tv Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN October 2, 2013 8:00pm-10:43pm EDT
[inaudible] >> we are looking at even with the government shutdown are the budgets close to each other? the immigration reform which has no deadline and it's not like -- [inaudible] >> let me just say that this is an issue that has strong support of the american public. that is what we think it can move forward. we think that there are 435 members in the house and 100 members of the senate who read read -- represent the american people and represent their interest and desires and their visions and this bill we think enjoys overwhelming support among the american public and that is why we think it has a probability of moving forward. the speaker himself has said he
wants to do something with immigration. i know he said he doesn't the senate bill or anything like the senate bill on the floor but he has his committee who has reported off some bills. we may not like those bills that but we think when the senate has 68 members of the senate which has otherwise been deeply divided on by partisan lines over two-thirds of the united states senate representing the american public says we need a conference of immigration bill with a path to citizenship. we believe that's a strong indication that the american people want this done and we hope the house acts. >> we know the votes are there so there's no reason why we shouldn't get this done. if everyone keeps talking and paying attention to the american people -- >> let me also say this is not a challenge to the speaker. this is a suggestion and that is why one of the criterion that we established was that it be
bipartisan. everything passed out of the committee of jurisdiction passed in a bipartisan way in the senate. this is by no means a challenge. the speaker says he will bring something before. we would like it to have these characters of comprehensive immigration reform which secures our borders protects our workers , has a path to citizenship among the principles which have been the principles of the house democratic caucus but which are shared. let me tip my hat to president george w. bush. nobody was better on this issue than he was. he understood it as the former governor of texas and he knew the issues. he believed in the value of everyone in our country. unfortunately some in his party did not all of his lead the think with the results of the last election and the reaction taken by the senate that we can work cooperatively to do this. not in a challenging way but in
a proposal. >> one last question. [inaudible] >> there has been a lot of speculation and talk that it would be some sort of conversation. a. [inaudible] >> the this is about a path to citizenship. whatever passes in the house and goes to the table -- the conference table we would hope would have comprehensive immigration reform in it. doesn't mean we wouldn't vote for a bill that doesn't but it does mean when we leave the table of will have comprehensive immigration reform that leads to a path to citizenship. that's really important to america. >> thank you all very much.
there appears to be no progress toward ending the government shutdown after president obama met with congressional leaders at the white house this evening. the meeting lasted a little more than an hour. house house speaker john boehner emerged from the meeting and said president obama reiterated one more time tonight that he will not negotiate. democratic leader nancy pelosi said mr. weiner and the gop keep moving the goalposts and won't take yes for an answer. our live coverage of the government shutdown continues tonight with the latest news briefings from the day and your calls and tweets. that is going to be on c-span tonight after the house goes out.
and including 9/11 and when asked what was the scariest moment i think people are always expecting me to say 9/11 and in reality for me it wasn't. the scariest moments and there were more than one, came in september and october of 2008 when it genuinely appeared and probably was true that the global financial system was on the verge of a collapse comparable to or worse than what was experienced during the great depression. >> the director of national intelligence james clapper today called the government shutdown insidious. he and nsa director general keith alexander told members of the senate judiciary committee
that 70% of the intelligence community is furloughed and they are bringing staff back on a day-to-day basis based on threats to national security. this portion of the hearing is two and a half hours. >> good morning everybody. it is a strange time in the congress. i would also note before we start that we will not allow any demonstrations. it's a meeting of the senate. i know some demonstrators like to get themselves on television. i don't care whether you are in agreement or disagreement with positions of mine. i do not want people blocking others who are here and as much as they love being on tv and holding up signs i don't want them blocking the people who are
here to watch this hearing. this is the united states senate people have the ability to watch the hearing. no one knows for sure how long the federal government will be shut down but i feel strongly the senate judiciary committee has to continue its work on this important subject because it does involve the security of the united states. i consulted with senator grassley about this. i appreciate director of clapper and general alexander proceeded to the hearing today as scheduled. ramps certainly -- are doing their jobs despite the need to with shutdown of the federal government. that said i have decided to
discuss with senator grassley the postponement of the weekly business committee meeting tomorrow in light of the government shutdown even though we have judicial emergencies. i am hoping that those of us who like isobar on the appropriations committee will be able to get back to passing bills and are concerned that we are now in a sober. by law by the end of last month the house of representatives this was supposed to send appropriations bill so we could vote up or down. they have peaked yet to send over a single one. maybe instead of looking for slogans we ought to pass these appropriations bills are voted against them whichever way we can get it done and let people get back to work. i am also going to ask --
discuss with general alexander and direct your clapper at the end of their statement they take an extra minute and tell us because this will be in the interest of many of us on this committee who are on the appropriations what a shutdown of its meaning and the number of people who were not able to come to work and do the jobs we expect them to do in our intelligence agencies. as we continue -- because we continue to re-examine the intelligence committees use of authorities let's be clear that no one underestimates the threats our country continues to face or the difficulties in identifying many of those threats. we all agreed that we should've put the intelligence community with the best inappropriate tools to help keep
us safe. but there is always a but, there has to be limits on the surveillance powers we give to the government. just because something is
quote quote quote
technologically possible and just because something may be deemed technically
legal does not mean it is the right thing to do. this summer many americans learned for the first time section 215 of the u.s. patriot act that for years has been secretly interpreted to authorize the interpretation of americans phone numbers on an unprecedented scale. the american public learned more about the government's collection of internet content data through the use of section 702 of fisa. since the committees last hearing on these revelations in late july we have learned a great deal more. we have learned the nsa has committed -- implementation of section 215 and section 7702 of fisa. in this way without a warrant collected content of tens of thousands of --
americans. nsa violated a fisa order under 215 records
database without meeting the standards imposed by the court. these repeated violations led to several reprimands by the fisa court for what the fisa court called a systemic noncompliance by the government. a series of substantial misrepresentations to the court. now we have seen no evidence of intention by the fisa authorities but the pattern is deeply troubling. we have also learned that the nsa in 2011 start searching for america's communications in section 702 database to database containing the contents of indications acquired without individualized court orders. in this past week and all of you have seen the sun --
front page story in "the new york times" reported that the nsa is engaging in sophisticated knossos of both domestic and international metadata to determine the social connections of americans. when you have all of these revelations it's no surprise the intelligence community faces a trust deficit and after years of raising concerns about the scope of fisa authorities as i have and others have the need for stronger oversight. i'm glad many members of congress of both parties are now interested in taking a close look at these programs in the legal justifications in the efficacy of existing oversight regimes. i think it's time for a change. i think additional transparency and oversight are an important part to that change. i believe we have to do more. so i'm working on a conference of legislative solution with congressman sensenbrenner the
chairman of the crime and terrorism subcommittee the house as well as other members of congress across the full political spectrum of both parties in a bipartisan bicameral legislation that addresses section 215 and 702 and arranges surveillance authorities raising some of the concerns. her legislation would end section 215 involving collection it would also ensure the fisa statute and the national security letters could not be used to authorize collection. the government has not made its case
in bulk collection of domestic phone records is an effective counterterrorism tool especially in light of the intrusion on american privacy. in addition i find the legal justification for this bulk -- to be be strained of it. i looked at the classified list of cases involving section 215
and i found to be unconvincing. the deputy director of the nsa himself acknowledge that at our last hearing a couple of weeks ago that there is no evidence section 215 phone records collection have -- several terrorist plots. in addition to stopping bulk collection improve judicial review for a think this is extremely important. by the fisa court. it would require inspector general reviews the implementation of these authorities and senator grassley and i and eight other members of this committee requested last week for the intelligence community. it's common sense. it's a bipartisan bill. i look forward to working on this effort with those in the senate and the house and others who care about this and i do appreciate the dash of director general alexandealexande r made
in recent months to brief members of congress. i have been hashing out many of those briefings and the move towards more transparency and declassification of documents. the welcome the participation of the legal and technical experts on our second panel and
note with particular pride in my alma mater georgetown for his representative among those witnesses. i hope this will inform a legislative efforts. we all agree we have to ensure our nation's security. we also have to restore the trust of the american people in our intelligence community. fundamentally we have to protect the liberties that have kept us great in a diversified mocker saint and the envy of countries around the world because of our democracy. senator grassley do you want to say something?
