little on the ground force is that you have to create a myth about yourself. that's at the heart of terrorism is to great myth. create political power out of relatively small amounts of force. and so you do that with strategic communication. you do that with attacks that are going to get a lot of attention. he do that with attacks it will generate a lot of publicity. you do that by building a sense of coherence and cohesiveness within a range of organizations that are really running in all sorts of different directiondirection s. and i think that's one of the things that you see with the taliban is that you've got a lot of different organizations running all sorts of different directions. and why that's important is because understanding those networks and understand the internal tensions within, within these gives us tools for undermining them. i've heard it said in sort of,
been criticized at times for similar, we need to dig deeper and understand, i don't want to use the word emphasized that we need to really put ourselves in issues of so these are decisions to understand how they understand were. but the reason why we needed it is not so that we can understand why their able and how they're able to exploit drone strikes in order to recruit. it's so that we can understand how they operate so that we can undermine them. and understand what they are afraid of. so we can undermine them. the last thing that i'm going to say, and this is a model that is not just applicable in pakistan. he had close relationships rhetorically with mullah omar and mullah omar reporter intervened on his behalf, again in 2006 to keep them in a leadership position in south waziristan. so does look like a pretty close operational relationship at least as far as it goes.
for less than going to say just going forward is on the future of afghanistan, i could not agree more with what anand was thing about the money issue in afghanistan. i wrote a paper published here by new america called russian roulette, and i forget the subtitle, that runs through and as a comparison of the last days of the russian occupation in afghanistan in the late '80s with where we are today. frankly, i don't think from a sustainability of the afghan government standpoint we have done much better. and that's pretty depressing but i think that's the case. and we may have been worse. i think that a lot of ways you can make a strong argument that he was a more dynamic and creatively within hybrid car site. so the last thing though is where do we go going forward. and i think especially in the process. we had a strategy of very effective tactics, meaning the drone strikes. those aren't going to defeat the taliban and they're not going to
fundamentally defeat al qaeda, in my view. i think they will suppress the taliban and al qaeda. and i think it's possible that al qaeda, in particular, will sort of defeat itself, the last 10 yards or so. because they've lost a lot of the important people. and their ideology is fundamentally in conflict with himself. but it comes to the taliban i'm not as optimistic as anand because i am quite pessimistic about the afghan government. and i don't think that what we will see is the taliban in sort of brushing with -- i think civil war in afghanistan is a real possibility in the years after american withdrawal, particularly if, particularly if the money stops flowing the way that it did after the soviets
left. that's how the taliban got the in the first place. they didn't succeed on their own. they rose after the afghan government had been shattered by civil war. and i think the danger comes not in the first three or four years. the danger from the taliban for some reflection of it comes not in first three or four years after american withdrawal but in the next five. and if you can get through the first five years without civil war, maybe to make it. but i worry very much about that's not going to happen. so thank you. >> thank you, peter bergen and steve coll, new america for both the book and this presentation. as peter mentioned to you, i will talk about two things. one, the poll that my organization, terror free tomorrow conducted in the fog
off. and this will complement what hassan addressed. while much focus on the fatah deservedly has been on the militants there, as well as the united states drone strikes in the area, not as much attention has been paid to the actual people who live there, in their point of view. in our public opinion survey, while not starving and some of its conclusions, i think it's an insight into where future policy might head. here's some of the key findings, and their set forth in the book in detail. nearly nine out of every 10 residents in the fatah region opposed u.s. military operation. this is not a few that slightly held. in fact, passionately and intensely help but here's one measure of why. when only one in 10 people, flat
