tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN December 11, 2015 7:51am-10:01am EST
senior officers on increasing the effectiveness of military operations. they testified before the senate armed services committeeom thursday for one hour 45 minutes. [inaudible conversations] >> well, good morning. committee meets today to continue our series of hearingse on defense before. we predict the effects of the goldwater-nichols reform on ourd defense acquisition management and personnel system. our past and the past few days have considered what most of you as the essence of goldwater-nichols. and the roles are responsible for chan'ector at defense and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the service secretaries and service chiefs, and the combatant commanders.to unde this morning we seek to understand how goldwater-nichols has impacted theat effectiveness of u.s. military operations and what reforms may be necessary.or we are pleased to welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses who will offer insights from
their many years of experience and distinguished service. general norton schwartz, formern chief of sdtaff of the air force and president and ceo of his executives for national security. admiral james stavridis, former commander at u.s.-european command and u.s. southern and currently again at the fletcher school of law and a diplomacy at tufts university, and frequent appearance on various liberal media outlets.oe dr. christopher lamb, deputy director of the i institute for national strategic studies at the national defense university. more than anything else that goldwater-nichols act wouldsulti result of escanglating concern c the conflict and in the country about the effectiveness of u.s. military operations. the vietnam war, and to the hostage rescue mission in irannd and the flawed invasion of grenada all pointed to deep systemic problems in our defense enterprise and needed to be of bothor the saksake our war fighters at our national
security come in particular goldwater-nichols focus on ensuring unity of command and approvinimproving the ability or forces to operate jointly.have p as we've explored in previousman hearings many questions remain about the ballot our military io striking between court military competitiveness, competencies and joint experience. but as it relates to combats, t effectiveness there is no doubtu as one former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff put it, no other nation can match our ability to combine forces on the battlefield and fight jointly.dt the subject of today's hearingds relates directly to the many steps goldwater-nichols took over the unity of command. the law made unified commandersm explicitly responsible to the president and secretary of defense for the performance ofee missions and preparedness of thei fr commands. it also renewed the joint chiefs of staff from the operational chain of command and preventative services for moving force in an out of regional commands without approval. geographic combatant commanders
were given the ability to issuel authoritative direction on allad aspects of operations, jointl training and logistics, intro change of command, and personal. within their assigned areas of responsibility. these steps were effective in establishing clear lines of command authority and responsibility that translated to a more effective fightingwe 1rce than we had in thehe 1980s. however, 30 years later we havev to take a hard look at this command structure in light ofuc current threats and how our model of war fighting has mo war fig the united states confronts thee most most diverse and complex array war iisis since the end of world war ii from rising competitors like china, powers like russia,e the growing asymmetric capabilities of missions ranging from iran to north korea, persistence of radical islamist extremism and the emergence of new domains of warfare such as space and cyberspace. these threats cut across our acs regional operational structurepc
as embodied by geographic combatant c commands. so we must ask, whether the current combatant command structure best enables us to succeed in the strategico environment of the 21st century. should we consider an alternative structures that are organized less around geographyt than trent regional and functional missions? at the same time as numerous witnesses have observed while combatant commands were originally envisioned as the wat fighting arm of the military, the department of defense, that function is largely migrated to joint task forces, specially on an ad hoc basis in response to emerging contingencies. this suggests that people havele identified a shortcoming in the current design and have adopted measures to work around the system as we see quite often. this chip in for our efforts ton evaluate and reimagine the our combatant commands.e the e, the same time combatant commands have come to put a very importantan piece time diplomatc
functions. developnts argue these developments argue for changes in structure of combatant commands. at a minimum and would call intl question a top heavy and bloated staff of structures that we seet in the combatant commands. time and again during these hearings wine have heard how dramatic increases in civilian and military staffs have persisted, even as resourcesn available for war fighting functions are increasingly strained. as former undersecretary of defense for policy michele flournoy pointed out earlier this week, combatant commands staf cf have grown to 38,000 people. that is nearly three divisions worth of staff and just the combatant commandsju alone. we have to ask if this is trulyy necessary and whether it is improving our war fighting capabilities. at the same time we have to examine whether you are duplicative functions and the joint staff combatant commandsa
and subordinate commands thatli? can be streamlined. that includes the question ofe i whether we really need all ofthe the current combatant commands. for example, do we really need soh and northcom and a southcom? do we really need a separate africom headquartered in germany when the vast majority of its, h forcesen reside within -- as we have to revisit the role of the chairman of the joint chiefs, of the chairman and a member of the joint chiefs of staff, goldwater-nichols strengthened the joint staff and operation sr management expense of the service. has that gone too far or not far enough?y of defse rober from a sect oft defense robert gates raised this issue when he testified before this committees because his frustration with the military services lack of responsiveness to currentf neerational requirements.ur wit many of our witnesses have discussed whether the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff have sufficient statutory
the stity to perform the strategic intraegration by the department of defense all too often seems to d do poorly, grte integrating priorities comean efforts and resources across regions, across domains of military activity, and across time. and balancing short-term and long-term requirements. ed question has been raised whether the chairman should beai placed in the chainrm of command with the service chiefs and? combatant commanders reporting to him. we have heard testimony in favor and against. i look forward to exploring this further today. these are critical questions about our defense organizations that have direct bearing on thea effectiveness of u.s. military a operations, and as a consequence on the well being of our warfighters. we are wicked and to look at thh -- blekaitis or so, ask toughche questions, challenge old assumptions and embrace new solutions if and when you. need. i think our witnesses again i look forward to the testimony. senator reed. >> take it very much mr. chairman.
let me join you in welcoming the witness. i've had the privilege of working with generalhe schwartz, admiral stavridis, and dr. lamb, your service to the defensee department now as an analyst and i deeply appreciate it.h thank you very much, gentlemen for joining us today. gentlem as the chairman has said we'veiv undertaken a very rigorous under his direction review of the goldwater-nichols, and we heard just a few days ago from secretary of defense, former secretary of defense michele flo flournoy about one of the issues and that was in her words over the years the qdr has become a bottom up that includes hundreds of participants that consumes many hours rather than a topersp down leadership exercised that sets clear priorities that makes tough choices and allocates risks.i would the witndo things i would hope the witnesses will talk abouts e with this wplhole planning ceocess, the formal process como in from a process and we ca improve it. that's just one of thee items.
there's a long and i think a lon important list of topics that we coulcould discuss.thor the rolite and deferred a scientific of the joint chiefs of staff including whether the militaperatireplace the chain of command for military operations. improving the employment and synchronization of military capabilities for combatant commands, defense agencies and field activities. ..efficiencies and provide senir militaryand leaders more timely recommendations. in previous hearings, our witnesses have observed better capitalizing on the gains achieved through those improvements may require significant changes to enter agency national security structure and processes, as well ,s this was made by jim walker
the godfather, if you will, of the goldwater nichols. no matter how you transform the defense department, it is quite broken. and the problems that confront this nation require an inter-agency response. executed ato national security mission by itself is long going, we do not have the ability to integrate everything that exists. i think it is important to keep that in mind. and the chairman, again, let me commend him for beginning this process with the department of defense. i hope it is a catalyst on the issue for serious review by other committees and other agencies about how, together, we can improve security in the u.s. thank you. senator mccain: welcome, general schwartz. general schwartz: thank you, sarah mccain and ranking member reid for improving dod's internal governments and defense
organization by the goldwater nichols reforms. it is a privilege to return to his room and offer a few related ideas on how to improve performance in the department of defense. it is a special pleasure to sit beside the finest flag officer of my generation, jim. while there are many issues that warrant petition, resource allocation and overhead reduction and joint credentialing of military personnel and the potential for consolidation, among others, i wish to focus this morning on the three that i am persuaded that hold the greatest promise for particularly positive outcomes. they are the role and authority in the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff rightsizing
supervising combatant commanders and jcs is insufficient for the. demands of our times. while it is true delegatedted authority from the secretary off defense is alternative, there a should be non doubt in the armid forces, that about the directivi authority of the chairman. subject to the close and continuing scrutiny and oversight of the secretary of defense. strategic guidance for force employment. force allocation tradeoffs between combatant command andwen establishing strategic priorities for the armed forces
should not be the result of bureaucratic negotiation. or the exquisite application of personal persuasion. per but aren't the product of strategic leadership. this capacity is constrained by the chairman's inability too executive authority on behalf of the secretary ofsecr defense and remedy i suggest is to place the chairman in the line of supervision between thep secretary and his or hermbat combatant commanders. combatant commands are mom plexl entities none of which are alike. some with regionalich responsibilities and some with functional roles. the command strives to serve both peacetime, crisis response and warco fighting obligations. the composition of the come plat tant command staff clearly
reflect inherent tension in excessively broad mission array. peacetime administration, deterrents, training and partner engagement versus maintainingeru capacity to conduct complex contingency operations in peace and in war. the prolive race of resource directorates, j-8s, joint intelligence centers, j-2s,ecur security assistance programcall offices, typically j-4s, partner entities, typically j-3s and result of this expansive assigned mission set. and, over time, the war fighting role of the combatant commandsat has evolved to almost exclusive use, some would suggeste, s excessive use of joint task forces up to and including
four-star led joint task forces to execute assigned missions. the simple question in my mind is, can a combatant command no c matter how well-tailored perform each and every associated task with equal competence. i don't think so. and the attempt to infuse greater interagency heft into the combatant commands has in mm experience detracted from theas core operational focus and either peacetime or in conflict. how have we squared the tension between combatant commands peacetime and war-time roles? i would argue by againain, ex-sensitive use of joint task force organizations. to execute operational missions. it is my conviction that the efficacy of the task force employment model is beyond dispute. the national counterterrorism
joint task force demonstrates conclusively in my mind, the enduring value of standing, mature, well-trained, and equipped joint task forces. it may well be that high performance parallels exist forr national joint task forces in the surface maritime and air domains as well. what we should continue, however, or what i should say we discontinue, is the proliferation of joint task forces in each combatant command with the attendant service components and headquarters staff. task force 510 in the pacific command might qualify however, as an exception to the rule. in short, mr. chairman, we need to have within the armed forces a strategic leader who can exercise executive authority.
