tv Government Response to Combating Terrorism Panel 3 CSPAN December 27, 2017 3:39pm-4:49pm EST
of time but i want to thank our panelists for not only delving into the nuance of some of the very complicated issues . before the mode but allowing us to deal with the broad themes that we should be thinking about not only as we think about the region but also what supplies you specific so i hope you will join me in thinking our panelists for a very illuminating conversation. >>. [inaudible conversation]
>> all right, thanks everyone. thank you to cf i asked for holding a timely and fascinating friend, bringing together so many vital perspectives from the region and from here in washington. i'm very honored to moderate this panel with doctor ahmed driss who's the moderator for international studies and mister arezki daoud who edits the african journal. we will be talking about government approaches to countering terrorism in the region. and the frame, the discussion i'm also interested in drawing out my fellow panelists on the sort of impact that all the considerations inherent in us strategy towards counterterrorism and it's very complicated arena. i'm interested in their perspective on what has worked, what hasn't. what needs to be taken into account .
and as you all know, the us approach to anti-terrorism in north africa involves effort in libya, obviously including the racks military action. and the other countries of zagreb we see a security assistance and cooperation approach aimed at building thecapacity of partner forces, partner militaries . which includes extensive military sales and grants in some countries. training and other types of support with varying levels of engagement depending on which country we are talking about. we also see the us engaging in sanctions programs and watch lists to limit financing and mobility as in other regions of the world a ll as programs designed to counter violent tremists ideology. >> which have been particularly prominent with regards to us partners in morocco but we also see
efforts in the other countries of the region. >> morocco, algeria and tunisia participate in a long-running state department led regional counterterrorism assistance program in north and westafrica known as the trans-american counterterrorism project . but they have largely focused overtime on the poorest countries of the hotel region and much of the us security assistance relationship with zagreb countries runs through bilateral channels. each of our departments have historically led these efforts but over the last 16 years, we see an increasing role for the department of defense. as congress and the executive branch have worked in some ways together to increase the scope and level of resources and authorities available for community activities. and that may have complications, political implications for our own
government as well as the region. as we found in the aftermath of the recent deadly attacks on us soldiers in niger. the extension is not without risk and raises policy concerns and considerations both for us and regional actors. from where i sit in the us congress on the congressional research service , the legislative branch and support agency there is a continues to be a debate with over the policy framework for us anti-terrorism in regions of the world affected by threats that may be primarily local and regional info but which have the capacity to affect personnel. and i look forward is limited to exploring tax from the region and on the region with my panelists. more broadly, i'm interested in discussing sort of some of the unintended consequences that may principles or some of the considerations that may not be from front and center but perhaps should be.
with that i will send it over to doctor ahmed driss first. >>. >> good morning. thank you very much to the center for strategic and international studies for the invitation and the in particular to name for having us here. well, when i saw the program and the folder i said to myself i have to speak under a group. who is responsible for the security, missteps insecurity and decisions today and tunisia. so yes, i also have to deal with that and be careful for what i am also saying. but so speaking about the tunisian strategy, both
strategies included to counter terrorism, to counter radicalization, i think three keywords have to be sent to life. the first one is informing. the second one is restructuring. and the third one is vision building for vision making. which is also innovating now. >> on the first point, reform on what? after the rising, tunisia had a new constitution. a new constitution was adopted in2014 and says that , everything should be in accordance to the constitution so that means that most of our initiation had to be amended before. in order to be in not in
contradiction with the new constitution. the new constitution indicates to disposals, one transliterate the other one on security forces, both of them . that means that maybe in the past or not serving other centers of the public and the people which means that now all efforts are written by the security forces and by the military have to be driven by that concept of serving the people. and in accordance to that, the new law against terrorism and the questions of money and laundering was adopted and focus to 2050 and this law, the new one , the former one adopted in 2003
immediately after the 9/11 attacks, before law was the support of theinternational amework to combat terrorism . the effort to combat terrorists as it terrorism is outside of the country and they have the support only the effort to combat. >> so now we have new laws which is more precise, more precise to define. not terrorism but all the time we have a problem to define terrorists and our state also faces this same problem and is not able to define the word terrorist or the concept of terrorism so we have a list of facts considered as terrorist acts and this can be used to
define what is terrorism. terrorism is linked to acts of violence but it's a very long list. but it is precise and clearly underlined. but there's also more respectful of the workflow which is very important because as the admiral said this morning, once the objective is to be very difficult to the rule of law and i will have great ownership by people and if we counter flow, people will not consider as serving. a new element in this law which is very important, i think is a chapter on special investigation needs. or means or tools.
