tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN September 27, 2014 2:30am-4:31am EDT
>> one of the amazing things was usaid was working with us throughout the deployment and we were starting projects. we would check on the projects and as things turned of the city towards august and september and into october we started seeing other projects. it would come up and we would say who's doing that one? it one? it turns out the people themselves were. you start to clean the area up and started to do things that were amazing. that was good to see. >> i have a suggestion for your next project. from fallujah to ferguson. you will even have the same equipment unfortunately. [laughter] >> we have time for one more question. >> hi. i'm a student with american university. i'm a journalism major. i want to ask from your experience what do you want for his readers to take away from an inspiring story about ice is
taking over the city of fallujah and my other question is how did you end up winning the trust of the city in order to change it and make it more prosperous even though isis is taking over the city? >> i think for a lot of a lot of americans they sea ice is taking over iraq and hear about the growth of al qaeda affiliates and there's a sense of what can we do about it? is this something we just have to live with is a permanent condition of our lives? one reason i wanted to write the book is to show that success is possible. it's not by accident. it's a process that takes place. there's learning that has to take place as well. this is not an intractable problem. you can do it but it requires local partnerships. the problem is so much of how we remember war or misremember wars purely about combat.
it's not how wars are fundamentally finished in this type of work very. i that's the big take away i would say. >> i would like to add on that that's one of the reasons we wrote this. to get people to understand when the united states military left iraq for the most part in 2009 and 2010 we left on good terms. things were very quiet. four iraqi was pretty quiet and the job we were given to do had been achieved. you hear nowadays we lost the whole thing and a lot of that has to do with the way people felt about it to begin with which wasn't good but the job was done. one of the things, i could've walked up to prime minister melekian said that you do this and this you are going to have a problem and he did every single one of them. which was absolutely amazing that is what i think with what's going to happen here. one thing you'll notice and ken
pollack from brookings has talked about this a lot. they haven't taken over any shia areas. they can't. they are not strong enough to do that. like mosul, two-thirds of mosul is shia. the only areas that have taken over were the areas they were sympathetic to because they hated the central government because they accuse them of being shia and iranian. they preyed on television and got some equipment. that doesn't mean they know how to use it. they waved the flags around and cut peoples heads off and the tide is turning i think. i suspect this is going to go back with a national unity government i think it's going to go back to being what it was before this started a year or year and a half ago. >> how are you guys able to win the trust of the city of fallujah during that time? >> part of it was the discussion we had with him. over time they had seen how the
u.s. military dealt with them in the city in a professional and balanced way. i have more impact than i thought it would. in discussions that was one of the things they talk about. it did mean it like this. 30 years under saddam hussein they were told we were the bogeyman. they didn't have to like us us. they had to respect his work with us and that's what they did. i don't know if you could say they really trusted us. they knew we were leaving because we told him that and him that and we show them out. they knew the other folks couldn't be around when they left because they'd have what they have now and they clearly did not want that. >> also bill was there for two tours and some have done multiple tours. one soldier did two tours. you become local on the scene and everyone knows you. when you are living the problems everyday as bill did for two tours you know the city better
than some of the residents. it starts to become part of your own life and your own hometown in a weird way. as part of dealing fairly with people and honestly it will take you far. sometimes that's an unusual characteristic. >> there are other small things to build trust. when he you do something small word gets around quickly. one of the city councilmembers came up to me and said his neighbor's son had been arrested by the previous unit and really was not a troublemaker and could i get him back? he had gotten lost in the iraqi prison system. it took me a while but i got them back. i brought them to his house very emotional scene. you can't begin to calculate the effect it has. it didn't take that much effort on my part. there was a combination of all those things going on and a lot of the stuff that dan was doing to help reinforce push the mir out in front, the city council getting them motivated and working when they were under threat.
