tv Book Discussion on Warrior Diplomat CSPAN January 17, 2015 8:30pm-9:52pm EST
coming up next on booktv michael waltz former counterterrorism special adviser to vice president dick cheney and director of afghanistan policy at the department of defense. he talks about his experiences fighting the war on terror in afghanistan and in washington d.c.. this is about an hour and 20 minutes.
>> feel free to come forward if you would like. good afternoon. i'm peter bergen and peter bergen and i run into national security foundation and it's my great pleasure to introduce my colleague and friend michael waltz who has this wonderful new book out "warrior diplomat" a green beret's battles from washington to afghanistan which really outlines mike's unusual career both being someone who is creating policy in the white house and the south asia adviser to vice president cheney and carrying out the policies and the field as a special forces officer. mike is also running a successful business. he's a fellow here at the new america foundation so he is going to outline the big ideas and some of the interesting stories in the book and then we
will open up to question after session. thank you. mike. >> thank you peter and thanks everyone for coming out today. i will just take a brief moment and talk about some of the broader strategic issues that i have tried to address in the book and really underlined up a lot of what my experiences as peter mentioned in the white house working for vice president cheney and in the pentagon working for secretary gates and rumsfeld and as a reserve special forces officer out in the field. so bear with me one moment. let's take a little bit of a history lesson looking back on the war and in looking back on it as far where i think we have made some critical mistakes that historians decades from now will look back on. the first is that our strategy never really adjusted with the insurgency as it began growing
past 2001. so we had a very counterterrorism focus strategy targeting al qaeda and targeting key taliban leaders but as we kind of died down and as the afghan government stabilized our strategy did not coalesce with that. what that drove unfortunately was the perennial under resourcing of the war effort. so we found ourselves as violence began to grow in 2003, 2004 in 2005 timeframe we found ourselves chasing the violence rather than putting the resources in necessary to get ahead of it. there were important reasons for that one of which which obviously was the iraq war. i was on the ground and saw the sound of resources where there was helicopters or predator drones or what have you getting pulled away from the afghan theater over into iraq where it
really came into play was once the insurgency had reconstituted and the taliban surely reconstituted in 2006 and i came back from my tour back to the pentagon and said hey boss this isn't going well that was kind of the depth of the iraq war and there was nothing to commit. so we find ourselves more and more reliant on nato to provide those resources that we inhabit that point. that's not a moral statement on the iraq war. it's just a statement of fact from my perspective of a country fighting two wars. the other kind of critical mistakes looking back is which i just mentioned is handing the effort over to nato and handing emission over to nato but frankly it wasn't prepared to do.
as we transitioned the lead for security over to nato and to isaf coalition they frankly thought they were getting into kind of the a bosnian style keep peace -- peacekeeping. i was then kandahar when the canadians took over and they came prepared to do what they called the soft parade patrolling and frankly in 2006 they ran into a buzz saw. their political constituencies were prepared to deal with it so they signed up to do peacekeeping and found themselves by the time they deployed in a folbaum counterinsurgency effort. i write in that quite a bit in the book about being on the ground and special forces that didn't have the equipment, didn't have compatible radios sometimes didn't even have enough ammunition to being with dutch forces and asking them to
work with us and had to go all the way to the parliament for approval. it promulgated this kind of under resourcing but then it also really tied her hands to fight an enormous the complex war with the 42 nation coalition. three is we never got our arms around pakistan then or now and the sanctuary that they afford and seth jones and others have done studies of counterinsurgencies overtime and none that they have found have been successful when the insurgent enjoys unfettered sanctuary. and then four and what i would say is probably the most critical was announcing our withdrawal years in advance of
that withdrawal. i was standing in my headquarters in 2009 when president obama gave his speech at west point announcing the surge but then in the same speech announced the end of the surge and my operations officer standing next to me and saying can you imagine franklin delano roosevelt announcing d-day but then announcing to the germans into the world that would only last six months to a year and the effect? not a perfect analogy but it was one the tea throughout and it had immediate effects on the ground. two weeks later i was up in the mountains meeting with the tribe elder with the gentleman i had been building a relationship for the better part of the year. many many cups of tea, many many meetings many hours of getting to know each other and building that relationship and building a level of trust because one that
it was the largest -- and that part of afghanistan and they want to work with the government against the haqqani network which was the predominant insurgent group in the area and three they had about 1500 tribal militia well-trained well-armed that i wanted working with us on this new program eventually called building stability operations. two weeks after the speech at west point by president obama this final signing of a statement of commitment and a very cold reception didn't offer tea. finally after a few minutes kind of got to the bottom of it in the said look we always suspected it. we have seen it in the past that now your president has said that, you are going to abandon us. you are going to leave and the haqqani's are going to have a gun to my families head tomorrow
