ourselves in the process without being a nuisance. we were involved in the help america vote act, and we've had experiences there that tell us we have to get some matrix and other things and not just give money. i think that is kind of what your comment is about. i yield to the cochair. >> thank you, cochair. i would like to thank our witnesses. this election proved there are powerful enemies who want to harm our elections. we are here to understand that threat and hopefully do something about it. when a foreign power interferes with our election, it is an attack on our nation.
now, there is no doubt that russia launched an unprecedented attack on our elections. in 2018 andt more 2020. the security of our elections should not be a partisan issue. fair, free, and secure elections are cornerstones of our democracy. i thank you for joining the conversation on how to work to secure our election system. i heard what you say about what we need to do -- and assessment. is there any way you would know -- i guess you wouldn't know that if our current state iection systems are secure? don't know how we could possibly secure them without funding for interfering too much with state rights. i don't know whether they need to be replaced. i note from the city of philadelphia, we just had recently replaced our voting
not a techut i'm savvy guide, nor would i want to be. you fixhat once something, there are smarter people that come in and hack that. i'm saying, we are struggling amongst ourselves, which means we -- about what we can do and how we can do it. i respect states rights, but i respect who we are and what we can do to instill upon them the major importance, to make sure that the process does work, that it can't be hacked by anyone else and we have fair elections. there's been this talk about internal states and cities doing something, or we had of someations inappropriate things happening on election day, and they come out to be miniscule, minor.
haveprobably never would really changed the outcome of an election, except now i'm getting nervous. we tell people they need to come out and vote, we've got to increase our attendance, increase voter participation, and yet we can't let them know that we are doing nothing, that their vote doesn't mean anything because somebody else is voting for them or nullifying their vote. this is important and we appreciate you being there. its financial. it's purely financial. i know you can't tell us, nor can anybody tell us whether they are secure. the assessment is probably going to cost money. we hope we can impress upon our states that we do need their elections, and what has happened in the past, we can try to stop it in the future. that we can impress upon them the importance of that. i thank you and appreciate your comments that you are a private
you are a private powerful citizen and i appreciate you speaking your mind. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. thompson: the gentlelady from florida. much, mr.ou so chairman, and our cochair. and thank both of you for being with us. undersecretary spalding, you mentioned that some states have taken initiatives to better secure their election systems. you mentioned virginia. it doesn't appear that governors as a whole have taken an active role or an upfront or public role in making recommendations for securing their election systems and being engaged in the process. if we do believe that what happened in 2016 is a national security issue, then what can we
, our secretary or undersecretary, and what can dhs do to assist governors and see the need to play a more up, active leadership role? ms. spaulding: thank you. sentiment, that my and i think the secretary would agree, our sense from working with the secretaries of state in the run-up to the election and my work since leaving office with state and local election officials, it reaffirms the sense we had that they take this seriously. they take their responsibility to ensure a free, fair, safe election very seriously. that, my sense is also that most of them would welcome some additional , stillnce in improving
further, their ability to withstand attacks from a sophisticated nation state actor. that's a formidable threat. my sense is also that the governors, certainly the national governors association under terry mcauliffe's leadership, he made cyber security a signature issue. i would say that in our workshop couple weeks ago through the defending digital democracy project with state and local officials, we had someone there who was very interested, from the national governors association. i think they do continue to have an interest in this. abouty want to think asking that organization in particular to come before this congress, to give you more details about what they're doing. i agree with you. they are the ceos of their states. one of the lessons we learned in dhs is that if you really want action on cyber security, you've got to reach the ceos.
they are the ones making the resource allocation decisions within their state budgets, and so your emphasis on making sure that governors are on board with this is well-placed. >> anything you would like to add? ma'am.nson: yes, i was impressed by a number of the things that suzanne suggested about how to shore up state cyber security, and what congress can do. i think the idea of an intelligence assessment is a good one. at some point in advance of the that, and ifuiring the states are resistant to any type of federal presence and their systems, perhaps the certified third-party validator is a good idea.
