tv Panelists Discuss European Union Relations with U.S. and China CSPAN April 17, 2019 1:59am-3:39am EDT
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made public at the same time. once the report is released, it will be available online at c-span.org and we will open our phone lines to get your reaction. scholarsforeign-policy on the state of relations between the european union, china, and the u.s. topics include trade, cyber security concerns and china's growing influence in europe. from the hudson institute, this is an hour and a half. i'm the president and ceo of the houston institute -- hudson institute. on event today focuses balancing eu relations with the u.s. and china. days is omnipresent these from investments to high technology to geo-strategy and it has also become quite a factor in u.s.-eu relations.
the united states under president trump announced a fundamental shift in u.s. policy toward china, a whole of government approached announced here at hudson unit -- princeton institute by mike pence in his october 4 speech and now after years of largely benign view in china of china in the eu, a view to largely benign views in the united states by leading opinion makers viewing china as a strategic partner and engine for markets and investment, china is now viewed with greater nuance in the european union, recent guidelines given by the european commission and the european external affairs service talked about china as a country with -- a partner with whom the eu has closely aligned objectives and partner where there needs to be a balance of interest and economic competitor
and systemic rival promoting certain models of governance, the need to have a more nuanced approach to china comes against a backdrop of increased chinese willingness to seek to use various levers against the eu, whether through belt and road or new partnership with italy for the 16 plus one arrangements and others. today, we have an extraordinary distinguished group of observers to examine the eu between the united states and china. let me first and foremost, our forrator will be the chair strategic affairs at the carnegie endowment for national peace. he is one of washington's leading observers of asia, senior advisor to the u.s. ambassador in new delhi. for planning on
the national security council. we are delighted to have with us ofay the secretary-general the council of the european union. he is the top advisor to highest-ranking european official, european council donald tusk. he is well-known in brussels as a man who has managed an extraordinary array of portfolios from breaks it to the refugee crisis and calm with discipline and the ability to bring great focus and eventual unanimity on divisive issues. extinguished -- distinguished, a danish diplomat with a career serving as the danish ambassador to china for three years. he served as denmark's permanent representative to the european union and there are 2800 people who work for him at the council. , the assistant secretary of
defense for indo pacific security affairs. randy is well-known as a longtime asia hand with deep insights in the region, extensive contacts, someone who has been responsible for implementing the national defense strategy which certainly handles -- focus is a great deal open indog free and pacific. some might say this is the real pivot to asia being implemented under randy's leadership. georgeed under president w. bush as deputy assistant secretary of state for east asia pacific affairs. have two of my hudson institute colleagues on the panel, as well as a senior fellow at hudson who focuses on trade. -- tom duesterberg, senior fellow here that focuses on trade. he was for many years the president and chief executive officer of the alliance for productivity and motivation.
before that, in addition to being the director of the washington institute, he was assistant secretary of commerce for international economic affairs and chief of staff to then senator dan quayle and afterward to congressman chris cox. last but not least, liselotte odgaard who is a lead observer of u.s. china and eu relations. she spent time visiting fellowships at harvard university, the molson center -- the wilson center, and other similar institutes. we are delighted to turn the microphone over to the secretary-general. >> thank you. it is a pleasure for me to be
back at hudson. to moderate this panel, it is going to be a very easy task because we have many distinguished speakers who are going to explore different aspects of the european union and the united states and the management of relations with china. i think i ought to say in the beginning that if there is that anything distinctive about the trump administration initiative the free and open indo pacific has been the most distinguished. there have been many discussions about what that entails. i think there are three elements worth focusing on. first, the freedom from domination to create a political order that is not dominated by any single power, that chokes out the possibility of political life for others. second, the maintenance of an open economic system. that the united states spent a lot of capital building since
the end of the world war. third, the need to protect our strategic coupling with key regions of the world to include asia and europe. china is probably one country that challenges these objectives along multiple dimensions. what our panel this afternoon is going to do is explore various aspects of that challenge and explore the possibility of collaborative action within the united states and europe in dealing with these challenges. since the foundation of this republic, the united states has always benefited from having strong allies in managing its interest in the world. today is no exception. as we look to managing the challenges in asia, we have to work collaboratively. that is the focus of this panel.
without further ado, let me ask jeppe to take the floor and speak on transatlantic relations in china. thank you. >> thank you for the invitation and this framing of the debate which i think is a good one. i would like to thank you for the title of this event, which is maybe a little provocative, but even so i think timely and relevant. thank you also for the presentation of me. while i do represent a european perspective based on where i am coming from, i am here in a personal capacity. the first point i would like to make is based on what i see in my day-to-day work, the eu is in the process of adopting a more serious approach to its
relations with the rest of the world and to its global role. why is that happening? first of all, because after 10 years of crisis, we are now again beginning to have the capacity to look to the future and look beyond our borders. we have been through a serious economic crisis which took on specific aspects in europe, but we have now had growth for six years and we have the highest employment we ever had. secondly, the migration crisis that dominated politics in europe for the last couple of years and which exploded in 2015, we are back to precrisis levels in terms of irregular migration.
this has not politically completely sunk in. in terms of numbers, we are back to the situation before the crisis. then there is brexit, an ongoing issue that takes up too much of our time with we think. it is no longer a political crisis on our side of the channel. it is clearly still a political crisis in the u.k. for all these reasons, the union has been able to begin to look to its future and the future and construction of the euro and look more towards the rest of the world. the second thing is not just our capacity but also the reality that keeps creeping in, that the rest of the world is very difficult to ignore. as we begin looking beyond our own borders, we discover that during those five or 10 years the world changed. it changed in china, the u.s., and the relationship between
china and the u.s. has been changing. what is it that is sinking in? what is it that is provoking a re-think in europe these days? about china, while we were fighting our way out of the crisis, the gdp of china doubled. it is not the same world we are coming back to, it is a different world. it is also a china that is increasingly at the cutting-edge when it comes to the most important technologies of the future. that was not the situation 10 years ago. it is a china that very clearly is pursuing a state led long-term strategy that is not new, but it is a strategy that in certain aspects raises security issues.
