tv U.S. Army Air Missile Defense Strategy Part 2 CSPAN May 12, 2019 4:41am-5:57am EDT
announcer: the center for strategic and international studies hosted this discussion on a new report on the u.s. army's air and missile defense strategy. the report is intended to give u.s. strategy through 2028. this is an hour and 15 minutes. we're going to transition to our second panel here. we have a great lineup of very thoughtful people to talk about the strategy and put it in context. i want to turn things over to our moderator for this panel, lieutenant general dick formica, who spent 36 years in the army with a number of posts. course,l assignment, of
was the commanding general of space and missile defense command. i'm going to turn things over to him. before i do that, i want to recognize senator john warner. thank you very much for coming out and for your service. general, over to you. >> thanks, tom. and thanks to each of you for being here and those that are online on behalf of the panel, i say good afternoon if you have an opportunity to hear it to think the turn it skaggs again for that thoughtful discussion on the army air missile defense 2028. they provided a great understanding for where the army is headed and how it intends to get there. and with that approach to missile defense talk about
offense and defense integration with lethal and nonlethal capabilities and those four lines of effort to get after that. and from different perspectives and then see sis has assembled a stellar panel. first, the director of the office of missile-defense policy and the office of the secretary of defense. it is a position he has held for over 18 years. he's been an adjunct professor at think tank experience and was in the office principally responsible for the drafting of the missile-defense review. he'll be followed by kathleen hicks, senior vice president
and the dr. henry kissinger chair for the security program at csis. she's a former principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy and the deputy under secretary of defense for andtegy, plans, and forces, a member of the national commission of the future of the army. division chief or integrated air and missile defense of the united states european command. he has been in that position for 10 years. he's a retired united states marine corps colonel with over 25 years of uniformed service. then finally, colonel makes salice. he's a u.s. air defense officer. he has served for over two decades, and prior to that he served as both the chief of staff at the g3 and the 32nd
army missile command. this panel brings you neat and varying insight and perspective to this discussion. and then to make opening comments that will be plenty of time for your questions. let me first turn the floor over. >> all right. thank you. i didn't hear the earlier part of the discussion so i will proceed as though there isn't too much redundancy, so hopefully that supposition proves to be true. what i'd like to do -- i've been asked to give a few remarks that set the policy framework with regard to integrated air and missile defense. i'm going to continue to use the "i" part. i understand in the earlier discussion it was mostly amdp's, but the long-term objective is to get to the integrated piece of air and missile defense. i'll talk about how the issue is
framed. the very name of the missile-defense review gives you an indication that the department is thinking about missile-defense in a larger and more, or hints of term -- larger, more comprehensive term. you probably heard the discussion earlier today that it is more than just ballistic missile threats. i will keep making the point that we continue to deal with large numbers of ballistic missiles and countries continue to acquire those capabilities in addition to other new missile threats. the defense review identified aaron missile-defense as a major teaching operational concept, one animated by shift in the security environment, in the words of the national defense strategy, more complex and volatile than any we've experienced in recent memory. that complexity and volatility consists primarily of two major
elements -- the rapid evolution and dilution, and the onset of the renewal. different fromit the great power competition of the cold war. we have at least three powers that are part of this equation. at the same time, the challenges associated with rogue regimes and regional opponents means largely a diminish. so what we have seen over the past couple years, opponents have been rapidly developing can military capabilities, particularly evident in the domain of offensive missiles capable threatening the u.s. forces and its allies and security partners. let me give you a couple characteristics of this threat
environment as we look at it. we are seeing a steady quantitative expansion and improvement in ballistic missiles, they are getting larger and more challenging. we are seeing the development of new systems by russia and china, new advanced weapons, hypersonics, advanced cruise missiles. a lot of that is described in the report the department released within the last couple days. additionally, the traditional distinction between missiles is collapsing. hypersonics can fly to regional or intercontinental regions, ballistic missiles come from aircraft. with icbmke an irbm ranges. the distinction with regard to missiles is regional and strategic, they are starting to rapidly co-opt. that is one of the features as we were setting up our air missile defense problem.
countries like iran and north korea carry out their ballistic missile activity. ballistic missiles and cruise missiles are a feature of contemporary work, russians use cruise missiles and ballistic missiles in syria, we have seen nonstate actors like the who the rebels in yemen who use integrated,n an complex attack structure, at amber riley naval vessels and american naval vessels. over the last couple years. in addition to those technologies and these new missile capabilities we are seeing big and regional powers integrate emerging offensive capabilities with their military using employment concepts
generating new vulnerabilities and at forces abroad. characterizedy this challenge to deny the u.s. military access to key regions and operate within critical which i suspect was discussed a little bit earlier today. the strategic aim is quite combat u.s. and allied has substantially degraded our decision-making and material ability to respond to aggression and partners in conflict. this is not exclusively missile oriented but it is missile centric. it is now and for the foreseeable future. predicated mostly on and isve capabilities directed at the core of american defense strategies.
