tv Panelists Discuss European Union Relations with U.S. and China CSPAN April 16, 2019 12:02pm-1:41pm EDT
good choices, it is not a choice we have to take insulin. by accepting insulin from the insulinle -- exempting from the deductible you will save money. this is in conjunction with an organization called the national diabetes council. they work at a high level with we employers to look at ways can exempt insulin. >> we will leave the last few minutes of this but you can find the washington journal segment online. we take you live to the hudson institute hosting a discussion on relations between the european union, china and the united states. focuses ont today balancing eu relations with the u.s. and china. omnipresent these days. from investments to high technology to geo-strategy.
inhas become quite a factor u.s. relations. the u.s. under president trump announced a fundamental shift in u.s. policy towards china. the whole of government approach that was announced here at the hudson institute by vice president pence and his a historic october 4 speech. a largely benign view in china and of china and waseu become a view that parallel to the benign views held in the u.s. by leading opinion makers, viewing china as a strategic partner and an engine for markets and investment. china is now viewed with greater nuance in the european union. by theguidelines european commission and european talkedl affairs service about china simultaneously as a thetry, a partner with whom eu has closely aligned objectives and negotiating artners, the eu needs to find
balance of interest and economic competitors in pursuit of technological leadership and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of government. have a more nuanced approach to china comes against a backdrop of increased chinese willingness to seek to use various leverage against the eu. whether it is the new partnership with italy, through the 16 plus one arrangements and others. extraordinarily distinguished group of observers to examine the eu between the united states and china. be me -- our moderator will ashley tellis the chair for strategic affairs at the carnegie endowment for national speeds, one of the senior advisers to the u.s. ambassador in new delhi and special assistant to president
george w. bush and senior director of community planning on the national security council. we are honored and delighted to have with us today jeep tanholm-mikkelsen the top advisor to the highest european official, european council president donald tusk. mr mikkelsen is well known in brussels and has arranged an extraordinary our range of portfolios with calm, discipline and the ability to bring great on divisiveanimity issues. he is a danish diplomat with a distinguished career serving as the danish ambassador to china denmark'syears, as permanent representative to the european union and there are 2800 people who work for him at the council.
schrive honorable randy er, the assistant secretary of defense for indo pacific security affairs. he is a longtime asia hand with the insights in the region, extensive contacts. someone who has been responsible for implementing the national handlesstrategy which theocus is a great deal on free and open indo pacific. some might say this is the real pivot to asia that is being implemented under his leadership. he served under president george assistanteputy secretary of state for east asia and pacific affairs. we have two of my hudson institute colleagues. , senior fellow here that focuses on trade.
he was for many years the president and chief executive officer of the alliance for productivity and motivation. he was assistant secretary of commerce for international economic affairs and chief of quayleo then senator dan and afterward to congressman chris cox. liselotteot least odgaard who is a lead observer of u.s. china and eu relations. visiting time fellowships at harvard university, the molson center and other similar institutes. we are delighted to personal -- or in the microphone over to the secretary-general. >> thank you. it is a pleasure for me to be here.
to moderate this panel, it is going to be a very easy task because we have many distinguished speakers who are going to explore different unions of the european and the united states and the management of relations with china. sayhe beginning i want to if there is that anything distinctive about the truck -- trump administration initiative the free end up and open pacific has been the most distinguished. there have been many discussions about what that entails. elementshere are three were focusing on. first, the freedom from domination to create a political order that is not dominated by idea that chokes out the possibility of political life for others. second, the maintenance of an open economic system.
that the united states spent a lot of capital building since the end of the world war. third, the need to protect our strategic coupling with key regions of the world to include asia and europe. country that challenges these objectives along multiple dimensions. ist our panel is going to do explore various aspects of that challenge and explore the of collaborative action within the united states and europe in dealing with these challenges. since the foundation of this republic the united states has always benefited from having strong allies in managing its interest in the world. today is no exception. as we look to managing the challenges in asia we have to
work collaboratively. that is the focus of this panel. ask jt further ado let me eppe to take the floor and speak on transatlantic relations in china. >> thank you for the invitation framing of the debate which is a good one. i would like to thank you for the title of this event which is maybe a little provocative, but even so i think timely and relevant. thank you also for the presentation of me. while i do represent a european perspective based on where i am coming from i am here in a personal capacity. the first point i would like to make is based on what i see in my day-to-day work, the eu is in
the process of adopting a more serious approach to its relations with the rest of the world and to its global role. why? years of crisis we are now again beginning to have the capacity to look to the future and look beyond our borders. we have been through a serious but we have now and wewth for six years have the highest employment we ever had. crisisy, the migration that dominated politics in europe for the last couple of years and which exploded in 2015, we are back to precrisis
levels in terms of irregular migration. this has not politically completely sunk in. in terms of numbers we are back to the situation before the crisis. , an ongoings brexit issue that takes up too much of our time with anchored -- we think. it is no longer a political crisis on our side of the channel. for all these reasons the union has been able to begin to look to its future and the future and construction of the euro and look more towards the rest of the world. the second thing is not just our capacity but also the reality that keeps creeping in, that the rest of the world is very difficult to ignore. beyond our looking own borders we discover that during those five or 10 years the world changed.