it is a development where as we see it in europe, we have confirmed it with unfair practices in the trading relationship which we need to address. i would like to underline that the eu in its relationship with china sees china as a partner and not just a challenge, but also an opportunity. i would say that in looking at those challenges and opportunities, the challenges have become more in focus. what also happened during those years was that political climate changed in the u.s. we had a new american president. that also made an impression in europe. in particular, the current administration's approach to the international rule-based order
which as we see it deviates from what has been a traditional american approach and where our approach continues to be a firm commitment to that rules-based international order. i'll come back to that. secondly, a u.s. that is insistent on its own interests and as we have seen it, not always taking into account in our view sufficiently the legitimate interest of its allies. that is also reflected in public opinion. the best analysis of that is coming from this city, the pew institute, to which i would refer you. finally, we see that the relationship between the u.s. and china is changing and taking on a new character. increasingly, that puts us on the spot. that is why i said while the
title might be exaggerated it is not without relevance and is quite timely. what consequences do eu member states draw from all of this? here, i cannot claim to speak on behalf of of every eu member state. based on what i see in these meetings of the leaders of the european union in the european council, i would claim that there is less a clear trend here. the first element is the recognition that there are no big states left in europe. that has been more difficult realization for some than others. the biggest of our medium-sized member states, but i think that has sunk in today. when we look at the global world and this global picture, individual member states cannot really exercise their sovereignty as they used to in this world.
it is either a joint exercise of sovereignty in this world or it will not happen. the second realization is the union has been strong on values and will continue to be, we need to be more serious about our interests. we have to take into account the world we live in and we cannot be naive. we have to be -- not shy away from using leverage where we have it in order to pursue those interests. finally, the eu must define its role in this relationship between the u.s. and china. that is not the only defining element in our role, but we need to find our role in this context. how that ultimately plays out does not only depend on us, it depends on china and the u.s.
we are seeking cooperation with them both. we want to preserve the rules-based international order. we also want to reform it. we recognize that the world we are living it has changed and that those rules that have been created a long time ago are not always fit for purpose any longer. in particular do not always take account of the changing role of china. we need to reform that order to make it more resilient and more fair and better fit for purpose. i would like to underline that the european natural inclination is to align as closely as possible with the u.s. the transatlantic bond is not just words, it is very deeply rooted in history and the
democratic values and alliance. that is a reality, and i think that is very much present among the leaders when they meet in the european council. they want the transatlantic bond to continue and they want to strengthen it. it continues to be a key factor in how we go about seeing how to place ourselves in this world. that also means that we need to build on what we have in common. we need to maximize the positive agenda. it is also about the rules-based international order and about the wto. where there is sufficient commonality of interest to push a common reform agenda. at the same time, we need to
minimize friction. there have always been friction in the transatlantic relationship. we have always been able to manage it. i'm sure we will be able to manage such frictions now, but we have to be careful that they don't proliferate too much because of the impact that has been a broader political sense, which may influence the room of maneuver when the leaders want to strengthen ties with the u.s. in short, we as europeans are ready and i hope that the same is the case as far as the u.s. is concerned. >> thank you, that was both clear and brief. randy? >> thanks. thanks for having me in your house this afternoon and thanks for allowing me to join such a distinguished panel. i know we are somewhat judged by the company we keep, so my reputation is enhanced today
with dr. tellis, secretary-general and hudson colleague. ashley, in your opening remarks you captured where i was going to lead off. no need for me to repeat. i do think developing a better understanding of what we mean in this concept of a free and open indo pacific is something we are pursuing. your articulation is very good. we are going to be producing a defense indo pacific strategy report that will give a dod perspective on what we are doing to pursue this concept. i see a few veterans, patrick you remember the old east asia strategy reports. it will be along those lines. a public articulation of these concepts. we hope that will resonate well. we do seek a free and open border and as ashley said a
protection of sovereignty, promotion of sovereignty, no matter how large or small a country may be, promoting international law and norms, free fair and reciprocal open trade, those are the foundational principles. we don't want to see any coercive approaches to resolving disputes but rather peaceful diplomatic approaches. we do see a number of challenges to that. to china.limited of course, we have russia as a country seeking to upend that order based on international law and norms. we have continuing dangerous behavior from north korea. we have seen nonstate actors, transnational threats. there is a wide range of challenges. they are familiar to everybody in this room. we are particularly concerned about the trajectory of china. china with a different vision or aspirations for the region. if those goals are achieved, if
they are realized, i think we could see a very different indo pacific region. we could see where sovereignty one has eroded and there is backsliding in terms of human rights and religious freedom. everyone should be concerned about what is going on in tibet. we should take every opportunity to talk about it because it is unreported. we can see more attempts to resolve differences through other than peaceful means. i think it is a very different regional architecture in order if china is successful in its model of governance. we are in somewhat of an ideological battle as vice president pence pointed out in his speech when he talked about the promotion of certain enduring values that china does not pursue in its own relations.