night is an issue due. i tried to talk the nuanced know he was only announcing withdrawal of the surge. the nuance was lost. they heard that america was leaving, period. and it is truly detrimental effects in other ways as well. we saw corruption spike after that announcement. it was kind of get the manny out while you can. we saw government officials that we had really been gaining traction with reform efforts be less inclined to do so. we really frankly were undermined by that policy statement within days, within weeks of its announcement. it's a fascinating case of how his policies intended to go in this direction immediately on the ground sense that tactical and operational effort in a totally different direction. so you know and this is how i ended the book. the thing that he left me with
was as we were leaving that meeting where he withdrew all of his support and pledged not only to not work with us but frankly told me they were going to be hedging their bets with the haqqani network e. said look until you are prepared to have your grandchildren, not your children but your grandchildren standing shoulder-to-shoulder with my grandchildren we can't work with you and this will never work. that's really a theme that kind of commitment or lack thereof that runs throughout the book. and the signal but that sounds low to the region to the afghan government to the afghan populace into the enemy has really hurt us throughout the war effort. it was whether you are only here for al qaeda or now you are focused on iraq or you are handing us off to nato or you were announcing a search to
bring security but now you're announcing your withdrawal and that the morons come up. so where does that leave us? today we frankly have to be very blunt a policy of hope and a lot of assumptions. right now we are assuming it was just discussed today at the london conference but we are assuming the afghan national army and the afghan national police can stand on its own. i find it difficult to wrap my mind around how the afghan national security forces are going to do along with better support with 42 nations, 42 western nations in the last two years. and personally i have been hearing that in the pentagon briefings in the white house since about 2005 that the afghan national army would be able to stand and operate on its own. in 2005, 2007 and 2009 and then
by 2011 and now by 2014. the next assumption is we are sending this unity government will hold. as we all know the afghans have a politically peaceful transition and in its entire history. we have a very tenuous situation right now in the same year in and at the same time we are announcing a zero option. it's frankly almost borderline irresponsible from a policy standpoint. we are also is assuming that in a type of reconciliation talks will regress in our interests. we are assuming that ethnic tensions won't continue to rise and i think washington grossly underestimates the amount of tension that's on the ground right now. and most importantly we are summing that al qaeda can't and won't end isn't already were constituting in the wake of our withdrawal. i just did a q&a with "fox news" and the kind of went through all of this and she said mike i've got it. it's always the simplest questions that are hard.
she said why should the american people care? we have been at this for 10 years and we have invested billions of dollars. we have lost thousands of lives. that all this scary but i think we see now with isis in iraq what can happen in the wake of our withdrawal, a precipitous withdrawal and if that makes you nervous having isis on the doorsteps of baghdad makes you nervous having a reconstituted al qaeda on the doorsteps of islamabad with the keys to a nuclear weapon should petrify you. it certainly does me. and you know we can talk about the nuances of that analogy and there is a lot but i think that they are are some real issues and i have a real issue and i write to that in the book which is turning our backs. so what is the policy going forward? and how were we going to get
what i think is aptly called long war to a better place? a few years ago i give a talk to a bunch of new congressional staffers there were coming in the wake of the 2012 midterm elections and i talked about a country in asia that one point had a higher literacy rate than afghanistan does today no roads, no structure, no real political system and certainly no army because it had been occupied for the better part of 50 years and the country was south korea. and it did indeed have a higher literacy rate in the 1940s than afghanistan does today. it's not a perfect analogy -- analogy. i do think it's a great example of what sustained u.s. engagement can do over the long-haul and i argue at the end of the book despite all of the mistakes we have made we certainly need to learn from that the sooner we stop attacking this in an 18 month,
three-year or for your increment and start wrapping their minds around this is going to be a generational multi-decade effort i think the sooner we will be in a better place. and the examples of germany south korea, japan while not perfect i think are examples of good american engagement can do in the long-haul. so those are the underpinnings of the book from a policy and emblematic standpoint. what i tried to do chapter by chapter is rather than talk about these things i tried to have you experienced them through my time on the ground, my time in the white house, my time in the pentagon and also of course the introduction starts with there we are in the helicopter going after a taliban commander. he was responsible for the deaths of several of our afghans in that tour, really a bad character.