and this was not at all present in the former law so the new law, decides the role of how to investigate other tools. it's very new and also very helpful to the rule of all because everything had to be allowed or with the permission of the judiciary. and the last new point in this law is the creation of the national commission for the fight against terrorism so now with thiscommission to also analyze and toal adopt strategies to fight against terrorism. so this is reforming the legislative framework. >> the second idea is about reflecting. reflecting what?reflecting
the services and it is not what we have but very. very canny and qualified as a deed and very detailed frame of services. it sends 2013, immediately after the election of the current president. so it seems that all the effort on services is linked to that. and also the president also behind the president. so the destructing of the services in november 2014. by establishing a new body, a new administrative public body. which gave autonomy to this body because since 2014, it
was generally directed to security. as part of the different militaries and this general directorate was intelligence, military intelligence within the defense history but since 2014, it's been replacing the former director he of military intelligence by a new body, call agency for different security. >> but still, it's related only to different, not to cover all of the intelligence services but only to protect agency equipment and secrets of the department of national service. >> but it's a new body and it's a new body because it's a public administrative body.
and also this agency had to contribute to the prevention and fight against terrorists. >> in 2015, a degree establhed the center for military session which is also a very new one so now there's a decision. the new body ultimately and then the center for military areas related to national defense policy. so another step instructed the services and the last one in january 2017, by the creation, the national intelligence center. so the national intelligence
center is considered a new step in restructuring services because something really new in the fact that there was only be different intelligence status but now we have the national intelligence center which is the main focus was that the center is coordination between the various national intelligence programs. but with this indication in article 2 of this degree that this is the role of the national intelligence systems, it's an answer to a concern, since the uprising in tunisia, tunisia has suffered a lot. from the meat of the nation between the, this was the main object. 25 of urse terrorism, but that also mainly to place any of the threat that tunisia is
facing since 2011. absolutely, it's all very difficult in coordination and this was one of the main demands during the four years to establish the body and to coordinate between these services and this was established since january. this year. 2007 and 17. and also, the other objective is the development of the national intelligence. so that also means that there is a new vision in order to have an event and to monitor the institution of that plan. which is a new element. >> and yes.
i'm supposed to have a presentation but i am leaving for myself. >> and also, in january, 2017. the same date, same date, 19 of january 2017, is the reformulation of the national security council so the national security council this morning it was indicated that mark mood is now the secretary, let's say that this council was established in 1990. 1990. by the former president and i don't see any difference between the objective of this
national security council in 90 or today. the same article one, it's the same. the national security council is to ensure the interests of the state within the framework and as the preservation of the sovereignty of the state. and to guarantee its integrity, the integrity and security of the people and the protection of research. it's article one of the decree of 1990, so it's the same purpose or the same objective. the national security council was established. but what is new now in this degree, this council is also
responsible for the national strategy, particularly the fight against terrorism so to update, periodically, it is a strategy in coordination with the national commission on the fight against terrorism rated by the law of 15. so it's a link with the new law established there. and also a link with the commission to establish the national strategy against terrorism so the national body, the national security council had to work in this y. >> and also, the presence of the new director of the new body created at the center of intelligence created as to replace the director of the
defense agency in the composition of the national end. but this is what's new today is a decision taken by the president by 13 of october 2017. creating 15 commission within this council. >> one of them is also intelligence. and the other is in the other also 15 commissions is the permanent secretary of the head present everywhere. >> but those are the minister of defense has to be present and also everywhere or one of
them in the 15 commission but i'm curious, that 15 commissioncovered all the mains, not only intelligence and terror affairs etc. but also education, health, energy under the elimination of security and education and security innovation. >> so everything is related to the age of the domain. >> and also creating a lot of trouble now in tunisia is this concept of basing the elements of some work. but the question had to be also. >> it's legitimate to answer to this question because one of the maybe risks is the
