tv Next Presidents Foreign Policy CSPAN April 8, 2016 4:48am-6:25am EDT
really tries to address and comes to grips with some of the issues that we are going to be talking about today. also chris, three-time ambassador -- four-time ambassador, including to poland and iraq at macedonia. and south korea as well. named after the father of madeleine albright, somebody who i think across the world are on some of the toughest issues from bosnia to north korea. the summer looking closely as well. and it is a really terrific
memoir. chris and i have joked about those as we were talking about in the early 1980s. if you don't know what that is, we can talk later on. and he was for many years, 15 years on the staff of the house foreign affairs committee he went on to be the chairman of the national intelligence council until 2014 and is now a professor at georgia use publishing something called global traditions every four years we have stephen who is
here it teaches u.s. foreign policy among many other issues. and it was published just before the conclusion of climate change talks in paris in late november and december of last year. so welcome to all of you, thank you for joining us. and there are some important potential issues for the next president. so i wonder if you want to take
and so we should bear that in mind. but i do think that the most important set of considerations and the most limiting for the president is not going to be what is in the inbox but what is around them. and that is the state of our domeic disunion and so well is our central purpose. since then, we have had nothing but the central purpose.
and explicitly designed to undermine the u.s. position in the negotiations and there were some of the key states this summer, saying do not make commitments for the united states in the paris climate talks because their bill on a house of cards. they will not be sustained. so on three occasions this was an explicit open attempt to undermine a negotiations policy. and they set up a conflict between the president and congress and it's been forever. in so far as the supreme court has ever tried to speak on it, the most important was a
decision and it said with an unusually clear statement. the president has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. in the field of negotiations with senate cannot intrude and congress is powerless to invade it. that was a 7-1 decision. so things have changed. so i think that the president faces a moment of unprecedented need to clarify and try to lead a national conversation on what are the answers to these questions that we are talking about. how big of a leadership role do we want to play. what kinds of things can we do
and what kinds of things can we not. and i will say that these are -- these are issues that have never been more urgent to have a conversation about. and that is going to be the set of dysfunction that you're describing so well. >> we would be in a different position now if the senate had been able to ratify this. which was an american initiative imposed by john f. kennedy.
a priority of ours for decades. turned down by the senate during the clinton years. and therefore not enforce because it is an odd treaty that requires a particular risk of countries. and so in trying to deal with this lacking a certain degree of moral authority and presence that is a functioning regime that confers in the same way that the nonproliferation treaty was able to bring together this across the table from iran. that is one example. tomorrow i gave an example earlier this morning about the administration implementing money to the uprising of the arab spring. key commitments are crucial and
and so we are proceeding without that. and of course, on the treaty from you could see any number of examples. because we were hobbled go into paris. we knew that they could not pass a mandatory set of commitments because the senate would not approve of such a treaty. and we have not ratified it since the early 1990s. we ratify three of them. since i'm they have either been defeated, put on the shelf, or turn into executives. the united states has a 20 plus year record of being unwilling and on unable to do so.
not only what we can do but what others will attempt to do as well. and so i would say that in part i would answer your question by saying that i think that these affect almost everything. >> in the case of iran were the president was able to conclude a deal. the resolution had to be crafted as one of disapproval because of the majority to support. >> for doing so is wrong because in the last five administration each president has concluded
roughly 800 for the after term. most of those are irrespective who is democratic, republican and who controls the senate. and in fact, international law doesn't care how you reach approval internally. so what is really notable about that is not that they did it as an executive agreement but that they were forced to compromise and send it to them for disapproval. and so we are in a time frame of unusual dysfunction. and it will make extraordinarily
difficult jobs of trying to crack a strategy. and certainly it provides no guidance. it just doesn't mean anything. and i think that any president, it is going to come into office as we face a degree of strategic situations. and i don't know any other president that quite comparably does so. >> thank you. switching gears just a bit. then left us with this list is
tasty sandwich of issues. and how would you prioritize the top issues that he or she have to face? >> well, first of all, let me just say, that is a tough time. there is always next year. about what it was an honor to speak with you. my assistant said that lee hamilton is calling me. and he asked me make sure that i was going to show up and of course i was going to. because i think more of them should stick together. great to be here.