we enter the home and a night raid and we -- an 8-year-old little girl. i just skyped with my little girl the night before. the emotional toll that had on us and the impact it had on the counterinsurgency campaign in that area but then flash back there i am with president bush vice president cheney and president karzai talking about the issue of civilian casualties and the effect it's going to have or not have on afghan supporting the war. in each chapter goes into that type of back and forth trying to look at these issues from all angles whether it's pakistan and there we are what can we do with this arsenal, what do we do with this support of the insurgency but yet we are dependent on it for both air and ground supply in the war but yet there i am literally getting rocketed from the inside pakistani military bases along the afghan border.
and how do we bridge that and the afghan national army is not ready and will not be ready for at least a generation or you know the total lack of -- when i took command i commanded the special forces in southeast afghanistan. i had about nine months of data to deal with. our lack of continuity in terms of learning from previous lessons in knowing what we have done, i wrote another chapter about a patrol that we conducted in the valley outside of bagram airbase. i went around to every intelligence officer could find. this was in 2005 to talk to me about who had been there before the united states, who did we talk to, what coalition efforts? we knew there had been development projects they are but why why in this village and not in that village and it just
didn't exist. all i could find were new target packages to target key taliban leaders in the area. so i titled the chapter patrolling the ambush because that's essentially what we were doing. we went out to the area to figure that stuff out ran into ambushes. i was nearly killed. an afghan sergeant that i'm very close to his killed and died in my arms and i'm still taking care of his family today, that sacrificed i would like to think was worth the information that we gathered but i'm not confident confident that went into some type of repository that others could learn from. in fact i know it didn't because i look forward on my next tour and it was gone. we just didn't do a great job with that. so i talked to a number of those issues in each chapter. i also try to address i think some fundamental issues that the army has yet to deal with.
one is the layers of bureaucracy that we have to go through to conduct each mission grade in one chapter i write about the 12 approvals that we have to have to go after one taliban commander. i literally had an elder on the phone, a proud old man that i had a great relationship with. his sons were worth thing -- working with us. in tears because a commander that threatened his life was next door looking for him begging us to come and get him. i couldn't get all of the approvals to go out 10 kilometers down the road. we ended up not only losing the elder but we lost a son to weight-loss the village because we couldn't conduct a night raid. so looking at it from a different perspective we have all heard about the negatives of direct action night raids were there a lot of positive than a lot of negatives. i also look at the overall issue
of risk-averse this that is involved. one of the issues i don't think we were fully wrap our minds around is that this is the first and longest war in our history that we fought with an all-volunteer force. not the first is certainly the longest. in previous wars and me to look at what that does to our incentive mechanisms. in previous wars coming out of the draft you were in it to win it. you were pulled out of your lives whether as a lawyer or a plumber or what have you incentive award and had every incentive to take every risk possible so you can come back to your life. now a tour is a one-year blip on an otherwise promising military so they incentive off and became don't mess anything up. don't hit a base and don't take too many casualties, don't lose too many what we call sensitive items would have use of the
default reaction in the gray areas became an action. i say that carefully because i never want or intend to disparage anyone's motivations or service to their country. it's more of a fundamental issue that we haven't i think is a military started to deal with. we felt that risk aversion get permeated in a number of ways. one other quick anecdote was i came across a perfect example of this. i came across a base that we were working with on the pakistani border that was manned by an infantry platoon. 18 soldiers in his platoon. if you think back when everybody saw the movie lone survivor of where the four navy s.e.a.l.s were killed and eventually the one was captured a four-man unit out conducting reconnaissance.