onely the as an island power its ability to project power, reinforce its deployed forces that have been built around this principle, aimed at the heart of american strategy which is why it's an important element to address. it identifies a major strategic operational challenge. it calls for a strategy to take a more holistic approach in dealing with these offensive capabilities. it is passive defense, active defense, and attack operation. it puts the discussion focused on the active defense dimension. -- in pasthlights ,ig missile-defense reviews
aaron missile-defense -- the problem associated with ballistic and cruise missiles is not a major feature of defense plan. it has been a focus of american strategy. a number of key roles ,or aaron missile-defense contributing to adversary missile-defense by undermining any access to protect u.s. and conventional forces, required to respond promptly to aggression and ensure blunt adversary to halt orikes reverse military gains. forward, there are four
areas the dod will focus on, that will require sustained attention in adapting its posture. this applies both to the u.s. joint force as well as what we do in our military alliances. there is a set capability on the cruise missile defense front where they said they want to focus because that was the main essentially the ser vice -- they are doing a good job to get back into the amd increase missile-defense game, and the army is buying iron and cruiseg air missile defenses from a former government. areeflects the fact that we
going to rapidly move in that direction and we are looking at other sources. capacity in the air and arena. it's a question about the right balance between bmd and cmd. the department is looking at its force structure, sufficiency with regards to regional bmd in of -- adversaries have a large missile strike posture. that camen, i think up earlier. defenseistic missile and cruise missile defense on a technical level are sufficiently synchronized in order to be operationally effective against combined ballistic missile and cruise missile strikes. the army is doing some grid work on bringing together the pac-3 system. and interoperability.
it's really critical with satellites. really the key to increasing the overall effectiveness of a collective combat capability. it's going to require systems that we and our allies have that are compatible, we will have to do exercise and training, concepts of operation to make sure we can pull together integrated air missile defenses. news,is some good something you may know, nato actually has a policy on the books. you can go to their website. it says all the right things. hat iseterrent, w essential now for nato as we end our nato allies, continue now to bring new capabilities to the framework. so let me stop there.
andink the army, air, missile defense framework we published is a good path and serves to think in the right way about this problem set, but we have a ways to go to build out the posture. >> thanks. it certainly comes out to me that not only is the army approach heading in the right direction, but it has nested nicely with the missile-defense review. i'll turn the floor over to -- >> thanks very much. a pleasure to be with everyone today. especially nice to be with peppy, we first got to work together in 1984, 1985. i don't think either of us have our reading glasses. what i thought it would do is reflect first and foremost on what we said back in 2016 and the commission on the future of the army on missile-defense issues and where we have come to
in the army framework. just to reposition you in that timeframe, we were one of the first major external big studies, whether on the army or something else, occurring in the aftermath of the invasion of of ukraine and the annexation of crimea. and of course because we were looking at the army, that alongside a variety of other major threats really helped us in some ways turn. they claim they supported our recommendations. on some of the big issues of what we now think as competition, nowhere was this more true than the missile-defense issue. when i -- i want to hit for things we talked about in the commission report exclusively on missile defense for the army, and where we are now in terms of the framework and the discussion more broadly the defense department. thefirst item was
deficiencies and underinvestment, which we all now take for granted, but at the time that was something that was being heard in the field, most especially in europe, but not a place where the army was looking eager to invest significantly. deficienciess the in structure around patriot, and the demand signal, very high for both, that we were not able to meet. i will tell you what we said -- what we ended up deciding was the investment requirements -- we couldn't solve for that, and i think that's reflective of where the army is today, a conceivable level of cost to buy our way out of the missile-defense challenge at the level of requirement that is being felt in the field. there was a very high up-tempo that patriot in particular was
feeling at the time, and the reality that we didn't have a good solution inside the army for that except to keep plugging along and tried to manage through the tempo challenges. then finally we made a special point of pointing out that the gmd mission stat was exclusively held by the guard, and we had concerns given the centrality of the missions to the national security enterprise writ large in terms of our approach, and with our missile defense -- national missile defense, that there ought to be a more thoughtful, thorough way of integrating gmd for professional corps, for officers and enlisted. and we had concerns entirely in the guard that would limit that. so where did we get to concluding how it is wrapped up
in this framework? goal set up for the four battalionswe have the goall mailing by the end of 2023. that is much lower than we hoped it would go in the army, but looking back, we are looking for some forward progress. just a number of major studies out there that have highlighted this challenge. i was also in the national commission for national defense strategy. patriot, you know, the theework, pointing out other side of it, that i think is important to one out, that there are other countries that ought to be purchasing the defense capabilities as part of
the solution set for our own challenges and temple, but you do have the challenges, and the framework acknowledges that. again, i am not clear, maybe it came up in the prior panel, how the army is tending to deal with that. the way we are currently thinking about missile defense, and we have this generational challenge of how to shift the cost and the return shot advantages to the u.s. gmd issue, it is not touched in the framework. i do not know if it was touched previously. i am left to believe we are right back where we started in terms of that continuing to be treated as an issue that the guard has managed to in and of itself without a knowledge of recruits toges that
retaining the force overtime, training it, having it capable. , again, i am pretty hopeful based on the framework that at least there is an acknowledgment of many of the challenges out there. nestedis a seriousness within the missile-defense review to take seriously the challenge of missile-defense for the army. be worried, as i am in every part of dod, frankly, it is not unique to this, that we are instrument all in our approach, that it requires more transformational, that is a lot more disruption of grand concepts of how we anrate, and i think there is acknowledgment of that, but i am not seeing a huge amount of improvements. again, it is not the optionally here. it is probably more the overall position we find ourselves in, particularly with regards to russia and china.
