NSA Director Rogers Says Russia Poses Threat to Congressional Elections CSPAN May 10, 2017 12:53am-3:10am EDT
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>> today, admiral mike rogers, director of the national security agency and head of such u.s. cyber command testify that the senate hearing about threats to u.s. computer systems. he highlighted the government-sponsored hacking by russia and china, as well as the threat posed by nonstate actors. this hearing of the senate armed service committee is to are some 15 minutes. [inaudible] [inaudible] >> the committee meets today foy hearing on the united states cyber command. we're pleased welcome back admirable mike rogers, the commander of the national security agency, chief essential security service, and several other titles i believe. we are grateful for your many years of distinguished service and for your appearance be for the committee today.
threats to the united states and cyberspace continue to grow in scope and severity. our nation remains willfully am prepared to address the threats which will be a defining feature of 21st century warfare. as a result, the committee is focused its attention on cyber security. we've expressed our concern that lack of a strategy and policy for addressing hours cyber threats. we're hopeful after years of serious efforts to develop a strategy impulsive from the lesson ministration, the new administration promised one within 90 days of the inauguration. ninety days have come and gone and no such policy and strategy have been provided. while in action from the executive branch has been disheartening, this committee is not sit still. in fact we have adopted more
than 50 provisions over the past four years, focused on organizing and empowering and enabling the department of defense to deter and defend against threats and cyberspace. cyber is an issue that requires an integrated whole of government approach. we simply do not have that now. the very fact that each agency of government believes that it is responsible for defending the homeland is emblematic of our dysfunction. we have developed things that we know our adversaries will use against us, yet we fail to some of the will to address these scenes for reform. our allies, most notably the united kingdom, has recognized the need for unified approach. i look forward to hearing from admiral rogers in his assessment of the national security center in the u.k. and whether unified model would help address some of our deficiencies in the united states. the coast guard also presents an interesting model that should be evaluated for addressing some of our cyber deficiencies. as the coast guard has an interesting mix of authorities that might be just as applicable
cyber bases their territorial waters. but an agency within the department of homeland security in a branch of the armed services. it can operate both within the united states and internationally and can seamlessly transition from law enforcement to military authorities. a cyber analog to the coast guard could be a powerful tool for addressing gaps that impede our existing organizational too structure. it can also serve as a much-needed cyber first response to responsible for immediate triage and hand off to theentity appropriate federal and achieve for response, mediation, or law-enforcement action. as for the efforts of the department of defense, i understand cyber command is still on track to reach a full operational capability for the training of the cyber mission force in the fall 2018. unless we see dramatic changes in future budgets, i'm concerned these forces will lack the tools
required to detect, deter, respond to malicious cyber behavior..or in short, unless the services begin to prioritize and deliver the cyber weapon systems necessary to fight in cyberspa cyberspace, we're headed down the path to a hollow cyber force. i'm also concerned with the lack of trained people ready to replace individuals at the conclusion of their first assignments on the cyber mission force. unfortunately, we have already heard about some puzzling issues. specifically, out of the 127 air force cyber officers that completed the first two are on the cyber mission force, none went back to cyber related job. that is unacceptable and suggests a troubling lack of focus. o it should be obvious in the development of a steady pipeline of new talent and retention of the ones we have trained already as essential to the success of
the cyber mission force. emma rogers, we look to you to help us better understand if we should take a closer look at the existing man, train and equip models are sufficient or if we should consider a different model. later this week we plan to have another cyber hearing with outside experts of which we plan to ask if we should be considering the creation of a cyber service. admiral rogers, welcome back. this is, i am sure one of numerous pleasures you have had to come before this committee. >> thank you very much mr. chairman. . . e welcome admiral rogers. but a with the testimony until the importance of cyberthat we face. something to for your service and dedication. with his espionage and theft
of intellectual property to support the military and economy so now to experience firsthand of that manipulation and distortion to threat in the bedrock of our democracy and with those cyberattacks now the scope of what we are defending against and it even takes on greater urgency. in just one year's time intelligence community has warned that the russian election interference will be a normal. well designated as critical infrastructure with that of louis operation to
continuously conduct. , those to deter such actions as secretary carter commission and to serve on >> >> what key leaders on the other side value the most that include the financial well-being is in order to deter cyberattacks achieving it credible deterrent across the department of defense as well as through the overalll gon of government with dod nd just justice department we have not seen evidence in
intend to address them. the concerns that those forces are cyberspace operations to figure are hard to penetrate the networks the concern is the cognitive element conducted through cyberspace. there is much work to do afford to your testimony. >> welcome back thank you for your support to talk about hard-working men and women i welcome the opportunity to cross cybercommand defense againstensa
powerful adversaries. to be recognized seven years ago u.s. cybercommand has been given the possibility of the department systems and now works for all the divisions. to also rely on cybercommand those that require supporte to q the pace of international conflict that intensified over the last few years we have not seen one event and has consequences for the military in nation at large.
into track the state a announced delaware adversaries. through cyberspace to undermine the united states national interest. is not committed operations by digital means that we are continuing to understand it in hand the department and situational awareness per car want to update you on the plan to address that issue of first management. and with that environment with those objectives globally of critical infrastructure. duffel spectrum cyberspace live to deny the same to any
adversary. the information is our top party including platforms and data we have the cybernation force with all scheduled to be fully operational by 2018 with the help of the services we are having the readiness the whole target is a risk. was strong and critical support especially as we complied with the directive to elevate cybercommand i i served as both director aser the nsa this tool had a point underpins a close partnership between separate command and nsa with cybercommand operations but cybercommand may fullefficien
efficiency in the future and a separate provision also talks about splitting those tool that can not impair either effectiveness i support this spending did betsy mentor certain critical provisions and other matters with those responsibilities and authorities over the coming years pancreases cyberwork force to build capacity with the acquisition process these are critical enablerss for cyberspace operation and most or all have been directed from the national defense authorization act will with the office of the secretary of joint staff to iron out the implementation details. and motivated to accomplish their missions over sea by the congress in this
committee the systems and networks counter adversary support those objectives through cyberspace the command operation to have those cybereffects on the battlefield and beyond operating out of operational necessity in behalf of those meetings of those joint force commanders to ensure the effectiveness over timee this combined with policies in the decisionmaking process with the broader concept of operation will insure the sever command gets the full potential of the cyberstrategy is. thank you for your support we appreciate your continued support as he overcome the challenges that lie a ahead of us congress that will
literally facilitate and support us to allow was to accomplish our mission but fellow citizens understand and endorse the efforts executed on their behalf perhaps seen the growth on the side with the resources that time and effort is paying off to keep american safer battling in cyberspace but other domains as well afford to continuing a a dialogue and delacorte to answering your questions. >> we have seen another russian attempt to affect the outcome of the election in france. dec any slackening of the russian or chinese efforts to commit cyberattacks orlectio effect elections. >> no i do not. >> abuse in any reduction of russian behavior? >> no i have not.
