tv Charlie Rose Bloomberg April 3, 2014 10:00pm-11:01pm EDT
they have ordered draft measures on sanctions. we are joined by nato's secretary-general. i'm pleased to have them on the program. is good to have you back. >> you're welcome. >> tell me what you mean when you say that nato suspends all practical cooperation with russia and that it means certainly that no more business as usual. can you elaborate? >> we have decided to suspend all political and military and
civilian practical cooperation with russia as a response to russia's illegal military action in ukraine, so it means that a number of cooperation projects where we had with russia will be suspended. some of them will be continued but without the participation of russia. >> you're waiting or russia to withdraw troops from the ukraine border,, when you spec that to happen? >> is difficult to speak about expectations because we have seen a very determined russian action in crimea. we urge russia. we want them to engage in a constructive dialogue sooner rather than later. >> do you believe that they will withdraw troops from the border? have they given you any indication that they will?
>> no indication whatsoever. we have no information that can confirm this information. what we are witnessing is a very massive russian military buildup massive russian military buildup along the ukrainian border and we have no indication that they have started a withdrawal. >> what else can nato do? >> well, we are focused on the defense of our allies. collective defense is a core task for nato, which is why we have decided to enhance our collective defense. we have enhanced air policing in the three baltic states. we have deployed aircraft to improve surveillance over
poland and romania. you have seen more of a naval presence in the black sea. now we are exploring how we could possibly further strengthen collective defense. >> what might that include? >> that might include an update and further development of our defense plans. it might include enhanced exercises and also appropriate deployments. >> do you believe the russians are listening? >> i do believe they are listening. i think they have no doubt that nato allies are strongly determined to provide effective defense and protection of our allies and that implies a deterrent effect in itself. >> this comes a time when there was a withdrawal from nato, some people even questioning its mission and its relevance.
you think that this action by the russians will revitalize nato? >> no doubt. people in nato nations have seen now with their own eyes how important it is to have the world's strongest military alliance to ensure effective defense and protection. you have seen people in our newer member states express a gratitude that they actually joined our alliance some years
ago. >> the president said that this is not the beginning of the cold war. the russian ambassador told me it is not the beginning of a cold war. you believe it has that possibility? >> i don't think we could or should speak about a cold war because this was another era when we saw the soviet union leading a block of communist countries in the world. that is not the case here. actually, we see russia quite isolated. what we see, however, is what i would call old soviet style thinking in the kremlin. >> you have said the crisis in ukraine is calling into question the very principles upon which we have built the modern europe. >> yes, indeed, we have built a europe whole, free, and at peace.
a europe where each and every nation has the rights to choose its own path, including alliance affiliation. now russia has put into question the fundamental principle. we have seen russia redraw the european map by force, and we've also seen russia put into question the fundamental principle that each and every nation has an inherent right to choose its own security policies. >> i'm still unsure what happens if they do not move their troops back or if they take a more aggressive action in ukraine. >> if russia was to intervene further in ukraine's it would be
a historic mistake, it would isolate russia's further internationally. we have already seen russia quite isolated recently. the u.n. general assembly had a vote on the crimea question. this russia is already know quite isolated and if russia were to intervene further, it would have grave consequences for russia's relationship with what i would as a whole call the western world and that would have a very negative economic impact on russia. >> many people believe that they may respond and change the number of troops it has on the border but few people believe
that they will withdraw from crimea. crimea. is that your position? >> we will not recognize the annexation of crimea. it is illegal, it is not legitimate. of course, the facts are that russia has occupied crimea and also has taken steps to include crimea in the russian federation. the international community will not recognize that a legal act. >> you just had an extraordinary meeting with the foreign ministers. is there a collective judgment about what vladimir putin is up to? >> he wants to reestablish a russian sphere of influence in the soviet space. that is what it is about. >> will be get away with it? >> in the long run, he will not.
in the long run, you cannot suppress the free will of people. it is a basic right that each individual nation can choose its alliances and security policies freely. it might be that russia has taken steps as they have done in crimea in the short run but in the long run, you cannot suppress people that way. that is actually the old-fashioned soviet style of thinking. in the long run, he will not succeed. >> do you believe a diplomatic solution is possible and if it is, what would it include?