we went to his city council meeting where dan and i were the only two people that showed up. so it takes persistence and they saw that in us. >> another question? >> she is over there. >> pacification is a very complicated process. empowering people is just chapter 1. the question is how you internalize changes in the population that will last after the u.s. soldier evacuates. it seems to me that marines and military force in this process is almost unfair. it really requires specialists
that know the language, that know the culture which is very different because in the middle east it's important that the concept of honor and shame is much more powerful than money. and also to be the school. these people have to be school schooled. it's a variant of psychological warfare. so since the involvement of the united states in the middle east is not going to be short-term likely, does anybody think about training a special force that will be attached, and you know part of the forces that have come to these countries and do a job that is a specialty job together to enhance and
synergize by this shia military of the marines? >> the u.s. army special forces is organized around different regions of the soldiers can focus on that part of the world, get that language and training -- cultural training and that's good in terms of working with local security forces forces. on the civil side state department usaid has people staying in the country for multiple years so they have, they eventually get to some wisdom about the place. the state department often has a challenge with manning austere locations with the kind of people who have the skill sets. they also send many of their people to foreign institutes. one of the things we have in afghanistan called the afghan hands program. it was an attempt to get out of this relentless careerism aboveboard promotions of getting people to eventually get out of the country or the region and
really focus on afghanistan for multiple tours of language training. the problem is that to the war in afghanistan of a certain size to slightly bent personnel rules to have the program created. right now the institutions are reverting back to their normal resting place which is to say good for you have -- for having been an afghan ham an afghan ham but your an afghan ham but your career is done thank you very much are you very much or you would post it to someplace where you will never get the next promotion. places like iraq and somalia and the sedges of empire we think they need these types of deep subject matter expert piece but also the relationships. most of these countries are based on relationships not in formal situations we have in the west. i think in yemen we need a yemeni hands program. we will be there for a long ti time. >> back to one of your first comments about whether it's fair not. in many ways especially when there's complete lack of security who else is going to do
it? that's part of the issue is you have to establish security first but one of the things we emphasize with the marines and soldiers as we have have to deal that handed off to someone. our presence there is an antibody and we understand that clearly. >> this is what i meant. i didn't mean to take away any. >> no, no but you hear that echoed in some of the marines and soldiers, this isn't fair. what is the enemy get to do things that we don't. well we are not them. so why do we have to do this? why can't we have more state department folks state department folks and folks from other agencies in your? they are allergic to getting shot at. those are the kinds of things when you don't have the security you have to have something in their that calms things down and inclination has to be we need to build a hand this off to someone. somebody else has to come in here and do this for the long-term to get things calm down because we know we don't belong. i hope that answers your question.
>> hassan abbas is a professor at the national defense university and author of the "the taliban revival" about the reemergence of the taliban in afghanistan after u.s. and nato invasion of 2001. he talked about his book at the carnegie endowment for international peace for about an hour and a half. >> welcome to the session on the resurgence of the taliban at the carnegie endowment. we are happy to welcome you here this morning and i must tell you from the very beginning this is cosponsored with your organization in this. what this session is about is the launching of this book, "the taliban revival" violence and extremism on the pakistani-afghanistan frontier.