>> yeah thank you and thanks to our witnesses for what they do for the security of our country and to you mr. chairman for holding the hearing. it's a very important oversight hearing, an important function of congress to make sure that our laws are faithfully executed although government has been partially shut down due to partisan differences over various agencies we are continuing our oversight work, as i said a very important matter and in this particular instance because national security is the first responsibility of our federal government. we last held a hearing on the subject in late july. at that time i expressed the view of the reports in the media that called into serious question whether the law and other regulations currently in place strike the right balance between protecting our civil liberties and our national security. this is especially so concerning to the public revelation under
section 215 of the patriot act the government is collecting americans phone records and public disclosures since her last hearing have underscored that concern. indeed since that time the administration's declassified opinions reflecting significant errors by the government before the fisa court and implementing 215 and 702. the good news is that these appear to have been for the most part unintentional mistakes that
government brought to the court's attention on its own accord. of course the bad news is that even with all the checks and balances else into the system these kinds of errors can still recurve. even more unsettling or other airports since july that suggested that there have been cases of intentional willful misuse of intelligence authorities by nsa employees to spy on their spouses and
neighbors. these disclosures have created a broader crisis of trust in the legitimacy of our intelligence gathering methods generally. in my view have these programs and more transparent from the start the trust deficit that the american people have wouldn't be as severe as it is now. this brings me to the response which has been very baffling to me. the president held a news conference in early august a news conference that should have been held and thankfully he did in which he defended the whole collection of phone records as quote an important tool in our effort to disrupt terrorist plots end of quote and suggested some areas for reform. since then as far as i know he hasn't said a word in public about these issues. if the president really and truly believes in the importance of these programs pay should be
publicly defending them as part of our national debate. you shouldn't be contracting out jobs to the intelligence community. simply put as in so many other areas the president's failing to lead where he wants others to follow. in any event i'm pleased to have taken a number of steps to follow up on some of these disturbing reports since july. a bipartisan group of members of this committee requested that the inspector general on the intelligence community conduct a thorough review of the implementation of these authorities. initially the nsa inspector general received a public accounting of a
handful of documented instances where the nsa employees abused their authorities. it was heartening to see how few cases of intentional misconduct exists but on the other hand it's alarming to know the possibility of employees engaging in such behavior turns out to be very real. the nsa inspectors general's
response to my letter reflected that many of these cases were referred to the department of justice for possible criminal prosecution.
i was planning on following up with how these referrals were handled. the deputy attorney general at this hearing -- the chairman chose not to invite the administration to provide legal perspective on these matters and therefore i will be following up with the department of justice about these cases with a letter to the attorney general today. the balance between protecting individual liberties and our national security is a delicate one. reasonable people can disagree about precisely where that balance is best struck. i probably don't agree 100% with any member of the two panels of witnesses that we have with us today including professor
cordero who was half invited to share her valuable perspective as a lawyer with hands-on experience in the intelligence community. i welcome them all and i'm pleased to hear their views as we consider various reforms to fisa and related surveillance activities. something has come to my attention just yesterday, press reports of 70% of the intelligence community being furloughed. i'm concerned that if lawyers in the intelligence community determined that 70% of their employees are nonessential to the national security mission the number one responsibility of the federal government, could than the intelligence community needs better lawyers to make big changes to the workforce or are you over employed in those
areas? i can't believe that 70% of the intelligence community is being furloughed and we are still being able to meet our national security responsibilities. so that concerns me very much and maybe you folks will touch on that. thank you mr. chairman. >> of course as you know we have the deputy attorney general at our last hearing and we have the deputy attorney general after a closed-door hearing on this. we are limited in time. we kept to these two witnesses. >> you do not want me to send my letter to the attorney. >> feel free to send it that we have had twice on the same subject and i'm sure we will have it again. senator do you want to make a short --
>> thank you mr. chairman. i appreciate the chairman of the ranking member on me to speak briefly as i have to leave for another could committee responsibly. congress plays an important role when it comes to overseeing our nations intelligence and surveillance programs. we have to balance various competing interests and is difficult. i wanted to highlight a couple of concerns i'm looking out for. number one is the breath of metadata collection of% to 215 of the patriot act and number two the potential for backdoor searches of information on americans that is collected somewhat argue indirectly pursuant to section 702 of the fisa amendment act and the lack of transparency within the fisa court system. i've worked with with the chairman and pass some legislation to address each of these and look forward to working with him in the future on these concerns. thank you very much. >> thank you very much. our first witness is incidentally the most senior
member on our side, at the chair of the senate intelligence community which helps us a great deal on this deliberation and will also be joined later by senator durbin who is the chair of the defense appropriations and handles much of the budget for this. our first witness james clapper is the fourth director of national intelligence since august 9, 2010. he served for 32 years in the united states armed forces. he retired in 1995 as lieutenant general in the air force. he previously served undersecretary of defense for intelligence and the defense intelligence agency. direct there it's good to have you here. please go ahead. see chairman leahy ranking member grassley and distinguish members of the committee sir, i
would like to answer your question about the impacts of the government shutdown and the furloughing of our civilians. first the legal standard against which would make decisions about who is furloughed and who isn't and this is quoting from the love. that which is necessary to protect against imminent threat to life or property. our applying that standard is what resulted across-the-board in furloughing roughly 70%. i think that will change as -- if this drags on and we will make adjustments depending on what we see as the potential imminent threats to life or property to quote the law. i will tell you if the impacts. i've been in the intelligence business for 50 years and i have never seen anything like this. from my view i think this on top
of the sequestration cuts that we are already taking that this seriously damages our ability to protect the safety and security of this nation and its citizens. i would commend to you senator feinstein's statement yesterday on the floor outlining her concerns with which i completely agree. this affects their ability -- this is not just about weight issue. this affects our global capabilities to support the military, to support diplomacy and to support our policymakers. the danger here of course that this will accumulate over time. the damage will be insidious. each day that goes by the jeopardy increases. this is a dreamland for foreign intelligence service to recruit particularly employees many of whom are subject to furloughs driven by sequestration.
they are going to have a delete even greater financial challenges so we are spending our time setting up counseling services for our employees to help them manage their finances. from my standpoint this is extremely damaging and it will increase so so is this shutdown drags on. do you want to add anything to that? go ahead. >> from our perspective -- >> press the red button. >> i'm technically challenged mr. chairman. from nsa's perspective this has impacted us very hard. we have an amazing workforce. when i look at what our folks are capable of doing we have over 960 ph.d.s, over 4000 computer scientists, over 1000 mathematicians. they are furloughed. our nation needs people like this and the way we treat them is to tell them you need to go home because we can afford to pay you.
we can't make a deal here. from my perspective the impact impact -- what director clapper points out as we went to the most specific threats against our nation. this doesn't apply to all the threats against our nation. we can't cover all all of those so what we are doing is we are taking the most significant counterterrorism and the other threats we see in the support to our military forces in afghanistan in overseas. that is the priority we are doing in the way the law has been interpreted. that is what we are doing and from my perspective it's had a huge impact on morale. >> cert if you would like we will go into the subject of the hearing. we do appreciate you having us today to talk about the way ahead occasioned by the dramatic revelations about intelligence collections programs since their unauthorized disclosure and about the steps we are taking to
make these programs more transparent while still protecting our national security interest. we are joined by the director of national security agency general keith alexander and following my brief statement he will have an additional statement. we think this hearing is a key part of the discussion our nation needs about legislation that provides the intelligence committee with authorities both to collect foreign intelligence and to protect the privacy of the civil liberties. we, all of us in the intelligence community are very much aware of the recent unauthorized disclosures have raised serious concerns both here in congress and across the nation about our intelligence activities. we know the public wants both to understand how it's intelligence community uses its rules and authorities and to judge whether we can be trusted to use them appropriately. we believe we have been lawful under the rigorous oversight we have operated under has been
affected so we welcome this opportunity to make our case to the public. as we engage in this discussion i think it's also important that our citizens know that the unauthorized disclosure of the details of these programs has been extremely damaging. from my vantage these disclosures are threatening to our ability to conduct intelligence to keep our country safe. there is no way to erase or make up for the damage that we know has been
done and we anticipate even more as we continue our assessment is more revelations ocher. before these unauthorized disclosures we were always conservative about discussing the specifics of our collection programs based on the truism that the more adversaries know about what we are doing the more they can avoid our surveillance. the disclosures for better or for worse have lowered the threshold for discussing these matters in public so to the degree we can discuss them we will.