after that roulan edict came down but no less than six individual soldiers out on patrol. okay, that makes sense. after the base when not was overrun in 2008 another edict came down no less than 14 u.s. soldiers guarding the base so you can see now do the math, this platoon had 18 soldiers. they couldn't necessarily leave their base because they would have enough that they couldn't go out because they didn't have enough to patrol said they ended up having reinforcements flown in every time they wanted to go down to the bizarre where the taliban were openly harassing a girl school that was in the village below their base. think about the signal but that sense. military platoon part of the top of the hill and you have taliban commanders at the bizarre shutting down shops in harassing a girl schools. every time they saw a helicopter coming to a new was the
americans coming. so with those tactical and operational permissions of the risk aversion that really come from fundamental issues that i try to address. there is a little bit in their four lawyers rules of engagement and law of land warfare. there were a number of instances that anyone who has had to fight in this type of warhead had to deal with. didn't make it an easier on me. there was a certain one where mortar rounds started coming into our position and we saw them walking in. one of my snipers finally found who was calling them in. it was a nine or 10-year-old little boy up on a hill with binoculars and a cell phone. no weapon. he was not armed but every time he raised the cell phone we saw another round come in. he is looking at me with haight
sir what do we do? make the call and i told him to put a warning shot down at his feet which he did and he dove behind some cover but he came back out and raise the binoculars and raised his cell phone and another round came in. at this time i have hostile intent. i'm clear with the geneva convention but i still make the decision to keep putting warning rounds around the kid. who knows if the taliban had a gun to his family said, what the situation was but that was a call that i made at that time. was a right or wrong? i think it was right but would i feel that way if i was explaining that to one of my man's families who was killed by a mortar round? i don't know so i want to bring those experiences to the american reader as well aside from the broader policy issues. and then just a few other things and how do we move forward today
and what i am convinced is 100 year effort. yes this is our nation's longest war and i think we are 13 years into a 70, 80 90, 100 year effort just as we were in the early days of the efforts against communism. the end of the day we are fighting an ideology and that is by far the hardest thing to defeat. we have seen that after the adulation after we killed osama bin laden but the idea of extremism like the idea of communism has survived. it's going to take a long time to undermine that. one of the ways, one of the things i think we are doing right is forming a moderate arab coalition. this isn't the first time we have done it. one of our key partners united arab emirates have been with us in somalia. they have been with us in bosnia. they have been with us in afghanistan. they were with us in the intervention in libya and to
have partners like that. i was out on the ground with them and several chapters of the book in southern afghanistan and just to kind of put a face on this to have an american officer standing next to an arab office talking to groups of afghan villagers and to have the arabs say this is not the way. the kit jakarta, look at dubai. there is a better path for you and the children to still be proper muslims and followers of islam and by the way take a step further and look what the united states did for germany and look what it did for japan, look what it did for korea. that kind of a voice immediately undermining the ideology and frankly the ignorance the taliban was espousing was the tynes of u.s. soldiers. the other piece i have become passionate about is girls education peer we need to take that out of this kind of
feel-good humanitarian realm and put it squarely on the national security round. it is a national security issue. no ideology can suppress 50% of its population and oprah's 50% of its population. i think the more we put brave leaders like la la la -- the nobel peace prize the nobel peace committee doesn't get a lot of right things right in my opinion but they got that one right. if you think i'm brave for our soldiers are brave that little girl is brave and those are the types of women leaders we need to empower and really put the full force of our government behind in terms of emphasizing. in the last thing i will leave you with and then i will turn it over to questions is the issue of our veterans and the impact that it's having on us
particularly if you buy into that player into a multi-decade or multigenerational effort. it truly is having a detrimental effect but that doesn't mean we are not ready to do it. we don't need sympathy. what we just think it's probably just some support and almost kind of a technical assistance and how do we translate these wonderful skills that we have walked away from a separate into the private sector into the next life into but most of all i would ask for your support for the afghans. it's an all-volunteer force as i was saying earlier. the families get drunk along and they have to live with the consequences, good or bad. if we don't come home and often even when we do come home it's really the families that are suffering. we wouldn't have the military we have today without their support. so one of the things i want to make sure everyone is aware of is 100% of profits from book
there probably would have been difficult to swallow. >> i will ask another question. [inaudible] but i also want to get that empire peace. an the stability since world war ii and a lot of that is the overlay frankly of the american military power whether keeping pirates that day, somalia, the fact we can go to our gas station to get relatively cheap gas or go to meet all the -- recalled with the dollar menu the benefits of free trade. kick comes from a the of
projection of power. dave a success story right now. and it goes to the fundamental questions. it has done a fantastic. >> with candidate hillary clinton or jeb bush boasts a - - both going at zero in 2016 but hillary has to go with morocco, or the republicans with the base. sova to negotiate that strategic partnership effort was put into that.
