tv Charlie Rose Bloomberg August 14, 2016 12:00pm-1:01pm EDT
♪ >> from our studios in new york city, this is "charlie rose." charlie: the cyber attack targeting the dnc appears to be more extensive than officials first believed. nush and hackers -- russia -- original leak in july forced dnc chairwoman debbie wasserman schultz to resign. the question remains, whether it is part of a larger effort to influence the election. .oining me now is adam siegel
my guest served as the general counsel at the national security agency. he currently leads a global cyber security practice. michael riley covers cyber security for bloomberg news. david sanger of "the new york times." i am pleased to have all of them here. david, tell me where we yard at go -- tell me where we are? david: we are at a protectable place in the course of this. what we knew a year ago, although the government did not announce it as such, the russians have got inside the state department's unclassified e-mail system, part of the systems in the joint chiefs of staff. then we discovered that the fsb the successor to the kgb, more , than a year ago, got into the democratic national committee systems, followed by another russian intelligence agency probably did not even
know the fsb was there. systems,go into these you follow the breadcrumbs out. it wouldn't be surprising to me if one of those hacked e-mails, or individuals, with either the one who led these agencies into the dnc, or from the dnc that went out from them. it you follow the string as it you follow the string as it proceeds in and out of these networks. charlie: tell me what role the wikileaks plays in this, david? david: wikileaks was the recipient of a number of the documents. they were not the primary recipient. initially after the dnc hack was discovered, and the report pointing back to two russian actors.
after that, we began to see some of these documents surface on the web from somebody who we talked about a few weeks ago, who identifies himself as a guccifer 2.. with the name after another hacker actually in jail. it looks like that was a construct. probably there was no individual, but a committee of russian hackers. whoever it is, they published this material themselves and they did not get much news bounce out of it. after that, it ended up in the hands of wikileaks. we do not understand about the transmission belt of how it got from the people who hacked this to the people who published it. charlie: is julian assange saying that he has a lot more? that he is going to dribble out? david: he has hinted he has more.
he has hinted he has no particular love for hillary clinton. but in an odd way, the contents these leakss in apart from the fact the dnc was , favoring hillary clinton over bernie sanders, which was not the best kept secret in washington. the fact of the hack in the -- and the concept that the russians may be inserting themselves into an american election is far more newsworthy than what we have seen of these e-mails. charlie: any doubt the russians did this? >> i do not think there is any doubt the russians did this. -- doubt that the russians are behind this. i think the big question still is, was this directed at espionage? so we know, as david said, the russians for a long time have
been interested in u.s. government agency servers and it works. we know the chinese have an long interested. or did they, in fact, intend to insert themselves into the election? or did they make the decision after they were caught? charlie: have we seen the tip of the iceberg? should we expect much more? >> i would expect there is much more. the interesting point here is that this appears to be much more than an espionage operation. something like an information warfare operation. the russians have been running these kinds of operations in europe for couple of years. they have done it in ukraine, eastern europe. they hacked a television station in paris. they claim to be the islamic state. game,they have upped the they decided to intervene in a
very contentious election in the u.s., and i think there is no doubt that they have a lot of information in which to do that. the attacks of come out, the victims that of come out, are part of a small subset of a much larger set of people who were at least targeted. security firms tracked 4000 spearfishing e-mails from the gre intelligence unit and they crossed a whole bunch of categories. there are lawyers, lobbyists, foundations -- they go into every corner of the washington power structure. they include nato officers, the terry stotts, defense contractors, a lot of those are personal e-mails. gossipy stuff with things they managed to get that people talked about. there is a lot of stuff out there and the question is -- how much have they already given to wikileaks or other people to
release? do they plan to do this all the way up to the election? is there any response the u.s. can make that might change the calculus? >> i am sure senior officials are debating that exact question and the complexity involves a host of factors. first of all publicly admitting , something to a nationstate is far different than privately doing so. we saw the u.s. government make significant strides when the sony hack was attributed to the government of north korea. i think officials now are saying more and more the public benefit and need for attribution, to hold hostile actors accountable. charlie: how do we do that? how do we hold north korea accountable? how might we hold russia accountable? >> there is a range of tools of the government's disposal. everything from diplomatic action, we have seen diplomatic approach meant with the chinese.
in the wake of a number of chinese hacking activities to criminal indictments, as we saw with several pla actors. two economic sanctions as we saw , in the case of north korea. there are a host of actions they have various advantages and disadvantages. charlie: the quest today often comes up -- the question comes up with regards to hillary clinton server, do we assume the people who did the hackings wanted to hack her server or would it be much more difficult to penetrate? david? question weis a have been asking so much about. what we have heard from the fbi director so far is he said there was no direct evidence that anybody who had gotten inside hillary clinton's server.
