tv U.S. Policy on North Korea CSPAN August 28, 2017 4:01pm-6:06pm EDT
withdrawing from the parisquestv climate agreement? >> guest: he will get a number questions over the course of several weeks and months as thii houston situation plays out. we are all working from a number of scientists and people in theo scientific community about how these types of storms are a sign that climate change is here. as always having an effect that like thisee more storms like this going forward in the future. the president did fall out of the -- >> you can watch all of today's "washington journal" on our website c-span.org. we leave this segment now for a form on north korea. >> director of the institute for korean studies. i'm the moderator of today's panel and at the great pleasure of introducing our three distinguished speakers, dr. robert colluding and dr. greg brzezinski. the topic is how to handle north korea. more specifically we mean how to do with north korean issues and the recent rhetorical crisis.
looking at what happened just a few days ago in the korean peninsula, north korea firing another, this time, three missiles short-range missiles from its east coast. i think it is very timely and important topic to discuss and so we are extremely grateful to have three expert here today. we also warmly welcome all of you, make sure to have enough time for q&a and hope we have fruitful discussions later. today's panel is cosponsored by the institute for korean studies and the institute for humanitarian policy studies. first, just a few points for housekeeping. i want to thank my colleagues for organizing this panel, and the two institutes for their hard work in helping organizing this event. i also want to let you know that the institute for korean studies
future events are listed in the fly. i hope you all received those flyers before you leave. we hav had many exciting events coming up as a place check those dates and subscribe to our mailing list, if you are interested. before we actually begin the panel discussion, let me take this opportunity to briefly introduce our institute that was just established last year. in a political town where most talks to focus on policy oriented current affairs, the faculty of korean studies at gw felt it was necessary to strengthen the korean humanities in the nation's capital. today's panel represents our mission by engaging in into display dialog but not a discussing practical matter but also placing the north korean issue in historical context which a doctor brzezinski will do. when negotiating with north korea, jimmy carter once said that he wished he had known north korea's history better. i take this quote seriously.
in order to have a deeper understanding of current affairs, it is necessary to place a and historical cultural and social context. as director of institute for korean studies i would like to ask for your attention to our future events and hope to see many of you. let me explain how we will proceed for the next 90 minutes or so. i will start by introducing our speakers. each speaker with another 20 minutes to share the thoughts and then we'll open up the floor for q&a. we have extremely distinguished individuals joining us today. their introduction would be far too brief compared to their accomplishments but let me highlight a few points beginning with you. he is a distinct professor in the practice of diplomacy at georgetown university. he served as dean of the school of foreign service for 13 years until enough in 2009 to become president of the john d and catherine t macarthur
the american association and was the founding president of the international society for the advancement of socioeconomics. in 1990 he founded the cometary network, a non- profit nonpartisan organization to shore up the moral and political foundations of society. in 1991, the press began referring to them as the guru of the cometary and movement. he has authored 25 books. just amazing. the most recent one was just published in may 2017. the title is avoid a war with china, two nations, one world. he is a specialist.
his work function focuses on the impact of the u.s. in east asia. he has written extensively about winning the third world, american rivalry was published from the north carolina press in february 2017. >> thank you. i want to begin by saying how pleased i am to be here with you that is common for speaker to say, but i want to add something
speaker special and to say that it's significant that i'm sitting here next to you. i did my little calculation. it was 50 years ago that i was a graduate student and i remember reading this work and i have tried to keep up but he writes quicker than i read. [laughter] it's an honor to be with you. this morning, when i was coming up, walking out to the car, i passed my wife who is finishing a book of her own right now and she noticed i was not wearing jeans and a flannel shirt and she said, speaking today. i said yes, i was. i said you won't be surprised to learn and going to talk about north korea. and she said oh and i said yes, i'm going to share with the
audience my very creative thinking, which led her to fall on the floor in laughter. she observed that i haven't had a creative idea on this subject since 1993. that is how i would like to begin here, not with my lack of creativity but with the idea that analytically, for me at least, the korean situation hasn't changed. the panel is supposed to talk about options for the future. analytically they have, there's always been three and there still are three. it does depend on how you count, i recognize that. the character of the threat has evolved over decades and decades , but really three options. this is what i'm selling tonight
the first option is containment. it's been called lots of other things, but it really is containing the threat, managing the threat, one could call it most recently was called the previous administration, strategic patients. you can wrap it up a lot of different ways, but what it really means is the united states of america will first tend its alliances and other alliances for the north korea situation. pending tending the alliances mean we will do military exercises and consults, et cetera. we will extend our deterrent principal characteristic to these countries. that's the first point in containment. then after that, in the military exercises, there will be
sanctions. we have learned over the decades that americans love sanctions. it gives you the feeling were doing something even if all evidence is to the contrary, it still gives us a good feeling. sometimes they can have an impact. the third element is china. every president has discovered china at some point when he thanks about north korea and decides that is the solution to the problem. why are we worrying about it when it's in their backyard as though it would be brilliant for us to subcontract this problem to our principal competitor in the region. but, nevertheless, going to china and asking for chinese help, in some way to mitigate the threat or solve it, and then all the other lesser things we might do that do not raise to the level of military action though they can be quite
offensive. it can be cyber or covert operations are all kinds of things but it is not war. all of these things together amount to managing the threat. either push it back or drive us to the second of the three options, negotiation. negotiations are discovered by administration to start by disparaging associations, the blessed bush administration was very tough on the clinton people who negotiated the agreed framework and had almost a decade of negotiation. they held them in place for a couple of years. they then decided to fall back to containment and then decided containment wasn't actually containing the north koreans. what was evolving was the
character of the threat. it evolved in such a way that the clinton administration had tried to stop, emerged not in the clinton administration but in the bush administration. in emerged just as the north koreans said it would if we abandoned the agreed framework. we abandon the framework, they develop nuclear weapons and so the bush administration discovered option one, containment after the disclosure discovered option too, negotiation and ultimately ended up with containment. it's not clear to me that the obama administration really pursued negotiations. they may have. they argue they did. it seems like a pot of strategic patients to me. option two was there to some degree. for now in a situation in which
it is very difficult to tell what we are doing, at least for me as an observer and i try to watch this particular subject closely. it seems like we were involved in containment. we are talking about the possibility of option two and negotiation constraint almost anything. they can be very narrowly focused on a particular thing like now it might be ballistic missile test or nuclear weapons tests or limiting the capabilities of north koreans to actually reach continental united states where the ballistic missile armed with a nuclear weapon. it can be narrowly focused or broadly focused. the negotiations might, sometimes in the past be aimed at normalization of relations between the two countries. it's a different enterprise than simply containing the threat. and then, the third option is actually military action of one
kind or another. i would like to do a service and make a distinction between preemption and prevent preventive strikes. you may have heard this before but apparently can't be said enough. i would like to say that i hope everybody in this room is in favor of preemptive strikes. a preemptive strike as i understand it is a strike that one nation launches against another just before the other is about to attack it. in international law, that's acceptable. under just war theories of war, that's acceptable. but it must be just before the other side attacks. in other words, we don't have to wait to be whacked before you whacked the bad guy. however, if you are trying to prevent the other side from
developing a capability that you would rather not see them have and you strike them to stop them from getting that capability, that's not preemption. i would like everyone to think that is something you should think long and hard about doing before you do it. preemption, yes. prevent preventive war, i am generally against that especially when it masquerades as preemption. think about iraq too. i think it would be useful for your mom mind to go to the capability we would be thinking about preventing north korea from getting. clearly it's not nuclear weapons they have those. clearly it's not arming ballistic missiles because it is quite possible, according to the analysis i read that they can, in terms of size fit the nuclear
weapon they have designed or at least one of them to a warhead in a ballistic missile. whether that warhead will withstand the reentry forces in an intercontinental ballistic missile is another matter, but certainly irb alms, yes. we have allowed that to happen. the question is, will we now tolerate, we being the united states of america, tolerate a vulnerability that we have been happy to allow our allies to suffer, which is being subject to targeting a ballistic missile by north korea. i'm thinking of japan and south korea. we may not wish to be in that position and we could claim a separate posture because the
security of our allies depends upon our ability to extend to transfer them and in deterrence theory, our vulnerability adds an element of question to whether we are credible by threatening north korea with the response if they attack an ally. this leads to those questions, would you trade the city for that city type of thing. all in all, three options are open to us. we have had potentially 40 years of containment. they've had about ten years of negotiation, and now we are back to about 15 years of containment this kind of analysis leads one silent on the question that i regard as an overwhelmingly important question when we think about north korea and that's the question of transfer. i myself, personally i will be clear here, i am ambiguous in my own thinking. we've had a lot of experience,
logically you would never know when deterrence works. you know when it fails, that's pretty clear. but i think that deterrence has worked against the soviet union and russia and china and it will work against north korea. where deterrence does not work, or we have good reason to believe is against terrorists,ç and i worry about nuclear terrorism, and since i do, i worry about transfer and particularly the kind of transfer that happens around 2006, 2007 around north korea and syria. were it not for the creative israeli concept of nonprint for proliferation, might actually be operating.