>> obviously, a political solution would include a recognition that crimea is still a part of ukraine. if russia has concerns regarding the treatment of minorities in ukraine, there are numerous ways to address such concerns in a peaceful and political manner. >> mr. secretary-general, thank you so much. as a pleasure to have you back on the broadcast. >> my pleasure. thank you very much.
successfully defeating an insurgency. he also directed the joint task force in afghanistan. chuck hagel nominated him for his third start, the rank of lieutenant general. starting in july, he will oversee the armies and tank which focuses on the future of warfare. this i am pleased to have you back to this table. welcome. >> great to be with you. >> you as well. >> it is a real privilege to continue serving in any capacity. we want to make sure that our army is prepared to respond to crises and if necessary fight in future wars. >> as americans, we don't expect to and we ought not to have fair
fights. we want to give our forces every advantage we can give them. this first order of business is to lay a strong conceptual foundation that defines the problem of future war and how we have to prepare our forces to fight and win in future conflicts. >> are we now prepared to fight two wars of the same time? >> what has been clear from public statements recently, that strategy is no longer feasible. this is given the size and the protections of the budget. as the chief of staff has spoken about in the chief of staff has spoken about in the past week is that we believe that our army can do the minimum to support the current defense strategy which is to fight one major contingency operation, hold onto another one and be able to respond. there are dangers that we will fall below the level. as military officers, we don't make those decisions. is our job to do best we can with those resources and make sure we do right by the nation and by our soldiers.
>> let me talk about something you write about with interest and this is why people like general petraeus like you. the first is revolution in military affairs. what did he mean by that? >> this orthodox really gained a lot of momentum. it set us up for a lot of difficulties that we had this in both afghanistan and in iraq. this is the idea, advances in technology and communication technology, computing power, precision munitions had made war only knew. future wars were going to exhibit where we had a discontinuity of all wars and come before. the fundamental assumption was the application of this technology would make war fast, cheap, efficient, and allow us to dominate any opponent. the language surrounding this
was -- >> a lot of that came out of the gulf war. >> it did. i think it was a misunderstanding of the result that really led to a lot of this. the conventional wisdom became in the wake of the gulf war, the technologies that they demonstrated, tremendous ability and a tremendous in the gulf war would be decisive in future wars. those explanations, do they undervalue the training and professionalism? it also undervalued the iraqi's approach to the war. you can say there are two fundamental ways to fight this. asymmetrically and stupid and i think the iraqis chose stupid. they were overmatched in ways they could not even imagine.
they had been at war with iranians from 80-88. they were used to infantry walking towards them. now we had armored divisions. we have forces that were confident and well trained. these aspects of overmatched or underappreciated. >> who has fought the best asymmetric war against the u.s.? >> all of our adversaries have tried. you can go back obviously to the frontier wars and the wars against native american tribes which were fundamentally asymmetrical. i think you can look at fights we have had in the philippines, the philippine insurrection. >> that means -- >> it is common sense. if you see an enemy has certain strength, you don't want to impale yourself on the strength. you want to go around the strength. >> many revolutionary forces are asymmetrical. >> yes, because they come from a position military weakness.
this would have to organize military operations in a way that allows them to strike a strike zone and to make contact with us and to fight us on their own terms. and they operate on multiple battlegrounds. >> did the insurgency in iraq have that ability? >> what we encountered was a localized hybrid insurgency that coalesced over time. what is striking about this insurgency and the one in afghanistan is that they continually evolved based on how they saw our responses. initially, the iraqi insurgency was really driven towards
inflicting damage on us. saddam handed out copies of "black hawk down" to teach that we would leave. then, they attacked nascent security forces. >> ultimately, they formed an alliance of convenience between organizations associated with al qaeda. tried to establish control among certain territories. >> this drive a wedge between them. >> ultimately, we respond to the evolution of conflict. we were behind in the beginning and the based on ignorance of the problems. we went from ignorance to denial. we did not want to acknowledge that this was an insurgency, that this is a threat to our vital interest.