joint responsibility was important to have come obviously, and the. something that the defense is going to have to hold accountable for the defense force. combining to make sure it is urgent to make sure the bill is enabling capabilities are there. and in the last is the durability of this commitment. somethingat is anytime you're working against a major cultural influence of a service, where, in this case, the missile-defense is not the first and foremost primary are focused they on, it is challenging to make sure that they have a durable solution set. you can count on the next set up, building on that and then retro greeting. that is where i am going to be looking coming out of the framework. cdr. formica: thanks. now to build a little bit of an
operational flavor, peter woodmansee. thanks.odmansee: thank you ray much, tom, for inviting me. general waters to go over from commander uconn -- commander yukon from general scare-- they talk amongst themselves. i was not sure if it was going to take place and more importantly, whether his vision and mission and priorities would be published, and i am here to tell you i got it yesterday, and so i can give it to you hot off the press. how whati went to see the amd 2028 mess with a combatant commander here, albeit one combatant commander, with his view of war finding.
i will give you a disclaimer. actually, i will give you two disclaimers. naval do not have a billet. but you will see everything we do supports nato and made a lobster secondly, i sit in an ,ffice chair, i work with aj-3 and if you are a hammer, everything looks like a nail, so for me, everything looks like an ops problem. combat ready were fighting theater united with our ally, red nato, combined in joint military operations across all demands. he talks with speed and battlefields. general walter sees as missions as he must execute multi-domain operations in coordination with natos and workers, support
and allies and partners throughout, and to deter russia in order to defend the homeland. ucomm willit be ready. i will go into more detail about what that means. second, strengthen solidarity and unity with our allies and partners. thirdly, foster a highly motivated team of patriots, agility, and resiliency. so in a nutshell, what i just outlined broadly for this audience is general walters' vi is really his priorities and mission, and it is no surprise that he
emphasizes joint coalition, allies, and partners going forward. so these strategies that we heard chad talk about an hour ago, how does it fit? how does it map? i think it maps nicely. i will talk about the challenges and additional challenges in the joint fight. amd 2020, commander ucomm's wharf i am writing as an intern russia in assistance of israel. ucomm has a capacity, and in a problem.is this is a joint high-intensity deployingy defending the floyd forces within eucom aor.