erosion of trust in the intelligence community. we do understand the concerns on the part of the public. i am a vietnam veteran and i remember his congressional investigations of the 1970s disclose i was in the intelligence community then. some intelligence programs are carried out for domestic legal purposes without proper legal oversight or authorization. having lived through that as a part of the intelligence community i can assure they make in people the intelligence community today is like that. we operate within a robust oversight involving all three branches of government. another useful historical perspective is that during the cold where the free world and the soviet blockade mutually exclusive telecommunications systems which made foreign collection a lot easier to distinguish. now world telecommunications are unified and intertwined with hundreds of millions of innocent people conducting billions of
innocent transactions or smaller adversaries trying to do harm on the very same network using the same technologies. our challenge is to distinguish very precisely between these two groups of communicants. we had an alarm bell bell that went off on one tiers communicate with another terrorist and their jobs at the zoo but that capability doesn't exist in the world of technology today. over the past three months are documents related to section 215 hundred 15 and 700 to the foreign intelligence surveillance act or fisa. we did that to facilitate informed public debate about important intelligence collection programs that operate under these authorities. we felt in light of the unauthorized disclosures the public interest in these documents far outweighed the potential additional damage to national security. these documents let our citizens see the seriousness thoroughness
and rigor which with the fisa court exercises his responsibilities. they also reflect the intelligence communities particularly particularly in sa's commitment to reporting and correcting any compliance matters that occur. even in these documents we had to reject certain information to protect sensitive sources and methods such as particular targets of surveillance. we'll continue to declassify more. that is what the american people want. that is what the president has asked us to do and i personally believe it's the only way we can reassure our citizens that their intelligence community is using its tools and authorities properly and legitimately. the rules and oversight that govern us ensure we do with the american people want us to do which is to protect their nation security and our people's liberties. i will repeat that do not spy on anyone except for valid intelligence purposes and they only work within the law.
on occasion we have make mistakes some quite significant. these are usually caused by human error or technical problems. whenever we found such mistakes we have for ported them a dress them in crack to them. national security agency specifically as part of the intelligence community broadly as an honorable institution. the men and and women through to the sensitive work are honorable people dedicated to conducting their mission lawfully and are appalled by any wrongdoing. wrongdoing. the too are citizens of this this nation if you're just as much about privacy and constitutional rights as the rest of us. they should be commended for the crucial and important work in protecting the people of this country which has been made all the more difficult by this part of damaging disclosures. that all said we in the intelligence committee stand ready to work in partnership with you to adjust to foreign surveillance authorities to further protect your privacy and civil liberties. i think there are some principles we agree on. one, we must always protect our
sources that methods targets partners and liaison relationships. secondly we must do a better job of helping the american people understand what we do why we do it and most importantly the rigorous oversight that helps ensure that we do it correctly. and three we must take every opportunity to demonstrate our commitment to respect the civil liberties and privacy of the american people but we have to remain mindful of potentially negative long-term impact of over crafting the authorizations granted to the intelligence community. as americans we face an unending array of threats to our way of life and a more diverse array of threats than i have seen in my 50 years of intelligence and i believe we need to sustain our ability to detect these threats. we welcome a balanced discussion about national security and civil liberties. it's not an either/or situation. we need to continue to protect both. let me turn now to general alexander.
>> the director of the national security agency and the u.s. cybercommand who has testified before us in open and closed sessions of this committee and of course continuously in the intelligence community. general, go ahead is featuring leahy ranking member grassley to sing which members of the committee thank you for the opportunity to provide opening remarks. i'm privileged today to represent the dedicated professionals at the national security agency who employ the authorities provided by congress the federal courts and the executive branch to help protect the nation and protect our civil liberties and privacy. if we are to have an honest debate about how in sa sa conducts its business we need to step away from sensationalized headlines and focus on the facts. our mission is to defend the nation and to protect our civil liberties privacy. ben wittes from the brookings
institute said about the media release and specifically about these fisa programs shameful as it is that these documents were leaked they actually should give the public great confidence in both nsa's internal oversight mechanisms and the executive branch and judicial oversight mechanisms outside the agency. they show no evidence of any intentional spying on americans or abuse of civil liberties. they show a low rate of the errors and a complex system of technical election will inevitably yield. they show robust complaints or seizures on the part of nsa and they they show an earnest ongoing dialogue with the fisa court over the parameters of the legal authorities and commitment both to keeping the court informed of activities and to comply with the judgments on their legality. today i would like to discuss the facts that specifically address who we are in terms of both our mission and our people. what we do, adapt to technology
and the threat to take direction from political leadership operate strictly within the while consistent with explicit intelligence priorities and ensure compliance with all constraints posed by our authorities and internal procedures. but we have accomplished specifically for our country with the tools we have been authorized and where do we go from here? first who we are. our mission. and this is a foreign intelligence agency with two missions. we collect intelligence national security interest and we protect certain sensitive information in u.s. networks. all this while protecting our civil liberties and privacy. privacy. nsa contributes to the security of our nation its armed forces and their allies. nsa accomplishes this mission while protecting civil liberties and privacy because the constitution we are sworn to protect and defend makes no allowance to trade one off for
the other. nsa operates squarely within the authorities granted by the president congress and the courts. who we are her people. i'm proud of what nsa does a more proud of our people. the national security agency employees take an oath to protect and defend the constitution of the united states. just like you they will never forget the moments terrorists killed 2996 americans in new york pennsylvania and the pentagon. they witnessed the first responders efforts to save lives. they saw the military shift to a wartime footing. they committed themselves to ensuring another 9/11 would never happen and our deployed forces would return home. in fact, they deployed with their armed forces to areas of hostility. more than 6000 deployed in support of operations in iraq and afghanistan, 22 have paid
the ultimate sacrifice since 9/11. sadly adding to a list of css personnel numbering over 170 killed in the line of duty since our formation in 1952. bears is a noble cause. nsa prides itself on its highly-skilled workforce. we are the largest employer of mathematicians, 1013. 966 ph.d.s in 4374 computer scientists linguists in more than 120 languages. more patents than any intelligence community agency and the most businesses. they are also americans and they take their civil liberties and privacy seriously. what we do, adapt to fit à la g3 good indication systems is literally one of the most complex systems devised by mankind. the fact that over 2.5 billion people communicate across the common infrastructure is a
tribute to the ingenuity ingenuity of mankind. the stark reality is that terrorists criminals and adversaries make use of the same infrastructure. tariffs and other foreign adversaries hide in the same global network use the same communications networks as everyone else can and take advantage of familiar services gmail facebook twitter etc.. the technology has made it easy for them. we must develop and apply the best analytic tools to succeed at our mission finding the communications of adversaries while protecting those of innocent people regardless of their nationality. we take direction from political leadership. nsa's direction comes from national security needs as defined by the senior leaders. nsa does not decide what topics to collect and analyze. nsa's collection and now this is driven by the national intelligence priority from marchant received informal tasking. we do understand electronic surveillance capabilities are
powerful tools in the hands of the state. that is why we have extensive mandatory internal training automated checks and an extensive regime of both internal and external oversight. what we do. we use lawful programs and tools to do our mission. the authority we have been granted in the capabilities we have developed help keep our nation safe. since 9/11 we have disrupted terrorist attacks at home and abroad using capabilities informed by the lessons of 9/11. the business record fisa program nsa's implementation of section 215 of the patriot act focuses on defending the homeland they linking the foreign and domestic threats. section 700 to fisa focuses on acquiring warring intelligence including critical information concerning international terrorist organizations by targeting non-u.s. persons who he reasonably believed to be located outside the united states. nsa also operates under other
sections of the fisa statute in accordance with the law's provisions. it is important to remember that in order to target a u.s. person anywhere in the world under the fisa statute we are required to obtain a court order based on probable cause showing that the prospective target of the surveillance is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power. nsa conducts the majority of the tech to a solely pursuant to the authorities provided by executive order 1203. as i've said before these capabilities are powerful. we take this responsibility seriously. we ensure compliance. we stood up a directorate of complaints in 2000 repeat who betray in our workforce in the proper use of capabilities. we do make the stakes. the vast majority of the compliance incidents reflect the challenge of implementing very specific rules in the context of an ever-changing technology. compliance incidents with rare
exception are unintentional and reflect the sort of errors that will occur in any complex system of technical and dignity. the press claimed evidence of thousands of privacy violations. this is false and misleading. according to nsa's independent inspector general and the vice-chairman brought up the 12 cases of libel go through that quickly. there were 12 cases of willful violation. all of those were under executive order and none of them were in the business record fisa or under faa 702. we hold ourselves accountable every day. most of these targets involved improper tasking regarding foreign purposes -- persons in foreign places. in unaware of any intentional welfare violations. of the 2776 incidents noted in the annual compliance reports 75% are not violations of
procedures at all but rather nsa's detection of valid foreign targets that travel to the u.s. and a record that nsa stopped collecting in accordance with the rules. we call this row mars and they mispronounce that and in one of the things that came out out of it was rumors but it's row mars. let me clear the air on compliance incidents. the vast majority of the actual compliance incidents involve foreign locations and foreign activities. as our activities are regulated by specific rules wherever they occur. for the smaller numbers that did involve the u.s. person a typical incident involves a person overseas involved with a foreign organization who has subsequently been determined to be a u.s. person all initial indications in research before collection point the other way but nsa constantly reevaluates indications. nsa detects and corrects in most cases does so before any information is obtained.
used or shared outside of nsa. despite the difference between willful or not we treat incidents the same. we detect address remediate including removing or purging information from our database is in accordance with the rules and we report. we hold ourselves accountable and keep others informed so they can do the same. nsa's compliance regime at last friday's intelligence committee hearing one thing we have learned an enormous amount about is the cub clients were seizures that nsa uses. they are remarkable. they are detailed. they produce data streams that are extremely telling into my mind are reassuring. we welcome an ongoing discussion about how the public can going forward have increased informatiinformati on about nsa's compliance program. >> lets go into that discussion because both of you have raised concerns that the media reports about the government's surveillance program has been
incomplete and inaccurate and misleading or some combination of that. i worry that we are still getting inaccurate and incomplete statements from the frustration. for example we have heard over and over again the assertion that 54 terrorist plots were thwarted by the use of section 215 and/or section 702 authorities. that is plainly wrong. we still get it in letters to members of congress and we get it in statements. these were not all plots and they were not all
thwarted to the american people are getting left with an accurate impression of the effectiveness of the nsa programs. would you agree that the 54 cases that kid getting cited by the administration were not all plots and of the 54 third -- 13 had some nexus to the u.s.. would you agree with that or no. >> yes.
