tv FBI Director Christopher Wray on FISA Section 702 Renewal CSPAN October 14, 2017 3:17am-4:11am EDT
here in this room and obviously to the world out there -- i think i can say new director still and get away with that, chris wray of the fbi. mr. shedd: director ray comes from new york city, graduated from yale university in 89 makes -- in 1989, makes me feel old. earned his law degree from yale law school in 92. he then clerked for judge michael of u.s. court of appeals for the fourth district. in 1993, began working in private practice in atlanta. he began his department of justice career in 1997 as an assistant u.s. attorney for the northern district of georgia , where he prosecuted a series of cases on public corruption, gun trafficking and financial fraud. in he joined the office of the 2001, deputy attorney general where he served as associate deputy attorney general and then principal associate deputy attorney general with oversight responsibilities, spanning the full department.
it's clearly a very rich curriculum vitae that makes him very appropriate for the job he holds now and the fbi. so without further ado why don't , i just let you make your remarks and then we will do some questions and answers. welcome. mr. wray: thank you. thank you very much. i appreciate it. thank you, david. thanks to the heritage foundation for putting on this whole program so that we can have a better and more informed discussion about fisa section 702, which i think is sorely needed. i'm very happy to be here this morning and i'm extremely fired up to be back in public service at the fbi. as david says, i think i still qualify as new. i still feel new. and i spent the first to much months trying to get up to speed on a lot of things
including section 702 and the , reauthorization effort. i've also seen the enormous strides that the bureau has made in transforming our work in the new reality i still think of it as new, post-9/11. following the 9/11 attacks, the bureau and its partners in the intelligence community and elsewhere systematically worked to tear down walls that had prohibited or dangerously inhibited critical sharing of intelligence across our programs. i know that because i was there. i was there in the days before 9/11. i was in fbi headquarters of the days of the attack themselves, and i was there for the four years afterwards. and it is because of diligence by thousands of professionals, most important it is a product of teamwork and information
connecting byt those professionals in the post-9/11, post-wall world, with dot connecting made possible, especially with tools like section 702. unfortunately, some of the potential amendments that we've heard about as part of this reauthorization discussion yearly -- eerily similar to rebuilding walls like we had before 9/11. it's like watching well-intentioned people start positioning bricks back in the walls again, perhaps growing complacent from the fact that we haven't had another attack. so what i'd like to try to do in my brief remarks today, and then obviously i would like to have a discussion, is talk first about the current threat landscape, which has evolved and changed since 9/11. second, the value of the
us stay ahead of those threats, and some third clarification as to what the 702 program is and what the 702 program is not. last i want to talk about system , of the potential real-world, practical impact of some of the proposed changes in the 702 program. so let me start with the current threat landscape. when i left public service in 2005, we were still very much focused on the 9/11-style attacks, the kind of terrorist threat posed by al-qaeda and groups like that. that threat remains. but since coming back, i've learned very quickly how much the threats have changed and diversified. we now face a serious and constantly-evolving threat landscape where travel and technology have blurred the lines between foreign and domestic threats. we still have enemies who are plotting the kind of elaborate,
mass-casualty attacks that we suffered on 9/11, attacks that might take months or even years to plot and plan. but that's not all. new technologies now allow isis and others to recruit, radicalize and direct people worldwide much more easily and more remotely than ever before , including right here in the u.s. home-grown violet extremists -- or loan actors who self radicalize at home also continue to be a concern. and we worry that terrorists and others are going to be using, as we've seen in europe, crude but agile methods of attack from vehicles to drones, attacks that can be planned much more leanly and with fewer participants and executed in a matter of days or even instead of weeks or months. so overall, what that means is we now have a greater volume of arguably more compact threats and much less time to detect and disrupt any one of those potential attacks.