dissensions of the institutions since we have the implication. so we have each minister, each minister is behind and there is the minister of this defense so the security general of the national council. the security council and okay. so what the head of the government would do with that and this can create a sort of dissension and it creates a risk of dissension between the politicals so we can discussthis . >> yes, one minute. in the last minute, about the strategies. and i am putting the admiral and one of the direct declarations he made . so the objective of these
strategies and prevention, prediction,prosecution . so yes. prevention, protection and i can say that for the three lessons, protection, constitution, the strategy can be different. because of the frame and also the operational capacities in power now in tunisia. so it's a little bit more able to risk now than before to the threat. but one remains problematic for me is the constition becae prevention, that needsome rehearsal strategy and we are building a radical strategy. this is primarily why because we are not able to take all
the aspects and link it to that radicalization. and to answer them as a threat or answer them as related to terrorism and counterterrorism and for example correction. correction is not one element of the national strategy because it's only radical, not transversal. so if we do transversal strategies, then we can fight to have correction and coordinate more with those who are fighting . yes. so the last thing. the last thing is about the decision about innovating. and i think that november and italy, this year in 2016, it
was enough announced by the minister of defense. the white book, this minimization in tunisia and it doesn't explain in fact, it's an innovation because modern armies use this technique to think about these strategies, think about how to build armies and in new ways. so now it's also trying to have in tunisia a white book. that was launched in november 2060. they set their goals but i have no time to explain or speak about the old goals of the white book but this is very important element now to understand the tunisians in tunisia but again, i have a remark here. the white book is proposed
only to create ownership. ownership between the structures, between the military and security centers. we have to create confidence between people and those structures because without people, you cannot fight . terrorism is not, it ithere on the ground, it is living in our city and they have a new generation of the fast food generation of japanese. in two weeks you had your bodies because you have to face not only your body but also the facility of the world. [inaudible] you have a lot of self these in our country and one woman who crossed the border being nonviolent and being violent and we have to be prepared to do that. in order to be prepared we have to involve all of the
components of this idea and we have to work on one thing. this thing is how to deal with our religious prejudices and with our religious differences. we have to learn how to not use the consent of haram ll in our society. it is what is permitted but is forbidden originally and we are in our houses using it , this is haram, this is halal. we can be considered part of the terrorist movement because tomorrow we are creating those were transcending the haram or and we have to involve society on that. we have to make the societies learning how in the.
[inaudible] way. to avoid. this is also partly innovation and we have to deal with that and not only to speak about our self and between experts or between those who are in the society to those who are of note. and altogether. thank you very much. >> thank you, mister daoud. >> good morning everyone. i'd like to thank amy for inviting me. i have been tasked or asked to discuss the not so easy topic of counterterrorist strategies or a colonel in algeria and i will do my best. right from the start it's very weird that the two countries share many many similarities.i think with relations, culture and profile. that includes also a level of economic level and to a certain extent it is a
centralized government that we see sometimes are could be a root cause of the problems that we see reedit in the region. >> the two countries obviously have different attributes and characteristics when it comes to deploying, attracting counterterrorism strategies. the example of syria, does require a broader contribution of all these purposes whether they are military or the border patrol and the minister of defense for the police needed to administer the interior and that because considering certainly the risk zones along the tunisian malian knee-jerk orders. in contrast, morocco has been relying heavily on a centralized fbi like agency called vela somehow. we see which i will refer to from now on. so as people, as we get close
to the end of the year, how did the region do in 2017 and what do you expect to see going forward, let me start with a quick status check for the year. that's closing. clear looking at the research that we do, this is not government data, this is private data. it's, ouparent company being the rest and we continuously track what's going on in the region 2017 could be considered by the moroccans and the algerian authorities as surprisingly as stabilizing year. this is not a stable year but clearly a stabilizing year and we will share some of the numbers. being exposed to the crisis in mali, libya and tunisia, algeria is closing the year with much bigger numbers in terms of incidences and counterterrorism operations but in general, when you take the broad moderate region as
