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tv   [untitled]    October 15, 2011 2:00am-2:30am PDT

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here, we mobilized the fleet and pushed forces to honshu. the uss ronald reagan, the first effort was to save lives. eventually it would come underneath the plume and protect the radiation in the atmosphere. next slide. this eventually became a hubs and spoke approach to providing support in northeast honshu. as we provide that support, what you are looking is our own way of working with u.s. aid. these other rapid response teams, developing a picture of who is in need so that we can have a better understanding of situational awareness on the ground and act on that information.
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it allowed us to address the directed needs of the people of japan. what the people wanted was to return to normal as soon as possible. meaning they wanted to clear the schools. they wanted to address the human needs of the population. which meant showers. it also meant providing use it to help to relieve the tension and the pressure that had built up on people. now, to the consequent management. while the humanitarian assistance operation is in place, we need to get through an understanding of what goes on. in other words, we needed to build a reactor. we needed to understand what was going on inside of the reactor to anticipate our next move.
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i think that the value of this conversation is to share with you the kinds of questions that come up in the course of a crisis and how we can answer them. for us, this is to get inside of a boiling water reactor and understand where the key levers are in terms of what affects temperature and pressure. there are four reactors present. they performed as designed when the earthquake hit. in other words, they shut down. what you saw released reflect only 7% of the potential energy that could have come from those reactors. still, it was substantial enough to cause measurable contamination in the atmosphere. now, we are trying to understand trends over time. but we realized was that the heat coming from the reactor
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would dissipate. but we needed to stabilize the situation on the ground to allow for that key to dissipate over time. the alternative was to flood the reactor. the concern with that strategy is that although it would put the temperature into a controllable situation sooner, it would provide far more contamination into the environment, which was already at an intolerable level. so, we went digging into understanding what radio isotopes were the ones we were trying to deal with and how to react. but i am showing you here is downloaded from the next public web site. you are looking at 80 sensors around tokyo. a report on atmospheric levels
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of cesium and iodine. which is critically important during a crisis. what this means is information. the information in a seat -- event like this is critically important. anyone can go to this web site and download the information. anyone can get these actual readings. they will be published after words. of what this does, it addresses will long-term radiation exposure that people were most concerned about. think of this as a timing critical issue. people are going to look to leadership and say -- how can i react to this? it is invisible. all that they know is what to tell them. this website was up and running all the time. i found this incredibly useful.
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i could see data trends over time. in terms of long-term exposure, that was one issue we had to be aware of. the other was lethal dosage. we did not have a gamma issue. we had reports from around fukushima to understand what was going on in terms of lethal dosage. populations wanted to know -- do i need to move? do we need to evacuate? so, we had to get everybody on to the same page of understanding the actual data that was reported. " we found within the head of community was that simulation predictions are not equal to share. not everyone has the same view of what will happen in a radiological crisis. being able to develop an operating picture was the goal.
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what you are seeing here now is the actual data of an aerial measuring system. these are sensors in an airplane. it think of mowing the grass in the air. they are looking at the reflection in the ground. that helps us to understand how bad of a problem we have and how to communicate to the self- defense force. they are looking at the same information. it helps us to understand what is going on with the water in the reactors. modeling and simulation that we have at sea is based on what happens with oil. what happens with oil and a radio isotope are different properties. we come up short when we look at
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what happens when radioisotopes are introduced to overtime. that is a common operating picture. that is what we developed so that, as the next aftershock came in the next power loss incident took place, in the launch floor that we build with the self-defense force, we were able to work side-by-side. we have a hot line to the embassy and ministries in japan as an event takes place, everyone knows.
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one of the critical questions that everyone wanted to ask was -- and i at risk? do i need to evacuate? the concern that we had was that the level of radiation in the background, which is to say people, the 90,000 americans that were there, in the event of one of these crises getting worse, they actually tried to get in line and get on a ship. this would put them at more risk. where they needed to release radiation into the atmosphere. we could measure the real impact
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into the atmosphere, using real data and numbers. the concern that we had was that without and in the that -- absence of data decisions, they are simply responding to the cry -- crisis atmosphere that was there. putting themselves on the road in the panic that would follow the uss ronald reagan was one of the ships already there. we do not have lingering effects of radiological contamination. we have gone through our own individual monitoring and we are satisfied.