but he went on to say the actors are usually so good, they might not leave any evidence. now, that raises the obvious ,uestion, if they are so good why was it so easy in the case of the dnc hack? there was may be that more than one hacker inside the dnc. it could've been the fsb were there and others were there, too. in fact, and ciber it is not , uncommon, once somebody gets caught, for them to leave the door open to other hackers so the crime scene gets polluted. there are all those different elements, and it may be a long time, and we may never figure out if her server was hacked. i want to pick up on one thing, there is a growing sense that naming and shaming has some utility. the justice department indicted some iranians. there is the chinese indictment,
the naming of the north koreans. one interesting question may be, did the obama administration make a mistake by not naming the russians for the state department and white house, and joint chiefs of staff? and have they done so, would have it created some kind of deterrent to act against the dnc, or would it have made no difference? we will never know the answer. it will raise the question, what about these previous hacks the u.s. government knew about and never discussed publicly? charlie: they named the north koreans after sony, correct? >> correct. >> that's right, and it was a very quick attribution. the president had gotten briefed on it and named them in december just before he went to hawaii.
and you may remember that immediately after that, there were a lot of people who came out and said, no, the evidence is no good. it is not the north koreans. the u.s. government did not want to reveal its evidence because it did not want to reveal how much it was up inside north korea's own computer systems. and had evidence from inside north korea. that could be going on in the russian case. i don't know if that is the case, i am speculating here. a codefendant intelligence agencies had more about the case from our own implants inside russian systems and the intelligence community may have decided they could not risk revealing the depth of that penetration, and thus cannot , talk about what evidence they have. charlie: does that make sense to you? >> generally, it does. gain-loss analysis, they will weigh the benefits of doing so
publicly versus the potential loss of an intelligence source. >> it is also important to point out we are trying to create certain norms of behavior in cyberspace. we are trying to distinguish what would be considered a good act of cyber espionage and a bad active cyber espionage. in many ways, the type of targets we have signaled those are legitimate targets. we don't believe you should be able to interfere with elections. i think we want to draw a line between what kind of espionage the u.s. itself conducts. and then interference or influence operations beyond. charlie: the u.s. government would not try to influence elections? >> the russians said, we discovered this malware in our own server. we not going to say where it came from. we all know who it is really from. charlie: we do know that there have been certain kinds of
agreements. the chinese claimed they would stop supporting industrial espionage. did they not? my correct in that? that?i correct in that yo >> so far, the evidence seems to be the cyber economic espionage is going down. charlie: what does this open up in terms of where hacking may be going in a larger sense? in terms of access to everything? medical records, for example. >> the problem is is we've often described the threat as a kind , hackers areor die going to cause massive destruction and explosions. and what we have been is cyber issues below the threshold for an armed attacker use of force. there is a whole range of ways to use cyber, influence operations, espionage.
and it is very difficult to figure out who the targets are, right quest market sony is a -- figure out who the targets are, right? sony is a private company. dnc is a political organization. the target is constantly shifting. it is a whole range of private actors that gives states the ability to influence and coerce in ways we had not thought about before. charlie: where is this on the priority of the nsa? topertainly, rising to the -- cyber security can be as much about protecting the confidentiality of communications as it can be protecting assets. if you are a business, then made intellectual property, or classifiedoperty, or for critical information. if you are the head of a party or the ceo the company, the hack and leak of e-mails can have just as important real-world impact.
charlie: david, do we know who in russia might have ordered this? david: no. it is very possible the intelligence agency were rooting around, because that is what intelligence agencies do. and once they got into the dnc and got this material, they may have brought it to their political masters and said, see what we have got. maybe they were looking for bureaucratic approval or they thought it was useful. it is hard to imagine a bunch of people sitting around at the saying, wow we have all , this great stuff about how the dnc was favoring hillary clinton over bernie sanders. it doesn't strike me that they was thatnk that that fascinating. but if they see a moment to disrupt an american election, they may see it as payback for what vladimir putin views is an effort by secretary clinton, who
-- when she was secretary of state to denounce a rigged or partly fraudulent elementary election in 2011 and rusty a -- in russian where she said some things vladimir putin views as having encouraged protests. adam got at a very important point. we has been our past years thinking about the cyber pearl harbor extreme, that is bringing down the power grid. that is something to worry about. but what we are seeing here in sony, or the dnc hack, is much more common and below the threshold of an act of war. and somewhere between espionage and information warfare as michael said, that may be the future of sort of where cyber war is going.
