tv Charlie Rose PBS June 3, 2015 12:00am-1:01am PDT
>> rose: welcome to the program. tonight, a conversation with henry kissinger about his war years that took place at the museum of modern art in new york. >> what the experience of evil, of the the breakdown, of civilized discourse, and of the vulnerability of societies when that framework collapses. and then, of course, at the end of the war one saw this immense suffering that you've described, or that you've asked me to describe but at the same time, there emerged the imperative of how are you going to rebuild this? and what are we going to do in
order to prevent this from happening again? and how you can create an international system? and within germany, a national system by which these tragedies could be avoided. >> rose: we conclude this evening with general mark welsh chief of staff of the united states air force. he gives us a look at the f-35 fighter jet. >> this airplane is all about the future. there are things this airplane can do that no other plane can do. there is information it can share that other airplanes will not have. there are ways for it to digest information, to disseminate information, to connect torg sensors, other platforms, other other-- whether it's a ship, a radar, or another aircraft, and share information that it senses that nothing else today can do. >> rose: henry kissinger and general mark welsh when we continue. >> rose: funding for "charlie rose" has been provided by:
>> rose: additional funding provided by: >> and by bloomberg, a provider of multimedia news and information services worldwide. captioning sponsored by rose communications from our studios in new york city, this is charlie rose. >> rose: we begin with with henry kissinger. may 8 marked the sefg anniversary of. former secretary of state henry kissinger fled the nazis and later returned to europe with the u.s. army. i spoke with him about his experiences during world war ii at the museum of jewish heritage here in new york city, and here is that conversation. let me start in germany.
tell me about growing up in kirth. what was it like for you? give us a sense of what it was to be a young henry kissinger. >> it's a town of about 80,000 people located right at the borders of nuremburg which was a larger city, and in my early youth, it was-- my father was a teacherer. he was a state employee and for jews to be employed by the government was considered a very rare thing. we're talking now about the late
1920s, early 30s. so i had a sort of german jewish middle-class existence until the nazis came. >> rose: '33 or earlier? >> in in '33. and they began a systematic campaign of segregation delegitimatization, and for-- it was sort of permissible for hitler youth kids to beat up jewish kids. you couldn't go to german schools anymore, so-- but it was in the german system, they had a law that everybody was entitled
to an education so it was like separate and equal facilities we had in the south. so there was a jewish school created to which i went for what, until we left. until i was 15. >> rose: did you have to-- did you want to do things and it was necessary to try to not acknowledge that you were jewish in order to do them, whether it had to do with sports or anything like that? >> in these relatively small towns-- and my grandfather lived in a village-- so it was known who the jewish people were, and you-- and there were signs all over the place "jews are not desired here," towns.
so that produced segregation. and i think the only times that i violated it was to go to football games to try to sneak into football games. i had a great passion for soccer. >> rose: was there much talk about leaving before you left? or did something happen and somebody-- your father says-- >> my father-- my father came from a little village, also. and for him, it was a spectacular career to come from a village and become a teacher with a title so he was very reluctant to leave. my mothers-- felt that her children would never have an opportunity. nobody thought that it was
possible that the holocaust would take place. and so my mother prevailed. and my father willingly went along, but he would not have taken the the initiate toif leave. >> rose: so it was your mothr. >> i my mother took the initiative. and she had an uncle in the united states who sent her an affidavit, should some assurance of support once we got here. and so we left in september '38. until then there, had been inincreasing restrictions and life had become increasingly unpleasant but it was not yet violent. two months after we left-- most
jewish men were sent to concentration camps. we missed that by literally two months. we hriefd here in september 1938 and the crystal naught was in early november, '38. and then, of course, the holocaust started. many members of my family became part -- >> including your grandfather? >> no, my grandfather was very ill, and at the kristallnacht he was-- he went to a near city,
and he died of his illness. my grandmother dieed in the holocaust, and three sisters of my father and all their families families. at least 15 members all together. >> rose: and you arrived in new york. >> yes. >> rose: in washington heights? and you were then what jiefs 15. >> rose: 15. and four years later, five years later you're 19. >> yes, i started work when i was 16. >> rose: thinking you would do what? >> well, at that time i was working in a shaving brush factory, and i didn't think i would have a huge career making shaving brushes. ( laughter ) >> rose: even then he was showing good sense. >> rose: i went to the night
college, night high school first and then night college and studied, accounting. >> rose: that would not have been the choice-- >> the world was spared a mediocre accountant. ( laughter ) >> rose: then you got drafted. >> yes. in '43. >> rose: '43 you were 19. >> right. >> rose: and they sent you down to spartanburg south carolina, or somewhere in south carolina. >> spartanburg, south carolina. it was a different world. ( laughter ) >> rose: how was it different? >> well, the draftees, of course, came from all over the country. in washington heights, there was an article in a german newspaper after the war that called
washington heights the fourth reich. >> rose: the fourth reich yes. >> because there was a preponderance of german jewish immigrants, at least a very large number. and most of the people i associated with there, and then in the shaving brush factory i was in contact mostly with italian immigrants-- not jewish. there was a different group. but in the army, i met, of course, a cross-section of americans, and i finally wound up in the the 84th infantry division, which was composed of of-- most of its soldiers came from northern illinois or southern wisconsin. the vast majority of people.