a whole, libya due to his complex set of circumstances, the number of terror related incidents against surprisingly failed by nearly 45 percent compared to 2016 so we're talking numbers up to pretty much today and if you compare them versus 2016, the numbers of critical incidents dropped by 45 percent. so the three thank franco: countries are. company risk recorded 65 terror relate related incidents down from 118 of these areartifacts . the threat is remarkable considering morocco for instance did not record one single incidents so what you have left is essentially algeria and tunisia, that's roughly this type of number that we've seen. one of the reasons that led to this dropping militant action can be attributed to both the radicalization efforts undertaken by algeria and morocco and the work being done on the enforcement
side to prevent terrorist attacks. the ability of security services to adjust has clearly led the actual law enforcement unit and even the military on the ground to work a little less then the previous couple of years. but we've seen peaks in 2015 and 16. the number of security operations in these sovereign countries dropped by 56 percent, a backdrop as well. a little less than 14 hundredths known no major security interventions. >> is military and security agencies have been through it. >> but clearly that doesn't mean the security services are taking a backseat. they been extremely busy to the number of arrests that we've recorded are reaching over 5200 so a little over 5000 people have been picked
up as part of the various suites we've been tracking. that was still a 17 percent decrease from 2016 but if you compared to the previous year 2015 there's been a ramp up and security force ready for percent increase compared to 2015. which was a very busy year. so this is not necessarily good news because the figure, this figure i shared with you over 5000 extends to the arrest of civil society stakeholders in addition to suspected terrorists and criminal elements as well. >> so let me focus a couple minutes on morocco, then i'll move to military. out of morocco, to counterterrorism you've heard a lot of it today. it clearly uses a multidimensional approach that involves new tools, performing religious environments, tracking and monitoring existing militant groups, and a severe crackdown on networks with military recruitment and financing and obviously it's been enhanced cooperation with europe but around the
world as well.in an effort to control the narrative of clerics and preachers and remove the extremist elements from mosques, morocco created a couple of institutions specializing in teaching and education educating imams and sermons are highly controlled and directed by religious employed by the government. any deviation from the allowed speech would cause the imam a great deal of hardship. the terrorist attacks in 2003 have been a major turning point for morocco in terms of creating and adjusting its counterterror strategy. several years later authorities even release some of the subtleties that were arrested in the aftermath of 2003 tax. some of you have pledged allegiance to the king and country and are now putting a very strong role or heroes role in securing marks.
on the enforcement and intelligence front, the bureau has been instrumental in monitoring and neutralizing all sorts of networks and arresting suspects. the bureau has resources and is part of a domestic intelligence agency called tsc it is the equivalent of homeland security here. in collaboration with the investigating branch of the national police . we heard some numbers today. i think from 2002 to 2016 morocco has said it dismantled about 170 suspected terrorist sale. they also report that over 3000 suspects, exactly 3145 suspects have been arrested. we hear numbers from morocco that said 344 planned attacks have been stopped as well and
the moroccans are keeping a very close eye on their nationals who left or are leaving the country and end up in conflict zones.for instance, estimates from the bureau and we went to those numbers earlier, 1500 moroccan nationals went to fight in iraq and libya. mostly with daesh but also with other organizations. one of these challenges, again, this is a theme we heard earlier this morning is the role of the social networks playing in terms of recruitment and financing and funding. from morocco data suggest 80 percent of active moroccan identifiers have been recruited through social networks. they mention twitter, facebook, other social media sites. in may 2017 the authorities removed almost 400 facebook and twitter accounts and a
move that has accelerated since then and officials acknowledge there are individual groups who are using networks in the so-called darknet and therefore are very hard to mark. it's a phenomenon that they are taking. the worst part, algeria's war against insurgency and not start in 2003. i grew up in algeria in the 1980s and the proliferation of religious dissent was absolutely essential. even the most liberal pro-western individuals were often attracted by the religious antigovernment narrative that authorities tolerated after the independence in the 60s. the mosques being the only tolerated sensors for discourse, flash between them, that is the most and the government became inevitable and obviously all fermented. it was in the early to mid 2006 that the government
