tv Discussion-- Dancing CSPAN December 21, 2013 7:45pm-8:46pm EST
>> thank you, danny, for the generous introduction. i'm honored to present the american enterprise institute bradley lecture on my new book "dancing with the devil: history of rogue regimes and terrorist groups," and certainly, as the united states reengages iran, the manner in which american diplomats engage them and as essential, how rogues engage the united states is worthy of consideration. i'm going to step back for a second. the concept of rogue regimes
predates the united states by centuries. the statesmen lamented advantages dictators had over democracies in the diplomacies. dictators neither had popular will taken into account or engage in debates about strategies. late 15 #th early 16th writer and statesmen mock veally used diplomacy as diversionary. what printed have to do, the public must do until such a time as they become powerful it was used to delay rather than by pass war. the romans never had two very big wars going on at the same time. rather, after they selected military targets, they worked
industriously to foster tranquility among the rest until such a time they could turn armies towards the secretary targets. the 11th century persians knew them, likewise, described diplomacy as a cover for other activity. the basis for modern diplomacy is viability of agreement. he had little patience for such notions of honor. a prudent ruler ought not keep fate when by doing so it would be gefns his interest, he wrote. the 30 years war provided 17th century diplomats a backdrop for reflection. while today's debate, the wiz dock, they argued there was no reason to conduct diplomacy with representatives of what he call wicked states. now, western diplomacies evolved far today, but to assume that 21st century rogues have made the same evolutionary leap is
naive. too often, western engaugement of rogue regimes seem a matchup between chamberlain. in such circumstances, chamberlain rarely wins. it's well and good to discuss diplomacy with rogues, but for the purposes of american diplomacy, what is a rogue? there's no consensus about what a rogue regime is, jew den rations accepted the idea that it's the diplomatic equivalent of supreme court justices stance on pornography. i know it when i see it. there's an element of american national security thinking further belter part of four decade. political scientists spoke of priority, but based designation op country's isolations and hostility of its neighbor, their neighbors, rather than moral judgment, hence israel and taiwan and south africa became
praia states. the notion of praias or rogues, however, began to change at the end of the decade as human rights concerns impacted foreign policy. in 1979, citing uganda and pole pot in cambodia, the washington post differentiated between rogue regimes and mere dictatorships. how do we deal with rogue regimes, those that under the color of national sovereignty commit unspeakable crimes against their own citizens, it asks. among diplomats, terrorisms an increasing concern. in 1979, forced by congress, the state department began identifying and labeling state sponsors of terrorism. the islamic revolution in iran underscored the notion that in the middle east, at least, all bets were off. the next years were rough. president reagan, for example, called libyan leader gadhafi the madman of the middle east and described him as part of the a
new international version of murder incorporated, and years before george w. bush would describe an an axis of evil, reagan spoke of a confederation of terrorist states. it was the clinton administration, however, that made rogue regime part of washington's lexicon. when the defense secretary left aspen unvails proliferation initiatives in december 1993, he warned that the new nuclear danger we face is perhaps a handful of nuclear devices in the hands of rogue states or even terrorist groups. speaking in 1994 to politicians in brussels, clinton, himself, described iran and libya as rogue states. sec tear of state kris tosser rougherred to iran and iraq as rogue regimes in an address at georgetown university later that same year. in each case, the clinton administration focused more on rogues towards the yaits than the danger of rogue leaders
posed to their own people. saddam hussein was a rogue leader pursuing nuclear weaponry and invaded kuwait. he was not a rogue because he gasessedded kurds and massacred shiites. tony lake, clinton's national security adviser, thought to define the concept, we've been together all parallelled definition using the term "backlash," the concept was the same. their behavior is often aggressive and defiant, ties between them are growing as they quarantine themselves from a global trend incapable of adopting. they are ruled by cleats that control powers, and they suppress basic human rights and promote radical ideology, and most important for the purposes of u.s. diplomats, these nations exhibit a chronic inability to engage constructively with the outside world and do not function effectively in
alliances, even with those like minded. in 1997, secretary of state albright says dealing with rogue states is one of the great challenges of our time because they are there with the soul purpose of destroying the system. the friends and allies do not get it worrying rogue states were immune to deterrents. clearly, rogue regimes post a challenge, but are they reason to negotiate with someone? the noargs that not talking to countries is punishment to them is ridiculous, then senator obama said in 2007. you don't make peace with friends. you have to be willing to engauge with enemies. hillary clinton opinedded in the context of talks with the taliban. within the state department, there's a culture which treats engaugement as cost free. we will be no worse off if we try diplomacy and fail, former undersecretary of state
