tv Public Affairs Events CSPAN December 23, 2016 12:12pm-2:13pm EST
north american products. that is a key element we must take into consideration when we analyze where we should be headed with nafta. in terms of a lot of the talk itself in terms of impact of trade agreements and jobs, look at the fact five my jobs in u.s. depend on trade with mexico and another nine with trade with candidate. almost 59 jobs in u.s. related to trade with number one and number two customers in the world, canada and united states. that's a a very peculiar element of north american integration that have to be taken into consideration. there is the employment aspect of companies in the u.s. exporting to the nafta partners but increasingly in the case of mexico over the last 15 years we have almost $50 billion of accumulated foreign direct investment from mexican companies into the united states that great over 125,000 jobs. this means thousand jobs. this means jobs and specific
communities. and send the message to one of the benefits of nafta we must delve deeper into the numbers and not just the $530 billion level that we've heard a lot but talk about how mexican company, a steel manufacture, is supporting 700 jobs in ohio and in missouri like investing and plants that produce construction materials, nuts, bolts, nails, etc., that utilize mexican steel and able to become more competitive vis-à-vis other companies that do not have those linkages to mexico. we have many examples. mining companies in arizona supporting 800 jobs in a community that has 600 population. examples like that are peppered throughout the united states both in terms of the presence of mexican investment in the u.s. and the benefits of companies that export, u.s. completes it exports to mexico or candidate. those are big benefits went to get out and speak about both the
government and the private sector. when we're looking at what we could call nafta 2.0 where do we go from here from what we have built? there's three main pillars. the first one i've discussed which is essentially doing a realistic fact-based assessment of the impact of the north american free trade agreement on the economies of all three countries. given examples on the benefits for the u.s. so we have to analyze that deeply and distribute this information, get it out so people understand what impact it has in their day-to-day life. the second element is the recognition that our trade agreement can be strengthened, modernized. it was negotiated over 25 years ago with many of the disciplines that we incorporated but tpp didn't even exist are elements and intellectual property rights protection, the digital economy, state owned enterprises, a whole list of issues that we can analyze. there's a strong cooperative agenda that exists between
mexico and the u.s. and also with canada but an example of mexico in the u.s., the agenda to work at elements to increase the competitiveness of the region. nor did we eliminated tariffs over 20 some years of trade between mexico and the u.s. but now the next 20 years have to be how do we reduce the cost of transactions between our countries? that involves areas such as increasing border efficiency, investing in infrastructure in the border, regulatory cooperation, looking at elements we were analyzing and other key areas in the world where we are negotiating which i will not mention the pacific alliance, the movement of professionals. that's something we've not been able to advance within nafta but we should definitely accelerate the pace in looking at all these elements to build on what we have and strengthen it and not move backwards. third, understand trade is a win-win proposition. we have to start getting away from this argument trade is a
zero-sum game. my neighbor does well, that means i do badly. if i export its okay. if i import its not okay. all those arguments do not translate into the realms of what we are seeing in the marketplace and in the job creation in any of the three countries. we need to have that assessment. mexico, will it have a very constructive dialogue with the new administration come in and along the lines of what we have described but at the same time we are not standing idle we're moving ahead with aggressive program of trade liberalization and diversification. we were members of the tpp as was mentioned. we have the tpp bill in our senate being analyzed and voted on in the next session in the spring in mexico. we have to analyze what will happen if the u.s. will be able to join or if we will have to have a different type of arrangement within asia-pacific. the advantages of tpp, you have a region that would be the region that's going to be the
engine of growth over the next few years years, over the next 5 years asia-pacific will add almost 1 billion and have people to the middle class. these are consumers and you want to be in the front line when that opportunity opens up and it's already opening up. we will continue either through the tpp an and/or looking at options whether it's why laterally or other collateral arrangements. mexico is able to engage in a fully open manner with countries in latin america that have the same values and same pursuit of an open trade environment and economy. there's a lot we can continue to do in that region and that's what a lot of these countries that are observers to the pacific allies are interested in what's happening. given a lot of the changes taking place domestic in brazil and argentina, there's an increased engagement with these
two countries to look at options to really enhance our trade with them. as damon mention the effort were making to modernize and strengthen our free trade agreement with the european union in terms of market access and many other disciplines can also be upgraded because it's in effect since the year 2000. the reality, other countries are not stopping. competition is fierce. we have to do the same in north america and that's what i say we are in very important crossroads in our history. we have a chance to be the most competitive region of the world but that is only going to happen if we actively, government, private sector, political, political actors at all levels really do a fair fact-based analysis of what trade brings and how we can be more competitive going forward because competition is not going to stop. thank you. >> thank you. that was awesome.
thank you to the whole panel. we went around the world and about 30 minutes. i really appreciate that. it's clear from their comments the rest of the world is not standing still and that there is a robust embrace of trade and the role trade place in creating jobs and bringing benefits to the country, even as increasing concerns about globalization, new opportunities tickler in africa. i was interested to hear your perspectives. we will throw it up to the audience for questions and while you are thinking other question i just want to throw one question back to you all that kind of built on something kenneth said, which is clearly one of the things we need to do in the united states is a better job of educating the american public, the american worker, the american consumer, all the stakeholders on what does trade you both positively and negatively. that's central to the mission which is to educate folks on
trade. ken mention would be doing the next trade initiative. we started that you kind of plot at where we are going to go in trade over the next generation. let me ask you all, drawing upon the perspective of the regions for which you are presenting, what do you think we should be doing in terms of doing a better job of educating americans about trade? when we had elections 12 years from now, the candidates are trying to outdo each other on how much they like trade as opposed to the trade enforcement and the trade protectionist rhetoric that we heard. >> i think that's a great point and something everybody is talking about in the trade community because we haven't done a good job communicating these benefits. this isn't a new recognition, so i can say to my years of working
at ustr the efforts to the years to really convey the benefits in a much more understandable form. from my perspective what's really needed, and ken was getting at a bit, it's really talking about specific plans, specifiplans,specific workers, f workers. getting small businesses out there that really conveying the benefits and a much more tangible way. i think that would be extremely helpful. i also think that the time is coming for the global trading system partners to kind of get together and to talk about this whole issue of globalization, share experiences, share information on adjustment programs that they're putting into effect at work - judgment network, that don't work. i think the whole social safety net issue really needs to be focused on. i think it's something that
everyone could benefit from learning from what others do. >> one of the suggestions are course very much true to point. i think deconstructing the opposition to globalization locally is more important. because if you look at what's going on in the region, that are different elements that are the basis of that. some of it is sort of related to trade agreement but it's beyond that. part of it may
what percentage of what you do is really trait. it is impossible believe workers and the port of long beach or up in washington, they work all day on really shipping products all across the world and at night they going to participate in demonstrations against trade because there's a complete disconnect between what they're doing in the jobs and the perception this is all due to international trade. if we break this overall perception that trait is negative we will only be able to do it if were able to get to each person until the wha story. it's a tough task because of people enjoying the ipads, their cars, the plasma tvs they don't associate that to trade. witwhen a candidate loses 10 or0 jobs, there's a quick desire to find the culprit. it's hard to say the country lost your job to is productivity call technology, called, in many instances, things that are
intangible. then you turn toward specific issues and a partially trade has been taken up as the flag against all the ills and economic concern that exist in certain communities. we need to advance in the education element both at the level of the private sector working with their workers and the cue mood in general in telling the story but also a larger scale, the issue of really addressing actively the notion that we need to look at where there is displacement. there is a study by ball state university that talks about manufacturing jobs lost in the u.s., 87% is not due to trade. let's look at that the other way around. maybe 13% is that what does mean in terms of dislocation and what can we do? a complete rethinking of what it means to really retrain workers. it's not a question of payment because you lost your job,
prepare you to transfer into another job. that involves a lot of analysis but i think they can be done. >> we will go out to the audience. if you have a question, please raise your hand and upon ask you to follow the three rules we have here at wita. state your name and your affiliation, that you ask a brief question and that you actually ask the question in the form of a question. if we can all follow those rules we can get to our lot. so if there are any out there, and if you are shy i can toss another question to the panel. right here. if you can wait for the microphone first. >> i would like to ask each of the panelists, given that we understand the message has not been presented well for a very long time. i remember when nafta was first
going into operation, the canadians used to go around town and say, there's a secret that nobody in washington knows it. nafta is working. but for some reason the americans don't want to talk about it. because the understandings have been so bad in public, we have an incoming president who has used the argument reflecting public opinion as a wedge issue in getting elected. he may be open to some arguments that you will have presented. if you had 50 minutes to talk to mr. trump, what would you tell him -- 15. >> or a tweak even. [laughter] >> no one wants to go first?