linermy's pursuits of sicely with commander eucom' thoughts to combine situational awareness. it remains to be seen how it can be truly integrated and interoperable really across the commission and joint domains. the best sector i believe is spot on. and ient into detail, said, butedo what he certainly we see it as important, filling critical gaps. missile-defense, let's create a window of opportunity, allowing for the synchronization of offense. i think we have heard the panel, kind of the same for that. chad brought up that as well. 2 and 3,ving to eloise
too, and providing trained and ready forces, that is nicely, and the commander has a nicely motivated team of patriots that he talks about. patriot structure, staff, i am sure it fits nicely into commander eucom's vision of highly motivated teams. presence, iintain a cannot agree more with the army's focus on building out light compartment capacity, that supports our commander's priority to support adaptation, modernization, and engagement as well as collected efforts and interoperability. not think a piece of equipment here or there across part of it, a true
but the deterrence is our commitment to support nato, to support allies. it is just a piece of that. it is a commitment to our allies that is key. exercise and training activities most often led by components 'sthin eucom, support eucom priorities to build ally and partner capacities. and our component in europe are instrumental. it helps our allies and works toward that integration. so some of the challenges that are in the document, challenges about for disclosure policy, technical integration among allies that we talked about earlier, and the interoperability requirements and sufficiency that shared commitment that we strive for within nato. so some of my own views on challenges that we face in theater, in no particular order,
is passive defense, the safety it,tegy document touches on and how is it being incorporated in all we do? are we ready -- i think sometimes we pay lip service to passive defense. starts withdefense a mindset. you have that as yourself -- are we ready to go there? interoperability -- i think chad did a really nice job how he outlined the three steps for us. the complexity of the threats. we have a cruise missile problem in europe. it is a 360 degrees threat, as we talked about. we have to look more broadly in terms of army systems, navy systems, air force systems, how 15re looking at not only
fighters, navy command-and-control platforms, center,e, the operation how is it looking into that system, and the command-and-control, what is the right level of automation. those are questions we ask ourselves in europe when new systems are coming in line, what we replace in the legacy systems, how went better command and control is fight, and i look at everything again operationally, not at the tactical level but at the operational level. pres. bush: good -- thanks, formica: good, woodmansee. i want to introduce my sillies. dvc solis: thank you so much,
and thank you to tom for having us. as we lead up to this panel, general formica actually recommended that the lens that we look at is the ind 2020. you could probably on behalf of the joint staff take credit for the strategy. on that note, the ind vision 2020 and strategy 2028 nest well with each other. both emphasize the need for a deterrent heref not only chad's outlined earlier today but also the low panel panelists today. the army is grounded in its current effort and talks about
the current system and the pipeline to defend the new forces and critical assets and getting the elements of that strategy right. the manning, the training, the forward presence, and that. again, pulling on the theme of a difference between an aberrational document and a strategic document, i think on the first read, you may look at the ind vision 2020 and say that there may be a disconnect between the army strategy, because the vision statement active cannot afford an defense solution that leads i made for missile, and this mistake on my first read of the capacity and all of the emphasis on building up our forces, but then when i sit there and remind ourselves where our current forces are, and this was recognized by the commission for the future army, we had allowed a huge gap, and i think
chad's comment earlier about bringing observer control back to the national training center, i was the last 03 level at the national training center that that force operations, and i left in 2003. where the army is rightly putting their resources building toward those gaps. chad outlines a couple of risks to the strategy, and i think everybody within the dod wakes up wondering about other funding streams and make sure that those state secure when they wake up the next day. the technological challenges that we face, some troops splitting the atom type concept that we need to get to indirect energy. but i think there is also one hidden risk in their come up only evidence once you start digging deep and deep in
there, and that is one chad d earlier to make, talking about interoperability. order to achieve all of the things that we talked about, integration, and we talked about the independence, the interoperability, one thing that is lying, and the terms i use before, the militant within the department of defense, but recognizing the ownership of the operational architecture. in context some of the operational architecture leads you toward developing the system architecture and subsequently the textual architecture that allows you to get to those, and to use a highly technical term, uites to get to that integration that we need. the department has recognized and some of the efforts that they are doing were taking a hard look at why that was not
controlon at the end of activity, where the right place that is, and trying to resource that ever cared we will not -- that effort. we will not make up for the two years. that was an effort organized by a dedicated organization, the dod, but with the right priority and the right authority, we will find the right to make up some of background. with that will close my comments. lt. gen. formica: thanks. before i open it up to your questions, though i promise you i would do that, listening to policyel members of the level and down to the operational, i heard a couple of recurring themes. one was our capability and capacity. what my operations has long been the attention between balancing investment in new capability and increased capacity of what you currently have.