so a much shorter flash to bang as the professionals would describe it. so that's a very thumbnail description of the threat landscape. that volume of threats combined with fewer dots within each one of those threats to connect and much shorter and tighter time windows in which to detect them and connect them puts a huge, huge and obvious premium on agility. it's one of the things that i've also learned since coming back, is the tremendous value of the 702 program for just that purpose, that is that agility. as most of you know after the 9/11 attacks, our government worked very hard to figure out why we had failed before 9/11 to connect the dots. it is a phrase that should be familiar to everybody in the audience. as the 9/11 commission found, a
major problem was our inability to take seemingly disparate pieces of information held by different parts of our government, or even sometimes within the same agency, to integrate those different pieces into a coherent picture. since then, through a lot of hard work and a lot of motivation by a lot of professionals, we've succeeded in changing that dynamic. the value of section 702 is that it gives us the lawful ability to connect those dots between foreign threats and homeland targets using information that is already within fbi holdings. i want to make sure people understand that. when you hear about the fbi conducting queries, what they're doing is doing database checks against databases of information the fbi already has, has already lawfully obtained.
so query, data base check, lawfully-obtained information we already have. that's what we're talking about. that information in our databases gives us the agility we need to stay ahead of those threats. there's been some discussion about limiting the fbi's ability to access that database, accessing its 702 collection which would, i'm telling you now, would create a serious risk to the american public. every day the bureau across the country and, indeed, across the world receives tips and leads from lots and lots of different sources, from the public, from other agencies, from state and local law enforcement, from our international partners. the tips and the leads are flooding in hourly. that's the good news. they american people rightly expect that we're going to take every one of those tips and leads seriously and figure out whether that nugget, that fragment of information represents something innocuous or whether that's the key flag of the next attack.
to do that, to separate the wheat from the chaff, to figure out which ones are innocuous and which ones are the indication of something really serious at that early stage with that short time window i was describing, we've got to be able to connect the dots from the different pieces we're getting and figure out whether that nugget fits in with something else we have elsewhere that causes that aha moment that's so important. and the queries of the fbi databases, including the 702 database, is the first step. those queries help us better understand the information -- again, that we've already lawfully collected from a variety of sources through section 702 and a lot of other means by allowing us to cross-reference the information.
and that's what helps us prioritize and work the threats rather than just randomly working one-off cases. and the only way we can do that is by being able to search our data when we get a tip or a lead. so for that reason at that early and critical stage, section 702 is one of the most important tools that we have. so met me be clear. -- so let me be clear. obstacles to conducting those database queries will put the american public at greater risk. obstacles to allowing us to conducting those queries will put the american public at greater risk. they're going to do that because it will either delay us when time is of the essence in conducting those queries, or worse in a lot of instances, prevent us from being able to look at all. that is going to blind us to information that is already lawfully in our possession. so let me talk about what 702 is and what it is not. there's a lot of misconceptions out there, and i'm hoping that you are discussion afterwards
-- that are discussion afterwards will help us go into a little bit more detail about some of these. but let me just briefly make a few basic points. first, what section 702 is. section 702 is a law that has been passed not once, but twice by congress with strong bipartisan support. first in 2008 and then reauthorized in 2012. section 702 is constitutional, lawful, consistent with the fourth amendment. every court to consider the 702 program -- including the ninth circuit -- has found that. and a lot of those court holdings, as well as the civil liberties oversight board, has specifically concluded that those queries i was just describing, the fbi's queries, that practice itself is consistent both with fisa and with the constitution. what that means is all of the
debate about tinkering with 702, it is not the constitution that is requiring that, it is not given by the constitution, the courts have held that the program and the way it is being constituted is constitutional. so a straight reauthorization would be fully consistent with the constitution, including the fourth amendment. with bipartisan support, fully constitutional. ?hat else is it> it is an essential foreign intelligence collection program for the entire intelligence community including the fbi. but it is a targeted authority. by that i mean that the collection is only focused on specific selectors, like a particular e-mail address. whatne must point about
702 is, it is subject to rigorous oversight, oversight by not just one or two, but all three branches of government. and i will tell you from practical perspective, that oversight is demanding, it can ispainstaking and it certainly resource intensive, but we want to make sure that the program is working the way that it should be, so we take the oversight seriously and we respect it and we embrace it. but that brings me to what section 702 is not. it is not bulk collection of anybody, not even foreign persons. we in the u.s. government can't cast a broad net to collect information indiscriminately, and section 702 doesn't provide for that. it does not permit targeting surveillance on u.s. persons anywhere in the world whether they're here or abroad. and it doesn't even allow targeting of just any former
abroad. even with foreigners -- foreigner abroad. even with foreigners, there would have to be a reasonable expectation that the target will receive or communicate specific types of foreign intelligence information. the nsa, and you've heard from admiral rogers already, is the lead agency for the targeting part. one thing you might find reassuring is that the fbi only receives collection for a very small percentage of what the nsa does. so it is about 4.3% of the targets that are under nsa collection. but that 4.3% is unbelievably valuable and important to our mission. so let me be clear here. when we run our queries that i've been describing, we're running those against just a fraction of nsa collection, and the nsa collection itself is not bulk collection. and we can get nsa collection only for targets that are relevant to ongoing, full national security investigations.