i worry about transfer as a separate issue of what we usually talk about here. i think that leaves us with a couple of pretty important questions. one is, what really is the north korean motivation in all this. i would like to challenge you all and anyone else to answer the question, what is the confrontation between the united states and north korea all about is it about territory, is it about ideology or religion, what goes on. we're actually allies with a country that is contiguous to north korea so this is not a geostrategic kind of situation. that north koreans only ally of sorts is not terribly happy with it, that would be china so what is the source of hostility between us and north korea? do they get a lot of that estimate do we? how would we solve this?
oddly enough and i will leave this alone and come back to it if people are interested, i think the key for me is human rights. if the north korea human rights situation is not what it is, i think no motivation will be easily imaginable. thank you. [applause] >> thank you for the three analysis. now we would like to move on. >> i am very fortunate to follow him. he. maybe in the future we can set a new norm.
also he did a wonderful job of outlining the issue which allows me to move directly to speak to the issue that i believe is more promising than others. i choose my words carefully. there may be no great options it compares favorably to the other ones. if i have to put into one sentence, i would say the united states would offer china incentives to give it its ability to force north korea to have nuclear weapons. not to change the regime. but to settle for change in behavior the good news is that
the incentives we need to give china to take heavy cost. i don't want to exaggerate, but took some extent. [inaudible] first of all, clearly there is clear and present danger if north korea, this is not some hypothetical fear mongering, something that may happen five or ten years from now. this is serious stuff. only our allies and our forces in the area, it's clearly not a thing that we can just sit by
and say what's going to happen next. i expect patients on its course. the second, china has the means to force north korea because if we prevent north korea from energy sources and prevent north korea from storing the stuff, they will not be able to function but, for china to take this extreme point from its viewpoint, undermining the only major ally in the area, they are taking significant risks. one risks that they often talk about is that millions of north koreans who have to cross the
border, he think it's equally concerning or maybe more for china that a unified, united states moves its troops. they act like a buffer the tween china and united states forces. now let me explain this consequence. there's not really enough time so we'll see if we can find more about it in my little book avoiding war with china. the central approach is not to look for shared interests. it's not to look for complementary interests but to look for interest are different. the idea is if you rank china's interest form what's really important to them, you do the
same for the united states and then you have a deal to give them things that are very important to them but not important was. if we asked them to give us things which are very important to me but they don't important, if you can find it, then you have a very different deal. it's not apples to oranges. i have a lot of apples. i don't really care for them. they have a lot of apples. they have oranges which i'm dying for and they can give them fast enough away. that's the idea. if you do this for a moment, what you find, you find it important to us to stop north korea from developing a norse nuclear program. what they are concerned about first of all is only enough that
the antimissile batteries, reclaim these missiles are stopping north korean missiles and cannot be used against any of these. why this is important because the whole idea of the terrace in china is based on the notion that china will be able to hit back. if we have the capacity to stop retaliation by china, china is very exposed. they trigger an alert they had to build nuclear weapons. the essence is to be able to hit back. i looked into this.
second, before we commit ourselves not to move our troops , an argument can be made that it's time to take our troops home. there are other things, one of the things is that we have a country gaining intelligence up and down the china coast practically daily. i don't know what's that important to them, but there's something that aggravates them and the intelligence we connect is rather limited. you need to know where every unit is. for the long run.
[inaudible] if need be, one more thing, what we want from china. [inaudible] i would consider declaring. [inaudible] they argue about was included in the package. the main qualities you have to get more creative. you have to think outside the box. think there is one that could be made. briefly let me compared to the other options. there are horrendous risks.
