tv Natl Counterintelligence Security Director Confirmation Hearing CSPAN May 17, 2018 9:09pm-10:04pm EDT
>> that's one of the jobs of being ol the oldest passing the torch, taking what you know or have done or have accomplished or want to be done and passing it on to the younger hands. -- all counterintelligence and security center director nominee william evanina awaits senate confirmation and testified at a confirmation hearing on tuesday. the senate intelligence committee members questioned him about chinese manufacturer zte, russia and hacking and recruitment. this is just under an hour.
i would like to call the hearing to order and welcome our witness today, bill evanina, president trumps nominee. congratulations on your nomination. i would like to know if you've already served honorably as the dirt of the senc before june of 2013. before a suffocating this hearing, so this is a little bit out of the ordinary. i would like to start by recognizing your family come to your wife, julianne and your sons, dominic who is 13 and bill who is 19 months old and currently holding down the fort at home. i had an opportunity to meet your wife and oldest son as we had breakfast this morning, and
i just want to say thank you for allowing him to serve so many years in government. thank you for your dad because he does important stuff. i want you to know that. our golden conducting the hearing is to enable the committee to know the qualifications and allow a thoughtful deliberation by members. director evanina has provided written responses to over 55 questions presented by the committee, and today of course committee members will be able to ask additional questions and hear from him in open session. director evanina come from wilkes university earned a masters degree in educational leadership from arcadia university. he served in government over 23 years, including services as supervisory special agent and assistant section chief with the
bureau of investigation and prior to joining ncsc served as the counter espionage chief of the central intelligence agency. director evanina, you've are being asked to leave this agency -- lead this agency during the threats against our nation. i'm hopeful that moving forward, you will be an influential and forceful advocate for those foreign intelligence tools you believe are necessary to keep citizens safe while protecting americans privacy. as i mentioned two others during the hearing i can assure you the committee will follow its charter and conduct vigorous and real-time oversight of the community, its obligations and its activities. we've asked difficult questions of you, your staff and we expect honest complete and a timely responses. i look forward to supporting the nomination and consideration without delay. thank you for being here and i look forward to your testimony
and recognize the vice chair man. >> i want to echo the chairman's remarks and welcome will evanina, veteran of the fbi, counterintelligence and security centers, the chairman mentioned you had this job for four years and we thought it was so important we wanted it confirmed so you could go through your first confirmation hearing process. you are obviously no stranger to this committee and all the members on the committee briefed as many times, and i think you bring remarkable skills this position. in mand my question today, i wao focus on two issues. one is on the security clearances. this committee has had a couple of hearings on the subject both open and close. we knoclosed. we know that dni is the governments security agent and as the point person you have the technique to lead on that. as you acknowledge the current
system is broken. so a backhaul costs too much, take too long, too complex. we have had lots of testimony about continuous evaluation and better use of technology, trying to knock down on the gop side the amount of backlog and add more details and to provide us with any updates. the second issue that i want to focus on is your role to oversee the activities across the u.s. government particularly with regards to some of our nation state adversaries. russia and china that the whole society approaches. i believe particularly the challenge posed in its acquisition of our technologies for its and the penetration of starting it in early-stage companies this penetration of
the universities and some of the companies the committee has highlighted in the past we are going to need two of our game on that, so i look forward to your testimony on that as well. thank you for the witness testimony. >> i ask you to stand and raise your right hand do you solemnly swear to the committee the whole truth, the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you god? please, be seated. director, before we move to your statement, i will ask you five standard question the committee poses to each nominee who appears before us. they just require a simple yes or no answe answer to you've ago appear before the committee and other venues when invited? if confirmed, do you agree to send officials from the office before the committee and staff when invited? >> yes. >> deeb agreed to provide a document or any other materials requested in order to carry out its oversight and legislative
responsibilities? >> yes. >> will you ensure that they provide such materials to the committee when requested? the next yes. >> deeb agreed to inform and briefed to the fullest extent possible all members of the committee on all intelligence committees rather than just the chair man and vice chairman? >> yes. >> thank you very much. we will now proceed to the opening statement and i will recognize that members. the floor is yours. >> thank you, senator. chairman, vice chairman and come in and, i'd issued a statement for the record which i would like to be added to the record and i will add some brief comments. if you do not have your computer with you today, my nomination is the first director of the national counterintelligence center were ncsc and it's an honor and privilege that this congress has decided its position to be important enough to make it a senate confirmed
position. i'm also honored the president and director of national intelligence, dan coats have the trust and confidence in me to fill this position. i would first like to express gratitude for my family. my father, john, mother, barbara, brother, stephen, sister, tonya and most especially a wife, julianne and my son dominic. last, i would like to thank the women and men of the national counterintelligence city center who are dedicated professionals into success is the last few years that made ncsc a global leader in counterintelligence security. mr. chairman, i was born and raised in pennsylvania from a small town just north of scranton. they are coming through my family and friends, with value, integrity, hard work and service to others. genome early in the first-class army in world war ii was awarded the medal of honor, two purple