let me close by making clear that this is not an abstract or theoretical debate that we're having about this tool. this has real-world consequences. just to give one example. a tip under 702 to the nsa that was crucial in helping the fbi stop an attack on the new york city subway system in 2009. and just sort of stop and process what what a successful attack on the new york subway system would look like, feel like, sound like. 702 helped us prevent that. take a different kind of example. 702 helped us reveal the terrorist propaganda of an isis member, a guy named sean parson, and identified additional members of his network. he was using social media to radicalize and recruit actors for isis.
and part of his network was end -- encouraging followers online to carry out attacks in western europe and right here in the homeland, in the u.s. he was -- in the u.s. he was even posting the names and addresses of american service members. and i just want to quote from his postings in case there's anybody who misunderstands the seriousness of this. i'm quoting from him. "kill them in their own lands, behead them in their own homes. stab them to death as they walk their streets thinking they are safe." these are real-world consequences. those are american servicemen and women he's talking about there. and section 702 helped us break that network, identify the people he was in contact with. so given these kinds of potential consequences, i am -- as you might imagine -- very concerned about some of the kinds of proposals being discussed in this reauthorization debate. any material change to the fbi's
use of section 702 would severely inhibit our ability to keep the american people safe. i think back to the time that i was in government before on 9/11, right before 9/11, right after nep, and i think about -- after 9/11, and i think about how hard dedicated men and women throughout the intelligence community worked to try to tear down the walls that had prevented us from connecting all the information that might have been able to prevent those attacks. and as i said at the beginning, listening to this debate right now, watching some of the potential ideas that are being floated strikes me as eerily similar to people, well-intentioned, starting to put bricks back into a wall. normally, the idea of imposing more restrictions on our ability at the fbi to do our jobs would be based on some kind of
constitutional challenge. that's not the case here. as i said at the beginning, every court to consider this program has upheld this constitutionality. so it's not because of the constitution. well, why else might somebody want to impose restrictions? well, maybe in the past there have been times when government has abused its power. so maybe that's a reason to have restrictions. but there's been no evidence of any kind of abuse of power under section despite all the 702, oversight i mentioned before with three branches of government and quite a few years of experience now. so the proposed changes to section 702 that you're hearing about are not based on a need to somehow make this statute constitutional either as written or as applied. as i have noted it already is. , these are policy changes. policy changes based on personal views that people have -- again, well-intentioned views, and i respect that -- on privacy.