i think the politics will change. to make that case for that effort is about a half a dozen staffers walked out. and when i checked later almost all of them were republican. so going forward can we afford it to the american people have though will? >> but the debates of this search of 2009 that the group of kernels through the pentagon one idea was go light but go along but looking back at the end of
the day they just want to hear that our grandchildren are with them. so there is a minimum number >> there is the number of studies looked at what we need to do. we need to continue our counterterrorism campaign with a long list tribal regions to continue entering and training the afghan national army as a priority and right now there is such a high level that is the trees are falling in the forest i don't think we have the visibility to know.
so we need to push those back down if you add that up is that 50 or 20,000 up through 2007 is where we were. >> mentioning that nato problem is you mentioned international copyright? >> at that time there were nations in the coalition and each had its own rules of engagement and its own clearance process. they all reported to the commander that they had their own national officer there that reported back to override and joyce specific problem.
>> but the germans would not fly at night. >> but the dutch could not embark on offensive operations. so praying for the sleeper teams as the offensive operation had to go back to the parliament for permission. >> like going to war with a coalition in you have. it was better to have 42 nations in dissent? >> it became almost assessed in from the pentagon we had 36 u.s. soldiers trading 24
nato mentors to mentor the afghans because they came and prepared. they under estimated level of atrophy that was experienced after the end of the cold war. we are now asking to do things that we take for granted with eerie air refueling and the number three going into one of the most complex environments. >> i guess there is an advantage is they have pretty soft power projection. >> they do.
but what you have to have on the field is close integration. they often look at the e.u. said they didn't have the integration. so at the end of the day there is fantastic benefits that we have to be clear what they can do on the ground. from a political will also a capability. >> what about going up against isis as we are in a coalition? >> the other portion is american leadership. i talked about and there is real benefit to having arab partners from a messaging system point from a broader
strategic standpoint but it can almost work against you. >> general the kristol really tightened up those rules of engagement was it ms. communicated to those on the ground to make them overly risk averse? >> it needed to swing. often times we could get engaged by relatively small insurgents to call in the air force. it was too heavy-handed and part of that is how few forces of the ground. with the shift of mentality from counterinsurgency.
but the pendulum went too far. general my crystal issued the edict but then that next layer of command in each layer you got more and more cautious because nobody wanted that so it was over interpreted so that it is situations like you see captain swanson with the questioning and hand-wringing was frankly egregiously and the overreaction. he tried to write the pendulum one petraeus came into general mitt crystal did not have the opportunity but in that part of the world people respect strength.
so when they see the haqqani pushing the limits constantly attacking a tepid response for the bureaucratic wrangling is send a message. >> a lot of things have to go right. may be those that are listening to this on c-span is vivid they tend to blanket together but the fact is you spend a lot of time in afghanistan. with all the things that we know that went wrong? >> so let's learn from the lessons over the last 10
years looking in all of the different angles i have worked for the next how many years? that doesn't mean we didn't do a lot of things right. but it's -- some things were just nonexistent. but now they're thriving even just five years ago. a the economy broadly speaking to get credit for this for stabilizing the currency for such a war-torn country has been okay and i hope survives the withdrawal of donor funding and it has the potential. one of the reasons i am so passionate of sending the long term message that we are invested in afghanistan and we will not abandon is
for factors to exploit, and not to exploit the work with the afghans with the natural resource is that they have to see the chinese and the russians move into. but from a security standpoint with the stability operations program with the army's special forces that the green beret will specialize to work with indigenous forces to put them into the village or into tribal areas that ask for our support we truly would see some benefits in the afghan national army is a success story. but we have to give it proper. >> there are taking casualties.