containment as you said in your previous argument is wonderful when it works but you have somebody you don't know. other natures nations, india and pakistan, but none of this country so the difference here, you said twice a week, they're going to attack us and he has the means to do so. the other notion. [inaudible] when we sit down to negotiate,
they feel we are not interested in regime change. that makes a big difference between heavy difference and regime change. if i can quickly make that point , look what happened in syria. since the beginning of the civil war in syria, united states said it's a precondition for negotiation, the head of state has to go. now you know, if you want to sit down gossip with somebody, in effect, of course north korea we are on the evil access with, what we have shown, we don't want only to defend terrorism. we also want to try to turn them
into democracy. one reason we should safely delay this is because we do not have democracy in this country so not only we push them to the limit by saying you have to resign before i talked you and then spent 15 years fighting, but at the end of the day we don't have a democratic regime either. let's focus on behavior change and worry about regime change later. let me stop here. i see no reason why china would
[inaudible] the chinese didn't comply. they get an a for effort. [inaudible] that's what i tried to do. thank you very much. >> i would like to thank both of you for keeping your time. when i walked in i promised myself i would be a timekeeper and stop them when they go beyond 20 minutes but i guess i don't have to. >> thank you for agreeing to do this panel. i want to start by saying there
was once in east asian world stage with a long history of hostility towards the united states. the rogue state had carried out successful nuclear tests and was developing miscible missiles capable of hitting the united states. president richard nixon visited this rogue state in 1972, changing the course of america's relationship with it and transforming the international situation in ways that greatly favored the united states at the time. the reason i am starting with this is not because i think the situations are completely analogous, but i do believe there are parallels between them in the options we face. in 1972, there really was no way to make the people's republic of china give up its nuclear weapons or give up its ideology, although the united states had done everything in its power to
prevent this from getting nuclear weapons before him. the nixon administration realized that i had two choices. the first was to have a powerful and nuclear armed china that was completely isolated from the rest of the world and had no contact with the united states. the second option was to have a nuclear armed china that was integrated into the international community and work together with the united states or could work together with the united states on areas of common interest. nixon chose the latter and while there are of course areas of conflict with china today and i will talk about those in the choice didn't work out perfectly , it was nonetheless vastly superior to its alternative. i believe today the united states needs to make a similarly bold and direct diplomatic
gesture in dealing with north korea. i'm not saying this will be perfect. i'm not saying this will change north korea overnight. north korea is and will remain a repressive country for the foreseeable future. i do not think it will even lead north korea to give up its nuclear weapons right away, but it would give north korea a stake in its relationship with the united states and it would make it less likely to use its arsenal against america and its allies. international relations is around in which there are no perfect and often no good options. the best we can do, i believe is to reduce the risk of conflict and improve the chances that east asia can continue to develop peacefully. i believe diplomacy in north korea with north korea gives us the greatest chance of achieving this. we all know what the other
options are. i agree basically with the option that professor laid out. one is the use of force, and i do believe the use of force is something that should always be in the background. we should make it clear that if they ever used their arsenal on the united states it will be met with overwhelming force and we should work to continue developing counter capabilities. as we know, a preemptive strike or unilateral effort, although p.m. preemption is a little bit different than i had been thinking about it when i prepared these notes, nonetheless, a unilateral effort to disarm north korea is not wise. we all know what the consequences would be. unfortunately, soul which has over 12 million people and its greater metropolitan area is within 30 miles of the area and
within easy striking range of north korea's old artillery. even without its nuclear arsenal , north korea could likely inflict millions of casualties and do billions of dollars in property damage. given that they currently have the 11th, south korea has the 11th largest economy in the world, he thanks such a strike would have horrific ramification for the world economy in addition to creating a humanitarian disaster. if soul was not such an easy target, i suspect the kim jong-un regime would have been taken out a long time ago, but as long as they are hostages to north korea's artillery, the risk of a military option is simply too great. i think sanctions also have their limitation. many advocates of sanctions always say that the problem is
that they haven't been tightened enough. if we tighten them a little bit more or if we impose stricter secondary sanctions, they will have an impact. i don't think there's any evidence for this. for starters, however much we dislike north korea's political leadership, if you can say one thing about north korea is that it has been resilient. the country has survived being raised to the ground. if we ratchet up the sanctions on north korea, the north koreans are just going to do what they always do, tighten their belts a little bit and continue to develop. another problem is sanctions is
for them to work, the entire international community has to cooperate. if it does not, north korea will find a way to get what it needs. aside from china there are several other nations that overtly of aid the sanctions. the more the united states pressures them to enforce the sanctions, the more the united states risks itself coming across as bully or domineering. finally there is the china approach. i'm slightly more pessimistic than my colleague. i think this is on the approach taken by the trumpet ministration during its first few months. personally, having spent time in china and just written a book that the professor mentioned about u.s. china relations, i
don't think china will ever give us what we really want on north korea. china will never support the united states if it's larger objective is to achieve regime change. i believe this is true not only for historical reasons, for strategic and cultural regions. when they talk about how china sees north korea they see it as north korea and china might have been allies back during the cold war but they read regard them as a nuisance. i think the to get matters much more to china than people think. the idea that china stood up to and resisted the united states in 1950 is an absolutely critical part of the chinese
party. even today, most chinese history instructors don't say that they launched an invasion across the parallel, they teach that it was a defensive war in which china played a heroic role. if you don't believe me, try having a conversation with any diplomat about the korean war. it would cut to the core. it would in essence make them realize the war was fought to fight in a moral regime and moreover the chinese leadership has probably been done on than any other chinese leadership.
finally, if you look at what china has been doing, i think they have been applying more pressure to south korea for taking actions that can be considered in south korea's self-defense than it has been pressuring north korea, and there's been more hostility over the bad issue then there has been toward north korea in some ways. i think this really leaves us with diplomacy as the only option that has any option of working. i want to talk about this a little bit, how should we pursue a diplomatic action. there's a few options i think are necessary. first, i think we need to coordinate very closely with our allies, especially south korea.
our relationship with south korea is critical. there's no more critical relationship to the united states today than its relationship with south korea. it's important not only because of the north korea issue, but also because south korea is a country in asia that shares our democratic values and which the united states has a deep history and helping build up economically in a country where the united states invested a great deal into trying to spread ideas about democracy. in recent months, however, i don't think washington and seoul have always coordinated policies as closely as they should. in fact, in south korea, the media has recently become obsessed with what it calls korea passing meaning the united states will seek to solve the north korea problem on its own without consultation with soul.
forces recently carried out their joint military drills. i also think the visit here was as successful as could've been expected given the circumstances , but i think it's clear that trump and the new south korean president are not entirely on the same page and i think they need to get on the same page. when trump talks about fire and fury one day and the south korean president says no one should be allowed to decide on military action on the korean peninsula without the permission a few days later, it gives an appearance of disunity, and i think this is exactly what beijing wants. we are also now eight months into the trumpet ministration but there's still no u.s. ambassador in south korea although it's been rumored that one of the professor colleagues at georgetown is being considered.
