tv Charlie Rose PBS July 27, 2017 12:00am-1:01am PDT
. >> rose: welcome to the program, we begin this evening with a look at north korea's nuclear program. we talk to david sanger of the new york times. >> the united states goat out to build a nuclear weapon, it is to highly precise specificses. these guys do not plan to be in a nuclear exchange. this missile is for one thing. it is to guarantee that kim jungun stays in office. so they're not actually thinking operationally about how they might do this. and launch missiles on the united states am they know that is the end of their regime. it is the end of everything. if this entire weapons program is all about survival for kim junkun. >> we conclude this evening by looking at the conflict between qatar and some sunni arab states and also the growing power of iran. we talk to michael morell, former deputy director of the
cia and the ambassador from the united arab emirates to the united states. >> we are ready to sit down tomorrow and negotiate the 13 demands. if the qataris are willing to say that they are ready to negotiate. so far they haven't been able to d a solution has to be a diplomatic solution. but the willingness to find a solution lies not in rhiyad, certainly not in washton, it lines in. >> north korea's accelerating nuclear prospects and conflict in the middle east and gulf states when we continue. funding for charlie rose is provided by the following: >> and by bloomberg, a provider
of multimedia news and information services worldwide. captioning sponsored by rose communications from our studios in new york city, this is charlie rose. >> rose: we begin this evening with north korea. american intelligence agencies now estimate that north korea will be i believe to launch a reliable nuclear capable interkonl miss thail could reach the united states in one year t had been previously thought that pyongyang was roughly four years from fully developing long-range missiles however in a test earlier this month north korea launched a missile capable of striking parts of alaska. it was the latest in a series of tests that have forced u.s. intelligence officials to recognize that they have miscalculated the country's aggressive technical advances under the leader kim jung you know, president trump vowed to con fropt north korea. joining me is david sanger,
national security correspondent for "the new york times" and i'm pleased to have him here. he wrote this story in today's new york sometimes experts say north korea could have a missile to reach u.s. by next year. what changed? >> well, charlie, a couple of things changed. the short term thing that changed is one you minged which is they conducted this test. it was done in a very high-- one of 1700 miles and came down, it didn't go very far in distance but anybody who knew anything about missile technology knew that flattening that out isn't very hard, just stretching it out, right. and it is interesting politically that they decided not to do that. because the reaction if you drop one of these things off the coast of l.a. or something like that is going to be a lot greater than if you do this high parable test. the test actually was more useful to them because what they need to figure out is can they
make a warhead reenter the atmosphere and not burn up. and that is an issue that took us a lot of time in the 1950s. it took the soviets a lot of time in the 1950s. we don't know exactly how close they are to that. but everybody in the intelligence agencies had been whispering for a long time that that for-year out number could well be wrong. and what you are seeing happen here, charlie, is the end of a caution, the overcaution that came from their mistakes in iraq and intelligence agencieses. >> rose: let me read your last paragraph. in the iraq case the intelligence agencies overestimated saddam hussein's ability to reinstitute what was once a healthy nuclear weapons program. in the north korean case, one senior intelligence official noted last week the speed and sophistication of the program have been consistently underestimated, much as it was with the soviet union 70 years ago, an china more than 50 years ago. underestimated. >> you know, charlie. we are all captivated by the
last mistake we made in life, okay. so their last big mistake was saddam heuses hughes has nuclear weapons and missiles and all that am and they reached that conclusion in part because he had made great advances before the first persian gulf war. and in part because every previous mistake that the. is intel gengs agencies had made from world war two forward had been to underestimate how close a country was to getting a nuclear capability. so harry truman had a memo on his desk the weekend of the soviets conducted their first nuclear test in 1949 saying don't worry, they still got, we have still got time on this. we underestimate the chinese in the 1960st. we underestimated the indians in the 70st and pakistanis in the 19 '80s. and so for a long time in the intelligence agency the theory was if you don't be more a dpressive and say it could happen earlier, you can get fired. then after iraq, it was if you
overestimate and you know, embarrass us, you can get fired. we're getting back to the norm now. >> rose: but this july 4th test, i think it was july 4th. >> that's right. >> rose: showed them a lot in terms of the possibility. >> that's right. >> rose: we assume that they can make a weapon small enough to fit on the missile that they are developing. >> if they can't now, they will be able to in a few years. it is hard to do. but remember, they're not doing this to american speks. when the unitied states goes out to build a nuclear weapon it is to highly precise specificses. these guys do in the plan to be in a nuclear exchange. this missile is for one thing. it is to guarantee that kim jung-un stays in office. they are not actually thinking operationally about how they might do this and launch missiles on the united states. they know that is the end of their regime.