started drafting a reconciliation process to allow the more moderate elements of militant islam to distance themselves from the more radical ones. and to distance themselves i guess from both of the ones considered irredeemable. the reconciliation included controversial emency optis and reinsertion into society. for us it's still practiced for those willing to surrender today. there was also an economic incentive with jobs and allowing the candidates to own their own business. just like morocco, we also tightened the control of mosques starting with an essential process training teachers and the inclusion of women and providing religious guidance to the community. when i would come up, change has been the banning of the political discourse in mosques and the exclusive
focus on theology and religion. the education system currently spearheaded by a female minister also underwent transformation of the curriculum level. but clearly introducing modern views in the country's school system has been a major challenge that continues to see extreme resistance from the movement. it's a conservative society, a lot of people resisting any changes in the syllabus and other educational institutions. obviously some of the strategy has paid off. in tunisia for instance which has some 2400 national fighting with daesh in the middle east. algeria reports about 200 souls left for combat in the middle east and elsewhere. the algerian figure is apparently far less than those in france, britain, belgium and other countries individually but part of the problem appears to be working. on the enforcement front, how
are the algerians executives on their territory campaign. just like morocco, the algerian risk is largely homegrown. there are rarely foreign nationals captured by the security services to speak of a global jihadist movement in general. it's mostly a domestic phenomenon and its spearheaded by the likes of organizations called khalifa and is on graham and others a domestic focus although they themselves are an offshoot of these global jihadist movements. >> the moroccan authorities have had zero-tolerance policies towards networks. which they often treat as if they were the actual militants themselves. those targets support recruitment networks with an aggressive stance with those networks comprising a full sympathizers of the jihadist cause but also civilian populations that have been accosted in the process and forced by local militants to provide forced retaliation. that's particularly the case
in rural and isolated areas. the second category could be considered an extremely vulnerable and treated accordingly getting that there are between a rock and a hard place. minutes later the borders, algeria appears more vulnerable to weapons trafficking. the military has been active in discovering arms cachet along the borders with molly and libya in addition to the ones in the northern provinces. the phenomenon of contraband and human trafficking tends to feed into the militant networks by providing resources, mostly in a fitting al qaeda and the migrant as we've seen before. these activities mean the algerian military troops have been extremely busy and possibly stretched to their limit, specifically the need to ensure border security with libya and work facilities as well as centers in rural areas requires a special service budget.
manpower certainly remains a concern and therefore algeria has been pursuing modernization of its military capabilities with any acquisition of weapons systems that the military leadership deemed adequate to fight at the current level. in both countries, most of the insurgent groups appear to be small-scale as we said before that are inspired by an organization more ideological in its purpose and a lot less as a provider of resources. this may be a reason why we have not seen a major attack. however, proliferation makes it very hard for authorities to catch. and likely attacks out in the last, the region does not pose similar loan. the attackers in the west also target the population as well that are different in terms of religion, culture, etc. there is a different impact. security of support, its place within algeria and
morocco but algeria is often founded with a influx of resources from both tunisia and libyan borders and has the military focus on border control as well. >> these support groups outside of its borders are obviously tied to islamic state and our kia, considering these organizations have a regional mandate as opposed to a localized mandate, operational, local militant groups have a greater fund. in conclusion, the problem is that while it is necessary for these countries to pursue an aggressive anti-terror campaign, the several shortcomings and concerns that would fuel tension in the future and some of them were mentioned earlier. for instance, the social economic demands of the population are often met with the views of repression instead of normal conflict resolution. the under estimate and morocco and social protests are basic examples of populations that are strained
and have not seen an effective response from their political leaders. continuation of such tensions in the absence of a comprehensive political and economic strategy militant groups will continue to tap into public anger for recruitment purposes. but the year ahead looks also challenging. not only algeria, morocco and the region will struggle economically but there has not been a special political process in the region to advance speedily. the libyan crisis continues to create a security breach. molly has been highly destabilized. tunisia remains politically fragile. the end of the syrian crisis has been debated earlier and also adds another wildcard in terms of security going forward with the return of 2000 fighters. facing these issues, of escalating security measures and poorly managed economies that are fueling this dissent and further threatening our stability so includi, we