>> first i would not tell that i worked for ustr for 30 years. [laughter] i think one of the points that ken made earlier, that's what i thought he he would go first, is let's look at the facts and let's have a review and let's look at what these agreements do and what they don't do. yoyou know, one of the unfortune things about tpp for example, if it was concluded and the middle of a presidential campaign season. that was not the plan. we were going to concluded a lot earlier but we were great negotiator and we knew the deal that was on the table to your earlier wasn't the one we were prepared to take on. so we waited, okay? we got the good you but, unfortunately, the timing was really bad and tpp kind of became the manifestation of everything that was wrong with trade and wrong with globalization.
so when people were on the floor of the various campaigns with their anti-tpp posters, if you asked any of them what were in tpp, no one willing to a no one really cared. what i would recommend kind of take a step back, look at what's in this agreement and what's not in the agreement. we look at what's going on in the asia-pacific region and where it may be added and what may be headed with us but without us, and the also look, as anabel was saying, the displaced workers and the people who may be left behind in this and let's find the appropriate policies to address their valid concerns but recognize not doing the tpp is not the answer that it's not going to help them. who's going to follow? >> i would simply say that for any government, mexico, u.s. or
canada is looking for opportunities to increase employment in your country. trade is not the problem for the challenges of globalization. it is the solution. it is the mechanism that will help us to grow the economy because the majority of the customers of the world are outside of north america. that's the realization that we have to understand and understand the history, country that have opened up that trait have prospered. those who haven't have not. there's this important historical lesson. the second thing i would say to an administration coming in and wanting to look at both the operation of the government as you would to a business, mexico and canada are your top customers. we are your top clients. mexico is not a country that comes in simply asked for concessions from the u.s. we work together. we sell a lot to the u.s. would we buy more from the just and all of the bric countries combined and all of western europe combined, but that has to
be validated and went to work together. because of the said competition is fierce, so strength in numbers. canada, mexico and the u.s. building products that are better and cheaper and could be better worldwide and generate more employment in the united states. >> i would say a few words but i would never talk to trump probably. first of all, politically there's an opportunity to reconcile the american public and in particular the european -- estates new line by surprise with globalization and with trade by doing a number of things. people vote against trade agreements, protest against trade agreements because they cannot protest against technical change, the fact that every year factory becomes more productive and, therefore, either you produce more to keep your staff or every year you have to lay off people. that's just a natural evolution of productivity.
there is an opportunity between programs, trade practices with other countries. talking from a european perspective, american companies invested $2 trillion in europe and vice versa. tremendous jobs, well-paying jobs on both sides depend on his investment and trade relationship. we shouldn't waste time to improve that. thank you. >> in some ways i would follow the theme from my neighbor here about competition being fierce. in a lot of ways and the africa context i would welcome a new lens from a number of fronts, a strategic alliance. as i said i think, and i'm look little bit different i think on the africa side.
i think a local voters don't really support any of the policy related to use africa. at best you have a misunderstanding. you might actually have animosity sought broader than trait i feel like in the africa world where we go out and talk to folks in terms of what kind of policies come with people support a pepfar, something like pepfar supported broadly? it wasn't but there was a lot of policymakers who pastor now people are supported because they understand the positive stories only later are they supportive come as the message gets out there. they were not supportive of the time from a policy perspective. on the africa context we all know it. chinese are kind of growing their market your everyday. a number of european countries that are doing quite well. india has a very strategic view on the continent and now there are growing. when you look at the u.s., i think it's not just from a trade policy perspective but also the support of element when you
think about ex-im which some of these things are actually being debated in terms of their existence. in reality we are still so slow in terms of execution. with i was in the infrastructure space and we would compete with the chinese, most of the time we would lose based on timing. chinese are going to be able to sign and deliver a road in less than two years. you have a sponsor from the u.s. saying i may or may not be able to get priority tiny at opec or x m, stick with me. we will have another year toppling together the financing, another year of other things. these are folks that also try to win elections and their local constituencies and the difference between four years and six years is losing. so i think competition is very fierce and i'm not sure that's the mindset that we've taken and so we have taken kind of a different mindset antagonistic towards a lot of these tools and i think a lot of companies are
falling, shortly falling further behind in that competition. i don't think the rest of the world is taking that same view toward some of the tools supporting the companies entering the africa market. >> i think maybe three points. one is that to make america great again you need more trade, not less trade. the second point is that trade is not a zero-sum game. particularly in the world today. it's not that country a exports its own cars where each and every part of the car is made in country a, to country b. then there's this question between the cars from a country a and the cars from country b. trade doesn't work like that in the world today. and the third point is that there is a very valid, there's a very valid point in being
concerned for those who are either losing from trade in specific communities in specific regions or those of not been able to connect to the benefits of trade. so the question there is more what is the best instrument to achieve that objective? trait is not your best instrument to achieve that objective. even if terrorists are raised, -- tariffs -- is a comes back it will be done in many cases most of the process will be done by robots and not necessarily by all of those people you were thinking of. think about the policies that will address some of those concerns and work proactively to intimate those policies. >> laura with mark consulting group. thank you to all the panelists. i just have a quick question.
knowing that there is been strong interest in the u.s., uk, bilateral post brexit, how possible is it that ttip could resume before brexit is concluded? thank you. >> i think the difficulty for any third country to negotiate a trade agreement with the uk is that you will want to know what you are negotiating from. what are the preferences you need in negotiating from? what is the entire schedule that you negotiating from? what is the opening on services, procurement that uk is giving to the rest of the world and the rest of the world has agreed with uk? and last but not least what is the relationship between the uk and the 27th of european union? what are the passport invites of financial firms, of reinsurance
companies, of banks? are they allowed to sell? are they subjected to additional requirements? until you know these things, you can have talks but those can be highly speculative talks it seems to me. and, therefore, like the canadians come if you want to do a deal for the uk, to the eu while it still in european union. thank you. >> thank you. don phillips consulting. perhaps this question has already answered i got her a little little late. does anybody in this groupthink is a chance of the trump administration will change its mind on tpp? second question, did president-elect has said he's very interested in doing bilateral fta's. he didn't want to do anymore big ones, multilateral types.
any ideas of what might be first in the list of possible fta's, possible bilateral fta's? i guess i will throw in another one. any sense whether they consider the eu to be a comic ttip to be a bilateral agreement or a multilateral agreement? thank you. >> high, don. that was three questions. you didn't hear the rules. with respect to your first question, on what might happen with tpp. my belief and it could be because i worked on it but also i think it's really because i believe tpp has economic interest in the region. i don't think it's dead. i think right now it's going to be sidelined. but i wouldn't be surprised if it comes back in some form during the administration.
i've seen this with other agreements. i worked on the chorus agreement, negotiated for the bush administration, and then renegotiated under the obama administration when the obama administration came in, they were very critical but they did a really thoughtful review of the agreement, figured out how they could improve it so it could receive support, not only from congress but from the american public and from the uaw, and that was successfully done. once again i know things are quite different now, and the magnitude of frustration and concern about trait and about tpp is much greater than chorus. but i'm an optimist at heart and i have to believe that there's a way forward. with respect to your question by laterals, i touched on that. i don't think any of us know
which countries may be of most interest to the new administration in the goshen by laterals but some people around town are talking about a japan bilateral. what i mentioned earlier was that to date, japan has been pretty clear that it's not interested in a bilateral, that it just put all its political capital into tpp pickett was a regional deal, it wants to get the regional benefits and really join the tpp to help shape the regional rules of the road. so that's where they are right now, whether that changes going forward remains to be seen. i think that they are putting their eggs in their basket, a basket of trying to be able to convince the new president that tpp has merit, is in the use interest, is in the u.s. strategic interest and its regional interest and in its economic interest.