aside from that, there are also several key posts in the state department that remain unfilled. second, i think the united states should continue its information and propaganda programs that are directed at north korea such as the voice of america. while leaders in the korean worker party are going to remain antagonistic toward the united states, i think these kinds of activities might at least change the view that some north koreans have of the united states, and more most people have been to north korea agree there have been some impact. along with this, i believe we should continue humanitarian work where possible in north korea to try to make it clear that whatever political differences or disagreements exists between the united states and north korea at the political level don't affect our view of the north korean people and that
we don't hold the north korean people responsible for the actions of their leaders. third, i think if we engage in a process of negotiation or diplomacy it should be kept open-ended. this was how things were done when the united states first initiated talks with china during the 1970s. they should be allowed to bring up issues that are of concern to it while north korea should be allowed to bring up the issues that are most important to its leadership. finally, i think we need to have patience in implementing this policy. i would say any kind of policy we pursue, whether you agree with me or disagree with me, i think we need to have more patience. we have to realize that north korea is a country that is deeply mistrustful of the united states, america's allies and also somewhat mistrustful of its
own allies to the extent that it has allies. by saying this, i don't mean to try to justify north korea's authoritarianism or domestic oppression. at the same time, it's important to recognize that it has been emblazoned on the north korean national consciousness for the past six decades that their country once fought a horrific war against united states in which millions died in 70 or 80% of some of north korea's largest cities were destroyed. it is a country that can remember very easily several decades of continuous american efforts to try to isolate it and it can see how the united states has pursued and succeeded in achieving regime change in afghanistan, iraq and other countries that became its adversary. if we choose diplomacy, i think
we must be prepared for it not to succeed immediately. suspicions about the united states and north korea are going to persist. we have to understand as well that north korea won't abandon its nuclear weapons or missile program right away and there may really be no way to get them to do it. this kind of patience is tricky. one of the reasons is because in a democracy, the electorate is always somewhat results-oriented you have a new policy, they want to see results. if it doesn't produce results immediately they want to change the policy. i think this has been part of the problem. this is why we keep going back and forth between deterrence and engagement or some combination of the two. i think we need to have a more consistent policy pursued over a longer term. this isn't the perfect option but i believe that it's the best
option we have and offers the best chance of slowly getting north korea to modify its behavior. it offers the best hope of lowering the risk of a cataclysmic war on the korean peninsula and it offers us the best chance of shifting the balance of power and interest in the pacific in a way that will favor america's interest in the long-term. i will stop there. thank you. [applause] >> thank you so much. i really appreciate how you put into historical context. now, listening to these three speakers, it seems like north korean issues haven't changed much after 20 or 30 years. we are still, we continue to deal with them. one question that came to my mind is, can we end this issue
of the two koreas. is that the only possibility? and also, one immediate reaction that i had, listening to his talk was, toward the end you said what is a source of stability between the u.s. and north korea, and actually, we had story and officially in the field of north korean studies, some scholars mention that they would not have become a paranoid state if they had experienced the korean war. so the kind of hostility between the two continue today due to the war and i was just wondering what your thoughts were on that. i asked the first question and
then we will open up four more questions. >> if i've got your question correct, is what leads to north korean paranoia, i'd like to put in a word for paranoia here. even paranoia's have real enemy. the north koreans, i've met a couple of. [inaudible] they never tire. after they say good morning they say what about libya and then they say what about iraq and they are pointing to regime changes they see accomplished by the united states against countries that dreamed of having nuclear weapons but failed to
get them and they tell me they are not going to make that mistake and they think it is bizarre that our theory of negotiation is one in which they would give up their nuclear weapon. it's not entirely paranoia here. as has been inside government privately, we would be thrilled to let the north koreans do in their atrocious human rights policy and just sit north of the tmz if they didn't threaten us with nuclear weapons. wouldn't want them to have them at all, that was the agreed framework from the '90s, but then we got used to that even after they tested and we were prepared to fall back, in my schema of containment again
because well we could deter them and we were directly threatened so if deterrence was credible, then the only reason we had this thing tonight, and people came to it, is because at any moment, tonight, someone can walk in their president's office and say we have definitive words that test number three of nice yet bm is about to take place. in case you had forgotten mr. president, you kind of said this was a redline for you and this one, we don't know whether they're going to go up so high so they don't have to go out so far so they won't be straight sticking their finger directly in your eye, but pretty much it is going to nail down this capability and so mr. president, if you want to do something about it, you have about 15
minutes to make that decision. in a way, nothing has changed, in a way everything has changed because we have made the something we will not put up with. on the north korean side, are they paranoid about this? they want have the capability to deter us. we don't want them, it's one thing to pick the indians, the pakistanis and israelis and it's another to pick the soviets who, a good book was written about our decision not to launch a preventive war against the soviet union when we still could have in the 40s or against the chinese when we were really could've probably in coordination with the russians against the chinese. now this view is pretty crazy and i have a lot to do with
deployment of our first architectures and antiballistic missile systems. what i'm saying is we are wrapped around this axle right now and i think a key question for this group, for us is, if this happens and somebody walks into the president tonight, what you want him to do? are the north koreans so crazy we can't rely on deterrence? then we have to try, this is not preemption. nobody's going to say that the launch a missile address. they're going to get the capability to deter us. do we want to deny them back. i said when i was finishing before that i thought the human rights issue was incredibly important because i can see no other way in which we are
credible. we have a narrative about the agreement in 1994. our narrative is the north koreans cheated with the pakistanis and that's how the deal fell apart and the administration decided to call him on it, et cetera et cetera. there narrative doesn't go that way. their narrative is we failed to deliver normalization. the only thing they could've counted on to insure them they didn't need nuclear weapons to deter us so they hatched with an enrichment program. that's their narrative. i'm not telling you to buy it, i kind of like ours and i'm pretty committed to it, but i think, if you think like they are thinking for a few minutes, then the only way you get that concern is no other way to reassure them. look, don't worry. they said don't worry, we don't care about human rights stuff, just stop this nuclear weapons stuff then you can do what you
i didn't think it was important to us. so i think geogiaars -- precisely that way about what it is we care about, they don't. they care about, we don't, and is there a saddle point in all this. i think that's a brilliant way of looking at it. >> is there a clear and present danger or not? is it reasonable to think that win a year or so they will have militarized nuclear weapons with capacity to re-entry? if that is true, any talk about sanction is ridiculous on the face of it. either work or work very slowly. so sanction off the table. any question about diplomacy? sure, who is against diplomacy? take us longer to agree on the
size of the table and the agenda than two years, and so that is not realistic, now, talking to them, given what you just said there very eloquently, they don't have trust so what is left, somebody can coerce, and so the question is, there is anybody around who can make north korea cry uncle? we are not. china at least has the capacity. this is not contestable. and so if you -- many questions, under what question would china be willing to pay the price? and that can be negotiated, that can be discussed. that's worth finding out, because if you go -- let them have nuclear weapons, not only will they -- japan will not sit
by. iran will dash for nuclear weapons and that's an enormous threat. >> but they have them now. supplies between 12 and 20 -- >> can't send them in saddle press. >> you, actually. >> stand created. mean the missile. i think in a lot hinges on the question. one more line. you have good friends. how can you possibly compare my dear to trump? that really hurts. >> i -- we all know who is smarter. >> talk about serious stuff. never know what he is saying. suddenly change his mind and then your secretary of state his something different. very difficult to complete a sentence, the trump administration. and so my sentence can be
completed. >> let me highlight where i'm disagreeing with you. it's not to the extent that you are or not like trump, but i think where i have some disagreement with you is i agree that china has the capacity to bring north korea to its knees if it wants, to but i'm not convinced it would ever want. to i'm not convinced there's anything we can ever offer it that would get it to do that. i think what is underestimates is how important north korea is to china's national identity and to the identity of the chinese communist party, and when you talk to chinese and when you talk to chinese government officials, you still see that. i think there is still an underlying sympathy for north korea in china. i think that chinese like seeing the north koreans embarrass the
united states. secretly, even if they don't admit and it say, ha-ha-ha. i think that they -- at some level they enjoy seeing this, and so i'm just -- i'm not convinced we can offer them anything that would be acceptable to us that would in the end get them to really start putting enough pressure on north korea to get it to abandon it nuclear weapons. i'm also not convinced you can get north korea to give up its nuclear weapons without giving -- without getting rid of the regime. you may have to get cid of the regime to -- get rid of the regime to do this. i doubt if push comes to shove china would be will to do. >> one sentence? >> one sentence. >> but no cost in finding out. no cost in finding out if china
will accept our offer. >> now we'll take questionsment when i ask -- many, many hands up now. i would like to ask you to identify yourself first, your name and affiliation. we'll begin with you. >> my name is steven with a federal agency. my question is suppose the price of chinese cooperation was the permanent secession of any arms sales to taiwan. absolutely immoral but putting that aside, would this trump the chinese narrative about the centrality of cork korea, the unification of taiwan in exchange for the regime change in north korea? >> i don't think so. i think the way china sees it is
taiwan is a part of china, and it's something that the united states should not be selling arms to taiwan in the first place so they see taiwan as something that is rightfully thursday. so why, from their perspective, should they put pressure on north korea to give us something that is rightfully theirs in the first place. from our perspective it makes a lot of sense. yeah, we're going to give you back taiwan and you'll give us north korea, but from the chinese perspective it doesn't make sense. that's why it's important to study the chinese perspective. it's important for people who work on this issue to spend more time in china and reading chinese materials because i'm not convinced that a lot of the people in the beltway are doing that. >> i strongly support the idea. i'm serious. we need to learn much more how the other side looks at it.