>> testimony stated that there is only one example of a case where but for section 215 following records collection terrorist activity was stopped. is mr. english write? >> he is right. i believe he said to chairman. i may have that wrong but i think he said two and i would like to point out it could have only applied to 13 of the cases because of the 54 terrorist plots or events only 13 occurred in the u.s.. >> i understand that but what i worry about is that some of the statements that all is well, we are talking about massive massive collection. i'm told we have to do that to protect us and statistics are written out in that they are not a critic it doesn't help the credibility and the congress and
doesn't help the credibility with this chairman and doesn't help with the credibility of the country. both of you feel free to answer this next one. over the past weekend the new york times article -- when i read that as reporting for the past several years the nsa has been -- social networks including americans. location information tax records voter registration records and more. like many of us who have access to classified re-things we sometimes find we get far more in the newspaper and we get a crossword puzzle
too but we get more in the newspapers than we do in the classified re-things
that you give us. according to the article the nsa associates and locates americans now if it's accurate it appears to contradict earlier representation that the nsa does not compile dossiers of files on the wrecking people. is the nsa compiling dossiers of
the american people through the use of its intelligence authorities? gentlemen either one of you. >> let me comment first on the value of section 215 where i think unfortunately and we may be part guilty of this. it's the only metric used his plots foiled. i think there is another metric here that is very important. i would call it the peace of mind metric. in the case of the boston marathon bomber were using these
tools we are able to check out whether there was what was not a subsequent plot involving new york city. in the case of the aqap threat this summer that occasioned the closure of several diplomatic facilities in the mideast. there were a number of selectors that emerge from ours collection oversees that pointed to the united states. each one of them were checked out and were found not to be relevant to a domestic aspect of a terrorist plot. >> mr. clapper we will certainly give you time to add that if you would like
but could you go back to my question? is the nsa compiling profiles and dossiers of the american people? >> in every case for valid cases let me go to general alexander. >> those reports are inaccurate and wrong. >> "the new york times" is wrong in its article? >> absolutely. here are the facts. what they have taken is the fact that we do take data to enrich
it. what is not in front of the statements is the word foreign.
foreign information to understand what the foreign axis is of the problems that we are looking at. how do you know what an individual is a terrorist without having dated to enrich it with a number of? in the foreign space for nevada. the supplemental procedures and guidelines for governing communications metadata analysis analysis -- the article allows nsa to not stop if we are targeting a terrorist if we hit a number. he allows us to go back and see where that goes in where it comes into or out of the country and what are the problems outside the country? >> which authority are you using for this analysis? first i want to make sure and your stand. you said the new york times is flat out wrong in their article? >> they are flat out wrong saying that we are creating dossiers on americans? >> are you going toward the social networks?
>> no. >> what if anything is anchored in "the new york times" article? >> the accuracy is the secretary of defense and the attorney general did approve a supplemental procedures governing committee patients metadata analysis and 2009. what that allows us to do is use metadata that we have acquired under executive order whether it's phone records or e-mails through u.s. selectors to figure out social networks abroad. i will tell you
-- >> the at 09 order is still being used? >> that that is correct but their cases i need to clarify this and want to make sure this 100% good. there cases where the fbi light started terrorist threat in the united states. if there's a terrorist threat in the united states and they get a warrant to go after that ari fisa then we can use fisma to go after that. we can look at hostages overseas u.s. hostages. we can look at this to attract industries because u.s.
companies are considered u.s. persons under this law that are the targets of terrorist communications. what we are doing we are not creating social networks. we are doing that and the insinuation that we are doing that is flat wrong. i take exception to that. taking a
classified document that dealt with foreign understanding and saying therefore it must apply -- >> have you made this complaint are responded to "the new york times" on this? >> yes. the issue is here they have all these documents that they are trying to leak out without having the understanding. we did give them insights. they didn't take all the data. i don't know what and why. >> is what you're doing being reviewed by the fisa court? >> not in all cases. some of these cases that deal with executive order 12333 that
fall under the business records would be. these would not be reviewed but they are reviewed by the administration and audited by our people. >> my time is up. you
have raised well -- >> one of the problems we have is this -- with this program is there is not enough transparency. >> thank you. i worry. you say it's executive authority not fisa court authority. does anybody have oversight of other than the executive branch? >> congress too. >> has this been imported to the congress either the intelligence committee's? >> i believe both of these have but i would have to go back and check. both of these have gone to the committee. chairman you bring up a good point.
for the complete transparency chairman you brought up a good question and if i could i think this would help greatly. the issue that we have here is how do you use meta-data which is least intrusive to understand a problem that our nation could face? and so we use that globally and sometimes it touches the united states. >> metadata is the least intrusive. many might think it's the most intrusive and i will tell you why. i realize there is a lot of metadata going on. shopping at the grocery store infusing your grocery store credit card and the ads you get her going to be different. if you are buying things for young children or if you are buying a nice bottle of wine. do you understand the concern is more and more things come out when it turns out for example the nsa members were checking
their love interests and using the tools of nsa. americans like their privacy. they like their security but they like their privacy to me. understand the concern that we are getting. simply doing metadata a lot of people think that they are on social media and whatnot what not that there's some expectation of privacy, less obviously but some. >> i do agree chairman but the differentiation that i make in terms of metadata for these purposes is the phone numbers to and from or the e-mail addresses to and from any issue we face in trying to figure out where we take this legislation is how do we do this in such a way that we can ensure the american people know we are doing it exactly right and protect the nation?
thank you very much. i appreciate that. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to use my time to say something to my colleagues. i believe maybe only senator hatch was only the intelligence committee in 2001, in mid year, the dci, whose name was george, came in to meet with us. what he said was that he predicted so as a matter of fact, i went on my staff, my staff -- cnn on july 1, 2001, and said this: there's a major possibility of a terrorist
incident within the next three months. it's a direct quote from what i said. something took place when i thought could never take place in this country. that's 9/11. i never believed there could be training schools for pilots who would teach people how to fly but not land in this country. i never thought our visa system was so weak they could admit terrorists to this country. i was totally wrong. the event happened and it was catastrophic for people, for this nation, for our standing but most importantly because the death and direction that -- destruction that it brought about this country. then we learned that there were stove pipes, and our intelligence was inadequate and we couldn't collect enough data. then we learned there was a man
by the name of -- one of the group in san diego. i believe if there were to happen again with this program and other programs working in combination. we have an opportunity to pick that up. absented these kind of technological programs. we do not have an opportunity to pick that up. this is a very hard culture to meet with human intelligence. t a different culture. the language is different. there are many dialects, the groups are tight. it is very difficult to permeate them. so our great strength today, ladies and gentlemen, in protecting this homeland is to be able to have the kind of technology that is able to piece together data while protecting
quote quote quote
listen to this program being described as a surveillance program. it is not -- there is no content collected by the nsa. there are bits of data, location, television numberses that can be queried when there's reasonable suspicious. if it looks like shotgun for the individual in the country. it goes to the fbi for a probably cause warrant and a full investigation takes place. i so regret what is happening. i will do everything i can to prevent this program from being canceled out. there's going to be a bill in my committee to do it. there's a bill in this committee to do it. and unfortunately, very few of us sat on this committee when george came in in june of 2001 and said we anticipate a strike,
but we don't know what. we don't nowhere. we don't know when. that can never be allowed to happen in the united states of america again. that's the basis for this program. it's legal. we are looking at increased transparency. we are looking to make some changes in it. but we are not looking to destroy it. to destroy it is to make this nation more vulnerable. i just wanted to say that. i had to say it. thank you. senator? i don't have any questions. thank you. >> okay. let me make clear something i said to the chairman to keep asking his question. we need more transparency. i don't know how much transparency we ought to have. i don't know your business. your number one responsibility is protecting our national
security. -- whatever that balance is i firmly believe that a lot of these issues that were -- i don't think the sphwhaict mr. snowedden would have -- well, i don't want to comment on that. anyway, i think that in our system, tran parent sincerity -- transparency brings accountability. i want to start out where i left off, and it's not a an accusation against the intelligence democratic national committee. i'm going ask a question. i'm going to tell you why i'm sin cynical about the statements and sequestration and what the shut down will do you made and
other people have made. we had world world world war ii veterans coming in on honor flight -- i called walk in to that any time. and so the show of putting barriers around because of a shut down and spending all the money to do it and having every other department talk about shut downs causes me to be a little cynical. i'm not putting your work in the same category of the park service. don't read me wrong. but if, in fact, 70% of the intelligence community is furloughed. it that is true, is that an honest assessment these employees are nonessential. i'm concerned if your lawyers have determined that 70% of your employees are nonessential to your mission, then you either need better lawyer or to make
big changeses in your work force. can you tell me whether the reports are accurate or not? >> well, firstful all, sir, we don't consider any of our employees for nonessential. for the purpose of the law where the criteria is necessary to protect against imminent threat against life or property. it causes us to make some very pain of the choices about who we keep on and what we accept. i would comment on your commentary about the monument closure. that's precisely illustrates the challenge we have in intelligence on conveying the impact of these cuts. because obviously people see the impact of closing the public parks. in the case of intelligence, it's insidious. capabilities that we degrade today or give up. we may not see the impact of those for weeks or months or an extended period.