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next slide. long-term, what this tends to do is reinforce the procedures we had in place for contamination. it recognizes that for air breathing equipment, small performance parts, when you needed to repair them, they required a special engine. we do not want to mix and match the parts and components that were exposed. we want to keep them isolated until they could be decontaminated. next slide. what you get out of this is the important role that people play in this discussion. this is one of the reasons we
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send our officers off to be graduates. when you go to graduate school, you get your degree based on original thinking and primary research. no one puts forward a thesis that says the status quo is ok. we teach people at a graduate level to challenge the existing thinking. when i look at this force, composed of humanities majors and technical majors, we found the right mix. we had to come up with the basic questions that needed to be answered. i think that what you get out of this is a force that is incredibly responsive.
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the chemical, biological, initial response force is another example. when the marine corps look at the sarin attack in tokyo and decided they needed a response force available, they came in from the united states. the first time ever we had taken that kind of tears zero national capability and made it available to a partner in need. from the perspective of the people in japan, it demonstrated commitment and, symbolically, indicated that we were fighting back. that we were going to reclaim the atmosphere, the land, the sea. what you are looking at here is how we would present our daily situation reports to describe how they are making progress. next slide another example of
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the incredible partnership that we have. we think that joint support forces of the right concept here that brings together the unity of effort. with u.s. aid, it was our clear understanding of how to work closely with the government of japan for the lead federal agency in this case. it was critically important, in this case. they can work the funding issues in ways that the military is not able to. in terms of where we were located, it was not meant to be
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read, but listed on the right- hand side were all of the ngo's that participated, attempting to galvanize this. it was the role that u.s. aid and the self-defense force played. an example of how to take command and control on the road is a command-and-control unit. we brought this from honolulu so that it would be available in the event that the crisis continued to provide more challenges for leaders. we will close here with the importance of messaging. another critically important element of this. who has the lead for the message? it should be part of the discussion that takes place at your next table top level exercise. messages can be very confusing
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and you have many different groups involved. u.s. embassy had the lead. to be very clear about that point, as you roll this up and look at it in aggregate, those are impressive numbers for the people of japan. these were the foreign deployed forces are in japan. everyone rallied and was under way, everyone was a part of this operation. when self-defense force called out 100,000 people, they had this right behind them. it allowed them to focus on what was critically important to them, finding the remains and lost, allowing us to provide support in the way they needed. someone went to a lot of trouble
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to put that in the sand and it was an indication of what was possible in times of crisis. particularly when relationships between countries are critical. violations have interests, people have friends. we were able to, for the people that participated, and we will always remember. thank you. i look forward to your questions. [applause] >> given the multinational
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nature of the crisis, the graphic you never -- graphic user interface system, which one was used? >> we went to googleearth. i miss that. we were able to develop and be a bit, which went down of the revolt of 0 in the morning in the afternoon. in terms of water, we found that when we were measuring it, they were all used in japan. everyone was tied up with the crisis.