so before i opened it up to them, i am going to throw this to the panel. on thee your thoughts capability and capacity, 18 still be done, not only army but across the dod, and are we doing those things to address that tension? and i will throw it open to the panel. hicks: i will start your this is a major challenge the department is facing, right? i often talk about this as the iron triangle at the trade office. the national ambition is roughly where it has been and where it appears to be, a significant level of desired military capability. at the end of the day, they are ultimately in the fixed topline or even not fixed but not inland tradee, you are having to
off modernization. it is not quite that simple, but it is kind of that simple. there are things that can get you out of that triangle, that geometry. those things are operational concepts, efficiency, posture, how you position, alliances. there are ways to kind of ease that, but fundamentally, that is what the department has been grappling with, and it has been grappling with it for decades. there is no, in my opinion, obvious answer. i think for some experts, there is an obvious answer. i am sure for those people it tends to be modernization. but at the work level, it is more challenging than that. i do think my memory, with my own remarks in this issue shut and more broadly -- set and more broadly, we have a challenge in approaching this issue too incrementally, and that pushes us into an almost immediate need to resolve this challenge, where
we have investment over time and the right research, people knowing we would need advance, you know, short range air defense systems, and they invested in that for years when the challenge presented itself in 2016, we would have had more than a pickup game, that sort of thing. that is a road counterfactual that we do not live in. i do think we do fundamentally have to make some investments, you have to give up some ,tructure in those capacities architectural structure, in order to give that modernization administered by the way, i think capability is a combination of all of the things i already talked about. it is not separate from structure. think we can use this as a trade-off, because outside of the department, the department is largely constrained politically, it is themculturally constrained
as i mentioned cared the state's top leadership, top central leadership, divisional leadership for the department to get there, and that is inside the department of defense, inside the white house, and inside capitol hill, and we are not seeing that right now. >> i think we know what capacity is like in terms of the result of our capability. bestext best bet is the place capability development. we want to make it more effective as well as on the solutions. -- active defense solutions. our dollars ont a table, i think the capability in those areas would be that. lt. gen. formica: great. thanks.
it is an ongoing capacity, there are different right?hes in dod, capacities, the combatant commanders, the war just capacity, capacity, capacity, as they should be. others, may be the civilian side or on the r&d side think about how to we -- we understand that, but you have also got to lay the foundation for future threats, the development. part of the strategies, at least the policy guy, i like the policy, and building this is a little bit messier, but really a postc period of 20 years, cold war, the challenges related the international security
circumstances have changed. advancements,ry the capability, the geopolitical challenges are going to force the partner, and i agree with. they're going to force the department leadership to engage on how to prioritize it for the continuing resources. a flood of resource fund capacity and capability, maybe, to mike's point, in an area of , iid geopolitical change think the scale should take more in the innovative capability direction, and we are going to have to think differently about the problem that we are going to deal with today.
it is not what we were dealing with 15 years ago. lt. gen. formica: good, thanks. operationally,e: combatant commands, we never have enough. we are always arguing with the joint staff, give us more, give do -- alliances, you know. i use the term with nato burden despise and i always that term, because it should not be a burden, it should be a shared commitment. so what is the shared commitment ? what is the right balance for the u.s., nato, what is the commitment to give us the right capacity for defense in europe? again, you know, and that how long do we defend before we make the decision to go off? because you cannot play catch forever. there has to be a balance between offense and defense. lt. gen. formica: i hope the offense and defense integration,
that threat will get pulled through your question, but if not, i will come back to it. the second thing i want to highlight is -- i heard through your discussion in that some scags postulate the whole region was this gap of the capability in the army, and i think it is important to remember -- i have heard senior leaders say it was a strategy amd -- i would offer there was not a strategy gap. there was not a very big strategy. , terrorism,e threat china, north korea, iran, were identified as priorities, and what we attributed to that threat was different. they talked about balancing modernization for structure and readiness. come or anylooks at
service on what kind of capability we need, it starts with a strategy. what do you want the army to do? what capabilities do you need it to have? and then to building force command and u.s. are the question, can you -- you answer the question, can you organize? i believe that process took place over the last 20 years, and the army responded to the strategy, the capability that was expected of it for the fight that it was in. and now, with a new priority, a new assertion of threat from your competitor, you have a different sort of capability that is required, and i think that is where we find our selves. with that, i would like to open the floor. over here in the back, young lady. >> hi. jessica bland from the british embassy. of all, i would like to thank everybody for their comments on the ally compartment, with regard to missile-defense and the the forces that
are actually protection for the u.s. homeland. my question comes in two parts. believe -- ayou nato question, no surprise, do you think nato is within the imd four or more just partner countries just within europe with regards to the missiles that russia has employed? how you balance any change in that posture with the need to reassure that they are not affecting that strategic capabilities through the nato bmd construct, which is focused on iran? lt. gen. formica: anybody? chief woodmansee: i will take the second part, because like i said earlier, i do not do policy. those systems are all defense systems, and we said it over and over again, and they are not aligned toward russia.