along with the kinds of attacks the u.s. and israel did against the iranian nuclear program, which was essentially an act of sabotage. but all of these are acts that stay short of what could prompt an armed response. charlie: where are we, michael, in terms of the race between of the race people who had and want to resist hacking? clear that the people who hack are pretty far ahead. it is much easier to play offense than defense. one of the things the dnc hacks have shown us, there are some interesting tactic that are being used pretty effectively. among them is, you can hack personal e-mails by getting a decent now where on a computer at home. getting credentials to an e-mail and that can get you all sorts of information that can have surprising sensitivity.
one of the victims of this larger set of facts is a general posted,ed on e-mails the russians were reading an e-mail from 2012 on. --was talking to: powell, colin powell and wesley clark. just because of the way people use information and go back between secure e-mail accounts and personal accounts, we haven't figured out a way to counter that. charlie: but i would have given the fbi some ability with respect to hillary clinton's server if they wanted to to find more about the e-mails that were deleted. in other words, there was someone at the receiving end of those e-mails or at the sending end of those e-mails she was
receiving. >> absolutely. the state department has released e-mails that have gone through and released them. but the e-mails that were deleted, the fbi was able to go in and reconstruct some part of that. in terms of the fragments and the data they had. they had met -- they may have more information than we know. but the clinton campaign has been pretty clear and said, look, that was a process. our lawyer sat down and went through everything that was in that account and the only thing , that was left out were personal e-mails that didn't have anything to do with state department business. so far, we have been stuck taking her word. donald trump suggested there may be another hand the russians could play which is if they did hack in the servers, they could present that themselves. it presents the possibility of some interesting surprises between now and november. ♪
♪ david, and others within the legal framework, are , we going to see a series of things? david, and reference to a meeting you may have been in, and i don't know, but i know there are lots of conference is about ever security. i'm assuming there are lots of meetings taking place. we know have -- we know cyber
has risen in terms of the focus of the u.s. government and within the military. what do we need now? and the most immediate case involving the dnc, charlie, i think there is a series of very hard decisions president obama is going to have to confront. first, he doesn't have an investigation report yet to act upon. the fbi is still looking at this. that is a story this morning that showed this is continuing to spread. and yet, at the same time, i think the president is probably going pressure. i know some of the staff are to be able to send an official message to the russians before the election happens. because, there is always the possibility that this could be the beginning of a more broader and more complex attempt to
tinker with election itself. we have no evidence at this point that they are in the election systems, but they know there are vulnerabilities in the systems of many of the states. i think he would want to be able to issue some kind of warning to the russians that they should keep their hands off of the american elections, both from an informational viewpoint and the actual votes in the accounts. can youader question is set some norms for all of this? we have had success with that with the chinese. i've never seen any indication of success with that with the russians. charlie: because the russians are different from the chinese? >> well, they are less interested in some degree of the kind of commercial data and intellectual property that the chinese are focused on. and more interested in espionage and information warfare part of this. and then of course, the traditional military secrets. the u.s. doesn't want to set any norms that would cut into its
own ability to conduct espionage against the russian military, or maybe some of the financial institutions. and certainly, it's political institutions. people are going to be saying before you cut that deal, think about what the u.s. espionage activities you might be affecting. >> we've had a little success with the russians with the group of government effort -- government experts at the you when. -- government experts at the u.n.. they agreed there are some basic rules of behavior in cyberspace that international law applies, that state should not attack the critical infrastructure of state during peacetime. how do you define critical infrastructure? right? the voting system is not considered by the -- political
infrastructure. i think one of the things the obama administration is going to do is sending a signal that we are going to consider critical infrastructures, including the voting system, and there is a line there. charlie: so they should say to the russians, stop this because you know what we can do. >> i think we are going to send a signal that there are certain behaviors that are going to be out by and that there are going to be repercussions. charlie: what would be the repercussions? >> i think most of them we are not going to see. already we are engaged in some , disruption in russia. so, are we disrupting whatever the russian spies are doing themselves? are we sending signals through our own cyber operations that we could respond if we need to? i think given all of the other interest we have with the russians right now, in syria, and the iran nuclear deal, we are very unlikely to use sanctions or other more genitive measures. >> charlie, it may be worth
noting that they may have played some cards already that we haven't yet seen. there's a lot we don't know about how this evolves. one of them is we don't know exactly how the dnc figured out that it has been hacked the russians. ample, thatle, for they got an external notification saying, hey, you guys should look at that. they called in an ir firm that outrelatively quick to put the message that it was russian. they called in other firms to confirm that and quickly the narrative became what's in the e-mails, but who is doing it and why? that may be an effective counter operation to influence it. there is a possibility that it has only come back there is more scrutiny on trump and his connections to russia. there are some complex things. charlie: what do we know about
donald trump and his connections to russia? >> well, a lot of people will point out a couple of things. he has pretty strong business connections. paul manafort, his campaign manager now, spent several years in ukraine working for the president of ukraine who once he was ejected on the country, and the protests, then went to russia and is there now. that is a close relationship between manafort and connections to the kremlin. it has sort of been brought up as a collection of things were people are like, what does this add up to if in fact the russians are trying to interfere and the u.s. election on one side and not the other? >> the "washington post" has done some pretty good work on this and looked at some money that has flowed between russian oligarchs and some of trump's financial interest.
