tv Demographics the Future Political Landscape CSPAN April 16, 2018 9:37am-11:51am EDT
>> good morning. welcome to the bipartisan policy center am the director. we're happy to see all of you and all you fleeing from afar here at a very important for the anniversary of project that's been going on called the states of change. the states of change is a coalition of a number of think tanks working on election demographic work and it includes, we're happy as bpc to be part of this with the center for american progress, the brookings institution now the public research, public religion research institute as well as some other think tanks that event evolved along the way like aei and others on our advisory board. this is a project that covers the political spectrum and has involved a lot of talent about town. i'm here to welcome you to introduce you and to set up the
day. we had to panel for you. the first is going to be the release of a report we put out each year and it really is outlook at election demographics, how demographics data enter interact with our pl data and what scenarios what might look like or four. again this is of the fourth annual report we putting out and especially of note this report looks at the 2016 election, the first one of our series to incorporate the data edit will also makes things down this time with white college and white noncollege voters who were always in her earlier reports but lumped together and now the other closer look at with a pretty good look at what scenarios are going forward including that group. again the people on the panel here don't need much introduction but i will introduce first we're going to have three commentators, i will give long introductions because we have a big panel but we got mark hugo lopez on the pew
research center. we got matt morrison from working america and amy walter from the cook political report. you will hear from them at initial presentation. that i reserve here for our three key authors of the report that has been released today, ruy teixeira of the center for american progress, bill frey brookings institution and rob griffin the start of the public research, public religion research institute. they will make a presentation. they will take some questions, will be some interaction among the panelists panels and then d be time for you. just looking slightly further ahead we've always in this project wanted to get reaction to this data from a different, several different perspectives and the second panel will follow this one where ruy and i will come and join with two people of written papers for us and look in-depth from republican to from a democratic perspective, anna greenberg will be with us but we can introduce or more specifically later and then sean trende on the republican side.
so that's the day. we look for to having you with us and going to turn over to rob griffin for this panel. >> thanks, john. thanks, everybody for being here. i know it's a rainy monday morning. so just to kick this off we wee going to do a short presentation by bill, , ruy and myself wheree will go over some of the top line findings of the report but just to sort of point a couple tanks hold onto because we'll throw a lot of numbers at you in a lot of different simulations. the demographics of the country are changing and some of the changes are going to come to define the electoral landscape of future american elections. they will affect how the parties are going to need to strategize and what incentives they will have going forward. those are the two big things to take away today. without much ado i will turn over to bill frey who will walk us through some of the demographic changes. will?
>> okay. i'll kick it off. i think most people understand that the election of donald trump and the elections of barack obama in 2008 and 2012 were heavily affected by the changing demographics in the united states. what are talking about there is the increased diversity of the electorate, the aging of the electorate, and increased disparity between educated and say college and noncollege voters in the u.s. all of those groups, they tend to vote differently and their changes had a big effect on some of the outcomes we saw in all of those elections and will probably have even bigger impact on the elections to come. and so this 2018 report that we have written the fourth in the series as johnny said, again takes a lot of -- underlying ung demographics, key part of our research. the underlying demographics, how it is changing how it affects
election outcomes and politics in the future. two years ago before the 2016 election we put out a similar report. that report projected the 2016 election in several tech respects. several simulations with several different outcomes. based on the 2012, guided by the 2012 votes. we sort of use of those twin 12 votes, tweak them to simulate different results for the 2016 election. those of you who may recall four of those outcomes what if elected a democratic president in 2016, two of those outcomes what if elected a republican president in 2016 and without patting ourselves on the back too much one of the republican outcomes if you look at the electoral college, the shape of the states in the electoral college, not too much different than what actually happened in 2016 although a lot of people didn't believe that one. this new report we are projecting the 2020th election as well as all the presidential
elections through 2036. 2036. isa projecting and not predicting. what we do is many different scenarios with many different assumptions about how voters will change. what's, among all these different projections is the underling demographics of the electric. as to what's a two things are different about this report from the last report. one is were using 2016 as the base rather than 2012 2012 and secondly we're adding to the democratic projections education as well as race and age because we saw as a result of the 2016 election the election of donald trump, nonwhite, white noncollege voters made a big difference. they are in there as well as education in general in our projections. that's what we're going to be doing with our simulations going forward. my job now is to take you to little bit of the demographics, the underling demographics of these projections and that will be followed by discussion of the different scenarios. let's talk about race and ethnicity going forward. in 2016 the eligible voter
population was 69% white, 31% minority. we moved up to 2036 which is the last of our projections, 41% of the eligible voters are going to be minorities. the percentage that are hispanic logo from 12% to 17%. african americans stay pretty flat from 12 to 13%. asian and other races from three to 7%. we see will becoming more diverse national but what's important is what's going on in different states. this chart shows to maps of the united states. it shows the racial diversity of different states in 2016 where the darker green, the higher percentage of electorate or minorities, going up to 2036. in 2016 there were three states, hawaii, california and new mexico, that were minority white and there were four others were more than 40% of the state or minorities concluded texas,
mississippi, georgia and maryland. if we move up to 2036 by then many more states or at least 40% minority. that includes texas which by then becomes minority white. that occurs in 2020 according to our projection. by then nevada with the minority white. other states or at least 40% of electric minority will be arizona, florida, virginia, louisiana and also three urbanized northern states, illinois, new jersey and new york. you can see that's happening and what is it happening? because dispersion inward of new minorities and the united states. hispanics moving inwards from california or a a fortune texar from florida to the other states that if you look at nevada, for example, in 201660% of nevada is eligible voters were white but if we move up to 2036 that 60% goes down to 45% because of the dispersion of more hispanics and asians moving into nevada. similarly in the south east, georgia all largely major
minority group were african-americans, even more african-americans moved to georgia, atlanta is one of the biggest attractors of african-americans in the united states but more hispanics and asians -- asians moving to georgia. that will also be the case not quite as big a change in states like virginia, north carolina and other parts of the south. it you think about it this way, a lot of these southern states and even some of the mountain west states prior to barack obama as election in 2008 were largely republican states for many elections. some shifts but for many elections many republican states but their becoming much more minute overtime and more in play for the democrats. the of the set when you look of wider states and other parts of the country, those states are becoming a a little bit more diverse overtime. even in 2036 quite a slew of
states will have at least 70% of eligible voters that are white. these include the famous states of wisconsin, michigan, ohio and pennsylvania that stuck out and a 2016 election that is moving republican because of the largely white votes. we're seeing the ships going over time not in the same way a different states but affecting parties in different ways. let's look at age. if you look at the age structure this chart shows the percentage of the eligible voter population for different age groups over time. the only age group that is increasing between 2016-2036 is 65 and overpopulation. these are baby boomers. myself included in this room. as we move from that page these will already turn 65 are going to turn 65. you might look at this chart and say what about the decline in these 18-29 year olds? are millennials not going? that's true but there will not
be forever the 18-29. [laughing] the oldest millennial now is 37. soon will be over age 30 that under age 30. that's something to keep in mind. but still if you think how this moves across states, aside from states like florida and arizona and south carolina at a big retirement magnets most of the states that an older populations tend to be decline in population because it's the young people who leave or tend to be whiter states because the white population has an older age structure. we project that in 2036, the state of maine one-third of its eligible voters will be over 65. similarly with the state of florida. the big shift in the new part of our projections this time is in, incorporating the education attainment of eligible voter population. this chart shows a tween 2016-2036 the percentage of the electorate who are white noncollege whites who do not have a college degree, go from
46% down to 37%. still pretty high numbers as a part of electorate overtime but what's even more important is looking at the geographic distribution of these noncollege whites. here's a map of course the greener parts of the country are the ones with highest percentage of noncollege whites. west virginia leads all in 2016, 75% of west virginia's eligible voters were noncollege whites. texas is only 34%, california only 28% and a washington d.c. only 6% of the eligible voters were noncollege whites. that's about the same percentage donald trump got in the district of columbia. what's more important is for 28 states more than half of the eligible voters are noncollege white these include again wisconsin, michigan, ohio and pennsylvania. and even if you project this up to 2036 most of those 28 states
will at least 45% of the eligible voters noncollege whites. that tells us about how the electoral college might be different for different parties over time. i'm going to stop here except to say that these projections by education, by race, by age, we were doing for the whole country and for each of the 50 states. these are the background, this is the bedrock for the simulations that we are doing. what the simulations do is make different assumptions about the turnout of these groups and about the voting behavior of these groups. now i'm going to pass the baton to rob will tell us all about that. >> thanks, bill. so just to recap a little bit. the country is changing. we're getting more racially diverse, , getting older, more educated. what this is before politics? what does this mean for the democratic party and republican party going forward and attack the strategies they might
pursue? one of the things we decided to do was write a bunch of simulations and want tequila that were just for a second. simulations, not predictions. we are not in the prediction game. it's about time to get into in general. we are not going to does after the 2016 election. how would like to talk about these is to say they are baselines for thinking about the future. the future is always sort of inherently harder to understand. nobody can predict the martian invasion of 2024, things like that. it's really hard to sort of not say really predict but to just use these simulations to sort of have the contours of the future in mind. to say how can we think about what might come tomorrow. as bill explained all the simulations where about 2% they use the exact same set of demographic projections but what we're going to do is go in and turn the not so little bit, so what if this group turned out more? with that group supported the democratic party all the more?