but as you can tell, my views are different. i think our responsibility, our role, my duty, the duty of the people at the fbi and in the intelligence community is that we owe it to the american people to use the full extent of our authorities that are consistent with the fourth amendment. and that we shouldn't be creating gaps and limitations in those authorities simply for policy reasons. one of the experiences i had in my prior time in government was meeting with the family members of the victims of 9/11. and i am not going to look the families of future victims in the eye and tell them that there were things, there was more that we could have done that was fully constitutional, fully within our legal authorities, but that we simply chose not to. i think americans rightly expect us to use all of the available information that we have and all the tools that we have that are consistent with the constitution to combat the threats that we
face as a country. the fbi has made enormous strides since 9/11 to insure that it's doing just that, so i urge, i implore congress to reauthorize section 702 in its current form so that we can keep using one of the most valuable tools that we have in our toolbox to keep america safe. thank you for having me here today. [applause] mr. shedd: well, thank you for being here, thank you for your opening remarks. ten weeks on the job, you've referred to the changes from the period of the first half of the decade. what's the biggest change that you've seen at the bureau, just in a general sense from having been in government, out of government and now back in ten weeks in your current position? mr. wray: well, i think two of the biggest changes that are
particularly relevant to this discussion -- but they also happen to be two of the biggest things that i've noticed even independently -- are in the roles of intelligence, the integration of intelligence and partnerships. so what i mean by that is the fbi in the '90s and before and into the very beginning of the 2000s was still primarily viewed as a law enforcement agency. the fbi now, in 2017, the integration that it has of intelligence into everything it does, its role as a full-blown, respected member of the intelligence community is like night and day to what it was during that period. and that's, i think, in no small part due to the elimination of the wall between law enforcement and intelligence. because it allows folks to understand how the intelligence is being used, what intelligence would be most useful. it's that merging of those two concepts that has made the fbi so much more effective as an
intelligence agency and not just as a law enforcement agency. second, i said partnerships. i've noticed that while partnerships were always important to the fbi, the degree of collaboration and teamwork between the fbi and the cia and the nsa, but also state and local law enforcement, our foreign partners, especially the five i's as they call them, has been a dramatic improvement since during the early 2000s. and i think that's, again, a reflection of the fact that, a, the threats that we face are so cross-border, but also the fact that we're able to communicate and compare notes and exchange information and connect those dots. and so i think the two things that i've noticed the most as progress, ironically, i would have said that even if we weren't having a discussion of section 702. it actually ties in very well to its importance.
mr. shedd: you mentioned foreign partners. how does the bureau manage the sharing of information derived from 702 with foreign partners? and at the same time, protect, for example, the sources associated with where that's derived from to enhance again not only our protection, but the protection of our friends and allies? so more on the partnership side since you raised that as one of the big changes. but as it applies to 702. mr. wray: certainly we exchange information related to section 702, although a lot of that comes from some of our other intelligence community partners and their interaction. but even the sean parson case that i mentioned, for example, you know, a key part of that was being able to exchange information with foreign partners so that there were subjects of interest in that investigation, foreign subjects of interest as well who were being picked up in other countries and intercepted through that collaboration.
mr. shedd: and in the question of reauthorization, i think one of the issues that's going to loom large is this whole notion of 702 collection used for investigations of criminals outside of the national security realm. how do you respond to that in terms of both the oversight and the functional role that you have of insuring that 702 is applied appropriately and in accordance to the law that admiral rogers so eloquently laid out in terms of the checks and balances to it? but this is more on the criminal investigatory side than the intelligence collection for national security. mr. wray: well, i think there's been a little bit of myth development in that, in that space. when we talk about sort of the criminal side, i think it's important to distinguish between
the tip and lead kind of scenario that i am describing, which is where section 702 is so and the prosecution , end of it where the information of any sort is being used. section 702 has not been used for any traditional criminal case as evidence, you know, in a trial or anything like that ever. except in about ten terrorism prosecutions. so the notion that there are criminal agents using section 702 to make sort of garden variety criminal cases, that's just myth. it is not happening. mr. shedd: why has that myth evolved in the public square? somehow a law enforcement agency