>> rose: end of everything. >> it is the end of everything. if this entire weapons program is all about survival for kim jungun. he looks out at the landscape and what does he see, he sees somebody like qaddafi in libya who had a nash yent nuclear program, no place close to what the north koreans or even iranians hadk and gave it up in 2003. we said don't worry, don't worry. give it up, we will integrate you to the west, come on in. the integration was pretty poor. and then when his people turned gebs him, the united states, europe and the arab states all came in and bombed him until somebody pulled him out of a ditch and shot himment kim jung-un looks at that and says not me. we're going full speed at the program. the big difference between him and his father is he is really is going full speed. >> rose: you is have to give the devil his due. he has shown a sense of urgency that has paid off. >> urgency, determination, i mean some day when somebody
writes the history of this, it is going to be the history of a dead broke country with, you know, no silicon valley to fall back on. that has figured out how to steal, beg, hire and bribe people to build a nuclear arsenal. >> rose: is part of this it the scomg psychology of trying to say to everybody, we have to get more urgent about our options and what we're doing because clapper and others have argued former dni, director of national intelligence, have said we have to act, and yet they have a weapon. everything we do has to be based on the premise that they had the possibility to do this. >> that's right. >> rose: that is the assumption we operate on. >> i just saw general clapper last week. he was out at the security forum with a lot of other of the intelligence chiefs. and this was a big theme. look, a year away or two years away or three years away, doesn't make that big a difference for american
planning. because the fact of the matter is it takes so long to deploy improved defenses, fixing your missile defenses, figuring out your next cyberattack on north korea's missiles that you have got to start now as if they had it now. >> rose: there is also this. some have said to me who know something about what intelligence, what america's strategy is, that they are already faced with this he request. we either have to do one of two things. sanctions are not going to work. the chinese obviously are not going to do what we hope they are going to do. so it is either we have to live with the north koreans having the weapons potential or else we have to attack them. and the president is going to have to make their hard decision. known that if they attack them, they will be a counter attack against south korea which will kill at least 200,000 people. >> is that wrong? >> well, it's probably right. there are some off-ramps from thatment and you know, here you have to have a little bit of
sympathy for donald trump. because every american president of the past four or five has kicked this problem down the road. every time they saw an incremental north korean advance, they looked at just the two options you have just described and they head locked. we're not going to attack these guys and lose seoul, rate? so let's put up with it and try. >> it is seoul for millions of people. >> 10 to 14 million people depending on how you-- it's one of the great economic powerhouses of asia and of the world. and more importantly, you know, it's a close american ally. so that's really not an option unless you've got an attack plan that the south koreans agree to, and that seems unlikely. so every american president has decided we can't go that route. they often don't want to give
in, so they ended up, you know, we're going to increase sanks. we're going to isolate them more. it almost becomes a joke, you go to these briefing and they would have to try to convince you that the sanctions they are going to do this weak are more super deuper wonderful and effective than the ones that they tried three months before. and as you said, there is only one sanction here that is going to work. it is the chinese turnoff the oil. or if we find a way to turn the oil off on the north korean side, other than that--. >> a sieb weapon, something awful happens to the pipeline, an accident happens, a maintenance issue happens, there are a few other things you could do to squeeze them down. president bush has some good success when he found a single bank in macao that kim jungun's father kept his fortune in and that was the money that was used
to pay off all the generals around him and others for their loyalty. and when they stopped that bank, it really caused a lot of screaming. the north koreans learned a lot from that. they spread their money around a lot more than that. but you are right, we are in this bad spot. and you have got to wonder right now whether awful as that is, when president trump looked at this issue, you know, a north korean crisis has certain advantages for him, it focuses attention on something other than the russian scandal and something other than what he is doing. and i don't mean for a moment to suggest that he wants to go get us into a war. i don't think he does. but he's got a real crisis right in front of him at a moment where he would really like. >> that was. >> that's right, that is why the best thing he left, and the one possible offer is the combination of cyberelectronic
warfare and other steps to sabotage the system. the problem of cyberattacks as you and i have discussed on previous shows is what works on thursday may not work next monday. they're quite temporary. they buy you some time. they bought us a year in iran. it was a critical year to get the iranians to the table. they bought us a little time in north korea but it looks like time is up. >> rose: thank you, david. >> thank you, charlie. >> rose: great to see you. >> great to be with you. >> rose: coming back we'll talk about the ctnflict between qatar and its arab neighbors. back in a moment, stay with us. on june 5th the middle eastern states including saudi arabia, the united arab emirates severed relationships with qatar, accused the gulf state of supporting terrorism and their iran. the dispute has thrown an already unstable region into deeper turmoil. joining me for a conversation about the crisis and other recent developments in the
middle east is the united arab emirate's ambassador to the united states since 2008. he has been called the most influential ambassador in washington. and michael morell, former deputy director of the cea and acting director of the c, a and freak guest on this program, of which we are deeply grateful. let me begin with you, qulowsev-- yousef, what is the mob with the qataris for your country? what is it they are doing that is so offends you? >> i think there are two ways to look at this. first is this a diplomatic disagreement or is this more a philosophical disagreement. i tend to think our differences with qatar go beyond the diplomatic and more philosophical. if you ask uai, sawedy, jordan, egypt, ba ran, what kind of middle east they want to see ten years from now, it will be fundamentally opposed what what i think qatar would like to see. what we would like to see is more secretary you lar, stable,