sometimes one of two not smooth at once? losing among what group would be gaining among another. start up with a pretty simple one. one we call 2016 forward. what that does is it says what the people voted exactly as they did in 2016? they turned out to vote in exactly the same way and a photo for the candidates and exact same way they did in 2016. if the only thing that changes if the demographics, such as walk you guys through our sort of visual legend. the type of each of these you'll see what actually happened in 2016, and we selected out a number of key states that are interesting in that scenario. in this what it is i will, texas, ohio, georgia, north carolina, arizona, florida, wisconsin, pennsylvania, michigan. you can see by the color coding that we have iowa, texas and ohio going through strong republican wins at the georgia north carolina and the rest sort
of being a more moderate or lean republican way. on the right we have what happened to the electoral college which went for donald trump. the popular vote went for hillary clinton. what happens if we just sort of change the demographics between 2016 and 2020 but hold everybody else's behavior constant? what we see as wisconsin, pennsylvania and michigan all go blue. these narrow wins by donald trump in 2020 would actually turn into narrow less than one percentage point wins by the democratic party in wisconsin, pennsylvania and michigan. this would result in a electoral college when by the democratic candidate, whoever they are. what's interesting about 2016 though is this is obviously a high water mark for third-party vote. about 6% of the vote went towards the third party this year. what if it doesn't quite hold? what if you can think about third-party voters going home,
they go back to the parties they typically vote for so that would make a lot of joe stein voters going back to the democratic party, a lot of johnson voters going back to the republican party, 100% of mcmullen voters going back to the republican party in utah. what happens under that scenario? it's not something i've displayed that i can walk you through it. we expect michigan and pennsylvania to go democratic but wisconsin not to go democratic. this would result in a very narrow one point electoral college went by the republican party. the reason that would happen is because the main second district are some of you might remember in 2016 main apportions its electoral votes are not known who wins the statement also wins than the congressional district. it went towards donald trump and he got one electoral college vote. because single vote we would anticipate in a situation where third-party voters went home and everybody else turned out to vote anything else did the same that it would be a a republicaa very narrow republican win in 2020.
what happens as we go forward? business 2020. i'll walk through some of the results and give you an endpoint which is the end of our timeline is 2036. essential in 2024 we see florida flipping to the democratic column just a result of demographic change. in 2020 we with the north carolina carolina go added 2032 would be arizona and georgia. all of the states going blue activity states that were once a deeper red now going sort of a lighter red republican. democratic wins all the way out to be a democratic win of 350 by 2036. take our second scenario. in 2016 african-american turnout went down and african-american votes shifted slightly towards the republican party. what i mean by by that is donald trump gets slightly better among african-american voters than did mitt romney. what if we see a a return to te prior election behaviors? and increased turnout among
african-americans and also a shift back towards the democratic party. we pulled out some key states to look at the this is what actually happened in 2016. as we shift forward in time, we see pennsylvania, michigan, wisconsin, florida, north carolina which barack obama did not win in 2012 but every turn the 2012 turnout rates support rates among african-americans would result in a flip north carolina and amazing with george would join the democratic column. column. george is a fascinating state, one of the few seats with african-american population is growing, growing quite quickly. as a result of that the dynamics within the state would mean a return to this higher levels of activity among african-americans would flip this into the democratic holder is that the huge win for democrats in 2020 if this were to occur. it would win when the electoral college by 339. forward in time there's not too much to changes in the scenario except arizona joints in 2020.
236 we are essential look at a 350 vote tried what they've electoral college college for the democratic party. north carolina even going dark blue, being heavily democratic win for them. our third scenario what happens to hispanic, asian and other racial groups? go to the gop. within the major notice we've seen the last couple of years is the republican party, certain portions of it had been trying to appeal to some of these new and growing populations in order to sort of, , they think that'sa path forward for them and look for luck. we selected out some of the states. here's what happened in 2016. what would happen if they improved their margin by 7.5%. republicans would do 7.5% better democrats would do 7.5% worse. republicans would expand the electoral electoral college win based on what they want in 2016. they would pick up new hampshire
and nevada, security electoral college vote while still losing the popular vote. this is an important dynamic that you will see through a lot of our simulation is even when republicans are winning the electoral college they are still losing the popular vote if we base went off of 2016. as we go forward in time, this starts to fallout not as quickly as it appears. this electoral strategy would hold for republican party between 2020-2020. if there ever will increase the able to increase the margin among these groups they would hold onto electoral college and 2028 but we see georgia and north carolina in wisconsin, ate venue, michigan, nevada eventually go blue the demographic change is occurring, overwhelming even in this increase in support that they saw. so these are not all of our simulations. we did 37 in total but i don't want to put everybody into a light coma, but in good head off to my colleague ruy teixeira who
will walk through some changes in the white-collar vote. >> great, thanks, rob. we got a few more simulations for you. hope everybody is staying awake in this numbers extravaganza. in these simulations were going to feature an attribute of our new simulations that's very important witches would look at the education gap, the difference between white noncollege educated and white college educated voters because we're able to break up our projections between those two groups. it turns out that's really important as you might expect. in 2016 according to our data we thought white noncollege voters supported trump by 31 points. we found that white college-educated voters supported clinton by seven points. this is an immense education gap can even larger than children exit polls. we also found in our analysis white noncollege educated voters were 44% of voters which again is a lot more than the exit polls, an extremely important group. let's look at some of things
that happen we wish to look at this. this just shows you against the 2016 result in some states highlighted. what happens if white noncollege educated voters get a ten-point margin swing towards the republican party? five points less support for democrats, 5.4 for the republicans. as you can see they do very well indeed. the ad to their hall in 2016. they add. you have to, then, minnesota and nevada for 329 electoral vote victory. so even larger that in 2016. in addition they take the popular vote narrowly by one point. however that does not, the popular vote think does not last forever as in 2024-2036 the democrats come back and take the popular vote but this is interesting. in every election from 2020-2036 the republicans would take the electoral vote despite losing
the popular vote in 2024-2036 eventually by the time we roll around 2036 the democrats have taken back pennsylvania. there taken back to minnesota. nevada but that's not enough. republican still at 296 electoral votes and intellectual victory all the way through 2036. that's kind of extraordinary. this is a different scenario that in a sense the mirror image of the one which is discussed. this is a white college-educated voters continue on trend and swing towards the democrats in a ten-point margin swing. so plus five democratic for white college minus five for republicans. what happens if we walked back into 2020? as as you can see the democrats do way better. they take back the rust belt, three, wisconsin, michigan, come pennsylvania. they at arizona florida for a very robust 334 vote electoral
victory. that just continues rolling until they get the 2036 picnic take the popular vote of course all the way through this that they take the electoral vote all the way through this. by the time they get to 236 they have fully 391 electoral votes because they add to the ones that took in 2020, they get george and eventually down the line they take texas because of the influence of demographic change, to that electorate. this is a massive 391 vote electoral hall for the democrats by the time we get to 2036. as rob mentioned, it's not,, these simulations showed a lot of our simulations just turning one knob but sometimes groups change in the voting behavior in reaction to changes in another group. so, for example, what if the republicans did a lot better among new minorities, hispanics, asians and those of other race because they made a special outreach effort or sort of made
a real appeal to these voters and it was tremendous a successful, what if in reaction to that white noncollege educated voters with an exactly the other direction because hey, it's not the party anymore. what if white noncollege voters reverted to the 2012 voting patterns? this is a lot less favorable for the republicans. what we find as we move forward to 2020 is this would not be a good trade-off for the republicans. they would not only lose the popular vote as they did in 2016 but they would lose the electoral vote as well and democrats would take back michigan, pennsylvania, wisconsin. it would also get iowa and although they would lose nevada, the end result of that as a think about 279 vote electoral victory for the democrats. so that's not good at trade-off for the republicans. they wouldn't be happy with that. and then if you move forward to 2036, obviously the democrats continue when across the board
and the ad to the states they took back in 2020. 2020. they get nevada back. they take north carolina and even add ohio. so republicans are just underscores the extent to which the republicans have benefit from this white noncollege shift and a difficult it would be for them if, in fact, that white noncollege shift went away. the final trade-off we're going to look at here is one thing we saw in 2016 was that the education gap widened at both ends, the white college voted became more democratic and white, non-college educated voters became significantly more republican. what if they continue into the future widening at both ends and say there was a five-point margin shift toward the republicans among white, non-college but a five-point margin shift among white college for the democrats? we find if you do that the republicans actually on that benefit from the trade-off and that reflects the fact nonwhite
college voters there's more than white college voters and their very efficiently concentrated for republican purposes. so under that trade-off the republicans actually like would slightly amplified the electoral vote victory even as they continue to lose the popular vote. they would add new hampshire to their column and by the time you get to 2036 this disappears for the past. the republicans under our analysis would still take the electoral vote and a pocketable loss of 2024 by the time you get to 2020 and onwards they start losing on both ends and by the time you get to 2036 i think the democrats are about 350 electoral votes, if the democrats get back new hampshire, north carolina, florida and georgia to make a pretty overwhelming victory for the democrats. that just shows if we turn both that two knobs at the same time a things going in opposite
direction admit you get depends partly on the distribution also the size of the different groups you are affected by turning the knob. again it underscores how important white, non-college voters are to republicans. as rob mentioned with 37 different simulations. with hundreds more we could have run but i think you probably got enough numbers to chew on for now. so i think we will move to a discussion. >> you know, thanks, ruy. i just want to start up, i guess with sort of a general question for all our panelists, and 80, we can start with you and move our way down. one of the things we did in this report sort of intentional ints we avoided having a discussion about this is more likely that in terms of the scenario. it's something we're just wanted to go after i think the scenario we thought spoke to interesting dynamics and just and sticks of demographic change over interesting. my prompt for you a little bit, your general reaction to the report and was there scenario