we talk about this proverbial inbox, and i think it is an extremely important question because america doesn't need to be great again. the problem with that line is not only does it make no sense but that it is just flat out wrong. anyone who has been an american diplomat one american overseas knows that when he speaks, people listen. people want to know what the united states thinks of these issues, what they're going to do about these issues. so we are it. those that say that this is china, we are turning it over, turning over the baton to china, they probably haven't been there. because as tough as the inbox may look, i am sure that the leader of china would exchange inboxes in a new york minute, so to speak. we have our political problems in the united states but i have
heard, and mike or i have heard when people are sort of counting out the u.s. used to be for economic reasons. nowadays because of the nasty politics. i would not want to be a u.s. diplomat overseas because of the context of these discussions and we have to sort of get this straightened out. politics does get going at the waters edge. i think the jusco was very kind when she only mentioned three examples of undermining the president. there's only about 300 of them and i think that people need to understand that we have only one president.
so what do we do when we look weak in the world? it is because of all this grinding criticism, of everything the president does. so i think that we have to dial that back a little bit. and it interestingly started about a conversation on the south china sea. i think we have a problem in beijing. i think that we are looking at a country that has china that is a country that thinks of itself as a civilization. it is a complex series of issues. this morning there was some discussion of what sovereignty means. when you think of sovereignty you think of was holly on all of these sort of things. when china looks at sovereignty of the neighbors, this is not a west folly and model. so it's kind of hard to undo a
couple thousand years of history and so when they look at a country like this. china is a country that is really wrong with a certain consensus in mind and so i would say that the united states president is a stronger figure than the chinese president. and so china, i believe, has a very difficult time for gym consensus on what to do with this problem like north korea. and there's a lot of talk like the chinese don't want to let them go down because after all you will start getting refugees and what would they be able to do it 20 million refugees.
assuming the north koreans would go north, i think even with this being part of it i think most of them would want to go south. and secondly that is not what - it's not that they can't handle refugees. for many chinese especially in the security services, it would somehow be a victory for the united states and a defeat for china. it is not a foreign policy problem for them as it is for us but more of an extension of their domestic issues. after all there are some very similar similarities between the system in china and the system in north korea. but for a lot of people it would be a concern of what would this do to the debate between people that really want to understand the system that they have been
people who want to keep it and reformat in the format and manager. so they don't want to see this and yet something has to be done about this. i know that you will have a discussion about proliferation issues. but since i left this account back in the beginning of the obama administration, it is pretty clear that the north korean regime is interested in developing nuclear weapons. they have shown zero signs of interest in doing anything else and somehow he became very ill, kim jong-il, and before you knew that they had essentially pulled back from the entire process.
the obama administration said that we need to be patient. which was quite ironic because the chinese always told me to be more patient and i always told them to be less patient and hear our own administration was talking about pigeons. then adding that word is strategic to somehow convey wisdom. but frankly i am not suggesting whatsoever that the obama administration should have engaged or push for negotiation. we did it in my watch and the beginning of 2005 area not because we saw some great openings in north korea but we saw the south koreans were so upset at the way that the first bush administration and first bush term had behaved on the issue of these negotiations that we created a situation of ourselves with some 45, 50%, we
are blaming the united states for the nuclear ambitions. so that had to be changed. it was changed. it's down to where it should be in terms of percentages and we need to -- we need to make sure that we continue to try to fly information with the south koreans. and so we don't want to mess up that relationship again. and so i think that we really need to do a deep dive with the chinese on this issue, on the south china sea and this is something that we need to actually put some real suggestion into the table. president obama invited us to come visit every six weeks. it seems like every six days.
but the point of that was this issue is important and i am putting my vice president on this. so he was there all the time, it seemed. and so it was pretty clear that this was a top priority for the administration so let's get it right. and i think that the new president needs to get the new vice president to have some specific assignmenassignmen ts and i would put china at the top of that. you know, i think that china is -- my concern is not that it is too strong or that it is going to take over the world. my concern is that it could become too weak. so i think when an important state like china or russia becomes too weak, that is when it becomes more dangerous. so i think that we need to spend a lot more intellectual time in china.