commented, and bush secretary of state promoted a similar argument. we have enough confidence in our aided and abetted as dip mats to go eye-to-eye with people. even though we disagree in the strongest way possible and come away without losing anything. the notion it never hurts to talk never has been challenge. to encourage strategies, advocates of the diplomacy cite high cost of military action and dislocate and high cost of sanctions. certainly, they are right with regard to the cost of other strategies, but just because strategy a and strategy b have costs, does not make strategy c cost free or panacea. the cost of engauging rogue regimes can be high. that is not an argument against diplomacy, but ignoring costs and the strategy increases the price and diminish the success
of diplomacy. a few observations. first of all, rushing diplomacy under cuts success. there are two general schools of diplomacy. one believes that diplomatics waits for the right circumstances to put through major initiatives and the other advises engaging in processes to engage alternates. the most astounding breakthroughs, agreed to peace with israel, only after trying to achieve aims in war and failing. the lightning speed of kuwait led to a conference in which countries like syria sat down with israel for the first time. operation desert storm changed north korea dramatically, and neither israel or the palestinians reached the accord, had it not been for the demise of the soviet union. seldom anymore, do dip mats set
circumstances for success. neither pakistan nor the taliban have incentives to seek peace when the united states releases prisoners before talks start or announces timelines for withdrawal, nor will iran believe they have to compromise to the same extent on its nuclear program when it regards american power as being in retreat, hence iran's back peddling in days about the actor and what enrhment compromises it's made. leverage is a dirty word. the state department regularly a poses new sanctions, politicians seeking outreach concur, and presidents waive sanctions at disposal. perhaps the best example of this involves saddam hussein. in april 1990, the united states expelled an iraqi diplomat involved in a incident in the united states, and in light of this, an iraq versioning weapons program, u.s. newses and world report rendered saddam the
world's most dangerous man. some of you may remember the cover. still, proponents of engagement refuse to give up. senator spector traveled twice to baghdad to meet saddam, and so impress the with the sincerity, he helped block military sanctions on iraq. there's an opportunity to pursue discussions with iraq, he said two mochtses later, and i think that it's not the right time to impose sanctions. less than two months after that, iraq invaded kuwait. only after several years did he acknowledge that saddam exploited him. they acknowledged that they transformed their 48 hour embassy sit-in back in is the 79 into a 444-day crisis once they read a boston globe article in which a carter national security staffer leaked that military
operation to be taken off the table. now, they talk about a pair dime in which every strategy has an information, military, and economic component, and academic talk about hard and soft power. the concepts are the same. success depends on all elements of government power being used together, and yet diplomats and politicians seek to free sanctions and military preparations in order, they imagine, to enable diplomacy's success. nothing is further from the truth. culture matters. the problem is not inadequate sensitivity to other culture. if anything, americans are too sensitive. for example, prom innocent ambassador pickerring and colleagues warned after some iranians complained that iranians, quote, ripped out the use of the phrase, carrots and
sticks, depicting them as donkeys and implies a threat of beating iran into submission if they could not be bought. put aside the rig iranian chapters, death to america. they used the phrase carrots and sticks, and accepts manufactured grievance as real, they effectively infused iranian sincerity and blame america. never poalingsz to rogue states. they demand apologies, for example, for the 1953 coo. let's put aside the debates with regard to 1953 coo for a second. iran's religious clergy at the time was a coconspirator with the united states and great britain against the soviet union leaning leader, suspectedded of leaning, and iran's communism party. when officials have apologized for that episode, for example, secretary of state albright in 2000 and obama more recently,
>> multi-cultural lissome was ingrained in to me but after that i went to yale and multiculturalism was put on a pedestal there but that is not simply about appreciating each other's differences not about going into this sushi join to him order the food but we need to recognize different people think in different ways and we have to understand that when rigo into negotiations now with adversaries but regimes that
bay base their philosophy on something other than the evolution of modern western diplomacy as we know it. rather than ameliorate tension they convince bad behavior pays both iran and north korea to develop nuclear and missile capabilities without interruption. as the 1991 and reach a demonstration is more effective and diplomatic the state department once understood this but one's culture changed over the decades since the cold war's end they operate under the assumption they should look at diplomacy rather than the combined them. as the sub = dell whole cub
biting diplomacy sanctions as the effective information campaign to broadcast the american perspective directly can amplify diplomacy effect. i should note while trying to reach senator biden had urged american public broadcasting to tone down some criticism of human rights of the regime in order to make diplomacy more likely. that was over a decade ago. it is the wrong way to conduct business.