much harder to rationize. any doubt about the necessity, the importance of all of our employees. as i said earlier, this -- as each day goes by, the impact and the jeopardy during the safety and security of this country will increase. >> general alexander, my first question. fisa court of opinion show there were significant problems implementing 215 phone records that were discovered in 2009. showing that the nsa was inadvertently assessing the phone record meta data. those problems were apparently not resolved with the court until late that year. since then, i understand every in-- query of the meta data is audited by the did want of justice and any must be reported immediately to the fisa court. my first question: precisely
when did the department begin auditing every query of the meta data. sin then has the department determined on any occasion that the reasonable and arctic label suspicious standards was not followed? >> so -- we'll walk backwards. i know of no cases where we haven't filed the standard. it's been auditable since the inception of the program. the issue if you bring out, if i could take one minute. we did make a mistake. in the way we do analysis on the foreign intelligence we collect is set up ab alert left side list. that would run against dat that comes in. and tell us if there was something on a terrorist that these alert lists were terrorist numbers we were tracking. what we had done is reasonable are -- all terrorist numbers. what we were using it for to say
there's a lot of activity on the number. it was a discrepancies between our technical folks who stet up and the legal folks. we did it wrong. and misrepresented the court several times in subsequent procedures of renewable. it set us to compliance to look at the technical side and the legal side to make sure we crosswalk it 100%. i think that has been successful. that's something we work with both of the intel committees in the white house. >> how does the nsa handle instances when a phone number may have been connected to the terrorist group in the past. they knows they are no longer associated with the group. is there a mechanism so a query of the meta data that is done that is limited -- against the record for certain time periods. >> i'm not sure as i understand
this all the way. let me see if i it right. the answer if a number changes over the life of it. how do we adapt to that? that's a difficult technical issue. what you could get is two set of people. you have senator sessions has one set of people he talks to. so you a different set. what you would see is those sets come together at different timeses. the an is yes, our analysts can delete the second part. part of the business record fisa has a date, time, group, and duration of call and two -- to and from number. i would like to follow up with mr. clapper. on my first question, does america remain safe even with a shut down?
i have to qualify that, sir. i don't feel they can make such a guarantee to the american people. it would be much more difficult to make a guarantee. each day as the shut down goes by. i'm very concerned about the jeopardy of the country because of this. >> can i have one more question? >> i just want to make sure i -- what you're saying it becomes cumulative. >> you're saying the danger and threat become cumulative. >> yes, sir? >> thank you. >> general, alexander. i hope you're familiar with the inspector general's letter to me in which he provides certain detail about 12 documented -- potentially or willfully abusing their surveillance authority. the details are alarming to me. so i have that followup question. the cases about nsa employees
stationed a rode. it does it set the mechanism to catch the kind of conduct at the domestic facilities are somewhat insufficient. what else could account for the disparity? >> it is much more difficult to track a foreign number and understand when something is doing something on a foreign number that sin appropriate. those can oftentimes be misleading statements by the analysts for saying i'm looking for a and it's a girlfriend. in the united states it's different. against a u.s. number or e-mail address. those are flagged. the system automatically cease you're doing something against the the foreign number overseas you don't get the flag. it's an extremely important point note even on a foreign person if we make a mistake. we hold our people accountable. there is no call for that.
it is supposed to be against a foreign intelligence purpose, and you saw the outcome of those 12 cases. what happened in each one. that letter that the inspector general sent to you. one followup. one of the piece of information i asked the inspector general for was the employee violated. as i read the response none of the 12 cases involved the phone records collection program under 215 or the collection program under 702; is that correct? >> that is correct, senator. if i could, also, it's important to note over a date. and when you look at the number of casualties we had in iraq. seven of those people, as you know, were nsa. when you look at three times more likely to die defending our country in iraq or afghanistan and committing a willful or
knowing violation against the foreign or u.s. person. >> my last question is for mr. clapper. if you can't tell us that the america is safe. why don't you simply use your authority to furlough fewer employees? >> sir, we're going look at that. we're going do it every day to see where we need to -- what is the right talent at. our an lettic expertise we need. we're doing that as we speak. so i anticipate if this thing drags out. we'll make adjustments and probably recall more people. particularly in nsa's case if they have a heavy military population or not furloughed. early on, nsa has accepted a low percentage of the civilian employees. i'm confident, i'm sure that over time that condition cannot continue. >> fortunately, i want to have
to agree with you. unfortunately we have a law passed in the 1800s that created a real problem on the furloughing and the passed in a time when nobody could have anticipated either the size of the government or complexity of government. but -- senator white house. >> thank you, chairman. welcome, jebt lman -- gentleman. we have identified terror threats to our country overseas; correct? >> correct? >> and we can track their trok communications. >> is important to know -- overseas? >> yes, it is. >> and they might be using intermediary or cutouts between
the prince. -- principle they're trying to reach and themselves; correct? >> correct. >> that's trade craft 101; correct? so -- records of call the and e-mail connection are necessary to allow you to look for those networks; correct? >> that is correct. >> now, in the call and e-mail connections, are information that, has for decades, been declared by courts demonstrated by law enforcement practice throughout this country to not within the warrant requirement of the forty -- fourth amendment united states institution; correct? >> correct. so the program is legal, but, it
risks abuse? >> correct. >> concede to that. could you describe -- and if you want to fill this out with a request for the record and answer for the record, the various oversight mechanisms and bodies whose job it is to assure that this program is kept within bound that protect the privacy needs of american citizens. >> well, yes, sir. first, as general alexander described -- >> how many committees of congress, for instance, have oversight over the meta data program? >> certainly the two intelligence committees do. i think -- >> here we are. here is another one.
that are relevant ervetion correct? >> yes, sir. >> swrowmed jurisdiction? >> how many inspectors general have? >> well, the nsa inspector general, certainly. my inspector general, who is senate-confirmed does. starting with the level of nsa i.t. with the director of compliance that was to set up in 2009, and additionally before shut down 300 compliance officers is to oversee the legal and technical aspect of that. that is overseen by office and the attorney general. as well as the fisa court which oversees these processes. >> the liberty advisory board? >> i need mention that's only for counterterrorism purposes.