it changed in china, the u.s., and the relationship between china and the u.s. has been changing. what is it that is sinking in? what is it that is provoking a re-think in europe these days? we wereina, while fighting our way out of the crisis the gdp of china doubled. it is not the same world we are coming back to, it is a different world. it is also a china that is increasingly at the cutting-edge when it comes to the most important technologies of the future. that was not the situation 10 years ago. clearlychina that very is pursuing a long-term strategy that is not new but it is a that in certain aspects
raises security issues. it is a development where as we see it in europe, we have confirmed it with unfair practices in the trading which we need to address. the eu in its relationship with partneres china as a and not just a challenge but also an opportunity. that in looking at those challenges and opportunities the challenges have become more in focus. what also happened during those years was that political climates changed in the u.s.. we had a new american president. that also made an impression in europe. particularly the current to thetration's approach
international rule-based order which as we see it deviates from a traditional american approach and where our approach continues to be a firm commitment to that rules-based international order. a u.s. that is insistent on its own interests and as we have seen it, not always taking into account sufficiently the legitimate interest of its allies. that is also reflected in public opinion. the best analysis of that is coming from this city, the pew institute, to which i would refer you. then we see that the relationship between the u.s. and china is changing and taking on a new character.
increasingly that puts us on the spot. that is why i said while the title might be exaggerated it is not without relevance and is quite timely. what consequences do eu member states face from all of this? i cannot claim to speak on behalf of of every eu member state. see in these i meetings of the leaders of the european union in the european council i would claim that there is a clear trend here. the first element is the recognition that there are no big states left in europe. that has been more difficult realization for some than others. that has sunk in today. when we look at the global world , this global picture, cannotual member states
really exercise their sovereignty as they used to in this world. a joint exercise of sovereignty in this world or it will not happen. thesecond realization is union has been strong on values and will continue to be, we need to be more serious about our interest. we have to take into account the world we live in and we cannot be naive. we have to not shy away from using leverage where we have it in order to pursue those interests. finally, the eu must define its relationship between the u.s. and china. in thisto find our role context.
how that ultimately plays out does not only depend on us, it depends on china and the u.s.. we are seeking cooperation with them both. we want to preserve the rules-based international order. we recognized that the world we are living it has changed and that those rules that have been are nota long time ago always fit for purpose any longer. do not always take account of the changing role of china. we need to reform that order to make it more resilient and more fair and better fit for purpose. i would like to underline that the european natural inclination is to align as closely as possible with the u.s.. the transatlantic bond is not just words, it is very deeply
rooted in history and the democratic values and alliance. i think that is very much present among the leaders when they meet in the european council. they want to the transatlantic and they wantue to strengthen it. it continues to be a key factor in how we go about seeing how to place ourselves in this world. that also means that we need to build on what we have in common. we need to maximize the positive .genda about the rules-based international order and about the wto. where there is sufficient commonality of interest to push
a common reform agenda. at the same time we need to minimize friction. there have always been friction in the transatlantic relationship. careful that they don't proliferate too much because of the impact that has which may influence the room of maneuver when the leaders want ties with the u.s.. in short, we as europeans are the same i hope that is the case as far as the u.s. is concerned. both clear and brief. randy? schriver: thank you for having me in your house and
allowing me to join such a distinguished panel. my reputation is enhanced today dr. tellis, segregation -- secretary-general and hudson colleague. ashley, in your opening remarks you captured where i was going to lead off. no need for me to repeat. i do think developing a better understanding of what we mean in this concept of a free and open end of pacific is something we are pursuing. your articulation is very good. a are going to be producing defense indo pacific strategy report that will give a dod perspective on what we are doing to pursue this concept. , patrickew veterans you remember the old east asia strategy reports. it will be along those lines. a public articulation of these concepts. we hope that will resonate well. we do seek a free and open
said aand as ashley protection of promotional sovereignty, no matter how large or small a country may be, promoting international law and norms, free fair and reciprocal open trade, those are the foundational principles. any colorsant to see of approaches to resolving disputes but rather peaceful diplomatic approaches. sieve -- coercive approaches to resolving disputes but rather peaceful diplomatic approaches. we have continuing dangerous behavior from north korea. we have seen nonstate actors, transnational threats. there is a wide range of challenges. they are familiar to everybody in this room. we are particularly concerned about the trajectory of china. china with a different vision or
aspirations for the region. if those goals are achieved, if they are realized i think we could see a very different indo pacific region. one where sovereignty has eroded and there is backsliding in terms of human rights and religious freedom. everyone should be concerned in towhat is going on bat, it is underreported the huge and -- human tragedy -- in , it is unreported. i think it is a very different regional architecture in order if china is successful in its model of governance. , -- we are in an ideological battle as vice president pence pointed out in his speech when he talked about
the promotion of certain enduring values that china does not pursue in its own relations. many times it is just the opposite. their predatory economics leads to greater corruption and weaker governance. period for us,us very consequential. we look for partners and allies. ashley wright fully set it is one of our great advantages as we approach security challenges to be included in that with the idea that we will have partners and allies alongside us operating from a foundation of shared principles. i appreciate your comment on the real pivot. i have to say the obama administration did a terrific job in developing some of our emerging partners in the vietnam, indonesia, very strong partnerships that were handed off to us. i think we have stood on their shoulders and strengthen those
relationships further. we are more and more looking at the transatlantic relationship, our relationship with the eu and individual european countries to help us address these challenges in the indo pacific region. layout four sort of or five things i think we can do together as partners that i think would be mutually beneficial but also promote would mention, i things like the following. we need to continue in information sharing, intelligent sharing on the strategic landscape. it is very dynamic. say, having been involved in china and asia policy for a couple of decades we have made a lot of progress. the convergence is significant. when i was spending time as a deputy assistant secretary of state were talking as partners. a knee you that largely sought