we need to aggressively tailor combatant command headquarters h composition to its core mission or missions and refrain from creating subordinate joint task forces out of service headquarters and finally we need to drive toward employment, highly proficient joint task forces or combatant command employment. thank you, chairman mccain, ranking member reed and members of thed. committee for your attention this morning. i trust my presentation will assist in advancing the noble cause of goldwater-nichols reform. thank you,ls sir. >> admiral stavridis. >> chairman, mccain, ranking member reed, other distinguished members. pleasure to be back withad you d to be here with general schwartz who was not only a service chief but a combatant commander asf, b well as being director of the
joint staff. there is no one who can talk more coherrently to this issues as well as him. to my good friend dr. chris lam who i think can best addressaddr questions of strategy and planning senator reed raise ad t momentha ago.ag io. spent 37 years in uniform. i spent probably a decade of that in the pentagon. i wish i had been at sea during those years but in that time i managed to serve on the staff of the secretary of defense, secretary of the navy, chief of naval operations and chairman oa the joint chiefs of staff. so i have sort of seen insideies the building and as senator mccain mentioned i was twice a combatant commander, once in europe and once in southern command, latin america and theis caribbean. so i'm going to simply walk into four or five ideas that think might be interesting for this committee to discuss and debate. none of these are fully firmed
ideas but i think they relate to the objective of what theate committee, i think very correctly seeks to do as we sit here, kind of three decades after goldwater-nichols. and they all relate in one way or another to how the department is organized.the so i will start with one i think is controversial but ought to bh considered, that is do we need a cyber force for the united states? i would invite you to think about where we were 100 years ago. we had an army, a navy, and a marine corps. did we have an air force? of course not. we barely flew airplanes one onl years ago. i would argue today it feelsago. like that moment a few years after the beach at kitty hawk and my thought is, clearly we need a cyber command. i think we're moving in thatcomm direction. but i think it's time to think about whether we want to accelerate that process because our vulnerability process, becae our vulnerabilities in the cyber
do s d for them. some part of our response will have to be done by the department of defense. and the sooner we have not only a cyber command, but in my view, a cyber force -- small, capable -- i think will be well served. i think we should have a discussion. of they, to the question inter-agency. and the power of how to bring those parts of the government together, i think an interesting organizational change to consider would be to at each of the regional combatant commands to have a ambassador is a u.s. or perhaps some other senior diplomat. would continue to need a military deputy, and order to conduct military operations.
but a great deal of what combatant commands do is diplomatic in nature, and i think having a senior representative from the interagency present would be salutory. this is been tried, and i think it would be an effective an interesting idea to consider to look at combatant commands. thirdly, and the chairman mentioned this, in my view, geographically, we have too many combatant commands. we have six today. i think we should seriously consider merging north and south com and emerging u com and africa com. there are obvious deficiencies in doing so, operational additional benefits that derive. and i think finally, it is a way to begin reducing what has been
correctly identified as the bloat in the operational combatant command staffs. would associate myself with general schwartz and a number of others who have testified with the idea that we should consider independent, general staff in strengthening the role of the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. practice, as a combatant commander, i would very typically all the chairman. check signals with the chairman. i would not undertake a radical departure without talking to the chairman. inhink putting the chairman the chain of command, as general schwartz as outlined and a number of other witnesses have mentioned, is efficient, sensible, and frankly, codifies what is in effect today in many ways. in addition, i think the
chairman would be well served with what some have termed a general staff. this is the idea of taking midgrade military officers of extraordinary promise and pulling them from their services and more or less permanently assigning them to this general staff. this model has been used in other points i other nations in history. i think it is a powerful way to create efficiencies and avoid duplication, because i doing so, you can reduce a great deal of what happens in the combatant commands today. so, in addition to strengthening the position of the chairman, i think it would be worth considering whether a general staff model would make sense/ . fifth and finally, i think that we talk a great deal appropriately about joint operations.
it is important to remember that joint education is extraordinarily important in ultimately the conduct of operations, the creation of strategy, the intellectual content of our services. so, i would advocate considering whether we should integrate our joint educational institutions. probably by taking the national defense university, putting it back to three-star rank and directivet officer authority over the nation's war colleges.this would also create intellectualf capability, which could match up well with the idea of a general staff. five of those ideas are controversial. but i think they should be part of the conversation that this committee is on packaging, which is one that is deeply important
for the nation's security. thank you. senator mccain: thank you. dr. lamb? dr. lamb: thank you for the opportunity to share my views on proving the -- on improving the effectiveness of military operations. it is a great honor, especially so considering the distinguished service of your other witnesses today -- general schwartz and the admiral. it is the high point of my career to be sitting with them today, and in front of you. and i am really truly humbled by the opportunity. also, i want to knowledge the presence of my wife, who, in light of the unconventional things i'm about to say, decided i needed moral support. and i agree with her. senator mccain: we will hold her in no way responsible. [laughter] dr. lam: she will appreciate that. i argued for three sets of organizational changes to increase the effectiveness of u.s. military operations.
first, to impress the persistent lack of preparedness for irregular threats, i argue we should give u.s. relief for small unit conflict, and the marine corps has the lead for larger irregular conflicts. second, to make the best possible investment in military capabilities and maintain our advantages in major combat operations, i believe we should encourage the use of horizontal teams in the department of defense, and support their work with collaborative management -- whether joint scenarios, operating concepts, risk metrics, and institutional knowledge. and i completely agree with general schwartz, we should invigorate our approach to headquarters, so we have standing task force to experiment and test with joint concepts. finally, to better integrate military operations with other end meant of national power, i believe we need legislation that allows the president to empower leaders to run inter-agency
teams. none of these recommendations are unique to me. and they have all been made before by various groups and individuals. but i hope now is an opportune time for the senate and the leadership in the department of defense to reconsider the merits. in the brief time remaining, i would like to address some likely questions, particularly with respect to horizontal or sometimes referred to as cross-functional teams, because i know that members of the committee have expressed some interest in that. and so, i want to raise a number of questions that are likely to come up in this area. first of all, it is often asked if all national security problems are not inherently complex, and therefore require cross functional teams? my response to that would be no. it was famously argued the most important judgment a commander has to make is determining the kind of war in which they are embarking, not mistaking it for nor trying to turn it into
something that is alien to its nature. the same thing holds true for national security, more generally. we need to determine the problem being addressed. not all military tasks are in physically joint. not all national security missions are intrinsically inter-agency. if we say otherwise, we greatly increase the risk of failing to bring the right expertise. another question that arises is whether all groups with representatives from functional organizations are in effect cross-functional teams? no. there is a huge difference between a committee and the team in the executive branch. the numbers of a committee, to use some shorthand, typically give priority to protecting the parent organization equity. and the members of the cross-function team give priority to the mission. why do some groups work like teams, others work like committees? for example, why don't all
executive branch cross-functional groups work as well an army battalion headquarters, which also has to integrate functional expertise from the artillery, infantry, armor, etc. i think the answer is a difference is the degree of autonomy exercised by the functional organizations, and the degree of oversight exercised by the common authority. and the battalion headquarters, all the participants share the culture, have the obligation to follow legal orders, and received direct an ongoing supervision from the battalion commander. interagency groups consist from organizations with quite different cultures, different legal authorities and obligations, and no supervision from the only person in the system with the authority to direct the behavior -- the president. another question often raised is whether we do not already have an effect good inter-agency teams with empowered leaders, for example, the state
department's country teams/ . ambassadors having given authority by the president. well, first of all, there are notable exceptions. particularly with respect to military and covert operations. but in any case, the ambassador of authority is not sufficient. many are perceived as st,resenting states' interte rather the national interest. and the direct supervision of the president is so far removed that many of the people on the country team feel they can do that and actually be rewarded either parent organization for doing so. i will stop there, but want to close by anticipating one final reaction to the proposals for horizontal teams. complain thatably this is all rather complicated, and that at the end of the day, we are better off just finding and appointing good leaders. this is an understandable but
dangerous simplification. first, as jim likes to say, there is no need to choose between good leaders and organizations. we need both. horizontal teams cannot be employed to good effect without supportive and attentive senior leaders. but neither can senior leaders of functional organizations solve complex problems without organizations that are engineered to support cross-cutting teams. second, in the current environment, leaders simply lack the time to supervise every or even the most important cross-cutting problems. neither is it sufficient to simply insist that subordinates get along. the heads of functional organization have an obligation to represent their organization's perspectives and expertise. this obligation, reinforced by bureaucratic norms and human nature, ensures the group members with diverse expertise will clash.