so that is when--. >> -- we did our training in louisiana where we got jungle training, and we were sent to the coldest winter that europe had had in quite a while. >> rose: so let's pick that up. you got drafted. you were naturalized as an american citizen. >> yes. >> rose: they had a fast track. if they drafted you they would naturalize you. >> yes but i had already-- you needed five years of living here, so i was close to being eligible. >> rose: so you go off to serve your country. you land in normandy what, a month after the invasion. >> about two months. but we landed at omaha beach and we still to go into landing boats from the ship. i don't know how i did that, coming down these. >> -- the side of the ship. but we all got sea sick coming
in on these flat-bond market boats, and when i think of the soldiers who had to land under fire in these conditions, it really increased one's admiration even more. >> rose: for those who had landed on december 7. >> yes. we landed-- we came in about october. >> rose: so what happened then? because the battle of the bulge was going to be-- >> we were first sent-- we were first sent to holland at the port-- leading to germany. at the border of germany, and my unit was assigned to another division for combat experience. and after the first period, i was pulled out of there and sent
to the headquarters of the 84th division to be in the-- to work in the g-2 section. that's the intelligence section. but that's still only about three miles behind the front. >> rose: so you went from booing a rifleman to counter-intelligence. >> well, at first it was not counter-intelligence. at first i was leading captured male of germans and interviewing prisoners and then i was transferred three months later to counter-intelligence. >> rose: when did you meet a man who had an enormous influence on you by the name of kramer? >> well, it was-- i met him when we were training in louisiana.
and kramer was a german. he wore a monocle riding boots. he was a ridiculous figure. he was a private -- >> he was a private? >> he was a private. he was-- luckily for him, there were only two possibilities-- that somebody would kill him or that he'd get promoted. ( laughter ) and the-- they dressed him up in german uniform and made him go and give speeches about what the war was about. and he spoke to my unit, the regiment to which i was adesigned. and disomething which i don't think i have ever done before-- i certainly hadn't done.