that you found really interesting? may be how likely do think that scenario might be? >> that's a fantastic question. i'll start off with my first reaction to the report, which you all touched on but is the tremendous disparity between the electoral college vote and the popular vote. and that in 16 of these come and six of the 16 scenarios republicans when the electoral college but in only one did they win the popular vote. the applications of course for the populace, right, to see one party continue to win an electoral college victory while losing the popular vote would have tremendous consequences i think just going forward. but on the simulations, i thought it was fast that he gets a look at all these and they all struck me as something that we've heard either from a candidate, a party, or an ideological group about which scenario is best for them. so than the democratic party the debate right now is to just
basically right of all those white working-class voters have voted for trump, we will never get them back, they are gone and let's just maximize, like barack obama did come nonwhite voters especially african-american voters? if we do that according to simulations we win. we don't need to win that grew the back. you can also have the rnc autopsy. remember when the recommended in 2013 we got to do better among nonwhite voters? that also succeeds a forever as you guys noted and has a short shelf life but it can get into 2020. then there's what i would call the trump more cowbell scenario which is give even more with white working-class. forget about everything rnc autopsy said, anything that the sort of never trumper said about reaching out to this traditional establishment republicans. that also can work. and then there's i would call
the joe biden scenario which is get those white working-class voters back from 2012. everybody can point to a scenario where it works. i think that is going be fast and as a watch 2020 get in shape where anybody can come out and say if we do things my way, see? these guys tell me that there's a possibility of it working versus this debate in which one is the best. >> reactions to the stereo and maybe which do you think is the likeliest to occur. >> first i i want to see the report is interesting to read and have enjoyed reading these reports over the years. there's a lot of insights, a lot of great thing relations to consider about what happens if this occurs or that occurs. the one thought that did occur was a synthetic or do, you have a lot of singers where one party wins the electoral college but the other one wins the popular vote. i can't imagine what would happen if red several years and wrote or elections interval
where the sample with the democrats were on the losing second republicans on a winning second look at the conversations in california after 2016, for example. in terms of scenarios one synergy didn't talk about was what about what happens when you get the latino vote in the asian-american vote turnout rates up to everybody else,, close the gap. great idea. would like to see it happen. i think if it did happen you would see some pretty big differences but there's been a lot of effort to get out the latino vote over the years and the story and the track record has been one of declining at least flat-footed participation in fact, we tend to be in a scenario right now were more than half of hispanics who are eligible to vote don't turn out to vote. as you sit in the report, latinos are distributed in a way that's not advantageous for campaigns to pay attention to them. it's also young and those are part of the reasons why was he that. i'm not sure how likely that scenario is.
the scenario i would've liked to seen you write is one that runs what happens if the latino vote and the asian-american vote sees slight increases in voter turnout but not necessarily this matching but we see for whites or blacks across all education groups. that seems at the moment really, really unlikely. the other thing that i thought that was interesting about the report is looking at some of the statement you hear people talk about when will texas turn blue, when will georgia turn blue. it's interesting to see the different scenarios and when that happens. my final comment is when you take a look at latinos and asian-americans i think there's two things you need to worry about. one, the sold-out of emigration of both groups. it's happening in a significant way for hispanics, starting to happen for asian-americans. i wondered what that means in terms of growth. the second part is that spent a population is very diverse. it's not the same. your scenario but it an additional 7.5.2 republican candidate among hispanics not out of the range of possibilities. that's about where george bush
was in 2004 so it's possible but i do think there is some changes within the hispanic population that might lead to a different set of voter turnout rates and voter support for different candidates defending others candidates, and depending on the group when we talk about puerto ricans in florida or in new york. cubans in south florida. i'm asking you to do a lot, i realized that is not speedy let me just get that on my schedule for the next year. >> matt? >> well, first of all thank you so much for the report. i always find the work you guys put together in forming a trend that we landscape. i'll say a couple things that jumped out at me. one company spent a lot of my youth in georgia i'm really excited about the prospects both near-term and long-term. i do think it's interesting that one of the immediate questions
before us is what happened this year, not just what happens in 2020 and beyond, for that timing is everything. if we think about what's at stake this year, a full slate of governors races, control of the house et cetera this has implications for what the shape of congress is for the next decade, for example. the opportunities for dramatic shifts in power are pretty near-term. i think the second thing that really jumped out at me and this is partly a function of work we do, is there's really no meaningful path for republican party to exist in this country without over performing in the noncollege white vote share. and that national, localized, et cetera. that's a strategic proposition. i'm going to do any mention, and ideological group. i for perspective think if you have conservatives, -- partly
what barack obama did to an extent in 2012 and in 2008, then the fundamental shifts what the map can be. i think to the point in terms of increasing voter participation for more diverse parts of the electorate, i agree wholeheartedly. i've been one of the actors is been trying to affect voter turnout and you see that behavior is a hard thing to move. it takes a lot of testing and adjusting and learning cycle to cycle. ohio went from 4.8, 5.8 million votes between 2,052,004. if hillary clinton got six and thousand more votes in texas and barack obama did. you can have these massive shifts in participation but it's hard to predict and it's even harder to cause. those are some of the things that really jumped out at me. in terms about next steps playbook kind of where does the
interest lie, we are working on your to do list, rob. i'd like to understand this question at a finer grain geographic level. if you look at the overlap between where education attainment exist particularly amongst white voters and urbanity. if you look at smaller communities obviously those of the older populations that was referenced earlier but it's also tends to be a lower educated population and, quite frankly, there's less communication in the spaces as a political matter. those are some of the trends that are jumping out at me. >> let me go off of what you had there, met come and talk about that when 18 election. so if none of you want to talk about the 2018 election. i apologize for this boring digression, but from here on out i think we can have a conversation. since the inauguration we seen a lot of special elections where democrats have been over performing. they've been doing a little bit
better than hillary clinton did in 2016, republicans have been doing a little bit worse than trump did in 2016. what do you all see as driving that? is it just thinking about our knobs here, is this changes in turnout were missing democrats and republicans turnout at different rates, or is his people changing their mind? >> i'll just sit at the outset it does look much more about turnout than it does about persuasion, about people actually changing their minds, although i think pennsylvania in special elections a few weeks ago did show that in order for democrat to win their while it was helpful that he got democratic turnout, he also did need to win over some republican voters. so we needed to get some minds changed. it's also true that the procession of donald trump and a lot of these districts is different than the perception of them back in 2016. he took 58% of the vote in the
special, sorry, not special, in that district in 2016. the approval rating according to the polling writing by for the election was 49%. republican with 49% perceptions of the the present for having a direct impact on the perceptions of the republican party. take some of the numbers you put on the screen in terms of the under or over performance by certain groups and you're just sort of pump those up, especially women, younger voters and nonwhite voters who, and the women's numbers right now to me are the most dramatic and what you're looking at the most recent poll that came up this weekend at just the perception of the president, job approval of the president that women now are off the charts in terms of the disapproval ratings of the president. we are also seeing that the intensity of disapproval of the president is that much stronger
that approval of the president. i think a lot of this is intensity more than it is changing the actual demographics. we'll know a little bit more about changing of the demographics. i think that's much more about once we get to 2020 than 2018. >> i'll jump in. i'll start with pennsylvania 18, the race where we are active campaigning. wait a chance to see up close what's going on with the different segments of the electorate. just at ask a broader oversimplification white college voters have decided where they are on trump. to the extent that was a significant portion of it coalition, if you were earned $80,000 a year of your four year degree and you're white that generally means you are republican. that portion of the electorate has started to shift considerably. we saw in virginia. we see it in place after please. do we saw in georgia six. the question is how much of the
vote doesn't make up after any given election? in pennsylvania 18 that was an important part, a 20-point gap or so. we track approval and that particular race for trump and what we are seeing, as you just said, trump approval is absolutely predictive of where you fall. the second part of this was and how do you get to the corridor lamp type victory quick yet to work into a more working-class electorate is that's just who the voters are. if you look at washington, westmoreland, greene county, these are outside of allegheny county, somewhat rural populations. that's about 60% of the population. excuse me, of that vote. it shifted in every one of those counties in terms of his vote share. he improved his vote share. that's unique that because when you look at virginia, if you look at alabama senate which probably not a replicable set of
circumstances, but if you look at these different races what you're seeing is that actually been a lot of places we see that type of shift from the noncollege white since the last election. and so one of things were going to have to pay close attention to the cycle, this year i should say, is to what extent are college educated whites represented in the upcoming electorate versus noncollege educated whites, versus people of color? the one thing i do want to point out and i should've said this earlier, i do think we should acknowledge barack obama was a unique historical figure and so the probability of getting african-american turnout and vote your back to the same levels as when barack obama was on the ballot, it does require some real imagination. we will see what happens in georgia. as a primary, epson on the commercial contest and so should one of the candidates prevail, we had the opportunity to see,
can you replicate that particular phenomena and over , therefore, change the composition of the electorate. that's what i'm interested in. >> let me key off one of the points you brought up, amy, and it's young women. recently there was a pew report put out which one of the biggest find i saw from was a huge shift among millennial women in the last four years. today 70% of melena women identify as democrats or say failing toward the democratic party. a lot of that has happened just in the last four years. what's driving that right now and what you think maybe are some of the long-term consequences of that? >> i really agree wholeheartedly about the shift college-educated voters on trump i think were always a little bit later in 2016. i think there was a sense of, i don't know about this guy, i don't really like his behavior but man, hillary clinton, right?
