tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN October 21, 2014 11:00pm-1:01am EDT
and lot of bipartisan votes for her to attack me but that is too bad because there really are people in we did our best but again it was just as sad day for this country because of partisan politics in mecca was writing questions for this debate on september 29 and went of the reality check of the daschle debt so i've looked at the clock it was alarming. really in one minute it increased by roughly 1.$1 billion in one minutes or as of tonight at that pays a richard has not slowed down $11 billion this does not bode well for our children or grandchildren what plays will believe them if we don't rein in spending
so you talk about the balanced budget bill so explain your criticism. >> we cannot balance the budget. or medicare as we know it cutting social security cutting education funding is not the way to go. >> but everybody has to have skin in the game. >> we have to protect our kids the way you get out of debt is with pro-growth policies. and then i was a part of the farm bill the way we did that we took a of look at the duplicative programs to make sure we were cutting the programs to make them better we can do that we just need leadership we have
done it before. to actually bring it down i studied business that is what i did undergrad of economics. we needed to do this there are a ton of different areas we can do it would get the corporate loopholes and a number of different things but we need leadership. valadao: with the house or the senate to pass the budget still looking at those members to do the math we decided pass a budget of paul ryan of the majority in the house. >> but we have to realize we
have to work together it is just as important for the retiree today and jesse have to make sure the penang ashley pet programs are solvent so we make sure that they worked for the first time the fibers in shares the members of congress have not seen the appropriations committee to pass an appropriations process instead of the continuing resolutions that have been happening for the last five years. >> but now we have the budget but we try to make sure social security and medicare all the programs are there for the next
generation teeeighteen we will take of a quick break that we will talk isis. ♪ ♪ >> moderator: welcome back watching a live debate between the two candidates of the 21st congressional district. >> moderator: and representative valadao. we will start off with a question to support common core in reference to a common core curriculum the status of california is transitioning into calls for more critical thinking in the testing process for students. if not would you help get it out of california?
how many years did you teach ? >> one-year. >> moderator: you are not teaching, and for what it using today? renteria: my eighth teacher is then teacher here in the valley of course, the mom works also and i really could have the upper judy's i have had in my life but common core is narrow everyone is starting to talk about i think we need to give it more time to understand it but we really need to listen to the teachers on the ground by a understand how hard it is how it you motivate each one of these kids and, in court is a new way of thinking. i was talking to a couple of kindergarten teachers they
said it is new. but if you are for it or against it they said give it a little bit more time. they appreciate the idea people try to think through because we need to figure out education this country but at the same time let's see what this looks like. >> it is more wrote based and critical sinking on your feet's. valadao: as a father of three young children and spend time and my kids klaus have been talking to teachers all over the district. our schools are feeling something has to change and common core is the idea that was brought up by deal like the freedom of the teachers we have some great teachers to do a good job to make sure the kids have time to read the also hear stories
of some that are horrible but i struggle with math because some kids are really struggling how would applies to real-world. talking a parent teacher conference that comment was i cannot help my kid with mass. this is a problem. we do have to look over but it is not ready for prime time but with that critical thinking there is some opportunities. >> moderator: talk about minimum-wage $9 an hour and will be at that than is that sufficient? valadao: right now it is sufficient. >> moderator: $10 an hour? valadao: yes. if you look at minimum-wage us state has a responsibility to a smaller
group of people. look at california with communities like san francisco with the high housing costs are central valley i have friends who moved to oklahoma or other states they sell a house here in the cost of living is a much different situation. we want to make sure our nation is competitive in every state has that opportunity. but with the thinking is a good start and we can create some higher wage jobs there's some things out there so we're not so focused. >> the key question if they're working if the
answer is yes panera is something wrong and i said this several times we do need to raise the minimum federal wage because right now california is at a disadvantage with our neighboring states when they say right now it does have a higher rate than surrounding places we need to make sure people can work. it is incredibly important point i do with the federal minimum wage needs to go up. >> moderator: we need to keep the answer is concise. valadao: i am very much against it. i opposed it the first time back in 2010 when i was
running for the assembly i spent time in sacramento and on the budget committee and it is the disaster from the ground up talking to people in the district talking to a couple at the restaurant and now they are ran over with high-speed rail. everything will be undercut and left with nothing and it needs to be shut down for different reasons but that does not make sense the plan does not work. renteria: at the moment i think the cost is not where
everyone expected them to be. where i go out in the district i get a lot of questions where will the dollars come from? is this the place where jobs could have come from? the often say those jobs are here the 21st district. the difference between the congressmen and i he has hit this project pretty hard to say it is a complete disaster i don't disagree with where it is now that the end of the day let's be a part of the discussion to make sure the jobs are here like 50 percent unemployment rate wicket where the jobs are. tuesday is -- as a bait bring people here to do
these jobs? i a disagree with where it is now. >> moderator: ask a quick question for a 30-second answer teton national resources defense council of the bay area and the national resources defense council hosted a fund-raiser for my opponent in the bay area. do you take the contributions from this extreme group? renteria: this is a political stunt and everybody knows that. valadao: yes or no. renteria: everyone knows this including anyone i have never talked to my family lives here will i take their
water away? of course, not the aclu even try to go there. i appreciate everyone's supporting a spot at the end of the day we have to work the idea that all of a sudden this is a problem of where the money comes from for my opponent. valadao: with the valley. renteria: i have no idea when it happened.