>> i want -- we supported tpp all along. because we think it's good for the region and it's also good for negotiations with u.s. and our negotiations with japan. i think in four years time if we go through all the negotiations, we are currently pursuing, we will be the hub of the most impressive network of free trade agreements. if the u.s. wants to catch up it will be in their interest and finally we negotiating i think 15 agreements at the moment. 15 countries or groups of countries see us as one block when it comes to trade. so i think as a result of the policy we do we will probably find out if you want to do a deal with the union, it's just one deal, not a series. it's just one.
thank you. >> let's go back to the audience. >> doug palmer with political. i just want to ask wendy, there's some uncertainty about what would be the status of ustr in the new administration, whether it will i guess still be a cabinet level like we see some out the play second fiddle to commerce department. i just wonder come from someone who's worked there for a long time what do you think would be the impact on u.s. negotiating ability if it's not cabinet level or at the ustr is somehow seen as subservient to commerce? and if kenneth or damien have any thoughts on this, from a foreign perspective, does it matter much to a foreign
government whether they are negotiating with the ustr or with the commerce secretary? >> having been around these issues for a long time working for the government, i've lived through many reorganization debates and i understand this debate is rearing its head again. i will say as a negotiator for the american people, you want your negotiator to be totally empowered. you want them to be senior pic you want them to have a mandate to do what they need to do. if ustr is going to be negotiating deals we need to keep it at a cabinet level. you need a minister to do this you can meet with other ministers at that level. and particularly in the asian region, those levels and the ranks of officials at the table are very, very important. it would be noticed around the world if we were now going to demote the level of the top u.s.
negotiator for trade agreement. >> the only thing i would say is that i would say that ustr has some of the best trade negotiators in the world. i know it and i've worked with a lot of them for a very long time. that's it. [laughter] >> we need a negotiator in front of us who is indeed at an executive level and who is fully empowered. that works both ways. that's what we also hear from our american partners, who is negotiating? we negotiate with many country and you don't have ustr in other countries so we can adapt. thank you.
>> tpp, ttip, these deals didn't seem to come to a halt or be put in the freezer as i believe the popular metaphor is, for the most part because of donald trump's election. ttip was struggling before that. tpp, the congressional site was struggling before that. so what can be done with each of these different trade negotiations in the plural laterals to move them forward with the new administration, other than just the education process? are there specific parts that can be taken away, whether it's japan bilateral or specific arrangement? >> any thoughts? >> so i guess people are going
to take that question under advisement and come back. back over here. >> committee to support u.s. trade laws. that name alone let you know i'm coming to the question with a certain attitude. okay, so we're almost another hour nap into a very intellige intelligent, well-informed discussion on trade, what the american people think about trade. not one reference to unfair trade practices. and so can't i conclude everyone on this stage believes that there are no unfair trade practices that rise to the level of influencing trade flows in the united states, or are the american people who voted for trump because they feel they're not winning because they can't win, are they wrong? >> why do we take maybe two
other questions. i think there is some others. there's one back here and then there is one over here. we will package them together and answer them altogether. >> thank you. melinda st. louis from public citizen. my question is for kenneth. in the context, i'm curious if there's any talk or anything you could share about how the mexican government is perceiving any potential for nafta renegotiation interim of timeline, do you expect that to happen right away in terms of the trump administration ask you for that, how the mexican government would respond, and what are the elements that they mexican government would be willing to renegotiate or not? thanks. >> and then the last one over here. >> thanks. william from intellectual
property watch in geneva. and i'm tempted to ask ask, to y that for ustr it will be elevated to the desk of president trump who said he will tear up all the agreements and we negotiate them himself, but i'm not asking that. i was wondering yesterday in geneva there was a reference to the agreement and yesterday the two parties announced or tried to gain support for their new investor state i guess multilateral investment court that they're trying to create. i don't know if panelists are aware of that initiative yet and if there's any reaction to the idea of a multilateral investor state court? thank you. >> great, thank you. ken will do the nafta question first and we would investor state and then end up with the trade, unfair trade practices
with regard to the nafta and what will happen happen, well, i have said, mexico is willing and ready to engage in constructive dialogue with the incoming administration. we favor the possibility of having discussions along the lines of how we strengthen the nafta, how we modernize it along the lines of what i mentioned. the art disciplines that did not exist when nafta was negotiated, and that has to be taken into considerationconsideration, to e agreement, the requirements of the 21st century economy. just a reality, a fact. that's how we operate in all the different trade agreements that we are negotiating, that we have negotiated. it's impossible to think you can simply extrapolate what we have negotiated in other trade agreements and bring it exactly as it is into the north american region. you have to look at the specific peculiarities of each region. in terms of the timeline, of course we're working in
unparalleled track in analyzing what elements of the nafta can be strengthened. we are going through a process of internal consultation, both with the private sector, civil society and analyzing it within the industry of economy but you can look at some the things we've done and other trade agreements for a guy that to some of the key elements were interested in. being that the world is a 10th largest exporter we are interested in being able to eliminate not only tariff barriers that no longer exist within nafta with a few exceptions would also look at elements that facilitate trade, elements that go beyond the border that help us get real axis tour products throughout the world and that's also some of the elements when working within north america. in terms of the timing, it really will depend and the substance of whatever we discussed with the u.s. will also depend from a perspective of what the u.s. and also candidate, let's not forget about candidate in the equation of bringing to the table. as i have said weber open to
working within the framework that allows us to strengthen the very successful free trade agreement that we have built over 25 years. >> we've responded to the criticism in europe against isd has which was seen as privatized justice, just giving rights, excessive rights for foreign investors, arbitrators could be having comforts of interest on certain issues. we proposed a system which we agreed to canadians and vietnam. with an appellate body and if you do that in tens and tens of agreements you create the problem. the way to solve it is to have investment court where you could have judges settling these
disputes. i talked about our reform on tbi, that we are changing it to create exceptions to the lessons to allow us when there is excess capacity or market distortions in security, energy and so forth to impose duties that are higher than the current duty. we are still analyzing our trade defense by proposing the removal of, i'm becoming technical here, but the list of nonmarket economy countries but are still making changes to the rules. i mean, we need trade defense to do these inside trade practices. you cannot do on one and trade without having strong and orderly trade defense regime, that's for sure. >> if i can just add to that. i think you're right the conversation this morning perhaps focused more on
negotiations that different countries and different regions of this world were engaged in but that by no means lessons the critical importance of addressing unfair trade practices. my colleagues at ustr, at the commerce department, at state, at our embassies abroad, they do this day in and day out. because we need to make sure that after we put all of our efforts in negotiating trade agreements, we want to make sure our trading partners live up to them. but we also want to make sure that if there are unfair trade practices, they are keeping our products and services outcome of that giving address. i really welcome president elect trump's emphasis on what is called kind of the enforcement issue and really strengthening that function in the u.s. government under his upcoming administration. i think that's a very helpful initiative, and i think as a result we are going to see more
cases filed, both in the wto and more aggressive use of our trade laws. as long as in my view, it is done in the context of living up to our rules that we've agreed to in the wto and elsewhere, then i think this is a very welcomed step forward. >> any thoughts recs i think that's a good positive note to end this conversation on. i would invite ken backup to the podium to make some final remarks. >> thanthank you, steve, thank u to our panelist we are looking forward to hosting more of these conversations in the months to come. a lot of questions in the trade community, around the world about what the u.s. is going to be doing and we planned on helping of the minute some of those issues for all of you. we are very grateful to all of you for being here. thank you very much. thanks to all of you. watch your inbox for more wita events coming up including ambassador froman. thank you.