and i think if you ask one year ago most people say it will be a complete catastrophe. >> but in fairness to the iraqi army those who are following closely were looking at the fighting that has been going on. this is not a brand new problem but they did finally collapse religious don helmand province and one of the bases down there that was killed there in is now threatened so i worry if we are beginning to see the initial indicators that we saw two years ago.
>> one final question. did that make any sense that had to redo that? >> from the perspective -- from the sense that the helmand river is a virtual highway into canada are. i think this sequencing was off for political reasons. >> like trying to defeat nazi germany by attacking austria first? >> yes.
>> i with voice of america afghan services. i have two questions. the pakistan time shows they're not interested with a clear for a policy but then it has no power over the military so what can the united states this strategy to the military but the 1. $6 billion but over half of that goes what can united states do to prevent so the
main purpose of that is to trade afghans. with a failed strategy? but i know with the taliban they are willing to die. so what they say is the only bread maker at home. >> i am still supporting some of the family is. >> natalie deal lose the husband and father but the only breadwinners. >> so how should day oppose
the trading? too easy questions. [laughter] >> first with pakistan which we did have all whole other forum but from one perspective by sheer you. pakistan cares about its own interest and i know i sound like a broken record but back here diplomatically 2005 / 2006 it became very clear tune them with off the record discussions with the eventual u.s. withdrawal. not as an excuse but looking at it from pakistan's viewpoint. holding this says they work
through a proxy and a surrogate is a key part of pakistan policy. what do we do about it? >> we need to look at the issue of the monetary support for the pakistan a military. we have to be careful. i have sat in many debates and are we truly prepared to either let pakistan become destabilized given the arsenal or make an enemy? how far down that path to do we go? and from the policy standpoint it got scary in many ways that we pulled back and continue to try to change their behavior. so the nuclear arsenal is key. we have to be careful about how far we lot pakistan get destabilize.
as we provide funds is it to buy more tanks? or to fight the counter insurgency? and as we shift we look at the pakistan needs to focus on this extremist problem that now threatens. we have to think about if we're willing to accept they are more reliant on their nuclear arsenal vis-a-vis india. is a broader problem but the united states needs to think about what their priorities are. i a agree with you. his site doing training all the or the coaches you can only go with your team to practice once they go to the big game you waved goodbye. we need to go well with them
to conduct operations to facilitate the medevac for the air support for the afghan army to develop. >> there was an off the record discussion with general sharif sitting in that chair who had come to washington and look at relations in 2011 there was the border incident this seems that things are more normalized. something united states wanted the pakistan a two you do. so how has that assessment on?