conflicting views are healthy, but they must be productively resolved in a way that gives priority to mission success, and not less noble factors. dare to sayould that the intense focus on leadership particularly in this town, has always struck me as rather un-american. our founding fathers realize the american people needed more than good leadership. they paid great attention to organizing the government, so that it would work well or work well enough, even if it is not always led by saying, sensitive ops. we should do the same with respect to the department of defense and the national security system. right now, i do not believe the men and women who go in harm's way are backed up by the best possible policy, strategy, decision-making. that can and should change, and i'm glad the committee is looking into the matter. thank you again for this opportunity to share results from our research from the
national defense university. i look forward to answering any questions you might have read senator mccain: thank you very much. let us start with a fairly easy one. is there a reason why we should have a north and south com? and is there a reason for us to have an africa com based in germany, right next to euro command? let me start out with a fairly -- and let me add onto that 1 -- is in there now and need, as much as we are trying to reduce and streamlined, is in there now a need for a cyber command, given the nature of that threat? general? general schwartz: the original thinking on north com was concerned about having assigned forces to a senior officer, with responsibilities for the u.s. and domestic circumstances. foreclosed at the
time the possibility of having a joint command for both north and south america. in this time, now, with the passage of time to consolidate both of those organizations, as the admiral suggested, the africa wasor ferent.t differen it was the place it on the continent. senator mccain: that did not turn out very well. general schwartz: it did not create but you see ho. but you see with the passage of time, it is a good way -- that is an act of consolidation that certainly makes sense to me. and with respect to cyber com, yes, once they have assigned
forces, it is time to establish cyber com as independent com. sir, i think we should merge north and south. not only for efficiencies, but i think there are cultural connections -- canada and mexico, two largest economies in the americas -- into the flow with our work and world to the south. predictably, there will be objections based on norad. i think that can be easily handled with subunified command in some way. africom was a good experiment but i think it is time to admit merging it back together, the forces as you said are all in europe. i think those connections between europe and africa actually would be very positive and i think in some sense well-received in the african world. and then cyber command i already addressed.
i think it is absolutely time to do it. the real question should we consider, do we want to go one step further to a cyber force? >> that is really important. thank you. doctor? >> i wouldn't have strong feelings on the command and control assigned to the combatant commands but i would make the following observation. i think that decision is linked to other recommendations made here today, including whether we increase and beef up our ability to field joint task forces, standing joint task forcess. whether we have general staff or chairman in chain of command. i think that would impact a lot of effective command-and-control combatant commanders could exercise. >> thank you. the whole issue of joint task force i think is one of the most important aspects of it obviously since there's now a gap between the organizations in being and appointment of, in
every crisis of a joint task force, whether it comes from that command or from others, it's obvious that's where the operations are. finally, in more philosophical plane here, one of the much-criticized but yet pretty successful staff structure has been the german general staff. names like shlefein and others as well as kidel, that, in every time we start talking about centralizing authority in the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff that issue is raised. the german general staff system is not something that we want to emulate yet there are others who say it wasn't because of the staff system they lost. it was for other reasons.
so, give me a more of a fundamental view of, do you want to centralize this much power in the hands of one individual or authority in the hands of this one individual? general? >> mr. chairman, i would not create a general staff. i actually believe that there is risk of having the brilliant few become self-serving. however, it isn't necessary that a chairman in the chain of command connect to a general staff. by retaining a similar arrangement as we have now where the joint staff is a creature of the joint chiefs, you minimize concern about a rogue individual >> i would at least have a robust about the pros and cons
of a general staff. in addition to place the chairman on top of it operationally. in terms of the concerns raised about the german general staff, you know, that rattles old ghosts in our memories but at the end of the day it was political leadership and economic collapse in germany that led to the rise of facism. the german general staff was perhaps a tool of that. i think here in the united states the culture in the military is so strongly one of sub servians to civilian leadership i would not believe that to be a significant concern when weighed against the efficiencies that could be derived from such a structure. >> i would just second what admiral staff reed december said about there not be a civilian control of military from the general staff. but i think it is worthwhile for the committee to ask or take up
issue michelle turn know said earlier in the week, tyranny of consensus. the general staff is well-known for its extensive coordination to insure consensus on positions forwarded to the chairman. i think it would be very interesting to hear from former chairman and current chairman what they think of their staff's performance in that regard. for the committee to get to the heart of why consensus tend to rule in the way the joint staff operate and runs. i think it has to the served us particularly well or the chairman particularly well to date. >> i would just finally make a comment and that is being a student of world war ii, they didn't have any of all this stuff. there were some very brilliant guys named marshall and leahy and king and others that won the most seminal war of probably modern times. so, maybe we, i don't know how we look at that aspect of it but it certainly was the factor, major factor in winning
world war ii. senator reed. >> i thank you, mr. chairman. thank you gentlemen, for your very, very thoughtful testimony and two issues are emerging among many. one is, putting the chairman in the chain of command and two, creating a general staff and there are pros and cons as admiral stavridis pointed out. since you're some of the most intellectually honest people i know and we get the pros a lot. what is the con? what is it that you worry about, general? if we had a chairman in the chain of command, if we did it, we'd have to create sort of a buffer against those downsize. so both you and admiral stavridis please and dr. lamb. >> the traditional thinking of having the chairman in the chain of command is potentials for abuse, for excessive exercise of
one's authority. and undermining, as chris lamb, mentioned, the fundamental principle of civilian authority. that's the downside. and, but i believe that, and given my experience, the chairman and the secretary operate so closely in today's environment that there is a level of supervision which mitigates that possibility. but, that is, that's a legitimate consideration. >> let me follow with a question. even in your concept of putting the chairman in the chain he would still be supportive of secretary of defense? >> of course. exactly correct. >> so what, practical effect would be injecting him between the service chiefs and service sector? >> no. >> what is the practical effect? >> the pracht call effect is there is an authoritative referee in uniform. at the moment that thor trait tiff referee is either the
deputy secretary or the secretary and it seems to me having someone in uniform with executive authority properly supervised contributes to effective activity. >> to your points on both these issues, the general staff, stand alone general staff and chairman and the chain? >> sir, let me take the chairman position first. we identified, correctly identifies one of the cons. i give you another one. having put that much power and authority into one person, what if you get extremely mediocre chairman, someone who is not smart, not effective? we have a very good up and out system. we're probably going to get a very good chairman but that, that level of power and authority you need to worry not only about abuse of power but lack of capability in it as well.