really? we have got to be working on this. renteria: i have no idea when this happened. really? how long ago? listen, we have got to be working with everyone here is what happened central valley brought everyone together if we have divisive relationships with people in need to do everything you can on water we're done. >> moderator: one minute before closing statements. renteria: i worked hard on the farm bill looking at one
of the big debates my opponent voted to cut $20 million of food stamps while at the same time taking a lot of subsidies is not about yourself and your committees are taking care of. valadao: i applied to get rid of those subsidies for u.s. in a position to have employees on your farm and families to worry about when you make decisions you need to be competitive with all options are on the table and have to make sure you do everything possible so those families have a reasonable job. i had the opportunity instead of throwing money that is the first thing we went after that was not good for the economy.
renteria: thanks for being here today one of the things you saw tonight is the big difference between. valadao: -- representative valadao and i it is about attacking who he thinks ibm this is why i am doing this that is always good about public service starting as a teacher and today is still is. it is all about helping others because i know we can do so much better i know we can be effective and solve these problems and i look forward to doing it again i ask for your vote help me make the central valley everything that it can be deal xanthate queue for this opportunity i'm a dairy
farmer and i used to go back to d.c. with a different groups and i sat there across the table for those who seem to know about the felly but it is a sad situation because those who are a mile wide and an inch deep. know what is on the groundwork for a living doing business in creating jobs with my experience what i bring to the table is important we was someone there who has done it and continue to do that for the last few years heliport to having your vote in november and never car for the valley. >> moderator: thanks to both of you for being here that is all the time we have for the 21st congressional debates don't forget to vote have not registered debt beat the deadline is a
october 20th you actually need to postmark or send electronically by the 20th of october make informed. for more information of local races in your area and the candidates visit our web site you can watch this debate on both websites as well. from all of us here from tb 24 in fresno thank you for being with us to night. goodnight. ♪ ♪ ♪
we'll come everybody. we're now gathered in session to look at the second round of evidence of a report to into iraq and syria we're very lucky to have with us today dr. if you don't know him one of the most distinguished u.s. economics on the subject of strategy and insurgency. he has come as a distinguished professor from monterey california and professor of strategy at the naval college in rhode island and taught at the united states marine corps in quantico and u.s. army war coach as well as the navy defense college in rome. his most recent book is specifically on counter insurgency witches essentials to the inquiry because all these things are about the summit round with
a surge and general petraeus attempt between 2006 and 2009. so welcome. so whether the options that are potentially available to the response of the current crisis in iraq and syria and which using the most effective? >> let me say two things at the outset as first a disclaimer i am now retired from u.s. government service so what i say is my own opinion not the opinion of the navy or the graduate school or department of defense. the second thing i have 2.0 is i am not a middle east expert.
idea military strategy and military history. i thank you should keep that in mind but since we have been involved in iraq and afghanistan for mid-level officers and the motivation for writing my book is they're coming back from these two places to say this does not work. i also lost students to the afghanistan. i have seen marriage's collapse as results of repeated deployments and frustrations. i have a curiously lived through their experience as
the colleagues evaporated with ied attacks. this is my motivation. they come to me and we talk about this in class with a reconstruction class with a historical perspective. to questions we did this in germany and japan why can't we doing now why doesn't it work? why can't we do a marshall plan for afghanistan? these are some of the questions that have come up. and why if the british were so successful why can't we do this? looking at this historically how successful were they? why were the british successful? when does one win?