>> most people in america has never been on a farm except the county fair, but they don't know what it is to be a farmer, so there is there's kind of romantic view of agricultural which i find exasperating because it makes it impossible to think about agriculture clearly. >> scented 11:00 a.m. ox news
anchor meaghan kelly talks about her life and career as a journalist in her burke-- but. she spoke with kathy k and at 5:15 p.m. james rosen and christopher buckley, the son of the late william f buckley discuss their book, greater lives of the 20th century which examines essays on famous figures written by christopher bus-- a buckley's father. at 6:15 p.m. medea benjamin looks at the relationship between the us and saudi arabia in her book. go to book tv.org for the complete weekend schedule. >> the us institute of peace recently hosted a discussion on india pakistan relations. we will hear from a security council staffer, a number of journalists and foreign-policy scholars.
this is about 90 minutes. >> good morning and thank you for joining us. i am the associate vice president here and look after much of that institute and i apologize horse starting on south asap-- south asia time, but it is only fitting. let me welcome my panelists for today's events and before that let me just say whenever you talk about in the and pakistan you almost have to say it's a very interesting time, so it's cliché, but it is a interesting and trebly-- troubling time for the india pakistan relationship. you would know that since mid- september both countries have been in a virtual crisis. there has been constant fighting
along though dividing control. there have been violent protest for a number of months and this time for the first time in what many are calling a paradigm shift, india claims it retaliated to the attack by conducting surgical strikes and due to pakistan india pakistan denied it and india said they did it and they are still debating its. one of these days we will find out what happened. another chain in the relationship is i think the first time they've been very explicit in arguing the policy will be to isolate pakistan globally. that pushes pakistan to retaliate. the pakistani de facto foreign minister was treated fairly roughly according to pakistani newspapers if you follow those.
that's also remains inconclusive what we know is that tensions remain high and fighting is going on. both sides are armed with conventional and nuclear weapons and this is not a happy read. in the us india pakistan remains completely off the radar which came to the presidential campaign as did a lot of foreign-policy issues and at the same time we know india pakistan are priorities for the us, have been and will be going forward. prez elect trump make the headlines were a couple days by suggesting he would be interesting in resolving the pakistan dispute involving kashmir, which would be a major department from us policy. it essentially is to work with india and pakistan independently
of each other and try to build partnership, respectively if that policy changes and if there is a us move towards working on the india pakistan relationship, what is in store for us? what are the stakes? should the us do that and if it does, what's realistic and if not how does one manage this constant tension in the india pakistan relationship. we will discuss these issues today and we could not have a better panel than whites we managed to get. lets me briefly introduce them and then we will move to the conversation. to my right is toby dalton, the codirector of the nuclear policy program and card reading-- carnegie endowment for international peace. , sameer lalwani, resident fellow at the american enterprise institute. a scholar of india, just returned from india last week and is fresh from the ground.
sameer lalwani who is also just back from a two week trip to india and pakistan. forthcoming volume on southeast asia. glass, but not least, shamila chaudhary, state department official. i should also mention that toby just put out a very interesting book called or not peace which looks at how to manage terrorism , from pakistan to india, pretty much of it we. as we announced this event will be different in format. rather than have our panelists give us longer presentations i have requested them to keep their remarks very short, about three minutes each answered a specific questions, which if they were inviting the next where incoming us
administration, what would they advise on how to manage the pakistani relationship in current and future tensions and then we moved to a free-flowing conversations among our panelists about 30 or 40 minutes before we open it up for a q&a and i will make sure we leave ample time for that. without further delay to me begin with sameer lalwani then we will go to toby and then shamila chaudhary. let me not forget i was ordered by the panelist to tell all of you with their twitter pat-- handles are. i'm not on social media, so i don't understand,. @toby_dalton, so all of you need to start following and tweeting and retreating however it works. >> think you. so, the prompt put to us was to offer policy suggestions with respect to india pakistan and
having never been involved in the policymaking process i've a lot of advice to give, so i will take a few cuts of this. i think we will get to a broader discussion over the course of this event. the first point i would say is we need to have an honest accounting of our interest in the region and that is probably internal policy choice and to deepen our relationship with india. i think there is still a lot of equities with pakistan that make for good reasons why we should not make hasty moves with respect to issues of terrorism conflicts. clearly are-- we are in the process of providing gradual and conditional aid and i think that process will continue, but it's more to keep in mind some things we still value with respect to pakistan, corporation intelligence, counterterrorism, prospects were cute-- future
counter isis isil organizations and at the end of the day my opinion i still think we need our relationship with pakistan to stabilize in afghanistan. at the same time we can think more about dynamic incentives perhaps be more responsive in terms of punitive measures when we don't see pakistan making good on some of the things we expect. we can alter your responses in the opposite direction. i think one example is 2015 and there's probably at least-- they do not believe the us appreciated the efforts they went to in that process. maybe there's good reason for that, but recognizing efforts when they are made and recognizing for example that it was fairly comparable to the bureau was quite briskly-- risky and costly. we see some of the blowback.
another point is to think about cross-border attacks and how they have adapted over time. if we had dispassionate analysis , some of the cross-border activity on a linux control over the past couple of years has been more narrowly focused and has evolved to be hitting hard targets of security forces rather than going after civilian targets and while the us should make clear that these activities need to be dialed back and at least to some degree , even if we don't push for something like this man commit, there might be realistic, but messy stock at measure that we could push for, so not necessarily about going after the heart, but perhaps helping to restrain some of the things that they do. think you have these messy op-- messy options rather than decisive measures my gain as more traction. there's another sort of broad trend going on in the region, which is that china is investing
heavily in pakistan and also potentially afghanistan down the road. i think there's a general sense that in pakistan that the us might want to compete with them. i'm not sure that is accurate, but i think there's a good way to frame this, which is that we don't need to compete with china , but we can stay in the game by identifying us comparative advantage in the region. i think there are obvious ones in terms of economics. china is putting down a lot of it is a and hardware, but i think there is concern within pakistan about the need to retain a relationship with europe and the us for trade to avoid power by china and access to international lending should oil prices spike in the fragile system. at another way of thinking about this is china brings hardware to pakistan. the us can bring software and that's in terms of social and management systems, investing in the health care system sort of
the economic and labor force education system and things like that where the us has comparative advantage and we don't necessarily have to keep on the hardware infrastructure side. class, there's a lot of expectation that china will play a major role in crisis management. my conversations with both within pakistan and colleagues who study china suggest that may -- they may not be poised to do that, so there will still be a chris-- critical crisis management seen on both sides. last, a coherent policy when it comes to the two borders that we care about a lot in that age of -- asia. one thing that we can do internally is to make work of your policy with respect to these two borders. right now they seem to be silent and that leads to appear at times for cross purposes.