expect to see 2018 as a continuation of this year and should be slightly more challenging as we contemplate the return of some of the jihad. >> thank you very much. there's a lot of information on the table. as i mentioned in my introductory remarks, european powers and other external factors continue to seek viable partners in pursuing shared security objectives. that kind of approach may be the best of many possible options, some of which would be more destabilizing, perhaps or have greater negative implications or political implications to some of the western countries but those kind of approaches
are contingent on having sustainable partners who share those similar perceptions of the threat and prioritization of actions. but also who share the ground rules about appropriate tactics and mechanisms for countering these groups. i wonder if you could both touch on the ways that algeria and tunisia in particular as border countries to libya have approached this partnership question with regard to libya because libya is certainly a country where the level of chaos and the political disunity have proved serious stumbling blocks to us efforts to seek viable, sustainable partners to counterterrorism so i'm interested in and how tunisia and algeria have approached the situation over time, how those approaches have changed
the initial libyan uprising in 2011. outing ages approach may have changed under successive governments. and then i'm interested also in drawing you both have a little bit on how external actors priorities have shaped the counterterrorism approach of countries in the region. >> and you can sort of talk about that if you'd like. and then we will turn to q and a although i don't know how much time we would have to i can give you my point of view with where broadly algeria and tunisia stand or the impact of libya. these days it's not a wildcard, it's a wild place. the, there were hopes that a better political process would stabilize the country. there were several attempts to bring the various feuding
parties together. it really didn't work. it still is a country that causing an enormous amount of tension in the region. the jihad these, islamic state were at some point in tripoli, they went south. they are penetrating in tunisia, going into algeria and so an enormous amount of resources in countries like tunisia andalgeria . it's really that the infiltrations are limited to as much as possible, very hard to achieve when you have massive borders but still it's an effort that's ongoing. what's the long term, what's going to happen longer term, remains to be questioned. i think as i stated in my conclusion, we can see what we've seen in the past year or two or three. it continues to happen in libya. therefore, the border areas will rain a mar issue. syria might have different
approach to security. algeria has been existing on internal libyan conflict resolution. that involves mostly libyans, the libyan solution. obviously the presence of western troops in libya is cause for alarm for the algerian military and the algerians in general.i think the museum has taken more advantage of that by having the americans for instance helping with drones surveilling border patrols so each of them has different takes but it's very dangerous to limit the discussion with these two countries. there is obviously egypt. there's the issue of the sale. there's migrations to europe. it's a very hard conflict and when it started, i think we predicted it would take at least 20 years to sort out
and i still stick to that number. it's going to take along time for libya to get together and in the meanwhile a great deal of these projects , the budgets that the neighboring countries are going to put aside for military is going to increase over time. and it's going to create a lot of tension short of a political solution. >>. >> algeria all the time is an issue. they all the time are saying don't forget that we are big. and of course this can be a sort of or can be used for a link without area because they have profited. they have coordination with them is very important for tunisia. in the sight of our fathers
with obviously the cooperation, since nigeria is against interference or against any role of international actors, in the region, then i agree with that approach, it's very different. and tunisia as a small player can look so tunisia needs to be present and have something on the bill but at the same time, that decision needs to be supported by others, by the international community and is not really accepted. anyway, on the libyan case, tunisia needs to have its own position but in the sense, it's very difficult with whom. and tunisia discussed this. those were noted. and there is a real psychological context that
those who are in power and the western power in libya and the current actors, political actors in power in tunisia. so this is a very fragile situation tunisia has to have the support about syria because without algeria , at the same time it's a balance with also the need to have support from international players or factors. and this land, tunisia has a lot of partnerships. both international, partnerships with europe and for its part, with the so-called european security has a different policy because it's their but also it's considered as one of the
most important countries in the region since with morocco, both are partners with europe. tunisia is taking part of the 555, the forum and that's also important because the administrative differences have been discussed informally but it's very important for tunisia. tunisia has a bilateral, very strong relations with france. we have given a different agreement but it's a different agreement. we don't know if it's still on the table or not. and of course, the last year was very important partnership with the us.