>> the defense science board told this committee those of those capable adversaries are to exceed the ability to have key infrastructures do you agree with that assessment? >> guided agreed with the opposite side and general which is why the idea is for so important how do reshape for change the opponents behavior? >> we have to have a policy followed by a strategy. >> qsr. we do not have that now but we'll working on that. >> the check is in the mail? >> do you agree we have the fbi, department of land security, infrastructure and
computer networks and department of defense to defend the homeland with computer networks is the status quo sustainable? >> is but my question is is it the most effective is a better question. >> my recommendation is we've built a foundation but what experience has taught us we can respond in a more integrated and focused way wheat and that is the challenge harder reintegrate these across the country where. >>. >> within the dod i am not in favor of the following service reasons in my
experience to be successful you have to understand the technical aspects also the broader context in which cyberevolution occurs somewhere in the world there is the man or woman sitting at the keyboard directing and operations of we have a w unique approach to generate a force the was proficient in and to use a service based model is a stronger way to go about doing this. >> emission to my opening remarks of those in the air force nobody stayed in cyber? are you getting the cooperation you need? >> i have talked to all the service people personally and mason be need to change the policies with the cyber
mission force that i am responsible for i knowledge this cyberneeds. >> was that message received bye greg. >> there clearly still working their way through that they have a broader set of challenges with manpower. i had the airforce to come out to fort meade to see if i do have the accurate picture they said the do have the right sense we're trying to get their summer job is to help them to make sure we sustain this. >> you have to look at scenarios and give us theos best in the worst for cyber attacks on the united states. >> the worst worst-case
scenario, that activity to be focused on critical ever structure that could be space and in addition the other thing back concerns me second the worst consequences to recede that manipulation on a massive scale? >> so what happens if we go change data? that is a different challenge. what happens when non state actors is the attractive weapon and in naples them to destroy the status quo. >>. >> we continue to make improvements.
>> as you have pointed outchnica and terms of technical aspects cybercommand has been in the forefront but this issue of cognitive operations changing public opinion have you been tasked to conduct this operation greg. >> no. rainout. i >> is it any betty's. responsibility to your knowledge? >> a lot into specifics but there are some things we're doing for example, with the fight against isis with combat and commanders. >> but one of the challenges
if it will become a weapon then how will be optimized ourselves? when i first darden my journey in uniform have extensive infrastructure infrastructure, expertise as the soviet union collapsed we decided that was required so we did away with those institutions the think we need to step back and reassess. >> so i figure expertise is rather limited with the skill set and the personnel. >> lambo first usa. >> is not comparable. >> certainly not on the day-to-day basis. >> within dod so, has bank s given the lead on the
operation izzard any integration with cyber command?an >> we do work very closely. >> and the other issue that has come up in context is that this is a mission that goes across several different organizations we have heard comments of the state department if you go back to the cold war to do all radio towers it's a new world they don't have those resources so nobody is doing this aggressively. >> certainly we are not where we need to be. but. >> and terms of russian operations with the election
of 2016 what actions did you take to inform your superiors? >> so '02 differentiate is the director of the nsa i publicly testified before other committees when nsa came to knowledge the russians were encased in the effort to racks as political as tuitions the fbi would inform those organizations i and turn to make sure that dod and other elements with the role as cybercommand comes in with the efforts of
intrusions against u.s. infrastructure to major the dot system is optimized that if they come after duty of the same time to coordinate with the department of homeland security for example, if we had to find that critical infrastructure if they determined that dod found themselves and wouldan have a separate cybercommand >> so then you would have been prepared to disrupt his operations? >> yes. given the of role of looking back in your estimate we are much better prepared for 2018 and beyond greg.
>> after looking bad experience of 2016 with at attribution to a foreignn state going after the key systems in this country we have to be much better prepared. >> ivory. -- i agree. >> admiral rogerses of fear to last to evaluate the article is assured you this morning but it says are the cyberkirk's funding can john moon with the successful with the offending practices that make sense greg. >> i will like it into specifics with the
unclassified forum but we have seen north korea use cyberin a criminal mechanismcrim to generate monetary resources. >> when you look at that you can eliminate and come to that conclusion greg. >> i would highlight this is only one element to generate revenue. >> when you see the number of attacks then you talk about the lack of policy to make a decision, there is some thought that maybe there is too much authority at the top.as quoted it was december of last year before the committee thatla said if we want to be more agile we have to push this
authority to a lower level in certain areas. does that make sense? >> yes, sir. as a secretary has assumed his new responsibilities we need tocybe invest in this area. >> we have been to be in israel a few weeks ago talking to their national cyberdirector. he actually came over command senator rounds had a meeting that i think was pretty productive but the doctor was careful to say maybe that they're doing something better it is much more complex than the united states but they also pointed
out the three things that were significant. or maybe some other countries. >> there is a reason i seey him every time i m in televisa. we can learn from each other in fact, we're talking about potential test cases we could use but i look to him one of the things i have learned in my journey there is no one single one organization that has all the answers so it is the power of the of partnership to have insight and knowledge from all the partners in cider outside the united states or the government he is one example
>> i got the impression that when general alexander was in that position he spent some time at the university of tulsa the chairman asked the question do we have access to the people that our necessary crooks is a serious problem that we have is there an effort to promote the programs? period there is between nsa and cybercommand that is part of the future workforce something i try to highlight be leery of creating a cyber force for all the w cookie cutters some people will be really good that has spent much of their personal life we have to build ais construct to get that full capability.