sort of major contested areas in the world, we don't necessarily make policy with terms-- there has to be coherence with iran and i think his estate---- same respect we need to understand how policies on one side of the pakistan border will affect the other side, not just by the us by india policies with respect to pakistan and vice versa. more coherence on these two borders would help. last point i will add relates-- i think there is always a push for conflict resolution. conflict resolution is something you either think is quite difficult or certain parties don't want to purchase a within india pakistan bilateral relationship, but even if we are engaged in conflict resolution we can help in other-- including
faqs on the ground. when i think about border hardening, it's not just in terms of pakistan, but also india. material assistance and guidance for example in india and hardening the borders for its defensive capabilities. the greatest flashpoints for a lot of these crises is coming out of cross-border attacks hitting vulnerable points within the indian security forces establishment. there is a lot of this they goes unnoticed, but there's a lot of failures within the spell years with in terms of intelligence available, security parameters, organizational pathology and these are things that the us could probably provide assistance on both physical as well as organizational. pakistan is also in the game of trying to harden its borders with respect to pakistan and we could play a role in that in terms of supporting hardware side of things, technology of
the structure and also in terms of helping the afghans understand what they can do for both sides, managing the flow of people across the border and the risks that come with it. it won't resolve conflict, but could probably face facts on the ground to manage it. >> think you. toby. >> i will make five quick points. the first of which is in the category of advising what not to do rather than what to do. i realize that was not the task, but i think it's important to think it through. in this category i would say there's a temptation to see issues as binary without understanding the history and linkages and i think that's a temptation that if followed can lead to real trouble. probably related to that, avoiding making statements for
which there is no intention or keep ability to follow through on is also important. if you say you are going to negotiate kashmir, you better have something behind that other than 140 characters or whatever it was. third, in this category i would say taking the short-term view of regional problems that had deep sociopolitical roots is also not advisable, so those are three things that i think would be well advised for the incoming administration. what today should do an following from some of the points that shamila chaudhary made is that it's important there's some sense of privatization and i looked at this largely in terms of issues that carry significant risk for the us and let me highlight two of them. first, as we have seen over the last six months, the potential for a crisis in south asia to escalate is not something that
exists just on paper. it's now something that we can see in the dynamic, the politics, the demand in india for retribution. and this is something that is growing, i think. second, the potential for there to be another terrorism incident in the united states that is traceable to south asia and that could be a serious raptor of our policy there. finding leverage on these two risk, i think, is important. the problem here is that the us role as often created dependency in the ticket with pakistan that merge on moral hazard. that bring some real challenges as we think about our crisis role. it would behoove the next administration to think about wedding next crisis could look like and what some of the questions that they might confront would be. for instance, if there is a crisis where there's .-ellipsis
say more of a military activity then we saw after the early attack, then let's imagine we had imagery showing that pakistan was moving nuclear weapons. what would we do with that information? will be cautioned pakistan about doing something? would we provide accordance to india? one possible way to think about the us role here is in how we could help clarify the signaling that each intends to do. a third point is in in the context of the discussion and debate lately about intelligence here in washington is the importance of intelligence sharing relationships that would not be bound by politics in our relationships. i think it's super important in terms of having the clearest possible assessment of risk and threat for the issues i have described, both of-- as catalysts and also given the
threat of terrorism potentially coming to the us. we need to maintain those relationships regardless of whatever else has happened. this follows sameer lalwani's points on politics. i think it's important to embrace more wholeheartedly changes that could reason-- reduce us risk exposure in the region. i think that economic is an interesting potential case of this. it's quite possible that chinese presence there could be stabilized-- stabilizing. recognizing there are significant concerns about this. lastly, sort of a pet issue for me specifically on nuclear things. there's a 10k show and there has been a temptation and an effort in this ministration to try to
negotiate some nuclear deal with pakistan. i think you have to take real care and understanding the nuance of that issue, the dangers of that issue, its relationship to the india pakistan competition. if we are going to go down that road, this is one where we need to have both eyes open because of how important that is in the region. >> thank you so much. >> in my think tank that i have been working on a paper on us pakistan relations and trying to make recommendations for the next administration and i work through the whole analysis and talk about ct, domestic politics, al qaeda, pakistan and then i went back to reviewed review it and i realize i ignored india pakistan and i quickly reduce a bit about it. there is a huge gap in my paper and i'm hoping my colleagues will help me in the coming weeks , but i use that to illustrate the fact that india
pakistan has often been an afterthought in american policymaking and that after that usually comes when there's a crisis and when it's actually happening. we realize that not only do we have to respond to this, but we don't have a plan in place to prevent these sorts of escalations from happening and would automatically go into crisis mode rather than any kind of long-term prevention planning , even though we may have engaged in contingency planning within can intelligence community or amongst diplomats or defense folks. that is kind of the starting point i would say we have to think about when making recommendations to the next administration. no foundation for long-term planning on resolving conflict within pakistan. there is a response effort always underway and i find that to be slightly ironic and challenging because one of our main interests in south asia is to prevent nuclear escalation between india and pakistan, so the foundational interests don't match up with how we have
designed the policy and how we have set up our infrastructure to manage it, so actually see it more as a policy management issue rather than a conflict resolution approach and i think that is kind of the most we could expect for the next administration to do and i haven't ever seen us to more than that given that, i just want to highlight a couple of new dangers to consider and then focus on a couple of policy recommendations care here, direct military conflict is really should always be real when two countries have nuclear weapons on the kind of relationship that they have and i think recent events have suggested we have to be more realistic about this for two reasons. virtually-- it doesn't mean the pakistanis have it done anything with these militant groups to kind of control them and it doesn't mean they are interested in controlling them in the future, but there is a dynamic
between the pakistani state and the anti- india militants that doesn't give the state a lot of flexibility and there are two major trade-offs and taking actions against them and that limits the state's behavior and we have to really worry about that when conflicts arise with india. second, the notion that there would be less indian restraint should something happen, should there be a cross-border attack. in the era i would've told you during my time in government that there is no escalation possible and this would happen. so me attacks happened that have been linked back to militants in pakistan and the indian government has not responded with military force. i'm not sure i can say that now, so it's something we have to pay attention to what that increase risk of the amount. second, on the geopolitics side of things, the speakers have already mentioned that the india us relationship is expanding, pakistan is strictly its ties
with china and russians are interested as well and i worry some of these new diplomatic options actually produce the allure or the need of it and should something happen india pakistan might take a conflict further because they have these big brother behind the scenes that they can go to in use as leverage house of the something with the pay attention to in the next administration. it will always be an issue as long as they are helping the us. i wonder about kashmir and when they are dolled up or dialed down and how much of that is related to the indian presence in pakistan. pakistani concerns about that. the us, i think i'm has flipped flopped a little bit on the messaging and when i was a government we often would say to the indians privately, of course they have to pay attention to your presence there.
it's causing concerning pakistan. more recent statements have suggested otherwise that the us is very much in favor of india's activity in pakistan and i think there has to be a middle ground there and that will be a tough thing for this and ministration to focus on, but that would be one area i think we should focus on. in terms of actual reformations, think this is more of a policy management rather than conflict resolution. one recommended-- reclamation would make us are at the us government to consolidate the india and pakistan bureaucracy as much as possible. there is a strong tendency when the two countries are separated and sometimes there's favoring one country of the other and i thought-- don't think it's too easy our policymakers-- you know, it's a bit unfair to them because eventually you are supposed to represent and focus on the bilateral relationship, but you are not looking at things from a regional
perspective and that's the one thing that has to happen. the second thing is whenever a new administration comes in regardless of their political party they always want to solve the india pakistan relations. let's avoid that grant peace at narrative. it's never worked and it's not realistic. there's a tendency for that. another broad policy recognition i would make is to focus on private policy and strengthening the maggot-- mechanism we have for that. we know some public statements don't work well in this region. when the united states makes a public statement and can be used for whatever reason domestically and we have to be very cautious about what we say if it's on twitter or elsewhere. i think that public narrative can hurt us in many ways. thinking critically about what kind of private narrative we want with both countries and who delivers that message haircut that's where i think the role of diplomacy is important--
important. using our ambassadors in the region, connecting kind of the us foreign service officers in delhi and islamabad and making sure they are having conversations on these issues and really important and having modest goals, so not solving kashmir. kashmir is not a modest goal. do we look at india and pakistan concerns a bit. do you kind of phase into that conversation? india is not going to leave pakistan and that's another area we can have some kind of modest improvements in the issues. finally, i would say as a closing point we have not mentioned economic engagement or department issues yet and i think there is a lot of space for collaboration between pakistan and there always has been in the business community. there can be joint projects on development and economic engagement and these are really
important because-- when conflict does happen sometimes the countries need to show they are stopping something or halting something so they can assess the situation and you need to have these other leaders to push and pull and i think having a development and economic engagement allow for that and to give both sides breathing room into-- the support is there is its less political and it would build long-term goodwill where is like on the security summit i don't think that's as easily done. >> thank you. >> thank you. i'm going to bring a slightly different prison to the discussion. i follow indian domestic politics quite closely and not have been in india repeatedly over the last elements and i will make three big points. first, the political dynamic in india is quite dramatically different. it is not simply the election of 2014, but what we are heading
into the next two half years. early next year you have an election with india's largest state and is seen as a semi final before the final which effectively means that now india is back in election mode, general election mode. this makes a big difference. the second point is that i think that attacks and surgical strikes by india, it seems quite clear that indian policy now will be much more unpredictable than it was in the past. i don't think it necessarily suggest that every time there is a terrorist attack on an indian army camp that india will necessarily retaliate, but i think this shows that our old assumption that would almost surely not retaliate and almost certainly take diplomatic tools
over military tools, that basically has gone out the window with the response. with that i imagine coupled with the political popularity of that act really does increase the odds of india responding militarily to terrorist attack, not only in kashmir, but particularly if there is something in the mainland. second sort of point i would like to make is that all of us over here have followed south asia quite closely, but realistically as one of the other panelist said this is not one of the top five policy concerns of any incoming administration i would argue increasingly us and any pakistan relationships will be's cute through the prism of what's happening in asia more broadly and of course you have what's happening in the south china sea.