haven't talked about shoring up our information sharing capabilities. no matter how sophisticated of firm, company, state government is, we all benefit from information sharing. disparity in the between sophistication and among actors in the private and public sector in terms of cyber security. so, we all benefit from that knowledge, including the most sophisticated of my corporate clients in private law practice. they do benefit from this. in terms of, if i could go back to congressman brady's question, and his comment answers your question, i think. is -- the practices a rollover the map. the way ballots are collected
all over the map, literally. when i got into this last year, what was reassuring to find was there is very little reporting that occurs on the internet, and if it does, there are backups. most of the states recognize that is not a best practice. and they have numerous backups, all the way to hand delivery of a ballot count if necessary. the practices do veary. it's up to congress to explore whether some type of legislation is appropriate to legislate either certain federal minimum -- or a requirement of a certification, or as suzanne perhaps congress
mandating that the executive branch provide an assessment of our cyber security across the country. i think there are some things that could be done by congress, including for example, we are talking about your constituents. i think it would be well within to say to officials within your districts and states, at the state level, what are you doing to shore up the cyber security of national elections yourselves? congress should consider, and practices seem to be all over the map. we know that recently dhs contacted local officials to let them know whether their systems had been targeted are not by russian hackers. understand more about white dhs cannot always share information with every interested stakeholder, if you will? mr. johnson: i'm sure suzanne can bring a greater level of
granularity on this. when we were working with states last year, i'm sure that a number were contacted or because theyher came to us, because they contacted the fbi or the fbi contacted them about what we were seeing at the time, and we either had direct contact or through something called the m multistate information sharing and analysis center -- did i get that right? i cannot speak to the timeline since suzanne and i have left office, but i know there was a considerable level of contact with states where we saw this activity going on to provide what we knew at the time and offer our assistance.
we said that publicly and privately to a number of states. ms. spaulding: i would add that we at dhs operate on a voluntary basis. our stakeholders, and that includes state and local officials across the board assistance,s for and to come to us when they see suspicious activity. if they think they have intrusion, scanning. the reason we've been successful in getting businesses and officials to come to us is because we safeguard that information. we don't hold a press conference to talk about the help were providing, we do not share that information without their permission. that is critically important. had -- the we secretary had calls.
-- there was some frustration that we would not reveal in that call, the states that had come to us or that we had information on. trusted to protect the relationship there with those individuals. the secretary is correct that having said that, we do notify the owners and operators of networks when we become aware of activity on their networks. it's called victim notification. remarks, in my opening that was often done through our normal relationships in those governor offices, often through i.s.a.c.istate that's how those notifications took place. >> thank you so much. mr. thompson: the gentlelady from california. >> it's good to see you both again.
thisopeful that through effort that we are engaging in, that we will be able to establish best practices that ofl command the attention not just democrats, but also republicans, because the threat here has nothing to do with partisan politics. it has to do with the conduct of democracy. while the intelligence agencies have told us that the russians intervened to benefit one candidate in the last election, it could be any candidate in the future, or it could just be the damage to the country. this is something that should rally all of us as americans. . have a couple questions one, would it be valuable to make sure that the secretary of , as wellthe 50 states
as the territories, have security clearances so that they can receive the full information that is gathered by our intelligence agencies? >> i think either the secretary carson -- of state or some other official we give security clearances to people in the private sector. agree that would be a good thing to do. >> it's my understanding that the department of homeland security is working with secretaries of state to make that happen? >> my information is it's been painfully slow. that atinformation least one secretary of state is eager to get and has not been shared perhaps for appropriate needn -- reasons, we crumbly information flow between our partners. in terms of minimum standards,
article one section four of the constitution indicates that the congress may at any time by law make or alter regulations for the federal elections. we should engage in minimum standards. number one, if you don't have a paper balance, you can't do a recount. if you can do a recount, you are vulnerable to hacking and mistrust. as a minimum standard, that's something we could certainly comply with. votertacks on registration is very disturbing because of the potential for mischief there is very large. i'm wondering if states are all over the board on how they do their registration. it's not proper for us to interfere in that other than setting minimum standards, we are not going to have civil rights violations in terms of
registration. guidance do you think the congress should give in terms of cyber security, encryption, and the preservation of those registrations? would same day registration process and that -- a system that? -- a assist in that. >> when we saw these voter registration databases being targeted, i was worried that it was the run-up to a huge catastrophic attack, where people would show up at the voting booths and were told there not registered to vote. we were very worried about that, i continue to be worried about the ability of bad cyber actors to compromise the voter registration data. certain federal
standards for the cyber security of our elections and the process, certain minimum standards, congress went down that road after the 2000 election. it's very difficult. state regard this process as jurisdiction.n i think some type of standard or inducements through grants should be encouraged one way or another. federal mandates standards in a whole bunch of context. the whole of our democracy is important. it's something we have to look at. what is mandated? i'd want to carefully consider. the whole of our democracy is important. i know it's a very sensitive with the state, too.