economic opportunity and a u.s. that saw a security challenge. we talked about the export ban on arms and things of that nature. we are much closer now. i think there are differences that remain but we are much closer in our views on economic challenges and security challenges. dynamic environment that conversation needs to be strengthened and continued on intelligence and on policies and how we approach the region. on that i would say another isng we should be doing comparing notes and trying to learn from one another on best practices. when we look at our milton mill the chinese are smart and opportunistic. they will choose the type of engagement with a particular country based on what they can learn from that country and what they can extract from them. maybe the country has a niche
area of excellence, that is where china will want to engage. we have seen repeated requests in certain areas. how we engage china is another area where we can benefit from exchanging information, comparing notes. about howee, thinking developover time, operational approaches in the region. i would put that into several subcategories. in some instances it might the actual operating. challenges in the south china sea to ensure that chinese militarization of the south china sea does not result in erosion of international water and that the dream of operational lysing the line, no country can change international law and claim it as their own. we have seen more european
countries willing to operate beside us on joint patrols and presence operations if not ultimately freedom of navigation operations. in thatone subcategory area of operational cooperation. another area would be in terms of capacity building. we have many of our allies, friends and partners in maritime asia that lacks their own capability to see, sense, understand the environment around them even through their own territorial waters if not there economic areas. out to 200 miles. when we look at providing that capability -- those capabilities we know our european friends have more systems and ways they can contribute training and educational opportunities. i think the capacity building
area is another operational area. i think also where you see this fusion from china, the economic statecraft and security interest and people refer to the belton road initiative and how it has certain security and military objectives tied to it. shoring up our relationships through things like strategic port calls and other types of engagement that gives those individual countries alternatives and conveys to those countries that they have friends, supporters and allies and other ways we can cooperate with one another in that category. shifting now to another area where i think we need to continue our cooperation. that is in the protection of our own technology and our own critical infrastructure. looking first and foremost internally. we have gone through a round of
extensive have done studies of our own defense supply chain and seeing where vulnerabilities may be. every country taking that task on for themselves. then a way to trade notes and discover best practices for one another. a very dynamic environment where these challenges will continue to evolve. we have to be nimble and flexible. i don't think one round of reform will do it for us. as we are doing that individually, being able to trade best practices is critical. him inlooking at challenge with 5g communication .ystems networks we recognize in the u.s. we don't all start from the same place. there are countries that have 4g infrastructure. we need to end up in the same place which is having companies
and assurance we can continue close relations, share the most sensitive information we need to share as partners and allies and understand we can do that without compromise. as individual decisions are made by member nations and the eu looks at these types of issues we will want to stay in close coordination. on our side continuing to explain where we have concerns and appreciating we are not all starting from the same place on the eu side and individual member states side, understanding that decisions that are made need to be made with that end state in mind come oil want to share the most sensitive and important information -- in mind, we want to share the most sensitive and important information with our allies. a thank you that was wide-ranging menu of things we have to focus on in the situation. deusterberge tom
to look at the economic intentions. let me express: my solidarity with the european people on the great tragedy of one of the icons and symbols of western civilization that was all but destroyed yesterday. i am a long-time student of french history and european history and it is particularly questions think about of our long-standing relations on this day. i am a longtime advocate of u.s. eu cooperation. i wrote my first article on promoting a free-trade agreement with europe in 1994. most recently i have written a fair amount on the reasons we share to cooperate on all of the
issues related to the chinese economic challenge, this includes wto reform as well as bilateral and multilateral efforts to try to respond to chinese mercantilism. our economies are the most threatened by chinese mercantilism. though united states alone probably lost, according to the most definitive study of job losses in manufacturing due to is 2hinese juggernaut million jobs in the u.s.. exploited thep problems associated with that decline of industrial sector to be elected president. said i am nervous ability of the united states and europe to work
closely together despite the many positive reasons that we should be doing so. these stem from a lot of long-standing disputes on the trade front with europe. concerneda little that our cooperation on china has gotten off to a very slow start. the united states is at the tip of the spear taking on china bilaterally. has joined us in issues .elated to wto reform technology transfer, addressing theft andoblem, ipr the like. is in typical european style
it has moved very slowly. i would note a couple of things. the best chance for a u.s. eu free-trade agreement was under the obama administration when politics were aligned on our side to get a deal done. internal politics in europe, especially in germany and france, were so opposed to a deal that it did not get done. junckerer the trump agreement we will make another try at this. it has taken europe nine months to get a mandate to negotiate and for that mandate the french have voted against that. it is going to beat tough to assemble a coalition in europe, even if we are -- even our negotiators do an agreement.
i am somewhat disappointed in cooperation on tough issues like wei 5gile way -- hua dispute and pushing back on the belton road initiative. italy, hungary, and greece are all active for dissidents with the chinese and it is affecting politics in europe area i would also note on the question of timing europe is somewhat slow to respond to wto decisions. i'm going to point to the iconic case of boeing and airbus. the dispute started in 2004. on the u.s. side our complaint has been judged three separate times. concludede wto panel
that airbus had benefited from about $17 billion worth of launch aid which was contrary to wto rules. they appealed the decision and put in another $5 billion for a total of 22 billion. there is a decision in 2018 reaffirming that and it still has not been implemented because you can drag out the wto process. people like donald trump are not especially patient with this sort of delaying tactic. in the counter case against decisionhere was a recently finding that in one out of the 29 charges boeing was guilty of breaking wto support to the tune of about $100 million a year.