that is pretty far several steps removed from saying he has direct financial interest that coincide with the russian oligarchs or vladimir putin that would explain why they are doing what they are doing. a better explanation might be that the russians looked at the field, and don't have any love for hillary clinton, and may have just decided an information operation like this is a way to confront the west, specifically the west without much the u.s. can do about it. >> that is an important point. a lot of russia information operations are not a specific outcome. as long as you can create distrust, you can undermine people's trust in information, that is a positive outcome.
it may be enough to throw the election into chaos. they would see that as a positive outcome. charlie: do you believe the russians are trying to influence the result of the american presidential election? >> the one big open question, the relationship between the hack and the leak. know intelligence officials are trying to think through that. that is an important step in policy consequences and is there a direct attempt to influence an election? know intelligence offs whether or not this was the case, clearly this highlights for the american public importance of preserving the integrity of our electoral process from cyber adversaries, everything from the party process to voting machines. i think now they all have the spotlight. charlie: we just don't know. i do not think we know publicly that critical link.
in line with the other comments made, it would not be unusual in the tradition of russian information operations for this activity to be undertaken but i think the jury is still out on this and you shouldn't leap to that conclusion until we know more. david: i agree completely. the evidence that there were russian actors and almost certainly linked to or part of the intelligence agencies who did the hack is very strong. the transmission belt of that, making it public, who made that decision, who was in control, whether they may have been others who leaked the material, that is unclear, at least to me and the people i have talked to. on the broader question, this is something the u.s. government is going to have to act on pretty quickly in the next 90 days.
it's a very decentralized system. every state does it differently. some are going to be more vulnerable than others. the good news is is because it is so decentralized, it is not as if some hacker could sit around and come up with a way to manipulate the vote in the united states. they would have to go state-by-state and locality by locality. that would be difficult. charlie: thank you so much. thank you. pleasure to have you here. thank you. we'll be right back. stay with us. ♪
charlie: on september 11, 2001, 19 terrorists use four jetliners as guided missiles to kill 2977 people. that changed this nation's approach to national security. since 9/11, the u.s. has spent $1 trillion to protect itself against terrorist attacks. a new article by steven brill is the result of an year-long search and answers the question -- are we any safer? it is the cover story for the september issue of "the atlantic." he joins me now. i am pleased to have him back. welcome. what made you pursue this? steven: i was curious to document and see how we had
done. i did a book in 2003 about the immediate aftermath and the standing up of the department of homeland security. other than as a citizen i had not paid much attention to it. i have the sense that we spend a but the record might be interesting and mixed. the record is mixed. charlie: but it is clear we are safer. steven: we are stronger. we have more defenses because of the men and women who work at it every day. charlie: why doesn't that make us stronger? >> there are two things in the equation. the offense has multiplied. it is much more diffuse. we went into iraq and caused
turmoil in that part of the world. we face many more threats, different kinds of threats and we haven't even completely responded to the threats we faced on 9/11. you will recall after the attacks, there were the anthrax attacks. we haven't made progress we need in dealing with bioterrorism. charlie: but what happened in iraq was not the reason saddam -- osama bin laden attacked on us. >> that is the point. that was a gratuitous raising of the threats against us. not only was it not justified as a response to 9/11 but it was counterproductive. charlie: because? >> it unleashed destabilizing forces in the region.