our current negotiations are not new. we have done this before or to let reality intrudes. but in 1997 the u.s. ambassador to pakistan wrote there is little evidence to suggest with the entire western agenda me. the head of the american negotiation delegation concluded is actually a desire for more dialogue all he has subsequently been promoted. on august 31st 1998 number three launched a new missile while talks were ongoing.
the advancement of north korea military under the agreed framework and continued defiance for one more call the clinton administration would not reassess the process to justify the diplomacy that to be concluded no serious consequence for the provocation just as important also provided enemies while washington embraced investment in the north japan had been a fan suspended funding. the clinton did the industry should did not allow the north for the breaking of commitments to side track diplomacy even with the non-partisan concluded the number three and did you mp program headed financed since the framework was signed that might hinder cat this entire policy of the missile talks with know
where the birth this is -- israel construction resumed. sometimes the best way to have diplomacies succeed is demonstrate a willingness to walk away. let me just say as an aside that while the news today is filled with tension between the white house in the israeli prime minister that donny off do this battered also isn't limited to the middle east with the nettlesome on based united states wanted to gauge north period the south korean president gave an interview in which he criticized the american initiative not because he was opposed necessarily to negotiants but under the right circumstances had not been set properly. the clinton administration at the time went ballistic
we saw a lot of the name to aids making ad hominem attacks on the president as that becomes part of bashing allies over the sake of adversaries. one of the most amazing things of previous administrations is we always believe that with the occupied the white house with the failure of past diplomacy was more with predecessors they and their adversaries. it doesn't matter if you are a republican or democrat. it is with high-stakes diplomacy and when someone suggests the emperor has no clothes personal animus can be great. , founded a problem is the
tendency to shop around for partners with the most compliant are those that could deliver want to allow good, bad cop while pursuing goals through terror. with political rivalries we might exploit but those factions matter on the issues of greater concern simply plucked factional rivalries of north korea of france and germany and switzerland are not the same when you are run by a supreme leader sometimes those rivalries at best are cosmetic. had any rate during the hostage crisis the card registration was understandably desperate to reach out to any iranian who would listen and i will not criticize jimmy carter. no one knew what would happen to those hostages
there was fear they would try a long dash be tried by tribunals in be executed so we need to put ourselves in jimmy carter's place when considering the faith -- the fate of the hostages at the time he would reach out to any i radian that with this and but to be set up with a meeting with l sadr but that failed when he lost his post after only two 1/2 weeks but his physician did not stop him from adding to demands no sooner did f. former trader from the fpl as to propose that the carter administration reached out to him he made demands go further. in order to prove their own legitimacy i would not say
the popular crowd but the new regime that if we reach out to a session they need to prove themselves by increasing demand there for if we would only stop and take a pause the problems on the table can be less than if we move forward with this much dialogue as we can. metric smattered this state department avoids those so seldom cuts is loss when the policy is failing. as said in the introduction introduction, as soldiers spend less time in the field they and the classroom to identify errors but diplomat selleck -- sold them a knowledge failure before obama offer the outstretched ian to irene he never
described as similar efforts by jimmy carter or reagan or were bush had failed her never to the state department wonder why that consideration but why that should succeed i recall albert einstein definition of aseity doing the same action repeatedly but expecting different results. some officials it is always an heir to negotiate rather than those problems on the ground in reflecting upon the george to view bush failed police peacemaking i am focusing mostly on government right now but in my book i also looked at other aspects for example, people to people dialogue and the entire industry has grown up around the idea that people to people
exchanges were. citizen diplomacy is info. -- in vogue the people to people is a risky gamble. the with conflict resolution but the cost can be highly they have mastered the art to hijack for propaganda to maintain momentum at the height of the dialogue in the year 2000 certainly the clinton did ministration with see the people to people exchanges with the americans offered passport holders iran offered american passport holders the parity was not there in