>> looking at these countries coming after their parliamentary election. he started to do things just with the level of warfare and also started working the they have few cybercapabilities more than 620-0500 times over the last two months so it is happening all over the world if you see that example in the ukraine so now all i am sure you were out on top ofe everything that is happening >> thank-you mr. chairman
and admiral for your service in response to senator reidsenar you said you are aware of russian attempts to interfere in our election. are you aware or were you aware of russian communications with members of the trump campaign greg. >> now you are into my role as the nsa i will not publicly get into that. >> gained standard reluctance but i also see you not just as cybercommandrcod but as the nsa director. >> the chairman mentioned is this what we see with this behavior a new normal to which responded, i think
regretfully, yes. how do we counter the cyber and naval operations and who has the responsibility? >>. >> with education our response? >> both in. >> to be referred to the intelligence community with those elements that were involved with respect to what should we do? we need to have a public discourse to engage him in this behavior to publicly identify the behavior and secondly we have to make it more difficult for them to succeed looking at our
election process is not the cybercommand role but to ask ourselves what changes do we need to make infrastructure parks and reedy to climatize ourselves that we hear back into the information of manipulation of media you have to be a much more discerning reader and lastly make it clear these areit groups of would engage in this behavior is unacceptable and a price to pay for doing this for. >> at this point listening to the answers that we are really in a position that we cannot prevent a cyberattacka like a critical infrastructure?
>> when we say prevent wind deterrents become so important to convince the actors you tell what to do this regardless it is not injured best interest and you don't want to engage. >> so this setting that is secure wooded you share with us either under the threat of an attack to use that word deterrence? >> i could do that in a classified setting. >> that would be very helpful. to consider critical infrastructure voter registration rolls? >> one of the challenges is going back to that process
that critical infrastructure in the private sector we tend to look at that to best very industrial one of the things we need to think about no how the election generates the of plant but does that to exist in areas as a nation? >> we better because suddenly they find out they're not a registered voter because the data has been manipulated and taken off the rolls that is pretty serious. >> that is critical. >> yes, sir. we can look that bad definition.>> >> let me follow-up on the chairman's statement with regard to this cyberofficers
not remaining in the field of work is one of those reasons they do not view that as a good career path? >> when we say not in the field louisiana they take the officers to employ them in other areas of cyberin the department support of the challenge is a wide spectrum of requirements as wide as try to make better demand that what we need to do is something on the order of one-third should stay with us how do we put that elsewhere with that broader enterprise to build al level of expertise?o sound at want to make it sound
like a drop them after three years but to become ans airplane mechanic we don't see that after all. >> is that a good way to get to be the four-star? eric did you build a career y over time greg. >> i'm sure i am not class person that will be this position as a four-star. >> with regard to that cyber service that you are doubtful for that it does have cyberstructure? >> no it is less cyberservices more activen of at and significant reserve. >> are any allies trying this? period nobody right now has gone to a single service single most rise to do with the existing structure to have a
dedicated work specialty that is what is done by most nations around the world. >> keep us posted on that. page two of protest to money you say they continue to maintain the initiative just short of war so what constitutes an act of war in your opinion in terms of policy greg. >> i am not a lawyer or a policy individual that is legality and policy but it is clear that i would argue j broadly international leave we have now reached a broad consensus of the clearer a actionable terms with the cyberreno looks like.
which try to discuss this broadly and now we are involved in those broad discussions with u.s. government and foreign partners how we develop a consensus. >> help us out you are not a lawyer but you with be one of the first people i would ask so what sort of backed would go beyond this threshold of four -- bore? >> looked at the techniques that reduced to develop specific criteria rather than of the broad nebulouscused that isn't the right word
but rather genuine origin you will -- general conversation howdy get this to a more specific set of attributes? that would be defined as an act of war. >> so you say technical developments or outpacing policies we find that in the commerce area also. but do you need anything new that you don't have now? >> specifically in broad terms process has been made need to reassess the delegation take a look at the right investments of manpower and very honor theho department is focused on this mission. i am the first to rutledge
-- abolish the priorities and the needs but within those parties i think cyber is pretty high we have to focus their employer ties we cannot except fire for tenures for development cycles for training. >> so that those are outpaced lettuce know what you need. >> yes, sir.. >> following data line of questioning one of the issues raised the saudi government as a whole escalates the response to believe there is a coherent plan in place to respond to major cyberattacks around the country greg.
>> to be honest i don't know enough because some parts is outside of my purview. i am not trying to be a smart ass but this is outside of my knowledge. i cannot say yes or no. >> was concerned blair earlier responses ioc hadee deterrence will work with regards to russia since we see a continuation of the interest of their parts cohosh that hacked other countries with their election so i am looking for leadership and coordinationin to rather agencies to be prepared. >> i don't think you heard me say that the strategy was deterrent a daughter communicated deterrence
should be part of a strategye po but not the only thing and i am the first toward knowledge that. >> with that transition between private companiesvernmet and the government are the authorities in place? if not what might you need? >> there is that authority aspect but i am wondering if it is cultural so the government comes to a private entity and informs them the russians have penetrated here's renee r. -- is where they are. we will work with you. comeback in some cases we don't hear anything. some cases i don't believe you.out and some states respond.es >> correct that is the
testimony we have heard at a few hearings but i am concerned if you don't have the authority or some aspect we recognize that you choose a the technology that you want to pursue but if you don't have that level of sophistication is not adequate so we hope you come with the list of authorities before the next election. the we need assurances that they are covered by the most highly sophisticated expertsexpt in our government preferred figure of leadership and coordination is so
necessary. >> did not dispute that but that falls to the homeland department of security and what to speak for the secretary. he can speak for himself but with critical infrastructure the deity clearly has a role no doubt about that. >> with regard to the most recent election we saw evaluation of the successful french candidate had previous hacking online there was a rumor of a launch against him on the internet and they accuse russia of packing it in preparation for germany's elections had we prevent those and how the cyberbring
back what. >> is is more of my director of nsa but if you look different she elections in the classified hearing will not get into specifics but we talked to the french counterparts before the public announcement and gave them a heads up we are watching of russians there penetrating what can we do to assist? we are doing similar with the british counterparts we all try to figure out toqu learn from each other. >> thank you mr. chairman and admiral for being heredebate today to be a geographically
based counterterrorismsm strategy to conduct operations so to what extent are your operations and cyberspace dependent upon those declared aires -- areas of hostilities? ltd. is an issue for us. the point try to make to policy makers is the infrastructure that if you take a crisis -- isis it is not in syria or iraq i don't want to go into this in the unclassified. >> rebound by uh limitationsy ? >> yes ma'am.