you have obviously fraught relationship with incoming relationship administration and the chinese and i think increasingly what's diverted to in some ways to push india and pakistan even lower in terms of its priorities than where it has been earlier. .. i think it's counterproductive and not a very good idealism was struck by the amount of blowback i got on social media and
elsewhere, and a few year ago this would not have happened. it would have been fairly mainstream position, which is you can take hard-line possession or a tough position against the terrorist or pakistani government, but that things like sports and movies and so on are out of bounds. i find the mood has changed sharply. in some ways this is a slow fuse reaction, would say, going back to mumbai. in some ways this is something that reflects the rise of a very new agrees -- aggressive, hyper nationalistic news channel in indiana and the rise of -- in india and the -- i think that india is going to be increasingly -- when it comes to pakistan. think the political payoffs for that are quite clear, particularly now given that the
prime minister has done something unprecedented on the domestic policy front by nuking 86% of india's cash supply. so he well be looking for ways to recover ground, and i would imagine that this is something -- i'm not saying necessarily something will happen but much more heightened than i would have said six months or year ago. in terms of what means for u.s. policy, think at some point there's gene to be a reckoning, and this idea that u.s. policy towards india could dry india more and more towards more active role in east asia, particularly in southeast asia, greater indian naval presence, closer indian defense ties with japan so on, while ignores indian concerns with mat is happening in pakistan.
think that circle can no longer be squared because of domestic politics and if -- a big if -- if theres another major terrorist attack and pressure builds, domestic pressure builds on the indian government to retaliate, the u.s. going back to what has been a -- quite successful in the pass' past and is to urge restraint upon india in order to stablize the situation. believe would be greater impediment to the u.s. and india developing that sort of relationship than it would have been in the past. >> thank you. thank you to all the panelists. so, let me very quickly turn to all of you to ask -- prompt a few questions and have a discussion. let me begin with you because you sort of made this point which is crucial.
conflict management, not resolution. the question i would have for you but if others want to chime in -- is it realistically possible for the u.s. to secure its's in south asia without some resolution, if not total and complete even partial off the indo-u.s. relationship? for instance, afghanistan. pakistan's pool possession si is policies --eye does india play on the global stage? pakistan's internal terrorism problem. are we not only looking at the symptoms -- i'm not saying it's resolveable but is it realistic to expect the u.s. -- >> it's sort of what we have been doing. >> not working out too well.
>> i think we're in this mode where we deal with it when it becomes a problem because they're there bigger issues we're working on. so afghanistan is the number one issue, not the real estateship -- relationship with india. it's a reactionary moat. see that changing unless we good to zero troops in afghanistan in next year. i don't anticipate that. until that -- afghanistan situation changes, i think that the u.s. is constantly going to have to balance how it approaches peace between the two countries. remember having a conversation in -- let see -- tout and we withgiggling a lot of money to pakistan unchecked and being at the state department and a very senior official said kashmiris
not a national security interest. don't see a national security threat there, and as long as we can manage india, then i think we'll be okay. so i think the comment is very interesting and that perhaps needs to be focused on, the unknown on the indian side. they're not going to respond to u.s. attempts to restrain them anymore. i'd actually be curious if you could elaborate on that. what possibly could happen in the event that they choose not to respond to u.s. pressure. >> you saw this sort of interesting debate break out after the attack on september 18th where india looked as though indiana ways going to follow the play book and people wrote articles and nobody is going do what indian has always done, and there were a hand. of people arguing that, no, he
will not, because of the constituency that elected him and because of it -- it's could bed into irrational but the disproportionate role that social media seems to play in the policymaking process in india. so, you saw -- i thought it was quite restrained and carefully sort of planned by india to maximize the domestic applause, while minimizing the international fallout. so in terms of what was outward facing was the fact that india had only gone after the terrorist lawn pad, not the pakistan military. not used air power, but what they calculate, quite cleverly in my view, they recognized the domestic need ya has no restrained.
so they consecutive making up these stories but it was all untrue but they got the most out of it on both sides. i would not be surprised if there is particularly going into this next -- there is some kind of pressure, if there is cause for it, if there's another attack to do something similar but up it. and then the question is, what does the u.s. do? my interpretation of what the u.s. does after the surgical strikes was that it effect live di -- tacitly agreed with the indian position, and the sense it didn't immediately lean on india and say -- it eexpensely, a questioned. does it acquiesce again and say, now india you must stand down
because of the interests of stability. the point is if that happens there will be -- i don't think it will work, first, and secondly, there will be sharp pushback from the modi administration. >> bring this to you. you have done a lot of work on this, done the book. i think what he's saying is well-taken. what happens. the question is, india does something next time. let's assume pakistan responds and then what? is the world's only super power going to watch the next nuclear war or is there a moment when pakistan and india wanted the u.s. to say, back off. dot that playbook remain or completely new now? >> i think the a couple issues i pick up on here. one goes back to the moral hazard point i was suggesting,
which is that some of the u.s. response coming as it does to try to encourage restrain, is exactly what pakistan has sought the u.s. to do. so, maybe there's some calculation of provocation that would bring in the u.s. in. now you have this unpredictability on the indian side. and on the u.s. side, too. about the extent to which the next administration is going to be concerned about this to the same extent the previous administrations have. so that's a problem. i think it's also a problem for indian policymakers to think through what kind of effect they want to have in pakistan. is it largely going to be another tactical effect to score domestic political points or actually trying to coerce and change behavior in pakistan in some important way. and if that is actually what they're trying to do, then the means with which they would do
that would have to be significantly different than surgical strikes and more. what is interesting also that since the attack and since even before that you have seen an effort by india to try to isolate pakistan regionally. and what is the effect of that isolation should there be another crisis? is it levers with which you could influence but not break the relationship? do they goway? all of that is a pretext to say, if india really does want to change wildfire in pakistan and the proof they -- change behavior in inspection -- the place they do that is more military, that places pressure
on pakistan and the difficulty for the political class, nor military to actually take on groups like let. that really hard. there has to be some sort of response there. so, you see the domestic sources of escalation exist on both sides. it's difficult for anybody here to think how you can influence that in ways that would either buy time, as we tried to do in the past, or stop escalation at the first move. >> if i may ask, hasn't been discussed as much on this panel but there's a conversation about isolating pakistan or cutting pakistan off, not only in delhi but also in washington. how does one square this urge to punish pakistan, cut pakistan, with this crisis management problem? because if you have no relationship with one country, how do you influence, during a
cries whichever way you want, and if the u.s. loses that ability are we not leaving the space open for china, even if they're not ready yet to capture more of that in their neighborhood than preponderances than the -- >> okay. let me take up a couple of threads. the first is just on the row roo saint -- restraint and escalation. i don't income india broke out of the mold of restraint. think the decided the cost of escalation outweighed -- without much coercive effect and not testing the threshold that much in their actual action pock statements after that were -- public statements were pushing
that. that's restraint for the most part held and the operation was an interdiction operation if don't think we push that bound yet. on the crisis management, does the united states, if it tries to pakistan, close unilevers in a crisis. that's constantly a concern but i don't think our concerns are just about the crisis management,angle. pakistan would be more interested in us playing a role in cries -- crisis management in terms of intelligence cooperate for homeland security, something that i think europeans think a lot about and goss unnoticed on a day to day basis but if european government are concerned about the flow of nonstate actors through pakistan or afghanistan and don't healy have intelligence where they can