top, flat top, one and 10 full-time residents, in tribal areas think that suicide attacks are ever justified against pakistani military forces, almost six in 10 believe these attacks are justified against the united states military. much of the antipathy towards the united states stems from one cause and one cause really only. and that against cia director jon strikes on militants living in the area. more than three quarters of fatah residents oppose these strikes. however, this opposition to american military policy does not mean that the people of fatah embrace the taliban or al qaeda. in fact, it's quite the opposite. fewer than 10% of the people in the area supported the presence
of al qaeda and less than 20% supported the pakistani taliban. and here's a telling finding asked this question. it was peterburg as i decide to give them credit for. on previous polls we have conducted, not with new america in pakistan, he always suggested this question, and it's a brilliant one. we asked the people who they would pick for to vote in an election but we listed al qaeda and taliban. fewer than 1% of the people in fatah said they would vote for either one of these groups. so the support for these groups is quite, very, limited to a very small minority of people. instead of supporting the militants, interestingly enough, nearly seven out of 10 residents of fatah want the pakistani military, the pakistani military alone and without u.s. help, to come in and pursue the militants and take care of them in their
area. pretty stunning finding. so the popular support is that these militants draw from is limited largely to response of military action in the area. as bryant alluded to, it's a tactic. he this was a fascinating finding the the antagonism toward u.s. policy was not coming from any kind of general anti-american feeling. in fact, almost three course of the people in tribal areas said their opinion of the united states would improve most by a great deal if the united states provided humanitarian aid, and believed or not, this is a work in study, come to the united states. this is not some generally anti-we hate america, they're bad, they are good. it's very much related to the presence of drones and the military policy of the united states in the area. so while hating the drones above
them, the people of fatah would welcome the chance to have the ground of america leave. as i said, the poll details are set forth in the book. i'll just take another minute or two to outline what i found that which is kind of complement to avoid anand talked about, about the taliban and this is, in my book, based on my interviews with taliban leaders and foot soldiers. and the role of mullah omar. according to the taliban leaders and fighters i interviewed, the seminal event of securing and establishing mullah omar's authority, the undisputed leader of the taliban occurred apri april 1996 in kandahar, southern afghanistan. there, mullah omar war, took from a religious shrine, the holy relic of the cloak of the
prophet muhammad. simply by standing in the hold the cloaks present, then you'd have walked out speaking. the blind scene, but only when a true leader from god stands before. will the holy cloak. this is what a taliban leader told me. in fact, in the past 100 years the cloak only came out, if you will, if you were confined within a association association with that term, but anyway, closest i could translate, came out when the legendary teen wore it to save asked in a stand in -- the prophet cloak can be opened only when touched by a true leader of the faithful taliban, mullah omar has the right touch. so, so all open the chests for
him. as anand talked about after the initial american victory in afghanistan, mullah omar and his top leaders retreated to pakistan. i received what anand is true. they didn't fight and a lot of them try to get deals. i received a very different explanation for this, and you can take it for what it's worth. but it was recounted to me am mullah omar was tested by the taliban defeat. he was paralyzed with an action, and he was taking up shop in qatar. couldn't decide what to do. he couldn't decide whether to launch a holy war or not. reason, he was waiting patiently for a true dream from god to tell them what to do. that's what caused him to go to
kandahar to begin with, to wear the cloak of the prophet mohammed. he had a dream we are told. so only after a taliban deputy, leaders of taliban are sitting in addition, taliban deputy as recounted to me told of his dream comic and his dream was that he saw the beard of mullah omar turn a blinding white. so that it was made of the very thread of the prophet holy cloak. this is greeted with praise, and told to me this is why the taliban took up holy war against the united states. this reference for mullah omar, i found among all the taliban that they spoke to, i'm not sure about the political implications of it, but they saw mullah omar