europe has now announced they want to retaliate to the tune of $22 billion on that case. boeing isof aid to not a typical of what goes on in the united states. and i would suspect what goes on in other places in the world. to give two examples, when airbus set up a plant in alabama to assemble a320s they got a package totaling $254 million from the state and localities. when bmw went to south carolina the package they got was 130 million plus 900 acres of land which they can lease for a dollar a year. there has to be some sort of reciprocity in the way we think about these things.
people frequently noted the protectionism of the agricultural sector in europe, which does date back to the early years of the wto and the efforts by the united states to cooperate with europe in the face of the challenge of the cold war and the soviet union. europe clings to the benefits they received back in the 50's, 60's and 70's. the united states is not a perfect exemplar of free-trade but the levels of tariff in europe are much bigger than they are here. i would also note, and purely economic terms there is a problem with trade surplus in
germany that has been pointed out. they are running a trade surplus of seven to 8% of gdp on an annual basis. despite the rhetorical criticism by the european commission nothing is done about this. this is a problem for internal convergence and cohesion and europe and for southern europe. it is a problem that contributes to the trade deficit with the united states which president trump so frequently pointed out. i would note, on this german trade surplus a famous economist noted" weett he -- must stress the fact that there is no example in economic history, not since the beginning statistics
that a company has asked -- a country has experienced this level of trade surplus on a long-term basis. not even china or japan which in most cases have risen above 2% or 3% of gdp." rules suggests that trade surpluses or deficits of more than 3% of gdp should not be colonnaded. why is it being -- should not be tolerated. why is it being tolerated in germany? i think the prospects for flexibility on the part of the eu as part of a trump juncker tologue, i point agriculture. the president, mr. lighthizer the chairman of the finance committee, people like
senator portman have all noted that without some anyntion to agriculture agreement is probably a dead letter in the united states. i noted earlier it took a long time to get a mandate in europe. i noted that france is not a part of the mandate and belgium also abstained. understanding of popular movements in france germany and italy and eastern europe are not all that sympathetic to doing a free trade deal of any sort with the u.s.. to me that is not a formula for rapid action on the trump juncker dialogue and the free-trade agreement. i am not a supporter of using .ection 232
i was not on steel or autos. specific security related issues such as perhaps on 5g technology. ahave supported on iranian -- uranium mining case that is in our natural interests. with that being said i'm very nervous that president trump will look over the horizon and see all these lingering problems senseurope, plus his own could pull thend trigger on 232 or some other thing. europeans have said if we retaliate on the boeing case, we have three wto rulings in our favor, they would pull out of this dialogue. to me that is not a formula for success.
to take a lot more flexibility than we have seen so far on the part of the eu, it will take some flexibility on the u.s. side as well. let's hope for the best. mr. tellis: thank you, tom. that was sobering. liselotte odgaard is an honor to be in this distinguished panel. my remarks will spell out how europe can and already is contributing to stability between the u.s. and china. havet challenges to europe actually made europe stronger and in particular the european union. traditional -- when it
comes to the additional eu issues like trade european institutions have demonstrated they play a key role in devising, and policies for member states and that they cannot be bypassed without severe repercussions in terms of losing influence. wherever there are other issue areas where the eu has not traditionally played such a big role such as security issues in the pacific and chinese industrial and investment policies. we see newa initiatives and new partnerships and thatemerging allowed europe to contribute in ways that we have not seen before. actually, europe has today at greater footprint outside of their home region. the way i would argue that works
is a division of labor has developed between the eu and member states. so that the european union assigns general policies and individual countries have the space to translate the policies into practical initiatives. that is actually a desirable division of labor because it is still seen as europe acting and not individual countries. these groupings who take action on the basis of common eu policies they have greater freedom to work out initiatives that are effective and that will be followed up in practice because they are not stuck with the minority who disagrees on their actions. such actions allow europe to demonstrate support for core values that are shared with the
united states and its allies. it comes from independent position that also allows europe to align itself with international actors on the basis of european interests and addressingsuch as multilateral institutions such and to linkleague up european initiatives such as the giro asian conductivity plan that was adopted by the eu in october 2018. give a more specific example of how this works you can look inthe european operations the indo pacific that have taken place since 2016. the setting for europe us engagement in the indo pacific
security environment is the growing strategic competition between india and china. china has a naval base in djibouti, poor access in bangladesh and myanmar, pakistan and sri lanka that challenges india and western countries position in the western ocean. there are other issues such as the south china this is one of the issues. the eu can only have a general policy on this because there are too many disagreements to have very specific more action oriented policy. been active in addressing these problems. europe, like india sees the indo pacific as strategically linked to africa and the middle east. by the firstated joint eu arab league and summit
that took place in february 2019. in a time where the u.s. has not addressed this grouping very much. the eu has also looked for closer relations to asian states that are considered compatible with european liberal economic and political values. it has been able to do that despite some country's skepticism. it has made an economic partnership agreement with japan and also a strategic partnership to facilitate security cooperation. the eu has a long-standing partnership with india. aom 2019 the has turned into security dialogue on common interest in the indian ocean.