in terms of the general staff, i think a con would be that a general staff, because the officers would have been you can mr.ed out of their services at the 0-4, 0-5 level in their late 30s, they wouldn't have the robust level of operational experience we see on the joint staff today. that would be a con. again my intuition in both cases the pros would outweigh the cons but that would be part of the conversation looking at both sides. >> dr. lamb, your comments? >> first with respect to the chairman and the chain of command i think i would agree with general schwartz in the past the relationship between the chairman and the secretary has been extremely tight. so i'm not sure what the value added in inserting someone formally into the chain of command is. there are issues there, as some chairman and secretary teams have worked very closely, and the secretary's interests and decisions have been passed
through the chairman. in other cases the, you can think of secretaries who dealt directly with the combatant commanders at length. so i think, i would be kind of agnostic on that but generally inclined to believe there is not a lot value added to that. the important decisions i think chairman needs to work on is future force development. this is where we really have to work hard to preserve the qualitative advantages that we currently enjoy in which i think most people agree are diminishing. there, to get the issue of general staff i think he needs really dedicated, deep, expertise on his staff and currently we tend not to have that. we bring people in directly from operational commands who never worked. we throw them at problem for couple years, he rotate them out. my view would be more stability on the general, the, like the general staff would bring to the chairman would probably be a
good thing on the whole. maria: thank you very much. general, thank you for your service and for your testimony. >> thank you, mr. chair. thank you, gentlemen for joining us today. nice to have you here. some interesting comments. admiral, and dr. lamb, if you would please, in 2009 in relation to the dod, former dod secretary, bob gates said. this is department is not organized to wage war. that is what i'm trying to fix. that was from bob gates. from both of you, do you believe it can be fixed within the department? if so, if you could share your thoughts on that. yes, please, general, go ahead. >> i agree that the model for employment once again i would try to re-emphasize my earlier point that we have migrated perhaps more by chance than by design but, that joint task
forces are the way we operate today. and, it seems to me that professionalizing those entities in the same way that we have grown the special operations national joint task force is the model for the future in the other operating domains. >> thank you. >> i agree with general schwartz. as a general proposition. i think we should make the point that the department of defense today operates very effectively in a number of venues but we could be better and more efficient if we had a model like general schwartz is suggesting in my view. >> i really appreciate the question. i am personally fascinated by secretary gates and his tenure as secretary of defense. i think he is a remarkable man and he has been very candid in
his memoirs about the experience he had leading department of defense at a time of war and i looked what he had to say very carefully. i think it is interesting. what seemed to frustrate him was that, even though we had troops on the battlefield, in contact with the enemy, the service chiefs were called to their statutory obligation to raise, train, equip the force of the future and he couldn't get enough capability in the field for the problem we were currently trying to master. this was a source of great frustration to the secretary and i think it underlies the comment you just quoted him on. but for me the problem there was in part our lack of prepareness for irregular warfare. the services, whether we are talking about preparing for future irregular conflicts or engaged in them currently always given priority what they consider their correspondsability of fighting and winning the nation's
large-scale force on force conflicts. we've never been very good being prepared for irregular war. i think that is true over the last 60 years. so i, i think we do need some changes there but for me, the solution there is to put someone definitely in charge of being prepared for irregular conflict. that is something we haven't done. we always turn to all the services you're all equally responsible being prepared for irregular conflict and they invariably include a lesser included case. so we don't go to the the conflicts, think about them, planning for them, with niche capabilities, et cetera. i think that is what frustrated the secretary and can and should be fixed. >> there were a lot of very provock tiff comments the secretary has made. that is good because we're spending time talking about some of these reforms and thoughts he had with regards to irregular warfare, asymmetrical warfare.
we weren't talking i wasn't so much aware of it until about the 15 years ago until we started taking a look at our force. how can we empower combatant commanders to take a prudent risk and make decisions on their own? do we empower them to do that or how can we empower them to do that? any thoughts? or does it need to be a top-down approach? why can't it be a more bottom-up approach in taking some of those risks? general? >> i think thoughtful combatant commanders like jim stavridis did exactly that. however it is important to assign missions and to distinguish what the priorities are. that is a function of this, of the pentagon in this town and we haven't been terribly good at that. >> we have not. thank you, general. thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman.
thank all of you for your service and i'm going to direct these to general schwartz and admiral stavridis. you know it's, i'm so appreciative of y'all coming and so candid with us and tell us exactly what you've seen and what your experience. the hard thing i'm having, i'm having a hard time with why either you can not make these changes when you're in that command, when you're on the front line, when you're in charge? is the system bogged down where we're throwing so much stuff at you from here to the intermediaries coming to us? also how we keep the separation of the civilian oversight as we do in, which is unbelievable, and i'm glad we do. that is the concern we might have, the balance? but you know when you have the 2010 report by mckinsey and company found less than 25% or one quarter of active duty troops were in combat roles, with majority instead performing overhead activities. if you look at it from the
standpoint of all the pay increases, we're giving the same pay increases to 75% the people that don't see any action. and, are you all, i think we need to know from you now, in your role, not, not being constrained in your remarks, how do we, how do we get to where you're able to make the decision when you're in charge and in power? they're saying it can't be made. the military can't change. only under the goldwater act that we had way back when, only we can force it from here. but yet we throw so many regulations and some oversights it makes it impossible to govern. where is the intermediate? who makes that decision? is there a commission should be in place? for those who are concerned about giving total power to a joint chief, the joint chiefs and chairman, still having the civilian thing control and
advisory capacity? i don't know how to circumnavigate this. the final question y'all two can anticipates, i know we're talking about northcom and south come. i would ask the same question about national guard and reserves. i was a governor, former governor. i had, i was over my guard and i would have gladly shared with the president. if the only reason we have the reserves doing what they're doing and guard doing what they're doing is because of separation of oversight doesn't make any sense to me. we could save tremendous amount and use our guard and reserves in a much more, i think effective role and much more cost effective. but i don't see that happening either. whoever wants to chime in, please do. >> thank you. first on the question, i actually believe that giving the chairman, hopefully a very capable individual, directive
authority, executive authority, would change the dynamic in what you're saying. >> right now you're saying that that person doesn't have that? >> at the moment he does not have that. he can encourage, he can persuade. >> can't do it. >> but can't compel. and that is not a business-like approach to the problem. secondly, with regard to the guard and reserve, it is, it is at least in part a function ever statutory authority as you're aware as former governor and others here on the dais. >> right. >> the reserve is a title tenentty which is responsive to the service leadership. and the guard of course is title 13, a little more complex arrangement and i think it's safe to say that the, the at least the arm and air force have a preference maintaining both of
those entities because access. >> admiral. >> couple thoughts. you touch on important aspect which is reforming pay benefits. i think those authorities, derive from all of you here on capitol hill based on proposals that can come and i think you're spot on to look at, why do we pay an 0-3 essentially same amount of money? >> right. >> really in my view ripe for a new look. you could drive it from here but i think in the building they have the authority to build that into proposals an move it forward. i hope you spur them to do it. in terms of authorities to really make changes, i think providing the the sec-def to go
into government and move civilians in there, simple authorities over the gs system i think would be helpful in creating efficiencies. in terms of the guard and reserve, to the degree the committee wants to really lick your finger, reach up and touch the third rail, you could look at, you could look at alternative model in the maritime world. we have an air guard and a land guard if you will but we have a coast guard. coast guard resides, as you all well know in the department of homeland security. it's a very different model. if you want to look at efficiencies and structures, that might be an interesting model to look at as to whether it pertains in the air and on the land as it seems to work quite effectively, in my view at sea. so these are huge questions. in terms of do you need a commission, i would say what
this committee is doing right now is the basis of driving these thoughts forward. i hope you continue at this. >> thank you, sir. >> sentor fischer. no thank you, mr. chairman. gentlemen, recently a friend and i have been having discussions on a 1984 speech by casper weinberger which of course became known as the weinberger doctrine and the third rule that he laid out would be that military forces should only be committed after the military and political objectives have been clearly defined. there has been criticism lately because of recent campaigns we've seen in afghanistan and syria and criticisms that perhaps we haven't seen that end result, that end state really
clearly defined. i think in the future conflicts, especially when we look at the cyber area, it is going to be difficult, it is going to be a challenge there, to be able to define what's ahead. i guess i would like to hear from all of you if you believe these evolving trends are going to change, how we look at laying out those objectives in the future. and are we going to be able to, to look at a comprehensive strategy, a comprehensive plan for the future? or are we going to have to look at it more incrementally as we move forward and what are the risks that would be involved with that? if i could start with you, general? >> as i see it, ma'am, the role of civilian leadership is to
decide the why and the where. and the role of the uniforms is to offer advice on the how. both are essential ingredients of success and the desire for clarity in the why and the where is, is important to those who serve in uniform. without a doubt. i think the clear thing here is that there is a need for understanding that these are complex circumstances. by it is important for there to be support for the mission.
