tv Charlie Rose Bloomberg January 6, 2015 7:00pm-8:01pm EST
magazine" as foreign affairs columnist. each year, eurasia group publishes its top risk report. it outlines geopolitical developments to watch in the coming months. this list includes the politics of europe, russia, isis and the chinese economic slowdown. i'm pleased to have ian bremmer back at this table. >> happy new year, charlie. >> congratulations on the "time magazine" assignment. what will you do with them? >> i have to create a voice that can talk to a broader constituency. i'm going to talk about how global politics and economics come together, and hopefully people react to it. >> look back at 2014 first and tell me what came out of that year that shaped 2015. all of it, i assume. >> what came out of it were all these disparate headlines that were bringing geopolitics back to this table. it was a year we paid attention to ukraine.
we talked about all these conflicts in asia, the east china sea, the south china sea. of course, the rise of isis and the breakdown of iraq and assad staying in power and violence expanding. political islam died. radical islam came up as a much more significant force. yet, it was also a year when the united states got its footing and became robust. if you look at this report -- >> the most robust economy in the world. >> where is the united states here? on the one hand, it means great things. you got oil going into the low 50's today. americans are doing well with that. you've got a five handle on american growth in the last quarter, but you also have things happening all over the
world that are very dangerous to other people, not so dangerous to americans directly. our intentions in responding they are not so great. another thing you don't see here, there is no internal china risk. we've gone through years where everyone said, china is going to fall apart big political instability -- xi jinping is one of the most powerful leaders in the world today. you are looking forward to 2015 and the largest economies in the world the united states and china, don't figure here. >> they are going in different directions. >> one direction they agree on is, neither of them want to do an awful lot to fix other people's problems. >> they have agreed to address a common problem, which is climate. >> a little bit. >> they made an agreement. >> they are promising that 2030
will be there peak year. >> so it deserves no attention you are suggesting the fact that they are agreeing to something? the president is heralding this as an achievement. >> it deserves attention that the americans and chinese want to show -- >> that they can get something done. you said today that u.s. relations with russia are broken. china is charting its own course. >> where is the good news? >> the good news is what we started with. europe is good news economically. unfortunately -- >> greece is good news? >> economically. today, spain's new job numbers better than at any point since the finance of prices.
>> you are saying it is the politics of europe. in terms of nationalistic right-wing parties challenging or because there is no consensus? >> first, let's go to the point you raised. unemployment in spain. as a consequence of that systemic unemployment, the economy is growing, but the average spaniard isn't feeling it. a new party that didn't exist when we wrote this in 2014 is not only the most popular in spain today, but is likely to get into government when elections occur in 2015. answer reza in greece -- and syriza in greece is likely to win. >> and if it wins, what? >> as they get closer to power, they moderate their position. they are not going to default immediately. >> they say they are not going to treat the debt with respect.
>> what have the germans said in response? we expect you to adhere to 100 percent of that deal, thank you very much. don't even think about it. and we can handle a greek exit, by the way. which is not what merkel was saying three years ago. >> what are the repercussions of an exit? >> i don't believe there will be a greek exit, first of all. i believe they are going to get to the line and it will be harder to borrow and you will see unraveling of the policies that these countries put in place. europe will be weaker. the euro will continue to slide. that's different from saying the eurozone is going to implode. the likelihood of this moving towards a british referendum for exit, going up. what are the other ramifications?
externally, when the eurozone crisis happened, they didn't have a russian crisis. we didn't have this massive radical islam that was putting refugees onto europe's shores. now we have that. the external environment is worse as well. all of that is fine for the united states. >> it has an effect on everything. as china's economic machine slows down 7% as european economic forces are at work as they are, as oil prices are going down it is changing the global economic outlook. >> absolutely. it is changing the balance of power as well. >> there are no signs that emerging economies have any likelihood of regaining that growth rate in the near future. >> many of these emerging
markets are going to take it on the chin. all of those that were selling commodities to china, china is slowing down, suddenly they are not going to be buying from the indonesians, the australians the brazilians. >> their economic plan is to create internal demand. we want to create an economy that feeds consumer demand. >> this is a great year for xi jinping. nobody benefits more from $50 oil than xi jinping. he can do what he is planning to without political pushback. this is fantastic. cracks this is "the new york times" today.