i can't. four more years of that. he's a businessman and he's an outsider and is going to change politics, and there's, , sure, they're still on college educated white republicans who feel that way, right? i still don't like his behavior but i like what he is doing just policy wise. but i think for women what you saw was right after the election was a sense of engagement that had not been ignited or intensity that had not been ignited by hillary clinton, that the idea of having a woman as president was exciting for many of these women but what they got with the election of donald trump was even more intense in terms of their reaction to the. that's what's remarkable about this coalition that right now is engaged certainly much more engaged than the trump coalition
is what we're seeing in american politics now is what it takes to engage this coalition, not that there's a transform the figure of every month and is supportive of as much as they turn out and are engaged because of how much they hate the other person. that can drive you through midterm election most certainly to give me even drive you through an election presidential election but it's not enough to sustain you as a party. so what do democrats do with all these new folks that are engaged to keep them engaged? what kind of candidate in 2020 can take that coalition of women, of nonwhite voters, college educated white voters, of younger voters and say, okay, and here's the path forward for our party, rather than just your going to come out and throw sticks at the white house. >> so we've we talked a couples you about sort of white,
non-college voters. what we've seen a century since 2008 has been a been a decline in democratic identification among this group. it's been pretty dramatic even over the course of the last, it will be ten years now. this is just a question for the panel sort of, how much of that is permanent at how much is the democratic party can still win back some of these white, non-college voters who at least temporarily have left the party? >> i might add to that, kind of sort of make that question even more in-your-face but whatever. if you look at the data, it's pretty clear that the knob the republicans want to turn is a white, non-college. they don't have to keep it where it is. they want to turn up the volume. how feasible is that? is there any ceiling to republicans -- do they eventually have to do something different? >> right. you do look at that and you think, i mean this over democrats and a lot of us got in trouble in 2016 because we look
at president obama or democratic performance say in western pennsylvania and we said, democrats can't get worse than this, right? if these folks elected and african-american dude named barack hussein obama, certainly they can vote for a white woman. okay, or not. they can actually -- i just knew in 2016, the same in minnesota people think i thought we hit the low mark with obama, like democrats can't do any worse than this. this is our absolute floor, and then with hillary clinton it went at much lower. i guess you're right you could, could you get to 75% noncollege -- i mean, i can remember which poll it was this weekend had trump among noncollege whites in the '70s. if you said he got 31% margin can sober in the high 60s, right? maybe. i don't know. what do you guys --
>> sure. i mean, you can always get worse. [laughing] unit, it's fascinating you know, one of the values of the report is its painting on a canvas that is also influenced by a lot of other folks who are painting on this campus. what's happening with economy, incarceration issues, et cetera. when you start to look at kind of that composite set of indicators, the trendlines for noncollege whites suggest that if i could actually could get considered we were turkey of increasing incarceration levels. obviously we've all heard about that often we offer know firsthand what the opioid addiction means. you are having, you know, i regret that i can't recall the authors from princeton that did an analysis or from princeton, sorry, did an analysis of the
creation of jobs in the last decade. 95% of all new job creation was in the informal sector. uber drivers, that type of thing. that trend line is the type of thing that i think actually drives wages, elevates differences between different constituencies. i think you could actually get a lot worse. there's good news for democrats. there actually is a real credible path and there's a lot of evidence to support that he showed up and engaging directly, does change how folks are processing. it changes in a measurable and a consistent way. if there's actually an explanation, if i'm in southwest virginia, that medicaid expansion means something to our particular community then that gives you a different variable to process when you're thinking about where you sort yourself in the political context. i don't think it's a surprise that we are seeing virginia possibly reverse course and
expand medicaid for 400,000 people, partly because you have had so many republican defections from folks who previously said no, i'm not voting for this. it can get worse but it also cn get a lot better. >> how much of this is driven by policy and how much is driven by culture, right? this has been a culture fight for so long that your wanting or the other is not really a specific policies that these parties are represented but how do you identify with the messenger. i think a lot then depends on who the messenger is going to be, right, or the democratic party and the republican party going forward, having and ability to actually make significant changes among these demographic groups. >> mark, i want to wrap up with just one question. anybody who looks and the political democracy space would say we make too many assumptions
about the future of the spanish identity, people continue to identify and suspended .4. i'm wondering if you could sort of walk us through maybe some of the democratic change that occurring in this community and why we might be wrong to assume they're going to continue to identify a suspended. >> a great question. also the general question, is there a population or should say community called latinos? i've tried to use the word population to describe this group because community employs they all have the same point of view. it's not necessarily clear that's what's happening. there are two big trends that are changing the way in which latinos see themselves in the united states see the identity and perhaps were we might be in 40 years, for example. first is declining immigration. ..
they married at a rate of about 25%. how does that compare to whites and blacks? ten to 15%. this intermarriage rate has been constant so as we move forward we will see more. we just did a report that looks at what happens to people who have hispanic ancestry but no longer call themselves hispanic. we literally asked why don't you consider yourself hispanic. these people would say the number one reason is i didn't
know my ancestors but i didn't speak spanish, i grew up american. i think we will see the population continue to grow and it will be important for u.s. population growth however i do think you will see news numbers slow down and the notion of hispanic identity might be different 20 years from now than it is today. >> we will turn it over to the audience. there should be people walking around with microphones. just a couple bits of order, please wait for the microphone so we can hear you. please let us know your name and make sure your question is a question. gentlemen here in the row. >> don, i wonder if these trends would lead to one thing
being more dominant than the other in terms of economic policy or cultural policy, so on. does this point to a changing important issue that would arise in the 2020 elections? >> the economy is always important, especially if it's not very good. i think i will always dominate especially minorities and they may help turn them out even further in the future. it looks like it's okay now and it probably will be good in 2020 although we don't really know, something could happen but certainly, the idea of culture, we saw how important culture was in 2008 and in 2012. the turnout not just of african-americans but other minority groups as well. that is not going to go away and i think, as much as we want to talk to the interest of working-class whites and rural whites and this group of people who seem to persist in all of our simulations are sort of their, they keep
popping up in 2024 in 2036 and so forth. it's also important to look ahead at the minority population which will be a bigger portion of not only the 18 - 29 but the 30 - 34 and so forth as we go up. despite what's happening with the hispanic population, and i agree there's a little bit of a moving away from that hispanic identity. that won't happen very quickly. i would say for 2020, cultural issues are going to be important. >> it's a little hard to separate cultural from policy issues or economic issues. one thing that occurs to me is maybe the tag phrase will be something like gets the
geography stupid because if you look at where the move to trump is concentrated and you look at the kinds of communities these people live in, they are very distinctive, they have sort of a cluster of economic problems related to place an economic decline and lack of mobility, there is a whole set of problems there that may be could be addressed by policy if that becomes underscored is something that is critically necessary. really, the same thing you could say about communities of color in a lot of parts of the united states. they have things that are very placed specific to the economic problems so maybe one thing we will see in 2020 is more of an attempt, it's not one-size-fits-all. they are distinctive problems in parties and places and have to speak to them in distinctive ways. >> the woman in the third row. >> thank you very much. i am a wisconsin native. i would like to point out that senator johnson won by 3% of the vote as opposed to the 24000 that trump won by so perhaps in your demographics and your studies you might
have looked at johnson's vote versus trumps vote going forward. but my larger question on all your demographics is that my take away, regardless of simulation for the state of wisconsin, is that massive suppression on a multilevel work so you need to keep down the african-american vote in milwaukee and kenosha with strong voter identification law. you need to punch out wikileaks anti- clinton democratic party stuff online and you need to work the elderly on the social issues with the coke brothers and if you have those three levels or more of suppression in the state of wisconsin it will stay republican. >> just to underscore what you're saying, according to
our analysis there was a 19-point drop in black turnout in wisconsin. whatever the reason, it's pretty amazing and it's hard not to think some of the laws that were passed and some of the difficulties to vote had something to do with it. it wasn't as effective or didn't seem to hav have as much affected some other state but clearly it's part of the environment that parties will have to deal with. one hopes they will decide and favor a fair fight rather than putting some sort of scale. >> i just wanted to jump in on both of that, but the earlier point, we took a look at african-american vote in ohio and we went under the field survey and just asked
different cohorts, so voted in 12 and 16, didn't vote in either, voted in 12 only but not 16 and we wanted to understand what was animating people's participation levels. did black voter turnout dropped by 10% here in ohio from 2012 to 2016? why do you think that is. we are being intentionally provocative to see what type of response we could get. across each of those segments, regardless of what level of participation they had, the consistent answer was many said i don't think it even matters. and so there's this culture versus policy question. i think there's a pretty big group of folks who don't have any connection to the system. you do need to figure to elevate interest when you have to go beyond where is my self interest in participating in the process. i think we have to take a deeper look at what the economic interest are. they are not peculiar to white
working-class people. people of color have economic interest as well. let's look at the full set of actors who are involved. >> this gemini here. >> thank you. my name is mark, my question has to do with the white non- college-educated and the question was treated, at least in the presentation as a single group, but if you peel off swimming, is there much of a difference, and particularly looking at 2020, i'm wondering if you peel down a white non- college women are they as concerned about sexual assault, adultery, the whole raft of issues with a start losing with college-educated women. >> okay, if you look at the
data, we weren't able to include that in our simulation because we just couldn't cut our sample sizes too small but if you look at other data from 2016, it does suggest that there was a huge difference between noncollege white women and men in terms of voting behavior but we do see, in terms of data that has come out since the election that the noncollege white women are definitely moving away from trump at a faster rate than noncollege white men. that's a potential significance. one thing the data does show from 2016 is that if we looked at more nails, we look at young noncollege whites and we didn't have a broken down between women and men but they are quite different. there much less hostile than democrats, they had much more positive results and so it would appear that the younger generation of noncollege whites and i would assume that would especially apply to women might be much more assessable to democrats than some of their older
counterparts. so it's not all one big glob of voters. there are very important differences among them by generation and gender and i think there's potential for democrat. >> this is where 2018 will be really important to see if those splits that are starting to occur in terms of moving to or away from trump, will that actually become clear in the midterm elections where you will not to see white college women in the suburbs moving away from republicans voting for democrats but you will see a drive driven by women who are noncollege and i am fascinated to see what the turnout level will be. usually women turnout by one or two points more than men at the national population, but i will be curious to actually see if we're going to have an even more significant turnout differential given the intensity that we are seeing
among women. >> let's try to hear. >> hello. stacy with veterans vision. my good woman over there touched on my question and stole a little bit of my thunder. i was wondering, what role will these voter laws play as far as your demographics are concerned because laws are changed every year and every state has different laws and you say african-american turnout was low, however a lot of them were purged from the voting role. they showed up but they were turned away. how will state laws affect your demographic in the future? as far as access to voting?