i think north korea is part of that. that we are not going to take some strategic advantage. we are not going to do that, nor are we going to make this at the expense of sovereignty, to use that word from this morning for south korea. so we need to manage this relationship in a mature fashion. and to make sure that our interests there and our reputation there remains as great as it has always been. turning to the other huge issue in the middle east. there are a lot of faultlines the middle east. there were certainly people yearning for democracy and there is also a sectarian fault line and i think that we just need to be a little bit more honest about what we are doing in the middle east, understanding that as much as i would like to
impose our agenda on the middle east, we cannot. your number those days back in 2003 and 2004 when we had otherwise serious people saying that we are going to create a city on the hill that the other arab states would admire and ultimately we see that model is something that they want to follow. well, iraq is a majority stake. the rest of the mental east is run by the sunnis. do you really think that these states are inspired by the example of iraq? they are not. and so just kind of missing the basic facts like that, i think it has a huge effect. so i think that since we are in an educational establishment we should start by doing our homework and also understand what we are talking about. i think that to talk about those is a problem in the middle east is to miss the point of what is
going on within the community. and what specifically is going on between the saudi arabia model of sunni islam and the rest of the middle east. and i think we talked a little bit earlier about the fact that you have some powers in the middle east all who have been playing a different role from the way they had traditionally. traditionally turkey, absolute nato power being an adult presence. but look at what turkey has been up to in the syria and frankly a rock. and so we have to really pay attention to what is going on here in turkey. when you look at iran, this is not so easy as people think. to say that iranians should stay
out of these areas, i would love them to gather these arab areas. but if you climb on the machine, you will see why iran has these weird connections to places like southern lebanon when they became shia. you need to understand this a little bit better as we try to establish some patterns of cooperation and make no mistake about it. this nuclear deal is just about a nuclear deal in the way that moby dick is about a whale. going on under the surface i think we need to understand that this iranian thing is important and we need to stay on top of it. we need to understand the divided society a lot more than we do.
and it has to be concerned that we are dancing with an old partner and that we somehow have had to go back to the future with the 1970s. so i think these issues require quite a bit of wisdom. i think that we need to be careful to show leadership because we do need to show leadership. as much as i like the idea of pivoting east asia, i think we did create unintended consequences, we left the middle east with the sense that we didn't want to be involved. now we are back dealing with the middle east. we left europe with a sense that maybe we didn't care as much about the atlantic relationship and worse yet coming back to my first point, we created a situation for the chinese were they thought that we were actually beginning a sort of encirclement. when you think about this,
didn't it inaugurate a great moment for u.s. and china relationships. >> you could even state the end of the war, the cold war 1972. and so i think we need to be careful not to create unintended consequences and in diplomacy a big pivot like that would create the unintended consequences. little things can create huge problems. you remember the congress of vienna, the russian ambassador deals over from the heart a heart attack in the french ambassador said why did he do that. even sort of small muscle movements can cause people to sort of wonder what the real
objectives are. so i think we need to be careful giving into this idea that we need grand strategy and concepts and remembering the point that you need to be able to react to those things and react very smart way. so when we look at these issues of migrants as well as these issues of this whole issue of radicalization, we need to address serious. and we need to address that with all the players who have a part in this. one terrible mistake was saddam hussein had nuclear weapons and the other was that bashar al-assad would be gone in a matter of weeks. and so when the administration says since we are accused of "the new york times" being slow
in egypt, we are going to kind of pick up for lost time. the consequence is that he was not gone in a matter of weeks. there were other countries with the state in alley led to syria. i think that syria needs to reflect its majority even though i would rather people be democrats and republicans rather than sunni and shiite, but that is a political identity and we have to be realists about that. so i do think that as we approach it we need to understand that everyone has faith in this and we have to manage it a lot better than what we have. ultimately if you want to stop a war, you do not have a cease-fire. what stops wars are political arrangements that everyone more or less agrees upon some people think do i really want to be the last person to die in the civil
war when i know what the outcome is going to be. so i would like the new administration to go further like yesterday to make clear what the future is for syria. people make a lot of complaints about supports it we were kind of laying out the future of bosnia, who are we to tell the bosnians. well, when you kill 200,000 civilians you lose the ability to feel patronized. we need to be clear that it's going to be decentralized and you will have upper and lower chambers. and it can be done because it's been done before. and i think that the consequence of that is going to get people focused on the future. then when people are focused on the future it becomes easier to have things like cease-fires and even elections. elections in the absence of political and democratic