where is china going? >> not towards the new york times. the times has problems in china. they might not even keep their website. >> that is due to reporting on the powerful families in china. >> it is also a general orientation towards western values. >> what are they worried about? why are they threatened by western values? >> i think they are threatened by anything they feel could unravel or cause dissent to the monopoly of political power that the chinese communist party enjoys. >> all about the monopoly of the party? >> sure. the chinese dream is, we want you to get rich. hong kong, that is not the
chinese dream. >> some say that is the philosophy of, we'll take care of the politics and let you make as much money as you want. >> when putin and xi jinping get-together, this is where they have commonalities. the fact that western political ideology reform is dangerous to them in their regimes. i do worry that even though china is much more responsible, doesn't want to cause eruptions internationally because power is moving towards them over the long-term, yet the russia-china relationship is becoming real. >> what are the repercussions of that, the consequences of that? >> over the long term, the repercussions are creation of institutions that will undermine things like the dollar, american standards that have been global the ability to engage in a free and open internet, american companies to enjoy a multilateral playing field that
is competitive for private sector organizations. the chinese are the world's largest economy and they are trying to get other countries to align with them. so far, they've gotten laos and cambodia to engage with them. those are tiny countries. russia is a big country. russia hits over its weight militarily, matters a lot geopolitically. but economically, it is very small compared to china. >> it is primarily energy. >> and that is not a great place to be today. >> imagine a scenario of chinese-russian cooperation. what would it be, how would it play out, what might come out of it? >> one thing that comes out of it is the ability of the united states to punish or isolate russia for transgressions n
becomes -- transgressions becomes nil. clearly that means, provide them with a lot of energy and prices that would be more favorable to china. seldom even more arms than they've had. russia already is the largest arms dealer for china. it would also mean supporting chinese positions in international organizations. >> don't they -- on international issues anyway? it seems to me that when the security council comes up and russia is going to veto, the chinese are there with them. >> it is largely true. the chinese would much rather generally be able to abstain as opposed to veto. they don't like to do no votes
by themselves. i'm talking more about the creation of other organizations, the strengthening of the shanghai organization as a counterweight to nato. the creation of the silk road overland organization that is bent to really drive infrastructure that will make china stronger and will move towards internal eurasia. those are things that are inherently competitive to organizations like the imf and the world bank. >> does china want to become an alternative reserve currency of the world? >> they certainly don't want to become the reserve currency anytime soon. the reason for that is because they are not prepared to float. they do not want the dollar to be the reserve currency and they don't want the americans to have
the influence that comes with the reserve currency. if they can fragment it, that is very useful to china. the russians agree with that. the russians are more willing to provoke conflict to make that happen, but the orientation is similar. >> with respect to the chinese it was often said that they have not been an imperialistic power. history has said that. they have not reached out to gain territory beyond what the chinese kingdom was. is it possible that they, if not imperialistic, want to expand in geography as well as depth of influence their hegemony? >> the depth of influence, i can take quite literally in terms of the territory they want to grab in the east china sea. anyone who has looked at the line from china, right up against the vietnamese border no one could imagine that that
would be territory that china believes it could take or that it legitimately should have, and yet that is precisely what they are arguing. they are growing the military at 15% of a year. nobody in the region will be able to counter. china, right now, is playing a relatively slow and thoughtful game. they don't want to provoke unnecessarily because they are focusing on their economy successfully. there's no question that over the long term, rules of the road for many countries in asia are going to change dramatically. >> if you wanted to argue about what leader in the world has served his country better than anyone else, xi jinping? >> certainly the interests of his party. interests of his country --