i have to meet those requirements. >> looking at the interconnectedness of cyberspace what impact does that have on your operations? do you have the necessary ability to meet those to meet the geographic combatant commanders? >> this is not in an open forum but this issue came to ahead weaken workouts through the interagency process to grant the authority to execute for what we doing beyond thel physical environment of assyria and iraq by and the first to mcnall which it is not the fastest processors in the world but it is very complete. >> are there any changes that congress needs to make?
>> i am trying to have a dialogue with my immediate bosses of the framework and i think it owes them time to come to their conclusions first. >> vendor stand-up policy from 2013 is being reviewed? >> it is not a departmentt document but the presidential document. >> are they reviewing it? >> we're probably looking at cyberauthorities out large akita and in plant to the secretary of my views of what we should look at. >> cybercommand is involved in the review so where should those improvements be made quite. >> everything i hear it is vague knowledge structure in place is not fast enough that is a good step for me i
am not spending time in a debate so what should redo? as an ongoing topic of discussion i owe them the time to come to their conclusions but they are right reaching out today have no complaints. >> the secretary will come forward on those conclusions >> in uh testimony you mentioned about applying that capacity in thede cyberarena. can you elaborate wood type of capacities would be beneficial and what type of gaps are you trying to fill? >> so to ask for critical
infrastructure i don't want to show up in the middle of a crisis in the first timeme interacting with these sectors that is what has taught me through discovery that is a painful way to learn against your opponent you're not effective for efficient. so to build on that sector approach can we create a standing mechanism with theat private-sector to operate 24/7. water receiving? >> in a perfect world i would prefer the greater structure to put sensors or
telemetry on the networkmetry on could do you share that rather than us can we create a mechanism. >> can we do that now greg. >> in some areas but i would make it much more institutionalized and much more realtime. >>. >> the first question for the record we have had these hearings for years and we talk about the problem. i appreciate given the fact of the death appeared knowledge if you could supply for the record the five things you think we should do?
what are those five factions -- actions of legislation or relationships or communication? all of us would find thatn, helpful.nd we ha second to approach this from government think the term should be society because it is an odd situation with those vulnerable elements of the private-sector with gas and pipeline you had a situation in 2011 with the cyberbill that was regulatory applying to the private sector that failed, there is great resistance so what about the idea we don't ask the private sector to defend itself against russian bombs
or missiles attacks. we do that but we work with the private sector to assist them to install those defensive measures may be with the limitation of liability but how do we do that without them taking their fight off the gas. incentivize behavior generally has better outcomes is a much broader issue but the core point that you raised traditionally in society we have strong walls that i think cybershows much of what we see is a national security issue that requires gold nation approach. >> that is all the creative
thinking. >> because we could have a perfect government systemet but if the financial system goes down. >> i did agree. with the national defence act last year that essentially that said 180 days the report is due of options available for deterring and responding to imminent threats. that date is coming just to remind you. this is the way that senator mccain talks about policy and the president has 180 days after that to describe the actions that warrant a military response.
>> they will respond formally as part of the process. >> i am delighted because talk about what we need to do is a policy and strategy it is critical because deterrence doesn't work. finally think about what the russians did one was hacking leg and leaking the other was attempted hacking which is very serious but the other is information and manipulation of information and it is hard to get out.ink au this is not in your jurisdiction that people
have to understand when they're manipulated my wife has a sign that says the most difficult thing on the internet is to determine the authenticity of theth quotations, abraham lincoln. [laughter] but we have to be educated and the public has to understand it is a whole new level to manipulate their are reports of the frenchh elections of bank accounts in the cayman islands have loaded they defend themselves against that? i urge you to think about how we have people be more discerning. >> there is an information dynamic for all of us.ar >> that is in the country that values free expression. >> admiral think
fee-for-service to our country wearing two hats what is the earliest date cyber, should be elevated to combat and command and share the criteria greg. >>. >> and then to make the initial steps. >> is that the criteriacriteria before such a move was made? >> we have identified in shift to the current responsibility down to us
changes with the document signed by the president ofdo the united states of what combatant commanders insist? those aspects of those responsibilities and then we have identified that manpower as well. >> to separate organizations law the information was shared in a manner and then to make a move like that? >> but my recommendation that after six or nine months to be the right
answer in the long term as cybercommand worked in the same vowel space. >> so it is a unique creation ship but in the long run it is the right thing to do.bercomma and with delaware beers to tumble period a time. >> sodas by the dod mission and then to classify the other stuff.>> which tried to partner of
closely and uh is critical of restructure and then to spend a lot of time in particular the same organization with that makes it emission and execution in that resonated in the private sector the dewey's speed up the process but some bite to see over time is hd but the framework overtime how we could amend that for those that have a direct relationship to be of little
more isolated to partner between critical infrastructure hardly highlight to work closelyhere i with that capability with the distribution system. >> sometimes we forget how critical these aspects are. >> can you think of any of their areas that require a dominant sea if we don't have that with the cyberdominant cybergreg. >> is a verbal opening statement not only with the omission that helps to
underpin the ability but that foundational element to execute the of mission. >> thank you, mr. chairman. welcome back admiral the rationale as master the domain of digital ofin formation to effectively set up a situation with their coordinating the fate social automated accounts to amplify those stories and that is true of any real news to undermine u.s.