this is indeed a timely book, or maybe not so much a timely book. ideally i don't know because we arrived at the end of the cycle. this cycle is the cycle of western intervention in afghanistan. this is definitely not the end of the arab complex. unless we believe our own propaganda this is not likely to be so in the months to come. since the end of 2001, a lot of people have died in afghanistan. all of that was -- the taliban. i know that the focus these days in the country is mostly about the election and what is going wrong in this election. it will escape none of you that what we see actually is a
resurgence of the taliban in both the south and east. none of this can be really surprised since there was mass information both places. the point is not whether this is the case. we know what's going on a retry to know what's going on. we certainly don't know everything. the question is whether does this mean that almost 13 years of war in afghanistan, additional war in afghanistan has served no purpose? has the taliban been eradicated? definitely not. does that mean that the war was a success? that's definitely a different story. this is what this book in many ways is about. how did we get into the situation we are in now? how did we get into a situation that everybody in 2002's thought
had been more or less eradicated or what was left of it was essentially residual. how is it that this movement has come up again and this is what this book by hassan abbas is about. i'm happy to say that this is an attempt to bring an objective perspective looking at a different angle. this is a three-dimensional aspect of the book which in my opinion is of interest. the role of kabul is something that is discussed. the role of western policy and again this is something which is slightly less discuss. today we tend to say mission accomplished or so we would like to believe. for that matter we are delighted today to welcome the author's hassan abbas and let me say for
most of you, for many of you at least he doesn't need an introduction. he's a professor of the department of regional and analytical studies at the national university college of international security affairs in washington d.c.. he is also senior adviser at the asia society. he previously served as the distinguished professor at columbia university and the sitting adviser at the belfour center for science and international affairs at the kennedy school of government. to me what is more important is he is a very prolific writer and many of you remember his first book, pakistan's -- extremism. with those words i will not stand between you and the speaker. we will ask a song to please come up and present your book. >> thank you very much. thank you very much and it's a
great privilege and honor to be here and to see many friends and for so many of us to be able to find time. in the beginning i mentioned frederick is an old friend and his work has affected many of us. it's bold and courageous and scholars of south asian studies. thithis is a newer organizationa think tank and advocacy group and bloodgood and indifferent thing about this organization is it's primarily pakistani americans but benefiting from expertise in the guidance of many scholars of south asian descent and many of the other scholars. they believe in making pakistan a progressive state and also
building u.s.-pakistan relations so thank you very much. i wish the u. the best of your luck in your endeavors. to give you first the main arguments of my book and also briefly talk about my recent visit which was kind of a book to her. i landed in pakistan for 15 da days. it was an opportunity to go to iraq. i had the opportunity to speak to parliamentarians and law enforcement agencies. some of the things that i heard and it's not that i'm just mentioning iraq, the linkages between the pakistani taliban and this new militant group which have built a new state,
it's very interesting. some of the slogans that it started coming up on the streets in iraq are in language. we will talk briefly about some of those linkages as well. first and foremost i must add this is also about my background other than me academic background and his face. i had a great honor to serve as a police officer in pakistan's tribal areas between 1995 and 1997. some of my ideas and talks are based upon that. one of the understandings with my publisher was who has greatly helped me in -- to have some of the stories and ideas. i have many anecdotes in the
book on that. what i want to begin with i had friends who lived around many cities around the world but my experience with pashtuns for both afghan and pakistan make up 80% of all taliban. my experience living among the pashtuns and i'm not pashtuns as i have not seen as many as hospitable and friendly as the pashtuns. at the same time i have found the pashtuns but they are principles are very religious. in their day-to-day affairs they are not only pragmatic but quite similar. i served as an assistant superintendent to the schools in 1997 and said -- 98. it was taken over by the militants who were beheading and
killing people on the streets before we have become aware of this phenomena phenomenon elsewhere. i remember a few years before this that in pakistan in those days and i'm not talking about the 1970s. this is late 1990s but if you want to hear good music and see the sights have a drink perhaps or whatever you smoke if you want to do that, subbot is the best place. it really changed and radicalized. this brings me to the pashtuns. having seen them as hospitable and very secular and i can mention only one name abdul for a con. i don't think that any pashtun leader or pakistani leader was so close to gandhi the great indian leader.
they used to call him frontier gandhi because of his secular ideas. despite being a religious man. what was the biggest for me was having seen it up close what was the extent that they produced and are producing unfortunately 70 to 80% of all taliban. what had gone wrong? so in search of that question i started working on my book. we have in the united states and the rest of the world are familiar with the phrase afghan in pakistan or afghanistan however if you start picking up the history books you will find most books of history are in the political arena. focus on the overall south asian affairs a competitive political study mostly on pakistan and bangladesh india of course and some of the other countries.