prosperous, empowered, strong government. what we have seen qatar do for the last 10 to 15 years is support groups like the mus imbrotherhood, hamas, taliban, islamist militias in syria, islamist militias in libya, exactly the opposite direction we think our region needs to go. so our disagreement is about what the future of the middle east should look like. and that's not something that we have been able to square request with the qataris for a long time. >> rose: what do they want it to look like. >> i think they want more groups like the muslim brotherhood, hamas, the taliban. i don't think it is a coincidence that inside you have the hamas leadership, the taliban embassy, you have the muslim brotherhood leadership, groups going on al jazeera promoting and justifying suicide bombs. why they do that, we don't have a answer, perhaps michael and some of his can help us. but we seem to be at odds with a very core belief of what we want the region to be. >> rose: is there a demands
because there was a long list of demands including ending al jazeera and other things. you have essentially wanted to isolate them. it hasn't worked entirely, jordan is not isolated from qatar. partially. what are the core demands? how could this be negotiated. >> this is a great question. so the core demands if you step back and look at what we went through with qatar in 2014, just to put some context behind what is happening today, 2014 saudi, uae and bahrain pulled their ambassadors over the exact same set of grieveances. the exact same set of issues. support for terrorism, meddling in our internal affairs and incitement and provocation. november 2014 the late king abdullah hosted a meeting in riyadh and hosted all the gcc leaders and had a very, very open conversation, we'll call it a very honest airing of his grieveances with the qatari
leader. and at the end of that meeting, there was a document that was signed and we called it the riyadh agreement. and i brought a copy with me. it is right here and it has the signature of the imir of qatar it was over the exact same set of issues. and qatar promised to stop supporting the groups and individuals that were giving us a hard time. unfortunately, everything that has been signed into this agreement has been violated for the last three years. so the collective frustration with the four countries today is at a new level. so the demands while they are more specific, they are still in tari signed up to in 2014. we are ready to sit down with qatar tomorrow and negotiate the 13 demands. if the qataris are willing to say that they are willing to negotiate. so far they haven't been able to say that. but we want a solution. and the slawtion has to be a diplomatic solution. but the willingness to find a solution lies not in riyadh, not in abu dhabi, certainly not in
washington, it lies in doha. >> rose: this disagreement took place in what year? >> 2014. >> rose: so three years ago. so this just didn't happen because of the visit of president trump to riyadh and the arab summit conference. >> absolutely not. this has been, this is like a pot sitting on the stove for a really lining long time and it's finally boiled over, except it boiled over twice. one three years ago, it was resolved. but these commitments were never lived up to. and today it has actually gotten worse. so we got to a point, charlie, where we said we can't live like this any more. you can't sit around the table with us and support the groups that are threatening to kill us and kill our children 6789 you can't be inside a tent while you are supporting the groups that undermine our security. and so if you want to continue that foreign policy and supported hamas and the brotherhood and islam militias, you are more than welcome to. they have every right to come
back tomorrow and say we reject these demands and don't want to negotiate. and we will also-- within our rights to say, we don't want to have a relationship with you. it is very hard for you to come and force upon any country having a relationship with a country where they don't think that relationship is in their best interest. and you have four countries who feel that qatar has been supporting groups that undermine them. not one or two, and like i said, this has been going on for a very long time. >> rose: all right, what is the u.s. attitude about this? because on the one hand you have the president saying he is all in. and then you have the secretary of state saying he's trying to negotiate. >> well, first i will tell you what my attitude is and then we can get to what their attitude is. look, i think yousef is absolutely right. this has been going on for a long time. i think what happened here is that qatar, a small country, small population, significant
wealth from natural gas, wanted to play a bigger role in the region. they wanted to have a foreign policy that was outsized for itself. and they looked around, they looked around and said okay, where can we, where can we make a difference. and one of the areas that was open was talking to these groups that the rest of us won't talk to and won't interact with. and they saw an opportunity to play a role with that. and as they became closer and closer to these groups over time, they started supporting them. >> rose: supporting them financially. >> supporting them in many ways. as yousef said for example, groups that the united states of america considers to be intlrl terrorist organizations, that we have designated as such, hamas and the taliban have ocheszs in doha. and then also supporting them, them and others with money and
arms including al nousra, another designated terrorist organization of the united states and syria. so you know, clear, clear support for terrorist groups. and then a lot of people talk about the muslim brotherhood. we don't, in the united states, see it as an international terrorist organization. we've looked at it hard. we don't see it that way. but it is absolutely an organization that wants to-- that wants through political means, we think, right, i think they would tell you a slightly different story, through political means. >> rose: they use political means and elected a president. >> in egypt, right. but then they want to impose a particular way of life on the populations throughout the middle east. and qatar supports those organizations.