>> ohio is one of our flagship states so we've got a lot of analysis about it. we looked at the changing population from 12 to 16 and the number of registrations by race. what you see is a far disproportionate level in terms of removing folks from the pole based on race. that's not shocking. i know there are several folks who have been litigating this matter. i'm not sure where it stands before the court, i think it's going before the high court. what we are seeing is that even inside of that context there is still a depression of voter participation and you have both the purge and the folks left on the role are not participating at same level as what we had before. some of this is a direct affect to suppress voter turnout. i think we should take a broader view of what is
actually suppressing voter turnout. i think gerrymandering is and major factor. if you don't have to compete for geography, who's mobilizing? lastly, i think alabama is a known for its most progressive framework. their use our heightened level of voter participation. i think the objective is clear for these laws. the effects tend to be more nuanced are coming from a broader set, mainly gerrymandering. >> i want to talk about the message mattering and people feeling like they have something at stake. we heard this over and over again who saw the biggest drop between 2012 and 2016 election. day.what does it matter. agency anything they liked in
either candidate, they didn't think engaging in the process would make their lives better, that was as much about it so i think if you're thinking ahead of what's the most important thing you need to do to engage more people of color in the process, the first thing you need to say is why does it matter to vote. it's like a little laboratory. what can you get to get people more involved? how can we do gerrymandering and a fairway? automatic registration, top two primary process that encourages people to come and vote in the primary. we saw this in 2014. the last time i dug into this was in 2014 where we had the lowest turnout in modern history because it didn't
matter. i go when i vote. nothing changes, the system is still dysfunctional, my system is in better or they say my neighborhood is better summon about in city council and school board because that affects me. don't expect me too come to you. you have to go get them. until politician gets that and i think trump got that with a certain community of voters and they turned out at a rate that nobody really had expected because he spoke exactly to them. you're right. nobody has come and asked you. nobody did say what would it matter if you showed up or didn't show up. want and ask you all tell you i'm going to do.
for any candidate running for president, if your first question isn't how i get you to think that i'm in help make your life better rather than how megan a change the law so you turnout than i think you're kinda missing something. >> unfortunately, to keep us on schedule that was have to be the last question. everyone if you could join me in thanking our panels. [applause] and i'd like to invite the second panel up. >> welcome back. we are moving on to the second panel. i am here with michael ringleader who you saw earlier
and we will join by a couple people who are known to all of you but also have worked with us in the past and working closely with us today. anna greenberg and sean trendy. they have written papers for us but let me say also that they are part of an advisory board that we have which is really an incredible advisory board. they been helpful along the way giving advice and their other members of the advisory board in the audience. rob lange is here and a great group of demographers who really keep us honest and give us advice over the years, but anna and sean have written papers for us this year from the perspective of the democratic and republican parties. what should they take away from all of these scenarios
and these papers are available for you to read, i'm going to give you a couple options. one we have a printed copy for those of you in the room. if you haven't grabbed it, these are the two papers by shauna nana, the report underlines this project which really was just presented and was available as part of this package and both can be found online, certainly at the bipartisan policy center and american progress.org, at brookings.edu. we hope that you will take a look at both the two papers we discussed on this panel and also the underlying report we heard of in the first panel. again, without waiting too long to jump in i want to give one award to sean trendy, sean was supposed to be a guest last year, panel is not a paper writer but he was coming in to really give his commentary and had the worst
of planes trains and automobiles that you might imagine with several flights canceled and could not make it last year. this year he was prepared to come the night before and everything was fine except planes were canceled again, rainstorms prevented his drive all the way here which he drove through the night and i made him stop in the middle but he is here with us. we are grateful to be with him. what we are going to do is have a conversation with you. were not going to asked him to recount their papers, you should all read them but we will ask what the highlights are. >> let me share with you. maybe you just telescope your basic argument for us but also may be related to what sean wrote, where do you agree with sean, where do not agree with him, where you come out in that sense. how might it differ a little bit from sean's view. >> i was lucky enough to write a paper from the democratic perspective and i think it's often the previous
presentation, it's a much more rosy scenario than the republican side so i figure a way to been more fun to write my paper that was for sean reading his paper. one of the thing it raised for me has a democratic strategist is that it really hits home the challenge of what the progressive narrative is for democrats. in this narrative that's laid out and some others that i generated, you can easily win in the future solely on the votes of minority voters, white college-educated women and not ever talk to the white working class. in other words there are scenarios where you can replicate hillary clinton's performance of white working-class voters which is historically bad and you can just keep that constant and just look at demographic changes in shift in the margin and win easily without ever talking to white working-class voters.
tactically that's a fine strategy but for the democratic party not such a fine strategy and it mirrors all the debates we are seeing about what the national messages because you have identity politics versus populism and that can be framed in very negative and destructive ways for the democratic party. while i think that the more and most realistic scenario is one that democrats win pretty easily and i'll walk you through that because it's not in the underlying report, i also really beg the question of what is that narrative that deals with populism and white working-class voters because i think most agree it's not really acceptable to say we don't care about white working-class voters. this narrative that i developed in 2020 that leads to a fairly easy win, i won't go through everything they talked about but holding the 2016 election constant and then looking at the demographic changes, a
democrat can win in 2020. it's very tenuous especially if you allocate third-party votes are actually it's probably a one electoral vote win for republicans, but if you keep the third-party vote dynamics the same, they can win in 2020 purely on the strength of the growth of minority voters and particularly new minority voters and college-educated voters. it's very closely you have to get pennsylvania and others where the .5 margin and thence where campaign actually matter a lot inc. close races. the quality of the candidate and the campaign, what kind of spending is happening from the inside and the outside, but i think if we look at what has happened since 2016, that scenario is unrealistic. you can look at virginia as a good example but also pennsylvania 18 and in both cases, the dynamics are slightly different but what we saw is better turnout from democratic groups and the suburban part of virginia and
closer to pittsburgh but also emergent ship. as an example, hillary clinton 151% of college-educated women in 2016. it's a really significant shift in margin. when you look at that dynamic, the margin, the democratic margin went up with minority voters. they're actually trending higher on turnout and more democratic even as the african-american margin turnout dropped. how could turn out in margin where obama was a historic figure that enjoyed enthusiasm that is not easily easily
replicable. then there was a slightly higher turnout margin among minorities because they're ready trending that direction. it wasn't a massive shift. then i increased the margin among white college voters in this project was not able to look at gender but there's no doubt my mind it's mostly college-educated women that will drive the margin ship. i didn't touch turnout because not only did it go up, they have much higher levels. in one inflate the white college voters. in that scenario, democrats win by nine points. the easily win the electoral college. they win all those blue wall states in north carolina. if you look at that since trump was elected, that scenario seems entirely realistic to me is without
doing anything. so much of what's happening on the ground is organic. they're not specifically doing anything to generate this enthusiasm. people are just desperate to do something. i think the implication is for democrats that you can live without worrying about noncollege voters and i think that's problematic from another perspective. sean wrote a really interesting paper that i sort of mostly agree with in the sense that real events happen. 911 happened. world war ii happen in things shift and realign. we can project out from these numbers, but nothing is set in stone and nothing is inevitable and certainly there are lots of scenarios we can think of that would change the dynamic in both the short and long-term. i think sean does a great job of talking about all the things we assumed in the past that end up being quite changeable.