>> building a stronger country not building his own power base. >> i think it is dangerous. xi jinping looks so much to soviet history and the mistakes they believe were made by gorbachev. or much of did three things. he did economic reform that they want to do, political reform that they don't want to do, but he also decentralized power. that didn't work in the soviet union. you had these republics that said, we want independence. in china, the country is so different. the people want to be led the way they've been led for decades. they are relatively poor and they want growth. if that means heavy industry and the smog is really bad, so be it. if you go to shanghai beijing,
these are people living relatively wealthy lives and they want more quality of life. they even want things like an independent judiciary. i fear that xi jinping has no willingness whatsoever to truly decentralized power. i think he's doing the opposite. he has centralized power. >> he's attacked corruption and some of his enemies have gone down. it enhances is his reputation. >> i worry that risk aversion in china is going to create much bigger problems with their own domestic population long-term. >> tell me what mr. putin wants. what is the risk of what he wants in 2015? >> we know what he wants. to maximize his influence in his
country and in his region. he does not want to accept being the leader of a russian decline. the news today with oil prices going down into the low 50's is the worst possible economic news for putin. the only thing supporting him in terms of popularity right now is his demonization of the united states, the west. >> that is popular? >> it is popular. across russia. >> is it likely that he would strike out because he's hurting from sanctions and falling oil prices? does that mean he has to do something to maintain his popularity at home? >> he is lashing out and i think he will do more. i think it is unlikely that he will back down from his occupations of east ukraine, his military incursions into european airspace, the cyber
attacks on american private sector institutions and the white house. they are getting dangerous. >> that is the interesting point. we saw what happened to sony as an example of the power of hacking. anybody you talk to in that world will say, these attacks are happening multiple times, hundreds of thousands of times all the time against government and private enterprises. >> you are right to raise the north korea point. russia and north korea have some unfortunate similarities. they hit tremendously above their weight militarily. they are both countries the americans are trying hard to punish because they are doing things the u.s. doesn't like. they are also both countries the u.s. has no hope of isolating. the chinese won't allow it. the biggest difference is that russia is a big country. russia has the ability to lash out and cause trouble if they
want to. it is true in a lot of other ways. >> what is the likelihood ukraine will take steps to become a member of nato? >> they've gotten rid of their non-alliance status with new legislation. i don't believe they'll do anything else that is substantive in the next few months but the fact that they've taken those steps shows a level of desperation. they are trying to get more economic support. their economy is falling apart. ukraine is the big loser here. a lot of people care, but nobody really cares. it is kind of like hong kong. we have these issues, yet they are not national security interests and no one is coordinated to take steps. >> japan. we had an election recently. >> abe did pretty well, not
extraordinarily well. he can't do everything. >> economics or nationalism? >> personally, i think he's more interested in nationalism. as a politician, he's more interested in economics. i think asia, right now, is geopolitically going to have a bit of a reprieve. you've got xi jinping, who is charismatic and focusing on the domestic economy, you've got abe , who is charismatic, is focusing on the economy. i could say the same thing about modi in india. i could say the same thing about joko in indonesia. historically, we talk about the security tensions. they are still there. they are not going away, but they are not going to be front
and center this year. i think japan is a big piece of that. abe said that he's going to do a speech that will soften his policy in japan on the willingness to apologize for atrocities during world war ii. very late for him to do it, but very smart. >> it really is a problem for every neighbor who has suffered from japanese atrocities. >> the south koreans especially where i don't see the relationship improving. he needed to do that for china. >> is there a right in japan that threatens him? >> the media in japan is overwhelmingly pro-abe and supports a more nationalist take. if abe wanted to move on this, he could have done it early. personally, this nationalism, he could have done this. >> the chinese are developing
some sense of wariness about the north koreans. >> it is very clear that the cyber attacks that brought down the north korean internet, the 1000 servers, those attacks could not have happened or been successful without some level of chinese complicity. having said that, the chinese later shut down all access for gmail in china. it is not clear they are happy with the united states punishing the north koreans. it is very clear the chinese have felt that north korea is a danger for them. i wonder if we are going to have this question about how china feels about putin. >> they will begin to say putin is irrelevant? >> putin is annoying and dangerous and we kind of own him now because he is our guy, but