as a spiritual, almost the divine presence that would guide us. there's this religious aura around. that concludes my remarks, within eight minutes. >> great, thank you. as mentioned, i'm tom lynch and i want to thank new america for having me here today. as already been mentioned by michael authors it is truly an honor to be included in this work, particularly because of the terrific piece in the distinguished chapters by the authors and that shivered from to become and several that are not here today, one of which i intend to allude to my comments as ago for. in that context i think the book is special at this time as has been alluded to because i think it is irrelevant and very important in terms of our understanding of this region, this afghanistan-pakistan region, now and going forward. so thanks again to peter bergen
for the inspiration for this working for the opportunity today. as i mentioned, i'm a research note of the national defense university so i must make the specific opening comment. the remarks i am about to make and written i chapter 14 of the book neither rep -- neither represent my old employer, department of defense but, in fact, represent my own research and conclusions. i think for the opportunity provided by national defense university for that academic freedom and for the freedoms published here in this book. in the text of the chapter inside entitled the 80% solution, the death of bin laden, al qaeda and the implications for south asia security, i make and work hard to justify several points regarding al qaeda as constructed by osama bin laden. my general strikes is in the following three areas. first, we so under estimate and underappreciated significance of
the death of osama bin laden to the essence of what al qaeda was. global al qaeda, al qaeda as a threat of an international and the static -- catastrophic niche. into a cogent mobley threatening movement and he was no less important in this and lenin was to making a marxist bolshevism globally relevant to the commons and the cooperation of the communist. so much like lynn was to global communism, bin laden was a unique visionary. the unique attitude problem posed by bin laden's al qaeda was its incredible effort to grasp itself on the top of the
movement. it's one progress of call option was brought together largely and in most significant ways in the region we're talking about here. talibanistan. so i think that's important as a marker as to why this is so important in the chapter i established and assess the five elements of bin laden's al qaeda that made it historically unique and conspicuously severe threats and then go on from there to argue that why the threat is received and what applications it has for us to better appreciate dynamics, the region dynamics that underlie the present and the future in south asia, particularly in afghanistan and pakistan. first i argue that the five elements of the bin laden's al qaeda that made it unique was it aspired to be a wa court order session dedicated to planning, recruiting and training and organizing of this is important work, catastrophic global terrorist incidents against
americans and other westerners, especially in western homeless. this was for a specific purpose. that purpose was to drive westerners out of muslim lands. second, al qaeda scored on a principle was to serve as a vanguard for organizing and coordinating already existing regionally focused and locally focused groups towards acts of violence against what they referred to him as the american scientists could save in muslim lands. again, for the purpose of driving westerners out of muslim lands. third, and although a lesson in, the goal of the tide as it comes to serve as an inspiration and a focal point for a disaffected lone wolf muslims worldwide to act on the frustrations through violence this also proceed aggression against islam in the islamic world or in the western world, again for the purpose of driving westerners out of muslim lands. the fourth and fifth is very
important i argue here in the many scholars who have argued about al qaeda score is, was to serve as a brainy. al qaeda represent the highest level of jihad theology. this is important, free from serious punishment, penalties or home. and here this was indeed the kind of mystical notion of al qaeda prior to the rate against bin laden and abbottabad that was the notion of npd. that bin laden and to lesser extent the solitary were immune from justice and they could hide out beyond the arm of contemporary international law. and fifth al qaeda would serve, this also import from the notion of talibanistan, serve as a base certain for the conquest of afghanistan, and included in that is their notion of western pakistan and the name of global jihad. this is important because of the mythical origins about where al qaeda come from and how it it it builds up in afghanistan itself.