so how should the american people think about this from my perspective. they should think about it as the qataris are trying to deal with the muslim brotherhood in places like its em ralts, in places like saudi arabia, but the rushan-- russians tried to do in the united states in terms of interfering in our politics. it is exactly the same. >> and just to add one point, we have become really good, both we and the united states, at fighting terrorists once they get on to the battle field. we're good at defeating isis, we're good at defeating al-qaeda, between our military intelligence capabilities. once they get on the battle field, we can take them out. our challenge has been and i think where we failed is how do we prevent them from getting to the battlefield in the first place. how do we get them before they become terrorists. >> rose: is there evidence that they supported either al-qaeda or isis? >> there is evidence that they supported al-qaeda an syria, which is the same exact group. there is evidence that they supported islamist militias and libya. it is the world's worst kept secret that qatar has supported individual groups both in libya and syria and in some ali.
>> they have allowed one of bin laden's sons for awhile to live in d o.j. a. >> rose. >> so about a year and a half ago, senior u.s. official called a senior uau official, so we will leave the names out. but the purpose of the call was to say we need your advice. how can we convince the qataris to stop supporting al nousra in syria. it tells me two things. it fells me one, you have governments aware, and it tells me the u.s. government is unable to prevent it. it is the world's worst kement secret that qatar supports groups in syria, somalia, libya and throughout the region. >> rose: who else supported al nousra in syria? >> i don't have any evidence. but we know for a fact that while-- . >> rose: could any other nations support al nousra in syria? >> i don't know. >> rose: you don't know with all the intel gens you have. >> i know i have an issue with qatar because they supported groups throughout the region. it is hard to direct or to
understand where the money flows go in once they go into sir why but we have seen evidence of qatari funds going into syria and into libya because we have people there. >> rose: i don't want to get into a debate about terrorist groups but al nousra is cked different from al qaeda, is it not? >> it is the al-qaeda affiliate in syria. >> rose: but it has been going through certain per mutations over there. >> and it name change but essentially think of them as the al-qaeda group in syria. there is a third piece. we talked about the actual ter rest organizations. we talked about the muslim brotherhood and then there is al jazeera, right? and i think in the american media, what you often see on this issue is freedom of the press, right. what al jazeera do its job as a journalistic organization. the american people need to think about it this way. what if the canadian broadcasting company was trying to incite individuals to conduct attacks on the united states.
the united states would get pretty upset about that. the united states would have a conversation with the canadian government about that, that is what is happening here. >> and its' one thing-- they're not mutually exclusive. you can support freedom of the press and be against incitement at the same time. al jazeera is owned by the government of quatd ar, this is not a private channel. second they have clerics that go on a weekly show that promote, condone and justify suicide bombings. and you guys in the u.s. had a problem with that when you had soldiers in iraq. you had an issue with this. but it still continues. >> rose: one point we haven't touched on is there is a big american base in qatar which is used as a kind of launching pad for our activities in syria and elsewhere. >> yes. >> yes. >> rose: and that example of how the qataris say they are friends with everybody, that is their line, that's what they say, that is what the-- from the prime minister said when he was here, we're not engaged in terrorist activities, they suggest, suggesting that hamas is supported by other people
other than them. >> right, but here is the point, right, here is-- this is the point i tried to get to at the beginning. the cost of them trying to be friends with everybody is the-- the everybody, right, the bad guys who they are friends with, want something, want something from them, from that friendship and that's the point. >> rose: financial support from terrorist activities. >> uh-huh. >> rose: what about the base. you are connected to the base because you know, there was some emails of yours that were hacked in which you approximate spoasedly saying to the someone, an american, i guess, going to get the american base out of qatar. >> i think the base so far has not been touched, has not been harmed. i was in abu dbee two days toog, he thanked us for the fact that we insure that the base operations had not been touched. >> rose: do you want the base out of qatar and you want to see it moved in part to a variety of other locations. that's what was said in the email. >> i want qatari policy and
qatari behavior to change. and i think to a certain extent the base gives them a certain amount of cover. and i think that's what we are concerned about. >> rose: and is that hard for the united states because the base has been so valuable to. >> so now we get to kind of washington's view on this, right. at least my perception of washington's view. so in the state department, right, they look at this as not a healthy thing for the gcc. in the a healthy thing for our sunni-arab allies. >> rose: the conflict between. >> it's conflict, right. at a time when we are all trying to stand up to iran, right. and they look at the base and they want this to go away. right? and that, that is what lead the secretary of state to get on a plane and go to the region and try to help resolve this and then come back. i think the president's view is exactly what yousef and i have been talking about here, this is behavior that is unacceptable,
this is behavior here that is-- that is feeding the problem that we all have. and it has to stop. and so i think that with a little bit of a difference of opinion, there was a difference of opinion between the president is is not about president is trump's visit. this is about our issues with qatari policy and base or no base, we would still have the same concerns while they support the brotherhood, hamas, taliban, et cetera. >> rose: so this is not a new issue. when you have brought this up with them, all along, so this should not have been unexpected from them. what is their response? >> their response, and you have heard the amir say this in person. they don't believe the groups they support are ter rests. he did an interview with amanpour a few years ago and she asked the same question. he said we don't believe the people in libya or syria are ter yis-- terrorists, not only are they not-- . >> rose: we don't blee the muslim brotherhood are terrorists. >> they are supporting far worse than the muslim brotherhood.