in fact, many times, just the opposite. their predatory economics leads to greater corruption and weaker governance. this is a serious period for us, a very consequential period. we do look for partners and allies. said -- righ foley said it is one of our great advantages as we approach security challenges to be included in that with the idea that we will have partners and allies alongside us operating from a foundation of shared principles. i appreciate your comment on the real pivot. i have to say the obama administration did a terrific job in developing some of our emerging partners in the vietnam, indonesia, very strong partnerships that were handed off to us. i think we have stood on their shoulders and strengthen those relationships further. i think more and more we are
looking at the transatlantic relationship, our relationship with the eu and individual european countries to help us address these challenges in the indo pacific region. if i were to sort of layout four or five things i think we can do together as partners that i think would be mutually beneficial but also promote these concepts, i would mention things such as the following. number one, we need to continue in information sharing, intelligence sharing on the strategic landscape. it is very dynamic. i can say, having been involved in china policy, asia policy for a couple of decades we have made a lot of progress. the convergence is significant. when i was spending time as a deputy assistant secretary of state, we were talking as that largely an eu sought economic opportunity and a u.s. that saw a security challenge. we talked about the export ban
on arms and things of that nature. we are much closer now. i think there are differences that remain but we are much closer in our views on economic challenges and security challenges. it is a dynamic environment, so that conversation needs to be continued and strengthened, not only on intelligence and information, but on policies and how we approach the region. on that, i would say another thing we should be doing is comparing notes and trying to learn from one another on best practices. when we look at our mill to mill engagements, the chinese are smart and opportunistic. they will choose the type of engagement with a particular country based on what they can learn from that country and what they can extract from them. maybe the country has a niche area of excellence, that is where china will want to engage. with us, we have seen repeated requests in certain areas.
how we engage china is another area where we can benefit from exchanging information, comparing notes. i think number three, thinking about how we can, over time, develop operational approaches in the region. i would put that into several subcategories. in some instances, it might the actual operating. we have challenges in the south china sea to ensure that chinese -- china's militarization of the south china sea does not result in erosion of international water and that the dream of operationalizing the nine dash line, no country can change international law and claim it as their own. we have seen more european countries willing to operate alongside us on joint patrols and presence operations if not ultimately freedom of navigation operations.
that is one subcategory in that area of operational cooperation. another area would be in terms of capacity building. we have many of our allies, friends, and partners in maritime asia that lack their own capability to see, sense, understand the environment around them even through their own territorial waters if not their economic areas. out to 200 miles. when we look at providing those kinds of capabilities, we know our european friends have more -- similar systems and ways they can contribute training and educational opportunities. i think the capacity building area is another operational area. i think also where you see this
fusion from china, the economic statecraft and security interest -- and people refer to the belt and road initiative and how it has certain security and military objectives tied to it. shoring up our relationships through things like strategic port calls and other types of engagement that gives those individual countries alternatives and conveys to those countries that they have friends, supporters and allies is another way we can cooperate with one another in that category. i would say, shifting now to another area where i think we need to continue our cooperation. that is in the protection of our own technology and our own critical infrastructure. looking first and foremost internally. as we have done in the united states. we have gone through a round of reform. we have done extensive studies
of our own defense supply chain and seeing where vulnerabilities may be. every country taking that task on for themselves. then, a way to trade notes and discover best practices for one another. a very dynamic environment where these challenges will continue to evolve. we have to be nimble and flexible. i don't think one round of saphenous reform will do it for us. as we are doing that individually, being able to trade best practices is critical. of course, we are looking right now at a particular challenge with 5g communication systems networks. we recognize in the united states, we don't all start from the same place. there are countries that have 4g infrastructure. we need to end up in the same place which is having companies and assurance we can continue
close relations, share the most sensitive information we need to share as partners and allies and understand we can do that without compromise. as individual decisions are made by member nations and the eu looks at these types of issues we will want to stay in close coordination. on our side continuing to explain where we have concerns and appreciating we are not all starting from the same place on the eu side and individual member states side, understanding that decisions that are made need to be made with that end state in mind come share the most sensitive and important information with our allies. >> thank you that was a wide-ranging menu of things we
mr. duesterberg: let me express my solidarity with the european people on the great tragedy of one of the icons and symbols of western civilization that was all but destroyed yesterday. i am a long-time student of french history and european history and it is particularly painful to think about questions of our long-standing relations on this day. i am a longtime advocate of u.s. eu cooperation. i wrote my first article on promoting a free-trade agreement with europe in 1994. most recently i have written a fair amount on the reasons we share to cooperate on all of the issues related to the chinese economic challenge, this
includes wto reform as well as bilateral and multilateral efforts to try to respond to chinese mercantilism. our economies are the most threatened by chinese mercantilism. the united states alone probably lost, according to the most definitive study of job losses in manufacturing due to the chinese juggernaut is 2 million jobs in the u.s.. president trump exploited the problems associated with that decline of industrial sector to be elected president. that being said i am nervous about the ability of the united states and europe to work closely together despite the many positive reasons that we
should be doing so. these stem from a lot of long-standing disputes on the trade front with europe. i am also a little concerned that our cooperation on china has gotten off to a very slow start. the united states is at the tip of the spear taking on china bilaterally. europe has joined us in issues related to wto reform. technology transfer, addressing the soe problem, ipr theft and the like. it is in typical european style it has moved very slowly. i would note a couple of things.
the best chance for a u.s. eu free-trade agreement was under the obama administration when politics were aligned on our side to get a deal done. internal politics in europe, especially in germany and france, were so opposed to a deal that it did not get done. now, under the trump juncker agreement we will make another try at this. it has taken europe nine months to get a mandate to negotiate and for that mandate the french have voted against that. it is going to beat tough to assemble a coalition in europe, even if we are -- even our negotiators do an agreement.