you can find a book which is comparing pakistan and afghanistan. this is the 9/11 construct. for security reasons and political elite reasons the focus was on these but there's not enough academic study or historical treatment of the subject. that was another purpose. i realized if i wanted to talk more about pashtuns and that is how i'm constantly pronouncing it different because in pakistan the call at pashtuns and their side of the pashtuns is called -- mike pashtuns. the first challenge was pakistanis is a 60 country and -- was built in 1700's, very
different ideals and different ethnic factors and tribalism played a major role in the creation of what we know today is afghanistan. whereas in pakistan it was of course a product of a very secular progressive movement led by all those leaders. the 15 most important pakistani leaders and political founders of pakistan. you would be amazed. they were from all different ethnic backgrounds, different sectarian backgrounds all very secular. it would seem if you looked at those from the 1940s it would be difficult for you to comprehend how a state whose own founders and the people who came up with the idea for pakistan how was it drifted into a very different direction? that too is a phenomena that i try to answer the question how
that drift had taken place. that was just to begin with the larger context of what we are looking out. there are five major factors that i would like to mention in my findings as well. first and foremost is the particular need for us to understand the different ways in which the taliban and pakistani taliban developed, how they were groomed in some ways, what was the genesis of these organizations? my net finding is that today afghan taliban, the old guard of the afghan taliban seems to be quite open to negotiations. i would not say they have gone toward the left but they have
migrated quite a bit and they are looking for opportunities and openings to negotiate. but these afghan taliban and maybe some of the other associates then my understanding the old guard afghan taliban have lost control of the insurgency taking place in afghanistan today. this is the second which has links with criminal groups and various sectarian groups as well as well as those who really believe that the foreign presence in afghanistan was something they have to fight. they were not necessarily taliban or militants but that was the considered view. that is what is in their. that is what their tribal identity has led them to believe. that is the narrative that has been embedded in their mindset. those people who are still fighting into my assessment continue to fight, this is one
subset of the afghan taliban. that taliban asian-americans if i might say are trying to negotiate in some form or shape to bring to into a mainstay in the biggest problem in my assessment the old guard trying to take control of insurgent the insurgent movements of a can directed and potentially bring it somewhat towards the middle. that's briefly my assessment of afghan taliban stand. they have various other groups. one is the haqqani group which operates from a pakistan afghanistan border and which is now on the run. some people believe because there's a major pakistani military organization that is happening. i just want to expand on this division between the old guard
and the new taliban. coming to the pakistani taliban. the pakistani taliban unlike the afghan taliban who had cooperated and a few more words about the afghan taliban. the afghan taliban had coordinated and collaborate with al qaeda -- collaborated but it never merge. there are couple of good studies that have come in recent years. bin laden had used afghan taliban for their financial needs and used al qaeda. however in the case of the pakistani taliban there was more of a merger that had taken place. the nature of the group and their publications, their media and the pakistani taliban are quite active on social media as well. they afghan taliban are also but the pakistani taliban are more so.
the afghanistan taliban are far more dangerous and lethal. they have moved far closer to al qaeda and in fact today if you ask in many experts how do we define and analyze them today you will not be able to explain to them and ask without explaining the dynamics of the pakistan taliban. that's the kind of proximity that has taken place. this brings me to the point i was referring to about iraq. the belief is there are around 300 pakistani taliban and some other religions from the affiliated groups. from syria they move into iraq. some of the new slogans mostly in parts of iraq, there are
these pakistani taliban who are beginning. the pakistani taliban are also interesting and not homogeneous in terms of the pashtun identity. they are sick. groups in punjab the americans who have infiltrated or who have joined the ranks of pakistani taliban in a very big fashion. the number of in terms of the threat by the pakistani taliban all you need to see is read about the major terrorist attack at the karachi airport. the major attack on the milita military -- military headquarters destroying one of the most important aircraft that they had. the attack on the air force base and in one case they successfully attacked a location