track these guys, they're sort of -- whether good or not, one of the cower sources of support is pakistan. -- core sources of support is pakistan. so all the crisis -- i don't think we necessarily need knew levers of influence, but i think that we're going to be involved in the process one way or the another, and i don't see china filling that void anytime soon. they don't seem to be ready for it. it's not that we're necessarily an hospital broker but i -- honest broker but i think the chinese are closer to us in that process, seriesly from from india's standards and i don't think the pakistan would want the u.s. to be involved in the conversation. >> let me trust that relationship during the crisis would be tougher. >> let me push back on one point. if you measure india's response purely in military terms its does not break the bounds of strategic restraint. i think that in particularly when it comes to indias' pakistan relations, when there's
set policy, there's such a large element of theater. the 1998 nuclear test. the rational for pakistan was to -- but the fact then, given this backdrop and the fact in both countries the theatrical element is so important, means that india going out, having a press conference and saying, look, we did this. has much greater significant than purely the military aspect. >> i would argue both of you are agreeing on this. the paradigm shift is not what was done but how it was presented. if i may, push and -- i'll let you -- push you one more time, which is are be part of the problem? the intellectual space, the social meals gentleman and the media? i bring this up because we assume that domestic pressure is
so huge on both sides and have to do something. but there were attacks before the september attacks, which was in some ways not in kashmir in that way so much more -- if the indian account is correct pakistan just denied it. wonder whether there is more space, one of the well-known pakistan scholars has made this argument in the past that actually salvation states are manipulating the public sentiments and use it as they want. do we have more space than we're giving celled to both sides -- giving credit to both sides? >> possibly. i'm not saying something has changed in the sense that now indian retaliation has become a certainty. i don't think we have moved from one kind of uncertainty to a new kind of uncertainty but the amount of uncertainty has been raised. >> i think india does have mo
space to do these lower level forms of retaliation, mainly because of the stronger relationship with the united states. this is a byproduct of this strategy relationship, the wayest exists right now, and we keep talking about changings pakistan's behavior but a the indians are doing the to cack the americans' behavior. so this what we're going to do now and the americans aren't saying anything. and, pakistan absorbed it, and the u.s. will only come ins' intervene if it's at the 11th 11th hour. in most cases in the past that what u.s. intervention looks like. doesn't come in after there's been retaliation to a cross-border attack. think that there's more space for india to do this. there is an unknown. we don't know what they'll do and if it will rise that level but as the u.s. gets closer to india, this could happen more frequent live, and i do think there is an inclination within
the american bureaucracy to be accepting of that approach. it's actually an out for the americans in some ways, because it puts checks and balances on militancy in pakistan without the u.s. having to make any kind of public statement. >> sure. just want to follow up briefly. this picks up on your point about twitter and up up at the nationalist media. the theater can be help inflame to them there are cultural linkages they allow people to interpret on both sides but to the extent it's being shut down and much harder to do that interpretation, you end up with very captive narratives, and not much ability to read the signals between them. that's another yet one of these new unpredictable elements. >> the only good news is if both sides go back on the cultural side there well be all these movies smuggling through. they won't stop. promise you.
indian movies to pakistan won't stop. if i may ask you this question. we talk about the dangers and salvation. we also talk about the arms race and pikes and its nuclear weapons. and we are pushing both sides to make they're they manage this relationship in a responsible manner. at the same time i would argue that neither side is doing anything that is purely irrational. so pakistan talks about india and says, look, india should work out a conventional arms control, arrangement with thus. we i think it would be crazy for india to do that because it's doing other things, looking at china and other thingsment doesn't make sense, but if i doesn't make send for india, then pakistan looks also its -- i have to look at nuclear but i have to defend myself. where does the u.s. come?
we are in a fairly strong arms relationship with india and also provide support to pakistan, and what we see at the end of the day is the biggest value is nuclear in one way or another, and that only increases with this paradigm. is there a policy, internal contradiction in policy in terms of how we are approaching this when it comes to the pakistan military? >> well, i wouldn't say these decisions are necessarily irrational when you look at serving the pakistan calculation but what i think might be happening is they may not by internalizing the full set of risks. they not have a long-term horizon. one are there are a lot of nonstate actors in pakistan, some which they have tackled or
haven't on can't but a muck tour in between. those put a lot of risk across their borders that they not be able to manipulate and come. so its take that control escalation out of their hands and something that if it was factored in might lead to an alderration of the costs and benefits of going after these groups. with india, their exposing themselves to certain risks by other choose north take, a particularly in kashmir. they have a lot of vulnerabilities and fissures exploitable by storm actors. some backed be other states and some win the region, and in a recent year, so seems to halve denied it has a problem. maybe a new one that changed. they reverting to at the sim talking points as well without other tactors driving this
entire process who there seems to be more or organic unrest in kashmir that is exploitable and vulnerable to violence. i think the last point on internalizing risks there will be arms competition, protecting themselves internally or externally but there's a question of sufficiency and how much is enough and in this case, again, i think the worry that gets expressed within some parts of the united states and the local community is, if you start to push yourself in one direction, sort of fully build up and compete on eave conventional platform or develop every nuclear capability to plug the hole? the escalation matter. do you run out of the resources that underpin your security and military strength. >> mine biggest concern is not the nuclear question. my biggest concern with the u.s.
is that india and pakistan problem may derail or that he potential to derail larger u.s. interest in the region which are being driven by u.s.-india cooperation. >> if i may come to you, and you mentioned this but everything mentioned this. the pakistan behavior and the question of changing the pakistan behavior, the focus, effort, others have tried, what checks pakistan behavior? i think a lot of times people talk about reducing and increasing and i see no evidence that assist stabs -- assistance changes it. what is going to change? may well be india and the relationship but that may not be do-able. is there anything here that is realistly to do to change the pakistan behavior? >> in short, no.
i don't think that's going to work. we have seen that over the past decade and prior to that. pakistan behavior changes when it realizes it has certain interests its wants to pursue. we different see a change in pakistan are orientation towards certain militant groups in the northwestern areas. we did see that. that's observable. they went after them and suffered the backlash of that. there war coases and they knew that and they explained to the public that we'll continue on this path tuggeds the other militant groups on our own timeline, so if i were to look at that as one example, it strikes me that once pakistan's own sense of security is threatened domestically they start to look at the groups differently. when they only look at them through the national security paradigm, it's not going to work. can't thaek heir orientation. if they feel thenned by afghanistan or india and feel encircled they're not going to change they're behavior but if
there's aaron creased sense of threat throw state that opens it up for possibilities. when it comes to the apts anti-india group and pin job it's tricky because -- its not that these groups could start pakistani citizens. they're a useful tool itch think on the assistance issue, this is something we have to tackle. the next administration may not choose to do that buff i we don't do it now we have to do it in eight years or four years. the u.s. aassistance relationship with pakistan is a crutch. the pakistani mindset is the americans will come in at the 11th hour because they have so much invested in us, whether it's afghanistan or the nuclear issue, that kind of relationship with continue to be a crutch. that effect -- the orientation towards india and pakistan knows if we just go too far, the meshes are going to get worried
and come in and save the day or not save the day but they'll come in for us. i think until that changes, it's status quo. >> going back to your book. the premise of which is how do you, as india, manage the cross-border terrorism problem from pakistan? >> what about the scenario which may not be the most -- is realistic which is that the position is because the history, because of the -- head happen in the past india's default, we must do something about pakistan. but elements like isis and -- i wonder what happens to a crisis where actually it's a third-party actor, not a group we know of. that manage an attack.