the eu has approached singapore and negotiated a free trade agreement with singapore which is seen as a precursor for a free trade agreement with -- that is a sort of general frame the eu has made for other countries to take action. has beenral policy supplemented by france who since has been joined by an increasing number of -- naval diplomacy in the indo pacific. this year the french led carrier group will sail from the eastern mediterranean off the middle canal to thesuez yemen,f africa,
across the indian ocean and to singapore. there will be a rotating cast of allied ships from portugal, denmark, u.k., italy, australia and the united states. concerning this french initiative. during the deployment the group will participate in maritime exercises with the egyptian, indian and japanese navy. this battle group exercise with the egyptian and indian navy and the japanese self-defense forces at a time when europe is seeking to strengthen security cooperation with the arab league and also with the asian democracy.
airbases opened a new since 2019 to counter china's increasing presence in the indian ocean and japan has supported india's strengthened military presence in the indian ocean. supports these efforts. it will exercise with these navies and it also is prolonging the general eu approach meant -- rapprochement and agreements towards these countries. so, this is a kind of division of labor between the eu and groupings of member states whereby the eu designed the general policy and then individual countries have the space to translate the policy into practical initiatives.
i would argue that is a division of labor because it seems as i as europee beginning acting in that individual countries. the groupings that do in fact take action also have greater freedom of action to work out initiatives that are expected and will be followed up. allowsfort actually europe to play a kind of middle power role in between the u.s. and chinese strategic rivalries. on the one hand demonstrating support for core values that are shared with the u.s. and its allies. positionan independent that allows europe to take action on it strategic perspectives and priorities such as the importance of the arab league. of course these initiatives also serve the interests of individual countries such as french arms sales.
same time it helps europe contribute to common transatlantic strategic interests in the indo pacific. this kind of division of labor that allows europe to proactively address common transatlantic challenges is seen in more cases. it is also seen in the eu 10 action points of robust defense of policies against china's belton road initiative which provides member to adoptth backing cross-border cooperation and industrial policies to deal with china's undermining of intellectual property rights, data security and so on. it is important that these initiatives are coordinated between allies and partners and that is essential to a world
working across purposes. for example, u.s. participation in european naval diplomacy is a desirable development. it is also important that various infrastructure projects in asia are coordinated so that we ensure they work within the if that kind of action takes bold -- takes hold and becomes more pronounced i do believe that transatlantic relations will be seen as a united front against the chinese challenges that the other speakers were describing. that will be a sufficiently powerful force that china cannot just ignore. it will have to take note.
with more of the u.s. and european demands for what should happen should not happen in the indo pacific and other areas. thank you. mr. tellis: i want to open the floor up for questions but i want to make two points based on remarks that i heard in the last few minutes. first, the challenges that we face in the indo pacific and the perspective global order are fundamentally a transatlantic project. the united states is not have the capacity to deal with these alone nor should it. mission of what constitutes good order. we are condemned to work with this collaboratively, no matter what the political exigencies of the day maybe. point number two, the fact that
is noe common values guarantee that we will not have there is a huge difference between disagreements between friends who don't constitute threats to each other's security and disagreements between competitors. we oughtomething that not to forget on both sides of the atlantic. it provides a basis for cooperation going forward. with those remarks i want to open the floor and invite you to explore issues that were raised by any or all of these people. just two points of order. identify yourself when i call upon you and keep your own dimensions brief.
there is a microphone, sir. >> thank you. it is dan from the transnational strategy group. i see a number of friends on the panel, excellent discussion. on one of thend points that was very important to me. there have been discussions in this town that the u.s. needs to work more closely with allies on the problem. how best to work with member states at the commission level. the last speaker spoke of a division of labor. i wonder if she or others on the panel could elaborate a bit about the role of brussels and the role of member states especially at a time when there is a large difference between some of the southern member states and others.
if you could speak a bit about that. thank you for the question which is a highly relevant one. description one this. this is complicated but that is because the union is complicated. that is because the union is complicated. the union is not a state. the union has certain state like qualities, national actors. in some areas and in other areas. when it comes to trade, it is a union that is affected. i have to disagree with the mandate, yes, the council has decided. union mandates a that encompasses all member states irrespective of how it was brought about. the union is an effective actor globally. other areas where the union is almost absent, it is almost absent or at least not very much
present when it comes to the defense or military end of the spectrum. however, i think the union is still very much relevant for that type of security. first of all, the union plays an important role in helping building capacity. developingas been initiatives lately in the defense area. not about building common forces, but about helping member states to spend better than they do now. there is a discussion about the amount of spending, and other factors that we spend less efficiency in europe thing you do in the u.s. we spend i think something like 40% of what you do. but we spend it six times as many weapons systems as you do. that is not particularly efficient. there, the union is relevant. i think the union is also relevant in reaching out to its
also in asia.but in asia, we may be less visible, less present because of the military dimension. but we are strengthening our relations with a number of the countries around china. and they are coming to us. i think unfortunately, the answer to the question is rather a nuanced one and a complex one. but that is where we are. sorry. >> the question is for randy. if you could talk about taiwan's role in technology competition between the u.s. and china? the second question is chinese military aircraft operates in
there recently. will there be actions to maintain the stability in the region? thank you. mr. schriver: the second responsibility to respond to those kinds of incursions rests first and foremost with taiwan's military, as they did. they intercepted the two aircraft see mentioned. long-termch is more in helping taiwan maintain a certain self-defense capability. you may have seen yesterday we notified a large case to congress, about $500 million, for sustainment entertainment -- training. we have a security partnership through the taiwan's relation assists taiwan in responding to those particular incidents. but more broadly, for taiwan's deterrent capability. with respect to technology cooperation, we do have a strong history of industrial
cooperation including in the high-tech space. i think again, just to repeat, we have a dynamic environment where some of the risks are growing. china comective in in the high-tech area and taiwan is active, we of course have concerns about protection of intellectual property and the like. but i think we have a growing security concern with china's trajectory as a technological power themselves that we have to be mindful of. i think those are discussions that representatives from taiwan and the united states need to mature. >> i want to talk about the belt road initiative on europe's periphery.