i argue in the peace that these five essential elements of bin laden's al qaeda go through them were completely devastated by the rate and abbottabad and the passage of time has eroded by about 50% of the two. the notion of al qaeda as bringing that was free from retribution or have impunity from being attacked and captured, that was exploded literally in the manner in which and the finale of which that bin laden met his end. to most of us who followed jihadi websites, we saw in the traffic short after bin laden's death, sort of a period of two to three months that this notion of how could this happen was followed by the claim and desire to have revenge, a revenge that in many ways has never yet been served up there but the notion of al qaeda and its leader living within the impunity of link above and then the law, that came crashing down by where this raid and other groups, other regional groups exploited for their own benefit and for the own standing within this wider movement. the essential idea of al qaeda
as -- able to plan, recruit and to conduct successful terrorist operations overseas that have been already eroding over the previous five or six years really came down on the heads of the organization with the death of bin laden. indeed, we can show in our intelligence that -- was the point of many clocks since 2006. of the western government largely due to their own efforts in the conduct about that in question and answer in terms of understanding, identifying and it will monitor the movements of al qaeda were very successful in taking would be plots and decided getting them into a success applause. since the attack in the northern subway system in london, england, in 2005, there has not been a commensurate significant and substantive attack in western countries and yet there have been dozens of intercepts and disassembling of a terrorist attack to a talk about some of those here in the chapter. and talk about how that has led
to a delusion of the credibility of al qaeda as a global catastrophic moving. finally, there's this critical notion al qaeda is a base certain for congress in of kinston. that's a long stint in critical notion to the base. this too was dashed but i think it's important for the work and piece about south asia to understand this as a argument the chapter that the relationship between bin laden and mullah omar was really personal in terms of relationships between leaders. he has never sworn the same kind of bios and, therefore, the linkage to al qaeda matters far less to mullah omar and folks like haqqani these days than the vital strategic link they have to pakistan and of military
establishing. what i argue has occurred with the death of bin laden is that pakistan's national objectives don't align with al qaeda or nation. indeed, they don't align even with the pakistani talibans aspirations to eliminate the pakistan government itself. as a consequence islamabad has incentives to constrain the effect of the afghan taliban going forward in manners that do not represent the movement. so much argument in this piece is the loss of three critical elements and the erosion by 50% of the other two, due to the u.s. campaign and the pressure, change what a defining put into place 80% solution to the problem of al qaeda, bin laden's al qaeda. now, what does that leave us in south asia? it leaves us with an under appreciation of the need to rethink our strategy going forward in south asia.
almost a year ago i finished a piece and i argue in three areas for the wider region for afghanistan or for pakistan proper understanding of this schism between the taliban and aspirations and al qaeda, make it important for us to adjust the way in which we do moving forward with the quote in game in afghanistan which argued should be an interesting game. here's points i made. i will update you on where think things are adjusted or adapt. first, to point about the wider region. the war in afghanistan used to be reconsidered as it's always been viewed in afghanistan and pakistan the encircles. and that adds as a pakistani supported rebellion in afghanistan against the government is the islamic republic of afghanistan with significantly in new delhi in a run, knowing a slight references inflation -- representation. that point i don't think has yet
to resonate in the west and asserting that resonated yet several streets down in this government. i think there's a grudging and slowly evolving understanding but not yet one that puts us in of any policy friend of mine to adjust to address the subject -- subsequent point. with bin laden's death a critical mass of al qaeda score in western pakistan a laminated and cover was the essential dynamics in afghanistan are those with regional rather than international import. fundamentally the war in afghanistan is an indo-pakistani proxy war between nations that have fought each other in feuding was an indulgence or other martial conflicts since 1947. these are layered on top. and the poise for action between them is great and growing ever stronger as each day passes going for but i think to low u.s. and western can of this to the obligations for everything to u.s. diplomatic and military
presence to try to cleave together that which we have now armed and tried to put a better footing is important before it breaks apart and moves in separate directions. implications in afghanistan. and i will skip to of history i had had it is a time for caution to it's a critical notion is, led by the united states, the coalition in afghanistan months shepard reconciliation talks when the afghan government, the talibans to show how a more central system in afghanistan to meet both pakistan and taliban and swappers are the basic framework of an afghan public. and here i think there is some room for cautious optimism. it shows there's a recognition that the taliban, pakistani leaders and afghan leaders each of who will different