i am somewhat disappointed in cooperation on tough issues like the while way -- huawei 5g dispute and pushing back on the belton road initiative. italy, hungary, and greece are all active for dissidents with the chinese and it is affecting politics in europe. i would also note on the question of timing europe is somewhat slow to respond to wto decisions. i'm going to point to the iconic case of boeing and airbus. the dispute started in 2004. on the u.s. side our complaint has been judged three separate times. in 2011 the wto panel concluded that airbus had benefited from about $17 billion worth of
launch aid which was contrary to wto rules. they appealed the decision and put in another $5 billion for a total of 22 billion. there is a decision in 2018 reaffirming that and it still has not been implemented because you can drag out the wto process. people like donald trump are not especially patient with this sort of delaying tactic. in the counter case against boeing, there was a decision recently finding that in one out of the 29 charges boeing was guilty of breaking wto support rules to the tune of about $100 million a year. europe has now announced they want to retaliate to the tune of $22 billion on that case.
this sort of aid to boeing is not a typical of what goes on in the united states. and i would suspect what goes on in other places in the world. to give two examples, when airbus set up a plant in alabama to assemble a320s they got a package totaling $254 million from the state and localities. when bmw went to south carolina the package they got was 130 million plus 900 acres of land which they can lease for a dollar a year. there has to be some sort of reciprocity in the way we think about these things. people frequently noted the protectionism of the
agricultural sector in europe, which does date back to the early years of the wto and the efforts by the united states to cooperate with europe in the face of the challenge of the cold war and the soviet union. europe clings to the benefits they received back in the 50's, 60's and 70's. the united states is not a perfect exemplar of free-trade but the levels of tariff protection in europe are much bigger than they are here. i would also note, and purely economic terms there is a problem with trade surplus in germany that has been pointed out. they are running a trade surplus of seven to 8% of gdp on an
annual basis. despite the rhetorical criticism by the european commission nothing is done about this. this is a problem for internal convergence and cohesion in europe and for southern europe. it is a problem that contributes to the trade deficit with the united states which president trump so frequently pointed out. i would note, on this german trade surplus a famous economist thomas pickett noted we must stress the fact that there is no example in economic history, not since the beginning of trade
statistics that a country has experienced this level of trade surplus on a long-term basis. not even china or japan which in most cases have risen above 2% or 3% of gdp." the informal eu rules suggests that trade surpluses or deficits of more than 3% of gdp should not be tolerated. why is it being tolerated in germany? i think the prospects for flexibility on the part of the eu as part of a trump juncker dialogue, i point to agriculture. since the president, mr. lighthizer the chairman of the finance committee, people like senator portman have all noted that without some attention to
agriculture any agreement is probably a dead letter in the united states. i noted earlier it took a long time to get a mandate in europe. i noted that france is not a part of the mandate and belgium also abstained. given my understanding of popular movements in france , germany and italy and eastern europe are not all that sympathetic to doing a free trade deal of any sort with the u.s.. to me that is not a formula for rapid action on the trump juncker dialogue and the free-trade agreement. i am not a supporter of using section 232. i was not on steel or autos. i was on some specific security
related issues such as perhaps on 5g technology. i have supported on iranian -- a uranium mining case that is in our natural interests. with that being said i'm very nervous that president trump will look over the horizon and see all these lingering problems with europe, plus his own sense of impatience and could pull the trigger on 232 or some other thing. europeans have said if we retaliate on the boeing case, we have three wto rulings in our favor, they would pull out of this dialogue. to me that is not a formula for success. it is going to take a lot more
flexibility than we have seen so far on the part of the eu, it will take some flexibility on the u.s. side as well. let's hope for the best. mr. tellis: thank you, tom. that was sobering. let me invite liselotte odgaard ms. odgaard: it is an honor to be in this distinguished panel. my remarks will spell out how europe can and already is contributing to stability between the u.s. and china. recent challenges to europe have actually made europe stronger and in particular the european union. when it comes to the additional eu issues like trade european institutions have demonstrated they play a key role in
devising, and policies for member states and that they cannot be bypassed without severe repercussions in terms of losing influence. however there are other issue areas where the eu has not traditionally played such a big role such as security issues in the pacific and chinese industrial and investment policies. in this area we see new initiatives and new partnerships that are emerging and that allowed europe to contribute in ways that we have not seen before. actually, europe has today at greater footprint outside of their home region. the way i would argue that works is a division of labor has developed between the eu and member states.
so that the european union assigns general policies and individual countries have the space to translate the policies into practical initiatives. that is actually a desirable division of labor because it is still seen as europe acting and not individual countries. these groupings who take action on the basis of common eu policies they have greater freedom to work out initiatives that are effective and that will be followed up in practice because they are not stuck with the minority who disagrees on their actions.
such actions allow europe to demonstrate support for core values that are shared with the united states and its allies. it comes from independent position that also allows europe to align itself with international actors on the basis of european interests and priorities such as addressing multilateral institutions such as the arab league and to link up european initiatives such as the giro asian conductivity plan that was adopted by the eu in october 2018. to give a more specific example of how this works you can look at the european operations in the indo pacific that have taken place since 2016. the setting for europe us engagement in the indo pacific security environment is the growing strategic competition between india and china.
china has a naval base in djibouti, poor access in bangladesh and myanmar, pakistan and sri lanka that challenges india and western countries position in the western ocean. there are other issues such as the south china this is one of the issues. the eu can only have a general policy on this because there are too many disagreements to have very specific more action oriented policy. the eu has been active in addressing these problems. europe, like india sees the indo pacific as strategically linked to africa and the middle east. this is indicated by the first joint eu arab league and summit that took place in february 2019.
in a time where the u.s. has not addressed this grouping very much. the eu has also looked for closer relations to asian states that are considered compatible with european liberal economic and political values. it has been able to do that despite some country's skepticism. it has made an economic partnership agreement with japan and also a strategic partnership to facilitate security cooperation. the eu has a long-standing partnership with india. from 2019 the has turned into a security dialogue on common interest in the indian ocean. the eu has approached singapore and negotiated a free trade
agreement with singapore which is seen as a precursor for a free trade agreement with -- that is a sort of general frame the eu has made for other countries to take action. this general policy has been supplemented by france who since 2016 has been joined by an increasing number of -- naval diplomacy in the indo pacific. this year the french led carrier group will sail from the eastern mediterranean off the middle east and the suez canal to the horn of africa, yemen, across the indian ocean and to singapore.