on the one hand, it says we want countries to gain european perspective and join the eu. presumably to gain access to the european market. on the other hand, china gives out these loans with contracts and they do not meet eu environmental labor standards, which will most likely delay the , i am wondering if any of you have thoughts on that tension between those two notions? thank you. mr. tellis: anyone in particular? i amtranholm-mikkelsen: happy to step in again. in the union, we are conscious of this issue. is the issue of how do we go about the belt on road initiative. seeing we are opportunities and challenges in something like a belt and road initiative. tohink we are waking up
having to deal with this in a more comprehensive, strategic, and long-term perspective. commission,why the i think in october and the last autumn, a competition that is about how do we go about connectivity? it is ae ensure that safe place? respect the rules we have in terms of how we grow public procurement, things like that, within the union. and also, how can we help other countries and are neighborhood to face up to that? how can we prevent undue dependence? that is also about offering alternatives. if you go further south and look at africa, the union is still by far the biggest donor, by far the biggest investor, by far the biggest trading partner.
so there, we are present also as an alternative. that is also part of it. but we have been looking in the last few years, but i think we are waking up to this also and can play a constructive role in this. conductivity no to -- con activity with china and other countries along the way, thatoing it in a way is compatible in a way we want to see this relationship develop. ms. odgaard: can i just add that if you look at the italian case where they signed up to the eri and this nonbinding memorandum, they stayed within the confines of the general eu-china agreement that was just made. although it has been given a bad press, it has not evaluated from the common position. also, with regard to
banks, investments will be relying on ai i be -- aiib. you can see positive things about this agreement. thank you. thank you to the panel, very interesting and compelling discussion. one quick question. how would you respond to the criticism that the eu is more preoccupied with going after american firms like google and others on privacy issues than it is with ensuring the security of vis-a-vis china and china infiltration of the european market? defenders of the policies, please? going after american companies, i do not think that is how i would describe what is happening. i think the way we apply our
to thes aligned nationality of where companies are coming from. and one of the latest examples of that is the decision by the commission on that. which as you know, did not go down so well. that is how we go about our rules. it is true that in the digital this very much becomes a matter of american companies, but that is because it has been so successful. that is because all of the big digital companies are american. therefore, i can understand the perception of going after american companies. is about moving into record leading, something for which the rules we already have are not particularly apt because of the digital picture which is very different. about security, i suppose you
will refer to 5g and the question of huawei, on this, in marchean council welcome to the commission, was just about to come out with a competition on this. again, this is complex because the union cannot ban a particular company or defined national security for member states. that is the competence of the member states. the union is due in the maximum it can with a complication that came out as a response to this line also in the conclusions of the european council. setting outakes -- a framework for member states to evaluate the risks and calling on them to do so by the end of june. at the same time, establishing a process that will lead to a more collective assessment by the first of october so it is not that the union is not i think
him it is acting within the limits of what it is capable of doing. given this division of labor between the union and its member states. >> thank you very much. you have been following up, the chinese government has detained more than 3 million waivers in so-called concentration camps. including 23 members of my family, and many people died, including three people in my family died there. i got the news last month. -- don't yous, why with their cooperation economic and technological cooperations with china helps china to continue its crimes against humanity? and it's grip on power and
regime? thank you. mr. tellis: anyone? >> the union is very attentive and concerned about the situation when it comes to the situation. actingon has also been -- the union has had a delegation growing on this recently and is calling for opening up for other observers to be able to go in there. without going into details, i would say this is also on the agenda. and one of the things being discussed at the recent u.s.-china summits. >> i'm incredibly sorry for what it -- what has happened to your family and fellow citizens. as i said, we should not miss any opportunity for speaking about china to mention this.
i don't know how 3 million people being thrown into concentration camp like conditions is underreported, but it is. i think there was a second part of your question which is, if you are doing business with certain companies come in a way you are an enabler to this repression. we can't ignore that. we should not ignore that, i should say. we should not ignore that. te, other companies are inmselves enabling the ccp this repression. if you are doing business with him, -- with them, you are associated with this activity. i'm sorry. we should take that into account and be mindful of it in addition to the other concerns i mentioned. >> my name is no a bargain, i
have been working for reuters in europe for a long time. i am currently in washington doing a fellowship on this subject. i have a question for mr. tranholm-mikkelsen, and then maybe a second question for the broader panel. i am curious whether you think the u.s. can be helpful at all to the eu in addressing some of the divisions on china, particularly in eastern europe? do anysecond question, of you think there is a need for different and new forms for dialogue on china between europe, the u.s., and perhaps other countries, australia, japan, etc.? mr. tranholm-mikkelsen: well, on divisions on china, again i would not exaggerate those divisions. plus one form6
theh is a little bit like memorandum. this is not something that happens in the back room. and when a declaration like the one negotiated in that forum has been negotiated, you have the european total action service just behind, playing a very important role in that. more generally, i think what we can and should do is to take up with what was present in your intervention, randy, that is to maximize the cooperation in those various areas which you outlined. and i think we could even add to that list, there is a basis for that type of more cooperation and i am not sure we need a new form or new instrument for that.