aspirations and ideations must come together and produce a more can federal structure that allows for more southern pashtun representation. not all of which is taliban, which is, that allows that inclusion in order for us to have a peaceful future. with respect to pakistan where think the implication our most reaches because pakistan as a country is the fulcrum of the issues that present themselves number four in pakistan. i think american policy must do better at resolving unilaterally attacking al qaeda's remaining corridor, or mid-level afghanistan taliban figures to their last breath in pakistan, specifically with drone strikes but i think we too much are using drone strikes in the western region of the accident i've called for us to hold them temporarily and restructure them. although my next point is that i think we are, in fact, starting to see a limited calibration of drone strikes are being used. not any manner i think it will
work explicit enough to dampen the unhappiness in pakistan which i think is very important but rather in a manner where for the first time since back in 2008-2009 i said committees the last five or six much with drone strikes starting to converge around the pakistani interests in inhibiting, and also american interests in dampening the international forces where i think he was in pakistan interests converge even though they don't converge on the elimination of people like haqqani and mullah omar. i point to the same event that brian talked about and, indeed, the subsequent ones which have to do with the death of commander in south waziristan on january 2. a long-standing tribal ally of us, relations between him and the pakistani state had soured despite the importance over the last year. indeed, in his ear undertook a november 20 of the alliance with
-- and that is detailed in one of the chapters in this book, the chapter, number five about pakistan taliban. and, therefore, puts pakistan in a position of actually and course of emily be willing to allow u.s. assistance in eliminating nazir from his role. indeed, subsequent to that several members of the other tried cashing other tribes, including the suicide attacks coordinated, a cousin of a guy named wally have been killed over the weekend. and my argument here is those types of killings would not be happening without more than pakistan quiescence at this point. so i think that's important. and so some cautious optimism for us to change relationship and moving an attraction to find mutual common cause will acknowledge that is not common cause. i think we need most important diplomatic and how pakistan works quietly within you to find
the necessary accommodation to inhibit the possibility of a reckless toxic or i could scarcely threaten calamity both in the region and of the global import. and i fear unfortunately, that there's too little movement in this area and is not in a focus on that in the region. as a consequence, progress and understand by the u.s. and the western in some of these areas after the 80% solution to the global catastrophic problem of terrorism from bin laden's al qaeda in the growing problem of the looming proxy war and civil war in afghanistan is evolving since my time of writing but not fast enough and not near enough. and i really worry and am concerned that we do very diligent work in the next weeks and months to craft a residual diplomatic and military component in afghanistan that is sufficient enough to show concern, strong enough to show bonding in an otherwise factious military, and strong enough to
provide presence in south asia which faces a very difficult security future that is quite independent of actors. thank you. .. there have been explanations offered. when it gets used a lot is a strategic utility of militants. another is outright duplicity and interest in maintaining a certain level of insurgency to restart from u.s., nato allies.
i think it's possible rationalist explanation that the coziness of a venture of having comprehensive strategy to tackle all of their hands -- militancy in those tribal areas and the rest of the country. it comes to money, manpower and material and i outweigh the costs over the last 10 years in the chapter. because of these cars since 2007 they shaped the anticipation of future costs and fears about future might hold should they go whole hog into fata in future operations. it's worth paying attention to it pakistan says the pakistan military state leaders say about the cost they weren't. we are tuned to this. it is striking when there's new
reports say they have lost about two brigades of manpower from their military and the operational equivalent of two divisions, which is dramatic. this is based on estimations of the retreating costs, time, material costs. but that was pretty significant. for a military that has a hostel at eastern border, this is not a significant cost or send a talked about a lot in terms of assessing what pakistan can afford to do a caustic and there. another cost unnoticed is the level of violence that sort of hate in urban and poor centers in pakistan, particularly the seizure operation. the numbers are staggering. it's akin to data and the amount
of times in these urban areas, but also punjab and islamabad. you know, the number of tax increases two to three times. but the amount of casualties goes 20 to 25 times within a short period of time. pakistani military come the states they these attacks are likely to come again in the future should they take on certain other operations like north waziristan and haqqani network. this is a profound concern was to be repeatedly right after admiral mullen statements in 2011 about the pakistani government not doing much about the haqqani network. the explanation that can be taken with a grain of salt, but nevertheless should be padded out. if they describe the hornets
last, they would be in alliances chapati networks and bring the same level of violent the pakistanis experienced in 2007 at 2009, which crashed pakistani public and military and returned again and that was something in it. tennessee great degree of calibration as to what you have to absorb or bair that motivates the limited strategy to utilize. another question comes up with selectivity that they distinguished a taliban verse that telegram. it's not just about the target or the insurgent group, the territory being contested. refer to the distinction between settled versus unsettled areas is something that resonates in terms of how pakistan calibrates strategy. unsettled areas are expected to be frontiers, law lists.