as the insurgency continued to evolve, we did not adapt fast enough. when you saw that adaptation it was through the end of 2006. when it was clear that the dominant feature of the war in iraq have become this very destructive sectarian civil war. there's still a problem of insurgency and transnational
terror. then we were able to do thousand seven to reassess the situation and asked the right questions and then develop the strategy and an plan. this is supposed to give you the answer. a great prussian philosopher said, military theory is not to accompany you to the battlefield, and tell you what to do. it is like an old professor prepares the student. is not assigned to give you a strategy. when some people criticize, now it is become very fashionable. look what happened.
the zero dark 30 problem is that all you need is a global swat team that can do raids against against enemies. you can do that for a low cost. our special operations forces are amazing. they are incredible professionals. >> how is that different from what you said? >> our enemies apply countermeasures to all of these capabilities. there are traditional countermeasures. there are technological countermeasures to these abilities. of course, all enemy organizations are not the same. because of our global interest and because of our vital interests and those of our key partners and allies, they can be placed at risk by nationstates and the forces of nationstates and also the sort of network
organizations that are quite dangerous. because you can look you can look at some of the insurgent organizations. if you look at isi, hezbollah, these are nonstate actors who have capability is previously associated only with the field of forces of nationstates. those are destructive weapons, communications simply to mobilize resources. >> do the nationstates provide them with weapons they use? >> yes. what would al qaeda and associated groups be without the ability to establish support bases and safe havens. is important for us to deter nationstates as well as nonstate actors, but also to be able to respond to crises involving the field of forces of nationstates and the so-called hybrid enemies.
>> there is a strong sentiment in the country that a lot of people think the future of modern warfare is paramilitary. some say it is characterized as a counterterrorist warfare rather than counterinsurgency warfare. >> i think that is a fair statement. people would like war to be a problem that you can address just by raiding. because it is not get you in all those difficult things on land like people and populations and security, but these enemies are able to operate in and amongst populations. elvis ago two areas it is important to work with partners each and we have to
have the ability ourselves. >> you made your first reputation in terms of the vietnam war. part of what came out of the vietnam war is hearts and minds. that seems to be relevant to modern warfare if in fact it is a counterinsurgency that you're fighting. >> that's right. >> you depend on them for intelligence, information. i think too many of these conflicts -- of course, all of them are unique. what is common in syria, what is common with the conflict in yemen, what you see in northern nigeria, what you see in libya
today, what you see in mali and other spots. what you see are these transnational terrorist organizations who take advantage of local competitions, political competitions for power, resources, and survival and then they portray themselves as patrons and protectors of one of the aggrieved parties. that is how they gain access. once they gain access, you see what they have done. they have their own agenda and they establish control through tally, murder, and intimidation. the only way that you can defeat them is for some force to be able to lift that intimidation off the population. >> we have no force doing that other than the force of the syrian army. they have their own element. >> that is actually right. i'm not saying that we should do this. that is a policy decision, certainly. i think we don't want to be delusional about the ability to achieve or to help the searing people achieve a sustainable outcome that is anything less than establish security under some sort of political system. >> where will it come from in syria? >> well, that is the problem. is becoming more fragmented as a
sectarian violence continues. >> groups of people are fighting each other with levels of violence. >> what is important about the it. >> there is internal dimension. there is also an external dimension to the problem. prevent thery and conflict expanding and becoming more destructive. we need to begin to work to a solution that can break that cycle of violence.
remove support for who wantremist groups to perpetuate the violence. aat happens is you get wartime economy that self perpetuates. you have people inside a power vacuum. >> the marlin perkins of the mutual of omaha fallacy. wherever he was staying, it was not the battlefield. -- >> we are searching for these easy solutions to the problem. we think we will get other armies to do that. -- like marlin perkins. can't ignore the
important continuity in war which is political. it also has a lot to do with the interest of these various groups. we've encountered some of these pitfalls. unreliable? ito wasn't because we didn't organize and help train them. > -- the tribal population from which the taliban drew strength. molly is another example -- mali
is another example. assisting thes in navies of other countries only to discover that we were training and 80 that was conducting the exercise. one of the many lessons we learned in iraq is we have to put the politics in the center. whiche to recognize to degree our interest are incongruent. listen to trotsky. you may be interested in war, but war is interested in you. >> look what happened to trotsky. [laughter] him. caught up with
we are optimistic people, right? the tremendous example of our democratic society. much -- must define the problem of war not with reference to ourselves. it.world will comply with we interact with in these and we talked about those strategies in iraq and afghanistan. -- interactrect with adversaries. if you speak out and say this is what i'm going to bank on being decisive and protecting our interest.