policy that would be just as politically disruptive with day-to-day business as well with the russian hacking so does cybercommand have role to play that i would describe as a threat to? >> this not only an outside the that is one aspect of it if you look at the spectrum and the network and the information dynamic one of the questions and i am so focused to execute the missions but i am trying to conceptualizes how do we
bring together disinformation dynamic? how do we do this in the integrated way?in right now we are not there yet. >> to have people assigned with thousands and thousands they serve as a mechanism was social media accounts. and to interested people to make it look like so if youho look at the capabilities for the of platforms that those accounts are not genuine accounts.it see
involved in and that generation that we share with his activity we are seeing. >> so with big social media providers so one of the things that i try to do that i try to show them uh comprehensive effort and there is something systematic we have to stop looking at this. >> with the financial services sector will need to
maybe it runs parallel to teams where they provide backup in case of any sort of incident in the super bowl and things like that. we always have them on standby in as we look at major events and progression whether it is elections or others throughout the year we have those guard capabilities. >> one o >> one of the other challenges in the guard construct is based on state. i have the council of governors and the tags in many instances
the state is going to be counting from the cyber perspective into the cyber arena doesn't reside in the state so how do we take advantage of more broadly and i'm trying to figure the construct on something that isn't always defined to make sense. >> a number of my colleagues moving on to a different topic keep the personnel they are so there's been a lot of suggestions about bringing civilians and fill in the gaps. but they also stated that each dose is not a luxury. it is essential when you have a military. when we put look at things this how do we make sure it isn't being deluded fox
>> it's the reason i've argued creating the cyber force. the nationstate can do this and civilian cannot. to bring the total spectrum active reserve contractor civilian, private sector not to bring together one single slice so i would be wary about swinging the pendulum too far in one direction away from a piece of that. >> thank you mr. chair. >> the office of the director of national intelligence released an assessment on the activities
and intentions in recent years and general clapper testified regarding this report yesterday in the judiciary so we all know that do you feel the actions in the cyber attack -- >> it should be viewed as unacceptable. it is not a behavior that he wants tyouwant to encourage or r that you want to see repeated. >> how to get there is the challenge. what is your opinion of the role of the military in preventing these type of events. >> our job is to generate insight and knowledge that help inform a potential response and ability to get ahead of the problem to identify in advance
intent to do something that all arms policymakers and military commanders with the ability to engage in the operations or choices that communicate to the other party we know what you're thinking about doing. and the cyber command side, again, if we define the infrastructure to the nation and we are directed by the president or the secretary we can apply the capabilities in partnership with others because we won't be the only one in the department of security we can apply those capabilities proactively with some of the owners. >> it was very clear by general clapper yesterday they would continue these efforts and we know they've been doing this since the 1960s or 70s that thebutthey have many more toolse toolbox. so you are still awaiting direction for everyone to coordinate the efforts to stop.
>> i don't have a defined mission here. >> we need to do that for everyone to come together. >> they continue to increase the cyber security capabilities and advance to cyber attacks and they've placed the focus on the advanced capabilities. how does that work with the other commands to counter the threats they face? >> i partnered with honolulu two weeks ago and i try to get out there every six months. i try to do this with all of the combatant commanders around the world. are we meeting the requirements. cyber command in many ways.
much of the success is going to be defined by others and that is the way that it should be. so we spent a good deal of time outlining capabilities. it should be the priority for how the capabilities are appli applied. and the meetings with the other combatant commanders part of the function to encourage a. we have to do the same thing in cyber.
as other government agencies try to fill their requirement as well, i would like to know specifically how important it is to continue the nonmilitary investments in education particularly in the programs for the growing need of the cyber command. >> the workforce is going to be a spectrum from the guard and reserve and contractors. for much of the active piece, much of it will be done by the private sector and not by the government. so as i said we have relationships with over 200 institutions and it's one of the reasons why we spend a fair amount of time.
tell me how you generate a workforce and i acknowledge that there are some differences but there are some things i could learn from you about what works for you because it can't be all about money. >> thank you mr. chair. admiral, it's good to see you again. you've been on the job about two years now. >> three. >> if you were to go back three years ago and were in the same committee hearing with the answers have changed substantially? where in other words have we made significant progress? >> we have capability. we are actually using it. we have a good way ahead. we have a commitment to that way ahead. >> as you go through this, when
you think about the competitors is the gaps narrow or wide between the capabilities to defend ourselves and to potentially respond to narrowing the gap >> i would also tell myself you are not moving fast enough. we acknowledge we are not where we want to be. >> over the last three years the sense of ownership and i for one think we are making a huge mistake if we leave this hearing or if the private sector thinks we are coming up with a solution but they all benefit from.
it's what the consequences should be that we need some security ourselves and our businesses and homes and states. how have they improved? >> some have made significant improvement. others, to go to your point it's hard to expect the police force to stop burglaries not just unlocked that open. he will turn all the lights on and leave the house for an extended period of time and say feel free. that's not going to get us where we need. >> we haven't been in here for a hearing a week before and how do we get to the point that we put pressure on the private sector not to mandate that to use it as
a distinguishing factor choosing between one potential contractor or supplier and another. if you want to do business in the authorities is that within the current authority? >> we made some in the contractor will language. >> did they try to define in the discussion i think that we were talking about needing some sort of third-party suppliers, maybe a state agency adhering to a baseline standard.