they do not have the capability for russia. we said it over and over again, but we allow the rhetoric to get to us. &d, it shows wins for the alliance, again, not burden sharing, but shared commitment. i do not think whatsoever it is poking russian. i will leave the first question to someone else. for the -- how is nato responding to the challenge? kind of inleft iamd the distant past. it was part of the effect of the cold war, and not focus on any kind of capabilities and concepts. in a way, with nato, we are sort
of in the same place. important we identify strategic operational counsel to help us deal with any active challenges posed by the big powers. so we have reintroduced the concept, and we spent a good bit of time in the past, 6, 9, 12 consulting with allies, building capital to really rebuild a consensus on the role of integrated air that is what the alliance is about. potential big power allers fairies -- adversaries are doing. it is not a technical problem. there are trying to prevent the alliance from upholding its deterrence and defense function. the short answer is i think the
allies are starting to respond, in the policyork levels in nato, and you have committees -- they are looking at questions related to integrated air and missile defense right now in developing positions and strategies and trying to figure out the way ahead with the united states. imf, relates to russian cruiseg based land-based missiles, it is emblematic of the larger threat that has been in place for a while. reinforces the importance of the alliance, rethinking defense of its own critical assets. lt. gen. formica: thanks. anybody else? up here in front.
brian, the lucky martin. balancerying to achieve between left of lawns and defensive operations. from a dod standpoint, it appears now that the department has taken the position that the focus of resources and priority is going to left of launch. there is a tremendous amount of investment and resources being applied to hypersonic strike. hypersonicely on the defense side. from a crystal ball standpoint, i will point -- or what is the inflection point that we see that, at some point, the hypersonic defense begins to be better resourced than what it is today? at this point,e:
the department is still looking at its options for the defense .ypersonic oreline wise, maybe a year so. when we are talking about tough,nics, it is a investment decision. it is a challenging threat that will require new technologies and new movements into different parts of the domains that we have not been in before. and rightfully so, i think we are taking a deliberate approach to it. the threat at this time and the pacing of it allows us to take that deliberate approach. i think it is wise for us to go that way. lt. gen. formica: anybody else? it is safe to say that hypersonics is something that it would be prudent to look at. it is important to do that. and how may we deploy that
offensive capability. -- andm "left of launch" we use it fairly frequently -- i just hate for the term left of launch, for anyone to imply that we are going to attack them before they were able to attack us. i think offense-defense integrations are much more nuanced than just "left of launch." we will never be able to do it all -- it will be a continuum across operations. -- it mayretaliatory, be left of that guy's launch, but it is also taking out other systems, from logistics to command and control. that is part of offense-defense integration, beyond just a narrow left of lawns. >> that is a great segue for my
past -- ask. i am from breaking defense. i am struck that we are doing this incrementally. hearing about -- thermopylae comes to mind, saying that they will turn the skies into arrows and turn the sky black, and the spartans reply then we will fight in the shade. threat,me of this especially from russia, so great and the cost of operations is so bad, is there a way to turn it around, be it by putting lasers some cyberng or approach or some preemptive or left of launch, to pardon the term, approach? or do we just need to learn to
fight in the shade, everyone dig in and hide and pray that they can come out when the russians run out? ms. hicks: i will say, at a , might flippant answer is it is probably all of those things, minus the latest on everything. i picture roombas with lasers when you say that, which is probably unwise. is about foremost, it operational concept, flat out. you can see the army doing good work there for sure. obviously in europe but also the pacific, as part of a joint force trying to think through these talent sites as they present these now. it is a question for the entire front forces and department, which i cannot answer today -- are we doing this at the scale and speed and seriousness and ability to bridge adaptation of
what we find -- are we doing that experiment reputation as we should be? i am suspicious that we are not. i welcome being told we are proven wrong about that. but it starts there, and it leads you to the technology piece. what begins and what follows is always a unique and not always one way or another. but by and large, the concept has to be worked out with the technology before we know what exactly we want to invest in. i also suspect it is about a range of facts -- bets, and those bets are even more in the the procurement realm. i think the allies these comes important because of what we are talking about. more --l, et cetera, whether -- we just have to be thoughtful
about that. at the same time, we are thinking through the reality of the shock doctrine problems that we are facing. i think steady investment in the criminal side is important. it still matters. it signals to adversaries and allies and partners, and it has real capability, but it has diminishing returns as the technology advances. the question is how to replace that and get in front of that? and i am not convinced we are there. chief woodmansee: fight in the we, and i saynk europe, u.s., native -- we have to be ready to defend what matters. it goes back to the commitment. when you talk about the nato capabilities at large, we in this room tend to think about
what we just heard about the last few hours. u.s. navy and air force and army brings in an open it up to our allies in europe to the incredible capability we have in europe, and we do not get to see that enough, sitting here in the u.s.and looking at capabilities. but when you go out and see these exercises, see the nato forces, how capable they are in doing fighting exercises side-by-side with us, it is really nice to see. when we talk about homeland defense, we always think about our homeland. but when we are in europe, it is their homeland. toy are as committed defending their homeland as we are to our homeland. dir. debiaso: there are no silver bullets in this problems that. above.ind of all of the
it is not just what we've focused here with the active defense and passive defense and the attack operations. it is the important role that the general forces play in in a particular theater, when you combine with other capabilities. you end up with a broader toolset that is intended to deter provocative actions at the lowest level possible. that ensures that you have the right set of passive defense give abilities to accomplish the mission, wherever it may be, whether in europe or in the nato area. threatensive missile continues to grow and present a credible challenge to our overall defense posture. we arets back to the way thinking about advanced technologies. the department of defense, during the post cold war era, was not investing a lot in those there was not a
strategy or threat driver ispelling -- the calculus changed now. you can see it in some areas. even the narrow area of missile defense. with new and advanced capabilities to help provide more cost-effective future solutions. we are really in that process. we are looking at those kinds of capabilities in a whole host of different domains, most of which are unable to be addressed in some public ways. lt. gen. formica: i would say youand add two things -- if look across the six modernization priorities, from
long-range precision fire to the between,o amd and in they looked at it holistically, and what other kinds of capabilities we will need to fight in a new environment. what are the concepts, multi-domain ops, to provide that conceptual framework in which you would apply those capabilities. not to applicable fight -- not to oversupply this come up -- not to over-simplify, but more than attack ops in my experience over my career, when we were in the middle of the cold war, we were always going to face a soviet artillery threat that had much more capacity than our capability to do what i call the counter battery fire -- he sho ots, we pick it up, we shoot back.