there's a degree to which militancy or armed militias or the lack of state control to use the term is acceptable. we have a hard time grasping because our concept that they vary in state to the total doesn't exist in most parts of the world. it doesn't exist in india, which is a democratic outlay incapable of stronger states. dispensing with that idea will help to understand what pakistan state to state, with a much more comprehensive strategy to concern about civilian casualties in south waziristan which have been far more limited in scope and strategy. it are a thing we need to bear in mind is the public constraints, even though we think of it as either the mature
area, there's still an authoritarian effort or democratic one. in terms of utilizing force against your own people, it is that we don't want to think about because we authorize to be deployed elsewhere in the only cost to the american public is a counterinsurgency operations are fiscal costs. the loss of our troops and loved ones. and pakistan it's not just a strategic cost. it's also force against your own people, but they said this insurgent the end of passion community, which is nothing insignificant. pakistani is a key stakeholder in the military and so as those military theaters theaters as well.
[inaudible] [applause] >> we have not a huge amount of time for questions. if you have a question, it's really a question or statement. wait for the microphone and it's directed to a certain person, say so and back here. >> hi, thanks so much for being here. christine vargas, recent graduate -- [inaudible] my christian is no spur to ryan. it has to do is start calm. what can we do effectively these days to interrupt certain messages of our own works >> not a whole lot.
i think it's really important when we talk about strategically engaging to recognize often times you get this dynamic where we think about operations and then strategic communications and that's clearly wrong. actions speak author than words. the matter what people are assigned to archer illustrates and i'm not convinced the trust strikes are important i sometimes people think they are. but the most important thing we can do is to eliminate any sense there's a gap between our actions and works, even if our actions are unpopular. we just need to explain what we're doing from the state clearly what were doing it. peter bergen wrote an op-ed a long time ago saying we should acknowledge strong strikes.
at the time is that he was crazy, but he came to agree with him. and this is the point. we have a story to tell that it's not going to be popular lot at the time, but we need to explain that very clearly. militant groups try to create men and had what that means is the counter those minutes when we tell the truth. fundamentally we tell it clearly, we are countering domestic terrorist organizations and insurgents try to create to enhance their own power. when we objectively state the truth, that is a strategic communication policy. at the end of the day, certainly entitled have very little to offer from a company standpoint. and so what we want people to be
doing is assessing the effectiveness organization on their own merits and don't want to get in the way that process. not to set ourselves aside and keep on the terrorists, on the militants to establish their own credibility doing now. >> in front of you, jennifer. >> thank you very much. [inaudible] my question is to pakistan military and new strategic counterinsurgency plan. can you speak more about what it means for a transition or rather its policy of appeasement of operations against the taliban? >> i think this new statute doctrine being taught about an issue for the pakistan army has
given a statement, three different statements. he talks about a doctrine, but what is believed is that pakistan and pakistani military and intelligence is actively supporting u.s. institutions at the telegram to afghanistan, invited some of the leaders they are commonly taliban leaders who were in custody, but 15 taliban leaders were handed over to some rumors arranged when he refused to go back and was quite aggressive. the point i'm making is the whole effort or not unless
something contrary to the pakistani strategic thinking that telegram and the pakistani version of this militant groups i would argue is a bit late in the game. i wish this weren't happening in 2007 or eight. it's much more complicated. i make to believe that this is an honest effort. we have seen many either relative differences. the median increase between united states and pakistan at a senior level. so this is a façade for this is another well coordinated part of policy and would not have seen as many statements.