where pakistanis were believed to have kept some of its nuclear arsenal. the point is a case of the pakistani taliban there are linkages of security forces behind the scene in terms of some insiders and in terms of some people who are radicalized enough, that is a much more dangerous phenomenon. security analysts -- if i were security analyst i would spend more time looking at the pakistani taliban. there were attempts made to engage pakistani taliban during these issues. part of the reason the pakistani taliban art directed is because the only way pakistan attempted to get at them was through kinetic needs. from their point of view state out of the afghanistan tribal area. some part of it is still a hub. they moved into the mainstream
pakistan and it was extremely difficult to monitor to them. that's the kind of analysis of the pakistani taliban afghan taliban. now coming to more of an academic and not for very long time come in terms of how do we understand based on the major issues, because we found these problems whether it's a broader law enforcement or is it about education? is it about a rule of law system collects all of those are very good ideas from a long-term perspective. to be able to get to this challenge or to understand this before we can attempt to -- it has to go through a new wants analysis in which i claim that i
have attempted. there are five points that i want to mention about those but before that i will mention a couple of antidotes -- anecdot anecdotes. these are partly from my book and partly from the experiences i had. i remember the day that former pakistani prime minister was returning to pakistan. i was honored to have served with her for a brief time in 1995 and 96. in 2007 when she was returning i was talking to her and she just mentioned, she said once upon a time you were a police officer. what is the security situation in pakistan what should i expect when i land in pakistan? myself, many security officials and friends who focused on these issues we almost had a consensus before this. i asked her, i said do you want me to be blunt and direct and
she said absolutely. i said i think there's a very high possibility that you could be investigated and she said instantly, instantaneously i know it. tell me something else that i need to -- and i appreciate her encouragement. she knew she was walking to a death trap not only because at that time the pakistani militants were strong enough. her assessment was come and i think she was not absolutely right at that time but that's a new reality. the radicalization is taking place in pakistan unfortunately. it's not only confined to the militant camps or the waziristan area. it has seeped into the society in some ways. still a minority. still pakistan by and large. if you give them a chance they will mostly vote for relatively progressive political parties
whether the pashtuns where they would vote historically along the secular party but having said that the way the discourse has changed in pakistan, for instance the debate going on in some institutions apply this isis military groups who have taken part of -- over iran weiss is a good idea? at the end of the days have brought islamic state. that discourse is -- the day she landed there was a major attack. those of you to follow that in karachi there were hundreds of thousands people who came to receive her. there was a major attack. that evening i was very passionate about pakistan and i wrote something. i wrote who tried to kill benazir bhutto and i've made the case that beta masoud the
previous head of the pakistani afghan -- taliban. she immediately wrote about it. she sent back a text to me and i sent it to her that night. she wrote back and said this is not beta masoud. she said something to the effect and i'm paraphrasing that these are the radical elements within the pakistani establishment. that means bureaucracy as well but by and large it prefers to establishment at intelligence and the military. ..
enforcement. has that bennie never done the right kinds of things? and you did not take it to the right -- the next up8:íg when we see them moving and then that impacts as it would extend into that area. separation between isi and that pakistan are many -- are we in terms of operations. the leadership of isi comes from the army structure and then moves back at some point. and most of their own assessments that they are not separate entities but it
is the single policy. and this haqqani group comes out of that single policy. one example might be but we have not seen much in the way of haqqani victims in the current drive in resisting and. >> thank you for that work and for your research. your job -- jeb bush has done a great job but it was a great idea.
enforcement and has happened and not much has been done. because unlike in the military relationship with the clear responsibilities. with the united states it does not assume office. i really hope we have more funding. we have done a few things that kept us away from this but this is the idea right in my next book with the partnerships to support international intervention. but the same state?
sorry i amb6+÷ a professor and trained to give long answers. >> i am so grateful to hear of this from building up over many years. but you mention but i think some of the questions are debated. it is this type of cases. and to mention again that intonation that you gave. with the law enforcement enhancements.
first and foremost, those whose served. [inaudible] he had mentioned working in the prime minister's office that all the departments can honest and efficient and competent prime minister. allots are very basic. the first and foremost, for that accountability. with the major case of corruption. in that democratic arena.