but the problem now in tunisia is course we are in constant democracy level like mikhail said but at least we have several political actors to have their own views on the separation between tunisia and other international factors and it's difficult today. to say we are partnered with that. we have the support of you and we endorse this support. this is very problematic because how to face the society when you have no chorus to say yes, we have the support of us, we have the support of france. all the time we are trying to dissolve the reality and the sort of politically correct discourse.
and this is, yeah. >> very interesting. i think maybe we will take two questions given the choices. some of you already have questions but since we just have two hands we will go to bill and then hannah. >> another excellent panel, congratulations for bringing this together today. it seems to me most of the discussion of, the most interesting part of the discussion was about vision. and i would argue that for all the discussions we need to have about vision and all the vision building we need to do, algeria and tunisia have huge capacity issues. if you compare algeria and
tunisia to the moroccan case, i got the sense in knowing the moroccan case that there are a little bit ahead on the vision aspect and they are considerably ahead on the capacity area the ability to change policy and implement those policies.if you study tunisia closely, there are huge capacity issues stemming from the revolution and algeria had a different problem. hollowed out industries from the 90s and forced early retirement and security you had this weird bell-shaped curve and missing confidence in algeria so my question to both panelist is about capacity. you can have a great vision. you can work out a great vision but if you can't implement that, with the leadership that's required and the tools that's required, you will always come up with more. >>.
>> we will combine answers. >> mohammed larouche with the tunisian american young professionals. related question what bill was talking about. but there's this perception or at least related to reality that radical movements are always one step ahead. in terms of technology, in terms of, there's been a lot of discussion around the use of social media and encrypted networks and encrypted emails in my question is related in the sense that are we prepared in tunisia and algeria to face the threats that are coming our way in terms of cyber security, in terms of digital currencies, money flows. tracing all these and what kind of support we needfrom our friends in the us , european union to face those things. and it's a question to my friend doctor dress from tunisia related to the
national security council which he sort of portrayed as the very integrated structure which is needed in tunisia but that may perhaps cause a problem in terms of roles and responsibility of the president versus the head of government. the president is elected from tunisia, hasspecific roles for the constitution . the head of government appointed by the assembly but after a proposition of the president, do you feel like the tunisian democratic model is sort of structured the right way? >> if you'd like to lead us off? >> i think to the first question, i agree with you. there's a perception of capacity issues but if you look at the three countries we are talking about.
geographically they are vastly different. when you talk about challenges facing the central country of algeria in this case the our extremely lengthy. and the bordering countries are all crisis countries. algeria being itself the crisis country as well. whereas if you look at morocco, clearly it's northwest presence or location with a couple of borders, one heavily litarized or thealgerian moroccan side and on the mauritania side as wel >> suggests that the types of issues that are facing have to be different. >> in the case of morocco, it's a lot of it is homegrown when you talk about the presence of militant groups. a lot of it is homegrown. a lot of it driven by the issues that we are talking
about earlier.economic, social, political issues. in the case of algeria, if that is what the issue of patrolling the borders as well so i do agree with you that when you look at these countries. it gets the discussion around capacity but capacities are driven by the realities on the ground tunisia specifically, it's proximity to libya , that's the primary cause number one but we know of all these issues that the tunisians are facing in rural areas and in border towns and cities where basically employment or unemployment is a big problem. the rule of law is a big problem. the abuses that some of the kids have been facing their are key contributors and these social factors, you could argue they are common denominators in the entire region and probably beyond.