and do they do with the heart and the mind? so look at how western democracies fight. i concluded there are a lot of sacrifices one has to make it if you are going to be successful you have to be extraordinary and therefore you pay a huge price and military professionals it will be rowed in many respects because the insurgent is not regarded as a willful convent then they could be treated however and in other words, atrocities
so on into the fabric. so what you have to do to be successful. >> just to cut in for a second is impossible to focus on iraq at the moment that we could go get the sense of the surge? >> general petraeus was fortunate that his timing was impeccable because they overplayed his hand in the in our province. but some say petraeus to impose this one is actually
the people on the ground. there was an opportunity here. they were looking for a protector. but you are the minorities. and i'm sure they're being protected like the kurds so therefore it is temporary but we see that tactical success. as soon as a walkout. >> why did it prove to be? >> the government were protected with the chevalier's phone united states so what is happening is a failure of democracy in the middle east.
since the beginning of the colonial state in the mill east to have such faith and hope for democracy so democracy building did not. >> people say fast forward we need to get the people to hold and build the areas of iraq. talk to help that international coalition but does this seem to be a senseless strategy? >> it is a tactic and not the strategy. would increasingly happens is identity is identified with anti-americanism in
particular. so who is your local ally? seven duking it temporary advantage. but there will not be any great loyalty and we will reconfigure the middle east to create a sunny state in eastern syria. that might be a possibility but right now isis is the most radical right now. and they have taken the lead. so right now i would argue.
>> but there are people that say we need to get to boots on the ground to go face-to-face with the enemy. >> so what? would you going to fight? they put to ied everywhere do not support with the population's what will happen? with this language and culture i don't care is the people and we will take the mouth. so that makes this situation worse and that is what we will see boosts of the ground will get you anywhere. you have to build the political structure but its tactics and strategy the right now that is not a strategy.
>>. >> everytime we have intervened since carter we alienate people and we create and governed spaces. so with that succession but the middle east and toward democracy are dead so we're trying to achieve? will be rebuild syria? we could not rebuild iraq. successfully at any case cu roughly have 20 percent of that population at stake in the country. if we put boots on the ground now was the perceived? and in support of iran into
>> with u.s. intervention to make things worse it is a lot more intense but there for the current the engagement as it stands will make things worse. >> best yourself where is it going? to the east and west it cannot go north into turkey or courtesy and it would not go to baghdad because they will defend that also "this
is it". where will it go? there is a area that makes a little bit of money but think about doing nothing. >> i am a little puzzled. that question is the humanitarian catastrophe that without question they are pressing forward. and then it would be a disaster stories saying as a civilized western nation we should do nothing at all? >> i thank you should think about as an option.
there are other places we did nothing. africa for instance. >> that does not mean all six. >> but what will you accomplish? ms dean question. >> but if you except the promise with this a basket case of what isis is doing even think about is real or libya or elsewhere that quasi pacifist arguments says do nothing hoping the united nations and the politics? i am paraphrasing but it is
an argument. >> that war is politics. i don't see a plot -- a vial political goal can that is my point. i would never say war could accomplish nothing. but what is the center of gravity? what will change that dynamic of that situation in? what is the end of state if you cannot envision the end state that it doesn't make a difference. >> the u.k. government has hired a private company with
bomb disposal with the use of private companies and in the context of a military establishment that is downsized what is the current view on the use of private companies? >> it seems that using private companies to teach is perfectly all right. the experience united states had in iraq and afghanistan was disastrous. these men were out of control in most cases they were not subject to local laws. we had several atrocities committed by contractors.
what we called that you drive down the road and start shooting and hopefully that would trigger the ambush. that is one problem. the other is they cost a lot of money. the third problem is when they're trained that they are siphoned off the indigenous soldiers to work for private contractors themselves i know karzai kicked them out between desertion and detection the best police and soldiers afghanistan had were basically defective so the army had to be rebuilt.
item think that is a big use of one's money in my opinion. >> i should have mentioned this before briefly but the option surely is on the assumption that isil is that in end. also talking about iraq's own army. >> one can never be certain but everybody treats isil but they just run around in pickup trucks. >> said they'd be the official army hands down. >> we have not got to the
subject yet that one is security assistance how the failure meaning training up indigenous army is and how this has not worked in central africa. it did not working in vietnam. the only place it worked was columbia. united states has a great search how to retake the colombians to transition into another place? to argue just like the marshall plan, columbia succeeded under circumstances. you don't have a clash of civilizations with a very catholic christian country cooperating since 1942. and that was under attack by
the japanese there is a good military that was demoralized and with every think about the politics he fired a lot of generals and he got the strategy and imposed a strategy on his military that was ultimately very successful. will you have those conditions in these other countries? you will not get that and libya which i think is folly to think there is a model that you can't transition from one area to another. i have a number of students with security assistance and they said you don't know the hierarchy because just because he is a general but you have all these of tribal hierarchy's and then they
don't use equipment properly. so basically this gets back to the question about contractors. at a very low tactical level is a the military's the approaches to reform from the bottom up. this does not work well because with that operation of vacuum leads to all sorts of problems. one is for the foreign area officers and security assistance. and i remember one of them said i just cannot sleep at night because i am trading an army.