the course of this led to a self-censorship. those who don't say what they want or don't amplify the position of the world receive will simply find themselves absent. this can also be this way into academia. if you want to get tenure you have to break new ground to open new archives and write creatively but if the fate of your dissertation research depends on getting their rarity said that you have to watch very carefully what you would say it it creates quite a problem. likewise in talking to many participants one of the most interesting dialogues could happen with north korea and certainly any number of former officials of weld bidding conflict resolution
will be shipped in germany with north korean officials track to participants but while they've maybe a citizen free to say whenever they won without government instruction does anyone think there is korea participating in the dialogue is free to improvise to discuss policy officially? is a north korean equivalent they assumed any dialogue partners are just like them pseudo government operated with government instructions therefore if american track to purchase a ticket says something that is seized upon and reported to the north korean leadership that could throw a wrench in negotiations because number three is proclaimed they had been given an incentive for america agrees to a
compromise which would dumbfound anyone involved of the dialogue. the this is not to say an official dialogue cells back channels are useful that is the case of the plo before the oslo accord but seldom do back channels leave regimes. even when they do succeed there comes a time when private dialogue outlives others after all if the goal is to resolve conflicts eventually this requires to demonstrate shaped by years or decades that a new dawn is approaching and to continue those back channels simply allowed growth leaders like the prime
leader to dispense with the peace. so where does this leave us? i've not suggesting diplomacy is a failed strategy far from it but nor is it a simple strategy. diplomacy is not effective when it has conducted in isolation outside of a broader strategy the former advisers never acknowledged that wal-mart gadaffi of the cave man from the cold 2003 when he saw the buildup when allied forces intercepted bbc's china a ship carrying military parts to libya pure intelligence capability coupled with the willingness to use military force enable constructive the engagement after more than 50 years. don't forget gadaffi had
reached out to senator hart more than a decade before the about face in 2003. when americans are engaged in high-profile diplomacy they're willing to throw dissidents under the bus when diplomats invested in high a profile engagement but to avoid the metrics enables them to bypass tricky questions of the efficacy and while it is treated as synonymous with the iraq war corruption of intelligence is a constant problem. put the irony is intelligence is to keep the peace we should not believe that it changes their character of mark gadaffi
showed us in 2004 he ordered the hit of the saudi crown prince are more recently when he turned on his own people while diplomacy may achieve the intermediate name the only way to end as a rogue regime is when it fails they simply do not have a and epiphany. no doubt talks with every and our historic. y ma historian by training i usually only get that right 50 percent of the times and will not put away travel would happen with the iran talks now. but it is dangerous to convince hopeless change or to replace advocacy with analysis. what we see with iran is the end of the beginning rather than the beginning of the end.
if history is any guide the regime is fast the cost is high and success is far from certain. thank you very much. [applause] >> we have plenty of time for questions if you want me to address any issues. please stand up and identify yourself. >> with the foundation for democracy is. you mentioned number three jumps from conclusions from operation desert storm and more generally why don't they have the tiffany's? >> with regard to north korea, frankly for rapid
liberation of kuwait astounded many of regional states and other countries and the role the of the vast capability of the military could not be forgotten we have a situation in which many of the state's from the former communist bloc lost the superpower patron. in conducting interferes oftentimes there is a consistency to is the way diplomats engage but talking to those who are on the team which negotiated with north korea what i got in candid ways that in 1994 it was a
bad deal but we saw all of these regimes were falling. even if promised nuclear reactors we would never get to the point we would have to deliver that because north korea would not survive. that what also illustrate the wishful thinking. that comes with our diplomacy looking to the future hoping for the past that both democrats and republicans have been guilty of that overtime. with regard to why they don't have the tiffany's, i am not a psychologist. i cannot give a comprehensive answer to that. but all i can say is to become a leader of a rogue regime is often a tough business.