there will be a rotating cast of allied ships from portugal, denmark, u.k., italy, australia and the united states. concerning this french initiative. during the deployment the group will participate in maritime exercises with the egyptian, indian and japanese navy. this battle group exercise with the egyptian and indian navy and the japanese self-defense forces at a time when europe is seeking to strengthen security cooperation with the arab league and also with the asian democracy.
india has opened a new airbase in 2019 to counter china's increasing presence in the indian ocean and japan has supported india's strengthened military presence in the indian ocean. the french tour supports these efforts. it will exercise with these navies and it also is prolonging the general eu rapprochement and agreements towards these countries. so, this is a kind of division of labor between the eu and groupings of member states whereby the eu designed the general policy and then individual countries have the space to translate the policy into practical initiatives. i would argue that is a division of labor because it seems as i
said in the beginning as europe acting in that individual countries. the groupings that do in fact take action also have greater freedom of action to work out initiatives that are expected and will be followed up. such effort actually allows europe to play a kind of middle power role in between the u.s. and chinese strategic rivalries. on the one hand demonstrating support for core values that are shared with the u.s. and its allies. but from an independent position that allows europe to take action on it strategic perspectives and priorities such as the importance of the arab league. of course these initiatives also serve the interests of individual countries such as french arms sales. at the same time it helps europe contribute to common
transatlantic strategic interests in the indo pacific. this kind of division of labor that allows europe to proactively address common transatlantic challenges is seen in more cases. it is also seen in the eu commission 10 action points of robust defense of policies against china's belton road initiative which provides member states with backing to adopt cross-border cooperation and industrial policies to deal with china's undermining of intellectual property rights, data security and so on. it is important that these initiatives are coordinated between allies and partners and that is essential to a world working across purposes.
for example, u.s. participation in european naval diplomacy is a desirable development. it is also important that various infrastructure projects in asia are coordinated so that we ensure they work within the same limits if that kind of action takes hold and becomes more pronounced i do believe that transatlantic relations will be seen as a united front against the chinese challenges that the other speakers were describing. that will be a sufficiently powerful force that china cannot just ignore. it will have to take note. with more of the u.s. and european demands for what should happen should not happen in the indo pacific and other areas.
thank you. mr. tellis: i want to open the floor up for questions but i want to make two points based on remarks that i heard in the last few minutes. first, the challenges that we face in the indo pacific and the perspective global order are fundamentally a transatlantic project. that is the united states is not have the capacity to deal with these alone nor should it. we have a common mission of what constitutes good order. we are condemned to work with this collaboratively, no matter what the political exigencies of the day maybe. point number two, the fact that we have common values is no guarantee that we will not have
-- there is a huge difference between disagreements between friends who don't constitute threats to each other's security and disagreements between competitors. that is something that we ought not to forget on both sides of the atlantic. it provides a basis for cooperation going forward. with those remarks i want to open the floor and invite you to explore issues that were raised by any or all of these people. just two points of order. identify yourself when i call upon you and keep your own -- interventions brief. there is a microphone, sir.
>> thank you. it is dan from the transnational strategy group. i see a number of friends on the panel, excellent discussion. i want to expand on one of the points that was very important to me. there have been discussions in this town that the u.s. needs to work more closely with allies on the problem. how best to work with member states at the commission level. the last speaker spoke of a division of labor. i wonder if she or others on the panel could elaborate a bit about the role of brussels and the role of member states especially at a time when there is a large difference between some of the southern member states and others. if you could speak a bit about that.
>> thank you for the question which is a highly relevant one. i agree with the description on this. this is complicated but that is because the union is complicated. the union is not a state. the union has certain state like qualities, national actors. in some areas and in other areas. when it comes to trade, it is a union that is affected. i have to disagree with the mandate, yes, the council has decided. therefore it is a union mandate that encompasses all member states irrespective of how it was brought about. the union is an effective actor globally. other areas where the union is almost absent, it is almost absent or at least not very much present when it comes to the defense or military end of the spectrum.
however, i think the union is still very much relevant for that type of security. first of all, the union plays an important role in helping building capacity. the union has been developing initiatives lately in the defense area. not about building common forces, but about helping member states to spend better than they do now. there is a discussion about the amount of spending, and other factors that we spend less efficiency in europe thing you do in the u.s. we spend i think something like 40% of what you do. efficient. there, the union is relevant. i think the union is also relevant in reaching out to its neighborhood, but also in asia.
arab states, but also in asia. in asia, we may be less visible, less present because of the military dimension. but we are strengthening our relations with a number of the countries around china. and they are coming to us. i think unfortunately, the answer to the question is rather a nuanced one and a complex one. but that is where we are. sorry. >> the question is for randy. if you could talk about taiwan's role in technology competition between the u.s. and china? the second question is chinese military aircraft operates in taiwan recently. will the dod to further actions
to maintain the stability in the region? thank you. mr. schriver: the second question, the responsibility to respond to those kinds of incursions rests first and foremost with taiwan's military, as they did. they intercepted the two aircraft that you mentioned. our approach is more long-term in helping taiwan maintain a certain self-defense capability. you might have seen yesterday we notified a large case to congress, about $500 million, for sustainment and training of taiwan's f-16s. we have a security partnership through the taiwan's relation act that assists taiwan in responding to those particular incidents. but more broadly, for taiwan's deterrent capability. with respect to technology cooperation, we do have a strong history of industrial
cooperation including in the high-tech space. i think again, just to repeat, we have a dynamic environment where some of the risks are growing. as we are active in china, in the high-tech area and taiwan is active, we of course have parochial concerns about protection of intellectual property and the like. but i think we have a growing security concern with china's trajectory as a technological power themselves that we have to be mindful of. i think those are discussions that representatives from taiwan and the united states need to really mature. >> i want to talk about the belt road initiative on europe's periphery. on the one hand, it says we want countries to gain european
perspective and eventually joined the e.u. presumably to gain access to the european market. on the other hand, china gives out these laws with no-bid contracts and they do not meet e.u. environmental labor standards, which will most likely delay the a ascession to the e.u., and am wondering if any of you have thoughts on that? thank you. >> anyone in particular? >> i am happy to step in again. in the union, we are conscious of this issue. part of that is the issue of how do we go about the belt on road initiative. for me, we are seeing opportunities and challenges in something like a belt and road initiative.