that -- has an intelligence function as does the bureau and as you appropriately say with the post-9/11 environment having that intelligence function, how did that myth come about, and how do we sort of beat it back from the public square? mr. wray: well, i think -- and i'm reluctant to try to guess as to how people who are just confused get confused. my goal is to try to get them straight. [laughter] at the access, you know, i said there were those two faces. at the tip and lead phase, it's important to think about how information comes in, you know? person x, you know, a private security guard or a police officer see somebody at 3:00 a.m. in the morning taking all sorts of pictures of the key bridge from all kinds of weird angles. that person who's taking those pictures hasn't committed a crime. the guard who sees it doesn't know what the person is up to, it just seems weird to him. we want that guard, we want that person to call in and say i saw
this was odd. could be nothing, could be something. well, we're getting tips like that by the thousands. how do we know that that one is something that really matters? well, when the agent gets that tip, he runs a query in our database, and it's not just the section 702 collection, it's all 120 databases that the fbi has all in one place. one piece of which is the 702 -- the 4.2%. admiral rogers: -- the 4.3% we get is in that pool. so the agent runs a query. he's just trying to figure out what do i have here. if he gets a hit that finds out that the person, let's say the guard gave a license plate, right? you run the license plate and trace the license plate to a person. so now you're running that person's name through the database. if you find out that that person has been communicating with a known isis recruiter, which is the kind of information that we have in our 4.3% of the 702
database, okay, now you've got somebody who's filming the key bridge who's in regular contact with a known isis recruiter. still may not mean that it's an attack. but now we know, whoa, don't let that go slip to the someday pile. we need to deal with that now and take a harder look at it and figure out how real is this. take another example. somebody at a, you know, some kind of supply store, a hardware store sees somebody buying some, you know, odd accumulation of some, you know, product that could be used in an explosive device, or it could be used for something else. and he thinks the person seems kind of squirrely, so he calls in a tip. we don't know what we have. we don't know whether the person's an american or a foreigner. we do not know whether the person is buying fertilizer for some gigantic lawn he has or whether he's going to build it into a device.
even if he is going to build it into a device, we don't know whether it's because he's mad at his employer or his ex, or whether he's actually in coordination with some kind of cell. at that initial access phase, the sifting of all these leads, that's when we need to be able to connect the dots. and that's where 702 is so important. we need the person to know what's the significance of the tip i have. what other dots does this fit with. and as i said before, unlike in the sort of more traditional al-qaeda scenario, we have fewer dots to connect. so these are fewer, these are in many cases we're talking about home grown violent extremists or isis recruits who are in contact with fewer people, so there's fewer dots that way, over a shorter period of time, so there's fewer dots that way, over simpler attacks but still very, very deadly to innocent people, so fewer cots that way.
-- dots that way. so each dot becomes that much more important to be able to connect. and the idea of just blinding the agent by putting some restriction on his ability to see information that -- again, and i can't underscore this enough -- that we already constitutionally have sitting in our own databases, the irony of it is tragic to me. mr. shedd: uh-huh. how often, if you could characterize in an unclassified setting, does the fbi come across criminal, traditional criminal activity as a result of those searches? and then walk us through the process of what you do with that. if you identify -- we go back to the individual taking photos of the key bridge. it turns out it's not a terrorist attack, but he's planning to spray paint it maybe or do something that mars the property and it's a crime but maybe not a terrorist act. what do you do with that information in terms of that
4.3% holdings as it applies to 702 where a crime is identified? i'm not sure if my question's clear. mr. wray: well, i think, i think there's some blur in there. so there's the information over here that the agent is seeing realtime in the u.s. that's the tip or the lead. and then there's the information in the database. and it's the connecting that's important. let me talk about a what's in the database first and what isn't. what's in the database, that 4.3%, that's not evidence. the only stuff that's in that is information about foreigners reasonably believed to be overseas for foreign intelligence purposes. so that's foreign intelligence information that's in there. it's not evidence of, i don't know, take an example, you know, child porn or, you know, something else. could be very serious, but that's not what's in there. so the agent over here if he's a national security investigator is connecting something that he
thinks of as national security information with foreign intelligence information. the criminal agent who is not doing anything related to national security, he is not looking to find some national security hook for his case, he is trying to make sure -- let's say he has a cigarette smuggling case. terrorists have used this to finance their cases. cigarette smuggling is a crime. handled one way, but if it turns out that cigarette smuggling is designed to support hezbollah, that is different. it needs to be viewed differently. but we will not know that if we just build a wall between the agent in the information sitting right over here in the fbi database. mr. shedd: there has been discussion about adding an additional dimension and legislation about warrants and probable cause.