at the same time, many come from countries that are not rooted necessarily into liberal culture. don't have there it is shaped. oftentimes the rogues are willing to cut the deal if they see that will preserve their own power but does not necessarily mean they will have a change of heart and overnight become democratic. that would be foolish even if the syrian president survives this civil war in the crisis to expect how he would return to that notion he is just up western educated eye doctor but i will come discussion. but not right now but from others why they can change
their stripes but that does not mean they will ever return to the normal pull of let the international committee considers. >>. >> said negotiations with the insurgents curbs and tribal groups seem to be successful the awakening occurred would you consider that a successful negotiation and if it was why did it succeed and sold many fail? >> that illustrates many of the points. first of all, the insurgents did not simply wake up one day to say we love america
many were deeply dissatisfied with operation and iraqi freedom and had considered themselves of a privileged minority and found themselves when it came to a central government political power on top of that a state of denial that however it is to find the constituent groups with the population they all made iraq is a country with 237% of its own population. now, al qaeda. i did have the weakening? basically they supported the insurgents in mesopotamia and to start running representative shot over local culture in that the plane time we had some of
the tribal leaders who had invented very carefully decide at the same time that when we look at this search and also looking at afghanistan when george of the bush announced the search for iraq war was deeply was nader but bush got to defy the popular will by announcing the search at the same time he did not attach a timeline. said did not happen with their record -- with the rate card of the other strategies with looking militarily is just as much psychological as military. when it comes to the ada to
engage with the roads the combined military strategy with the diplomatic strategy with the informational strategy in the provision of subsidies and jobs and economic strategy it may have been shortsighted because we were promising things we could not fully deliver and also is a device seeing violence but to convince some of those that were in engaged in the search that they could win political benefit through violence what they could not win through the ballot box that the iraqis will pay for quite some time.
>> boehner if the american enterprise institute here say the right time for diplomacy is when the rogue regime how low do you know, where that has happened? barry often negotiations have patch prematurely are portrayed in the fact that we have negotiations has proven that. how to do you distinguish? >> you never want to id entered for me. not that you are bad one of the things i have my interns do is compare the daily files with the success which
they were having with the intelligence that we now know what was actually going on and oftentimes discussion about great progress being made was reflected in the state department cables or memorandums of the conversations that day talking about the alternate reality so if you put your finger on it how do we know? hindsight is 20/20 survey i could be flipped it to say the only difference between compromise and appeasement is hindsight but this is one of those issues that most confronts diplomats at camp david 2002 when clinton wanted to be the president who ushered in peace between israel and palestine he came in as a closer and his aides never would have let him do that had they expected
yasser arafat was not going to mix up the deal that his own negotiators that is what really got the press conference of teleport, undiplomatic bill clinton actually was. fast over 2003 and the breakthrough with omar gadaffi before the americans even started to negotiate we went through years of the british intelligent -- intelligence service betting libyan negotiators making the of reach to be certain that what they said wal-mart gadaffi would do it and they could deliver. that is one of the reasons why that diplomacy was such
a lengthy process. there is a trend in washington and again the case across administration's second term presidents tended to rush to secure their legacy for example, bill clinton wanted a handshake, and normalization with vietnam and israeli and palestinian peace. george w. bush or condoleezza rice wanted to make north korea into his legacy so despite the fact looking at nonpartisan sources the north koreans at the time was working with has polite but yet for the sake of winning the second term break through we've
they've got the better judgments it has not helped national security and unfortunately not just the idea of negotiating but the speed with which we negotiate right now to make sure all the ducks are in a row that rigo the katchis certain statements by the call for her role with flexibility to be endorsements of the diplomacy but later that week fryer leaders appointed was about a change of tactic not policy. so we have any numbers of these examples sometimes
rolls are other adversaries will say one thing to diplomat the other two theaters and another to the audience. it behooves us not to simply excuse for the discrepancy between the two statements but to hold the adversaries to account not only what they say in front of the microphones in geneva to p'yongyang or in rows. other questions? >> i of rudbeckia to japan newspaper. what are your recommendations for number three in today's context? howell broke is tied dash
with your information in? [laughter] s pie purposes of my book isn't making my own personal deford bishop of broke i would apply tony lake's definition in by that account tied mbb the adversary and it may be problematic and at times this strategy may be to face but i don't know if i would characterize as rogue in the same way. with north korea, number three and has become unfortunately accustomed to receiving reward in exchange for defiance. if we ignore north korea
said its defiance only become worse. simply to make the incentive with the olive branch does not necessarily solve the problem. at some point we need to break the cycle that we believe they can get incentives or improve the negotiating position. therefore i would strongly advocate to take a much stronger line or a much more resistant blind when it comes to someone of north korea. they will suffer through the regime which is in place. there has been a consistent cost also with the empowerment of china.