from the previous developments we've seen is again there is any which will involve any of the militants will be problematic. i think it is a flawed belief if we think a negotiated settlement would make it easier for pakistan for militants in pakistan. the reason disempowered telegram, governor of kandahar or taliban in the coalition in afghanistan. that is inspired militants. so by negotiations and tell a band it would automatically make it easier for pakistani intelligence to do with the pakistani side of telegram. that fact will remain there. military action and from policy has not delivered evidence. military option has absolutely
failed to be the taliban in pakistan to do with taliban on the afghanistan say. i hope this military strategic change is also parallel to that. it is a space taken over. that military cannot do anything about it. the religious discourse and more education can do that. so we been at the pakistani military can only have a limited impact. i would like to see a much broader effort to do with these decisions. thank you. >> three questions here, punch them together because they're pretty much out of time. we make the answer short and the question sure. thank you. i do not
>> i thank you for the presentations. i have two questions. one of the main arguments is two days ago good situation or environment for pursuing negotiation of describing 2004. i want to know in light of all the things we know of what the government has received about the taliban and the americans, why does it say that americans taliban ace would find this two days good times in early 2000 when i mentioned iran. could you please elaborate more? the other is in passing i heard
something about him yet and iran. they have any role is to discuss. thank you very much. >> katie from the department of state. mr. abbas, you linked the reference, the growth of ttp to the lack of support received two bodies. i went to see if you would kindly clarify for domestic political will and pride i should put that to be provided to? >> u.s. commission on international religious freedom for professor abbas and professor gopal. the role of privilege and in the
pakistani offer religious terms. does that play with the populations of taliban assigned? says something that brings people closer to them or is that political verbiage in a different dressing quick >> we have the answers after 30 seconds, please. sorry because we've been too rapid a. >> the reason there is not investment in pakistan is because of sheer incompetence. it is of course that leads to lack of political will. i also criticize the reason being, this time talking about the 2001, 2008 with the u.s. started doing out by looking at this also is an important institution. so why from 2001 to 2008 on the circuit these organizations the u.s. top about counterterrorism westerlund horseman issue?
>> point. >> there's elements of the taliban who believe this is the right time to negotiate because they don't think that the taliban will be reconstituted. there are others who disagree with that. and they think they want when. >> to the search work at least on that level -- with no chance of military success? >> you come the surge didn't reverse or any other act to to win, whatever that may mean. but i think that informs this position i think. the robe of the religion and taliban, sort of the ideological battles that play out in the countryside are very much in
terms of religion peers at the taliban are booted in the countryside as mullahs and people who have a religious discourse and this is idea in government and other actors try to compete with the taliban on that background. >> a question about india. i'd refer you to a chapter in the book. india has a critical role to play and that's because the narrative of what afghanistan is has played in a south asian lyric is that afghanistan is in play between india and pakistan and that the individual tribes in the country of pakistan online in one way or the other, rightly or wrongly with either indian and choicer pakistani entries. pakistan's apparatus not wishing to see either to perpetuate
mysia from afghanistan against its ethnic minorities within the country or to gain decisive anti-geostrategic really really mistrusts fundamentally what i see is presently in kabul at the new delhi blaming government and that america and western offers have been either intentionally or more likely inadvertently because those naïveté and given a leg up in the country and one that cannot be tolerated for the long-term. >> i would argue that iran matters in the country, but nowhere near as much to the continuation of violence as the pakistan india dynamic iran will play. if you've been to western afghanistan is pretty heavily invested as the community in afghanistan. it's nowhere near as significant and two to the level is the
interplay between india and pakistan interests in the tribal relations. >> any final observations? thank you are much, everybody. thank you to our panelists. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> one of the key themes of coors on the twin issues. between the two of them come and they make issues around emancipation and abolition, issues around human rights on a general don of a specific level.