we could do an assessment or an inspection. >> it is the kind of thing looking at the reality they have a supplier base. we need to hold them to the same standard and repeat what we always say in the committees. all you need to do this understanis understandthe supplr that one critical component that shuts down the ability. after elevation how do you envision a standard operator and
what are the priorities? >> now w >> now we are into a kind of what if scenario. i just don't like getting into the what if kind of things. now we need to let the process play out and see what bottom-line they come to. >> on behalf of chairman mccain, senator warren. >> i want to ask about the importance of the nonmilitary agencies which includes defending the united states against cyber attacks by the nonstate actors. our department promotes international norm in cyberspace and helps make our partners and allies more secure. i think you've already talked about that and it counters the online radicalization by the nonstate actors everyday.
i want to ask with reductions in funding to the state department and counter radicalization programs make the job easier or harder. i am concerned about the significant reductions to them on dod departments proposed by the administration. he's agencies provide critical support for the work and i just want to make sure that doesn't get overlooked. but i also want to do is follow up on a question senator hirono asked. they helped the preferred american presidential candidate and last week they did exactly the same thing in order to help the preferred french presidential candidate. they need to step up the game and their gameand i know you arf that. you stated in the testimony that
improving the network defenses and building a cybersecurity culture depend on skilled people so i would like to press you on the question how we recruit and retain cyber warriors. one of the witnesses said that the military recruiting system is so focused on filling quotas they end up recruiting only today to execute the missions we would need a decade from now. can you tell us about your recommendations to ensure we are recruiting the right talent and the threats that we would face tomorrow?
it's the digital warriors in the 21st century and the images we are the cutting edge of something brand-new and everyday we are shaping the future in a way that nobody else gets to do and we are doing things that nobody else on the outside can do. we have a focus and a vision and we are driving so we are looking for how to get ahead of this and then one of the skill sets that i need this is one area that i would highlight. i'm saying to myself right now we are probably not optimized for the data requirements, so
what kind of skills do i need is that a uniform scale, with a contractor makes more sense, is that something that the reserve can do and they are going to stay there and do that, that is probably an example saying to myself is still in my mind we haven't developed a plan. >> in the 2017 defense department authorization we gave a lot of flexibility on how to recruit talent. so let me just ask do you have all of the authority that you need or do we need more exemptions from federal hiring malls and other changes come to help you in your recruiting efforts not just today that from todabut fromtoday and a year frd a few years. i find the ability we are
lagging. is this something we are failing to understand and not optimizing the outputs that we need i'm not at the stage yet but i told the team if we come to the conclusion we have to ask for more authority that is what we are doing. we have to take advantage of the willingness and the committee to work with us when it comes to flexibility in the capital peace. >> i know how much you have invested in the cyber military force and the mission force overall that you have made enormous progress that i hope you'll let us know more in advance. let us know because if you need more flexibility you should have more flexibility. >> thank you mr. chair. thank you for everything.
in the testimony we heard this year, the seder capabilities are the adversaries likely to far exceed the united states ability to defend the key critical infrastructures. do you agree with that? >> it challenges much of our infrastructure and represents the decisions made decades ago. the cost of replacing the fixed infrastructure is huge. so it's not likely that we are going to replace all of that infrastructure in the immediate and long-term it's just beyond the nation right now. >> so on defense in terms of detection from the earlier testimony even today is there
anything you can tell us what you're doing on the offensive side or are we developing a capability as well as >> we are acknowledging those capabilities and i apologize i would rather not get into that but i would like to move over to the question of the day and that is how do you stand up this force training is a very major part of this as you said between 2013 and 2016, under the supervision of the office of the secretary of defense and the joint staff were supposed to come to an agreement on a joined program funded by the services and the mission. can you update us on the status of that agreement? >> we will transition to that initial outfit if you will using the nsa infrastructure we signed up to use much of the structure and schoolhouses.
the buildout capability is due to be on track in 2018. the agreement was the responsibility for training and development. we are on track to do that right now but the service would be responsible for developing our own cyber warriors. >> we have a mandated training standards by position. each service then often times partnering for example the training in pensacola is used because we then get together and say give him the same common standard that is the best way to cross the person to make this work and what services the best capability, held we managed to
put? >> having some experience in the organizations i'm concerned about the trade off. we are in our crisis days right now with the ability to detect and deter at this point. i understand the ideal might be to have the context mentioned. in the interim phase when we are in this mode, do we have a send that there might be counterproductive to the ability to stand up to the immediate threats? >> it would be difficult. it's another reason why i would argue optimizing destructors and mechanisms that are in place and we have to hold them accountable. we can't turn to them and do what we always do.
we got a huge mismatch between the current capacity. the history has been the extraction of data from the system but it's the primary motive and the state actors. in north korea we saw a little bit of a different attack. what i would call the sleeper embed code do we see the continuing growth in that type of activity and any areas -- >> they both look no would looko extract but to understand it. one of the things if the system has been penetrated it is a
manipulated change amended to the configurations fo separately now for the mitigation when someone has penetrated a system so it is the full spectrum of the simple answer is yes it is a full spectrum. >> any others for that in the u.s.? >> they are clearly interested in a long-term presence extracting. >> thank you, general. >> it is always a pleasure and we enjoy your testimony as always. my question involves the semi conductor industry that right now faces some major challenges in addition to some fundamental technological limits are being reached in that area and has also been a push by china to reshape the favor using industrial policies backed by over $100 million in government directed funds.