of going further. can you describe the audience, what are we talking about in terms of terms of warrants and when this applies to us persons? so now we are in the us persons and of the spectrum as it applies to 702. mr. wray: a number of things. first let me start with, whenever i think about the word warrants, i think about the fourth amendment. remember, i am going to say it over and over and over again. every court to look at section 702 and the way it has been used including the fbi's queries has , found it fully consistent with the fourth amendment. and that makes sense if you think about it. because what the agent is querying is not some new search. information the fbi has a ready lawfully obtained. the second thing i guess i would
say is to me, when a -- when i hear warrant, it is lawfully and constitutionally obtained. that is those bricks in the wall. when people now sit back and say 3000 people died on 9/11, how could the u.s. government let this happen? one of the answers is they had , this wall. and people said how could this , be? folks, right now, that is what we are watching. this is what building a wall feels like. well-intentioned people, when there is no constitutional justification for it. and no abuse to be remedied. thinking well what if we just , put this one more restriction here? one more there? one more restriction there, one -- that is what building a wall feels like. it will be building a wall between the agents and what is in the fbi's own database. think about some of the hypotheticals and real-world examples given today. that guy who sees the person taking pictures of the bridge. cannot,not have -- he
he will not be able to go get a warrant based on that to search the database. think about the person at the store with what could be a precursor. they are not going to get a warrant. think about an example, you know maybe one that is near and dear to our hearts. high school student calls in, says my ex-boyfriend has been making all kinds of ominous comments about his admiration for various mass casualty attacks. and let's say he lists everything from the awful shootings in connecticut, all the way to the orlando nightclub bombing. all she knows is that he is saying how much he admires those people. let's say he has a twitter handle that says something like, i the angel of am death or something. horrible, scary, worrisome, not probable cause. no warrant.
so the agent that gets that tip, he is out of luck. he cannot look. if there is no warrant requirement he cannot run the search. maybe he can investigate and maybe we'll get lucky. maybe, maybe over a period of time he will hit paydirt. i do not think we should be relying on maybe. especially, when there is nothing in the constitution that would require it and there is no abuse by anybody in law enforcement intelligence community that this is justified. it is just choice. personal self-imposed choice. when i say self-imposed choice, another version of that is self-inflicted wounds. and like i said, i have enormous respect for the people who have raised some of these possibilities like a warrant requirement. i know they mean well. i just don't think that they understand the consequences of what they are asking for. tips, when they come and some people say, you could do it and
maybe you would have an exception for national security but not if it is criminal. think about some of the examples we talked about. when tips come in they do not come in with a nice bow on the top that says, national security. criminal. they are not labeled that way. it is not all of the rounded -- around -- round pegs go into and the square pegs going the square holes. these are coming in oblong. we need to be able to figure out whether they are round or square. that is what 702 enables us to do. any restriction on the ability to access the information that is already constitutionally collected in the databases, i just think it is a really tragic and needless restriction. and i just, i beg the country not to go there again. i think we will regret it and i'm hoping that it does not take another attack for people to realize that. mr. shedd: certainly in the kind of uncertain world that we live in, that is a distinct possibility with what our
adversaries would wish to do to us. 4.3would a decision on the of the 702 data, how is it decided? why is it not 10% or 2%? if you can elaborate on why it is so precise in terms of what is held, that moves to the bureau and not reached by nsa, let's say? mr. wray: the way we think of that is the nsa had done all this collection. and again, i want to stress the nsa collection is not both collection on anybody. not even foreigners. so they have their collection. and we are nominating certain email addresses to be included as part of what they collect. because we only ask that -- for that information when it is related to what is our highest level of predication for
a foreign intelligence or national security investigation, think at has i narrowing effect on what it is we would be asking for. so it is not some magic percentage that we are seeking. it is just, i think, our own focus is what leads to it being a small percentage. because we ask sparingly, surgically and with emphasis on the proper focus. 4.3%ou might say does not sound like much, so why is it so important? well, in easy way to answer that is think about how much havoc 19 people cause on 9/11. think how much havoc one person caused in las vegas. so, you do not need very many people for it to be incredibly valuable. and i can assure you, the 4.3% is very valuable to all the victims that could have been from that collection.