he's a loose cannon. how much of a loose cannon is china prepared to handle? >> they have no interest in some g-2 thing. >> none at all. if there had been some interest, after 2008, it died. now, they recognize the united states is still a force to be reckoned with. >> ok, isis. you said it will spread its ideological reach beyond iraq and syria. >> that's right. the islamic state will be smaller and less effective but the reach of isis as an organization -- >> social media and the ability to articulate some message that is attractive to people in all sectors of the world? >> that exacerbates it, but it is also the economic weakness. go back to $50 oil and the
amount of money available for these governments to pay out to their people and keep social harmony. it is europe times 10 in that regard. it is also the death of political islam. during the arab spring, there was this belief that moderate islamists are going to be part of new government. what happened is, the authoritarian regimes doubled down and have gotten stronger. the moderate islamists and leftist islamists are gone and you have radical islam. >> they would argue that isis doesn't represent islam at all. it maybe uses the rhetoric of islam but it doesn't represent islam, and in fact there are serious conversations going on about how this is islam against isis. that is the battle.
>> i respect and understand the fact that it is useful to do anything possible -- that is absolutely a worthwhile goal. >> [inaudible] >> they don't for me, but are there people that are fighting for aces? >> is that an idea, the idea that islam represents isis, the more they do, the more they will be in retreat? >> i think icesis reflects the support of disenfranchised people in the islamic world. >> that is exactly what happened in the growth of the islamic state. you had disenfranchised sunnis in iraq. they had gone to syria to fight and they came back and were disenfranchised because you had a shia administration in baghdad that gave them no resources and
no political power. it seems to me in iraq, there was an awakening to that idea that a new government is more aware of the fact that by doing the practices of their predecessor, the maliki government, that they were creating their own hell. and other sunni countries are saying the same thing now. saudi arabia. >> yes, i agree. but if you ask me, are we going to see more disenfranchised islamists who find isis to be a mechanism for the expression of their discontent, and will we see them in yemen, in jordan, in lebanon, especially given the massive numbers of refugees we have -- larger numbers today
than at any point since world war ii -- >> it is extraordinary. more than what -- 1.5 million from syria alone. >> more than that now. closer to 3 million now. in jordan alone, it is over one million. you look at what is happening in turkey. are these people going to support a moderate path to governance or take up violence? larger numbers are going to take up violence. >> what is the response that has to be fashioned? >> there are so many and they are not happening soon. one would be the support for education. one would be integrating these people into society. that's getting harder to do. think about what is happening in sweden, which has had the most are liberal response to
refugees, and the massive backlash after all these iraqis and syrians come over. now you have some covert and even over racism in sweden. the new swedish democratic party, which is kind of a fascist anti-immigrant party working to change the liberalization of their policies. >> more countries than i have time. saudi arabia versus i run. >> very related. you said the united states and iranians are strange bedfellows on isis. i'm not sure i'd say they are bedfellows. we are not really coordinating. >> by the end of 2015, will we have a nuclear agreement? >> no. >> what are the consequences of that? will they be closer to having the capacity to make nuclear weapons? >> my understanding from the
white house is there is acceptance that kicking the can down the road is ok. the reason they gave them seven months is because buying time is better. >> they are not making great strides in terms of these negotiations and inspections. we have slowed down the rate of their own appreciation of how many centrifuges they have. >> the iranian government sees over time that they can start to erode international support from sanctions. china, south korea, a bunch of other countries. they have less influence in that environment. >> nothing happened in the israeli-palestinian issue. talk about the u.n. and israeli elections. >> the palestinians now feel they have no choice. they lost the latest security
council vote. they decided to apply to become members of the international criminal court. that means that the israelis feel like they need to respond. they've cut off the taxes that they've collected. if that is not resolved soon the palestinian authority -- i don't think they want to do that. >> the turks. what does erdogan want other than more power and more authority? >> you know him well. we've known him for years. he wants to be the next otto- turk. he wants to be the next historical figure. you look at the rhetoric, the policies, the people he surrounds himself with.