>> dr. porch looking at the consequence of invading iraq into to those consequences and wonder you in biblical terms of just i ask charivari not be the good samaritan to these people? >> why are we in the middle east? what is the national interest to be in the middle east? initially to spread democracy. this is what we would do.
the it energy security has changed rapidly and we have to ask ourselves do we really need the unreleased? what purpose does that serve? now with natural gas and other sources of energy may be the middle east is not that important maybe we can walk away. if we do that then we say what do we have to prepare for? short term or disruptions disruptions, energy supplies , and tell we get fracking ready but prepare for a humanitarian relief. there has already been a lot of bad stuff that has happened. prepare for that and it seems to me would be one of the things we could do from
a christian perspective or humanitarian perspective and politically, with allies from the region to stabilize , maybe through turkey fails that them through today. but there is some of the agenda is in the middle east. but you have the gulf states have their own agenda and turkey will demand a huge price and all of these things will change. they could flip over night. >> had you planned a political strategy? do we have a moral obligation? >> i think, again i have a moral obligation to do what we can do to our own people
britain since it support or lack of support to degrade and this jury the forces. >> i am out of my depth here. i have no insight but we know he hates aside and if we intervene in syria presumably to reinforce the regime so that is a difference of opinion. obviously turkey can provide bases and potentially boots on the ground but what exactly were you thinking to said lawrence of arabia to dismantle the ottoman empire? it sounds good but if he has a lot of leverage on us
us, what will he demand? in return? that is my question spin nike made it clear as a understand it the case should not join the u.s. and american allies into syria? >> sanders than their domestic pressures to do something. politicians have to make compromises and i can stand the pressure to do something but it is hubris to sink this will have any long-term effect and cause collateral damage. to escalate a situation.
>> my last question is has been suggested if the terrorist group isil is defeated would be replaced by something worse? and if so what should be the coalition's strategy? is it enough to take on a new threat? >> al qaeda emerges in whenever form wherever there is a rebellion against dacia regime. -- also realize the middle east is one of the most wild agency in the road there is a welch's sarah for latin america but algeciras -- al
intelligence organizations have a vested interest. but that is one of the arguments that we have intelligence services of both countries that are proficient to track this down. and that if you intervene you'll have more threats, not less. >> before we let you go go, return to the basic model of how to do with the predecessor of isil with counterinsurgency. it seems to be if you contain. renteria: and somehow create the space for the iraqi
state to get these incredible state structures as it gets into and bar. huckabee characterize that what is your analysis? >> i would think that is the best case scenario but i don't think that will happen because we have already see how the shia regime and poses. the same as from afghanistan that you will have a safe haven across the border in syria or wherever you call it just like the taliban with pakistan you cannot get at them. they will continue to stabilize. then what you do? do be the french and go to egypt? then it just expands. where do stop? please keep escalating so
a very distinguished career in which he has served in kosovo and is with us today with a very, very recently retired british general. >> i fully left on this seventh of august estimate very recently. >> can i just ask are you being critical of the government's strategy of a bike to put a question question, would you be confident that our military is clear of this strategy in iraq? to believe that could be
attained by air strikes alone? >> i cannot answer currently if they are or not. >> what do you think? >> if you are asking me if this is credible and sensible strategy to achieve a policy, i would start by looking to define the policy. i think we have seen at least on two occasions articles written by the prime minister and the secretary dash leading a threat that isil causes the apocalyptic terms to stress the needs and i paraphrase that. >> but that is the government policy then i
don't think that the strategy such as it is will achieve that. >> why not? >> because a strategy is about integrating the ends and ways and means. that is the strategy. the policy needs to be clear. the end needs to be clarified. the problem needs to be scope to then determine how you will resolve the problem and then allocate means to achieve that. that means put your money where your mouth is. . .
and you cannot expect the military to apply force without the leaders applying the power at the same time. so that is your strategy or it. >> a number of other things have evolved as far as the armed forces go. would you like to comment on that? >> yes, if you have a thread and you take the threat like isis, which is potentially looking at defeating and undermining the statement in the least and the only way you're going to stop that is you decide that is what you want to do.