structures -- the only thing you can tell us how many sunnis or shiites or whatever and etc. what you need is a clear definition of what is going forward. so i do not think that this should be a matter of retrenchment but much more engagement than we have done today. and the one thing that i have not mentioned is the military because i think military should be a last resort and we should not be talking foreign policy -- it should be a last resort and when we go and we need to go in very strongly with a very strong position. >> i didn't bring an envelope i will give you one. another place it did not mention -- when you have a chance, we did not mention russia were giving the experience there. >> very briefly i mention that i think it is a decline in power
and i think it is dangerous as a result. i think that vladimir putin is particularly dangerous. i do not think that we are going to shame them into being less dangerous. i do think that we need to look for areas where we can somehow operate within. i would suggest serious, as painful as that is area but i think that ultimately we need to do so and i hope that you would agree that countries like poland or others are happy to be in nato. and so i do think that we need to look at a more eastwood projection but i think it needs to be done with considerable care in a way that does not invite a response. i also wish there could be something done about crimea. i do not think that there is. but i do believe that there is something that can be done about the rest of the ukraine, which i
think we can focus very hard on that with our european partners. >> thank you. so quickly, was it a 2035 global trend? >> 2035. >> okay. could you sort of talk to us as you speak about domestic dysfunction. we talk about the top of the inbox and the conference of way. and you can talk about both of those things as well as the other responsibilities. they beat from the perspective of someone else. can you sort of talk in the longer term about the trends and whatever are the urgent problems to drive the foreign policy challenges for a next president? >> i would be happy to do so. i am really pleased to be here
at this youthful and also this great school. also to acknowledge what an honor and a privilege it has been for me to work for the better part of a quarter-century to the congressman and everyone in many different capacities. does the highlight of my career as well as his outstanding public service. so turning over to your question here. a word about global trends is prepared every four years for the new administration. the next local trends report will come out in december after the election and before the inauguration. it is looking forward 15 years to what is the nature of the international order. what can the united states and policymakers expect. so i would like to speak about
four megatrends that are really unfolding in the international order. irrespective of event, events are really important and we will drive what these trends mean. but i think it is important to know how the trends are going to unfold. the first one i want to mention is individual empowerment. and in two respects. one of them the i.t. resolution has fueled that. so with your iphone in your hand you have more power at your fingertips and nascar did in the indy 500, then nasa had when they launch rockets. this powerful tool has done astounding things. it profoundly changes how businesses and economies as well
as political orders behave. it is a disruptive technology in every sense of the word. many of which are positive. some of them we will take up in the proliferation panel or very negative. individuals are very small numbers of people in which they can do great power that they know. the second aspect of individual empowerment but i do wish to mention is really the astounding growth worldwide of the middle class. hundreds of millions of people especially on the asia pacific rim and then china and elsewhere and turkey, brazil, hundreds of millions of people are now in the middle class. what does that mean? the good news is for the first time in human history half of
humanity is no longer absolutely in poverty. so it is a good news story for humanity. but the political implications of the growth of the middle class that will grow by several hundred million more between now and 2030, the political implications are that middle-class people want better education for their children. and so what this means for governments everywhere are many problems. governments are not going to be able to meet with those populations want. that is true whether it is an authoritarian government and heaven knows that it is true with democratic government. so let me move on from that to the problem of governments to
the next trend that i want to mention which is the diffusion of power. we have touched on it with several speakers already in the world of 2030, the relative role of the united states is going to be diminished compared to other powers. the united states in many respects are so going to be the most important player in china by 2030 will surely have a bigger gross domestic product as well as differentials in military, economic and technological power will have diminished because of globalization. because of information technology. the diffusion of power in many ways request the diffusion of knowledge. where really somebody today with internet access who is determined, someone who can investigate a topic can know
almost as much as senior leaders in government. it is equalization and knowledge across the board. in the third trend that i would like to speak to, and this is one where i feel like i speak with great authority because demographics, i can tell you how many 18-year-olds there will be a china in 2030 because they are all born already. on demographics, some of the things that the next president and the policy community will really have to think long and hard about is that 97% of the worlds population growth will be outside of the advanced industrial economy. and that is 97%. then we will have one quarter of the world's population.