>> are they secular principles? >> not at all. he's done everything possible to move away from them in terms of cultural sensibilities and education policy. turkeys huge advantage historically is they have such a diverse population. erdogan is making it a divided population. >> here we have a president who knows he faces a republican-led senate and house, who knows that he has some executive actions he can impose in terms of immigration and realizes that he is in the fourth quarter and he wants to be relevant. the area where you could be more relevant than anywhere else probably is foreign policy. he's shown a little bit of that with respect to cuba. able stroke. what else might he do? what can the united states do what can barack obama do?
>> i think the single biggest legacy he will have as president in foreign policy will be the successful conclusion of the transpacific partnership. 40% of the world's gdp, united states and japan together, forces the chinese to say, we don't want to the outside. it is not as exciting as cuba, but in terms of -- over the last years, all we've talked about is institutions that don't work right, agreements that don't happen, fragmentation. this is building something. i would love to say he could get russia back to the table and forge a deal on ukraine. i don't think he can. but they need to try. >> there's not much he could do with the chinese relationship that is not being done. >> he understands that the china relationship needs to be managed.
he is doing a reasonably good job. >> and the chinese are happy with it? >> they think he's relatively weak but i think they are ok with him. so many people who criticized obama for moving away from the pivot to asia, yet his best relationships around the world are in asia. it is not only the tpp but generally the u.s.-japan relationship is successful. the modi visit has gone very well. he was here about two months ago. it went very well. >> modi coming here -- >> he was in new york and washington. >> i meant the president coming -- the president is going to india. you scared me that i missed it. >> you did not miss it, no. that is a historic visit. >> with respect to this
president, he seems to really want to do something about iran. >> i think he really believes that there was a chance. >> he no longer believes? he continues to write letters to the leader. >> susan rice doesn't believe anymore. i think at best she is 50-50. i think she's gone pessimistic. people i talk to have gone pessimistic. they think the window has closed. i think it is closing for the simple reason that it has gotten messier. what was great about the initiative jewish nation's -- the initial negotiations is -- >> if you could pull off something with iran, it seems to me that is a big deal. >> it is a big deal. >> here it is, eurasia group,
>> arati prabhakar is here. she is director of darpa. the agency has been at the forefront of technological innovation since 1958. it has played a major role in breakthroughs such as the internet, smartphones, and driverless cars. it is pushing the frontiers of robotics, cyber securities, and brain science. i'm pleased to have her at this table for the first time. welcome. what is the mission of darpa? >> breakthrough technologies for national security. we are the slice of the defense department chartered with that job. that traces back to 1958 when we were formed in the wake of sputnik. that was a surprise that got
everyone's attention. the response was to form this agency to prevent that kind of technological surprise. my predecessors realized that the best way to prevent surprises is to create some surprises of our own. >> tell me how you ended up at this important job. >> i was fortunate to come back to darpa. i came to darpa early in my career, in 1986. i was a year and a half after my phd program. i stumbled into an opportunity to come in as program manager. i started one of the technical offices, then got to do some wonderful other things for 19 years, most of that in the private sector. but i never had as much fun as when i was at darpa. when i got the chance to come back, we packed up the kids and move back. >> why has darpa been so good about what it does? >> we want to make sure we preserve this organization's
ability to do the job. i think we are very healthy. internally, we are healthy and we are getting the support we need to do the job. you don't want to take that for granted. that has to be nurtured. i believe the seeds of our success our first in our mission , because it is a very specific piece of this much larger ecosystem that makes new technologies happen in this country. we have this one job of breakthrough technologies for national security, planting these early seeds. the fact that we've had this tremendous track record is an operating model that is a very small organization, 200 government employees, half of whom are technical staff. that technical staff, which rotates through three to five year rotations, they are very smart, able technologists from
the broader community, sometimes from universities companies other labs. those individual program managers they are the ones that we look to, to create really challenging, really hard problems that could be worthwhile to go after, and then to do the contracts. >> what is the grand challenge? >> that is one piece of how we do work. sometimes, for example, in robotics. technology has been bubbling along. sometimes a challenge is a terrific way to really see what we have. today, we are running a challenge, we are in the middle of a darpa robotics challenge. it is the rescue robot. we have another one challenging people to predict the spread of infectious disease.