it before and i don't remember that i ever did it sense-- i wrote him a letter about how impressed i had been by his speech. and he was much older than i. i was, what, 20, and so i got to know him. he invited me to meet him and when-- and he probably contributed to my being assigned to the headquarters. we both worked in the g-2 section. >> rose: his name was fritz kramer. >> fritz kramer. >> rose: there was a point in which he at some point said to you "kissinger, you're a historian." >> he had two ph.d. agrees. he was about 15 years or more older than i was. i don't know what he was doing inabin an infantry division to begin
with. and he actually took an interest? what i should be reading which was not the normal conversation. >> rose: he said two things, "you're a historian"-- >> yeah, he said forget about accounting. ( laughter ) >> rose: that was not a hard sell. and he also said you should go to harvard. >> yes. well, he gave me lists of schools. the problem was that i didn't know anything about admissions policies, so i applied in april of the year that i wanted to go to school. ( laughter ) and most of the-- every school except harvard, i must say and he wrote back in effect saying, "you must be kidding." ( laughter ) or "why don't guback to city
college?" but harvard took me. and so -- >> did he have something to do with that, do you think? wrote you a letter of recommendation. >> he wrote me a letter of recommendation, but he-- he was certainly extremely influential in my life. >> rose: so he's got you in counter-intelligence so you're interviewing nawtsa prisoners of war. >> prisoners of war and suspected spies, people-- during the battle of the bulge the germans had a unit that-- in american uniforms, operated behind the american line because in the battle of the bulge the front line disappeared for a few weeks. for example our division came into a town, and there were german military policemen
standing there because-- the policemen were supposed to direct the infantry that came behind them. and thereof an american infantry division rolling into town. so it's this that period that i was assigned to counter-intelligence because i could tell a german by look at him, like a kind of police dog. ( laughter ) so i was sitting there at the door of the division headquarters looking at people coming in and there were certain questions we had to ask usually about baseball. you know, "what do you do with
two men on base, and the count is 3-2?" ( laughter ) >> rose: what would say they? >> most of the-- well, luckily no germans in american uniform came in. so the americans knew it, more or less. if they didn't -- >> but you had enormous in one of the small towns that you were given control of. >> at the end of the war when the war was -- >> over? >> over. the task of the counter-intelligence people was to get the people who had held any rank above a certain rank, could not hold any governmental office, and if they had higher ed they were in tiewrn and it was one of the jobs of
counter-intelligence to collect this. and also, in the very first phase to restore public services until military government could come in. and considering that i was barely 21, they gave me an enormous amount of responsibility. >> you said, "i had absolute authority to arrest people. in the c.i.c., we had more power than even the military government." >> it's a question of timing. lawyer we came in with a combat unit. the military government came in after the combat units. so while the combat units were there-- i mean, we were moving and we were taking townss in which we didn't know who was
who. and right at the end of the war the germans had ordered-- or hitler had ordered to create guerilla units and then there were displaced persons and refugees and in one situation a concentration camp. so that was our principal responsibility, to bring about enough orders so that the combat unit could exist there and as soon as the combat unit went on to other things, the military government came in. >> rose: here's a letter you wrote as a young man, speak of holocaust survivors:
experience it was knowing that many people i knew had gone through a comparable experience in the camps because it this was not an-- it was a typical camp. and those prisoners were-- they had trapped an ss man and they were trying to hurt him and they were too weak. >> rose: too weak. >> and it was-- it was simply the reduction of human beings to a level of degradation that was -- >> you chose to speak now because to talk about it this is the place to talk about it.
having said, that how do you think it has influenced you? >> well it showed what can happen to a country if its most special element is given free reign, and what can happen through declaring-- segregating people declaring them subhuman, and the cins with which this was carried out, we captured the man who was in charge of that camp because he stayed there. and he turned it over to us because he thought he'd now had his orders from somebody else. to him that camp was a normal part of existence.
>> rose: what happened to him? >> i tonight know what happened to him. we moved on. but in the camp, it was the camp that was responsible for the whole region. that man the commander, stayed behind, and he was hanged six months later. he was one of the first war criminals that was tried. >> rose: you stayed, being in counter-intelligence, for two years after the the war ended. >> well, i stayed-- yes. >> rose: two years. >> well, the war ended in july of '45 and i stayed about nine
months in the the area which them was assigned to me. >> rose: cowed you have gone home then? >> i could have gone home make 10 months earlier than i did. put kramer whom you mentioned before, was-- there was a european command intelligence intelligence and i got a civilian job as an instructor at the intelligence school for about ability eight months. so all together i stayed about a year longer. >> rose: looking at everything
we have talked about this evening so far, tell me what impact, how it has influenced, you think a man who went on to, you know go to harvard and become a distinguished professor, write lots of books about foreign policy about diplomacy, about countries, and as you have developed the strategies, ideas other about how the world works, what was the influence of this experience we have talked about? well, there are two aspects to the experience. one is the experience of evil, of disorder, of the breakdown of civilized discourse, and of the vulnerability of societies when
that framework collapses. and then, of course, at the end of the war one saw this immense suffering that you have described or that you've asked me to describe. at the same time, there emerged the imperative of how are you going to rebuild this, and what are we going to do in order to prevent this from happening again? and how can you create an international system and wnl germany a national system, by which the-- these strategies could be avoided. at first my duties and then my understand move from understanding the nature of this order, crisis, suffering to how
you can restore this and prevent it from happening again. and then it jihadist just my experiences. i studied reading a lot so many of the things i've written may have had their impetus in it period but the content of it i dwe riefd from other experiences as well. >> rose: what was the big mistake after world war i that the world had to learn the lesson and not make after world war ii? >> first of all world war i was a horrible mistake in sense that here were nations that were living together in a reasonably
order manner. good to an indoor wall that they thought would last six months and the sievites strug itled that it faith in government is upon upon. the leaders who made the peace did not ask the question of how the peace they were creating could be maintain upon. so they create aid germany a settlement with germany which was two to be accepted, but too little aware of history, so actually germany's strategic position improved as a result of
world war i. after world war i they were surrounded by a bunch of little countries, each of which was too weak to resist germany by itself. so the page was created from which one-- put the statement of the world had notand the legend that you must have a concept the objective upon're of your policy and not be swept away by mood of a moment moment. so when hitler came into power there was no framework with which they knew to reresist him.