we look at counter fire more broadly. it started with first rapid offensive maneuver. if you are pushing him back, he was not shooting, and if you could get him out of range, you could mitigate the threat. two, you take out his eyes, and partply passive defense as of that, reducing the cabability in his eyes. three, proactive deep strikes. find his capabilities, the full range of capabilities, and take them out. we talked about that earlier. battery, in the equivalent would be the active defense. so there is always going to be a need for more capacity than we have, but there are other ways to get at it, and it is not just active defense. do not just have to fight in the shade. we want to move this on -- move the sun. next question. i am a reporter from radio
free asia. launch, north korea it included the short range ballistic missile. i wanted to know your response to this launch when it comes to missile defense. considering the north korean missile test, how do you see the missile defense cabability? thaad in south korea, so how could double is it to defending the missile threat? this wasformica: answered earlier, and the same, that we will deploy a full range of capabilities and we will constantly look at what is the threat, what kind of capabilities do we need, and to be able to deploy capabilities to address the threat. so i think we have taken the first question. the second question, thaad
capability in south korea? thaad'sssment of capability in south korea. col. solis: the deployment of thaad is focused on strengthening the protection of for and korean forces longer-range ballistic missiles i do noth korea, but have anything beyond that. it is intended to provide come along with patriot systems, more effective layer defense. that is what thaad brings. further, provides wider area protection, and in conjunction with the patriot now, it will provide more effective defense and provide greater area coverage against potential north korean missile losses -- missile launches into south korea. lt. gen. formica: and it is an
important capability to have. you had a question here? >> hello. the voice america korean service. i want to ask about the allied commitment for what you mentioned about the commitment to defend allies. ,fter the missile last week after north korea fired the short-range ballistic missile, there was a comment from mr. magma pair -- from mr. mike pompeo, it was not something to fuss about because it was not a long-range or medium-range ballistic missile. what the allied side perceive is since it is not a threat to the united states directly, it is nothing to fuss about. so some misunderstanding can happen with this. is the u.s. government just focusing mainly on homeland
-ecurity for mid- or longer ballistic missiles or shorter ballistic missiles? i just want to ask. ms. hicks: as the non-us government employee, i would be happy to answer that. statements are extremely problematic. extend andent to deter, and our commitment more generally, the treaty commitment to south korea and japan, that missile threat clearly aimed to -- divide us. that is not the message that was sent. so we have to make sure that we do better, that our public and private messaging all work to confirm that our best addition, with regards to north korea, is that we are positioned together. , as the united
states, our firm in our statements of commitment and are expressions of commitment here that would mean things like exercises, that are currently suspended, things of that sort. it is a troubling path, particle he because it is clear that as a north korean tactic of choice -- to demonstrate a division between the united states and its allies. that is clearly resonating, when that,s. reinforces whether by accident, misstatement, or worse. dir. debiaso: the u.s. has a substantial commitment of military capabilities in south korea today. 28,000 troops right now. commandsde substantial to missile defense in south korea with patriot and thaad and
ships in the region. you can go to the state department for clever cash in on what the secretary of state said, but in terms of the u.s. commitment to missile defense capabilities to south korea, it not only remains unchanged, but that commitment of missile defense capabilities in south korea has increased. it is a tangible element of u.s. commitment to ensure it continues to uphold its security obligations on the peninsula. lt. gen. formica: thanks. sir? i am from l file partners. -- capital alpha partners. i put this out as a general question. you think about the threat broadly over the next five to 10 years, is it fairly linear? are there major breakpoints to worry about? you mentioned hypersonics as
one. if you look at what is coming out in the commercial uav delivery -- if you characterize how you think about this threat over the next five to 10 years, that would be helpful. lt. gen. formica: anybody? ms. hicks: i will speak to it broadly, and beyond the missile defense round, if you will. space and cyber, other things he did not mention, because i agree with those, are the top. in cyber, there are various forms of that. informationto shape -- when you get cyber with ai, the ability to change narrative and change beyond narrative what the war fighter sees and thinks is happening in his or her operating environment, that is extremely worrisome to me. the space piece probably tells --elf, but what we have seen
tremendous aggressiveness from the chinese and russians in space, i am pleased to see much of that is unclassified and available. space is something we have held so much internally for so long that the rest of society, including on the hill, they are trying to play catch-up to a challenge that is really evident in the defense community, so we are seeing some of that play out through space force, but more generally through the ability to talk about the nature of the 3 -- space threat, especially from russia and china, something that can help us move forward. the united states has some strong advantages. we talked about some of them, like alliances that are more at the strategic level. operational level, beyond all the things that we should focus on first, in terms of our personnel and training, i think our undersea capabilities.