>> off of your paper will be very memorable in that you look at it as if you were an analyst in 1925 and look at some trends, republicans have been doing very well and trends that would never change that democrats would always when the south and working-class voters were trending and of course those things all changed dramatically within just a few short years. could you just look at some of the factors, what might we think might not hold as we go forward a number of years but what are the scenarios you see that seem the most likely. what might change in what seems the most likely. >> it's not just 1925.
there's any number of elections. if i told you they were about to win seven of ten elections in six of those were landslides, you would have me committed. if i told you in 2009 they were going to nominate someone who let their campaign off saying they were a bunch of rapist except for those, i'm a skeptic and i would've said no way, that's not going to happen. these things have a way of not playing out once you give a few cycles down the road. i don't disagree with the way this data has been presented. i think it's important to distinguish between the majority and the way we wrote about and some of the stronger versions we see some of this
was covered in the last panel but the hispanic vote shifts as you get more intermarriage and more conversions to protestant which does happen a few generations. does the hispanic vote stay salient or does it turn out like the italian-american sort of is for me. for my grandparents, that was it. i was there identity. for my mother that sort of her identity and for me that's the side of the family i'm closest to, but i don't particularly identify with them. my kids have no clue they are native italian. we forget 1985 part of why
justice scalia gets appointed is because the italian vote is incredibly important to what was then the swing state of new york. these things can shift in very short order. we talked a lot about the afghan american vote and what i think is a difficulty, with all things equal, and with president trump i think all things are not equal, but getting that to return to a 2008, 2012 level of turnout is not just the historic nature of candidacy in that he was the first afghan american president. i think quite frankly that sells him short for what a talented politician he was. he was able to do that while keeping the white working class largely on board and that was a tremendous feat that i don't think he would have seen from a lot of other after american politicians along the way. i was always the concern with jesse jackson. i think it's a very different presidential run than barack obama. what happens if those trendlines continue. there are a lot of white
working people out there. the problem is you start to run into college students. you start to run into breezes and that demographic. just like a republican strategists would feel comfortable that 30% was there flow of african-americans because that's how it had been for 24 years and then sought fall down to 10%, i'm not convinced we haven't seen the worst of it for democrats without college degrees. >> let's follow up with and on. you have a lot of good things to pick from in the demographics of the current performance, you laid out a
number of scenarios to do very little and you still win or do a lot and you barely win. looking at the current climate and looking into the future, where you think they will be moving? what would you pick out and say i think the democratic party would be doing much better. the second question, i know you spoke about this but you saw some weaknesses around the edges of the democratic coalition, whether it's after american men or other parts of the coalition, where would you say the democrats might actually have a little more weakness than some people might recognize today. >> interesting. i do think, this is more, if not necessarily based on the data but it's not a moral
weakness but a political weakness is the feminization of the democratic party. on one hand you are seeing huge numbers, the gender gap is bigger than ever, driven by white college-educated women and younger women and there's obviously some overlap but not complete overlap and certainly minority women, especially after american women who you see just tremendous support. white college educated women are almost becoming a group and are more likely to vote than other people. then you have historic number of women running, i have no doubt we will see a significant shift in the gender makeup of the house and even if nancy pelosi is not the leader, you want to see significant women in leadership. there's just no way you can sustain what is mostly male leadership in the house when you have this kind of energy. that is a great thing in my perspective. however it's clear that there
plenty of men who are sexist and did not want to vote for hillary clinton. i heard people who were democrats say awful things about her and instead of sangamon hold my nose because she's married to bill clinton she's been in the white house, not even mentioning that she was secretary of state but i think a lot of them voted for steiner didn't vote, i did some postelection research among millennial's and only 50% of millennial hispanic men voted for clinton. they didn't vote for trump, they voted for a third party. one potential weakness would be a backlash against democrats from male voters. i think you could see something like that happening. >> sean, let me ask you about something you mention that's near and dear to my heart which is the emerging democratic majority thesis. i do feel, speaking as someone
who is pretty close to the genesis of that thesis that it's been widely misunderstood and oversimplified to the point of just being sort of a trope. maybe you can expand. speaking of someone close to emerging democratic party, i do feel like you're onto something there's a great. [inaudible] it's an important. >> my book, if i may plug, the vast majority was originally conceived as a response to the
emerging majority and then i made the mistake of actually reading the book and i thought this is nothing like what i see in the new republic or the new yorker or favorite progressive publication. it's a very nuanced work that emphasizes heavily the importance of careful governanc governance, of tending to the various portions of the coalition of the time, it does not, it relies heavily on the white working class vote which, things have changed and i agree it's less important than it was at the time, but, the book is a very careful book about spelling out that this is not inevitably what will happen, that some of these states will be wrong, and at the same time it was dead right about the trends in virginia and colorado and nevada. at the time that no one really took that seriously.
it got a lot of things very much right and so, i think it's important when talking about these demographics because the emerging democratic majority in the book was not originally that it was just an argument. real quickly on what and i was saying, i just want to follow-u follow-up, i've always taken the view that political coalitions are like water balloons and you step down on one side and another side pops up, and i think that's a real problem for the democrats going forward. you can try to tend to the various portions of the coalition, but inevitably you have a message that dominates and i think we kind of saw that in 2009 and 2010 where were trying to keep this coalition at the time of wealthy white liberals, upper middle-class suburbanites, white working-class voters,
minority groups together to really cause some tensions and fractures. i agree you can win elections in a particular way, but keeping that group together when they have some competing interests, without the threat of donald trump front and center, i think it's difficult. >> if we could ask the question to both of you can i think you both have some expertise in the midwest, you are a midwesterner sean and you've done a lot of work from the union movement, so this is the key reason last election and for the white working class vote that's up for grabs, maybe sean, could you think a little bit about republican performance, we've seen a lot of governors win in the past ten or 12 years and that certainly is some on the wor working class but some of the windsor little different, their little more suburban,
what's your thought of the white working-class or what we should be thinking about, and i guess anna, that too, but also labor and the importance of labor and the union movement and diversification and within the labor movement. what is the future? >> i think one of the things that we have danced around is the electoral college in the senate and how two thirds of the government is decided in with the nonwhite vote you do get a large concentration in states that just aren't competitive. the white working-class is spread across the midwest which is becoming the swing region. i think the real alarm bell for the republicans there is that what they're taking on with whites with college degrees.
it's the crucial county, the bright red ring around milwaukee that's been the republican base. if that turns purple, republicans are up a creek. same thing with the county i live in may have voted republican in every election since 1916, but it moved, it was still a trump county but it moved five or six points for donald trump it was historically a week showing for republican spread there are real alarm bells going on in addition to some of the movement toward republicans that we've seen that are counterbalanced in 2016, but down the road may not. >> i don't think you can separate what happened to hillary clinton in those states from the assaults on the labor movement in those states. i do think there's some pretty important research that shows
that the elimination of collective bargaining in wisconsin has had a direct impact in the percentage of people voting democratic. it ranges from what happens when people are in unions and the effect of peers and that diminished but also the resources that unions have brought to communicating with union members in bringing out union members to vote primarily about 65% democratic. you also saw the same kind of assault in wisconsin which was the most extreme example but certainly in ohio you also had some real attacks on unions and the right to organize and bargain collectively. i cannot remember the name of the report but there was recent analysis that discussed what the impact of these policies had been on the strength of the union and their ability to get out votes for democrats. i do think one other thing, that's not a problem that's going to go away. even if democrats take over state government and that will be tough in some places, reinstituting those kind of laws and the culture is not
something that happens overnight. another committed to doing that but it's not happening overnight. in addition to what sean said about suburban voters, i do think there's consequences, if you look at the difference between minnesota and wisconsin and how it did, granted minnesota has the resources that wisconsin didn't have around the medical field in academia and that sort of thing, but if you look at the recovery that happened in minnesota versus wisconsin, and had a little bit to do with the fact that mark dayton didn't make cuts, he borrowed and there were massive cuts in wisconsin. if you look at the most extreme example of kansas where you see an actual democrat getting stronger in the state but moderate republicans voting to increase taxes. the reaction to the recession has really hollowed out schools and infrastructure in states like ohio and wisconsin pennsylvania. some of it has been restored but it takes a long time to
rebuild. i think kansas is kind of a cautionary self republicans and i think you could see that backlash in those states as wel well. >> but stipulate a weak version of the emerging democratic majority and let's also stipulate that the political environment has moved in the way it has since 2016, giving the democrats better chances. given that from the standpoint of the respective parties, what's the worst thing that the parties respectively could do to deal with the situation. what is the catastrophic mistake they could make in dealing with this? >> that's a good question. >> and i talk about republicans? [laughter] we talked about the water balloon, someone mentioned this on the earlier panel, but
winning over time the electoral college and not the popular vote is profoundly problematic. there are two things, in two ways. it can be problematic for republicans in undermining their legitimacy as a party because you keep winning and governing as if you've one when you have not one broadly and that just strikes me as dead overtime and makes the party weaker and less effective. and the bigger day for democracy is in mobilizing. if you think your vote doesn't matter them why go out and vote. we heard and postelection focus groups and even now, you hear a lot among younger people and millennial's that hillary clinton won the election and donald trumps the president so our democracy doesn't work so what's the point of coming out to vote. i think that's a danger for the country, not just for the republican party. >> i think the biggest mistake