we faced them in paris. we faced them in san bernardino and orlando. individuals get inspired. charlie: let's stay with that idea. are you saying, take 9/11, osama bin laden wanted to lash out. a planned attack by him. one of the principal people in captivity. in terms of iraq, destabilize the region, because that war had the destabilizing effect it had, it allowed terrorism to grow. and provided a bigger series of people who wished us bad as well as what else?
steven: they also had a target. suddenly the americans were invading an islamic country. the terrorist's greatest dream is to have the war with western civilization. charlie: would that have happened if we had not gone into iraq? steven: i don't know. it did happen after we went into iraq. the goal of the terrorists is the same. to lure us into a war with western civilization and the muslim religion. charlie: which is the argument used by many people as to how we have to respond to this. if we engage them in a land warfare, we would play into their hands. >> if we even say we are at war with a religion, that is what they want us to say. president bush didn't take the bait. president obama didn't take the
bait. donald trump declares that war. charlie: and other people as well. steven: but he is running for president. charlie: there's been a divide between republicans and democrats. >> not national security republicans per se. charlie: my point is to understand whether you can make a distinction between not saying it is a war against islam and recognizing that you are fighting in most cases a radical extremist islam. steven: that is the exactly the distinction we have to make, that you just made. that is not the distinction the terrorists want us to make. they want us to declare war. that is what inspires people in their basement somewhere. the great satan west is
declaring war on this religion. i am going to show i am joining the battle and i am going to shoot up a nightclub or a shopping mall. the answer to your first question, are we safer, no. we have done a lot, we are stronger, we are tougher. you can't hijack airplanes. we have learned a lot of the lessons. there are now these new lessons to learn and some we can't prevent. we can't prevent them if we let anyone who wants to walk into a gun store and buy an assault rifle. that would help if we would do something about that. in the world in which our enemy, unlike the soviet union during the cold war. soviet union was deterred. we had missiles, they had missiles. we decided not to kill each other. if your enemy is the people trying to kill you don't care if
they die and can't be deterred and take glory in the notion they might die, and if they have access to assault weapons, we are going to have more of the attacks we have seen lately. one of the things the president has tried to do is get the country to adjust to that, to understand that and say it is not the end of the world. we are doing everything we can to prevent it, but in this world that we live in today, that is going to happen. the cliche after 9/11 was never again. president bush used to say the terrorists only have to be right once. we have to be right 100% of the time. you can't be right 100% of the time. this stuff is going to happen. charlie: most are surprised there hasn't been an attack. they point out there have been a
number of times in which they were stopped. steven: i'm less surprise now that i'm looking at this and seeing everything this administration and the bush administration have done to fortify our defenses. they have done a good job. charlie: you talked to james comey. you talked to a range of people. the ultimate threat, terrorist organizations having weapons of mass destruction. steven: correct. lots of different weapons. if you're talking terrorism, you can have a weapon that doesn't destroy masses of people but scares masses of people. that is what the dirty bomb i wrote about is. it is a standard explosive you lace with enough radiological material, which you can get at any hospital in this city.
it's not well secured. you mix it with a standard explosive. when police show up after a bomb goes off, in the middle of midtown or the middle of washington, the radiation levels are going to show that there is contamination. what is your definition of lethal? what it would show, in washington, d.c., they did a test, unless you evacuated all of downtown washington from the library of congress to the smithsonian, one person for every 10,000 people would would die of cancer over the next five or 10 years. that sounds pretty awful.
that sounds terrible except that if you do the math, if you have half a million people living around washington, d.c., that adds up to 50 extra deaths. i could prevent those deaths if i went into an office building and got people to quit smoking. -- the essence of a dirty bomb is everybody gets scared and say this is as dangerous as a superfund site. we have to evacuate all of downtown washington. that would be the natural impulse. but the fact is, if you look at it rationally, we should not be that scared of it. one of the places i fault the
administrations, they have never had that discussion with the american people. if the first time you try to have that discussion -- the isn't as bad as it seems discussion -- is the afternoon after a dirty bomb goes off, that is not going to be very credible. if you do it beforehand and get experts out there explaining it, that takes the weapon away from the terrorists. you have an october surprise -- if you take it that the terrorists would like to have a trump presidency, the next logical step is they want to disrupt the election. the way to do that is to scare more and more people. that is what the pundits seem to say. you should be scared and vote
for me because secretary clinton is weak. obama is weak, and he has it terrorism. the moment i take office, isis is gone. charlie: did you see today, president obama is a founder of isis? steven: who could explain that? i can't wait to hear him asked about it. charlie: my assumption is we withdrew from iraq, isis grew out of what we used to be al qaeda, iraq. steven: that is true. if we had never gone in there in the first place, it would not have started. charlie: that would be his argument. a lot of things happen.