hearts and a bronze star for heroic activities in the battle of the bulge. spending time with other role models growing up i learned a valuable of character, citizenship and service and we should never take your democracy or freedom for granted. i am proud to be a public servant and i've been in federal service over 29 years, 22 of which is a proud member of the fbi. i felt a spectrum of positions in the fbi an and as you mentiod the chief of the central intelligence agency's counter espionage group. the threat we face from our adversaries is progress, persistent and requires medication by the government and private sector. most prominent they will continue to be russia and china however iran to north korea and others are prominent within intent and increasing capability. i believe the services will continue their efforts to
interfere and a distrus into the process and encourage political views and weaken our allies. the utilization of the collectors to advance their national development continues to place the national security at risk. we must continually and aggressively respond to the systematic technology, trade secrets, proprietary data, research development across the u.s. economy. economic security is our national security. historically the medication of the national security threats we see in the community and federal law enforcement. the thought for today is for the threats and complexities that we see not only in the whole of government approach but the whole country approach.
these are the vulnerabilities we face every day although we will never eliminate the possibility of bad actors within our walls we continue to strive towards enhanced technical and behavioral solutions to prevent catastrophic damage as well as develop solutions to this activity. mr. chairman and as you are as y aware that government security is outdated and inefficient and is undergoing a comprehensive overhaul. we plan to and will develop to implement the process that results in the onboard qualified u.s. citizen within the government and the industry with agility and reciprocity at the same time we must not reduce the quality of the investigations to ensure that we are bringing on quality highly trusted work force to protect secret. if confirmed as the executive's role of the agency i'm committed to leadin lead in this effort ad partnership with the management,
office of management and budget and the department of defense. i am humbled if confirmed i would become the first senate confirmed director representing the men and women of the ncsc as well represent the men and women who've told for decades and counterintelligence security field often without attribution and acknowledge. they do so to protec protect the coming to thpeople, the data, ts and the nation. chairman burr, vice chairman warner, members of the committee, thank you for the consideration of my nomination and i look forward to question. >> thank you for that testimony. the chair will recognize themselves and the vice chairman and then the members by seniority for up to five minutes of questions. we've talked about it before, the leaking of classified information for the sources and methods at risk because irreversible damage, and the
amendments reauthorization act by increasing enhanced penalties on those convicted of unauthorized disclosures and if confirmed how do you plan to address inside threats in the classified information? >> thank you for the question. i would concur the unauthorized disclosure of information are not only traumatic to this proves that we lose as a country that they are also harmful to the men and women that serve to protect them every day. if confirmed by will continue to work with my federal law enforcement officials to enhance not only the investigations but the penalties for such disclosures as well as the intelligence community to enhance their ability to identify unauthorized disclosure within their walls and provide the most effective and efficient monitoring and provide information to the department of
justice and the fbi for prosecution. >> foreign counterintelligence threats continue to increase and china has become a big part of these are. in your experience in counterintelligence both of the ncsc and your prayer positions, how has china's counterintelligence threat ground and what should we be concerned with? >> i do believe china is one of the greatest concerns we have moving forward with respect to our economic security. the utilization as a role of government approach to increase their economic and military development is problematic. the utilization of nontraditional collectors here in the united states, scientists, schools and visibility to identify and attract the data from the research facilities continues to allow us to not only lose positions, jobs, research and
funding as well as provide market capability and provide the data. >> in your response to the questions you stated some of the creepiest challenges include conducting effective and sustained outreach to technical partners, research labs and private sectors as well as securing the funding for the management. one of the plans for improving the governance supply-chain is supply-chain risk management. >> thank you. supply-chain risk mitigation efforts are nothing new to the u.s., however the last couple of years they've become increasingly problematic in their awareness and what ncsc does is provided that counterintelligence aspect to the who and why it's implementing and mitigating our supply-chain and adversaries and we provide in partnership with the organizations, the general service administration and the
labs to provide awareness and with the threat iwhat the threap them mitigate and protect the data from leaving their facilities. >> thank you for that and i want to encourage you that in the role of the director to please continue to focus on that greatly. this committee has been extremely involved in the supply-chain concerns that we have and it seems to slip through the cracks of the standpoint in congress. thank you mr. chairman. i want to start with the form i think you recall when we had the hearings, the bipartisan agreement system is broken, 740,000 plus on the backlog. this is a security risk, and economic risk in terms of the ability to brief companies.