in a situation where lost in all the conversation about india-pakistan crisis, that it india and pakistan do not talk on terrorism and you have a third party. think about it as isis. what's the best thing i do for myself? get pakistan and india close to war and if it's a nuclear war, correct. how do you manage the relationship if you're not talking to each other about the possibility, which is not made up. >> it's a real concern and a very valid question. don't know we have good levers that to fa facilitate that discussion. the trend seems to be to avoid those discussions and to set prerequisites to have any discussion. at the same time there's no mystery. people on both sides know what
need happen on cash heir and -- kashmir and afghanistan and they're difficult toy sustain politically beau they're not nationalist, but a they're billion nationalists. so -- internationalists. don't see any impetus on either side to take up this question of are there actors that are not under the control of the pakistani state that could catalyze some crisis. but i would imagine that there are people like the national security adviser in india, who have thought through the issue and probably would like to do something and maybe there are channels where you thank you start to broach this in a way that isn't so politicized. a little more on the margins out of the limelight. could the u.s. facilitate something like that? this isn't about kashmir. this is a threat that we
perceive that is a threat to both states as well. can we form late an agenda that addresses that threat? it's possible. now, are intelligence relation tonights with both bound by certain agentses for structured that make that hard? probably but shouldn't be impossible. >> let me -- to put this in perspective. it is interesting that we are having this grim conversation but if we had been speaking just a little built less than a year ago, it was a very hopeful time, modi had shown up to greet sharif on his birthday and then so there is this yo-yo'ing aspect and maybe we would be having a very different conversation three months from now. one thing that made this conversation particularly hard, from new dehli's situation, is
after the mumbai attack. that has one a breaker. at a public level. say that if pakistan was serious about getting at least the more moderate or thoughtful -- as to recognize that there is indeed some sort of strategic in pakistan. one would be to infact show progress on mumbai. this is -- it's eight years now. not like it happened yesterday. there's nothing. to show some willingness to clamp down on saeed or others and you have to say leading public prayers, the person responsible for 16 of deaths in mumbai, including six americans and you can see why the indian position becomes sort of extremely cynical because of these things and i think if
there were in fact concrete progress on two or three of the things and you can say, look, we have done this, just as there was concrete progress on a domestic pakistani perspective on going after the ptt. if there was some equivalent or even if it's not exactly the same but something concrete you can undeniably show that there is progress against individuals who have hurt indians badly. you would open up a little window. >> give the mic and tell us, you mentioned this issue about india-u.s. and then india-pakistan coming in the way. when i asked you about the tension in the indian part? is that on the one hand it makes perfect sense. the larger space and then indian
and pakistan not influencing that negatively. on the other hand, the more this -- the more the china-pakistan relationship backs more and more natural, which is something that worries india, and if you have to look at the peaceful economically integrated southeast asia, the one ideal scenario could be -- connecting to the east-west. how do you sort of square that? some ways indo u.s. and there's not -- to push each other to challenge the indian rights. >> i think the way it's viewed in indiana is pakistan and china are in a pretty tying embrace and i don't think india is making that embrace. it's hard to be tight -- tighter
than it is. the relationship with china has an independent history, pakistan and china has recently extend stepped up support for pakistan in the u.n. on the other issue, so i dent think that india -- india is worried about this in terms of the china being push closer. pushed closer to russia. that's a very live debate. not just on the pakistan but china and russia because of u.s. policy, but nobody in india think about getting closer to the u.s. pakistan and china are sew close this isn't something to demeanor that. >> so, turn to the audience and take questions. but before that, let me can if i may, ask you in one line no more, suggest where you think
the u.s. policy on india-pakistan, the india-pakistan relationship will be in two years time perhaps, after the administration takes over. >> i think it's going to look the same as today. no change. >> there's another way to put it, muddling through the same way. >> i think it well be worse. because we're in the process of moving out. >> can you define worse? >> our leverage on the situation will be much diminished. >> i agree. think we'll have less leverage. >> and that optimistic note let me open it up. you can raise your hand, identify yourself and then ask a brief question so we can get through as many as we can. let's guen-hye and try to come to all of you. if it's okay we'll collect couple and then come back. >> i am a masters student at gw.
me question with with modi establishing the idea of surgical strikes there is a possibility this could lead to using these as basically domestic pressure valves, kind of like people used clinton as the monica lieu win city -- lewinski strike. >> see your hand back there. >> good morning. i'm from pakistan. want to know that what role u.s. can play in terms of course resolution. when there's a clear stance -- neal we nothing allow third party intervention and what it restaining the u.s. to go further? domestic politics of india and pakistan or the international --
some kind of international issues which are active and we can seal the kashmir dispute is not as activetive as the other issues. what restraining the u.s. from going further. >> you want to thick the its one, you're you're absolutely right, this is a prepares dent and -- precedent politically successful. toy meant to what you moon by other leaders, future prime ministers or -- [inaudible] >> using this to manipulate domestic pressure. >> i don't know about that issue maybe someone else can answer the pakistan side of it. on the indian side, it's certainly something that i think the domestic calculus is part of this this and will be heightened every the next two and a half years headed into the 2009 election.
>> one quick thing on the idea of the pressure relief valve. some states're do this. made a big deal out of surgical strikes for pr purposes but they always sort of issue replies and then public an account in newspaper that says x number of people were killed, whether it's cross-border fire or are till rare fire. we talk about pressure as if it's ex-only necessary when it's actually stoked. it's not a bottom are up pressurey the public i baying four blood. there are moves made be media cells in governments on both sides that are trying to push this. these lines that are coming into all these leaked stories in the indian media that were different than the account reported by the army chief.
one method for certain manage pressure is to maybe just not cultivate it as measure. >> if could just add on that. think your question was also looking ahead, could you imagine using this as a way to divert from -- let's say that the -- a disaster that you need another surgical strike to recover from it. i think we're probably not quite there yet. but it was a big pr victory in india, and one after the reasons -- one of the ways that seems to be explained in pakistan is that had to be a false flag but it allowed for this. so the problem is then. delegitimateizes an pakistani narrative, these attacks take nation india. that's challenging and sort of speaks to kneed to be able to translate across borders. >> the second one? >> i like the way that you phrased the question which is
what is restraining the u.s. from doing something. an interesting perspective. and it's just not the top priority of the u.s. in the suite of national security interests in south asia, kashmiris not at the top of the list, not even the top three. >> or ten. >> yeah, or ten. once -- in the conversations i've been in my career, once you have those discussions of, should we go in and how and this and that, there are way too many costs to each bilateral relation and they exist in a vacuum and the bureaucracy that is -- there's no -- not one envoy. so, i also think there's something else happening which we don't talk about that much. becoming harder to defend the
pakistani position on militancy and when you talk about kashmir you can't ignore that, the use of proxies and the past decade we have seen this issue become much more violent in afghanistan. it affects american interests directly, and so when you translate that in looking at kashmir, you'll find that there's not a lot of u.s. support for the pakistani position. it's something for the pakistanis to think about. >> one two and three. >> i'm the ambassador to pakistan and i have two questions. the first is that -- >> sorry, because of time i need to get to others, let's make it as crisp as possible. >> i think talking about u.s. and india and pakistan india and the u.s., deciding what policy should pakistan or have, i think
they would better -- decide what is the policy outside of -- the second thing is, we have talk about what would -- in case another attack helps, what would u.s. do? with all these efforts efforts f diplomatically isolating pakistan, my question to the panel is what do you think pakistan will do if it is coronerred? >> we are debating it so i don't think there's a problem there let's go ahead. >> my name is karen fisher. i'm current live not associated with anybody but just returned from nine years of livering in -- livering in kashmir and 20 years in india and my question