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to get real-time information on water, we had to use our portable kids, which were not calibrated sufficiently to be reliable. and we have the results immediately fed back to us. in order to react responsibly, we had to be able to have reliable instrumentation and data as the basis of decisions. that is what we learned out of this. >> microphone working here. the informion in california was slow. seven days. how do we address warnings
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without causing panic? >> i think the to start with an understanding that, in the case of radiation, the first questions that we need to ask, number one, is the plant up and operating? or did it shut down? is there a potential release of a lethal doses that requires immediate status on the part of engineers in leaders? if the problem now, and we are talking temporal issues, is long-term exposure, then that puts this into a different category, i think. i would identify time critical issues in terms of how you manaso, if i have a problem whei
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am concerned about long-term exposure, now what i need to do is talk about how i gradually start move people away from this so that i can prepare for a long term, sarcophagus type problem. or i will have to find a way to deal with the long-term exposure. i think that as far as how you manage this, separating the immediate sorts of actions and long term actions would be helpful. if people think that there is an immediate step that needs to be taken for themselves and their children, they will be very much on edge and waiting to hear what leaders are asking. i am reluctant to tell you that you can act on instinct in this
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case. there is a series of questions that have to be answered. preparing for a table top that involves radiological contamination, it would be to develop crisis action and standard operating procedures where, integrated, we know who is going to do what to get to a clear, empirical understanding of the problem that we have, along with it the actions and messages that go with it. we did not feel comfortable leaving japan until we had all of that system instrumentation in place. that was our measure of success. as you think about crises in the future, i would incorporate the radiological dimension. the nature of what we are in has us in a position where we are dealing with what a climactic
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situations and crises we have not anticipated or seen before. having fought through what the radiological dimension is and what the implications of our for these very important approaches. >> i know that you have to get out of here. we have about two minutes. i appreciate your coming. i have this feeling that you're giving this presentation of pride over what you end your task force did for japan. i want to thank you for what you did today and what your doing out there. i know you must have this warm feeling overhead. >> i used to look up at many of you, what i was down there. >> thank you so much for coming
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to talk. i know that you have to get out of town there. ladies and gentlemen? [applause] >> thank you. >> for the rest of you, we are going to have our next program and it is going to be some elected officials and mayors. we are going to take 10 minutes. i want you to be back in your seats and ready in 10 minutes. thank you very much. >> precision planning. all right.
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but if it started here. i hope that everyone had a nice lunch. we have had fabulous speakers all day. this panel is going to be a panel on government executives and the regional will of cooperation. i have to tell you, in july of 2003, i was actually working for mayor willie brown. haley barber talked about leadership and decision making. this was a mayor that really provided leadership and made strong decisions and helped out in running the city with of those attributes. in 2003, under mayor brown, i got involved in something crazy called the table top exercise. at that time, again, former secretary of state george schulz
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had come back from new york and asked about getting the military together with san francisco civilian forces to talk about disaster response. the general was on the telecommunications division at the time, heading up the telecommunications information services. we decided we would put the table top information together. i want to say one thing, off topic from this panel. 2003, i met a gentleman named randy smith. he was with the planning division. randy was the first person who gave me an education on tabletop exercises. from 2003 onward, he has been involved in every program i have put together on disaster response and a variety of other things. randy, are you here? thank you for following us for
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all of these years and having the marine corps take care of us. willie brown, it was a table top exercise and a wonderful program. also in 2003 we work together and created the mayor is a summit, where we invited mayors from around the country to come from around the toussaint francisco and talk about technology solutions for homeland security and, essentially, disaster response programs. he is the longest serving speaker of the california assembly and to term mayor of san francisco. thank you, willie brown, if you could come here and give us some remarks. [applause] >> good afternoon to each and every one of you. i am delighted to be able to
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introduce the panel of individuals who collectively will assume, on any given day and any given set of circumstances, the responsibility to orchestrate the process by which we remain as safe, secure, and free of harm as is humanly possible to do, in case of either a natural disaster or a man-made disaster. in my capacity as the speaker of the california legislature, in 1989 i was invited by the then mayor to join, wellcome, and extend the arm of friendship to the then president, george bush, who came to tour the area as a
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result of the '89 earthquake. it was, for me, an incredible awakening. the president of the united states in total command of this nation. the most powerful individual in the world, observing in close detail what the mayor of oakland was doing with reference to the tragedy. what the persons who operated under his leadership in the coast guard were doing. what the people at the state level, who had the responsibility for emergency relief, were doing. what the mayor of san francisco was doing by way of feeding the people who had been disrupted in terms of their lives as a result of the quake and its devastating attack on the marina district of san francisco. then, of course, we moved
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outside of san francisco, with a stout heart, moving outside this peninsula. results were equally as incredible. his comments and conversations with each individual, evidence of a very collected and qualified group of people who were willing to be in appropriate form, working together to produce quality results. then, of course, 2001 occurred. now, the capacity of the mayor, in it i was awakened by martha:, a woman who was activating this activity. she tells me that i may not be going to new york, because something has happened to one of the world trade center towers that you should look at.


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