thank you, mr. pendleton. admiral moran, do you agree that, if we had more ships in our navy fleet, we could spread the workload more evenly, we wouldn't be pushed up against the demands and stresses that happen when you have ships forward deployed for mo than the planned mber of ears, extended maintenance riods, truncated training periods? give me your perspective about w the number of ships we have today -- let me put it in perspective. if you go back to the 1980s whene had a navy of 600 ships. we had 100 ships foard deployed. today we have 7 ships and we have 100 ships forward deployed. give me your perspecte about thsize of the fleet in relation to where we are today wh forward deployed naval worses. >> you just ga the answer for me, chairman. i mean, that math is pretty hard to arguwith. d while mr. pendleton and i ave had this discussion, you an argue over the factors, you know, it's four times orhree times, but the ft is, even with that, those ships are a lot clos to where we might have to fight by bein

>> mr. chairman, we -- we're doing a broader body of work, sentially monitoring the recovery efforts. we made a series of recommendations in september of last year. basically saying that the department of defense needed a readiness rebuilding plan that atched the priority it was aiming that it had, that said what the goals were and when hey would be achieved and what it would take in ter omoney and time and that need to be agreement on it from the top. because what we saw when we looked at it in depth was all h rvices were pursuing individual plans izeal but not necessarily being pull together in a department-wide plan. so what we're looking for, is it clear what the goals are d how are we going against those goals? in the case of the hey vinavy, they had a glide path. and our concern was the glide path idn't necessarily constitute exact goals. so he mentioned earlier this is going to knock them off the glide path. so being able to articulate the impacts of the decisions that you makeif you

mr. pendleton, i want to get to you. in terms of the material and training readiness of our home ships quartered in japan, versus ships home ported in the united states, is there a readiness -- a form of readiness in which one group of ships are more ready than others? >> the information in the report we were not able to update shows trends -- the navy calls them equipment casualties, broken stuff -- had basically been upward for both u.s. based and overseas-based ships. casualtybased ships reports were -- again, that is equipment -- was more steeply upward. but we were not able to update that trend line since then, so i cannot answer since 2014, when our data ended. >> but the recent data, the lower state of readiness overseas? >> we saw a more steep increase in breakdowns are the overseas ships. >> admiral, do you agree? >> i do. -- i think this speaks to what you raised earlier, in -- if we are not rotating those ships back, the older they get, the more care they will need area that may be what we aren of looking at i

mr. pendleton, do you have anything to add? >> not really, sir. that's not something we looked at specifically, the schoolhouse training. what we pointed out with respect to the forward deployed naval forces is that they were just so busy that they didn't have dedicated training time. so most folks arrived. we heard when we went on ships and did focus groups the fact that sailors would arrive green and untrained put a burden on the sailors that were already there and we heard that consistently. >> thank you. admiral moran, i also fear that the current tempo is not sustainable. but that we seek to sustain it to the detriment of training and certification requirements. recent reports indicate a large margin of separation when it comes to training and certifications between u.s.-based cruisers and destroyers versus forward deployed naval forces. so were there any indications or warnings that forward deployed naval forces up tempo was leading to a train on the margins scenario and not meeting qualifications or certification standards for key surface w

i'm concerned with mr. pendleton's written testimony which indicates 37%, over one third, of the training certifications for u.s. navy cruisers and destroyers based in jap japan were expired as of june. this results in a five fold increase in expired warfare certifications for these ships in the last two years. i would point out warfare certifications are a ship's urb ability to fully be prepared to engage in combat. press reporting paints an even bleaker picture. the mccain had experienced expired training certification in six of the ten key area -- key warfare mission areas. the fitzgerald had expired certification in all ten mission areas. secretaries spencer and admiral richa richardson, i don't need to tell you this is troubling and unacceptable. we acknowledge and appreciate t it is unacceptable. and we acknowledge and appreciate the accountability actions the navy has taken to date. the navy has relieved two commanding officers, a commander and a captain, it has issued reprimands -- 20 reprimands to

mr. pendleton: that would be taught. there is a lot of responsibility within the operation and maintenance counts, but that is not my specialty. there are limits on the modernization, i should probably get the admiral to comment on that. sen. rounds: that would be fine. admiral? admiral richardson: it would require coming back to congress with the reprogramming request, educated to make that happen. it is not easy. sen. rounds: the reason i ask, it seems to be that we are likes using a balloon in some cases. when we talk about moving resources, even if we could move them, we are still talking about limited resources brought about the sequestration and limited budgets, that all of our forces are suffering with right now. if we take a look at them, at the readiness and modernization side, within the navy, we have the best examples that we will continue to remind you of -- three nuclear powered submarines dock ase sitting at opposed to being at depot because we do not have the money required to get them operational. they ar

my question to begin with would be to mr. pendleton. does the navy have the ability to shift resources, if they were to be available, from programs involving modernization to readiness? >> that would be tough. there's a lot of funding in the operations can pick that's not my specialty. there's limits on the modernization. i probably should get the outdoor summer to comment on that. >> admiral richardson, would you care to --in >> a program shifted that type would probably require us to come back to congress with an above threshold reprogramming request and i would be adjudicated to make that happen. it's not easy. >> the reason why i ask is it seems to be we are almost, it's almost like squeezing a balloon in some cases. when we start talking about meeting resources even if we could move them we are still talking but the limited resources brought about by sequestration and limited budgets that all of our armedl forces are suffering with right now. if we take a look at the ready beside and the modernization side, with gotchas within the