nigeria is going to replace them up by about 2025 or 2040 to these demographic changes are profound. in europe and japan and korea, the median age in 2030 will be 45 in germany and japan it will be 50. one quarter of those populations will be over 65. we don't have examples of such agent populations in human history. so for leaders in europe, if you are running a social welfare state with fewer workers and more pensioners and others, the problems you face are going to be profound, as well as from the united states point of view how will they be able to invest in new and dynamic economies in military spending and etc.
china today is younger than the united states and in the the world of 2030 it will be significantly older than the united states because of the one child policy which is leading to a rapidly aging population. china could well be old before it faces the problem of social services, health care pensions and vastly different demographic environments. in the advanced industrial world the good news is with the united states of america where our population will only modestly age from 37 years old to 39 years old as the median age in the world of 2030. for china the comparison goes from 35-43 and i told you about the europeans. what this means is that the
united states will be the most dynamic and robust economy among the advanced industrial countries. which is very good news for the united states which also speaks directly to the question of the immigration debate. immigration has made and will make this country great. and urbanization today, half of humanity lives in urban areas. in the world of 2030 that will be 60%. well, the big deal is that it is another 1.5 billion people between now and 2030 that will be moving into cities and so that is the equivalent of 10 new york city metropolises. that is the extent of urbanization that is unfolding
now. and the good news is that urban environments are where ideas develop, economic growth occurs, they are the drivers of positive change. they are also the shantytowns and other centers of future class warfare if anything changing doesn't take place. the pressures of urbanization leads the last time that i want to mention are the pressure on resources, energy, food, water. all of these middle-class people moving to cities, there will be an increased demand for food of some 35-40% in the world of 2030. which is probably 10 or 12%.
that is because that'll class people have higher incomes and they would like meat and dairy products and better nutrition. this would be a severe press on the environment and water resources. which are under great pressure today. in china surface waters in rivers and lakes, 60% is on it for industrial use. and china also has no agreement on water rights with any of its downstream neighbors and so it is building on the mekong and so it is a huge set up for future
diplomatic and political situations. possibly a kinetic conflict in the future over resources and so coming back to this point at the outset. some of the implications is what it means now, you take a look at these trends and what impresses me the most is for the united states to advance the interests to address these trends and every international problem which is an international problem, it can only be solved by coalition and international engagement. we cannot address any of the issues outlined here in the absence of strong international coalitions and u.s. engagement in the world. so i'd like to come back with my very last point with the first
panel talked about. human rights as well as democracy. the structural conditions in the world of the future are very good for individual rights because of middle-class people and agencies and also because of the power of technology that is in people's hands and their ability to affect great things working in small groups and working in corporations or ngos. they do not have to rely upon governments are so much as in the past. so let me stop there. >> thank you very much. that is very good. okay, we have talked about the future. to talk a little bit about the past and perhaps we have transitions, bucket lists,
hundred day plans or how the president envisions what the future challenges would be and how they ended up. >> i would like to does echo my panelists and thank them for this wonderful event. i also want to thank all of you for coming today. especially the student joining in the conversation we are having here. when you look back through what the president hopes to accomplish in their first year, their first hundred days, a couple themes emerge in retrospect that i think will resonate with what we have are to been saying. one thing is that it often -- new presidents will move to distance themselves from predecessors and will do so in such a way to undermine their own goals and the desire to appear different or live up to the campaign trails.
george w. bush when he was elected and his team was setting up foreign policy initiatives, he sort of him by what historians call the abc policy, the end of the line, the end of the clinton era. so the international climate negotiations let them to pull out rapidly even against the wishes of some other members who argued that doing so would hurt relationships with european allies. and there was also now a growing consensus among historians that this policy led them to play down the threat posed by terrorism because it's coming from the clinton administration officials they were cast aside with other priorities. by contrast a more effective strategy one need not look
further than announcing a pause in the u.s. and soviet relations and they very much believe that it was necessary to take a step back and reflect on not only the tactics but the ongoing policies and some of the most basic assumptions about u.s. and foreign policies, whether the u.s. can trust this or whether or not this strategy was sound so forth and so on. we are looking back on this is a wise decision moving forward, giving them great confidence to not involve themselves too much in the revolutions.
taking the initiative. those that began under eisenhower not only in to be strong on cuba but conditions his thinking with the options available to him initially to feel his credibility is at stake and could only be preserved with bold and decisive action and ultimately led to planning and a core analysis if that would actually work.