for both parties is what we saw in 2005 and 2009 and to some extent in 2017 which is taking a single election results as a mandate to do big things because as we've seen it's not necessarily how most voters vote. most voters will look at their pocketbook or maybe look at the historic nature of the candidacy. there's a great quote about the electri electorate only getting to say one word, yes or no and then trying to interpret that is a broad example. regardless of what happens in 2019 and 2021, overplaying the hand is kind of like an ongoing joke online but i think it's real. being careful about that, it's tough because your base is excited because they think they want because at the end of history. you have to walk that line between keeping your base happy and the reality that your base is almost never a
majority of the electri electorate. we also have weak parties and strong partisanship so the way we govern is not conducive to a compromising way of governing and with the rise of nonparty funding that is continuing that goes up every single year, i don't see an end to that anytime soon. even if you want to as a party to govern in a way that's more compromising, more moderate, it's almost impossible to do. >> anna made the point about the electoral college. we see the popular vote going one way or another. i figured i would plug mine on the electoral college after people vote. if we do have this scenario, it doesn't sound very good for the country but it might be good for the book. [laughter] my question is, there's a lot to pick from and generally the story is good for democrats, you can pick the rise in the
latino vote or the decline in the white vote but let's take millennial voters. this is sort of a political science question which i know you both have expertise in print if you look at millennial voters they are very strongly democratic these days. of course that's partly because their more diverse but even the white vote in the millennial vote is strongly democratic. one would assume unless the ten and 12 -year-olds of today are very different that that marches through and looks very good for democrats. there some people who believe your voting behavior is formed at an early age print there is certainly some literature on this that you stick to the party you had when you came of age to vote and it doesn't change very much, but there's a little bit of evidence that maybe you change as you acquire family or grow or by house, what's your thought on that? is the move of young voters to the electorate, are we likely to see this just be a democratic vote going forward, forward, forward or other concerns you might have that
that is in the case. >> when i started writing on this a decade ago, my line was a decade or two down the line for republicans to really start having to worry about this so now the answer is yes, it's an up front and center problem for republicans because their voters are old and in a decade many of them will feel browned and there will be more of these younger more liberal voters, i do think it's important to keep in mind that mcgovern carried the 18 - 24-year-old demographic well losing in a landslide and today those are our boomers who are voting overwhelmingly to the right of the country as a whole. i'm not saying that something republicans can or should bank on but when we try to plan how things will go, events really do impact things. the other thing is that the parties will change. the debate over marriage equality is over. there are still battles around
the edges that matter, but the core debate, it's not going anywhere. and so, sooner or later, the republican party will change because the country as a whole is 75% in favor of marriage equality, then you will have probably a majority of the republican party in favor of it. i don't think that happens in 2020, but by 2030 i think yes, that will be how things go. it's just hard to speculate that far in advance. >> i would slam a little less optimistic, obama one white millennial's in oh eight but lost them in 12. he won the vote overall but he lost white millennial's in 2012. what i saw with millennial voters is a real detachment from the democratic party. so while they are liberal and progressive on issues of race
and sexual orientation and gender in that sort of thing and are really upset about the divisiveness and the attacks of the trump administration on people of color and vulnerable communities, that's very unique. you don't see that with older white voters. it's very interesting to see them very passionate about that. if you look at african-americans who still have a very profound attachment to the party because of history, you just don't see that with younger after the americans. younger african-american men in particular were not terribly supportive of hillary clinton. they did not vote for trump but they voted heavily third-party. i mentioned hispanic men as wel well. so while i think in terms of ideology, certainly millennial's are liberal and the folks who voted. [inaudible] i don't think they feel attached to the party or think the party has anything
relevant to save them is because partly of what they have run on is what affects senior citizens and social security. i don't think democrats have quite figured out what to say to millennial's and i don't think democrats, often what they default to his talk about college affordability which is important but we know majority of people aren't going to go to college. so what you say to a millennial noncollege voter. >> what about the issue of immigration relative to the party? if you look at the data from 2016, it's pretty clear that trump has this profile of having a socia certain amount of racial bias the issue that was most prominent was anti-immigration and it was less anti- black than it was inside immigration. those attitudes were the most predictive. when he goes out he does these rallies frequently that comes up and it's like an incredible
contentious issue within the republican party. do we see that changing anytime soon as a result of some of the dynamics we've talked about in our scenarios or does this continue to be having a significant effect in their outcomes? >> i think the challenge for democrats on immigration is that it's a much more important issue for republicans. if you ask people whether what the important issue is, immigration falls down to four or five or six for democrats so you have this imbalance row mechanic indication and activity around immigration, document et cetera and not just republicans, but if you think about social media and misinformation and propaganda, it's a huge piece that the right and the far right and the russian bought some bulgarian trolls sort of push around in social media so the
challenge is how do you talk about immigration when your side doesn't care about it as much as republicans do, anything for the party itself, the comprehensive immigration reform will continue to be a big part of what the party talks about. again for voters it's just less important so in some ways it benefits republicans more than no caps but the one thing i would say is that i do think, i go back to the millennial's that the divisiveness and the attacks on hispanics in particular as it regards to immigration, they don't like it. it's not that they're out there wanting to march for comprehensive reform, but they do want to march against discrimination, hate and prejudice and attacking people and they really, really don't like it so maybe that's where the counter is for democrats and it's less about specific policies and more about what does this mean for who we are as a country and what we represent morally. >> i talked a little bit about the passing of the fight over
gay rights and the religious orientation we add to our politics in the 1980s and 90s and then i look at europe and i say to my progressive friends, if you didn't like the religious right, wait'll you meet the secular right because he gets to stuff that i think even if you are someone who is not particularly progressive, but more racially progressive, gets to an attitude that's hard to really appreciate at a gut level because it just has a lot of residence for people that the republican party overlooks to their peril and it's part of what comes down in the primary and i think if you want, if i had to point to an area of democratic overreach, that would be part of my list. i don't know how widespread the attitude is that a lot of my younger progressive
friends, it will be crazy for the next decade to really go with. enforcement. i doubt the democratic party leadership would go along with that, but there's a lot of energy in that direction that again, it's hard for me too really game out because it's something that just doesn't register with me in a visceral way the way it registers with other people. but it is real and look around the world, it's not just us. >> it's kind of like the shutdown over daca where there was a potential shutdown where there is big complex in the democratic party on whether or not they went far enough. they should've shut down the government for two weeks and the republicans would have caved. that was really contentious so you see that as a potential flashpoint going forward. >> let me ask one question and know that we are going to be turning it to the audience.
it's a place the republican party has been moving to be more skeptical over time and one of the key dividing points on the white working class but the other issue was trade. what do you think about the issue of trade within the coalition. there's a greater divide between the different types of republicans and maybe on the democratic side some shifting as well. is the issue something that will have potential shakeup? should they go together? what's your sense of that. >> and trade and immigration are different sides of the same coin in a lot of ways. i think you are seeing a shift in the republican coalition, but i'm a lot more interested to see how it plays out for the democrats because i think
trying to reinvigorate labor or appeal to the labor base causes some real tensions on the trade issue. i defer there. >> i think with trade, it's not just what happens most recently, but the polling i did with bp, people don't know a lot about trade or how works. they don't know our trade policies so what's really interesting to watch is with how it's become just partisan. i just asked questions about the chinese tariffs last week and 75% of the democrats think it's bad and 75% republicans think it's good and independence are split. i was working on a presentation and use of the same thing with tpp. i don't know what to make of that except to say from the perspective of voters, i don't take care that much and i think they just see it through the lens of whoever's in power
and whatever policy they are promoting at that time. just because people are low information when it comes to these complex economic policies. >> we are going to turn to the audience but i asked you wait for microphone, identify yourself and ask a question. >> thank you. a question for each of our paper writers. to anna, sean made to structural points up front. one had to do with the possibility that the latinos and the italians of the 21st century and the other posed the question of whether the ceiling on republican support for the white working-class voters has been reached yet. i would be interested in your response to that. sean, first of all,
congratulations on working in the first reference on the voting study panel that i've ever heard. congratulations. in the previous panel amy walter raised very interesting question whether we are talking about the white working-class vote. to what extent are we talking about cultural cueing and actual policies and the consequences of those policies. suppose we get to 2020 and working-class wages haven't risen and most of the coal mines haven't reopened and steel is not doing so great in spite of the tariff. life for working-class people is not receptively better. does that matter? >> on the latino question, i do think we can already see if you look at the differences among latinos that for nativeborn english speaking latinos they are more conservative than foreign-born
so there's no reason, if the republicans had taken the republican report seriously in 2012 about doing outreach and not saying that they're all races from mexico, i think that would've been a real shot with making gains with latino voters. i think the problem in the next ten to 15 years is what has happened around immigration because it's such a source of strength for republicans is that it makes it much harder for that dynamic to change. : : :
you know, in the last 10 years, but most recently that kind of demagoguery around race is real problematic for this notion of transformation into being just like everybody else. so again, if they found a 2012 report, they would see different dynamics with the other direction i'm not. i don't know if republicans have reached their feeling that it seems hard to imagine democrats doing much worse than hillary clinton dead and already in place a framework in a pocket to what working-class voters and other things have improvement of that may be driven by white working-class women who are seen some improvement. i can't imagine republicans doing even better and i'm not seeing that now, but i don't really know.