let me stay with two notions. why do you think they haven't been able to explode a dirty bomb? explain to me how difficult it is to do it. steven: it's not that hard. it takes more expertise than getting an assault weapon and shooting up a nightclub. that is the one thing in all the reporting i did, what is the thing that hasn't happened you you cannot understand why it has not happened, the dirty bomb was the first thing everybody brought up. the answer is, i do not know either, but i do not feel comfortable that the past is prologue here. charlie: they would make arguments about intelligence, more vigilant in terms of trying
to understand who it is. steven: but we are not vigilant when it comes to protecting radiological material. there are two agencies in the energy department in the obama administration. the nuclear regulatory commission regulates anyone who has any radiological material. they prescribed a security requirement. the other agency suggests counter proliferation methods for people with this material ought to use. their suggestions are 10 times as strong as the nrc regulations. they go around trying to persuade hospitals and logging companies, put locks on your doors, have alarms, but the nrc doesn't require any of it. charlie: why not? steven: because they are a captive of the industry. one agency saying you ought to do this and the agency that
could make them says, literally quoted in the article as saying we like to make suggestions, we don't like to be prescriptive. he's a regulatory authority. charlie: so we should be more safe and secure with respect to radioactive materials. we have not done that. let me go back to the central concern. therefore they are not as secure. people who wish us ill can get their hands on it. the other thing, is it easy to learn how to make a dirty bomb?
steven: it is really not complicated. i'm oversimplifying this a little bit but not much. you have an explosive. a standard explosive. you put this material in the same box. when it goes off, it will disperse. it is not hard. it is hard to make a nuclear weapon. has anyone used a dirty bomb anywhere? steven: it has been tried. i don't know what the result was. but there have been tests done, tabletop exercises where they have mapped out contamination. contamination, the headline would be we are living on the superfund site. the reality would be, there is more radiation out there but
it's not lethal to any significant number of people. charlie: the point you were making, the president was sensitive to this, this idea of not making this a war against islam. the president does this by not using the word war against islam. steven: correct. he does not even use the word radical extremist. charlie: he also has said to a range of people we have a mindset here that you can't go out and explain more people are killed in other areas than terrorism. you can't do that and political dialogue. steven: he addresses that the article. there's a different sense of fear about this kind of danger. i asked, why is there a
difference between someone who is mentally ill and goes to a gun store and buys an assault rifle and shoots up a school, that is one kind of tragic event. the people against gun control seem to accept that as a fact of life in the united states. if the same person gets an assault rifle and as he is shooting yells out something in arabic, it becomes this apocalyptic event. the president says it is irrational but true. charlie: he also said you have to worry about the marginal stupid people. they motivate you. they are smart people waking up every day trying to kill us. you have to worry about that. balancing those threats is the challenge today. steven: that comes back to my
answer to your first question. are we safer? you put those two things together, you get the answer -- we are not safer. as well as we have done, as much as we should credit all of those who are doing it, the kinds of threats have multiplied. on 9/11, we were not thinking about someone shooting up a community service center in san bernardino and claiming he was part of a terrorist group. charlie: some may or may not have had contact. steven: the person who shot president reagan was inspired by a movie. these people were inspired, they say, by terrorism.
at the end of the day, him it is hard to tell the difference. charlie: how long did it take you to write this? steven: i started just about a year ago, reading reports and testimony. charlie: you talked to the president. steven: i exchanged e-mails with the president. i talked to everybody. charlie: a whole range of people. charlie: a whole range of people. is there a consensus? steven: the consensus is twofold. there are certain things we haven't done enough to deal with and people are surprised we have not suffered from it. the dramatic consensus is the threats have multiplied because somebody acting alone who is inspired by online communication
or reading propaganda online, that is stuff you cannot prevent and potential to scare us multiplies because when you do it in a random place, like a community service center, nightclub, the intent or the result of that is to send the message nobody is safe, it can it in a random place, like a happen anywhere. ray kelly is quoted saying he thought san bernardino was the game changer because it was such a random place. it was not the statue of liberty or something. it was an any place. ♪
ashlee: the year was 2047, and this is all that was left. ♪ ashlee: the great space wars between the muscavarians and -- had depleted the earth of all its natural resources. the bitcoin virus and uber's robot chauffeurs had finished the job. the only sign that humans were here, were the ramshackled buildings and the windmills that kept spinning, and spinning with nothing to power. everybody had abandoned earth.