i think we are waking up to having to deal with this in a more comprehensive, strategic, and long-term perspective. and that is why the commission, october,i think in communication about how do we go about connectivity? how do we ensure that such projects if they take place, respect the rules we have in terms of how we go about procurement, things like that, within the union. and also, how can we help other countries and are neighborhood to face up to that? how can we prevent undue dependence? and of course, it is also about offering alternatives. if you go further south and look at africa, the union is still by far the biggest donor, by far the biggest investor, by far the biggest trading partner. so there, we are present also as an alternative. that is also part of it.
we have been somewhat inward looking in the last few years, but i think we are waking up to this also and can play a constructive role in this. not in saying no to china andty with other countries along the way, but doing it in a way that is compatible with the way we went to see this relationship develop. >> can i just add that if you look at the italian case where they think after the nonbinding memorandum, they actually state within the confines of the general e.u.-china agreement that was just made. although it has been given a bad press, it has not evaluated from the common position. and it has also, with regard to banks, it has ensure that investments will be relying on aiib.
you can see some positive things about this agreement. thank you. thank you to the panel, very interesting and compelling discussion. one quick question. how would you respond to the criticism that the e.u. is more preoccupied with going after american firms like google and others on privacy issues than it is with ensuring the security of its own nations vis-a-vis china and china's infiltration of the european market? >> more defenders of the policies, please? [laughter] >> going after american companies, i do not think that is how i would describe what is happening. i think the way we apply our rules is aligned to the best is aligned to the
nationality -- i think the way we apply our rules is blind to the nationality of where companies are coming from. and one of the latest examples of that is the decision by the ,ommission on siemens which commands you know, did not go t down so well. that is how we go about our rules. it is true that in the digital field, this very much becomes a matter of american companies, but that is because you have and so successful, because all the big i.t. and digital companies are american. therefore, i can understand the perception of going after american companies. but it is about moving into recollecting something for which the rules we already have are not particularly apt because of the digital picture which is very different. about security, i suppose you will refer to 5g and the question of huawei, on this, the european council in march
commission, was just about to come up with a competition on this. again, this is complex because the union cannot ban a particular company or define national security for member states, that is the competence of the member states. but the e.u. i think is doing the maximum it can come up with the complication that came out as a response to this line also in the conclusions of the european council. setting out a framework for member states to evaluate the risks and calling on them to do so by the end of june. at the same time, establishing a process that will lead to a more collective risk assessment. soy is not that the union is not acting on this, i think it is acting within the limits of what
it is capable of doing. given this division of labor between the union and its member states. thank you very much. you have been following up, the chinese government has detained ine than 3 million uighurs so-called concentration camps. including 23 members of my family, and many people died, including three people in my family died there. i got the news last month. my question is, why, don't you think their cooperation with economic and technological cooperations with china helps china to continue its crimes against humanity? and it's grip on power and regime? thank you.
>> anyone? >> the union is very attentive and concerned about the xination when it comes to jiang and the situation of the uighurs. the union has also been acting, the union has had a delegation going there recently and is and forr opening up observers to be a blue going there to without going into details, i would say this is also on the agenda. it is on of the things being discussed at the recent u.s.-china summits. >> i'm incredibly sorry for what has happened to your family and fellow citizens. as i said, we should not miss any opportunity for speaking about china to mention this. i don't know how 3 million people being thrown into
concentration camp like conditions is underreported, but it is. i think there was a second part of your question which is, if you are doing business with certain companies, in a way you are an enabler to this kind of repression, and we can't ignore that. we shouldn't ignore that. huawei, zte, other companies are themselves enabling the ccp in this repression. if you are doing business with them, you are associated with this activity. i'm sorry. so we should take that into account and be mindful of it in addition to the american best in addition to the other -- in addition to the other concerns. >> i have been working for reuters in europe for a long
time. i am currently in washington doing a fellowship on this subject. i have a question for mr. tranholm-mikkelsen, and then maybe a second question for the broader panel. i am curious whether you think the u.s. can be helpful at all to the e.u. in addressing some of the divisions on china, particularly in eastern europe? and my second question, do any of you think there is a need for different and new forms for dialogue on china between europe, the u.s., and perhaps other countries, australia, japan, etc.? >> well, on divisions on china, again i would not exaggerate those divisions. we have this 16 plus one form, which is a little bit like the
italian memorandum. this is not something that happens in a vacuum. when a declaration like the one negotiated in that forum has been negotiated, you have the european external action service just behind, playing a very important role in that. more generally, i think what we can and should do is to take up dust to maximize the cooperation in those various areas which you outlined. and i think we could even add to that list, there is a basis for that type of more cooperation and i am not sure we need a new form or new instrument for that. i think we just have to get down to it and do it.