and he would make demands that at lirs seemed reasonable upon. upon upon upon upon upon uponso the lesson is to understand what circumstances can become so irrevocable that you have to resist them at the beginning of their occurrence, and not wait until they turn into a full-fledged tragedy. >> rose: and who failed to recognize that? >> who failed to recognize it? >> rose: except the german resistance. >> basically, the germans didn't recognize the full extent of what was going on. and the surrounded countries
the-- world war i had taken such a toll, that their reluctance to face another showdown was overwhelming. and so it would have been very easy to resist hitler, say 1936. the first move he made was at the end of world war i the territory... in germany was demilitarized. the first move was to demilitarize that. it sounded not unreasonable to put military in your own country. the leaders were not looking-- there were a few who of who did see the consequences. but that was basic dispute that was going on whether hitler could be brought to a region by
making concessions or one was dealing with a phenomenon that was so aggressive and evil that it had to be resisted immediately. that was the dispute between churchill and chamberlain. >> rose: and churchill was in the wilderness. >> churchill was out of power and he kept making warning speeches, and he had the reputation of being a kind of -- >> could another man have done what hitler did or did hitler have some combination of evil or-- >> hitler certainly had some qualities, and he-- of had-- if you look at the other day there
was some kind of a news program that showed his rise to power and where he entered a room to make a speech, and the gestures he made to attract attacks to himself. so he had a uniquely uniquely-- a unique capacity of concentrated evil. apparently very spellbinding effect on people around him. i've asked german generals "what were you thinking?" and they said well, he'd look at you, and you lost your judgment. soy that was a special quality. but a readjustment of the european situation had to take place because there were as many
people under foreign rule over the versailles settlement that there had been before of these people. checks living in in poland. it was a tippedder box but with more moderate leaders. >> rose: i thank dr. kissinger for taking this evening to share a life. thank you. ( applause ). >> thank you. >> rose: general mark welsh is here, the chief of staff. he is responsible for more than 690,000 active duty personnel. he also advises the president as a member of the joint chief of staff. the role of the air force has changed dramatically. in addition to the fighters and bombers that defend the u.s. and its interests it has taken on
new missions in space and cyberspace. its men and women operate the drones that have been critical to the u.s.-led fight against isis and isil. and the new f-35 joint fighter. general welsh has called the air force the military's leading proponent of innovation. he says every airman could be, can be must be innovative if we are to succeed in the future. i am pleased to have general welsh at this table for the first time. welcome. >> rose: i sat the simulator, and in the simulator of the f-35. and it's a remarkable experience for someone who had not done that before. because there i was and with the able guidance of one of your great officers, able to control able to take off, able to land. i would think one of the least attractive things about being chief of staff of the air force
is you don't get to fly as much as you used to. >> charlie there aren't many things that are unattractive about my job but that is one of them. the good news si'm not as good as i used to be anyway, so it's probably better i'm not flying. >> rose: for security reasons they don't let you fly much. >> especially the single-seat airplanes pup have to be good at it. you have to train frequently and i don't realistically have the time and i've lost a step or two. >> rose: take a look at this video of the f-35 simulator and we'll talk about this plane and hear. major, this may surprise you but this is first time i've been in a fliert plane or a simulator. as i step into this, tell me what the feeling is here. what am i about to get into? >> we call it strapping the jet on to your body or strapping yourself into the jet and wanting to become one with the jet. >> rose: shall i get in? >> let's go for it. >> rose: this is like a dream come true to me. >> what you have on your left is the throttle. if you push that all the way
forward you're putting engine in the full after-burner and you're going as fast as you can. >> rose: howfd how fast can i go? >> about mach 1.6. then you pull it all the way back as slow cause go. >> rose: do you do it slowly. >> -- >> you can do as fast as you want. it will be responsive like a lamborghini. and what you have here is a touch screen. this is a god's-eye view. you're right here with the aircraft, and that's showing 80 miles. if you want to go to 40 just like an ipad you can touch that and it goes to 40, cuts that in half. this is what we're going to use to drop missiles and bombs. that's the pickle button. you're going 91 knots right now. keep that thing forward. pull it into full afterburner. now pull back on the stick nice and easy. there you go spp and you're flying. >> rose: wow. >> that's pretty easy, isn't it? >> right now we're going to engame a couple of air targets. your jet has already found them.