i think we just have to get down to it and do it. ms. odgaard: i would just have the same comment. when i look at the u.s. and europe, sometimes relations have gone a little bit sour lately. we criticize each other. fact, the basic objective to me seems to be much the same. sometimes, we prioritize different instruments, but that is not necessarily a problem. that could be seen as a strength. working through different channels towards the same thing. i would also say there is not so much a need for more dialogue, but more coordination and the more alignment. it is actually good. if you are doing this, i can do something else toward the same objective. for example, with a big arab league, europe works with them, the u.s. can work with other instruments towards the same goal.
mr. schriver: i would just add if i could, from the u.s. perspective, when you are looking at why italy, why greece, why hungary have latched on to the belt and road initiative, it is because i have an economic need or they perceive they have an economic need that is not being fulfilled otherwise. the united states can't -- to lecture the europeans about how they handle their internal economic problems. but there may be ways for some sorts of cooperation for the sorts of economic development that these examples we have all cited are responding to. one example, we have all been critical of huawei.
don't jointly or individually, the u.s. or the eu, have a really good economic alternative yet for huawei. huawei, they have technology, they come in with low interest loans, they come in with construction companies. it is an attractive package they offer. we could work together on one side to challenge their procurement, the procurement policies. that is up to europe. but we might think about how we can work with our remaining providers we have in the united states and in europe to help them offer better packages. >> my name is pat malloy.
ima trade lawyer, former member of the china commission. i was interested, when secretary schriver, i was on the banking committee, we wrote the official sify is legislation. we put that in the 1998 trade bill. the assistant secretary said we need another round of sophia's reform. i would be interested to hear what he means by that. secondly, i have never clearly understood, is saphenous at the commission level within the eu, or other member state level? because i see that germany has done something. but it was never clear to me. it would be helpful to get an understanding of that point. mr. schriver: thank you. nice to see you again. i think what i said is one round may not be sufficient. maybe i said we need a second round. >> one round will not do it. think -- i hate
that as an official when your words are thrown back at you. [laughter] a. schriver: i think it is reflection of the environment and how dynamic the challenge is. let me give you one example. assistant secretary of defense was in los angeles last week meeting with producers, directors, writers, people from the entertainment industry. why in the world would i show up at something like that? because for china, the information space is part of the comprehensive competitive space for them. they are using the information space for perception management, influence, operations. lo and behold, everyone around the table had some story where the chinese, through the strength of their market, through their direct investment and production, was affecting script content, actors i could be used, on and on. saphenouse original
-- you would answer better than i, did not envision a comprehensive challenge that we have from china across all of these domains. it is not just hard-core military, defense industry, it is not just high technology. it is what is happening in our universities. what is happening in entertainment. i think the nature of this competition will require us to be nimble, and equally dynamic and how we respond. i will reclaim that sentence and say, we will probably need more reform in the future. >> i need the broader understanding of what is going on the eu. thank you assistant secretary schriver. mr. tranholm-mikkelsen: when it comes to how to go about investments against, the answer is complicated. thatit comes to everything has to do with national
security, it is really a member state level. but what we have been doing and the commission has been doing is to set out framework for investment screening that has been adopted. one is a new thing, that is of the things that is growing out of this increasing awareness about the competitive environment in which we find ourselves. a number ofovide instruments for member states to go about this and to be more vigilant in terms of what they'll island what they don't allow. -- of what they allow and what they don't allow. in some areas, there are eu rules which are relevant. when it is security concerns, then it is very much up to member states. the fact that a framework is created for that, the fact that there is an organization of an extension, exchange of
information and best practices, clearly helps in strengthening it. >> thank you. my question is either -- for either of the european experts. do you expect more european nations to sign up with the pri and how does the eu feel about that? thank you. [laughter] havell, the union does not any ideological position on the pri. we are happy to engage with china when it comes to conductivity. but we have to make sure that it does not happen based only on the perspectives and reflecting the interest of one party.
therefore, we need to engage on that, not as individual member states, but having let's say a more comprehensive and strategic view on this. again, i would refer you to pick up location of the commission which i believe is from october of last year. which calls for this broader, more conscious approach, in order to ensure that what we together china and our part of the world. that is something reflects -- that reflects the interest of those parties. is only natural. i think that flows naturally from what i said initially about as being more serious about our interest. not at the expense of anybody, but to be a more credible and useful partner. ms. odgaard: i think more countries will sign up to the bri, but that is not necessarily
a bad thing because bri is not going to go a -- go away. it is the way we sign up that is important. if you look in other parts of the world, japan is starting to join progress -- projects with china on infrastructure. i think that is necessary. ensure thatying to we can work with china, not at andcost, but within surfer -- within certain rules. i think that is the way forward. we can't just say no to old chinese initiatives. that would be sending the wrong signal. but we can insist on certain basic rules that needs to be maintained. that china itself has signed up to in various organizations. >> thank you. thank you for the opportunity.