mr. shedd: thank you for elaborating on that. a question from the audience, can you describe how the fbi uses 702 to fight cybercrime? which of course is a growing threat in its own right. as you look across the spectrum of cyber security. cyberay: well i mean, spans across everything from what people think of as traditional hacking all the way to ransomware and various other kinds of activity. and it is used by everybody from nationstates to nonstate actors , there is cyber terrorism. but much like in the terrorism context, we are sending and tasking certain specific email addresses that we think may be tied to cyber activity that is related to a security investigation. and then that may lead to again, just like in terrorism, we are getting tips by the thousands.
and we need to be able to figure out which ones need to be prioritized. so it is a similar concept in what i was describing. mr. shedd: and i think director, your observation about the information sharing admiral , rogers talked about the russian cyber issue and the report from late last year. that the community issued and how important 702 in its generic form, and he could not give us details on that, but that information sharing crosses the boundaries of foreign and domestic and i am sure it is of tremendous value. nsaerms of seeing what the is focused on while you are , adjusting that as well. mr. wray: that is true. in a lot of different ways. i mean, just to pick an easy one to describe. lots of people are focused on meddle withetal --
our election system. and nationstates are doing the same with other countries election system. the fbi does not investigate interference with the german election system. but if there is information that we are attaining about what's happening there, it tells us a lot about trade, methodology and so forth. i was on the phone just before i came over here with one of my foreign counterparts. over in europe. so that is where comparing of notes, it is absolutely essential across all of the different things we talk about, whether it is counterterrorism, counterespionage, cyber, frankly even outside of the national security context. we are in interconnected world in a way that i think is more and more true every day. mr. shedd: another question from the audience, can you tell us about the humanization process and how these 702 information on americans minimize, and what does it look lfo and what does it look like for the fbi in terms of getting access to it?
mr. wray: so minimization is jargon. it is a term of ours. minimization procedures are procedures that the fbi, in this case we are talking about the fbi -- that we have approved by the court that allow us to to, requirebout us us to restrict how we use , information about us persons in the take whether the intelligence information. and i cannot describe all of it because it is around 40 pages , but i think the main take away for the audience is these are persons,ns for u.s. approved by a court. if you think about all the discussion we had a minute ago about a warrant requirement, should there be a warrant requirement? well what is that? , it is a protection for a us -- for a u.s. person approved by a court.