on my package, which i didn't have a chance to lay out, of goodies we made up there, making explicit or implicit understanding that if they're not -- china will not use force to integrate taiwan, we will not recognize it as an independent state. moving from implicit to explicit would be one more character. trying to collect carrots doesn't cost as much and i would add that to at the pot. not going to make you a lot of point if you stop selling arms to tie one which we -- taiwan if we shouldn't be in the first place. >> next question. >> my name is earnest, i live in cairo since 25 years. i'm on vacation. anyway, none of you gentleman
mentioned reun-ification. the korean people, and it seems to be this could be a central issue and i would skimmer -- i would ask the, what would be the analogy to the german reunification. i know there's quite a devils but the emphasis -- different but the emphasis on reunification should be important. i think the north the south koreans, people certainly, even the regimes or whatever, want reunification at the end. in the long run. thank you very much. >> i just say a couple of things that come to mind. first, american diplomats, when they talk about -- talk to koreans about all subjects like this, always talk about the ultimate goal is the
reunification of korean people. after this said that and check that box then you talk about the world in which we leave and in that world i don't think many people who work this issue believe the reewan fix caution of the korean people is going to happen anytime soon. if it does it will be the relevant of incredible violence and doesn't have the appeal of the phrase reunification o of the people. sounds like it would be violent. the south koreans i've talked to offline, who have been in government service, suspect there's nobody that really is enthusiastic about the reunification of the korean people other than the korean people, and the korean people are divided over how that would have. the south koreans think under some nice democratic "the associatessan" government, the
north koreans say that under some part of the kim dynasty. the rest of the world from their perspective is hostile. the chinese certainly are not enthusiastic about a reunited peninsula, particularly if it was reunited under an appliance with the united states of america; they're not looking forward to seeing this unification on their border. the south koreans are suspicious, the japanese an enthuseisic and they suspect the united states of america is not either and we look at the divided peninsula as on excuse for forward base of operations and part of our encircle empty strategy that they believe we have that vis-a-vis the chinese.
that sent isn't that wrong. so a not very much discussed issue. think largely because it's not front and center in practical terms and policy, and there arlet of things that people think and say only sota voce. >> want to go to a question of professor kim, can you resolve this issue without reunification of the korean peninsula? and i think you can never resolve the issues that the korean war was fought over, and the basic political differences between north korea and south korea and the differences in just fundamental perspectives about which state is legitimate, but i do think nat you can have a significant reduction of tension between the united states and north korea without reunification, and i think that's what we have to aim for.
we have to look at thisrealisticly. what can help now. think reunification is something that i am increasingly pessimistic that we would ever see in our lifetime but i do think it's not too much to hope that there can be a significant reduction of friction between the united states and north korea if the policies are right and the approach is right. [inaudible question] >> the topic of unification was brought up, and having work in the unification ministry before joining the wilson center, this is interesting and i appreciate all of the things you mentioned and especially the frank comments right now, but when it comes to dealing with north korea, handling north korea as the topic goes, i think north korea is only interested in meeting and setting down with
washington and it boils down to how washington and what washington is willing to offer, and doctor, as you are one of the very few persons persons whe met with north koreans recently and face to face, what are your observations what north korea would be willing to negotiate? they have been saying they're not interested in negotiating and never begin up -- give up nuclear weapons about we should look beyond that. that's the language they always use, and were we to engage in associations, which i personally think that we are reaching that point because of the heightened tensions that is a tell tale of time for negotiations. so, you think that from your observation, do you think that north korea in this regime under kim jong-un, which is different from kim jong-il, who wanted
nuclear light water reactors. the is a different regime. what do you think it would take? >> first, i don't know. that usually doesn't stop me. let me barge in on john here. the last time met with him was a little less than a year ago in cowl squall la -- coil la loom pure, and the said not surprisingly that we are a nuclear weapon state, made it part of our constitution, always be a nuclear weapons state. we cannot trust you. libya iraq, blah blah blah, i said words the effect i couldn't continue discussions if they were going remove this issue from the table, because that would we legitimizing their
nuclear weapons program when we were allied with two countries that had voluntarily committed themselves not to have nuclear weapons and joined the nypt. thought for us to give up on their nonnuclear status and forever accepting the korean peninsula as being one in which one country had nuclear weapons, was unacceptable to me and i would fall back to a containment policy. much prefer we talk about negotiations and they don't have to say anything on the nuclear weapons issue except they'll never discuss it. that's one thing i can say. they understood that and this is track one and a half. i'm not representing the government. but we had that kind of exchange. would imagine we would have a version of that in a track one discussion. i also believe when the north koreans say never, which they said about any number of things
in 1993 and. -- and 1994, that means it will cost you a lot. that's what never means. in this case, though, most of us have one or two model in our head why the north north koreano so -- they want nuclear weapons to deter the united states of america from accomplishing regime change. that's the happy model. it's a defensive posture. a deterrent posture. the other model is they want to have nuclear soaps say think fracture the alliance, overcome south korea with conventional force, deter the united states from intervening by threatening u.s. cities. that is not a happy image. that's something else again. so, let's good to the happier image, which i believe is probably more accurate but i actually don't know, and if you have that in mind, then you
have -- the question is, what is it they want? they want some reason, some basis for believing that if they make a deal, that freezes their program and rolls it back and eventually eliminates it, some reason to believe that we will not turn over their regime. other than we're real swell people and rex tillerson said we won't, really, honest, scout's honor. that they were saying is not enough. so, i am driven to, well, okay, i believe there's no real -- really no outstanding issue between us other than the way you treat your own people once you settle the nuclear weapons issue. we care about your ballistic missiles because of your nuclear weapons. now we care about your weapons and your nuclear weapons because they can retch us.