a third challenge is a cyber grant challenge, to challenge teams to build automated systems. >> this is something you said if failure appears inevitable, we shift our focus and move on. when one bets on breakthroughs, one will sometimes lose. >> absolutely. in fact, if everything we invest in works, we are probably not reaching far enough. we have to push ourselves. once you start down a path, you have to really be willing to be clear with yourself when it is a failure. >> do you have a philosophy that says, we wish they would pay more attention to darpa and less attention to these huge programs that are part of the pentagon budget? >> big weapon systems? first of all, it is an ecosystem. our role is to invent new ways of doing business that can give us huge steps forward in
national security capabilities. historically, a lot of the equipment that gets built to do that, it has been very powerful and we've been very successful as a military as a consequence. today, it has gotten very large. especially the high-end systems satellite or aircraft. they have gotten very big and slow and expensive. >> give me a sense of how you go about this. there must be a better way to do this or there must be a better way that we can leapfrog to get to a place where, if we get there, we will have done something remarkable for the advancement of our mission. >> sometimes it starts as you are describing. when we hear from the military community or the national security community about a grave problem, a major challenge, that is something that informs our work.
we are the bridge to the technology work. technology is what inspires us. we are informed by national security challenges, we are inspired by what is technically possible, and our programs craft a way for technology to solve those problems. that is the bubbling pot of programs at darpa today. >> robots and artificial intelligence, two subjects that are of interest to me, are part of your effort. what is the connection to national security? >> everything we are doing is harnessing technology to deal with a world that has a very interesting range of challenges. when darpa started, very much a creation of the cold war. today, that is not the problem we face. it is a multi polar world. the future directions of nationstates matter for our national security.
where will china go, what is russia doing, what is happening with north korea -- those are questions, but the chronic challenges of national security are about violent extremism flaring up, connections to terrorism, and criminal activity. so we play across all those dimensions. one example of work we are doing that is more on network terrorism and law enforcement one of our programs in the big data arena is finding -- we are working with law enforcement and with our tools, they are starting to be able to find sex trafficking networks in the deep web. we are shining a light -- >> explain what the deep web is. >> a part of the web that is not indexed by commercial search engines like google. when you do a search and think
you are seeing the entire web you are only seeing what they have indexed. there is a lot that is publicly available but not commercially viable to index. in that volume, it is a vast volume, but our new program is finding ways to do cores through that deep wet and find patterns that are shining a light on trafficking networks. that is one example of a law enforcement activity that looks like it is linked to national security. >> what is the robotics challenge? >> if you turn the clock back, a decade ago, we were doing the darpa driving challenges which led to a driving car activities. it is wonderful to see people pick up those concepts and run with them. today's robotics challenge was actually inspired by the problems of fukushima.