>> first it was advertised munson events and there was speculation why that was advertised in there was the shift of the haqqani network out of operation to the northern parts. so many believe that was for show. >> i think it is more complicated because the military wanted to do the operation but the civilian government said clearly they would never go anywhere and they didn't but with the civilian leader you want to show we did everything we could. >> in fairness there is a growing chorus that the genie is out of the bottle and ritually have to take
on. that is interesting and don't know if i am willing to go that far if the senior leaders have changed the usefulness of the proxy's but there is a growing force particular among the junior officers but the constant theme is time. as it continues to progress. >> it seems like karzai was critical look to countries that you don't hear that. [laughter] >> and it wasn't helpful for all concerned so not to agree on every cabinet
position but they're both sad people if it doesn't work between them the whole thing goes bad. >> and they realize that. we'll have to reasonable well educated decent man in those positions like having mitt romney and barack obama in the same white house. i am not worried about them so much as a tertiary mayors behind them that will lose patience at some point in her already beginning to hedge. but i've still trying to be optimistic. >> we saw these series of attacks with the advisory saying u.s. personnel should not go anywhere. is this a taliban showing as
soft targets are something bigger? is it from july to abide? >> and you'll see a concerted push. i am praying we can get a new set of ministers to get a responsible government in place before what i expect would be hefty. >> "the new york times" said deal baumann administration is trying to change the rules of engagement. >> it is letting them provide air support down on the ground which essentially was turned off by karzai and the administration is so that has been turned back on. that is a positive but in order to use that, we are
not dropping a lot of bombs. >> what is really happening on the ground? image you talk about the stability operation. >> they're all pulled back. is the village overwatch with the afghan local police from tribal delicia, and in my view that is the worst either you don't have that type of problem with those inherent risk or you know, exactly what is going on but to create this kind of force
to not have the oversight i think is dangerous. so all of our advisers has been pulled up to the record level everybody knows that the corps commander doesn't always know what is going space with the platoon is still have special forces teams which can go out to do offensive operations. >> thank you for your service and your book. the media and the mayor can government referred to counter terrorism and counter insurgency without making distinctions about
what they are. and dealing with the insurgency requires different kinds of skills and deployments and terrorism but yet our government still counts them as counterterrorism sinners but about counterinsurgency cinders. >> but now confronting the islamic state the president was clear when he made his statement that we will degrade and destroy isis. those were the very words that he used. and clearly that would have a recognition -- recognition devices is an insurgency also uses terrorist tactics.
what type of confidence to you have the president and u.s. government is committed to the long-term effects or requirements to confront the insurgency? certainly it has garnered some coalition but it has not deployed the kind of forces like the air strike personnel. day think it is realistic about the grade and a strike? >> wow. i will get to my analogies with the cold war and communism at the end of the day over the course of history people who are disenfranchised that are disconnected from their
government have gravitated to some type of movement whether socialism or communism or now extreme is them that they feel it gives them a mechanism to address those grievances but at the same time those who use and abuse those movements. it is all about power either maintaining or seeking power. so it is an insurgency to some degree with the western liberal societies were the abusive government if you want to really drill down to have grievances. so to answer your question, yes i think we need to take a broad view of how we undermine the ideology.
people ask me what does victory look like? i will tell you and ices sore al qaeda or has blood cannot recruit anybody. think back to the '80s. those communist groups were very powerful and would further their agenda so what happened to that job of the ideology? and i think terrorism is just the tactic. >> so does the ideology it did not last very long. i am sure there is still kanye is professor somewhere but it is in a minority type the position.
so it was tied to the actual experience of the soviet union. >> goal to believe that is the biggest variable. >> that ideology that fuels ices -- isis that to even manage or to help so '02 sketch out a future that this could go on for a hundred years obviously people talk about the 30 year war in this could go on for a while but explain what the end looks like. a jazz as we critique that endorsement there is also this element.
what else can redo? >> and the american government says we cannot talk about is long in a meaningful way. so we advised february 27 what would you say? >> there needs to be a few components solid it is looking at ourselves internally we are not organized as a government for that effort it is over simplistic but the skills that we need weather border patrol agents or police advisers or what have you operate in the unstable space in the military's though the of the last 4415 years of constant back-and-forth of the two leaders of the 82nd
airborne figuring out how to be the town mayor then reaching out we need to help afghanistan control its borders the last time i checked border patrol was expeditionary. so we made a thames said doing that whether if it is the state department but we need to look from a broader effort to that essentially takes the stability of growth to many areas to talk about how we prioritize with countries like the uae or like turkey better willing to be partners in this i try to get that anecdote i just
cannot overstate how powerful that message is coming from modern arab elements that can do things to the ideology like really explaining the era of coalition in element of reorganization across that interagency to address it and then the part that you hit on to stop the american people. this is a long-term affair with international interest much like in the '50s and '60s. there are many imperfect elements with that analogy but i think there is commonality that space it
took 70 years to defeat that effort. we don't have the soviet union but that is the big enemy these are non state actors but we have certain states that have been more responsible than others. >> but that type of analogy anybody thinks they are a christian fundamentalist. so we have to be very careful how we identify. >> that makes you a conservative with said your religion of choice. >> i served a very short
time as a civilian advisor during 2010 and 2011 winter in on the economic development side, i would like to hear your comments of the top down approach where we spend billions and i had to sit next to who was during the course of modem when the taxpayer assets which to buy properties with western institutions where banks have probably will not exist in the long term the treasury position is we need them to adhere to basel three which will likely never happen so how are women a part of that change with women's own businesses? >> i have had the opportunity to really work
with the afghan private sector. i have never come across a more entrepreneurial society and i have worked and lived all over the world they will make their own future just give them a little help. so part of that is through the private sector to bring in private investment there is a lot of folks that are looking to employ those investment dollars. they want predictability. and frankly these conferences wooded come to meet tuesday with his united states going to do? are read going to turn out the lights?