>> i would just have the same comment. when i look at the u.s. and europe, and times relations have gone a little bit sour lately. we criticize each other. but in fact, the basic objective to me seems to be much the same. sometimes, we prioritize different instruments, but that is not necessarily a problem. that could be seen as a strength. working through different channels towards the same thing. i would also say there is not so much a need for more dialogue, but more coordination and the more alignment. it is actually good. if you are doing this, i can do something else toward the same objective. for example, with the arab league, europe works with them, the u.s. can work with other instruments towards the same goal.
>> i would just add if i could, from the u.s. perspective, when you are looking at why italy, why greece, why hungary have latched on to the belt and road initiative, it is because i have -- it is because they have an economic need or they perceive they have an economic need that is not being fulfilled otherwise. the united states can't, shouldn't try to lecture the europeans about how they handle their internal economic problems. but there may be ways for some sorts of cooperation for the sorts of economic development activities that these examples we have all cited are responding to. one example, we have all been critical of huawei. but we don't jointly or individually, the u.s.
or the e.u., have a really good economic alternative yet for huawei. huawei, they have technology, they come in with low interest loans, they come in with construction companies. it is an attractive package they offer. we could work together on one side to challenge their procurement, the procurement policies. that is up to europe. but we might think about how we can work with our remaining providers we have in the united states and in europe to help them offer better packages.
>> my name is pat malloy. i trade lawyer, former member of am a the china commission. i was interested, when secretary shriver mentioned, i was general counsel on the senate banking committee when we wrote the --cifiussif legislation. we put that in the 1998 trade bill. the assistant secretary said we need another round of reform. secondly, i never understood, is ifius at the commission level within the e.u., or other member state level? because i see that germany has done something. but it was never clear to me. it would be helpful to get an understanding of that point. >> thank you. nice to see you again. i think what i said is one round may not be sufficient. maybe i said we need a second round. >> one round of reform will not
do it for us. that, as an- i hate official when your words are thrown back at you. [laughter] >> the union does not have any ideological position on the pri. i will give you an example korea the secretary of defense with best i will give you an example. for china, the information space is part of the comprehensive competitive space for them. and they are using the for perceptionce management, influence, operations, and everyone at the table i talked to had some stories where the chinese through the strength of their streamings affecting content, was affecting actors that could be used, and so on. iushink the original cif didn't envision such a
comprehensive challenge as we have from china across these domains, not just hard-core military, defense industry, not just high-technology, it is what is happening in our universities, and in entertainment. the nature of this competition will require us to be nimble and dynamic and how we respond. so i will reclaim that sentence and say, we will probably need reform.us i need a broader understanding of what is going on in the e.u.. thank you, mr. secretary. tothe e.u., when it comes how to go about investments, the answer is complicated. when it comes to everything that has to do with national security, it is at the member state level. but what we have been doing, is
to sit out a framework -- sent out a framework for investment screening that has just been adopted. that is one of the things that are going out, increasing competitiveout the environment in which we find ourselves. it provides instruments for member states to go about this vigilant in terms of what they allow and what they don't allow. this is work in progress, but it is happening. in some areas, there are also a you will which are irrelevant -- there are also e.u. rules that are irrelevant. but the fact that there is a framework, an organization of an extension, and exchange of information of these practices, it clearly helps in
trengthening our overall posture. >> thank you. my question is for either of the european experts. do you think more european nations will sign up for the pri , and how does the e.u. and how does the e.u. feel about that? thank you. >> well, the union does not have any ideological position pri. we are happy to engage with china also when it comes to connectivity, but we have to make sure that it does not happen based only on the perspectives reflecting the interest of one party. therefore, we need to engage on
that, not as individual member states, but having let's say a more comprehensive and strategic view on this. i would refer you to the congregation of the commission last year, which calls for this broader, more conscious approach, in order to ensure that what we built brings together china and our part of the world. that is something reflects, that reflects the interest of those parties. it does not create any undue dependence, and i think that is only natural. it flows naturally from what i said initially about us being more serious about our interest. not at the expense of anybody, but to be a more credible and useful partner. >> i think more countries will sign up to the bri, but that is not necessarily a bad thing because bri is not going to go
away. it is the way we sign up that is important. if you look at other parts of is startingeff van to join projects with china on infrastructure. i think that is necessary. you know, trying to ensure that we can work with china, not at any cost, but within surfer and, -- but within certain rules. i think that is the way forward. we can just say no to all chinese initiatives, that would be sending the wrong signal, but we can insist on certain basic rules that need to be maintained and that china itself has signed up to in various organizations. thank you. thank you for the opportunity. i would like to ask both secretary schriver, and the eu
commissioner, how would the e.u. collaborate with the u.s. and the indo-pacific partners in the south china sea? especially with vietnam. asean? i would like to talk about the international law, to emphasize on that because i think that is a global issue, that surpasses all domain including tai chi, -- including 5g, information sharing and trade area. so, regarding the code of conduct, can we make it a global concern and require a code of all passing through the south china sea to be a global agreement? the e.u. position in this is tremendously important because of the u.s. alone cannot do it.
i especially think vietnam is reaching out to the e.u. in many different ways, asking the e.u. to support vietnam especially in ,ssues such as infrastructure to help vietnam to build that away from the proposal from china. because vietnam is being caused into taking chinese proposals in many infrastructure, is actually at the ports, where it is important for the south china sea. would you think that is something that we can put on the table for both the e.u. and the u.s.? thank you. >> i think i addressed some of this. just real quickly, through i think, diplomacy, continued support for international law and international norms, and protection of the environment, another underappreciated, underreported story is how much coral reef and fisheries were destroyed with the land reclamation that led to the
militarization of the seven outposts. present operations, probably not from the eu itself but the member states, if you are of my view that china claims ashrything within the nine d line, in the presence operation i think all of these countries have a need to be able to see and sense and share, because maritime security is inherently multilateral. helping countries and here, maybe the eu does have as an organization ways to help with training. but i think that would be a great place to start in vietnam and throughout maritime southeast asia. >> the south china sea is another case where the e.u. can only have a general policy because of the internal divisions. but it does have a policy on the south china sea. very general, but it has been followed up by individual groupings of countries again.