so to really think through how you govern in define your strategic priorities how that will help you assess your means available. recognizing early line climate negotiation to put nothing before congress. six that architecture that was streaking into recognized early on that institutional structure its third and use that time to reflect and to think through
ways. >> that's terrific. of. >> and so now in that case we have more than 12 minutes. when we talk about succession and to distance oneself i am curious in your research if that is consistent even if the transition is friendly? >> very much so. when george h. w. bush came into office jim baker called it a high style takeover that separated them from the
reagan administration to kick out the reagan appointees to put in their new team and that was part of a larger strategy we will come in and run our own ship and take time to reflect what that will look like and not just wrapping the tried to do that our just blindly accept what we are inheriting. we will think what we want to achieve. >> i remember reading that transition. thank nobody knows it's there telephone number
anecdote is of first year of reagan's first term was bureaucracy and logistics'. put to say the phrase that comes to mind that so many people who are chosen in the first year did not get along with each other to would be in charge of doing what? so if you have some idea for this transition to allocate responsibility. >>, but the first panel although it isn't in the war crisis file they are facing
and that capacity if you were placing a bet you would say not so great to have a reliable and important partner that is a enormously important for what the u.s. wants to achieve. so i think we ought to remember while it isn't ours but there vice facing a crisis in this serious threats. >> in to address any of the issues in to rely on it is
much more difficult to with that cooperation and of course, i do agree about the need to be positioned in a smart way on the "frontline" states. the good news is we have more time for questions and i am sure there are several if i could ask you to wait for the microphone and asked why. >> i am a student at the school of environmental affairs. specifically looking at these projections had is
climate change exacerbates and more to another point would you consider climate change to bien national perspective we should consider looking at these trends? >> the answers are pretty straightforward. yes. that has a dramatic impact on national security and makes mitt every trend more difficult. so with food and water changes in those patterns with any change to the historical norm will make life more difficult. that there is a drought in northern india hundreds of millions of people will die.
and with respect to energy what we have is reference to earlier today that a very significant trend dropping prices for solar power and battery storage, and we're moving very rapidly to a clean energy future. government is centered -- incentives the it is powerful and in this respect of moving in the right direction following the highberger one dash curving crisis will the slowdown. >> i'm a first your masters of public affairs student as
a chinese national the major newspapers were publishing an article on the chinese economy but they just published a new article that is the toughest year of the chinese economy while in china and the trend is going up everybody is talking about the rise of china and the power of china. is u.s. government prepared for a declining china and what happens south if a chinese citizen is a tired of the chinese government to give away a blank check to the african governments and the money to everyone else but solving the problem domestically? is the government prepared
and how could react to that? >> no. [laughter] i agree with the premise of your question turning it is this enormous thing and they're more concerned about the trend you are talking about and then by the way weaken the chinese economy is in just cited to suffer but other countries i would also be concerned if china guided to the position to really talk about dash demographic trends would use
the rise of nationalism or a government trying to get more favored? and try to be even tougher with its neighbors or vietnam? so i think if you raise important issues but i am sorry to say i don't think too many people are understanding best war following it we need a much more comprehensive approach to china and be careful to set priorities we should be careful of the name-calling i don't think that is helpful and generally speaking for more patterns of cooperation with china there are a lot of problems internally i don't think it is for us necessarily they
are probably upwards of several hundred million chinese who have pointed out these problems to their government either know what we can do but dare i say we have to be very vigilant and also be very patient with the vermis chefs over the last two decades and not to understand this oecd easier for everybody and those who have a real sense of being left out of the a miracle. i am not sure we have understood that as such. >> you can and get back pretty clear picture of what that may look like to think
the to to be adversaries not in the country's mutual interest. >> thank you very much. i'd like to ask a question about the u.s. alliance with the context of beach since -- east asia i'm interested in hearing the insights of any panelist here today talking about a number of trends both in terms of hard military power its economic trends also a demographic trends that are the integral parts of the conversation but in your estimation how is it u.s. alliaes of east asia of these major social
demographics in partnership with the united states built and how does it go to revolve? >> in the context of a previous answer we need more multilateral structures too often issues are handled bilaterally that is a tough channel to deal with issues where is numerate mechanism for parking problems for all of the constant alphabet soup but what they clearly