there are two enemy aircraft about 80 nautical miles off your nose. this is completely different than the way an f-16 would have worked. in an f-16 i would have had had to turn my radar on, i would have had to know they were roughly in that location, point my radar there and lock them up and start doing what we're already ready to do. >> rose: you would have had to do that manually? >> i would have had to do that manually. your simulator has already detected those two aircraft and are ready. you're traveling at 620 knots and he's probably going 500 knots. >> rose: do you think he's locked in on me? >> no, because you're stealth. are you ready to fire? push the pickle button. and the missile is gone. watch it on the screen. now you can shoot your second missile now. there gu. watch it come off the screen. >> rose: can i just play with this for a moment? >> you surely can. just full left or full right on
the stick just any way you want. you can go faster. >> rose: wow! you have ever done that in a plane? >> yup certainly. any time no one's watching. ( laughs ) >> rose: this is so, so extraordinary. you have to totally focus on it. >> you can do a loop, if you want. think you got that in you? >> rose: i got that. >> now pull back on the stick and go all the way over the top. try to keep it level. to the right. that's all right. >> rose: i see it. >> keep going. you can go all the way underneath. you have tons of altitude right now. >> rose: this is un-frigging believable. >> think you have a landing in you. >> rose: i think so. >> we're going toward that triangle-looking symbol on the screen. that's your home base. this is what we call the flight path mark perp that is where your jet is going. you're about 15 miles away from the runway. >> i'm going to go out and get my pilot's license. >> if you're ready to put the gear down, pull back on that and then push it down. there you go.
>> rose: gear is down. >> perfect. go a little more now. you're good and lined up. that's good. pull back with your right hand for me. that's what you want right there. hold that right there. you're about to land. boom. now put the throttle back to idle. beautiful. i think you got it. >> rose: i had a pretty good instructor. so make the case for why you need this military aircraft which costs $140-plus million. and has been controversial in its development. we'll talk about some of those issues. but why do you need it? >> because the capability gap between our air force and other air forces is closing and it's closing dramatically. we have been the world's leading air force for some time. and everyone else who had an interest in becoming the world's leading air force has been able to look at the blueprint we used to build this great machine with the support of the american people the congress, and the department of defense, and they've been following this blueprint and trying to build the same kind of capability to
counter the advantages we have. and they're having success. and the technology that is now coming-- being built by other countries is going to be better than the technology we have fielded in the past. and if we as an air force don't stay ahead of the technology curve we will become irrelevant. if your air force becomes irrelevant your joint force becomes irrelevant. >> rose: so you have to have this plane in your judgment. >> it's black and white, charlie. not just in my judgment but in anyone who sees the parameters of the sensors the weapons that will be fielded in the next five to 10 years. >> rose: the cost is $400 billion? >> the overall cost of the program. we anticipate by the end of 2019, 2020, the cost of an airplane will be $80 million a piece, which is the where the baseline of this program in 2011 said we should be. >> rose: the procurement officer for the pentagon, the top weapon buyer called the
f-35 an acquisition malpractice. >> mr. cendle is referring to the beginning of the program the first x-number of years-- i'm not sure of the exact time frame he was looking at. when i got into this job in 2012 i took a very hard look at the program and i started with looking at the program rebaseline that occurred in 2011. since that time i have tracked very closely along with leaders of lockheed mart and i know the department how the progress of this has moved forward. we have met every milestone. the company knows what it costs to build this airplane. we have held them accountable to those price curves and they lived up to them. i'm pretty comfortable with where the program is right now. clearly, we would have liked to have gotten here have a a different path. >> rose: i want to back to that. here it is a model of the f35-a. called the lightning? >> yes sir. >> rose: is this plane the best plane to fight future wars rather than past wars?