and that includes concentrating. and we are politically expedient. and if you are curious about it, you have to be able to apply all the leaders to ministry power and i would've thought that if you are serious about dealing with isil, but you should try and do what you can to build out the capability in dealing with it. and this includes a challenge to get them engaged in the middle east. and it may be that your national interest and you don't have the time to build up a regional capacity. and i think the capacity
building point is the key that you need to be looking at. if you don't build capacity in armies unless you are prepared to get on the ground and do it alongside. so i think it's a very good example of what capacity has been built up in line and it has been built from the bottom up and i think it is a great credit in place by the end of this year and they will be able to say that it has built an adequately capable defense force. and that has required significant expenditure and that is what it takes. you can't just stand off and expect private security companies to do a little bit of this training. >> in regards to the point you
just made, what went wrong two. >> well, let me talk about this. i saw one specific area in my view and it was part of the report. i think we developed a hands off approach to training the iraqi army and i think that we adopted an approach that was excessively risk-averse and we did not build a relationship of trust living alongside and if necessary fight alongside the iraqi people. we expected them at division level to do it and certainly the results were plain to see when they were put into this in 2006. so the americans did a much better job to engage that on the ground alongside the iraqi army and i think they did extremely
well. so into my last experience was a very small nato training mission working alongside them back in 2010 or 2011, actually achieving a significant effect and professionalizing them to be trained in cadet school, start colleges, the training mission and the like, and that was having a significant impact through that at the end of 2011. [inaudible] >> i haven't seen the intelligence of this but the key
point here is that clearly part of this what with the iraqis. and i think that the fact is that you have it to hobby terrorist movement which managed to acquit itself with the means and the capabilities of a national army through equipment captured from iraqi army and its got it's got tanks and armored vehicles and guns and therefore you need the capability to deal with those things. in terms of professionalism and the like and it would absolutely be no match for a western army. but the fact is that it is probably going to be better than the iraqi army that it's up against. [inaudible conversations] >> setauket about this, mainly
talked about this and i think given the reality of the policies in this state at least, they are advocating probably the same thing because of the special use of this and therefore we should have a part of that. >> i think at the very least we should build up this capability for the iraqi army and whatever forces we have in syria that we deem as suitable to this. >> thank you. gentlemen, you talked about the second part of the question that i was just about to ask.
and whether we do something or whether we don't. and the iraqi army and interestingly enough, that was about weapons systems and that includes training this even with moral component to the elite and see if someone else. what do you think that we should build into the? >> i would say that we start with commission opposites. that is what i would say. what would you say? >> i think that you build with
an army needs into the training program. and i think that it you start with the individual and then you build up the capability of the two companies in the battalion and you ensure that they have the capabilities in terms of weapons systems and that is part of the leadership training, which is absolutely integral to the building of of the individual efforts. >> it seems like a lot of them pull the trigger -- [inaudible]
>> you have to stop with the foundations and the foundations are individual basic training [inaudible] >> yes. >> you remain surprisingly optimistic about training. it might be possible to say that we put a lot of effort and money when i went to see them and that includes this and including what we would try to do with the same thing, consuming only without the american soldiers and better than us.
so what should we say? >> i think that you highlighted on one condition which is that it's not as if terry and forests in which one section is able to predominate over that and that includes being alienated in the share. >> if it was within six years it becomes part of this again because of politics that surround it in the government. and it looks like that is what we achieved and we put all this energy and we walk away and we are back to square one. >> i think that i would say that
in 2111 we would lead negotiations with the iraqi government, the mandate of the nato training mission, that this was and i think what we saw with that nato training mission is about 150 people. and through that and it comes to these forces that are not signed. [inaudible] and actually when we mention it. >> they recognize how this
training mission was. the iraqi government was key to maintain and indeed was prepared to pass this as well because they recognize they. and of course we see the end of that in 2011. in selecting from then on you get increasing domination and you get the impact of the syrian civil lawyer. the rise of al qaeda in iraq were isis and then i think it is in place. and so the idea was nevertheless you can achieve quite an impact on a higher level with a small mission when it comes to this. >> talking about this security, do you see that as training or a
separate set of arrangements? how do you see that because of these things that we have had a map what you have to say about that? >> do think it is very much part of the same sense and this is a good example because we have talked about these different levels and being a national forest, it had a significant coming in from italy. and we did a superb job in training the iraqi oil police and so i think if you can do that, it's a good highlight of the multinational force we can bring in different disciplines to focus on this as well. and this includes the training mission consisting not only with the afghan army but the afghan national police and civil pleased as well. >> so the security force. >> it is a security force, yes.
>> do you think that those structures are optimal in terms of a crisis such as that in the middle east? >> no. >> in saying no, it's very clear what needs to change in that. >> especially in terms of not just the middle east but the situation in eastern europe as well. >> well, i think that what we have in is that is and that is [inaudible] we expect the army reserve to be able to fill the gap.