has tried to resolve conflict there is a nasty land dispute with the committee it is embedded somewhere in the bowels to say now we will study that for the next 10 years, they managed to deal with that. europe has done remarkably well and i support the point we should not lose sight. from where they go there from vacation in they have done a lot of the structures there is much to be admired. retry teetoo work the trilateral i felt like i was
a mediator back in the balkans that needs to get better we ought to stop this bad mouthing of the structures to come to grips to foster and develop. we need to get off to understand the world needs these relationships. >> this is perhaps the sharpest single dividing line. and with those multilateral institutions and win the
in the coming years what is the role of the international institutions of the world decor the imf to solve these challenges? to become obsolete to the coming power structure? >> the very brief reasserted yes. famous seibald to reflect that power relationships of the international order are they becoming irrelevant in delegitimize there has been reforms of the world bank and imf in that direction the congress of the united states with the last omnibus appropriations bill approved those reforms with that said
there is a long way to go with respect to the u.s. and it supports the reform of the security council in india is a member in the other four do not want reform of its and the problem is most acute with the closest ally. with real said the security council should not get bigger. >> but there are elements do
not push year together and there is no chance of that happening. >> cry moderate the program of the school of international studies but my question is for the panel as a whole as well. listening to your provocative presentation i was struck by a contradiction. the foundation is a lifestyle or consumption pattern. they work against global warming, the middle-class
with those patterns to be more sustainable with the expanding world with less predictable weather patterns in more competition for resources. >> for the sake of time let's get those questions together so everybody gets a chance. >>. >> this ideological division about democrats and republicans or conservatives or liberals over the multilateral cooperation engagement see it is unjust republicans and democrats are deeply divided in this is reflected in electoral patterns but americans are also very ignorant with
american foreign affairs. with this division with the multilateral engagement and how we might bring americans more successfully into the area of policy making that suffers from a severe democratic deficit. >> it seems they are related. >> with that latter question it is remarkable that they have to dispense things like nato in the first place but to explain foreign policy is
the big picture that was constructed in large part with intention of the united states through international institutions. en to become a the world trade organization. into health condition a world with the 30's and '40's and to explain in general tes to put countries to the biggest of institutions constructing a the broad outlines it has resounded to the united
states those benefits often to the detriment of others but it was beneficial as a whole and that is one way we take issue to explain why they were created in the first place. in to be forcefully sustained over time. that is something i think about all the time. >> yes there are trends that have internal contradictions to except that observation i agree with that. in the middle class is much more dynamic in the pacific rim of the united states. so these are very
appropriate in to the appointed with the respect to the united states there are important changes under way that carbon footprint is the same as 20 years ago. stowe of important changes are taking place how we generate power with the fuels that we use. because they live in such a globalized world with the exchange and then you can wait for anywhere with a frown on the international
influence is. with the european and asian companies in the presence of communities that would have been unheard of a generation ago. with u.s. international the engagement. >> there are differences from countries to see the world so we have to be careful somehow we can handle everything through multilateral channels. we are a country where our values are important to us with the certain.
i guess the issue is how we can turn these values into more international values without appearing to be stacking the deck to internationalize of these values. issues like human rights need to be fully vetted in the panoply of the structures and we have done a good job of that. even though they say you masquerade those values i don't think so. but we do need to keep in mind the complexity of that process that some will reject that process in a way that does not appear we're trying to stack the deck.
>> to deliver your question to energy but that is by far. pfiffner and i much less optimistic we have a in the of footprint to lot there are three policy levers you can use regulation and are indeed at the national level we only use the first to the most powerful sits not touched we have to put a price to harness the marketplace so much it will flow from that seamlessly. seamlessly. but again it is a huge
problem. the u.s. has a very unusual powerful concept of sovereignty that is very roundup of ourselves. ioc is equal anywhere but china and that makes it hard with these multilateral institutions not because we are weak but the world has changed. maybe it seems like the inadequate answer but truly truly, you cannot inform people in a campaign setting people are not listening.
with a farmer knows he is exporting its people and though they are on welfare. but i think this will be long we all know the polls when americans are asking basic questions locate england on a map. [laughter] 17 percent of americans can do that. it's going to be really tough what goes all the way back to the very beginning and it doesn't have simple answers. >> thanks for a very rich