is it critical to the obligation of the critical u.s. defense systems and i am very concerned abouthat china's industrial pols pose a threat to u.s. national security and although we have a range of tools that are familiar to deal with this, the principal mechanism is the interagency committee on the foreign investment in the u.s. and within the dod as you know as well as a key contributor to the national assessment of the military services, the combat commands all have a role in this process. considering cyber calms leading role, how has the poster to support the mergers and acquisitions for significant implications for the dod cyber mission packs >> one of the applications, one
input i tried to make is to step back and reassess the process so that it is optimized. they understand the structure and criteria that we used to make decisions about the investment acceptable from the national security perspective and my concern is i can't say we are not smart enough but we are just one in the process. we need to step back and ask that question to ourselves. that is just one of the things we need to be doing. >> to turn back to some of the
discussions that we have had related to the involvement of the private sector that has to be involved in the security operations. the exercises in the most recent ones involved in the attack in the northeast all of these entities are not part of the department of defense. it cited concerns in a large part of the exercise that takes place in a classified foru forut places inherent limitations on public and private sector participation and the arrangements certainly are designed to protect the plans and capabilities and we all realize the importance of doing that. it potentially could be catastrophic so my question is
how are you balancing the need for security that must assess a broad support from. it's one of the reasons we changed the cyber overtime. so if you look at the scenario that you talked about that we did last year in terms of the activity directed against the power grid. we went to several companies and said we would like you to participate so what do we need to make that happen. we also are going to the private sector. we added the back so i am trying to sneak can we create an
exercise and we do tabletop exercises which is huge, it's like a thousand individuals. we talk at a higher level to skirt some of the security aspects of this and bring in a private sector that would do that before being complex. i want to touch on that and specifically a few moments ago you refer to the president as russia's preferred candidate. i think she is referring to the intelligence committee assessment of january 6 primarily with the fbi which
brings to mind the curiosity from the report i wanted to raise on the key judgments where it says we also assess putin and the government aspired to help the president chances when possible by discrediting secretary clinton. all agencies agree with this and they have high confidence in the judgment and have moderate confidence. in the end i made that call. when i looked at all of the da data. we have multiple sources, multiple disciplines and i was able to remove almost every other rationale i could come up with over time.
classified matters we want to build up the defenses and expanded the missile defenses and accelerate the nuclear modernization for oil and gas and none of those things seemed to be in account. in 20096 months after it invaded georgia. in 2012 and a moment with medvedev president obama said there would be more flexibility on the ballistic missile defense and mocked the opponent in the presidential debate saying that russia is the number one geopolitical flow. with the closest middle east
ally. 2014 we start virtually idly by the invasion. 2015 russia had a surge and continued the effort to block the security council resolutions. 2016 they pummeled aleppo i approached to the act that would hold them into account and increase the amount of times they were in the arctic. president trump promised to reverse those policies and secretary clinton largely campaigned on the continuity. that doesn't sound to me like
something the kremlin would be happy about. >> do you think given that eight year history of the intelligence and leadership felt emboldened to undertake those e-mail systems? now you are in the political judgment and that is not my ar area. >> on the issue of moderate confidence did you have a high degree of confidence or was there the effort to discredit one candidate had only a moderate degree of confidence -- >> if you read the key judgments it says i concur in the report and we have high confidence in the judgment that the russians clearly were trying to undermine democracy and discredit us broadly they wanted to specifically make sure that
candidate clinton did not win and then it was just the last part about the judgment they wanted a candidate trump. >> they were asked what would be the most significant adversary and he testifie justified basede capacity of the would-be russia. just on the cyber domain do you view it in the adversary at the taken actions that have put them into the position on the united states. >> i'm watching them on the behaviors that are destabilizing and the interest of cyber. >> would you also agree francis and i live in a coalition partner? >> you are aware of the reports in the last few days there was a second evidence tying russia to the effort to destabilize the
french election? that is something we should take seriously when the adversary tries to destabilize. >> there was an article the day before saturday's visit was fascinating headlines. you asked the far right activists to promote an attack and that the article was about the effort by the groups in the united states to immediately spread the documents in many instances before they were able to defend them. if we should take seriously an adversary cyber attack on the democracy of an ally, should we be indifferent or concerned about efforts of americans to work together with or in parallel with an adversary attacking the democracy of an ally? stanek i apologize. i'm not sure that i am understanding.
>> do we take seriousl seriousla inouye tries to destabilize the democracy of an ally if an american organizations are trying to work together with or are in parallel with trying to attack an ally like france, should we be indifferent to that or take that seriously? >> we need to be concerned. >> and should be cuba's government to be concerned in this case, and i will introduce this for the record if we should be concerned about the effort of the folks in the united states to work together with or in parallel with an adversary, where should that concern lie in the federal government, is that a small enforcement matter or dhs or cyber command after? syndicate depends upon the specifics.
if individuals in the united states are taking the documents from an illegal hack and trying to disseminate it to affect the french election, this is something we should be concerned about where it would apply. >> if it is a locality first it would be the fbi that that is not a fully informed opinion, but it is the first thing that comes to my mind. >> there's been some debate about whether there is such a thing as a good shutdown of the united states government. do you see any circumstance under which the commission would be none of it shot down by the united states. >> i know you've are asking for a yes or no but it's what we been through in 2013 and it's now four years later and every time there is the nearest hand in the media of a potentiality,
i get are we going to go through this again, you said this wasn't going to happen i thought they were committed to us in our mission. i don't want to work in an environment where i will just be jerked around like am i going to get paid, do they value what we do, we just want to support the key movement moving forward. >> russia is still interfering in the politics you concur with that? >> do you agree that with democrats in 2016 x. of the republicans in the next?
>> it's not about politics or parties, it is an effort against every citizen of the nation. i'm not going to get into them at large, but certainly we acknowledge an incidental collection and we also have a very strict process. the only way you can collect on a citizen is to have it weren't for if an american citizen is incidentally in a conversation with somebody that you are already following.
i'm asking is the request to your organization want to be american citizen? how many of those requests did to get in 2016? i think it is 1,900. >> how many people can request the unmasking of the citizen? if you are the recipient of the intelligence we used to criteria number one is to be in the official duties into the repealing of the u.s. person has to provide context and greater value it can't just be i'm just curious. >> if you are in the authorized
distribution. does the national security director -- advisor they are normally on the distribution for most. >> there was the record of who made the request involving the american citizen. there is the record of the basis so why do we say yes was reminded the individuals once we authorize it is only to that individual so if we unmask the reports that went to a particular individual we don't unmask the report for everybody only the individual -- general
flynn was caught up with the administration -- >> i'm familiar with the story. >> assuming he didn't have the warrant allowing us to collect on him it would be following the russian ambassador does that make sense? we would know how the conversation was revealed. i'm not talking about warren's. hispanic it is probably a greater potential generally in terms of collection.