necessary to have a viable national defense is to have a broad range of capabilities to be used in combination. a power and cyber thebilities ultimately, problems with those other domains, the aerospace, that cyber domain, are land-based. capability to deter war you have to have sufficient land forces as a deterrent. crimea.putin in >> i don't think it would be. , they would see it as the of ability to evade these capabilities.
calculation in the crimea is his captivation that he can use land forces to reassert russian power on the eurasian landmass. politics are you how we define our vital interest. about the people who might favor a russian regime? people go to war today and will in the future for three .undamental reasons >> a certain things remain true. for interest, fear, and honor.
here are three things you are talking about. we have been talking about the political. who was it that first said that war is politics. >> it's hard to get any better. dialectic, hehis puts in a thesis and antithesis and comes to a synthesis. who helpedussian found and teach the prussian war academy and was one of the founders of the prussian general staff. he is a product of the napoleonic wars. he institutionalized the genius of napoleon.
he developed a deep understanding of the nature over war and warfare. it marked a shift in the character of war. armies that you had were tied to monarchies. >> was that because of napoleon? soldiers?ates >> it was napoleon and the legacy. sentiments associated with ationalism led to -- >> you're telling me to people like you study war? >> you have to. >> the ability to move -- >> he a man who preceded him in the army how to operate
, what weinous terrain call today combined arms capability. that is infantry. battle is the game of rock, scissors, and paper. it's how you combine them. seapower, land power, and cyber power. it's how you combine this capabilities to gain and exploit the initiative. it is part of the application of all elements. napoleon understood how to use combined arms. he had a great understanding of avoidional maneuver to defended inlly turn these out of prepared positions.
people organize of the x patriot iranians are like fish. we make no noise and lay thousands of eggs. that backfired when he did the operation in basra. they are doing everything they can to maintain a high degree of control in iraq. my view of what iran is trying to do is they are trying to keep the air world week so they can -- weak, so they can advance their interest. you have a week government -- weak government dependent on
iranian support to survive. >> we live in a world of high-tech. a world of drones. the world of a different kind of war. >> enhanced medications. >> the world of cyber warfare. >> long-range ballistic missiles connected to weapons of mass destruction and a rogue regime. >> that's the biggest threat? >> i think. it is apparent that iran is moving in this direction. >> to we believe that both of them have long-range ballistic missiles that can carry nuclear? >> we don't know. i don't know. we have the people working on
this. >> the fear you have is long-range missiles that have the potential to carry weapons of great destruction. >> right. it has been great work on this on long-range capabilities. it is not just the missile. it is a striking network. somebody attacks in new york and d.c. the advantages that we have banked on over the last several decades of surveillance capabilities, that kind of a network is going to be available to adversaries. there has never been a silver bullet solution. you have the submarine, the bomber, the radar. you have the tank. we have to recognize that our future adversaries will have capabilities we have now and be able to disrupt our strengths.
what is our answer to that? it is a balanced joint force that can play rock, paper, scissors with anybody. you have to be able to put it all together. many have written about work about anti-access aerial denial. to try to deny forces the ability to get somewhere for access. the basic question, ask us for what reason? you need land forces as part of the solution. this narcissistic tendency we have, we are seeing this as a defensive threat. it is an offense of threat. i think it is a threat that could be analogous to the threat in london world war ii. >> the former secretary of defense bob gates said to me, we
are not using all of the weapons in our arsenal that are not necessarily military but could play a role. we have not employed those enough. you have had a lot to do with that in afghanistan. why was that so difficult? >> it goes back to politics. fundamentally, in afghanistan, this was a state that was destroyed. it was destroyed by the soviet occupation. a destructive civil war. then the taliban regime destroyed institutions we would recognize. after 2003, taking an approach to the military affairs enabling
militias through our air power advisers, after the collapse of the taliban, which was a psychological collapse, what you had in the wake is you have a help pull the state together to get a viable state. you have the bond conference. but, the institution building -- we didn't have enough of an effort there. the state institution functions were captured by these militias which were organized crime networks. they affected state capture institutions. they were driven by criminal agendas -- mainly by political agendas.