i will go through every piece of information that johnson puts in this picture, but i'll summarize by saying if you pay attention to the telepath as well as the bottom half, what you will get his white cat sleeping in a better window and out the other is to blacks and women holding a light skinned child. there's a ladder from the bedroom window to the bedroom late at the big house and they both come out the other bedroom and is i said this and out without being seen. there's a rooster appear in the 19th century there were six roosters have a habit in the finding a purge of calling into the hands to spend the night with them. the hand is on top of the slave quarters. if you start adding up all of the ins and outs of look down here at the white girl entering the backyard, with the woman checking to see the coast is clear. she's been mistress with of the master's daughter or something.
nobody is paying attention to her. nobody is like look who's here. is she a product of one of those liaisons? >> by jean c. associate director communications natural resource defense council is the author of a new book, reckless, political assault. tell me a little bit about your book. >> in the last two years we've seen the single worst legislation the colts on trent assault to depend on to protect our air, waters, lame. we have seen more than 300 in the house of representatives than to water down, undermine, delay or block altogether needed protections. this is gone after the clean water act, the clean air act, the endangered species act.
a comet pieces like the chesapeake right, gulf of mexico, great lakes and endangers the future of our children. we fellate the american people needed to know about this and here's why. the american people did not ask for this assault, but somebody is. the corporate polluters who spent hundreds of millions of dollars every year of anybody who will take an agenda on capitol hill. we fellate the story needed to be told because the american people care about their future. why have often made progress on climate change? why have i made safeguarding our people, ranches, farms, why are we doing some things about these threats to our future? an important money, the republicans have let this assault, but this is not the republican party historically and they make that point in the book. going back to tenebrous about,
coming up to richard nixon who created the environmental protection agency. ronald reagan got the lead out of her ghastly or george h. debbie bush even after acid rain. republicans have a history of responsible stewardship of the environment. the hard right turn to the party from its own path and conservative panic you remake that that in the book. >> you talk about the 20 tens house of representatives and focus on republicans. you also look at democrats in regards to anti-legislation? >> a handful tended to be from fossil fuel states that are reliant on the shows of the past. upper trying to say is we need to continue to invest in the country in renewable fuels and efficient he is solar and wind and we make that case while we continue to makewar on this country, oil and gas needs to be
moving towards cleaner, safer, more sustainable fuel. not overnight, but over time. >> as president obama does enough in terms of environmental regulation? >> president obama has worked hard to make progress, but there's a lot more to be done. president obama worked hard with the automakers to double the fuel efficiency of our cars by 2025. that is going to save consumers $100 a year at the pump. that's good progress. in opportunity he has for a second term is to go ahead and reduce the carbon from our source which is coal-fired power plant. we need to reduce its carbon emissions and epa's position to issue standards that can make a lot of progress in that. >> you read about 2010 house of representatives in 20 told his any different. what do you think? >> is fundamentally unchanged
election. we have democrats and republicans will reach across sail to find common ground around ways to go to climate change. which is finish the hottest summer on record in this country. 60% of our pastureland, ranchers liquidating cattle herds from the rocky mountains to the ohio river valley. we hope people of goodwill, leaders from both hearties that reach across the aisles that have got to do something about climate change. we've got to do something to make fracturing safe and would try to continue to make progress on the issues that affect the health of our children. >> talking with bob deans, associate director communications and author of the new book, "reckless." thank you so much. >> my cartoons depict native humor and they were native
characters and situation in my audience was geared towards peace. but in the last four or five years they've become more universal with a spilled out into the mainstream so it's more universal now. an inspired by the people that i grew up with. my friends, my family, members of my tribe, just basically watching people and some of the things they do. surprising if you pay attention to what people do with what people say. there's a lot of humor you can find it not. making the road twists and certain things. >> folks who have read my cartoons for the first time for the native culture in a native way of life.
so it's not always depicted correctly in cinema or in books, but this cartoon is coming from a genuine native american and these are my views. even though they may not agree some of the cartoons are some of my views, i hope they can appreciate it because it's coming from a real person that has grown up on the reservation and have seen the dominant culture and that with the dominant culture, so some of the stuff i learned from my at the back in my cartoons. >> up next,