>> somebody took that information that we gained. are you concerned about people no matter how noble they think the event might be? >> that's why i've gone through it in writing saying let's we do not engage in this behavior. it's that information is given to and it's possible us to know. on the nsa site is part of the investigation and a committee we are going through right now.
i would have to pull the data, sir. i apologize. >> thanks, mr. chairman and admiral rogers. thank you for your service. we have heard repeatedly in this room as well as yesterday with doctor clapper. >> yes sir. nothing is changing their behavior and clearly nothing will change their behavior in the future because to quote you they have more to gain than to lose in continuing this kind of attack.
>> can you recommend to us what measures would be taken, and i know you've been asked this question and you said that the tools like sanctions can be an effective option but so far distinctions in mind you are way less than they should be, do you agree that they can and should be increased to provide a price. they've proven to be an effective tool and they work all the time. there will be a point where the cyber response with the appropriate. >> i would highlight when we think about the terms we need to think more broadly because it doesn't mean we should automatically when it has to be a direct response i think we need to think more broadly in the strength as a nation.
>> there is no question that the russians attacked the country through the cyber and would you agree that americans who cooperated with that attack also should be killed by chemical? splenic broadly yes but now you are starting to get into the legal and policy piece. >> it includes defending the nation. let's talk about a group of americans that they have cooperated like the russians and enabling or encouraging this kind of an attack. and by the way they violated the criminal laws and wouldn't you agree they should be held accountable and the investigation is appropriate and necessary.
we still don't have one. can you tell the american people whose responsibility it is to develop a strategy and policy? >> there's multiple components but it all boils down to the executive. they are working through this in fairness to them this is not -- this is a complicated topic with a whole lot of nuance and i know
the discussions are ongoing. i've been a part of some of them and i'm grateful to team is willing to reach out and say from your perspective what do you think and e. and whether using a devout. i just want to conclude again for the attack on the country requires compelling americans and also a strategy and a policy for knowing when there is a cyber attack on the nation and then it is an act of war that should prompt the cyber domain or other domains and economic
sanctions to force them to pay a price. and right now, our policy of deterrence is in my view an abject failure. >> thank you. >> thank you mr. chairman. we have heard over and over again and multiple hearings we have our cyber hearing tomorrow so this is timely about the information sharing and the standing the challenges of the classified information by staff has tried to charge the structure for me and the one thing that sticks out is the coordinated group it appears to me to be the only place the structure is set up where the
private sector entities seem to plug into the national structu structure. the interesting thing is a the coordinated group is supposed to be in response to the significant cyber event. they have real-time collaboration within and desist on an ongoing basis. my first question is asked to coordinated group ever been called into a session and has there ever been ongoing meaning of or any meetings of the group that has been laid out? >> it does interact. we participated in the work we
do virtually in the videoconference if i could. i know we spend a lot of time today struggling with what our policy is. it looks to me we don't really have anywhere that there is an ongoing meeting over a structure that integrates the private sector into what is a pretty convoluted setup that we have right now. >> i think it is fair to say that the sector level we have those that occur but one of the things pointed out is we don't have a sector labeled u.s.
election infrastructure like we do in cover transportation. >> although it is named part of their critical infrastructure possibility and that happened last year may be in response to this but we will find out more tomorrow. i guess it seems to me when someone is impacting the election, if you look at the list, the national policies certainly impact chemical, commercial, manufacturing so i guess forget about russia for a minute. are you familiar with the model and what is wrong with it and why aren't we emulating it morec picture.
they turned to their gc hq and said you have the preponderance of the capability expertise we would like you to take a portion of the capability and the art going to create this center. the individual that runs it i worked with for a long time is the employee. they decided in their construct we have always been less comfortable in the idea do you want our military or the intelligence to be the primary interface if you will. their view is i it is about aligning the greatest expertise and a private sector and it isn't quite the same baggage or history or tradition. because of that, we've taken a fundamentally different approach and i hope that with this new team coming in are we happy with
the way that this is working i haven't seen the diagram but you have heard me say for a long time we have to simplify the complexity because if you are in the private sector trying to figure out who am i supposed to be dealing with and was it you and last time it was that organization, we have got to simplify this. pulling the group together after the cyber event, there's going to be a lot of monday morning corner backing about the information that should have been shared. >> i agree with everything you said that i would remind you perfect information sharing in and of itself will not necessarily fix every problem if you look at the reactions there
were plenty of organizations that provided the insight. i just want us to think about the simple cure-all. >> i know it's not the simple cure but i know that underlining does is about information sharing is calcified and i want to make sure that we are aware of that. >> thank you mr. chairman and for being here for the job and i wanted to go on the issue of classified and unclassified. the challenge in this case is that the american public doesn't know what is going on and when they don't know what's going on
on an event of this magnitude is a challenge for our democracy. and i wasn't able to hear your testimony into the questions. have you talked about in the big picture what that means and what are they trying to do with our electoral system and with the interference in germany and what they've done in the countries in eastern europe what is their goal? >> as we indicated and said in the intelligence assessment primary goals we have done, first was to undercut the united states and its principles to send the message they are every bit as consistent not as high on
the hill. they work against each other so they undercut the democracy. then it talks about the third objective is to try for the judgment that the third objective was to help the candidate when. if you look at the activity that they have done in france and germany, they are trying to help ensure that they might be more inclined. it might engage in the policies of the russian perspective.
what's the difference between the candidates and what the choices be in terms of national security policies and how that might impact the russians. >> doesn't the overarching strategy mean not who the winners and losers are the two undermined the public confidence in the democracy of how it works. >> at the center part of that. i'm sorry if i didn't make that jump. it's the
efforts pfft to take action against them because of their interference. what does that say to our allies greg sematech insert the and stand by they would be perplex of misconduct occurred why are we seeing xyz? i can understand that but we try to assure our allies that this is one aspect of broader set but in broad terms we should not question that long-term commitment like poland beat no doubt about that to mimicry are more committed to poland than rush the? spread that is not wise said but that is open to interpretation with that assumption, . >> at rogers thank you for your testimony today we