let's put the muslim brotherhood aside. can we agree on the islamist militias in libya, syrianess and somalia, the taliban in hamas. there is no debate about that at all. and it's not one or two, it is a consistent pattern of behavior. and it is the continued attempt to undermine countries like egypt, countries like saudi arabia, like the uae. were you recently in a conference where a mutual friend told you about them supporting the muslim brotherhood and inn their particle amry elections. >> rose: he worried about the muslim brotherhood in his country. >> we all do. because these are groups that fundamentally undermine our staibilityd. >> rose: i will come back to this but talk about iran. they came out of the riyadh conference, this united opposition to iran, the president spoke to it and has spoken to it since then. is there, what is the basic split and the basic fear of iran. is it that they are supporting terrorism and they are supporting groups that are in
opposition to the views of the united arab emirates and to the views of saudi arabia and to the views of other sunni arab states? is that essentially the conflict that iran is exporting their revolution to other places, and you want to stop them because you want to make sure they don't dominate the region. >> not only that iran export the revolution, it is in their constitution, it is the only country in the world where enshrined in their constitution is the concept of promoting and exporting their revolution. and they have done it with great success in places like iraq, syria, lebanon and now yemen. even reached as far as afghanistan. so our concern is the expansionist policy of iran, is the hedge mondayic behavior of eye iran, and as a diplomat that represents a country that has three of it's lands occupied by iran, until today, since 1971, there is not theoretical. we see iranian footprints everywhere in the region.
and if you are to map out 15 years ago where iran's influence, iran's footprint was and would you do the same math today, that area would be much, much larger. they have a much stronger influence in iraq. much stronger influence in syria and lebanon. and part of the reason we are in yemen is to prevent that from happening in yemen. we do not want to see iran replicate hezbollah in yemen. >> rose: what is our-- what do we plan to do in this government as far as you know about iran's behavior? >> so what i understand, yousef knows more than i do, is that we plan to challenge in specific places in the middle east iranian misbehavior. mostly behind the scenes. but we're going to take it on. and there is a significant
change. for the united states. for a very long period of time we ignored iranian misbehavior in the region even when it's been focused directly at us. so the bay route embassy bombing-- bay rut embassy bombing trails back to iran, the united states does not respond. the marine baracks bombing in lebanon goes back to tehran, the united states did not spond. the kobah tower bombing goes back to tehran, the united states did nothing. shia militia getting advanced ied's from the iranians killing hundreds of u.s. soldier ntion iraq-- in iraq and in av ban stand, two administrations, the bush administration and the obama administration did nothing. really interesting as to why the history is what it is. but i think, i think it's changing. and i think it's a good thing that the united states along with our partners are going to push back against this
hedgeemonic behavior, sucting ter rimp-- terrorism on their own, supporting terrorists in the region, .ing support to insurgents. iranian state policy to export their revolution, iranian state policy for israel to be wiped off the face of the planet. it is in my view about time that we push back against that. and as increase the cost of them doing that. because they won't stop until they do that. >> rose: is that your understanding of what the trump administration's policy is. >> yes, absolutely. >> rose: and therefore you welcome president trump and you believe that his policies towards iran and in favor of the sunni arab states. >> not just us, i think most of the gulf countries are relieved that there is finally a policy or strategy to push back on iranian behaviors because of the gains they managed to accomplish in the last ten years. and so one of the biggest challenges i see throughout the region that has probably undermined the stability of the region and sectarians in
countries like iraq and countries like lebanon, countries like bahrain, the intense sectarianism has increased and the only one guilty or mainly guilty party behind it is iran. >> there is one of the interesting points most people don't understand. most people see shia sunni and they think it's a always been there, right, that it's always been intentioned, the iranians behavior in the region have made it worse. used to be true in yemen. that sunnies and shia went to the mosques together. right? now in yemen, the sectarianism is much worse largely due to the iranians. >> rose: if it happened in iraq it became much worse in iraq. >> absolutely. >> rose: now. >> now there is a trick here that is a need thearl is hard to thread. and i think president o brama-- obama was on one side of the tough line to manage and president trump might be on the other. and here is the trick.