>> what could we send? >> i think we have the chief of staff. >> according to this i think that if you look at that, you would find it extremely difficult. if you go back to 1991 it had the british army is core capabilities and the result was that that was a force that the corps commander was described as his ability and it's so well with what you have for that. >> gentlemen, in terms of the current crisis, do you think that this would have an impact
in terms of afghanistan and how it was managed with withdrawal, and are there lessons from iraq that can be applied in relation to withdraw from afghanistan? or is it too late for that? >> well, a lot of questions, i think that the drawdown is part of that. and of course it finishes in just over two months time. so effectively the planning was that billy by the end of october the level would be pretty much the same as the post-training, which we were planning at the time and i think what you would have seen anywhere by now as the majority of the drawdown and we
will get pretty much a flat line now and that was one question. >> are there lessons to be learned from iraq enact an example as to how that is going beyond that? and what do you think the impact is in terms of withdraw from afghanistan and the earlier question about our capacity to deploy into separate things of war? >> changing the angle here, i think that there lessons from the afghans, which can be applied to iraq in this field. and as i said earlier, building up an army from the grassroots. building up the fact of the capability in a way which wasn't done in the british experience
that was relevant to what may happen. >> on that point, do you think that the afghan army is likely to perform better than we are seeing with the iraqi army enact. >> yes, i am optimistic are you provided with a major caveat of an international committee. both in continuing to train and also in providing the money. because the rush of the soviets left in 1989, they collapsed and then the money dried up. so i am optimistic provided those two caveats that the afghan security forces will be able to contain it will be an ongoing certainty in afghanistan. >> and on the final point, do you think that the drawdown from afghanistan will ease the pressures in terms of structures
on our capacity to deploy? >> actually this includes the drawdown avenue afghanistan and uk forces committed at the scene is probably at an all-time low since about 1968. >> okay. >> is asking this question. would you care to comment on the refusal to get involved in something that is in disaster on its own doorstep? >> well, all i can say is that the secretary is a member of nato. and a member of the alliance formation. but of course nato is not
engaged in any operations in iraq at the moment. >> the nato nations are. >> that is a different thing to engage nato. so the nato nations may be engaged but that is not going to be a rant and therefore it's up to turkey with what they should or should not do. so i think standing on the sidelines and telling other people what they should be doing is part of this. >> i recognize that and are you telling us that it is part of a domestic situation which is a factor in its decision? >> i suspect that it is probably
in turkey's national interest of our interest to return and to protect. >> we have had a positive and negative impact. >> yes, i do think that there is a real danger that we have given up by default which we were proud to have standing shoulder to shoulder with our number one ally. and i think that that could have long-term consequences. and i think that there was a time when the american can always rely on a and i think that it one of the consequences could well be the distance in
america from engagement in europe and instead of being able to say you that we were joining a long list of other allies who are not prepared to deliver in america basically. >> those members of the coalition. >> if we want to continue to have interest we need to be prepared to commit alongside. and that means we could continue to put significant military force into a coalition or alliance with the americans given the significant influence.
and it's as simple as that. >> he tried to communicate that in terms of something which is tangible? because i understand what you're saying in general terms, but in terms of influence that you can give us, how can you say that to the interest? >> i think by committing alongside the americans, we have a say in outcomes that we would not otherwise have. >> okay. and you could say, you could say that what good does that do? >> you could say that but i
think that if we had done improperly we would be in a different position. >> do not do it properly because we got along enact. >> i think that we failed to do it properly or number of reasons and i look forward to the reporting on this. >> okay. finally, if i may, we are very clear about the need to do things properly but your response is a point well made. so does that mean that the hopes of persuading of the nation of our neighbors to commit those is
in your view part of this? >> the uk is trying to persuade other nations to commit more than we are prepared to commit. and we will try to help you in some way. >> they may be prepared to commit. but you're going to understand that oh, i'm not going to be coming coming with you and were in rockland stand on very firm ground. >> okay. >> a strategy. you talk about strategy. is it a mission to destroy isil? >> well, the mission would be
determined by government policy and i don't know what the mission is. on one hand i hear destroy isil and then i hear humanitarian relief. and i don't think we have clarity. they are picking at the edges and we are going to contain it within the perimeter which is occupied. we are hoping that the iraqis will get their act together and be able to destroy the enemy,
which is isil, which is a pretty tall order. john has just implied that the air world would actually put up this to back iraq and the kurds, which is clearly not evident. i asked that question yesterday, what is the air world actually going to do beyond something from this. and we have declared dead there will be no infantry on the ground from the united kingdom and apparently the united states as well. until i just can't see where we