fundamentally we need do something about the way you treat people, and to which in the north koreans responded, that's regime change. and i opportunity actually prepared for that and i said, it's not what you meant before by regime change. it's a change in your regime, but they have made adjustments, if you have been watching, they have made adjustments in some of their policies in response to the u.n. actions. the they way treat the disabled. made quite a thing of. that when i talk about this -- i'll stop here in a minute dish told them this is not making north korea into jeffersonian democracy, we have friends whose human rights history is not that swell. it's terrific not working for the government and you can say the names of countries, saudi
arabia. they cannot be where they are on a continuum of good behavior. they have to move more towards the center. if they did, then the basis for hostility, i think, would largely be relieved, and i think it would be possible for all kinds of things to happen to address their concerns, but this, i think, normalization, would be the key. we have a normal relationship in which we were not in a state of hostilities, and that's the problem. were there other things? yes. they dish wouldn't put aside that they-the nuclear energy thing. energy for any developmenting economy will tell you that north koreans have a lot of problems and energy is one of the fundmental problems they have. not that thousand megawatt light water reactors was way to address their energy problem. it is very stupid but also what they wanted to sear prepared to
do stupid if it's what they wanted. there are better ways of doing this, but the list of things the north koreans want could -- it's not beyond in the minds of men and women to figure out what that would look like, plus we could ask them. >> point out only that international situation, i do the terms basically tragic onement rarely very good options. it's just a question. hope you all listen carefully, and the professor said, about a year ago he met with them. listen to this. if it's true that we expect within a year to have -- that phone call you messenger effort earlier to the president, thayer testing intercontinental mitchells which have a nuclear warhead on it, we're talking bat clear and present danger. i think i'm probably the only one on this panel, i've been to combat. this is serious stuff.
so to sit back and stay, let's call a psychiatrist from cia and tell us is the guy crazy or can we trust him or maybe talk nice -- >> talking about north korea here. >> yeah. >> just checking. >> fair point. wouldn't call it cia psychiatrist. so, it really -- comes down to this. the things which are wonderful, who can be negotiate negotiation, solving differences and having a human rising -- how could we oppose that? they are aiming a gun at our head, and member who wants to talk about anything which takes five years, at best, has to answer the question, what when that phone call comes in and about we going to do now to prevent it? i guest one last sentence.
asking china under what can be they willing to twist north korea's arms -- somebody said about energy, it's about cooperation and could get an answer tomorrow or by the end of the week. >> all right. so, to take more questions, i think we'll take two or three questions and then we'll have our panelist speak. yes, right over there. >> rather disappointed in hearing no expression of the need for credibility by the united states with we are to choose a realistic negotiation form of diplomacy, when the united states is disregarding international law by having weapons of mass destruction, 7,500, along with russia, and
the obvious solution is for the united states to regain or to earn its credibility by eliminating the nuclear weapons which have spent -- caused ten trillion dollars of your tax money, our tax money, to be wasted, something that can never be used, weapons of mass destruction. thank you. >> okay. so i guess that was a comment. then this gentleman over there. >> john burton with the create times. president moon right now is overseeing the biggest defense buildup of the south korean military forces in 30 years. he's made it quite clear that the purpose of this is to reduce dependence on the u.s. military.
do you think that the chinese would look at this as a encouraging sign since it would appear that he is trying to shuffle off u.s. forces from the korean peninsula, and my other question is, there's also been some talk about south korea gaining its own independent nuclear capacity. do you think that south korea would go down that route and what would also chinese's reaction to that be? >> you said south korea objected to adding antimissile batteries? >> we'll take more questions. over there. yeah. >> hi. my name is beverly holmes. i was a faculty member here at gw. i agree with dr. brazinsky very
much. my question is to the doctor, who is the present day kissinger that we can send to negotiate this? i was one of the early visitors to china and i published a paper at the "washington post" in 1972. two days before nixon's trip to china. so, i know that the country well. before then i did not know anything. but after that visit, i have learned a lot. so, i agree completely with dr. brazinsky and would like to know who would that present, day kissinger be. >> one more question maybe from
students. okay. that lady over there was raising her hands very fast. >> hello, i'm emily and a freshman at george washington university. this is in address to brazinsky, tailing what you said. through your idea of diplomacy as the first option, what is the u.s.' first step in doing that to build that relationship of trust and are the sanctions that have been imposed kind of hurting that relationship and making it more difficult to establish that credibility with the dprk? >> those are both very good questions. first, dr. fincher, who is the present day kissinger, i honestly can't say i know but i can say one thing, which is that when richard nixon visited china, people thought that he
was about the least likely person who woulder go to china because he had such a long history of being a hardine anticommunist throughout in the 1950s, fierce critic of communism and nobody thought the was a likely foreign do this. but history surprises us. so, i can only hope that there is a similar surprise in the next few years, but we also -- one of the problems, i think, currently is that we still -- the state department posts that deal with east asia and other positions have not been completely filled, so i think we have to hope that you have someone who has the knowledge and subtlety to deal with north korea, but i think even if you don't have someone with that
kind of knowledge and nuance, you can still having thises a lot better than they are, and so that is what i'm saying as well. i mean, the ray porchment -- approach with china was a very trick and process and you can have some process of negotiate with north korea that could improve relations even if you don't have the most able statesman or someone of the caliber of henry kissinger when it comes to dealing with the chinese. in my work there's a lot of places where i criticize nixon and kissinger so i'm not necessarily meaning to come off as someone who is offering -- for nixon-kissinger but i would just put it that way.
then diplomacy, what is the first step the united states needs to take in terms of diplomacy with north korea? i think first of all, the -- there needs to be a deescalation of the rhetoric. that would put north korea in a sort of better frame of mind. right now i think you're right, the war of words makes it much more likely that the north koreans are going to want to sit down at the table, but nonetheless, there are american officials and former american officials, of course one of them is sitting at the table with me who has had contacts with the north koreans. the north koreans know how to get interest contact with us, and we do not how to get into -- do know how to get in contact with them through the u.n. and institutions, through the chinese if need be. so i do think there are methods of opening up negotiations with
them. what is the best method? that's something that i'm not completely sure about. i think we would have to look at that very carefully, and we would have to look for a solution or look for a way of doing it that would make sure that we don't embarrass either the out or north korea. if we begin this process, think it will be a very delicate one, and one which could be disrupted easily. we'll need to have an approach and have people who could deal with it very carefully. >> very briefly, as a sociologist like myself who look at historical trends and social forces and see individuals -- not unimportant but much less important who is exactly going to good there and the question we would ask, what are the
forces here which are developing, which may or may not be carried out and get successfully. we have a volunteer. presume already said he's going to have dinner with the head of north korea of a streak as long as it's a trump hotel. not over kimchi, it's over steak. >> if you could respond to the first and second questions and comments. >> the first comment had to do with american credibility and whether we had any in light of our continued embrace of nuclear weapons. i have bad news. it seems to me that while president obama made some commitments at the beginning in
the prague speech and at the end at the hiroshima speech, that committed, i think -- at lest rhetorically to the united states of america reducing the number of nuclear weapons and certainly avoiding introducing new types of nuclear weapons to move to dee emphasize nuclear -- deemphasize nuclear weapons in the defense policy of the united states. that was declaratoriy. to be able to do that and to sign that agreement with the russians, you also commit the out united states of america to a number of virtually all of our strategic systems would be at least modernized and you have to pout "modernize" in quotes but
not to the extent they look like new ones to me. in any case, this -- even president obama, if you will, who had this commitment, an awful lot of stuff getting built in strategic systems. maybe the actual numbers of nuclear warheads would not go up and maybe he would? his vacation, and a future president would be able to get the u.s. numbers down to the way -- depending on how you count, 15 already or so which would be a drama reduction. that's not where we are now. that's is not on the agenda of this president or this administration. i don't even think it's much in the news. i don't think people are talking about arms control and god knows not disargumentment -- disarmment. wouldn't expect that be a pock policy issue of major moment, except as a budget issue.