there are a challenge. the unitedarea that states should be building on. i think our advanced air information and our and sensor capability -- our potential for global warming is just higher. we have worked to do. onticularly because we focus the warning when things turn red, and the strategy with russia and china right now is never let the indicators go read, so we have a lot of work in our intelligent systems from that intelligence system -- we have a lot of work in our intelligence system to catch up with that. and in soft power, we need to be tilting up our soft power.
col. solis: we were executing a shot at you, and that was focused on a different area. as we refocus in the great power competition, it calls for reassessment of our current capabilities against that new adversarial threat that we are looking at to make an assessment. and the incremental approach is, initially, the right way to go when you are in a resource-constrained environment. there will not be a lottery ticket that we can schedule off and pay for these things. so incremental is a prudent way of refocusing our capability development and capacity building. lt. gen. formica: i would like to give the panel a chance -- any closing thoughts you may want to share? chief woodmansee: the only thing i would say is, going back to the theme of today's panel about the army strategy, we are the joint staff were pleased to see the direction the army has taken it. we cheer them on pure the short-range capacity will allow
us to do cap closing with our competitors. -- gap closing with our competitors. chief woodmansee: there is not one thing we will do that will make this go away. and coming to will be across all domains. it is the shared commitment, with our allies every step of the way. ms. hicks: i would just reinforce the durability of the commitment is really important. whether we are talking army or department, the degree to which it is really invested in these areas, with regard to missile defense, will prove out over time. that is what we should be watching. dir. debiaso: two aspects of this. one is that the army's put together a good template. i would like to see the navy and air force -- i will get in trouble when i get back in the building -- put together something similar, but in a way that reflects the importance of workingaces -- services
in a more collaborative fashion. that needs attention. and to reinforce how important concept oftend the integrated air and missile defense, we have to be able to extend this approach with our allies and our security partners, because there is the multiplication component in our defense strategy. lt. gen. formica: isn't being in trouble in the building being part of a normal state of play? i appreciate you taking that risk. i want to think a couple of people to close this out. first and foremost, things to you here and online for your attention, dissipation, and thoughtful questions. i would like to think that panel for preparing for this, for being thoughtful in not only opening comments but in your responses to these comments. csisld like to thank the and the missile defense project for investing in this discussion, for hosting it, and
moving our discussion on air and missile defense forward. finally, in every public forum i have, when we talk about air and missile defense, we spend a lot of time talking about policy and some acquisition in capability and capacity, but i would like us to close by remembering that, behind all this, there are soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians who will develop, deploy, and operate the systems that we are talking about. it is to them that we owe a sincere debt of gratitude. with that, i will close. thank you very much. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2019] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> looking ahead to monday on c-span [applause] ande center for strategic
international studies hosts a discussion on the u.s. army's recently published two volume history of the war in iraq. watch live at 9:00 a.m. eastern pa that 1:30 p.m., the air force secretary and the army secretary discuss modernizing the armed forces. watch both events live on c-span [applause] -- on c-span2, on c-span.org, or the free c-span radio app. whip steveminority scalise of louisiana and house intelligence committee chair adam schiff of california discuss the needs of the day and other like slate of issues at a form hosted by axios. formerterviewed was planned parenthood president cecile richards. she talked about her new women's political action group, super majority. this is an hour.