i would like to ask both secretary schriver, and the eu the euion, how would collaborate with the u.s. and the indo-pacific partners in the south china sea? especially with vietnam. i would like to talk about the international law, to emphasize on that because i think that is a global issue, that surpasses all domain including tai chi, and information sharing and trade. conduct, the code of can we make it a global concern and require the code of conduct for all passing through the south china sea to be a global agreement? i think the eu position in this is tremendously important,
because the u.s. alone cannot do it. i especially think vietnam is reaching out to the eu in many different ways. and we are asking for the eu to support vietnam, especially in issues such as infrastructure to help vietnam to build that away from the proposal of china, because vietnam is being caused into taking chinese proposal in many infrastructures, especially at the ports, where it is important for the south china sea. would you think that is something that we can put on the table for both the eu and the u.s.? thank you. mr. schriver: i think i addressed some of this. quickly, through diplomacy, continued support for international law and international norms, and protection of the environment, another underappreciated,
underreported story is how much fisheries and coral reef were destroyed with the land reclamation that led to the militarization of the post. present operations, probably not from the eu itself but the member states. view that china claims everything within the 9 -- line, any presence operation is a fun up. presence operations and capacity building. i think all of these countries have a need to be able to see and sense and share, because maritime security is inherently multilateral. helping countries and here, maybe the eu does have as an organization ways to help with training. but i think that would be a great place to start in vietnam and throughout maritime southeast asia. ms. odgaard: this is another case, the south china sea is another case with the eu can only have a general policy because of the internal divisions. but it does have a policy on the south china sea.
very general, but it has been followed up by individual groupings of countries again. but a has taken the lead, lot of other countries such as denmark is also working with them on capacity building. that is already happening. but it is individual countries who have to do it and groupings of countries. i think a lot is already going on. but it has to be through this division of labor that europe does something. that can be more effective the land just the union acting, i would say. mr. tranholm-mikkelsen: very with both whate randy and liselotte said. on our policy on the south china terms of the union actually executing a policy is clear that there is any solution has to be
based on international law and continue to call for respective operation. and decisions in this respect. let me add specifically on vietnam, that vietnam is one of the countries to which the eu is reaching out. and i am happy we also have agreement on a new trade agreement that will be ready for the summer. we are very attentive also to the needs and the interest of vietnam, and want to reach out to all countries in the region and we are very happy that is quite a few countries coming to us. so that it is a mutual desire to strengthen those relations. ma'am, please. >> the code of conduct. global --o be a
regarding the rule of law. [indiscernible] it needs to be global. so many countries sharing the same international law, maybe. to make it a global code of conduct. mr. tranholm-mikkelsen: to make it global, everyone would have to agree. but this clearly should happen within a level framework and within the body of law which already exists. therefore, it cannot just be a one-sided affair like you are describing. i will take two questions. the gentleman here and the lady there.
>> [indiscernible] there is a coordinated notion where the strengths we have and the weakness is that we have the diversity act. is there a need to think of the difference -- different companies deal with china? should be brought together? or should there be new kinds of rules or organizations [indiscernible]
mr. tellis: did you want to ask a question? if you can make it brief? and then we will close. thank you for your presentation. i always think about nowadays, people talk about global, but on the other hand, i think other things are ignored. about talking partnership, talking about security. on the other hand, you will see has aly china concentration camp, but in the united states, you know that the prison population is the highest in the world. -- maybe afocusing corporation or business, some kind of development by partnership, especially a
public-private partnership, this is where the serious misleading -- it really reflects serious network. america is not the only prison population is the highest, but they send a lot of people to the hospital. they do everything possible to really abuse, and forced imprisonment -- and force imprisonment, and there are small businesses. i am just wondering, can we agree to work on humanity and the population to have -- to develop the general peace and progress, rather than just every misleading of security or partnership or development? can we work on this? this is very serious.
mr. tellis: thank you. >> thank you. maybe i willrg: say something about the gentleman from gw. q to that in terms of companies. well, companies can express themselves. on the issue of china, for instance, there is a u.s.-china business council, where there is a big presence in china. there is a european wide china business council, there is a german, specifically a german one, there is a u.k., something in china. opinion express their in two ways to their own home government but also directly to the chinese which they are not shy about doing. unifiedor not it can be
, not to be too cynical about it, but we have talked a lot about values and interests, companies more often have interests rather than values. i will just leave it at that. [laughter] mr. tranholm-mikkelsen: just one brief comment also on the question from gw. the first part of your question a strength and a weakness. i agree very much with that. i think the bottom line message today is that we in europe are trying to be a little more coherent than we have been in the past on this spectrum. we are trying to move while still being realistic on what we can achieve to what is the more unit -- the more spectrum. we believe that makes us a more credible and useful partner.
also for the u.s. in the discussions which -- on the issues we are discussing today, i hope that is the message you will be taking today also from this event here today. mr. tellis: i want to thank all of you because if there is anything this conversation has highlighted, that the stakes are very high. and that we need to continue this conversation because we are obviously not going to reach agreement in a single round, in a single conversation. this is the beginning of a longer conversation on both sides of the atlantic. i want to thank all of you for for attendance here, penetrating questions, and a special thanks to our guests. ambassador jeppe tranholm-mikkelsen, assistant secretary schriver, mr. duesterberg and mrs. odgaard. i hope we will continue this discussion.
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