but ultimately we need to draw a line in this the end. what happens when we don't draw a line in the sand? of course, we go back to the beginning of the korean war. there is a national security directive that defined america's defensive perimeter. within six months we were at war. we will be tested it is the response that matters. operation paul bunyan. many of you may remember were hacked to death in the demilitarized zone in the late 1970's. this was after jimmy carter said he would mistral from the forces. north korean soldiers hacked
americans to death how did we respond? we would cut down a tree supported by a carrier strike group sometimes standing up is not working. other questions? >> idea of with byu how why a. you mentioned syria and aside the state department sees a victory in the recent chemical weapons or for them to dismantle their chemical weapons ability. can you comment on that? >> sure. there is a case study in my work by the first ball at least a decade by is the cause of diplomacy. if this was successful in only involves the sites which then we have done is set a precedent that if you have chemical weapons you
throw up your hands to say we surrender in the deaths of the 1400 people are forgotten. i am not up here trying to dash diplomacy but i try to highlight as some advocates try to project it is not cost free. >> may i assume that all of the success of your research is due to the fact you speak arabic and can read faces and understand the nuances that if you had to go through an interpreter you may lose? >> no. quite frankly, both of my arabic and persian are far from flint. >> but it must give you a clear. the reason i ask you that is
why should we assume that negotiating an english has the advantage and with your experience held many senior level americans officials from the executive or congressional branch speak dash june, a turkish per-share nor is the other critical languages that we need to understand the world? >> it is a great question. if we had someone that spoke fluent arabic comment pakistan and would have have no doubt the state department would send them to peraea. [laughter] -- korea. but when it comes to diplomacy we do not always negotiate in english certainly with the run-up to the iraq war a very skilled
request was also negotiating impasse june and persian as those who were skilled at negotiating an arabic but usually as a matter of course, we will produce the english agreement the arabic agreement of the other language united nations does a great deal we go to the security council resolution that israel must withdraw from the territories in the united nations went into detail about which versions would be the tie breakers to open the debate with regard to what the definition article that and so forth.
first of all, we have many skilled diplomats but it doesn't matter how good you are if regional security officers prevent you from the free the embassy compound. we have a fortress today but we only have enough security to have 12 excursions outside the embassy walls of every day and with over 1,000 people and only 12 people are allowed to leave per day it to resume several of those are the ambassador making multiple trips then it does not do you much good to have you that as the foreign-language as the state department of state calculates so that is a problem but that said without a doubt the united states has a problem with language clemency in this is
part of that program the you know, the joke would you call speaks three languages strike illegal to language bilingual, one of language, american. , a. >> player from iran. in terms of the ran you say the negotiations but my question is what is the specific recommendations? for more sanctions? and second questions. and with china and with
russia is more than just the reagan with the american national interest. >> both are very good points i will address the question about the iran diplomacy i am not saying it does not work. after all the algiers accords and led to the release of the hostages we have felt every said the presence people forget the iran contra affair did have its genesis of a desire on the part of the reagan administration to reach out to have leverage in side the islamic republic after the ayatollah khamenei died. when we look at the president of on this first inaugural address, let me
backtrack. recent history is 1,000 years ago but in the united states going back for years it is ancient history but people don't think about moving 1,000 miles away. but to ask iran to stretch out that with george h. w. bush that is much of the same theme we don't need to assume this must go on forever. twice i can think of a time when the republic shot -- shifted positions with what it would take to release the american end hostages the second is what it would take
to end the iran-iraq war. if you read what warren christopher edited with different chapters contributed by all different policy makers and so forth forth, they came to a basic conclusion it was persistence of diplomacy that led to the release of the hostages. the late peter bobbins wrote in 1981 that they got it backwards that the key episode that led to the committee changes his mind is saddam hussain invaded iran and had increased exponentially. now we know from recently declassified documents that
in 1982 the iranians had approached from territory and betty had flitted does ipo there should be a piece fire but they said no. richet of the great jerusalem and then fallen six more years at a cost of hundreds of thousands of people and finally in 1998 -- 1888 he got up to provide the mandates that all except the cease-fire. but anything in our quiver of terrorist to have the supreme leader that is referred to as the real president of the rand, i am not saying diplomacy does not work but it is a tricky business. one last question.
>> you touched on this briefly but engage a with making with negotiators that may convey a certain event message but cannot convey a yes or no? >> ask the audience heard. are we negotiating with the right people why when the defense minister goes with the supreme leader why we make headlines with the deputy foreign minister? ultimately one of those questions that what we risk by not answering that question is we are caught in a good cop for bad cop for plausible deniability with our partners. fake you very much for your attendance.