>> yeah, i'd take to answer the second half briefly appeared on a macro level, elections are largely referenda and other parties in power. but i think at the micro level, method does matter. democrats were able to do while in pennsylvania eight teen because they had conor lamb and they had connerly a menu is running a very focused message that i don't know nationally the democratic residential nominee is going to run on. that said, you know, if we are in recession or there's still a mini recession among some of these industrial areas, i can't imagine trump will be duplicating his 2016 performance. that said come in 2009 -- in 2016 i couldn't imagine that trump would win so there's a lot of failure of imagination. >> let me add let me out when
they hear about latino spirit marc lopez is that you're anymore but he says them being interesting me. i think you might've even cited it in your paper about the decline of hispanic identification among hispanics. the implication of that is if latinos become less likely to identify with that ethnicity that they will become more politically conservative peer they didn't see a lot of difference controlling factors between, sort of among these people who lost latino identification, they look very similar to those who have their latina identification. that's interesting in march that they will publish something on it eventually. i hope he does because it's an interesting recall. >> amy. >> i am curious what you all think about the move of college white voters. how much that is the reaction of trump, if that will continue and
how much of it is really about what the democrats are doing. >> well, those are two different questions. the trend of college-educated come especially people with postgrad education becoming more liberal predates trump and trump just accelerated it because he's the antithesis of what a college kid wants to go for for our country. but it predates it and also the trend of more democratic also predates trump. i think he accelerated the dynamics that were already in place. >> if you look at the college vote and you control for national vote share, you get a line towards republican. you don't see lines like this in election results, yet that's what they get. trump did not respect is a
continuation of trend. college degrees are a trend, but there's less of one. suburbanite are where the republicans are in the 50 in the 50s, 60s, 70s, 80s and bill clinton started to break them away. i think they are a swing vote right now. they are not guaranteed to be 10 years down the road, but they are the name of the game for the parties trying to keep in the coalition. >> i think republicans have a challenge because to the extent that republicans are seen as anti-science and anti-women's rights and women's rights in the workplace in particular. i just think it's very difficult to make gains not necessarily the entire block, the certain segments of it. as long as that's important to the republican base, i just don't see how you make gains of college-educated voters. >> from my perspective, whites without college degrees are in the crosshairs.
the cultural issues do not resonate at all and repel them. i think if you take a bernie sanders progressive approach, you know, that is going to be tough. trying to balance those two impulses for both parties is a major challenge. >> the good news is the candidate in the primaries have not been winning. >> the thing about white college grads if it was postulated including a mild comrade john judith that an emerging slip is taking place between white postgrad than white college grads only will a four year degree and that was part of an emerging republican advantage. it is at monday's white college voters. if you look at the degree only population, you know, the trends are similar to the postgrad from a lower baseline. it appears like four year degree enough is all in the same direction as an emerging light
to some people postulated event taking place. >> far in the back to the. >> there has not been much discussion about the impact of foreign policy and the various electorate, but at various times the democratic party as well as the republican party have been motivated primarily by foreign policy issues. you know, democrats have a dominant wind of the democratic party that has been anti-interventionist and i suppose you could say there's not much rand paul in bernie sanders agree on except get out of europe, get out of asia, focus on domestic spending, domestic programs. i wonder if anyone would be willing to talk about the role of foreign policy interventionism, non-interventionism, isolationism, globalism,
whatever terms you want to use. it is fair but we don't hear much about it. thank you. >> i think americans like winning wars. when a war is being won they don't like losing wars and so won a war is going poorly, they'll react to that party and otherwise they don't care much about foreign policy. that is sort of my take on the postwar foreign policy dynamic here they just don't know much about it aside from this war is going well. >> completely agree. >> let's go farther back here. >> by name as palmcorder. my question comes from something and i raised -- sorry. my question comes from something that and i raised in was raised by the first panelist while
terms of disconnect in 2016 between the electoral college and the popular vote and then perhaps continuing for the next couple elections. it is clearly bad for democracy. but i wonder if it is more problematic for the democratic party with the democratic leaning vote in terms of there not being unintended vote because their vote is not worth as much as it should be whereas for the republican leaning vote, their vote is actually counted more than it should and so it might not need a discouragement to voting. >> i think i mentioned that is a danger for democrats which is demobilizing that people don't think it matters because they see democrats in the popular electoral college and i hear
that now in focus groups as a think about how to win in 2018. >> i am just going to add, i think the scenarios we've come up with are generally right in going in the right direction. they all show an electoral college in the popular vote in the other direction. in 2000, speculation was perhaps it would go the other way. there was were betting on the side that perhaps al gore would win the electoral college and the popular vote. i guess one other bit of wisdom was it was really hard to have a split return the electoral college with more than 1% of the popular vote and would we've disproven not another scenarios actually start going further and further apart. [inaudible] >> right. so the way it's going it is pointing towards states. but there is some uncertainty. as one saw, surprising part of
the issue here was the state of california margin democrat in some places where the vote didn't really matter. the score was run out. perhaps we are not seen some of these things, but i guess i do think the data is showing that direction. okay, let's go back here. >> one thing i was little surprise has been brought up was the wall, which is the most visceral sort of anti-immigrant image that i think did propel trump to a lot of it varies, to a lot of places where people did not think that was possible. still as either doesn't get built, which i think is likely to happen with this congressional makeup for it does start to come the know can actually get built and used a fake arizona and texas where
it's really not popular, what would be the effects of that? >> i am curious because i'm starting to see different, you know, hard-core right people upset that trump is not moving up to his promises. crazy people like alex jones or this attack on syria this weekend. i don't know, but i don't know if it's the real thing or just the elite. >> i think democrats are very much dodged a bullet with the trump administration. i think if you lead with something like infrastructure that of the muslim ban/travel ban you would have a very different dynamic. i think was brain-dead idiocy not to take the wall for the daca deal. i would've said there's no way. if you have actually gotten not come his supporters were right about him. they would've overlooked the
daca thing. we got our wall and the democratic phase, which as you said sees the wall as an important symbolic thing would've gone berserk. >> time for one last question right here. >> hi, thanks for the second question. stacy was veteran's vision. i just want to make a point that there are black people that actually live in the suburbs who are concerned about education and affordable education and accessibility to education, higher education. i'm one of them. i've got a kid in college. for my other brothers and sisters in rural and inner-city and their american dream has become a nightmare. what donald trump has been able to do is reach out to those people in rural areas and give them help you and what are democrats going to do to get the black voters hope? i know daca had a dream. blacks had a dream come it to a dream, too. it became a nightmare for some in the inner-city.
what are you going to do to give them hope because they are lacking hope for in leadership. >> you have a scenario you thought was pretty favorable effect may be they don't return to the barack obama levels, so what would make it go that way? >> i think i'm part that is a reaction to trump, but that is not an answer to your question about what are democrats going to do. first of all, there has to be a real economic plan and vision that includes people of color in all the circumstances they are in. i also think criminal justice reform obviously if you think about the new jim crow and what they continue to do, that strikes me as a place with a start to see some places in philadelphia and the conversation shifts with white democrats getting more comfortable with that as a
priority. in addition to an economy that works for everybody, that strikes me as a place of the most possibility to make change in policy terms but also people's lives. >> i do think that's an area where you see the tensions in the democratic coalition that you laid out playing out. one of the most fascinating political science favors ever written from where i'm concerned and i'm thinking in particular of the obama administration initiative to try to create low income housing in suburbs than in the great suburbs more. when they tore down cabrini green detract where the residents went and where they ended up, the white areas became a republican. there was a reaction. we aren't past race by any means in this country. i think some of those are still salient and becomes salient when you start getting into the nuts
and bolts of governing. >> have a lot of people saying first of all i'd like to thank anna and sean who have done a tremendous job on the panel. [applause] their papers, which you should read them and this the fourth annual report. we are planning on being in business for another year and for the foreseeable future. come back for the fifth annual for think tanks involved in the bipartisan policy center, center for american progress. robert and the pri, we all thank you and we hope we will see you next year. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]
>> is a follow to the recent hearings of facebook ceo mark zuckerberg, "the communicators" looks at the privacy issues raised by the spread of personal data by facebook with president and ceo at the center for democracy and technology in lee goodman, turning from her chair the federal election commission. >> look at all the politicians who asked mark zuckerberg questions for 10 hours. every one of them has been using data mined from american citizens to communicate with their constituents to build mailing lists, to target voters and a lot of this is for good and solid tory reasons. >> the meta-issue for me is how data is becoming used from a secured and processed by the companies with which we engage in the online world in a very comprehensive and pervasive way.
>> tonight i'm landmark cases, brandenburg v. ohio. ku klux klan leader clarence brandenburg was convicted of hate speech under an ohio law, but the supreme court unanimously ruled that state law violated his first amendment right. our guest to discuss this case are nadine strasser, former head of the american civil liberties union and law professor at new york law school in manhattan. and katie follow, senior attorney at may 1st amendment institute. much landmark cases tonight and join the conversation. our hashtag is #landmark cases. follow us@c-span. we have resources and our website. the landmark cases companion book, a link to the national constitution center's interactive constitution in the
landmark cases podcast at c-span.org/landmark cases. >> this week the u.s. supreme court takes up the case with internet sales tax. the goal experts offer a preview of the oral argument in south dakota v. wayfarer. live coverage from the heritage foundation begins at noon eastern here on c-span2. until then comes some of today's "washington journal." >> michael eisenstadt joins us now, director of the military studies program at the washington is to tear it for nearst east policy. mr. eisenstadt, before the latest coalition strikes, you wrote w that the problems in sya will not end with a single set of strikes. what did and didn't the united states and written and friends accomplish what happened on friday night? guess it would probably do them harm and damage of the chemical weapons capabilities. although the department to