i have, by law, also a privacy and civil liberty office whose full-time job is to serve as the coach for the entire ic. >> if i could ask you, just to -- there's a lot. if you could -- i'll make the questions for the record, if you could get it back -- i don't think there's a clear and simple expedition what the oversight is. i'll like to get it for the record. i'm concerned in the wake of the snowden incident -- let me put this way, it's not clear any legal address is being considered thought 0 at the time that committed his unauthorized relief of classified information i haven't got the information before me to make a detailed analysis of whether the basic doctrine would apply, which
makes the employer liable with the agent acted within the course and scope of employment. whether it would be an ultra -- act of some kind. i'm not aware of any conversation about that. and as we have seen from classified programs in the past, there is a danger that the private contractors managing the program begin to -- the dog. we have become so dependent on our private contractors we cannot seek for the legal misdeeds because, frankly, they are the ones we depend on to the extent we can't use the authorities that are pertinent to us as customers. >> senator, when the incident broke out. i flew out to hawaii with some of the folks and talked to the
people involved. including a contractor officer representative and what we have done and working with our folks on this. let me tell you one of the contracting officer representatives did exactly what you would expect her to do. when asked to get access of some of this. she denied it, to snowden, formally. he worked around that. those prude yours. i think you can see those things. we have asked our folks to look at this. we have that question from you. i would like to take it for the record, if i could. >> i wanted to make sure they're not too big to sue. >> right. thank you, senator white house. senator, hamp is gone. senator sessions, sorry, the problems of --
[inaudible] it's harder to turn around to check on you. >> thank you. it's important here. i thank you. the house has repeatedly passed funding, clapper, and not alout sequester cuts to occur. and i hope you haven't forgotten the way to 1600 pennsylvania aver. i believe the commander in chief has a responsibility here too. the law budget control whole agencies and departments have gotten zero cuts in defense and gotten too much, in my opinion. the house is trying to reconcile that. i hope, soon, he alleviate some of the stress on the defense department on the intej
community. number one, i visited nsa, general alexander, i was so i want pressed -- impressed with the leadership there and the people i met. i sent it publicly. i deeply disappointed, hurt, to hear somebody had looked at their girlfriend's messages and that kind of thing. you say that people -- all of that was a broad first? >> senator, nine of those were abroad. three were involving persons abroad on two of those. one was on a spouse or girlfriend. >> it's a great temptation. i trust that you stepped up your emphasis, and your determination to allow that to happen. even though it's not a large number. it's still unacceptable. >> absolutely. and -- >> i would tell you what senator grassley brought out and the
letter we sent to him were putting to the work force. so more people understand what has happened to the people. when you read that -- we have been disciplined. all but one. this this case, of it instiff. i don't have the disciplinary action in that one. all, either, retired, resigned, received article 15 for the letter of reprimand with additional consequences. >> well, i thank senator white house to clarify something and general alexander, let me ask you again. so when you look at the meta data you're referring to numbers? phone numbers, e-mail addresses, perhaps? no messaging are in this data; is that right? institution of communication. >> that's correct. in the meta data program there's only phone number. there's know mail addresses.
>> senator whit house probably issued subpoenas, thousands, maybe 10,000. in my 12 years of united -- no telling how many subpoenas we issued. >> we are more allow abiding. >> we have -- plenty of crooks in my district. the point of which is it does not require search warrant to obtain from the telephone company the persons toll records. is it relevant to the investigation. if somebody is thought to be a member of a gang and said he doesn't know bad guy one, and you subpoena his records and he's got 50 phone calls and 20 were within an hour of the crime occurring. that is hugely valuable. that's just done all the time. so we need to understand that the fundamental process here is
well within -- it seems to me, trait additions of ability to subpoena not the records are in the possession of the phone company. they're the phone company's records. they're not your personal records. that's the different. senator feinstein's story was so fabulous, mr. clapper, it just laid the whole structure out for us. would you -- i know you have said this before. could you tell us, did these leaks negatively impact your ability to be as effective as otherwise if they hadn't happened. did it hurt our ability to identify attack in the future. >> from my mind, absolutely no question about that. we are already seeing signs of changes in target behavior because of their awareness of as
a result of the revolution and the unauthorized lease. it's done great damage to partners and overseas in our relationship with them. people's lives are at risk here because of data that mr. snowden -- the full extent of it is yet to be measured. >> well, i thank you for your work. my impression from the people i met at nsa is they are dedicated, un-americans working every day to preserve and demand this country. i would i think we can do a better job of monitoring it. i'm glad to say the american people are alert and not going tolerate biewpses they shouldn't. the press has the right to do
their job within the realm of law. i hope that it's unthinkable we would dismantle this program. i would oppose that. thank you, mr. chairman. >> it appears a lot is being dismantled by the government shutdown. that's my view. senator clob char. >> thank you, director, and general. i would note that 15 minutes i'm going to be slipping out. not because i'm telling you if advance. senator blumenthal is going take over. >> thank you. i want to going baa to your earlier comment about the effect of the shut down on the intej community i think it's important as we sit here today. i know, in your testimony you talked about how 966 ph.d.,
44,734 computer scientists, 72% of the civilian work force in the intelligence community are aren't going to be able to do their jobs right now. that includes people who are connecting and correcting signals, engineers who put the systems back together. people who are on the ground across the world. you indicate that the law requires you to furlough employees not involved in addressing an imminent threat; stherkt? >> that's correct. >> is tbt true that is a threat not considered imminent today could be imminent tomorrow? exactly. we have to manage it on a day-to-day basis as best we can. you have to figure out if t imminent and spend time doing it with your lawyers and add someone back in? >> that's exactly right. we will have to shuffle people in and out depending on what we believe the concern of the day is. >> but you clearly see it as a
risk to security. >> in your assessment how much risk are we exposed to because we had to furlough our intelligence professionals who are covering issues that you can't define right now as imminent? >> well, if you want for myth mathematical quantityification. a , you know, the risk is, you know, 75% more than yesterday, i guess. >> thank you very much. i believe that's pretty significant. i appreciated senator feinstein's comment she made on the floor. i know, she can't give out all the information nor can you. i think people have to understand it's a significant layoff we are dealing right now. temporary as may w. the threats, i learn, change from day day-to-day. you need people on the ground ready to respond. thank you for that. i want to go back. i thought our july 31st hearing
was good and informative on the surveillance programs. then right after that, i was a little surprised and i know the chairman mentioned some of this. in mid august the media began reporting about an internal audit from may of 2012 which found the that nsa violated privacy rules over 2,000 times. we have gotten to the facts and what it means. i'm concerned about why it didn't come out during the hearing? senate, every quarter internal to nsa we put together both under fisa and 20eu7 and the executive order. we compile that. we hold our people accountable to it. everything we see is tracked. it's important to know the majority of those roughly 75% of
those aren't incidents are privacy violation. those are -- >> i understand that. my point is a processed one. we have hearing and find a out a week later the audits are out there. we didn't learn about at the hearing. we have a number of incidents that we track on 702 and 215. that's what we talk about here. most of these incidents that are in these report reflect us typing in a wrong number, these what we're call minor violation. the major ones are the one we brought up. >> yeah. senator, the subject matter of the hearing was 215. and these 12 violations over 10 years occurred under the foreign collection under the losses of executive order. >> all right.
i thought we were broadly asking questions. that's mind us now. i want to talk about some of the reform that have been suggested as i don't know there's legislation out there. one of the reforms that president obama has supported is the idea that we would have a privacy watchdog installed at the nsa, and an intelligence community website would be created to dissemnate public information on the activity. what is the status? >> on the first one, we have a hiring action out on the streets. probably stopped right now because the furlough. we have one for a civil liberty privacy advocate for nsa. >> we have activated a web page under my office to put out this hear data. >> okay. and you suggested a court-appointed amicus for cases that involve novel and significant questions of law. i'm interested in how it would
work in practice. what is an example of the novel, insignificant case? >> i think the i'm getting a out of the exarpt here and the department of justice. some form of advocate who would be a participate when called upon by the court address issues of law or >> thank you. >> general? >> i'll have some followup questions on the record. i want to emphasize it's important that people understand that 72% of the civilian work force of the intelligence agencies is now on furlough.
and the effect that could have on our national security and the reason we have tend the shut down. thank you. >> thank you, both, for your service. from my point of view, i'm sure every organization has made mistakes. if anybody has abused the program to spy on their spouse or neighbor or do something in that fashion, i hope they go to jail. because i think most of the people in the nsa would like that outcome because that's not exactly what you're there to do. do you agree with that, general alexander? >> senator, i agree they should be punished. enter whatever the appropriate pubishment is. they are outliers. >> that's right, senator. in fact two were done under field grade article 15. >> right. >> when you look what they did, you can see we trained them, they immediately did something wrong. they go no return. they just asked the question.
they didn't get information back. they did it wrong. they were held accountable. >> good. the point is when you do things wrong, you should be held accountable. when you do things right you should be appreciated. i think both of you are trying to do things right to protect our nation. i appreciate everybody that work for you. i know, many of them. they're patriots as much as anybody who crit criticizes the program. it you tell the president of the united states what you told us? because of the government shut down that our nation is less secure? >>. >> yes. >> what did he say? >> i scuzzed it yesterday. >> you scared the hell out of us. i'm scared. when you tell me that 80 percent of the nsa is unable to go to work. not because they are necessary. but because of the statute the way it's worded. both of you made clear presentation to the committee after that government shut down in a post 9/11 world is making this nation less safe.