that is the first thing but the second thing is the tendency of pakistan with there is the mosque for the church the state has nothing to do with it. and he was not into some corner. because his idea of pakistan they were very far away from those ideas. but they can do small things. in some of those issues with the policy issues.ot,yx
can actually bring benefit. second, if -- you talked about afghan, taliban, and pakistan's -- for quite some time as opposed to the pakistani taliban. i'm still wondering what exactly was the reaction of afghan taliban on pakistan's decision to side with the united states post 9/11? was there a sense of betrayal from the government of pakistan? if they felt that kind of betrayal, then i would assume that their reaction should have
been -- should have been some sort of a position within them, and wouldn't that create a tension against the state of pakistan? >> both are very good questions. second question, about afghan, taliban, and whether there's a betrayal. i mention that as one of my main arguments in my chapter three or four, and you're right. this is obvious from the book, "my years with the taliban." you can read that book and you see the distaste he has for all things pakistan but a he thinks the pakistanis went after him. simply no doubt about it. that's why i found out the -- but still, we know for a fact from studies that a majority of afghan taliban, even moved to pakistan with their families, and i think -- a leader who
still most likely by the taliban because military are pushing them. they want them to come to the negotiating table. that's the commit. they give to the united states. in the initial years of afghan taliban, they ignore the opening to come to pakistan in afghan they would have been killed in bombing. pakistan, keep them space at least to, i think -- it's my guess, and estimate, without any empirical direct source in this case, i think maybe around 100 afghan taliban leaders are close to the -- around that number probably came to pakistan. they brought their families and maybe their families are already living there. and then at that time they talked about bassan should have stood by them but they were
thankful. and, yes, there was a lot of manipulation as well. so, afghan taliban owed a lot to pakistani forces that helped them before 9/11. in operations against northern alliance. so this control -- some were still sympathetic to pakistan but that fight also, wherever pakistan needed afghan taliban, the old guard, had to go off to pakistani taliban. so they responded to that old reach by not coming out against pakistani taliban. so your question is very valid. the other question -- and i'll takemont, but that a very profound idea you have, and i'm absolutely not making a suggestion that from the -- from outside as a tool to -- i am interested because sunni and shia, but one thing is in
common, these are the points in punjab, or whether these are shabaab -- i start my book there. they had some common ideas which were -- which was complete nonviolence, which was always honoring the poor and giving them hope and was also nonenforcement. you'd be surprised go to sharif, a shrine, and you would be amazed at times more hindus than muslims there. why? becausecpa they never forced ane to convert. and those who -- i don't want more investment, more political support for them bump their tradition provide a bridge to
different muslim sects and not only tolerate each other -- if you tolerate others that a success. i think it respect for the other, which is -- and all the sufi teachings, about human being as a human being. that's why in terms of ideals, i support that sufi cause. but if anyone try to choreograph it, negative reaction. totally unprecedented in the history of south asia, never before there was an attack on a sufi shrine. that happened because of two reasons, one, because of the biggest -- bigoted people, and big bigotry, and those people know well that the challenge to
their orthodoxy and conservativism and narrow minedness is imbedded in the talk. they're fearful that what if that talk would get support, political or international. so we have to be very, very careful, and thank you for raising that point. >> thank you very much. i asked you to -- i'd like to apologize to all those who didn't get a chance to ask a question. i like to thank -- i'd like to also invite all of you and to attend the session this coming monday with -- to all of you, thank you very much. your presence, and please
even in these days, the rising concern about the young men going to the middle east in search of jihad or adventure and finding themselves caught up in extremism and violence and in many cases converting either to extremist causes or becoming disillusi disillusioned and resulting in them becoming a problem when they return to the west. there was a 1949 book called "the god that failed" that was about people that embraced c embraced commune ism and tonight's story is a story of conversion and empany and
conversion again and then loss of faith. i think you will find it fascinatin fascinating. the story is one that was developed initially by our then historian dr. mark stout and i will introduce them and he will introduce our speakers. mark developed this story having encountered the individual of interest in of all things, now pay attention, particularly you older people on facebook. anything can come out of facebook rather it is academic research or discoveries from the spy museum. it will involve a complicated, involved case involving the equities of the cia. i made the choice not to recuse byself, i have to be the museum