and if i may offer an unsolicited piece of advice, the absence of an authorization for use of military force in the current setting is less than ideal. >> i agree with general schwartz clearly ideally, the ideal structure, senator, would be crisp, clear direction from the political level. coherent strategy that has been explained to the american people. has a reasonable level of support in our democracy. then the military conducts the detailed planning which really is the precision piece of this going forward. how do, how to make that, make that link more effective, i think a lot of what we're discussing today would be helpful in that regard. and, the degree to which that our military can be given that
kind of strategic clarity will be the degree to which we're successful in our an gaugements overseas. >> so would you both say that that is a rile that we, as members of the senate should continue to require? to limit risk, even into a future where the nature of warfare mayor change? >> yes. >> and dr. lamb, if you had comments, please. >> yes. one of the jobs i had in the pentagon was helping prepare the contingency planning guidance and the defense planning guidance and overseeing the nation's war plans for undersecretary of defense for policy. one of my observations was that the operational plans were crystal clear compared to the strategic guidance that we often are able to promulgate and i know some of your previous
witnesses have talked about strategy from the point of view of the need for more gray matter, greater strategists, more, better strategist, et cetera. my view is a little bit different. i think there are political and bureaucratic forces at work that tend to militate against strati if. you asked why don't we have a clear end state? why don't we have a clear center of gravity? why don't we marshall our resources against that center of gravity? i think the answer is twofold. first in formulating a strategy with that kind of clarity, right now there are great political and even contract democratic disincentives for that kind of clarity. if you say there are three ways to attack this problem and we're going to choose door b, so to speak, someone will always criticize you for not having taken option a or option c. so the safer thing to do is we'll do all those things. in war on terrorism we'll emphasize strategic communications and go after
terrorists themselves and we're going to dissuade state sponsors and we're going to on and on and on. so if you look at all the public strategy documents, they're just laundry list of objectives. you don't have that clarity. when it comes to implementing the strategy you similarly have bureaucratic forces at play. i am firmly convinced at after a year of study, a lot of popular opinion what went wrong in iraq is in fact wrong. because of the point we just made about formulating strategy. if you have real strategy it really exists not on paper but in the minds of key decisionmakers because they can't problem mull gate the strategy for reasons i just mentioned so it is in their minds. so if you are going to get a clear cohesive implementation of strategy everybody has to be working together and have a mind meld if you will. that did not happen in iraq. and we could go into detail why that did not happen.
but the point is we had people in one part of our national security system working very hard to go in one direction and people on the ground in baghdad supported by other people trying to go in different direction. the results were not good. so when it comes to strategy i think we have political and bureaucratic problems. one of the reasons i favor these cross functional teams. think think they can put a strategy together and have better chance of implementing in cohesive and upfied way. >> thank you. >> senator kaine. >> thank you, mr. chair. i appreciate sentor fischer bringing up the weinberger doctrine and, general schwartz, your comment about the authorization. i think there are many reasons why an authorization is really important. one is just the legal requirements of article i and article ii. the second the sign of resolve you show to adversaries, allies and especially your troops but the third is sort of the one the
weinberger dock trin get at. it helps you clash out the at beginning what the is mission and goal. traditionally president presents an authorization. congress usually doesn't accept it verbatim it. president bush presented thor right after attack 9/11. congress rejected originally presented version and bat it it around and came up with something very different. the war against isil on we started august 8th, 2014 to protect yazidis and sinjar around eastern bill. then we had go on offense and we didn't have the rationale and withering cross-examination that it doesn't deserve. i rault the president not sending authorization for congress, essentially sings months after the beginning of war. now it has been 10 months since the president sent an authorization. we haven't had discussion we
should have at front end if you want people to risk their lives. i think weinberger doctrine is good way to look at it. a couple of questions to clarify. you all offered good ideas. general if you're offering a is there a force, a command? a cyber academy? most of us done the service academy nominations? is there a cyber academy? tell us what that looks like? >> again i think it is small, probably numbered in thousands of members, so quite small. less than 10,000 probably. what you have today is each of the service academies building inside of itself a small cyber academy. this is kind of infish sip of it i think we need to overcome. i think, yes, there would be a educational pipeline. i think there would be a career path. you have to get away from some of the, if you will, traditional go to boot camp, shave your
head, crawl your way up a hierarchal organization. i'm not sure that will attract the kind of people we need in the cyber force. it probably has somewhat different pay, benefits, back to senator manchin's question a moment ago are we paying right people the right amount. this may be a highly paid cadre. closest analog we have quite obviously is special forces. that is roughly what it would look like. i do believe it is time we get after this because i our vulnerabilities are significant in this area. >> second question, to another idea you had, i thought intriguing, idea of ambassadorial level. sort of civilian deputy within the cocomes. i could gather there is unstated discussion, nature of military mission that so much of it is diplomacy. nations want us to send a special purpose people around
africa to train their militaries. so much is on the border between diplomacy and military or working out with the japanese the okinawa situation. that is diplomatic as much as it is military. is that sort of your thinking behind the recommendation? >> it is. the structure, as it was in effect when i was at southern command and while i was at u.s. european command i had a military deputy. i think you need to continue to have a military deputy for conduct -- >> operation. >> conduct of operations but we also had instead of a polad, political advisor from the state department, we had a senior ambassador who was your civilian deputy. he or she was capable of doing that kind ever engagement, diplomatic work, working with host nations. helped resolve innumerable challenges if you will on the smart power side of the equation. it is low cost and strong signal
to inner agency how we want to work together to address problems that i think is salutary. >> sound like a fletcher school idea. then, dr. lamb, one last question for you. the idea that you have advocated in your opening testimony about having some, some primary responsibility for irregular war if it is small or if it is large rather than everybody feeling like iraq lar wars are sort of lesser responsibility, which means we're not really prepared for regular wars. talk about that? elaborate on that, if you would? a. we have parallel with regards to special operation forces in general. hobby services before we combine them had special operation forces. they knew what they wanted to use them for. they want a priority for the service. socom.s created u.s.
we have unparalleled capabilities. those have only improved over the last 10 or 15 years. when it comes to working with the host nation forces, we are not quite as sharp. there is a number of complex reasons for that, which have been discussed by many. i think the committee needs to take that issue up with so, leadership -- socom leadership. they intend to improve the capabilities. with regard to the marine corps, not every problem, not every problem can be handled was a team.special operations the question is who in the department of defense is really responsible for being prepared for that mission? we go on these missions well there -- whether it's panama,
somalia, we go not really prepared, kind of learning on the job, seeing the situation demands. not only not having the equipment but not being able to generate it quickly in response to urgent requests from forces in the field. i think we can do better than that. the marine corps would work well in that regard for a number of reasons.it has a history of greater involvement . withalready a joint force capabilities well integrated. there's a lot of advantages there. we've come to a point where we cannot afford this without some clarification of roles in the department. >> thank you. i want to thank all of you for being here today. admiral, i wanted to ask you
about the preposition of commander. we had testimony this spring from general john kelly, the commander, about how the networks are working over our southern border. the sophisticated smuggling network that i can assure you now are being used to devastate my state with how heroin is coming in but also the issue he raised as well was that he haveved adherence to isis called for filtration of our southern border. i wanted to ask you about your thoughts on that in terms of the use of those networks to not only on things like drugs but also as we look at this terrorism challenge. admiral stavridis: it is absolutely something we should be worried about. this is the convergence of these drug routes, which are extremely
with the, possibility of moving them to the really dark end of the spectrum, weapons of mass destruction with narcotics. threatsse higher level convergence, we are at a greater risk. ist we should do about it exactly what we're talking about here, thinking holistically about how you create a network to combat a network. this is a very sophisticated, private, public elaboration with international abilities ranging from moving submarines with 10 tons of cocaine to aircraft's. you need to bring the interagency, special operations. this also argues for emerging of northcom and southcom.
there is a quick basket of ideas. >> i appreciate it. i don't love anyone else wants to comment. i also wanted to -- not to pick on you today, admiral, given up our position as the commander of nato, what we've seen recently iran, on october 10, they conducted a ballistic missile test. we learned they tested a missile on november 21. -- first of all, a clear violation of u.n. resolutions. also from what we understand, the report suggests it has a range of 1200 miles. that would give them a capability of hitting eastern europe and places we are concerned about.
asking why aren't we responding to this? what do you think our response should be? should there be some response? it strikes me as a very important issue because it is already in light of the jppoa. they're violating existing u.n. resolutions and it seems to me if there isn't some response to us, they are going to continue not only as this doesn't bode for the jvp away, but assumed capability that could go even further to hit the u.s. admiral stavridis: as i've said often, we are concerned about iran's nuclear program but it's a much bigger problem than that. they see themselves as an imperial power dating back 2.5 millennia.