>> charlie there's no question about that. this airplane is all about the future. there are things this airplane can do that no other airplane can do and every mission it will be involved in. there is information it can share that other airplanes will not have. there are ways for it to digest information, to disseminate information, to connect to other sensors, other platforms another whether it's a ship, a radar or another aircraft, and share information that it senses that nothing else today can do. >> rose: there was some hope the navy, air force, and marines might have the same plane with this adaptation. that didn't happen. why not? >> well, i just think it gets down to the individual requirements of the severs, how they intend to use the of platform the environment they'll operate in. operating off a carrier is very different than operating off an airfield. and so i think the requirements for each of those airplanes naturally went in different
directions. that, obviously, makes the program a little more complicated, a little more difficult. i suspect that added a lot to the cost growth and the length the program went to get to the point we're at today. >> rose: you'll have this by when? >> this thing will be operational a little over a year from now. by the end of calendar year 2016 the air force will have an operational unit of f-35. >> rose: will we sell the plane torg countries? >> it has been contracted to other countries. we have eight partners and there are other countries. canada, the u.k., netherlands, norway. >> rose: is that a vote of confidence in the plane, as far as you're concerned? >> absolutely it's a vote of confidence. no question about that. this will be a great airplane. >> rose: let me talk about dproans droens. you prefer remotely piloted aircraft. because drones have a bad image? >> it gives the idea that it's out on its own doing its own thing which couldn't be further from the truth.
not only is there a crew directly praight the machine, a pilot, a sensor operator, there's also a mission commander. there's an intelligence analyst and an entire array of intelligence source behind the analysis of the imagery that you're drawrk the mission integration with other organizations that may be doing activities based on the intelligence you're gathering. but this is a very, very manpower-intensive enterprise. >> rose: we just had an incident in which american hostages, one american and one italian were killed. why does that happen? and what are the safeguards to prevent it from happening? >> it happens because it's warfare. this is an ugly business. there's nothing pretty, glorious about it. it's a very difficult business, and things like this are going to happen in it. it's horrible every time it happens. i'll just tell thu-- when it does, we dissect these things incredibly to make sure that we do everything humanly possible to keep it from happening again. >> rose: so what happened here? what was the mistake here-- if it was a mistake?
or what were the circumstances you should have known and didn't know, the fact that these hostages were there? >> charlie, i don't know the specifics of this particular case, but in general when something like this occurs it's because you didn't know the people were there. and typically, that would happen for one of two reasons. either you didn't have a good enough observation of the target for a period of time, which was not the case in this particular case i don't believe. or people had just been in the building for so long that you saw no activity around the building except the bad guys going in. but i don't know tbhapped this case. >> rose: but is there concern? i mean, is it the thing that worries you and worries people on the operational end of drones? as you know, there is some criticism around the world. >> i'm going to give you a different side of the story. i have been observing attacks from remotely piloted aircraft where after the weapon left the aircraft something was seen by one of these people who monitor the entire activity that caused us to slew a bomb or a missile away from the intended target and land in an empty field
because a child had just appeared out of a building within the blast -- >> so you pay attention to these kind of details. >> there is incredible attention to this. if you had the chance to sit and talk with our young pilots and sensor operators, you'd see how closely they train to that standard. they worry about this every day. >> rose: where are we in terms of isil? obviously, we're flying airstrikes there. in fact, i think you have told me that a significant percentage, 70y% 80% of airstrikes are flown by the u.s. air force. >> about 70% of the actual flight sorties yes. well, isil -- >> assess what's happening on the ground for me as you know it. >> i think what's happened if you would talk to general lloyd austin, what he has said is we have been able to degrade them. we have kept them from massing and taking new terrain. we have kept them from identifying new objectives and moving into them as they did for a period of time before we started the air strikes. we forced them to move into defensive positions which actually creates targets from the air. we have clearly disrupted,