i'd urge caution with how you go about this. i agree with the secretary. you mentioned encryption, it's certainly a practice for protecting data at rest, which is what voter registration data is. the basicr hygiene, needs -- things that need to be done. if you are looking for a set of best practices, i certainly would recommend the next cyber security framework. it's something we are promoting to private sector, it is not a one size fits all. forrovides a process entities to look at. to do that assessment, where are we today in terms? where should we be given the trust that's placed in us? and how are we going to get from a to b?
>> i appreciate that. effort, i doest think that although it was done in a bipartisan basis with good intention, in retrospect there were some things that could've been done in a different way. the cyber aspects probably were wishs tight as we now they were. i think the nift proposal is an excellent one. the collection assistance commission provides valuable service, but to re-create nift is not necessary. they are the state of the art in terms of standard setting in the united states. we should utilize them. i thank you so much for your service to our country. your willingness to come back and continue to share your
expertise with us even today out here in the private sector. >> thank you very much. we will now hear the gentleman from rhode island. >> thank you for being here today, welcome back. i just want to thank you for your many years of service at the department of homeland security and all of the work you have done in a number of things. on cyber security, which we had to work with you on over the years. of security and preventing foreign government interference with our election judges on so many areas that i have been involved with over the years, going back to my six years when i served as rhode island's secretary of state. in 1996 iwhich,
overhauled rhode island's entire collection system. chaired a special legislative commission looking at the alternative voting systems before iran for secretary of state. i was very familiar with the various types of systems out there. at the time, the new stuff was the touchscreen technology. ofouldn't get over the issue how important it was to have some type of audit trail, that's why we went with an optical scan system. was grateful more and more everyday that that's the route we went. it obviously poses a number of challenges.
in the years that i spent on the intelligence committee looking .t vulnerabilities there i appreciate your guidance and insights into this, you have had experience on this. critical infrastructure designation change dhs'relationship with the state and local election officials? if so, how? aso, how did dhs communicate meeting and the consequences of that designation? stater opinion, do officials understand the implications of the designation? how, in your estimation have they responded? in an official way, it changes the relationship in that
the member of the critical infrastructure sector is now a priority customer, so to speak. when they seek cyber security assistance, dhs will prioritize, prior -- providing that assistance. was a fair there amount of pushback, i'm quite sure that a number of state officials were not happy that we went forward based on a misconception about what it would mean. i was was can -- was convinced that it was the right thing to do, that it should have been done a long time before. election infrastructure is as important as a lot of other critical infrastructure sectors, i'm quite sure that in the relationship since january 6, since we left office, people in dhs had had to spend
considerable time explaining to state officials exactly what it means and what it doesn't mean. year explained a number of times, both initially ourugust 2016, and in explanations to them along the way during the election season. it's not that complicated. it's basically the three things that i spelled out earlier in my statement. it's not real rocket science. are a priority customer if you seek our assistance. you get the benefit of the international cyber security and, the benefit of confidential communications should we have those communications. directives orting federal regulations or anything of that type. there was this misperception, which we repeatedly wanted to
dispel. i think we did, for the most part. that's probably still a work in progress at dhs. you would have to ask people who are there now. it's my understanding that they have gone forward, and working with at least some of the state local election officials created a coordinating council as a subsector under the government's facilities sector of critical infrastructure. that's certainly progress. ote, we make this point repeatedly when we were in office, the definition of critical infrastructure is any system, advanced, or network. the destruction of which would have a debilitating impact on security, economic security, public health and safety, or any combination thereof.