they are currently in control of five capitals of the region. jcpoa isnney l.a. -- going to shower resources upon them. there are a highly dangerous opponent. iran toe should hold the commitments they have made and if that means that agreement is broken and we therefore returned to a sanctions regime, we need to face that. all ofy, we need to use our clandestine, intelligence capability to truly understand what's going on. third, we need to stand with our sunni allies in the region and of course, with israel, who will be the bulwark against this kind of expansion. we looked at the missile defense system and should continue to move in that direction. that's kind of a beginning but i iran willen --
continue to be a geopolitical threat to the u.s. >> thank you. >> thank you all very much for your service and for being here today. , you talk about of theing the structure military to set up special teams that have commitment to mission whatpost -- opposed to groups of bring to task. i really like that idea. i think one of the things if we look at the private sector, one of the things they've figured out is that the top down approach is not as good for decision-making.
one of the challenges -- i guess i should ask the general and admiral what you think the challenges are of trying to move from what has been a traditional hierarchy to a structure that allows that team approach to really address the challenges we are facing. general, do you want to start? general schwartz: i don't know if the committee -- here's an example. a be the best recent example of how the team approach produces extraordinary results. chris lamb'sne is while does work, there's evidence of that. there is a new generation of military leadership that gets it, i think.
we should support that, encourage it. through your oversight, we should mandate it. core questiontz: going forward. what mitigates against it, what makes it difficult is the built in structure of the military. this is an organization where one million people get up and that on the same outfit. start cracking that mentality. there is a generational shift. this is not an on and off switch between a highly chaotic silicon valley-like entity. toward to dial that more team approaches, international
cooperation's, strategic to medications without losing our ability to deliver lethal combat power. >> you spoke about the coast guard having a different model. one of the things i remember after the bp oil spill when they are talking about the response in rescuing people -- not the oil spill, hurricane katrina -- was that the coast guard was very effective in responding both of and on the bp oil spill able to makewere decisions on the spot without having to check with anyone. what's different about the coast guard model and how do you is effective about that or should we be looking at transferring what's effective about that to address some other challenges?
we spent some time looking at the coast guard model. theirast guard would say and their model training model is different from some of the other services. they are used to thinking about problems across functional ways. they has some natural advantages. >> can you explain when you say their leadership model is different. what's different that gives them that ability to focus? they beginvridis: their lives at the coast guard academy with an appreciation of they are but one entity within the department of homeland security, which has 19 different entities within it.
they know this border between -- they know they straddle that border. law-enforcement, rescue, environmental. ofre mentality is simply one cooperation, working together. betterrd to find a integrated organization than the coast guard. i think we could learn a lot from that. general schwartz: they have much greater experience with state and local leadership than typically does through the active duty forces. thank you all very much. >> thank you. your years of service. bit on yourcus a
recommendation all caps with -- with regard to north com and southcom. we are interested very much in what's going on in the arctic. there is a requirement for the secretary of defense to put together an arctic operations plan for the first time. we think it's progress. , onegiven your background of the many challenges we have there is when you look at the scene oft's a classic different combatant commands -- i'm sure you all
noticed the massive russian buildup. yesterday, there was another article about a new missile-defense system. huge exercises. we're looking at getting ordered the only airborne dct in the entire asia-pacific. as you know, that takes a lot of training to have your forces up there well trained and be able to operate in 30 below zero. i would appreciate your views on the arctic but also that merger idea and how it would enhance or diminish. we think there should be more attention on the arctic given all that's going up -- going on up there right now. it's importantz:
the arctic be assigned as a mission to one of the combatant commands. that has yet to happen. it should transpire. that's .1. point one. two, we only have one operating icebreaker. this is unthinkable for the u.s. clearly, that coast guard platform, we need more of that and we need the other kinds of wherewithal that will allow us to assert our sovereignty in the arctic. >> we have one and the russians have 40, i believe. admiral stavridis: treasure has 38 plus two -- russia has 38 plus two icebreakers. the chinese have 16 icebreakers.
have eight. this is beyond a pedestrian point. i agree with the signing it to u.s. northern command in its entirety. i think it would not be diminished by the merger. when you look at the level of activity to the south and what m is doing, i think it because itluable would further solidify her integration with canada. lastly, we should be working with nato. this is a nato frontier. canada and the u.s. are nato nations and we need to get that border as importantly as we do of the borders of the alliance
in eastern europe and to the south on the mediterranean. general, could you speak to the strategic location of the forces up there? when you speak about having it completely with regards of having it under north command, do you think the operational forces should be also under the command given they are very oriented toward the asia-pacific. you and the strategic location of alaska is such that those air forces, army forces can really be anywhere in the northern hemisphere within 7, 8 hours. would you mind speaking about that? general schwartz: if the constraint of signed forces to see domestic can be overcome, that makes sense. alaskagn those assets in
that have the opportunity to reinforce america's claims in the arctic as well as be deployable for other missions that might be a sign is certainly the right approach. admiral stavridis: we spoke a lot about the unified command plan, which kind of divides the world. the other important document is called the forces four document, assigns those forces. it's renegotiated typically every two years. that would be a very important, new way to think about this assignment. >> thank you. >> thank you. a couple quick points. on the icebreakers. it's preposterous we don't have more significant icebreaker capacity given what's happening in the arctic.
secondly, would you agree it would be advantageous to the -- to a seed -- acede -- could i ask why agnostic? >> i am concerned about our willingness to protect navigation around the world and the way other nations are interpreting their control over the areas. >> my concern is other nations are going through that process making claims and we're standing on the sidelines.
your gestures won't show up in the record. we are muchridis: better inside that treaty then outside it in terms of protecting our rights. we could have a long hearing and i'm sure such has been done. call me back on that one any time. >> i want to associate myself with the comments of senator ayotte. it's hard to interpret exactly what they are doing. some think it's the struggle of the hardliners. on the other hand, it would be very dangerous for us to establish the precedent of blinking violations. great believer that implementation is as important as vision. i voted for the jcpoa. it was based on the understanding it would be enforced and i think this could be interpreted as an early test of our resolve.
i take it you agree, general. general schwartz: i certainly do. if it's a violation of u.n. resolutions, we should call that out without hesitation. admiral stavridis: i agree as well. i have been hopeful of this agreement but i'm increasingly skeptical that it will be the right step for u.s. national security. it certainly gives way to the negative side of that equation. >> dr. lamp, and your remarks he spoke about how we need to be thinking about unconventional warfare and suggested several areas. you speak about persuasive communication. in my view, there are two friends with the war with isis. one is military, the other ideas. we're badly losing the war of ideas. it strikes me that a huge gap in
our national strategy. my sense is it doesn't have the priority it should. would you agree? dr. lamb: i absolutely would. i think there are two issues here. organizationally, we are not well organized to treat the issue of communications. we get public affairs, public diplomacy, -- >> usia was abolished 15 years ago. dr. lamb: we don't have a dedicated organization to deal with this anymore and we are confused about -- americans are sensitive about government control or use of information and we are losing this game. i would concur on the substantive front, we are having political problems with deciding the best way to deal with the issue with the fact that some
terrorists happen to also be muslim and islamic. we want to emphasize that the islamic religion is peaceful and tolerant but we do have this thatn within that religion sees the world differently and our ability to deal with that in a forthright way is handicap. unsurprised by the number of senior leaders -- i am surprised by the number of senior leaders who have said from their memoirs in their tours of duty that this is an achilles' heel for us and we still haven't effectively identified the enemy we are up against, how to turn that issue into something that the islamic world debates itself about what it's going to do about this strain within it. organizationally, we are really on our heels in this regard. that's where this
battle will be won or lost in my view. 200,000e now 100,000, jihadists. billion muslims. that's the battlefield. there can only be one within the muslim community but we have to lead it. withve to at least work the non-jihadist muslim community worldwide. general schwartz: i would close by saying we need to give voice to those who have escaped isil -occupied areas. >> seems to meet natural. admiral stavridis: it is a battlefield but it's also a marketplace and we have to compete. we have to recognize that. it's a very important aspect of how we communicate. we are pretty good at dominating
markets. we should bring some of those skills here. >> it's ironic we are the people who invented facebook and twitter and we are losing on that front. thank you very much, gentlemen. one additional question. about combining several of the combatant commands. had?here any savings to be if so, we would like to quantify them because in fiscal year 17, we will face a $15 billion shortfall somewhere real like to be. we are going to have to find some places where it can be saved in staff, personnel, noncombatant areas. perhaps you have an immediate response or for the record. in the schwartz:
business world, we call those synergies. i cannot offer a number but certainly there are those in the department who could answer that wouldon for you and recommend you press for that. admiral stavridis: yes, there are savings. i would recommend not only pressing the department but getting someone on the outside to take a good look at that. thank you very i appreciate your testimony. >> i appreciate any comments about the hearts and minds but first you have to killed him. -- kill them. as long as the perception is that they're winning, they will also win in other areas. i believe that one of the reasons why these young men are most attracted is they think they are joining a winning cause. bernardinouch as san and in paris are one of the
greatest recruitment tools they have. until we beat them on the that ourld, i think messaging efforts will be severely hindered but i also agree that there is going to be the mostght using advanced technologies and i would also point out we still have a big problem with the ability now of isis to be contacted and direct a young man or woman to a secure site. that's just not right. it's not right. that's not right. and i see heads nodding and that is, as senator king mentioned, that is not recorded. so maybe -- >> i agree with the chairman on both fronts. >> apple? >> i agree completely and i think that this also gets into
the cyber piece of this. there are ways we can track, control, eradicate in the cyber world. i also particularly agreed the edge of this has to be hard power. in the long game it's a mix of hard power, smart power. but at the moment dealing with the forces that are against us against islamic state we have to go hard now. >> doctor, did you have any comment? >> for myself i think this is just a good example of what i was referring to on the indirect approach and special operations. the military information support forces in southcom. it's u not to the same levels of proficiency that the other aspects of our. so i think there's room for improvement. >> i thank you. doctor, as a graduate of the institution of which you're
presently employed, when it had the correct name, i want to thank you for your continued good work and i thank admiral and general for your many years of service. this will probably be the conclusion of a series of hearings that we are having as we try to address this whole issue of reform, ability to get into the challenge. to meet the challenges of the 21st century. i believe that goldwater-nichols could never have come from within the pentagon. i think everybody agrees with that. we intend on a bipartisan basis to work with the pentagon, and secretary carter, as closely as we possibly can. but i think it's pretty well-known that we have to lead. and it's not to the exclusion of
the pentagon but it certainly is a responsibility that i think that we have. and i'm proud of the modest measures that we have taken in this years. but i think next year is really where we can really make a significant impact, and a series of hearings that we are now concluding with i think gives us an excellent basis for the kinds of reforms that need to be made. it just is disappointing to our constituents when i go back to arizona and somebody asked me about a $2 billion cost overrun of one weapons system. it's hard to defend, hard to justify. and then when we see the combat capabilities of going down in
organizations and yet the staffs and support going up, and we have still, we are still unable to conduct an audit successfully of the department of defense, and no one can tell this committee who, how many contract personnel are employed, pretty large task ahead of us. but if we pursue the principles that you recommended to us today, some of the other aspects of this challenge will follow. so you've been very helpful, and admiral, i ask the panel yesterday if you all would prepare notes of condolences to be delivered to senator reed on saturday afternoon. it would be much appreciated. >> go army. >> joe nathan.
harry reagan criticized justice scalia for the comments. >> mr. president yesterday the supreme court heard oral argument in the case of fisher v. university of texas. that case the plaintiffs was challenging from university of texas. during those oral arguments, conservative justice scalia asked whether affirmative action arms minority students are placing them in an environment that are too academically challenging for them. justice scalia said this about african-americans, and i quote. there are those who contend that doesn't benefit african-americans get the into e university of texas where they do not do well as opposed to having them go to a less advanced school, a slower track school where they do well, closed quote. spirlea further argued that african-american students,
quote, come from lesser schools where they do not feel that they are being pushed ahead in classes that are too fast for them. that's university of texas should not take really qualified african-american students because that means a number of really competent blacks made to lesser schools turns out to be less. but that wasn't enough. here's what else he said. i don't think it stands to reason that it's a good thing for the university of texas to admit as many blacks as possible, closed quote. it's stunning a man of his intellect. i've always acknowledged his intellect. but these ideas that he pronounced yesterday are racist and application, if not intent. i don't know about his content but it is deeply disturbing to hear a supreme court justice endorsed racist ideas from the bench of the nation's highest court.
his endorsement of racist theories, if frightening replications not the least of which is to undermine the academic achievements of african-americans. earlier this week i spoke about republicans platform which has a lot of hate in it. as we speak, donald trump proposing to ban muslim immigration. other leading candidates are proposing a religious test, tossing around slurs on a daily basis. the top two republican leaders in the training senate, i'm sorry, in the united states, have said they will support donald trump if he is nominated. now a republican appointed justice. the only difference between trump and scalia is fully has a role in a life time appointed. ideas like this don't belong on the internet, let alone amounts of national figures. the idea that african-american students are somehow inherently
intellectually inferior to other students is despicable. it's a throwback of the time to a time that america left behind a half a century ago. the idea that we should be pushing well qualified african-american students out of the top universities in to lesser schools is unacceptable. that justice scalia could raise such an uninformed idea shows just how out of touch he is with the values of this nation. it goes without saying that an african-american student has the same potential to succeed in an academically challenging apartment as any other student. i firmly believe that the united states is the greatest nation in the world because of our ability to embrace men and women of diverse backgrounds, provide them with opportunity to succeed. colleges and universities provide their students with opportunity, many in the world can never hope to obtain. people from different backgrounds spurs creativity and innovation.
research has shown that increased, excuse me, increase racial diversity on campuses produces higher levels of academic achievement for all students. and fortune 500 companies agree that embracing diversity is good for the bottom line. and the supreme court previously has acknowledged that diversity provides a substantial and compelling contribution to our educational system. yet, justice scalia's comments paint a picture to disturbing realities. despite the progress our nation has made on diversity and inclusion they're still much work to do to ensure we are giving every american a fair shot. regardless of their race, ethnicity or religion. as a nation we have the responsibility to direct adequate resources to our educational system to permit all students a higher education. generations of discrimination and legally sanctioned inequality have reduce racial disparities in our educational system. sad but true. these disparities must be
addressed by embracing diversity in our schools, workplaces, markets, neighborhoods while investing in adequately -- for all students, pre-k to higher education. our mission is done on the values of liberty, justice and equality. chassis scalia is distressing, a reminder we must remain vigilant to seek out opportunities for all americans. embracing diversity is not only the right thing to do, it is the american way. mr. president, lyndon johnson said quote, it is not enough to just open the gates of opportunity. all of our citizens must have the ability to walk through those gates. it's unresponsive as a nation to open the gates of opportunity all americans in spite of what justice scalia has said yesterday. >> here's a look at some of what we're covering today on c-span2.
>> are there certain parts of the day when music is not the only thing you want to listen to. the morning commute is one hypothesis we're testing right now is that when, if you're on the subway, in your car, maybe you don't only want music. maybe you want some news, a weather report, you want to see, if you on the subway, where you're driving, like a clip of jimmy fallon. there is some other content you want to experience during that period of time, and that is the hypothesis we're testing right now to see if people are interested in experiencing that. >> sunday evening, ohio governor
john kasich at the council on foreign relations on rebuilding international alliances. >> thanks to my 18 years on the house armed services committee i knew many months ago that the only way to solve this problem is to call for international coalition to defeat ices in transit and the right to quit to join with our allies import with allies in the region, jordan and egypt, the goals gulf states and saudi arabia to organize an international coalition to defeat ices on the ground and to deny them the territory that they need to survive. those with long experience know about an air campaign on its own is simply not enough. >> for more information go to our website, c-span.org. >> on wednesday republican presidential candidate john kasich talked about his foreign policy agenda at the council on
for those either in the room are watching who may not know is where an independent nonpartisan membership organization, think tank and publisher. we are dedicated to being a resource for nearly 5000 members, for government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders and others to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing this and other countries. consistent with this submission we are making ourselves a resource available to the american -- presidential candidates and their staffs of those to the american people in the run up to the 2016 election. toward that end i have written to the democratic and republican candidates offering briefings from our experts as well as the opportunity for them to come. and speak and take questions from our members. and so far in either new york or
washington we have heard from marco rubio, the senator from florida, jim webb, former senator from virginia, hillary clinton, former secretary of state, and chris christie, the governor of new jersey. today, we are pleased and honored to host governor of ohio john kasich. governor kasich has been governor of ohio since 2011. he previously served for 18 years as a member of congress from ohio. and today's conversation will be conducted by john micklethwait, the editor-in-chief of "bloomberg news" and formally was the editor-in-chief of the economist. this and mary will be first the governor will give us his prepared remarks, after which she will take questions from john micklethwait and then the governor has agreed to take questions from you, council formulation members to with that, governor, let me welcome you to the podium and to the council on foreign relations.