certainly you do have common factors and you have factors specific to each region and i would argue that a sort of control is probably one of the biggest as far as i am concerned. >>. >> i just had a vision that's very important but i want to talk about capacities. the discussion with the capacity of absolution. of our in tunisia for example, i'm sure that we, depending on international support, we see the international actors hesitating, supporting tunisia in the capacity of absolution. i think it is able to absorb any support that tunisia can have. and the prop that's the problem why the actors are hesitating. i think it also depends on the capacity of the tunisian government but it's capacity to convince the international
actors that they are able to also play in the correct way. and this is problematic because also it is due to the political system that we have. there's another impact on the political system as mister maloof, the tunisian model of democracy is the right one. so we can imagine that the, those were designed with the current political system, designed in order to have more balance of power between those but looking for the balance of power can also lead to the absence, the total absence of
responsibility and when you have to affect absence of responsibility, you have no actors can be with us all of them are absolved by other concepts then to serve the national interest. and when the national interest is not clear, and the substance maybe, international actors cannot be confident in what they are doing and then they cannot support you. so we have to politicians that they have to be careful on that side. and to work together in order to serve the national interest but anyway, the system is now two years under that case. the adoption of the constitution so we have no clear idea whether the system is delivering what it is supposed to deliver , but let me say that in the partnership with the tunisian institute for strategic studies related to the
pregnancy, we will work together on the sort of diagnostic of the system in order to see whether the sanctions in the system are related to the able to advance not solutions but the vision for the future. >> if you don't mind i'd like to address one of the questions the gentleman asked earlier about technology . i think it's a slippery slope in terms of trying to control all of this. it's legitimate for government to try to do something about it but legislating, controlling and repressing is in my mind not the right move and clearly we've seen some disastrous examples. i think this past school
season, algeria has blocked the internet for a week because there were leaks in the baccalaureate and iwould argue that's not the right way to do it. it's absolutely , there is a right argument to say we have a control of all these inputs into the caliphate movement and the jihad he movement, that makes sense but the approach that is kind of being proposed by many with the government under pressure to implement such destructive measures is not the right way to go. in terms of international cooperation, i think i was asked the same question 10 years ago. is it, should we, is the us in a better position than what europe is to support? what's going on in the region? the answer is more nuanced than that. it's primarily a domestic issue. you have to be able to bring
support to the local government and military in terms of knowledge and counterterrorist strategies, etc. but it's a fight that the locals have to fight first. secondly, obviously there are some elements that could be outside of the paygrade in terms of border control, technology control that would require gill sets of the us or western europe. but in general, i'm an advocate of its your internal issues. you've got to fix it, you got the pics fix the politics you have to work with regional governments . they are doing it a pretty good job. some of their militaries are able to cross the borders, to help each other and that works well with morocco. but it's this never ending western sahara. that's caused a big hardship for the region. but i think it's a domestic issue. it's building, providing capacity for the local governments, making sure that we also abide by the rule of law.
there is a parallel political process that enhances , that doesn't push the people towards radicalism. but also providing the necessary support in terms of technology, in terms of ensuring that the banking system is not, is not helping the those movements to go forward. >>. >> all right, i will bendthe rules to take a last question . >> thank you madam chair. i want to add something about since we are talking about the tunisian model of national security council. the defeat of 1990, it may be talked about security national. not national security and the level was more apparent than the right, the actions.
it's for political and strategy levels. second, the article 77 from the new constitution of 2014 has identified the composition of the head of this movement and we have tunisians, specifically we have to the president of the senate inside. with the executive. so there is no reason that or worry to see a shift in power . with these concepts. this has the old one has seven permanent commissions. actually on 115 of my commission, the level already changes. the mission and the task of the national security council from the constitution were more wise so we need not just a shadow government but this
commission. we are working to talk about sex, maybe opportunities and to give the national security council which has the permanence. i mean, the goodwill of the government and two other presidents so there is no way that we think that and that. second, related to our national strategy, counterterrorism and strategy, i had an opportunity to work on this and we had as the team from the national youth, the united nations territory, they show a way to understand and to prepare a national
strategy and as i told you, we've managed to have this small basement with human rights and so on. withhe national security council, we tried to learn from the experiences and we had many go wrong with the european issues. but from belgium and other countries, even from serbia and we learned from them. we learned too much from them to advance and not make the same errors that they made. thank you. >> thank you very much for the important clarifications on tunisia's nsc. please all of you join me in thanking my fellow members of the panel. [applause] ladies, gentlemen,