amass power in a post-u.s. afghanistan. it was driven by a lack of faith in a vision for the future. they were hedging bets and building up a power base. >> where'd you put an army in that? >> you put politics at the center. the problem is, how do you convince key afghan leaders it is in their interest to deal with corruption and organized crime? the political settlement that emerged was dependent on criminality. unchecked criminality. if i give you the ministry of defense, and i allow you to do what you're going to do, diversion of systems, rent seeking behavior, the commoditization of positions, you can have your power base, make money, if i threatened to do that, you are no longer going to give you your loyalty. the settlement that emerged in afghanistan after 2004, early 2005, was reliant on organized crime. everybody focuses on president karzai.
part of the problem is much more complicated and diffused than that. the key to the whole thing is political, and incumbent on all of us to play a supportive role. >> supportive of what? >> of reform. there are so many great afghans. i wish americans could know these guys. they are committed. >> a lot had been killed. >> there are so many who are resilient and persevere. these are people who are part of a multiethnic reform movement that is anti-taliban and pro-western. >> the idea was why copuldn't we have supported more extensively while we had a number of forces
there in the midst of early stages of involvement? when the taliban was at its >> this is 2002-2003. >> was that a missed opportunity? >> i think it was a missed opportunity. it was based on flawed assumptions on the nature of war. war is not about the application of military power against enemy organizations. that is a big part of it. you have to defeat enemy organizations. that is the part of war that we are best at. >> basis of security. >> and solidify those gains politically. we are not going to do nationbuilding. we always had to do some degree
of activity to consolidate gains politically. if you look at the panama invasion, the engagement in the philippines -- >> what generals have been at the top of strategic thinkers? >> a number of them dealt with difficult circumstances and persevered through imagination and leadership. george washington. we take him for granted. he was an amazing leader and commander. i think if you look at the battles of [indiscernible] it is not without assistance. when you come to world war ii, you look at george marshall. an organizer of victory. i think each of these generals
has their strengths. if you want to look at tactical command, there is a great book that compares and contrasts patton, eisenhower, montgomery, bradley. you see there styles come into play in the battle. a bit of a missed opportunity based on those relationships. >> vietnam? >> you have to go with abrams. and man of vision. he was a combined arms man. as a general, you're no doing specific things anymore. >> the gulf war? >> in the gulf war, i think there are debates about all of these. the idea to avoid enemy strength. strike from an unexpected position. >> petraeus? who did that? >> fred franks. they did the long envelopment. then the flank attack into
kuwait. that was easy, quick, efficient. what made it different was the enemy not being smart about how they fought us. it narrowly circumscribed political objectives. give kuwait back to the kuwaitis. >> churchill had a couple of things early in his career. >> all of these examples are instructed. some of the buzz words you hear now, agile, nimble, so forth. all of those are important. respond rapidly to forces, get there fast. ultimately, what you have to do after you get there, that is more important than getting there fast.
they were not able to convert that into larger success. then you have flexibility on the part of command. we have ian hamilton who says if i change the beaches we are landing on, it will disrupt the landing plan. the alternative is to impale yourself on turkish machine guns. which they did. you can learn from these campaigns. learning from history, it is not going to give you the answer. >> it is easy to see the consequences. >> war is the great auditor of military institutions. we have to be careful as we think about future war that we don't do so in such a way that we underpin our capabilities with flawed notions of ideas about what is adequate to secure our vital interest. >> general h. r. mcmaster. great for having you. >> always great to be here. ♪
>> live from pier three in san francisco, welcome to "bloomberg west" where we cover innovation, technology, and the future of business. i am cory johnson. online food delivery service grubhub has just priced its ipo at 26 dollars a share boosting the size of the offering. plus, what do tech executives think of hbo's upcoming series "silicon valley?" but first, a check of the top headlines. mozilla's ceo rendon ike,