off that it was very difficult to assert that the disruption of our election not capablere was of having a significant impact on our security. that really was one of the key driving forces behind this decision that we needed to recognize what was simply the case. that this is significant and critical infrastructure, it needs the definition -- it meets the definition. let me approach this next question from a different way. i found state and local officials are unaware of the cyber vulnerabilities in the election infrastructure and the threats they face. can we assure that state and
local officials are well-versed in election cyber security? i know you touched on that, what role should the age of in training election officials in cyber security? fromd we be sending people u.s. cert there, even to show them how they could be vulnerable, how the systems could be hacked, how easy it would be to do. i've seen some of these demonstrations, it's remarkable how, they can get into almost any system. is it helpful to send people there to do a little bit of red see whato they can they need to be looking out for? would bek it extremely helpful. the defending digital democracy
project held a workshop for state and local officials a couple of weeks ago that included a tabletop exercise. i think that would be a very useful thing to replicate across the country. dhs often does national campaigns to educate critical infrastructure owners and operators about specific threats to help them understand cyber security risks and ways to mitigate it. certainly it would make sense to do this for state and local officials if they are receptive to receiving that training. it might be that they would do this on a regional basis, and in conjunction with eac and the national association of secretaries of state. i think it is the kind of thing that i'm sure is being talked about and would be extremely helpful.
>> we seem to be dealing with two problems related to rhetoric . one is that some states are not acknowledging the gravity of the security threat. the public -- alarm with the public would feed into sewingsian mission of our democracy. what do you think the federal government can take to emphasize the threats that do exist, while ensuring that the public doesn't lose confidence in our nation's democratic system? one thing that occurs to me is having the discussion in an odd year, when it's not in the whereof a campaign, people might perceive us who
engage in the conversation to be taking one side or another in the run-up to a campaign. having the conversation with state officials right now is probably a good idea when people are not running for office. doing as much as possible to disassociate the discussion from campaigns, from politics is a good way to ensure we do this. my experience, whether it's state election officials or theire sector actors, wide disparity for the levels of sophistication and learning that people have about cyber security. there are some who are versed in it, and some who don't know the first thing about it. closing that gap has to be a goal, there are ways to do that through grant making,
certification requirements. now,ing about all of this when we are not in the midst of an election is a good thing. >> i've gone over time. >> we are going to thank our panelists for returning the year for sharing your insights. we will be calling on you again in the future for your wise advice. --do believe that secretary that this is a very important time to raise these issues outside of the fargo partisanship just -- fog of partisanship. in terms of the awareness issue,
as we raise awareness we also need to show solutions. if we allow the public to see the vulnerabilities, but also the steps to take to cure those vulnerabilities we will have achieved our goal,. thank you very much. this hearing is adjourned. strongly encourage you to do what i think you're doing here, which is separate -- thesue from other other issue of the investigation into a legend collusion, who knew what when, so forth. think about how going forward, we make a national policy around the cyber security of our democratic process. >> this is about preserving the integrity of the election system from threats from any source.
>> in november, president trump is to visit five countries in asia, focusing on countering north korea and its nuclear program. he planned to visit japan, south korea, and china. during your visit to be enough -- during his visit to vietnam and he plans to attend security conferences. taking a look at, former chair and ceo of equifax will testify hearings on the data breach at the credit reporting agency.
exposed social security numbers, birth dates, for as many as 130 million people. members of the house energy and commerce committee will hear from him on tuesday, wednesday, he will appear before the senate banking committee. live coverage of both the day starts at 10:00 a.m. on c-span3. you can also watch online at c-span.org or listen on the free c-span radio app. >> our prayers have been answered. and his family's strength have been such an inspiration to this house and to the people it serves. america is grateful for this moment. -- thernow pratley asks chair now probably asks --. speak out of order, mr. speaker.
[applause] >> the gentleman is recognized for his much time has he may insider. -- consider. >> you have no idea how great this feels to be back here at work in the people's house. for the past 30 years, the video library is your free resource for republicans, congress, and washington public affairs. whether it happened 30 years ago or 30 minutes ago, i get in c-span's video library at c-span.org. c-span, where history unfolds daily. >> next on c-span, a speech from british labour party leader jeremy cor