is that right, general al ?arnd. >> that's correct. >> that right? >> yes, sir. >> to mr. gibbs who told the president his political adviser he advise the president to just watch the shut down. do you think that's a responsible thing for the president to do as commander in chief? not negotiate or just watch the shut down? >> well, i'll give you my own opinion. we're all -- if you told him that that our nation is less safe and every day goes by we are less capable of detecting potential terrorist attacks. and why aren't the members of the house and the senate in the white house right now to try to solve this problem? one of two things are true. your telling us the truth and
the federal government leadership on both sides ignoring it particularly the commander in chief or overstating the case. i think you are telling us the truth. i'm not going down the road you're overstating the case. i want americans to know there are shout downs after 9/11 and before nieflt. there's a huge diversion. for the president of the united states, for the house democrats not to negotiate is a irresponsible. it for our republican party not to try to find a way to end the mess is irresponsible. i hope that the president will do more than watch. now, about 9/11. if we had the program and technology in place today before 9/11, what would be the likelihood that we would have detected that attack? >> senator, my professional opinion is very high. >> you agree with that? >> i do. i'm here to tell the american people if we had in place today
before 9/11, the 19 hijackers in the country most of them in legal status talking to people abroad. we would known what they were up to. we would to known the guy takes flying lessons to take the plane off and not care about ending it. toit pay for flying lessons but don't want to learn how to land the plane. let reform the program where it's gotten out of line. let be sensitive to the constitutional rights we all have. but here is my question. what is being proposed in term of reform are it makes less able to detect the next 9/11? are we going back to that pre-9/11 mentality? that's the question for me. is the congress taking us back to a time when we could not pick
up a threat that was right in front us? senator, there are several proposals that have been proposed until the form of bills. i guess our basic reaction to this is we're open to changes to make this more transparent or more oversight. but in doing so, we don't want to overcorrect such that we lose the operational utility and the atbilty. >> same for general alexander. will you tell me when you think we have crossed the line? >> absolutely. i believe t my responsibility tell you. >> very quickly about the time in which we live. are there active efforts by terrorist organizations to penetrate the united states? >> yes. >> absolutely, yes. as we speak. >> do you believe there are people probably already here as part of a movement?
>> there are sleeper -- >> yes. >> absolutely. i wouldn't calm a unified column. there are various entity. >> fair enough. i'll end with this. my goal is to make sure that if a known terrorist is already here who took bin laden's place. if he's calling someone in the united states, i want to know who he's talking to to. is that a fair thing for me to want for my question. >> yes, sir, i think it's a fair requirement for any citizens. >> is it fair to say before you keep the content or do something the content you have to get a warrant. >> are we at war? one difference it's more of a trade karat difference is the evident area standard we
struggle with since we're dealing with hints, bits and pieces of information that probably doesn't necessarily meet the standard. senator, i i believe it's a war on terrorism. i believe what we're seeing today is going to get worse with what is going on in the mid east. what is owning in sir yap. the action in iraq and afghanistan. we concluding 23, september, 972 people were killed in kenyan, yemen, syria, iraq, afghanistan, pakistan. over 1,000 injured. when you look at we, the relative safety we have here it's no accident. it's the work of the military and the intelligence community keeping this country safe. we need the tools do that.
thank you, senator. >> mr. chairman, i want to in response to senator graham to let him know that a few minute ago the white house just announced that the congressional leaders had accepted their invitation to come and meet today. they must have heard you from here. but also that, again, if we pass the senate bill. the house would pass the senate bill and the shut down would end. i think that's important for people to know. thank you, senator klobuchar. >> thank you, mr. chairman. director clapper, general alexander, you and your employees protect our country, and i'm grateful for that. thank you. i have a bill that survey less than transparency fact will address what i think is the essential problem in this debate.
that's the fact despite the large amount of americans information being collected
under the intelligence law. those law lack any substantial public reporting requirements. how many information are being collected. it doesn't have to tell americans how many of their investigate is actually seen by national security officials. what is more the companies that get information requests are under
strict gag orders. they are not allowed to give the public information. the american people are smart. they understand we need to give way to both national security and civil libertieses. the public lacks even the most basic information about the scope of the programs, they have no way of knowing if we're getting that balance right. my bill would change this. it would make the government
give annual statistic on the number of america's information collected. and the number whose information is actually reviewed. it would also let companies disclose agreements and disclosing a are aggravate statistics on the number of requests they get and a number of accounts affected.
i'm very pleased to report that yesterday morning perk's leading tech companies from apple to going toll microsoft to facebook and twitter to yahoo!, all of these companies sent a letter supporting my bill. urging this committee and congress to pass it. without objection, mr. chairman, i'll enter a copy of this to the record. >> without objection. >> my first question -- i want to give an example of why i think greater taryn parent sincerity is needed. senator grassley and leahy
indicated. this saturday, this past start "the new york timeses" had a story alleging that nsa gatherers data on the social qek. the article gave series of example the kind of sensitive data that is allegedly collected to create detailed graph -- graphs of social connection to you. both of you have classified some of the inaccuracy in the story. if americans knew this kind of collection was limited to a small number of people, people who we have reason to believe are foreign agencies are involved in terrorism i think most would be fine with that. but there nothing in that article g.i. any sense whether -- that's because the information just isn't out there. the lack of information scares
people and causes distrust and makes them distrust our government. director clapper, general alexander. do don't you think it underscores the need for greater transparency about our surveillance programs? >> absolutely, sir. it does. senator franken, and a couple of comments and the bill. -- in the total number of target arvegged by those orders. and we're fine with allowing the providers to release annually the total number of government request or -- about their customers and the total number of targets affected by the orders and certifications. what we are concerned about to be upfront here is that the stipulation on a company by
company basis. it gives adversary the terrorist the prerogative of shopping around for providers that aren't covered. i do agree with you about doing all we can to ensure the public of what a small proportion of these records actually looked at. case in point went to 215 only 288 qir rei that were actually made which was actually in the total scheme of things the minuscule part of the record. >> that's sort of the point. i want to response to this a. those are good positive stipes you're talking about. i have to be honest, i think it's too little. it's not permanent. the number of orders won't tell us all that much. for example, in 2012 there were 212 orders underred section 215
of the patriot act. it seem like a small number. now it's declassified that a small number of the order allow the government collect substantially all of the telephone meta data handled by most of the country. i don't unwhy we can't mention that as part of the law. what you're doing is sort of voluntary. it's not permanent. you change poll and we get administration that wants to i think which the policy, that does nothing. i'm 288 numbers recruit for reasonable articulate -- >> queer --
queries are -- only 288 numbers. i think that's a key point. i agree with transparency. are compelled to cooperate with the government. they aren't throwing nsa any information. they aren't doing something inappropriate. and it's interesting to note that other countries demand the same of them. so what our companies are doing is what our nation needs them to do to help us stop terrorists and other acts. they are compelled in other countries in a lawful intercept way the same. i think out of this one of the things that concerns me those companies who acted in good faith, you mentioned several of them. they're trying to dot right thing we as a nation asked them to do. it's blown way out of proportion. as if they opened up the servers and you know it's not true.
so i do think the transparency is very important because it tells you the number. i think people say that's it? >> mr. chairman. i know, others have gone over the time. we don't get the two witnesses before us very often. can i ask one question. >> i know if i denied the opportunity i would hear about it forever. i would say yes. >> i'm not sure what that says about me or you. [laughter] >> i just thought i would -- you're a great man, as usual. >> yes, thank you. i think one of the issues is trust, distrust, et. cetera. that issue. one of the issue is the ability to we snowden, a contractor and release all of this stuff.