is there is a real struggle going on inside of iran. between the hard-liners and i don't call them moderates. i don't call them moderateds but i call them-- so between the supreme leader and the force andrew hani and all the people who are with him, this tension was-- . >> rose: rouhani would you call, the president is a centrist. >> centrist, absolutely. >> rose: so the republican guard and supreme leader. >> and it played out in the recent presidential election. could you see it. the western media didn't report on it but you could see it in the debates between the candidates. >> you could see the tension. and the frustration of one side with the other about the future of iran. and so the question is how do you push back on this ma lined we maffier in the region that has been going on for a long imthat is making the region more unstable but do it in a way that doesn't empower the hard-liners
in this internal debate. because we all want the internal debate to evolve over time. it is going to take a long time. i'm not saying it is going to happen tomorrow. but we want this internal debate to go in one direction and we want to help it in that direction. so that is the tough line here to walk. and it's going to be tough to get right. >> are the iranians telling us, challenging us, the united states on the seas, we had today an iranian vessel coming closer to america, yesterday, and the warning shots had to be fired. so the question is, you know, how is this going to accelerate, and where is it accelerating toward sms. >> i think the iranians are really good at testing people. and i think what they are doing with the trump administration is trying to test how far they're willing to go. and you see more incidents like the naval scrimmishes. that is not the first time it happened. it happened several times. and to the extent we can all collectively signal that this is not sechable, that we will push back, that we will introa dik your weapons shipments into
yemen and other places, we will designate your terrorists. one of the things we are doing is doing joint des ig nations with the united states, saudi arabia, us and other countries. >> rose: where is europe on this. >> they are somewhere in the middle, i think. >> somewhere between confronting and appeasing. and i think, charlie, that the europeans are really important here. really important that we bring them along. i think u.s. leadership is required to bring them along. because if we can have a europeans with us, it's hard arer for the hard-liners to say this is all about,s is all about the united states. so its' really important for the president to bring along the europeans. >> rose: probably talking about this, let's bring in two other countries, one, turkey, where is turkey in this? because turkey is vfed in syria. turkey has had to-- the more authoritarian regime. >> turkey is playing a much more
influential role in the region. but in certain areas like syria, i think that role has actually helped empower radical browps. and so what does turkey want in syria, i'm not sure i'm qualified to answer that. but supporting islamist groups, in syria they want to overthrow assad immediately. >> there are a lot of people that want that. what are the means you want to use to utilize that. >> rose: includes also the saudis. >> i think it is very typical. >> at the end of the day what we want in syria is to have a syrian government that can actually deliver for its people and that is not dominated by ises lambists and not dominated by iran. how we get there has been a struggle for the last six years. >> it is all finding a peaceful ceasefire agreement that would work, with the russians, has failed because the russians clearly are a major player now. >> and because frankly even before the russians test in, each country went about their interests operately and we did not cooperate effectively. i will say, that each country
kind of went in and did their own thing. we were never operating as a team in syria or on the same objective. >> rose: whose fealt was that. >> i think it is the way things played out. syria is a very complicated issue and there are so many players involved it has been very difficult to get everybody on the same tabling. >> rose: we also heard that just conference that you and i attended, some people speaking out about that, terms of getting involved in the ceasefire, where do you think syria is, yound and i talked about this probably 20 times at this table. >> so so the coalition has taken mosul a fight is now on in raqqa. >> you will clearly win that. >> we will clearly win that fight. there are some other areas in syria where isis still has control. those will be taken. so the caliphate will come to an end. and the coalition will have been
successful. but a couple of really important points. one is, that is not, that oes not mean the defeat of ice is. isis will return to its original roots which was al-qaeda in iraq. it will turn to its original roots as an insurgency. >> rose: an online base? >> it will be in the shadows, it will be in the shadows just like it was before in iraq. >> it will go underground. >> they will go underground but you will remember when united states left iraq at the end of 2011, al-qaeda in iraq still had several thousand fighters in iraq, hidden in the shadows. that is where isis is going to go. so there will be still a security issue that has to be managed. and the united states will have to make a decision about whether we're there and in what numbers we're there, to deal with that problem. so there is a security problem. and then there is a huge political problem in both iraq and syria.
the military fight was a necessary condition to defeat isis. a political solution is the sufficient condition, right. and the military success is going to unravel unless we get the politics right. and getting the politics right is exactly what yousef said. it's having a government in both baghdad and damascus that represents all of its people, and not just part of the country. >> rose: and then you could am to the big question, how do you get that government, and can assad be a part of that in anyway. >> so my own personal view, is that assad cannot be part of that. and i am a little disappointed, quite frankly, that the 5d mrgs seems to have backed away from the idea atly publicly. >> rose: the secretary of state has publicly said our enemy in syria is isis and that is what we have to do first. >> and if we don't get rid of
assad event-- eventually isis will come back. >> rose: because? >> because. >> rose: because he's supporting isis or because. >> the sunnies and syria will never seap bashar al-assad as their leader and they will turn back to extremism if he long-term is the leader of that country, that is my view. >> rose: go ahead. >> i was going to say in iraq where i think it is easier, i think in the post isis world of mosul, there is going to be two concerns, one is what michael referred it and i completely agree, it is isis will probably go underground. they are not going to disappear. they are not going to just evaporate, this will go underground either in iraq, to europe or some of our countries, that is one major security concern. but the bigger political concern is who is going to govern mosul. afterwards. where is the leadership that comes from mosul. where is the governance. who is going to be responsible for governing and rebuilding and coming up with organic local leadership that will prevent ice fris coming back.