if these are very big numbers. the other point i wanted to pick up on, john's question, the first question about how would the chinese at south korean modernization? i don't think. i don't think they're drilled with it -- they're thrilled with, even if it's connected to a reduction in independence on the united states. think at the end of the day the south korean decide not wish, when there's security issue, the united states to take a walk. look at -- there are a lot of indicators of that, that the establishment and -- varies with party in the south but the establishments, if i can use that word for the south korean security thinkers -- are still quite committed to the alliance. with respect to south korean acquisition of nuclear weapons, getting their open nuclear weapons, presumably because they
could not any longer depend upon the extended detent of the united states of america to deal with the threat of north korea i think we're kay capable of saying stupid thing about alliances and whether we don't care if they acquire nuclear weaponses or not, we could move them in that direction. hoe we could figure out alliances are worthwhile and key to a nonproliferation policy and that we have to be credible there. but i certainly think if you take south korean nonnuclear status for grant, or even japanese nonnuclear status for granted, you're making a big mistake. >> thank you. all right. maybe one last round of questions.
>> hello. i'm a junior at this school. i what a student under professor brazinsky last year. you stated the united states has to integrate north korea just how nexton did to china. if you're integrating north korea, how should he u.s. deal with or take an approach of violence that kim jong-un has done such as percentaging and concentration camp and where there are in similar historical examples of the nixon administration and china and the subject of human rights during the cultural resolution under mao still. >> and the gentleman over there. >> stanley cobert. with get to the question there's
a news alert that north korea fired a missile over japan. just want to put that on the table. just happened. >> clear and present danger. >> the question. we have been talking about north korea, but north korea's basically it's ruler. it's not a normal government. and kim jong-un seems to be more ruthless even than his father and grandfather, the murder of his half brother, for example, whom he apparently saw as a threat. we talk about rationality in international affairs, but is this rational behavior? that's my concern. is he different from his father and grandfather? >> okay. one question from over here. >> my name is bob grist.
we have been talking about north korea as a rouge state -- rogue state and our news media echos that every opportunity they can the history of north korea and -- history of u.s.-co-korean relation others could just as easily be -- one could reach the conclusion it's the u.s. that is the rogue state and that has brutalized korea, certainly during the korean war, with 30% of the population was decimated, and all sorts of war crimes committed, but even since then, north korea has demonstrated a willingness to negotiate over nuclear weapons, both in the sunshine policy and in previous
communication with the u.s. the axis of evil speech in 2002 is what terminated a possibility for real negotiation between the u.s. and north korea. its there enough in the history of u.s.-korean relations that if the american public understood how much of a rogue state the u.s. has been in this specific situation, that they could change the dynamics of the kinds of options that we're hearing about now and actually demand the kind of denuclearization in the world that 122 countries in the general assembly, for example, month ago, supported. i am disturbed that the experts
who are talking with us now, although die appreciate the difference -- i do appreciate the difference between diplomacy and the other strategies, although the approach sound like negotiation, too but indirectly. but it seems to me that the american public has not really weighed in on the u.s. being a rogue state and i think this is a real missed opportunity for that point of view to be raised, especially given the clear and present danger that we see in this very explosive situation. [applause] >> all right. one last question from there. okay, two. >> hi. my question is for professor
brazi -- i'm alexandra o'keefe, columbia university. i guess this is echoing an earlier question about the first diplomatic state. both strategies steam be approaching not exactly the issue of -- that we are facing of having a gun to our head. professor you mentioned that affected diplomacy in the area requires patience. i'm not sure if we have the timeline to develop that patience, nor i think in the history of the united states' diplomatic strategy do we have the consistency to develop that patience which you note edit. what is an effective first step and how do we deal with the first crisis and also tying in longer term considerations, human rights challenges and normalization over time.
>> one last question. >> hi, i'm kimberly, i'm a ph.d candidate at g and a fulbrighter to ya alum, 2011:20:12. i'm curious to know, going off of your joke about who was the unstable leader in this -- >> good question. >> me question is -- we have touched on i think most of the panelists have four-on bit maybe delve a little more deeply? into what diplomacy looks like under the trump administration. >> okay. maybe start with -- >> i a lot of questions that could probably take us a long time to talk about. but we don't have that much time so i'll try to be brief. alexandria, your question actually touched on something that some of the other panelists said i'm not sure i agree with. that is that there's a gun to
our head. if you live in south korea the think there's been a gun to hair head for 70 years and say so what? so the question is, is there anything different all of a sudden than there has been for the last 70 years? i think this is where we disagree -- where i have some disagreements, and i also goes to mr. coal -- kole bury's question. he asked is kim jong-un different from his predecessors? i think that's an important question mitchell own sense is that kim jong-un will push the line a little bit further but there's still a line, at least so far there's still a line. there's still certain things we don't do because in the end he done want to see the end of his regime, and i think that is very important. so, this idea of our clear and present the danger is, is
actually debatable. these things don't have anywhere near as much impact on south korea -- i'm not saying nicer no impact. the south korean markets are probably going dive after the news that was just announced about north korea fireing a missile over japan nonetheless there's a question of whether there's a difference, and i think that is important because i still think we can be patient. i still don't see -- i still don't think that there's a war that's going break out tomorrow or next week, and that's why i have been advocating more of a long-term approach. i realize that a lot of people criticized obama for this idea of strategic patience and said, well, for eight years you had strategic patience and we actually didn't do anything at all, and i think that is a fair criticism. i think we don't want patience
to mean we don't do anything. want it to mean we do something, but we also have to -- i think we also have to be cautious. i think the media likes to take these incidences and all of a sudden blow them up and then two weeks late are something else happens and we fret forget about north korea and there's not a clear and presence danger. want to get to one modify students in the audience and i'm happy to see that, especially one of miss best students, the question about how we would -- if we integrate north korea, how would be deal with the human rights issue, and it's also actually a very good question because when we integrated china, we deliberately ignored the human rights question a lot of the time. jimmy carter, who normalized relations with -- finally
normalized relations with beijing was a big advocate of human rights, but when it came to china he said, well, we have to sort of be quiet about this so we can improve the relationship. i think with north korea it may be worth it to improve the relationship first and deal with human rights later. why? because if you can set up some basic level of contacts and exchanges and you have more information getting -- about the united states and the west inside north korea, you might slowly, slowly encourage more development of civil society there, and that's very tough. i don't know for sure that would happen. but die think that might be how we -- i do think that might be how we have to do it movement greece's point about who is the real rogue state, i am not a defender of american foreign policy in all contexts, and i