are going to have an endgame. because in the end i fear that as we started this conversation we have such a threat to the country and it is such a huge threat. in the end we may have to commit ground forces interaction in the middle east. and this includes in support of those people on the ground. so have i got this wrong? >> i was going to say, and your question is? >> i'm not sure that i have a question. my point is i just can't see how we can do anything else at all
of those things happened. the iraqis and the kurds are not good enough and iso- is terrorizing and we are talking about terrorizing with isil. >> it's very political to achieve that. >> it's going to be very difficult to get that into that area but it may well be that we will have to get the politics and. and that is just my question. >> i think that there is -- there may well be. and if this what you postulated came to pass, we are left with this basic situation. but if you want to neutralize
isil, you can do so neutrally or you take the time to build a double capacity. and that is going to take time in which case it might not be enough for you have to destroy. >> talk about that. if we were training to take on isil, what would we be training them to do? are we trying to create this kind of force against the afghan government? or retraining people in this or are we training the warfare which will be a part of the
territory. and is that going to be in the form of tribal militias that we had in 2017 or is it going to be a fully integrated thing with the iraqi army enact. >> it depends on the nature of the campaign and you need to understand the nature of the problem and the nature of the threat posed by isil in the way they operate and then design a force that can counter that. and it may be any of the above or a joined up capable armed force. >> thank you very much, gentlemen.
colleague for beginning. >> were going to run around some of the same sort of issues, but you said that it we are going to speak out about some of these things if we have a clear political plan and we have a lot within it. so what are the objectives and what are your comments about this that you have put together? >> yes, i did say that. and what i meant by that was that it's relative to a chance of success and making it worse in a wider context and i think that it provides a sort of use which is sort of politics and it does reaching for the military is what they do and it's a big
mistake. because it gets everyone's attention in regards to the political issues. >> so if it is between irradiance and the saudi's, what is this political question before we reach for this? >> welcome you need to address the question of what you think the problem is with isil and where you think they come from. and this has been characterized in many ways. it is on one level a manifestation of some extremism and is another it is definitely different to al qaeda where al qaeda was an external influence.
and the focus of isil is very much aimed at this. and indeed you can characterize it even more so and it's not just a battle with who are the true representatives that will help guys. because as you know it is part of islam and indeed if you look at the behavior of them in the region, they have not just been again and against non-muslims but the shia and any form that doesn't comply with a very strict interpretation of islam. so this is a particularly internal theological causality
behind isis, what you really need to understand and it seems to me that the real threat that they pose is not to us in the west but to saudi arabia in the states in the region and in the world [inaudible] and so i think that we should be looking at a resolution to an ideological religious problem. and going back to my response my other question, my concern would be that as far as terrorism is concerned we can do very little about talking about the real problem, which is particular mentality and ideology. and if we are talking about threats to the united kingdom, i think it's that ideology that is part of a major threat in northern iraq right now.
>> dc the existing military response taking this sort of expression and my understanding is it's kind of this whole population of the world and he just was part of this zone then doing something, what you're saying is that is where we have a containment strategy. and do not have forces, you have a pilot. is there not some program in terms of the neighbors understanding their own problems and accommodating themselves in a different way to map well, there is some, but very little. i think the policy is a sensible
policy as far as it goes trying to buy time. buying time for the nations in the region to work out the response. in this includes raising materials and i suspect that her life has now been made held by the religious extremists. because i think that we have to recognize that we have this much of an expression. and we believed in isis.
so we need to recognize that there are extreme internal divisions within the sunni world and we should be able to see them but not just because the government says something nice about a coalition. and it shows just how difficult they are finding it. and i think in many ways that is what we are seeing. and they are saying that we would be wise to take a hippocratic oath on this one. so although we believe that we are on the side of good, that actually not the way it always looks in the region.
and actually the one defined in political stability terms and that includes what it looks like with long-term political stability. so with it can be actually useful. and as i say in the west as we are leaving on this amount what is the effect of christian forces and not just this internal battle or legitimacy. but on until how does it make king abdullah and others feel. as a make their job easier or difficult they map until a little bit more confidence if i felt that i fully understood this as well.
government's clue and we can do it only once. i was there in 2007 trying to organize the withdrawal and is the police chief that separate about three assassination attempts and i said what can we do to help. and they said that this isn't about training work meant that you can't touch that. and i think that that is a lesson that we need to learn. entrained that fundamentally that is i still believed in what they were doing and these guys didn't. >> there's a good moral component there. and that is the point we're trying to make.