>> rose: and because, and i mentioned toth above you that malicki is in moscow talking with putin, i think as we speak. and what happened after the iraqi war is that who was governing there, did not respect the sunnies and did not give them an opportunity to participate and from that, isis had room to grow. >> and one example where it did work was the awakening movement. >> yes,. >> rose: at the end of the war. >> but when locals came up and basically took responsibility for their town. >> they made a decision it was in their interest to knock out al-qaeda at that time because al-qaeda had practices that were contrary to the wishes of people. >> the reason david was successful in doing that was because he was able to convince them that they would have a role in the future of their country, right. and at the ends of the day, they didn't get that. so it's going to be really lard
to sell that idea to them again. >> so is the present prime minister of iraq prepared to do that because he says he is. >> i think, i think with sufficient amount of u.s. leadership, it is possible to get there. but without the u.s. leadership, it's not. u.s. leadership here is absolutely critical. >> but there you come to the issue of u.s. leadership. you talk about how happy you are that the president, president trump is prepared to pushback, but you hear in the region that u.s. leadership is not there. beyond what happened at riyadh, beyond the efforts gengs extremism, against isis. >> i think what the trump administration, we see a level of engagement we have not seen. >> rose: the president has nod said he wants to do some of the things that the people believe are necessary to do in syria. i mean there has been one air strike because of the eulogies of sarin gas. >> i think there is also a role for regional countries to step up once they know what everybody
wants. >> rose: that is what everybody wants, right, mike, you tell me. >> some of us have stepped up. and there still is is a lot of things we need to sort out in yemen, in lebanon, in syria why. >> rose: take the united arab emirates. what participation has your country had 234 the syrian civil war. >> we had at the very, very beginning. you remember we had a major, our first air sortee against isis was lead by a female fighter pilot that we came out-- . >> rose: you, and jordan were the people really involved. >> in the beginning. >> we now probably have more in yemen and are trying to reach a conclusion with a political deal in yemen. >> rose: is it to find a political deal in yemen, what does that represent. >> very important. >> rose: what does it represent. >> it represents some kind of reconciliation between the various factions in yemen. and that ultimately needs to be a reconciliation between them. and clients, saudi arabia and the emirates have seem to always speak together.
>> uh-huh. >> and the iranians are on separate sides, my question comes back to, is is that what we will see in the middle east a kind of desperate fight on the part of iran and whoever its allies are, hezbollah and others, and saudi arabia and the emirates and other arab states, nor for influence. >> i think we are already seeing it. i don't think. >> for years it is playing out. >> rose: therefore could it get hotter? could it lead to a hotter war? which is the fear, that the middle east will go up in flames because of this conflict, unless somebody, because the president, president obama, correct me if i am wrong. president obama wanted, one of the things that was disagreed with the saudis and i assume the emirates as well, he wanted to see the saudis and sunni states speak to the iranians. that was a point. he basically did not want to do what president trump did, just
take one side, and even went to saudi arabia and urged that to take place am but it has not 457ed. >> in a perfect world, we would like to see the heat turned down on both sides. >> rose: how would he do that. >> the challenge has been how do you do that from one side while the other side is turning up the heat everywhere else. how do do you that when iran sends more people into syria and lebanon and yemen. how do we sit down at a table when they are on the attack. it's been very difficult to sit down and try to reach some kind of conclusion or consensus while one team is directly attacking us throughout the region. we don't see moderation in syria. we don't see moderation in bahrain. we don't see moderation in yemen. that moderate side that negotiated the nuclear deal with the united states, we don't see them having any influence over the regional files. and so those are not the people-- . >> rose: they make a deal with the americans on a nuclear deal, the we maffier aspect is-- who
report directly to the supreme leader rather than to the parliament. >> yes. >> rose: the other thing did. >> the other thing that is going to happen, charlie, when the caliphate is taken away is there is going to be huge issues to addressment and yousef mentioned one of them which is mosul, who is going to govern mosul and how is that going to happen. another is the syrian fighters who we have been, the united states of america and our original partners have been arming and training, and supporting side-by-side, who have been fighting isis, what will happen to them. will assad go after them? what will we do? will the iranians go after them? will hezbollah go after them and will we protect them? are we going to let them fight it out without our support after what they just did for us with isis. same story with the kurdish fighters in syria, all right,