absolutely agree that during the korean war, the bombing of north korea was something that was absolutely horrific, and there were a number of atrocities committed during the korean war. atrocities committed on both sides, though. one of the reasons south korea was so firmly anti-communist in the cold war is because the atrocities the north koreans committed in south korea were every bit as horrific or even nor so than what the united states and south korea did in north korea. this is debatable. one point that needs to be mentioned is that who is ultimately responsible for the start of the korean war? this is something that in china this is still not taught, but there is absolutely incontro veritable evidence that the korean war started because kim il-sung and stalin sat down and
had conversations and planned it, and if you want further evidence, i strongly suggest that you look at the woodrow wilson center, one of my former students by is in the audience, james person, one of the leading experts in the country on international documentation about the korean war, and i think the evidence of this, how the war started in the first place, and who bears ultimate cholesterollal cuppability is very clear. >> i -- very briefly. from the little i know, greg is completely correct that the south koreans don't think it's a big new deal. they're kind of used to that. for 70 years. i'm not sure it's true for japan. i'm not sure it's true for guam. and so we need to go back to the situation you heard about
earlier. somebody comes into the president, says they put a nuclear wind on top of a intercontinental missilement the response of the government doesn't wait until the president has a 15 minutes left. they talk about it ahead of time. i'm not saying we have a responsible government is now is the time say what do we do when that phone call comes? and my response is, this is not a situation which we can bet on optimistic interpretations he will not cross the read lynn and in -- read line and in his heart is rational. maybe he is, me a he is not. want to hedge against the situation there. we find yourselves directly threatened. as to what is happening in north korea is kind of interesting development. i china in 1973 began to allow
foreigners, not to do only what they required by planning but to sell surplus, they had to bring to the state or whatever x bushels or x chicken but if they made more think could sell them on the side of the road. that's enormousry encourage production, and so initially was suppose bed only for vegetables and fruits and consumer goods, then you saw the side of the road, furniture, and soon expanded more and more and out of that came this position to capitalism. that is what is happening now in north korea. anybody who things -- voter much agree, brutal leader, that the koreans are have women the current regime and need to look at what is happening there used to be a very oppressed regime
but they're moving now this chinese direction of allowing -- chinese -- can't use the word capitalism -- and it does make the chinese people and the north korean people fear there's a whole new trajectory improving the quality of your life. >> four quick points. first, on the question of the united states of america as a rogue state, i worked for the u.s. got directly or indirectly for over 20 years and all of it in political military stuff. can tell you for a fact we did not in all matters cover ourselves with glory. we did not. i have no difference -- difficulty -- excuse me -- telling the difference between north korea and the united states on ethical matters itch don't think there's any question about that. for me personally.
second. what is the first diplomatic step? that is actually a -- i think a very interesting question and one the administrations have stumbled over. the last administration, much to my frustration, had this standard of -- well, the north koreans aren't serious how much do you know when they're serious? they're not serious. every fall there used to be a peanuts cartoon where charlie brown ran and lucy kept saying, really, i'm not taking the ball and the ball goes away. the administration has this fear the north koreans are lucy and after the kind of infamous, leap day event that we cooperate trust the north koreans. will, it spilled over in this administration. you must have noticed that
secretary tillerson said, well, they're not serious yet. we're looking for a sign whether they're serious. what is the first diplomatic step? the first step is to have talks about talks that are without preconditions of any kind. because real talks you can't have right after they've tested a intercontinental but the first step is you do that and you set the terms for what negotiations would look like, and then -- i think my colleague is correct -- you expect the negotiatings to go on for a fairly long time. we were at it for a year and a half and that was pretty good, because things happen. it's not how long does it take to write the agreement
framework? a few years but it took a year and a half. you expect that. but the first step is to have no preconditions about any talks, and then recognize, you can't really engage on the heels of some aggressive move by the other side. if they just shelled an island, not going to say, oh, okay, good time to have talks, because you look like you have just been blackmailed. so you don't do that. third point here is with diplomacy under the trump administration. which i don't know why i wrote this down because i don't plan on addressing it, but it seems to me that among the many things, comments one could make, is that it is confusing. right? it seems pretty clear that mattis says something, then the president says something, then the secretary of state says something, and they don't match up. so, if someone has been watching
this like an american, can't figure out who is on first, you can imagine how allies feel, never mind enemies. so i would say they need some message control here. now, i've heard this said that maybe this is the plan, we're confusing them with our footwork. i don't actually believe it. if that is the plan, i think it's a dumb plan. the fourth is the most important point and one i want to conclude on. that is -- you may not hear it every time but he keeps saying, clear and present danger, sometime hi says it out loud, sometimes it's quieter. that's what wanted you all and us all to focus on. the clear and present danger problem. wanted us to think about, look, i say again, if the guy who runs into the oval office says, they've got a nuclear weapon, a
board a ballistic missile, i hope to god we take it out on the ground because we anted can't take it out with confidence in the air toms who think that thad or perhaps the standard missile or aegis -- some of you may have dilutions bit patriot -- thousand the systems layered give -- should give you any confidence that we can take out a missile that we have not shot at ourself, warned-of-when it was coming, told ourselves the trajectory and made sure there what just one, all right? so, now, if it's an enemy, then they're unlikely to do that for us. so, the option if it's got ballistic missile with a nuclear weapon is take it out on the grinned and this i nuclear war
101. go full out as a war fighter and take away the capability for there to be a second one youch try to take out the first one. about that is not interesting. you may think that's an overstatement but it's not. that's what we would do. so what is interesting is what happens if it's a ballistic missile test and the guy doesn't say wishes have no reason to think there's a warhead there but they're going to -- the reason they're going to do this test is to develop confidence in icbm capability so they can hit the united states with confidence and we will know they can. you, mr. president said, quote, that's not going happen. can you draw a read line with a tweet? that's a philosophical question. don't know. but i know my colleague here is talking clear and present danger help doesn't want -- tell me if i guess this wrong -- he doesn't want the north koreans to have the capability to do that to us.
[inaudible conversations] . >> north korea has launched another missile in the direction of japan. right now it is a developing story but the south korean military has confirmed the launch. this comes just a few days after they fired another set of missiles one that failed in flight. coming up tonight a look at the 50th anniversary of -- anniversary of the detroit riots resulting in 43 deaths
and millions of dollars of property damage. >> let's go specificallyy back 50 years ago today to put into context specifically what happened on this day. >> specifically a night like many others with folks in the of black community that the establishment were having a party and to get together it was raided by the detroit police department people were routinely pulled over or stopped and frisked and in this particular instance it just struck a nerve in this particular community