and that is not going to happen. and i think that if we are looking for an answer about isis, i think we have to look to it with the divisions that possibly exist. of course they have certain objectives and so why wouldn't fundamentally not part of religion in particular. and so how come they are alive with these ultrareligious people and they both hate the status quo. who drove a wedge between them?
and we have been talking about this. it seems that the containment strategy has these divisions and that is again one of my concerns that the more we christians get in there, the more we align people against them. but actually we should let their internal divisions be part of it. but the real question is what force can we muster to take up more than iraq if our objective is to restore the territorial integrity as it was before. and that is a difficult see.
and it's going to be problematic. and are you getting from saudi arabia? i doubt it. you can see the problems. >> i do see the problems and that is the argument. and so all of this has to be long-term. you made the point about sustainability. and it has to be sustainable. so how do you see that but it is going to be a long-term political argument to deal with objectives? >> i don't have any idea.
>> well, absolutely. politically it actually gives credibility. >> no, you're not wrong at all. and i don't think that you should see this as being something that is a reason of that. i think you should do see this as the latest recurrence of 9/11 of extremism. i think the most encouraging thing is when he came out recently in regard to violent extremism and i think that that's a absolutely right. that has been the problem for the last 12 years. and so, you know, that is a
generational struggle and we've only been doing it since on lebanon were going to need to keep doing it. it comes after the worse and in my view that's not the military it is actually about education because the nature of my view is being altered in the focus of this and that is part of the generational struggle. >> to what extent turkey involved in serious? and are the arms coming from croatia? what is happening and then all of a sudden we have this. so it's a big place, big spaces
and what do you think they can do. to your point how should they play in this way? >> i think that we should see this from the turkish point of view, they like many countries assumed that bashar al-assad would go very quickly and that they would not be in the jihad is crosshair. but that didn't quite work out and they became more extreme, what you see now is the kurds and you see the three working out to how they deal with it
because if you take the statement seriously last week that you want to redraw the boundaries than his ambition would seem to go this into iraq. and so given the objective, the question is what you going to do. he seemed to change his political direction and so i don't know. i think that we should start by understanding this and where he's going to be going next. [laughter] >> will come up, from a point of view i would say that i would hope that he would see isis as the biggest threat because i think it is the biggest threat
than i can understand that his point of view or would not seem that way at the moment. >> with all of your expertise in training, do you have any idea how they can pick up a relatively sophisticated artillery ,-com,-com ma get pretty good at the usage without having to do this? because we would spend weeks training on these things and i am just confused that they can just sort of pick up and command it and look after it. so how does this work? >> i think that i was surprised on this for some years. the people are saying that the
forces have been stationed for some time and it seems to me that they are actually being trained on these for some period of time. and i have no particular knowledge on this. >> the second comment in question seems so possible for us to deal with a situation and there is no solution as to how we deal with it through the air world. is it true that in the end it will be history that you resolve this problem insofar as we could actually make it work and if we do go in actually in the end people will have to sort it out
themselves and therefore it is an argument that we should just say the heck with that a plague on all the houses and say will be well. >> is that if you want a solution, go to the dentist. countries need managing. and that's how people choose to manage their conflicts that are inherent over society. and as may have been said before, the opportunity was there had he had a different mind to reward the sunni tribes to make decisions and also see
government. and in fact he saw the army of the tribes is a very short-term experience. because the biggest threat is to make sure that there was no research and that we didn't go back into their regime. so they were basically shut out again and that was always the political weakness of the military campaign in regards to the tribes. so that was mismatched. we say the heck with them? well, no, that's too prescriptive. i believe firmly that we should be in strong support of a fundamental sunni approach as i see it. >> that is why i'm actually in favor of the long-term policy rather than trying to sell that
from our point of view. >> we didn't abandon, we just contained. >> we are waiting for them to sort it out and i'm sure politically someone, we are thinking perhaps the way to manage this would be to reconsider the borders of the region and there are a lot of people i understand saying that the borders will not be recovered or regained. >> what would that take to achieve.
>> it seems to me the success as being limited on one side or another and that progress is so dramatically sloped. you could argue that all we need to do is provide airpower if there are strikes. and that helps to maintain that sort of sectarian situation, if you like. and so i think that that is a different situation than what we talked about before. and there have been those on the ground. and i think that this is
actually a vital one due to the headlines that they used to surround outpost as well. including taking the outposts. on that basis can certainly stop it. >> i don't know enough about it, it is that they have a right about them. but the real need is to how it is applied. and that includes having trouble finding a target.