who have been working, fighting with us, against isis. what will happen to them when the fight is over. and assad and turkey are able to turn on them. so, so there could very, very difficult issues. maybe one of the biggest is what happens to the eyian-- iranian desire to have this bridge from iran all the way to the mediterranean, through iraq, through syria, right. that's what they are working on, that is where they are. how will that play out, right. and you are talking about. >> rose: giving them access to lebanon and hezbollah. >> directly. over the land as opposed to air, right. and sea. and how does that play out. they've got their proxies there, right? we're there, the people we're supporting are there. how does that play out after this fight with isis and the caliphate is over. >> we want to avoid is in the post isis world in mosul, what we don't want to see is iran coming and exploiting that vacuum and taking it over and
putting more influence as opposed to the local governance and local leaders stepping up and taking control of mosul. >> so here is my biggest concern, right. and maybe yousef who spends more time talking to the administration than i do, can-- . >> rose: i'm not surprised by that. >> can make me feel better. i think our military strategy in the region is brilliant. i think jim mattis is doing a remarkable job. >> rose: define it. >> it is defined it, what we are doing militarily has been enhanced, it's been accelerated. i think that's first rate. what i don't see is anybody in the administration talking about a political strategy for all of these other issues that will come after. i don't see the secretary of state talking about it. i don't see anybody talking about it i don't know if it is there or not. and that is why i'm worried about it. because the politics of this qulafer wards are so, so important to make sure it doesn't happen again. >> rose: do you agree with that. >> i do.
i do. i think we've been talking a lot about this plongs each other, with our neighbors, but also with the united states, in terms of what if does the day after look like. >> rose: what about this. there will be no possibility for any kind of grand bargain as long as and unless there is regime change in iran. unless there is the moderates who have voted for rouhani on the one hand but also or even more moderate than he is. >> reg neem change from outside or from inside, that is the question. >> rose: inside, i would up it-- well, let's take both of them reasons regime change from outside is extraordinarily dangerous, right it empowers the hard-liners. it gives them exactly what they want. >> rose: so regime change. >> regime change from inside. >> rose: when they choose the political candidates who can run. >> so i think the key moment will come with the replacement to the supreme leader. and it could be next year t could be ten years from now. but that will be the major inflection point. and are the hard-liners
successful in choosing another hard line supreme leader or will a more moderate individual emerge. that will be absolutely critical to the future of iran, to the future of its relationship in the region,. >> rose: an to the feuft the region. >> the future of the region, ultimately, ultimately our sunni arab allies and partners are absolutely right to demand that iran stop its mall ianed behavior in the region. absolutely. >> rose: and the only way to do that is to be able to punish them for what they are doing? i mean sanctions is obviously worked in terms of bringing them to the table. is it sanctions or is it some other military action and show of force. >> so i-- so if it were up to me and not up to me but if it were up to me, i would push back
against their proxies in the region. right, in a covert way. so that you don't empower the hard-liners in the process. so it's' not seen. >> proxy in the region being hezbollah, praimly. >> right. >> they did the fighting in syria. >> hamas didn't do that. >> the support to, the support to the-- you take on some of those. and raise the cause but do it in a way that doesn't empower the hard-liners. i think the other thing you do is with europe, absolutely critical you do this with europe, is you sanction them in a way that hurts. you sanction them in a way that you did on the nuclear issue. and that is what brought them to the table on the nuclear issue. and it's not individual sanctions on individuals. it's not individual sanctioned on entities. it's sanctions that really hurt the economy and hurt the iranian people, that is what you-- that gets the attention of the
leadership. >> is it possible that what you want is regime change in qatar? >> no, not at all, no, we don't want regime change. i know that is floating around. and i know that people say oh there say military component to this. i am here to assure you, there is absolutely no element of regime change or military piece of this. we want a policy change. we want behavior change. and we would welcome the opportunity to sit down and discuss it. >> does it have to include al jazeera? >> we can sit down and discuss it i don't want to litigate the list in public, besides, by the way, the list was only handed over to two countries. the list was handed over to you can wait because the amir of you can wait was going to play the leading mediating role. and we were handed to the united states as a courtesy. within two hours of that list being submitted, it was leaked to the press and exactly what happened was happening now which is the lists with being litigated and nshted in public. i thought that was one, it was
disrespectful to the amir of you can wait because it undermined him. but in is not supposed to be nshted in public. today we are willing to sit down and negotiate it where the qataris directly if they want. the problem is they need to tell us they want to negotiate. >> rose: thank you for coming. pleasure to have you. >> thank you. >> always good to be here. >> thank you for joining us am we'll see you next time. >> for more about this program and earlier episodes visit us online at pbs.org and charlie rose.com. captioning sponsored by rose communications captioned by media access group at wgbh access.wgbh.org
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