delayed, degraded their ability to take ground and hold it. we have not been able to do that nationwide because they're so clearly embedded with-- in many areas of the country, that the iraqi government is going to have to lead the charge on this on the ground is there gl are we striking nem syria? >> we are striking isis in syria since last august. the strikes themselves are very effect 55 upon the scale is relatively small. if you compared this to the first gulf war this is not that kind of air campaign. it is a much slower paced air campaign for a reason. the intent is to align the air activity with the ground activity. while the ground forces are trained and equip the air campaign is intended to delay degrade, slow isil from achieving their objectives, and make it tougher for them to finance, try and disrupt their movement of resources and people. to do all those things so by the time the ground force is ready to move the air campaign will
shift to supporting the ground forces. >> rose: you have to have both in significant ways? >> if we're going to control in-state, on the ground, inside iraq and syria -- >> to control territory you have to have boots on the ground. >> if you want to control territory over time, there need to be boots on the ground. >> rose: is the target in syria just terrorist groups like isil or al-nusra. in so way is it the syrian air force and army? >> we are not targeting the syrian air force and army right now. >> rose: what does the air force do in cyber-security? >> quite a bit actually. we have a number of airmen who had been at this for quite some time supporting the national security agency and u.s. cyber command. everybody in our air force is part of the cyber defense mission. we have to be. we have a lot of systems that have cyber vulnerabilitys. we have got to understand those. we have got to understand how to prevent them being affected. we have to defend our networks. we have to make sure the right flaerks are secured in a way that makes them dependable if a conflict or contingency requires
their use. and we have some that involve national command and control and communication that go all wait to the white house that must be protected. everybody in our air force has a role in the the defensive side of the business. >> rose: as you know, there have been increased attention on domestic violence and domestic abuse, whether it's in civilian life or whether it's on campuses or whether it's in the military. what is the military and what is the air force doing to minimize that and to make sure that every violation of that is brought to justice? >> yes, sir. right thing is always done. we're a big organization and we have all the same ugly things happened in the air force as happen in society although i would argue there's a smaller percentage. if i use sexual assault as an example. we had 2300 examples of illegal sexual contact in the air force last year -- >> 2300. >> 2300. 1300 affecting female it victims and 1,000 with male victims.
that's ridiculous. so we work this problem very, very very hard. do we have everything, all the programs in place, and have we found the answers to eliminate this? clearly not. and we will give ourselves no credit until we do. i'll tell thu-- there are an awful lot of people twhork hard. there are programs in place now over the last two to three years that have having an effect. clearly the effect is not significant enough for to us take any credit. when the number is zero, zeal a victory lap. until then we have a lot of work to do. >> rose: it seems to me in every aspect of life the velocity of change is increasing dynamically every year in every wield fieldwhether it's biology or brain science or whether it's military activities as well. and certainly all areas of technology are affected by the velocity of change. how does it affect you and what you do? >> oh, it affects everything we do, charlie. if we can't stay ahead of the pace of change we will become irrelevant, just like not staying ahead of the technology curve. we have got to be better at
this. the "we" is everybody from the air force to the department of defense to the united states congress figuring out ways to get this done. this is a big effort for our government and a major factor in national security in the future. >> rose: it's a pleasure to you have here at the table. >> thank you sir and keep flying glu certainly stimulated my ambition. thank you for joining us. see you next time. captioning sponsored by rose communications captioned by media access group at wgbh access.wgbh.org
this is "nightly business with tyler mathisen and sue herera. auto sales remain on track for the best year in almost a decade making this one part of the economy that seems toe firing on all cylinders. security failures. despite bill yoz being spent on our nation's airports a new report shows it is way too easy to get past security. >> raise the retirement age, that the best way to save social security. all of that tonight on "nightly busine for tuesday, june 2nd. good evening, everyone and welcome. auto sales are hot and that says a lot about a luke warm economy. the industry is on track now for the second best year ever for car and light truck sales as