government as security is just the oxygen. >> is a $1 billion robbery. the rinaldi administration. >> it is the right move. >> and i spent years of my life frankly undermining the state department with the narcotics policy eradication hurting those that we tried to win over. i have the introduction in strategy with just a rest and a handful of the most notorious guys it since the right signal to your people
and to them with the drug and criminal networking and it seems down the most egregious behavior. >> good afternoon. ion from third group and i am having an experience in iraq and afghanistan and from every deployment i have seen you said risk aversion is the biggest problem so from your experience our people aware of this and what it means for the company level? >> at that time assistance secretary came out to visit through the problems that were going on. you should receive the death stare that i had from the kernels with them.
but his advisor at one point coming he wanted to make them aware of the layers that had accumulated. each one was put in place for good reason and makes sense of isolation but in accumulation caused the problem. and when karzai first complaint about the night raids to secretary rumsfeld and a five commander said every time we go out has to go to the three star level for approval. so the answer is mixed. sometimes they are aware or is on purpose. so in that case they want to tamp down the numbers.
sometimes they're just not aware. and there is a real reluctance for civilian policy makers to have that 7,000 miles screwdriver to share a hot -- to change a we conduct this operationally. >> so with the big modern raid with the commander-in-chief is the first time in history a tactical operation was seen in realtime. >> but the technology exists for the president or anybody in the cabinet to micromanage the operation that you do in the field. how does that change things? >> changes a lot. we have discussions and the
fact that it is a mixed it is the risk aversion from the career force and technology i have had it done to me and plays the huge role in why take huge severance with the idea to be the special forces guys or the cowboys kicking doors to help the missiles from creditor drones with a flip of the switch there is the elaborate process with
lawyers at every level standing there with a series of criteria if we can take the shot or film the raid to the point that i argued to our detriment and the pendulum has swung too far. and our inactions had greater consequences than action. >> i had a little bit of time in afghanistan with the guerrilla insurgency and a few others for few decades now to fight the battle in the beltway here what would you offer as a vice?
we wake up in their alternative universe with representatives of the joint staff, a duty advertising that we can take care of this problem that the same time we listen to you and all of the things we know about the reality where is the policy disconnect? don't just say vote for the right people. [laughter] >> that signal and direction in some ways is the way that it should work that the military should in a civilian run military be in line with that but there are fundamental issues with the army itself regardless of who is elected eight years
from now this is getting in with the military industrial complex was big shiny objects. counterinsurgency does not have a constituency. >> of the army's special forces i think it is 1.five. >> it is very inexpensive. >> obviously there are very bright people that try to retain the lessons learned and are they doing a good job? >> it is an important step in the right direction to move that massive tanker
with the trade-off which i applauded. so there are some of the right people maybe it took longer to get the right people in place so now talking about pakistan and part of that is the situation with the army the administration can wish it differently and it will shift to the enemy gets a vote in their voting right now and it will require highly trained and skilled special operators better able to live among the populations through the
approach and one of the disconnects right now with iraq with boots on the ground i think some say that means another invasion but we are talking about letting the traders and letting them and buys. right now do they wear boots? >> they do. there on the ground. >> how many one year ago? >>? 300? is this 1963 with kennedy? >> at least they to go out with the vietnamese army. but that analogy that i have received that they cannot go to the game. >> that is the great analogy.