has there been any thought given and where are we on thinking about this? the two key or three key situation where, you know, i know on some of the stuff that has been leaked and i've been briefed we have used backups where someone does something and other people are alerted. is there any change we're talking about making in the way that stuff is ak sets -- accessed? >> we are making significant changes. we can send you the complete report. some gets to the classified area. we put in two guyses in certain certain room and stuff. we are violate part of that for the intelligence. there are two thing. one is go to a system of
continuous evaluation for people who are clear as opposed to the current system. where they may go five years or more for a top secret cleern or ten years for a secret clearance. the system has to change so we can do it continuously. we have to finish with the aftermath of wikileaks. we have more exxonive means of detecting electronic behavior people on the job. i can give you nor detail if you would like, for the record. >> thank you, senator franken. >> senator flake. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you both. let me follow a little bit along the line of senator graham's comments. i wasn't here for your initial testimony. ibdz and read from the report
that you talk about the furlough . two days ago we passed through legislation quickly. very quickly. unanimously to protect the military from this shut down. have you reynolded to the president that he recommend to the congress that we do something similar for the intention services? if this is -- as you put it a dream land for our enemy here, wouldn't that be appropriate? >> i certainly think it would be, and of course, the support to the military particularly in the case of dod --
depending on the military population which, obvious, was not furloughed. to the extend this is shut down drags on, we are going to have to make some daily adjustments and make judgments about bringing people back. on a day-to-day basis. i hope if the situation is as dire. only you know, we don't have access day-to-day to the intelligence here. if it is, as you say, i believe it probably is. i believe believe it would warrant the president saying,
okay, whatever you do however long it's going last, we have to make sure we are collecting the necessary intelligence. i can guarantee you both the house and the senate would move expeditiously to do this. if it really is a problem, and i believe it is, i would trust that you will make that rebelling to the president. >> yes, sir, i will. again, i
would commend the statement that senator feinstein made on the floor yesterday about this. >> yeah. >> thank you. you and i asked the fbi -- collected under the 215. he testified that the data collected under 215 is scrapped every five years or after five years, i think on a rolling basis. it is all meta data collected under other authorities also discarded after five years?
quote quote quote
>> so for nsa, it depends on the type of data. so in the meta data repository for 215, as you stated, and aged off after five years by court direction. if there's a report, that, of course, would not be aged off. the report will stand just like other intelligence activities. within the executive order, 12333 meta data repository. it depends on the repository and the type of data being done. generally speaking it's five years. there may be pieces of information that we retain longer that are our intelligence value overseas that is different than the ones we have in the united. that's all that nsa has in those areas. >> as i understand that, yeah. it's handled differently..
the national government of the national security but and the shutdown. what the speaker could do any moment to allow the open vote but i will take seriously into account that it does seem to be alarming that the civilian workforce is furloughed and i hope he will be reviewing on a rolling basis if this exposes us in any significant way. also who recently spoke to our ambassador in kenya about the investigation said tuesday the work of the intelligence to the is sizable.
you to find dead better balance of transparency and dash blue dash privacy to fulfill your duties but there is a number of pieces of legislation to be considered by members of this committee to make a positive contribution whether the privacy takes into account general alexander
in support to find them a needle in the haystack but the fact it can tell so much from the target of the detailed analysis indicates there is some privacy interest at stake given the current doctrine that we come together that
should the congress be concerned about protecting that privacy against unwarranted intrusion? let you suggest we should do about this together? what we are talking about is each case when we asked the business record is associated with al qaeda or a terrorist group. that is the nexus of the question. it is the least intrusive. in to see the numbers of interest. if we see that then we would tip that to the fbi that
would go through the appropriate process but that was a long winded answer to say, i apologize that the appropriate steve garett is there and even the judge's statements were pretty good in this area. the end you can audit to see what we do. but then italy then do we look at the data. but the chances of might never been looked at are so many zeros out i am comfortable. i am sure that my data is in there. >> that is a helpful user. they get done ashley answer
given by the general alexander can you articulate why it is not required to show the you permission that it seeks under the surveillance authority pertains to the foreign power? after the near relevance standard? >> speenine getting to the lawyer area. >> this is the judiciary committee. >> i and the stand that the evidentiary standard for probable cause but with the investigatory leads. of wind but with this suspicion as a basis for that. but to have greater court
scrutiny of the determinations. after a real -- periodic basis under these suspicions standard that we would be fine with. >> one of the way to deal with this to trust people with their privacy in enter
the which this standard is being conducted in we have made progress with transparency to the congressional oversight but
it did not provide lasting assurance. >> i completely agree in these changes was a
degree of permanence and it would not. >> the to mr. chairman. >> they give for being here in for your service to our nation. with the impact of the shutdown with the intelligence committee and i would like to follow-up with specific questions. with respect to the shutdown i think the testimony fatuity provided today is deeply disturbing that 70 percent of the seven plans dash intelligence force has been furloughed is reason for concern that
those who should be most out front is our commander in chief. it'll think obama should be playing politics and should refuse to negotiate a compromise but stepping forward to correct this program -- problem right now. we know what congress can do with bipartisan cooperation to address the need. united states unanimously has passed legislation that not agree to that legislation to hold the military hostage with the government shut down. >> the director has presented a recommendation today that the intelligence
community needs to be funded. i have heard concerns raised from my friends and i hope it did have bipartisan cooperation today. to pass a clean in continuing resolution with the department of defense we to get this passed by the end of the day at the senate cooperates and we could respond to the national security threat and the only impediment to doing so is the prospect that harry reid would object. god forbid we see an attack on the united states because of the intelligence committee does not adequately funded. and then we can all come together but then to fully
fund the department of defense in the hope majority leader harry response to the %ln in response to the candid and heartfelt recommendation that dr. clapper presented today. doctor -- general alexander when asked if 20 records of
all americans would testify i believe quoted as a nation's best interest to put all code records into a lock box and weaken certain when the nation needs to do it. besides the phone records were the records to believe the federal government should be doing? >> i cannot think of any right now.
they give for the question because we did not have foreign brodeur i did not think of other bulk records that we would need
like the phone but i do think fazio look at the phone data that is the question releasing the intel committee today what they understood of the vocational data and the requirements, a rethink right now there are but i cannot think of any. i apologize. >> and also whether the nsa tried to gather the data of
the phone calls and there was some suggestion from senator wide and it was a classified matter. my question is in your personal opinion, do you believe the nsa needs to collect gps location information:american citizens to prevent terrorist? >> we did send a statement
if i could just read it real quick as previously reported of the oversight committee it does not collect vocational information under the patriot act that they receive samples to test the ability of the format but it was not used for any other purposes and is never available in the 2013 closed hearing of a select committee of intelligence. as noted in the foreign
intelligence bill they would be required to seek approval of the vocational data but i would just say this may be something that is a future requirement for the country but not right
now because when we identify a number we can give it to the fbi when they get probable cause they can get the location that they need. absent a search warrant. does the nsa have the ability or access to voicemail content or the financial records on
millions of us
citizens cftc. >> consumer financial protection bureau. >> not that i know of. but it is always the fbi but whether under a regular court or the fisa court. >> in the same for voice mail and text messages? >> in the targeting of the u.s. person all has to be done that way. and that would reticulate suspicion. >> ag general -- thank you general alexander. >> thank you, mr. chairman chairman.
i understand the series of concerns and consequences of the intelligence programs furloughed as a result of the shutdown. to create consequences for our economy. but the answer to that is not to have a shutout in the first place but to have all of government. but we talked about some individuals that have passed inappropriate or illegal query's and general alexander my question is is how did they come to light in the first place? day you have something in place with these actions taken by your employees?
>> before it goes up and makes a very quick to see. it is much more difficult oftentimes that is found when we have an update to the tech data of for a number a girlfriend or boyfriend and the number may be considered to a target or identified as such. that is the issue. what we have done is highlighting the punishment to go along with it will cut that down. if you think of a number of people that we have.
the few mistakes that we have had that is to be but actually we do a good job to hold people accountable. >>. >> cc we have the process for these queries? >> nothing is foolproof but we do have a great track record and that is how it was detected in the minority of the cases but the more difficult when i explain the. >> i want to turn to the new york times' recent article behalf many systems in place that collects the data it says it was taking in
700 million records per day also began to 1.1 billion records daily and it goes on to say the agency puts money in manpower to create the metadata repository to take 20 billion record events daily to make them available to nsa within 60 minutes so clearly the surveillance technology is evolving. and are we also developing the technology to protect privacy? >> a think we are. what was missing in the new york's times article is that it should have said the word for in in front of it. this is the issue that we face with metadata with the allies as well as us.
that have a huge tract that? >> you can do this on content but metadata with the connections is the best way to start. but the best questions to attract individuals is the most important and least intrusive way. in the united states what was complete with a couple of different programs. facebook use social networks jumped to the conclusion that it is factually incorrect. only when the americans are the subject of the investigation like terrorist investigation in this case the u.s. person is a terrorist to the u.s. is treated as u.s.%. in that case we have the fbi have a court ordered and then we do the check. just to be clear i think our rules for ensuring the privacy of americans and our
allies is better than any country in the world. >> i have one more question mr. chairman. is it the only program that fisa runs under 700 to? be the guests into under that authority for the court but that is under seven '05 spee n that would not require somebody to stand up just like with the subpoena and there are times to go to a judge the poteo do more adequately the security clearance that was
required. my hope is that we will be pursued but to reach your not too big to sue but too big in their responsibilities in very profound harm to the nation but they are very big in the role of the responsibility that they were legally required to fill a and failed so there is serious consideration and under way and that he will recommend as appropriate action to be taken. levy finally ask you a couple of questions to clarify general alexander of the airtimes report