that is a minimization procedure. we have those. like ithose 40 pages are very detailed. they affect things as if a u.s. person is incidentally collected. in effect -- it affects whether that information is read data ked in the information. how long the information is retained. affects weather can be used in a criminal case. all of those protections are being fronted and reviewed by another branch of government, of court, a judge, a federal judge with life tenure 10 he doesn't answer to me or anybody in the executive branch, reviewing that with the independent you get with judicial review. -- we put a lot of into crafting those, making sure that they will pass muster with the
court and then adhering to it. >> and then the training that goes with it. >> right. i have a question that starts with i'm interested in the process. fbi is made aware of this as a national security investigation. madehappens when an essay that discuss when nsa made that -- what happens when nsa made that discovery? what is the interaction? how close are the communications between two agencies before and during an ongoing investigation? 702-related. probably the short answer is all of the above, in terms of interaction between the fbi and the nsa. it depends on the particular
circumstances. it could be phone calls, emails, some other kind of communication between the two agencies. >> now i am adding to the audience question. place traditional requirements now thatr collection it moves into an investigation stage, in terms of data, in terms of looking for 702. in terms, there might be new selectors because the investigation is hopefully identifying other dots, as you described them. so then the bureau reaches back to nsa and says here are some additional leads. can you collect on that? >> yes and no. no, in the sense that -- remember, the bureau is only -- by that,electors
it sounds like a legalistic term -- but essentially making requests of the nsa in the context of national security, very specific kinds of national security situations. i don't want anybody to get that the fbi, to build a non-national security case, is a listing the help of the nsa to build that case. that does not happen. people inhappen is the fbi identify may be an even address. they started to pick up on somebody who is linked up to isis in some way and they thought it was these three email addresses. now they get a fourth or a fifth email address. they might supply that information and say, add that to your collection. can you collect on that information? in your tenure so far, is
there anything you find 702 does not provide that you wish it did? the last question i asked add robertserts -- admiral that it took seeing technology change. the copper wire of 1978 has largely gone by the wayside -- unless we double pay for our handset -- double pay for our handset as well as our landline. how do you see the future by way of where this is going, which is another way of asking of what you wish it would have, in terms of this legal authorization that we are not thinking about perhaps in the way that the world is going? i think my high level answer to that question is we need to
be trying to anticipate in no enough to still new the wayto evaluate technology is changing and the way people communicate. if you think of the way people communicate now i'm how different they are from the way people communicated 10 years ago, it is not hard to at least imagine and understand that it will be different again 10 years from now. is collection aspect of 702 really -- admiral rogers [indiscernible] an hour mislead appreciative and admiring of his work. if he already has a lead on that, i would defer to his expertise on that one. i think we are doing our best to figure out how we can be more effective in using 702. my main focus right now. is saying, folks, forgot sakes, let's not take -- forgot sakes
-- for god's sakes, let's not take a step backward. >> we can only hope for the sake of the nation that we don't go thewards, having lived with world of the 9/11 commission and the terrorism prevention act of 2004 and how vital and critical it was to move and hopefully stay ahead of where our adversaries go, rather than go backwards. and as a career foreign intelligence collective, i can tell you we are in a better place today by way of the two communities coming closer together with proper oversight, with new concern to privacy and civil liberties. [indiscernible] acknowledged itself any report three years ago. with that, thank you very much for coming here today, helping inform the public on this resolution that has just a few
weeks away from coming to a head and hopefully renewed as is. >> thank you to you and heritage for hosting this event. it is an important topic. it doesn't lend itself well to soundbites and one-sentence descriptions. there is a lot of confusion out there. so having a thoughtful, adult discussion is exactly what the country needs. so thank you for hosting it. >> thank you. >> thank you. [applause] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2017] announcer: c-span's "washington journal," live with news and policy issues that impact you.
coming up this morning from washington examiner's stephen nelson examines the voter summit, which examines speeches by president trump, steve bannon and judge roy moore. recent contributor and a journal staff writer roy cobol talks about the hemp industry in kentucky. discussessusan lipkin state and federal anti-hazing laws. be sure to watch c-span's "washington journal" live at 10:00 eastern this morning. join the discussion. live in we are jefferson city, missouri for the next stop on the c-span 50 capitals tour. jay asked croft will be our guest, starting at 8:00 a.m. eastern. the family research
council is holding its values voters summit in washington, d.c. speakers on the first day included president trump, former education secretary bill bennett and advisor kellyanne conway. this part of the conference begins with family research council tony perkins and is a panel of republican house members. everyone.rning, welcome to the >> good morning, everyone. welcome to the 2017 values voters summit. are you ready to drain the swamp? [cheering and applause] >> i've got the equipment and the motivation and we are going to get it. -- get it done. we must seize this moment and save our republic area we