director but to give mark and his associates the lead and let them develop the case and let the case take them where it may. that is what mark and his successor dr. hoyton have done. tonight's case is going to be presented and mark will introduce the speakers and handle the q&a. mike was our historian and now directs the master degree program and the global securities and intelligence program at john hopkins school of arts and science. he had 15 years in the federal government as an analyst and has degrees from stanford and harvard and co-authored three books and published a number of
articles. help me welcome mark stout. mark? >> well, thank you very much. i am be brief. i am honored here to introduce morten storm, paul cruickshank, and tim lister for the book lamp of "agent storm: my life inside al qaeda and the cia" which is just coming out in the united states -- launch -- it is a remarkable book. if you look on the back you will see this from me. a few words about the authors starting with tim. tim joined the bbc out of college and worked in the middle east for a number of years and in 1996 moved to cnn and spent a number of years there with cnn international. he specialized, not exclusively though, in terrorism. in 2011 he was at an obscure
village and i am told he was in eastern ukraine. paul cruickshank is a cnn terrorist analyst and investigative reporter. his website said he is out of new york but from what i can tell he roams the world as much as tim. he has degrees from cambridge and john hopkins university. he is a great reporter and did great scholarly work on al-qaeda. i just sent off a book chapter that draws in part in his work. it is a real pleasure to be with him this evening. and last and certainly not least is morten storm who you will be seeing on this screen. morten is coming from an undisclosed location in the uk.
morten you can come on out. here we go. i won't say too much -- there we are -- but i will not say much about morten's study but he contributed to our struggle against violent jihadism and the al-qaeda network. i have been study violent jihadist for 20 years since the russians invaded in 1994 and i will say i am only aware of two other cases even slightly, and i empicize slightly, like morten storm at all. the first is collins who was an american who converted to islam and became radical and went to fight along the arab jihad and
deradicalized when he heard about people he thought understood his faith in egypt were blowing up women and children. he wrote a book in 2002 called "my jihad". the other is omar samari. he got involved with jihadist extremist and thought it would be a good idea to embezzle money from them, realized how adaption dangerous that was and went to the france government and worked with them. in the late 1990's he fell out with his insiders and wrote a book later on.
to be here. the palm tree isn't necessarily real behind behind him. but morten's story is exceptional. we have never seen a story like this with somebody who has gone so deep inside the world of al-qaeda and come back to tell the tale not in a courtroom or guantanamo bay. but someone who has been at the tip of the sphere in the important targeting operations since 9/11. so this journey has been so rewarding and we have learned so much from him. he has exceptional insight and experiences and one hell of a story to tell. >> yeah, as we worked with
morten we found out his rolodex was something else. he knew so many people over the last 10-15 years all over the world. he was everywhere and met all of these people and then there came the moment where he decided he could not deal with it anymore. there were all sorts of reasons we will get into later on. it wasn't an instant moment. he is not alone in that. we will try to work through the story with some of the incredible volume of physical evidence he brought to us rather it was recordings, e-mails, visa stamps and everything that helps
substantiate his account of what happened to him. he visited denmark, talked to his family, talked to a lot of people that knew him and built a picture and it is a complicated picture of a guy who was into all kinds of bad stuff as a kid. isn't that right, morten? >> you are so kind. >> he was a baker and boozer and found islam at the age of 21 on the coast of denmark. he was the true jihadist for nearly ten years before he decided in about 2006 it wasn't for him anymore because it moved beyond where he was comfortable. but his contacts were gold dust for the western intelligence agency and he was introduced to the cia. >> you said his mentor from
2006, a friend and mentor and those connections we had became interesting to the cia and other western intelligence services. he began the campaign of terrorism in the west inspiring lone wolf attacks. he was behind the underware b b bombing and others. -- underwear -- it was about the betrayal that was necessary were our security. morten, introduce yourself, buddy. >> hi, guys. thank you very much for coming. thank you for the international spy museum, maxed out, paul and tim you guys are super