[applause] >> thank you. normally i would go off this but it's too much of a distinguished group to do that. just kidding there is great to be at the council industry to have a forum like this. and i want to give a pretty comprehensive view of my view of the world and then we can take some questions and it would be great. so i'm really honored and pleased to be with you today. this kind of a forum is really terrific because it something more than a seven or eight minute comment on the stage in the middle of a debate. is actually a chance to express yourself over a period of time. with this in mind i'd like to take a few minutes to describe my vision of what i consider to be the right way forward to preserve our way of life and to secure our nation's future. i do so with the fundamental
recognition that national security policy encompasses several broad areas. a strong economy, the necessary defense resources to secure our vital interests, a coherent and will allen strategy all of which must be supported by new commitment both to our allies and to revitalizing our public diplomacy. but first an important point. they may be able to broad vipers and support to achieve our national security objectives. the same approach that were pursued by president reagan in the very onset of his administration. november suicide bombings in beirut, the attacks at "charlie hebdo" and in paris, the bombing of a russian passenger aircraft over the sinai as well as the recent events in syria, turkey and san bernardino have once again made it stunningly clear that the challenges of organized international terrorism has to remain front and center of our
national agenda. i'm running for president because i believe i am qualified to lead them to govern in an exceptionally talented type in the first instance the most pressing part of our current challenge is the rising threat of global terror in the name of a distorted view, a distorted view of islam, not just against western civilization but against all of humanity. it is an ideology informing commitment that daily uses all the tools of modern communication to spread lies and to kill the innocent. it's worth pointing out that this challenge prize by leveraging the communication technology that is a product of western societies huge advances in science. the communication revolution has created the interconnectedness that we enjoy today, and it's ironic isn't it to consider that it's part of the unaired contradiction of extremism. but the ultimate success of
groups like isis would kill the very spirit of freedom, innovation, invention that created the communication technologies that they need to exist. patient negotiations played a central role in ending the cold war. it led to a long period of international stability. and i was there too much of it. the reason is that both the soviet union and the western alliance wanted to stay alive. our enemies today, they really don't care if they were anybody else lives or dies. and, of course, this is new and different for the civilized world. these opponents pose a challenge that doesn't lend itself to resolution by negotiation. they don't want to occupy a couple cities. they don't want to occupy some territory. they want to defeat the west. my the is there can be no further delay in the concerted coordinated effort that is
required to defend ourselves and our allies than to defeat the terrorist threat. i don't think we will disagree when i say that our present policies and military posture are not adequate to meet much less defeat the real threat that we face. extremist groups like isis and assyrian crisis are among the most pressing problems currently confronting us. diplomatic negotiations to try to solve assyrian crisis are under way. yet i'm not convinced that the agreement being negotiated in vienna would implement on an unscheduled franklin on any realistic schedule. frankly, i think that what is happening in vienna in regard to syria whirly are empty and unrealistic promises. what is more com, with isis havg threatened to attack the u.s. homeland, either we or our allies engage now with our full capacity and with determination, or we will continue to be engaged in times and places and
at extreme levels of violence when we least expect it. we can't wait, folks. instead of signaling that we will not become more deeply involved, as president obama has done, we must stand ready to support france, as i have called for initially to invoke article v, the mutual defense clause of nato, which brings together two of our allies france. france didn't go in that direction. i think they chose to invoke the eu mutual defense package instead of nato. because, frankly, our position was made clear, and it's a disappointed that i agree with president hollande of the november 17th attacks were an act of war by ice on france and, therefore, were an attack on america, and every other nato member state. nato came to our aid after 9/11. nato must now be ready to do so again for france. i also believe we should significantly to the security
checks that applicants for use of uses undergo and congress have begun actually to work together to think about that. since we are a nation of laws come efforts to counter terrorist, criminals and spies can and must be done in a way that protects privacy and civil liberties. but in public its duty to protect our nation the government must be able to monitor individuals it has reasonable cause to believe mean us harm. this san bernardino attacks show that sometimes a special with individuals who are off the radar enabling intelligence agencies to analyze telephone calling data quickly could play an essential role in uncovering terrorist planning and networks. i deeply the american people would support the capture and storage of this information for defense purposes, provided access to it will not be abused. we may, therefore, need to re-examine the period of time for which telephone meditated should be required to be held in storage, specifically for
counterterrorism purposes. that review should look into tightening the criteria for access to the data and strong sanctions should follow if there is any abuse. we need to intensify international intelligence cooperation identify and exchange information, tracking antidumping to arrest thousands of foreign volunteers fighting with isis, a number of whom return to their home countries to commit atrocities such as those witnessed in paris. we also need to ensure our joint terrorism task forces have the personnel and resources they need to track potential domestic terrorist. we need to understand the effectiveness of our joint terrorism task forces run by fbi and comprised of local law enforcement. we should provide far more support to the kurds both in syria and iraq. they are fighting defend their homeland and that one of the few groups friendly to was that really have demonstrated that they know how to take the fight
to isis. we must arm them much more effectively than we have done so far. turkey of course has legitimate concerns about arming the kurds. we are going to work to address president are the ones concerns even as we insist on addressing the threats to the final this interests of america and to the rest of the world. in other words, we've got to come to terms with erdogan when it comes to the ultimate resolution of the kurdish issue. we must create safe havens protected by no-fly zones in syria. i first called for no-fly zones only last month to ease the suffering of refugees and reduce the need to travel to europe. the sanctuary should be located on the turkish and jordanian borders, and our jordanian and kurdish allies could provide protection for the underground while the tiny provide protection from the air. somebody asked me in regard to russia, if they were to fly into
a no-fly zone, i guess an amateur would answer one way. is different in the first time, i would probably let them fly out. if they flew in the second time, they wouldn't be any plane leaving the no-fly zone. thanks to my 18 years, 18 years on the house armed services committee i knew many months ago that the only way to solve this problem is to call for an international coalition to defeat isis in syria and iraq. we have to join with our nato allies important with allies in the region, jordan, egypt, the gulf states and saudi arabia to organize an international coalition to defeat isis on the ground and to deny them the territory that they need to survive. those with long experience know that an air campaign on its own is simply not enough. and the longer we wait, the more difficult it will be and the more costly it will be in many different ways.
mark my words. we will all be on the ground sooner or later. sooner is better than later. the loss of life, the delay. the loss of life if we delay will be greater in the nation will be more difficult. we need to make it clear to our european allies that just sending some people to drop bombs is not going to solve their problem in their homeland, or our ability as a civilized world to defeat isis. to sustain the gains that such a coalition makes by defeating isis on the ground, we also have to win the war of ideas. u.s. public diplomacy and international broadcasting have lost their focus on making the case for the ideas of the civilized world. that means the value of human life, they called of all people, respect for the rights of women and for the rule of blog, these ideas are far more powerful than
our opponents propaganda and disinformation and our public diplomacy efforts must be consolidated, re-organize fundamentally in order to defeat their extremist ideology. i am not recommending a new department or expanded government. i am recommending we take institutions like voice of america, radio liberty, some of those communication tools we use in the middle of the cold war to tell the truth. and, of course, today in the 21st century it's not just about a radio broadcast. it's about everything, about a social media effort, all designed to tell the world that life is greater than just your own life, that there is respect for women and equality for women and the right to protest and the rights of free speech. these are things that i believe rest in the hearts of all human beings, but sometimes they are
overwhelmed by the propaganda of those who are intent on killing us and get broadcast to those who are confused or who have been propagandized throughout their life. we have to win the war of ideas. at the same time we win the battle of bullets. the challenge is posed by isis is a symptom of a broader weakness in american national security policy. fated to advance what we believed in our basic national interest. i believe this, and we seem almost afraid to do so today for fear of possibly offending someone. a great nation that walks with fear is a nation that cannot lead. particularly when that leadership is indispensable to the world. others and some who may harbor unfriendly views towards us interpreintrovert or fail to act the threats such as isis or in
places such as syria and iraq, and let me add ukraine, as weaknesses. the administration's desire for a nuclear agreement with iran at almost any other cost is another example. we now have the report by the iaea which did not receive full cooperation in information unquote possible military dimensions of iran's nuclear program. it states the military related work continued in iran as late as 2009. or lack of cooperation with the iaea does not bode well for the future of the nuclear agreement. a new administration should review and reassess the agreement upon assuming office. should remain vigilant and should be prepared to act in concert with allies in the event that iran violates the agreement. let me just suggest the president of the united states ought to be preparing with our allies in europe the possibility
that if iran violates these agreements, we will not delay in imposing sanctions. without that spadework being done now i'll tell you what i fear. money will be the order of the day and we would be forced to act almost unilaterally, which would not allow us to be as effective as if we act in concert with our allies. ..