wouldn't it have been great if we had robots that could have gone into an industrial facility and turn valves and climb ladders? it turns out to be incredibly hard for robots to do those things today. that's what the challenge is doing. >> google is -- some of the experimental stuff -- are they a kind of public and private sector darpa? >> i look at what google is doing and it looks like throughout the century, the last century, when corporations have the resources for research they obviously invest for product development. those that have some sufficient vision and resources often invest in new generations of technology. if you think about bell labs, ge research dupont.
to me google's work looks like the modern incarnation of that. >> is it only google? >> there are a few other places. the whole rmb ecosystem -- r&d ecosystem has evolved. there are companies that are rich enough and excited enough. >> where are we in artificial intelligence? >> that is a great question. simultaneously, we are dazzled by what is possible and yet in some ways we are really nowhere. artificial intelligence, that term has been around for more than half a century now. in fact, in our day-to-day experiences, we interact with the fruits of that research. in some sense, even when you drive a car and the antilock brake comes on, that is a form
of an algorithm that is learning what is going on and applying that. every time you do a research -- a web search, you get recommendations. those are huge advances. those are algorithms and learning methods that have been captured in code. we should keep doing more of that. we are doing more of that. where are we? where are we compared to what humans can do is a different question. >> we have a long way to go. >> we have a long way to go partly because humans are amazingly adaptive and able to do things that we can't -- there are whole disciplines. >> people like elon musk and stephen hawking say they are scared. should we be scared? >> i don't know if we should be scared. i think if you are going to work
on very powerful technologies it is important to ask those questions. it is part and parcel of how we think about the technologies we invest in. when we ask those questions, the question that is voiced foremost in my mind is much more about how humans are going to use this technology. in the national security context, how are we going to use it in conflict and against each other? more broadly, how are we going to shape how we live and work? >> cyber security? >> a vitally important topic for our country and for our military. because we need to be able to operate the networks that let us do business. the thing that isn't may be as visible, we talked about the internet of things, we see more and more of our world getting connected, our vehicles are part of the internet now.
in the military, our military platforms are part of the internet. they are vulnerable to exploitation. some of our work there -- the way we deal with cyber security today is patch and pray. we wait until there is a problem and put a band-aid on it. it is good we are doing that, but it is not going to -- what we need is fundamental new approaches that are more scalable than the pace at which the internet itself and the vulnerabilities are growing. >> what is darpa doing in the area of brain development? >> we are interested in understanding the brain and building on this vast foundation of neuroscience. our questions are, can we understand brain function in ways that help us restore function? for example, by using what comes
off the motor cortex. we have a wonderful experiment where we have clinical trials of volunteers who have had chips implanted on their motor cortex. from that, their neural signals are able to control robotic arms so they can do things they were never able to do. beyond that, we are looking at what probes in the brain that are placed for therapeutic needs, what can those tell us about the way memory is transferred in the brain? can we use that to repair memory loss that often comes with traumatic brain injury? beautiful science, but our question is, can we apply it to solve major problems? >> do you have the resources you need? >> darpa has been very well supported. our budget is about $2.8 billion a year which goes into this broad community to run about 200
programs. our budget has declined as defense dollars have shrunk in the last five or six years. but i think that is reasonably stabilized at this point. most important, i'm very pleased that we continue to get the support we need in the technical community. >> this is interesting, reporting on darpa for cbs this morning. here it is. >> some of the wildest ideas come from nature, like research on robots. >> this reminds me of an aunt colony. >> just as armies of ants work together darpa hopes to create armies of robots for micro manufacturing. the gecko also caught darpa's attention. >> it looks like he's hanging on with 10 toes, but when you zoom in, there are actually about a half billion points of contact. >> darpa created a material that
>> i'm mark halperin. >> and i'm john heilemann. and with all due respect to elon musk, we never have a failure to watch. hi, sports fans. obama takes names, jeb ups his game, and who is in and who is out in the hall of fame? but first, john boehner keeps his job. there was a surprisingly strong challenge to john boehner. a one-day blip or an omen of things to come?