france has taken the lead, but a lot of other countries such as denmark is also working with building, thatty is ordered happening. but it is individual countries who have to do it and groupings of countries. i think a lot is already going on. but it has to be through this division of labor that europe does something. that can be more effective the union acting, i would say. >> very briefly, i agree with both what randy and liselotte said. our policy on the south china sea, with the limitations in terms of the union actually executing a policy is clear that any solution here has to be based on international law and continue to call for arbitration
in the decisions in this respect. let me add specifically on vietnam, that vietnam is one of the countries to which the eu is reaching out. and i am happy we also have agreement on a new trade agreement that will be ready for the summer. we are very attentive also to the needs and the interest of vietnam, and want to reach out to all countries in the region and we are very happy that is quite a few countries coming to us. so that it is a mutual desire to strengthen those relations. >> ma'am, please. >> would you address the code of conduct? it needs to be a global, regarding the rule of law.
china is trying to press southeast asia to agree with the court of conduct, but it needs to be global. asean countries sharing the same international law base, would you make that a global code of conduct and not regional? >> for it to be global, everybody would have to send up to it. , thatr approach is clear this is to happen within the multilateral framework within a body of law that already exist, therefore, it cannot just be one-sided like you would describe. >> i will take two questions. the gentleman here and the lady there. >> [indiscernible]
if you could make it brief, thank you. >> thanks for your presentation. i always think about nowadays, people talk about global, but on the other hand, i think other basic things are ignored. we are talking about partnership, talking about security. on the other hand, you will see not only china has a concentration camp, but in the united states, you know that the prison population is the highest in the world. instead of focusing -- maybe a corporation or business, some kind of development by partnership, especially a public-private partnership, this is where the serious misleading
terminology. it does not reflect serious crime network. america is not the only prison population is the highest, but they send a lot of people to the hospital. just about everything possible. ande, forced imprisonment, deprivation of constitutional right and there are small businesses. i am just wondering, can we agree to work on humanity and the general population to develop the general peace and progress, rather than just every time use misleading security or partnership or development? can -- development? can we work on this? this is very serious.
>> thank you. >> maybe i will say something about the gentleman from gw. you framed that in terms of companies. well, companies can express themselves. on the issue of china, for instance, there is a u.s.-china business council, where there is a big presence in china. there is a european wide china business council, there is a german, specifically a german one, there is a u.k., something in china. they can express their opinion in two ways to their own home government but also directly to the chinese which they are not shy about doing. whether or not it can be unified , not to be too cynical about
it, but we have talked a lot about values and interests, companies more often have interests rather than values. i will just leave it at that. [laughter] >> just one brief comment also on the question from gw. in particular, the first part of your question about us being a unitarian actors and that being a strength and a weakness. i agree very much with that. i think the bottom line message today is that we in europe are trying to be a little more coherent than we have been in the past on this spectrum. we are trying to move while still being realistic on what we can achieve toward the more unitarian end of the spectrum. we believe that makes us a more credible and useful partner. also for the u.s. in the discussions which -- on
the issues we are discussing today, i hope that is the message you will be taking today also from this event here today. >> i want to thank all of you because if there is anything this conversation has highlighted, that the stakes are very high. that we need to continue this conversation because we are obviously not going to reach agreement in a single round, in a single conversation. this is the beginning of a longer conversation on both sides of the atlantic. i want to thank all of you for your attendance here, for penetrating questions, and a special thanks to our guests. ambassador jeppe tranholm-mikkelsen, assistant secretary schriver, mr. duesterberg and mrs. odgaard. i hope we will meet again in the not-too-distant future to continue this discussion. thanks to all of you. [applause]
>> on tuesday, president trump used his veto authority for the second time to reject a resolution calling for an end to u.s. military assistance in yemen's civil war. the senate passed the measure in march with some bipartisan support and it was then improved by a majority in the house earlier this month.
in a message to congress, the president called the resolution unnecessary and dangerous, adding it would harm u.s. foreign-policy and bilateral relationships. members of congress are currently on a two having week rates traveling abroad on official business and meeting at home with constituents. the house returns later this month to continue work on edible spending for the next budget year with immigration reform remaining a priority. the senate will continue consideration of judicial and executive branch nominations. you will find a house live on c-span and the senate live on c-span two. look at the live coverage wednesday. on c-span, consumer financial direction or -- director talks about priorities for the agency. chad is at the bipartisan policy center at 10:00 a.m. eastern. later in the day, wrote to the white house coverage includes south bend indiana mayor pete buttigieg.
and beto o'rourke at a town hall. at noon eastern, the effect wildfires have on public health and the american enterprise institute looks and modernizing the foreign agents registration act, which requires lobbyist working on behalf of another country to disclose their relationship and finances to the federal government. >> i think it is important on this day that we continue to offer the people of colorado, the people of littleton, the families involved the sure knowledge that all of america cares for them and is praying for them. >> 20 years ago, the columbine high school shooting was one of the deadliest high school shootings in american history. friday at 8:00 p.m. eastern, we look back on the shooting and provide reflection on the tragedy. >> at the time, columbine had never happened and needed the
parents nor the school counselor looked at the issue of a violent paper as indicated of the possibility of some real deterioration in thinking. on the 1999 special columbine high school shooting friday at 8:00 eastern on c-span. the chief washington correspondent for kaiser health news is here to help us continue the conversation about medicare for all and the affordable care act, the status of it. act, the status of it, what may be ahead. we have focused a little bit why do you think it remains the top of the democrats agenda for 2020? >> mainly because it is the top of the public's agenda going in, we