i was very concerned that we invited all of the parties to testify but they chose not to. i would like you to give us an update whether omb is on the team now to make this a priority and we had some discussion that the large number back for what the cutback in a relatively short timeline can you give an update on their backs >> yes as a matter of fact subsequent to the beginning of the process back in march, with our partners can be office of management and budget and the duty as well as a host of other organizations and departments, we have been working diligently to provide the committee and the government with two specific things, number one the dramatic reduction to backlog and the development of a new business process and how wil it will afft qualified citizens in the u.s. in an expeditious manner at the same time making sure they are trusted with respect to the question of the backlog we are in the final stages of paper for the dni to be issued its being
coordinated in the process right now which i believe with some dramatic changes about how we currently do the business process of investigations once implemented it will get us to that position we can estimate probably 20% reduction within six month. >> only 20% in six months, that is a little less ambitious than i think we discussed earlier. is omb part of the process at this point? >> the mark to becoming individuals are the dod and the dni. >> will they include reciprocity and common standards between the government and our contractors? >> yes sir. >> my hope would be, since a lot of these on the secret level, to take i thought a much greater percentage of the backlog down with administrative action and going forward i hope we would
see a reduction greater than 20%. that would only take us down 740,002 half-million that's don't doesn't do very well at the end of this calendar year. >> i agree with you and concur, some of the issues will be predicated upon the transfer of the inventory to the dod and how that impacts the planned mitigation efforts. we do not have an effective algorithm for that at this moment but we are excited to 20% is a conservative member. >> on the question of counterintelligence with china, a number of members raised concerns about the telecom companies and their penetration into the american market. i was pleased the president acted on one of those companies, zte and now it appears that it is a bargaining chip in the negotiations and i don't think that's an appropriate way if it
is a security threat it needs to be dealt with as such not as a bargaining chip into trade negotiations. my concern as well is we are asking the purchasers of the private sector we are asking others to understand the threat of china, but i don't believe we can fully debrief the threat if they don't have the clearances in their own institutions. again another challenge that comes out of the backlog issue. how will we be able to move aggressively on having a standardized brief to the universities, technical companies and i think that would have to be classified as well as unclassified. >> i would concur over the last two years we've made a lot of progress in promulgating such
advice to not only academia with respect to the threats to other nations dates who are producers in the proprietary data we will continue to do that and work with associations and i would concur with your point the private sector leadership of the ceo level needs to be more active in the obtaining security clearances so that it can get done in a more effective and efficient manner. >> i want to pick up on the vice chair man's point with respect to zte specifically come and thank you for the visit we had in our office i thought it was helpful. in 2012, the houston solutions committee issued a nonclassified bipartisan report on national security issues posed by the chinese telecom companies, and one of them was zte. the report concluded the risks associated with zte provision of
equipment to the u.s. critical infrastructure could undermine american national security interests. do you agree with that report? >> i do. >> now they recommended that the united states should be viewed with suspicion by continued penetration of the telecommunications market by zte do you agree with that? >> yes. >> i appreciate the response the president commented over the weekend about zte i think obviously raises extraordinary national security question as well as economic policy concerns, so if you are confirmedyou'reconfirmed, i hopg to stand up to the white house on this issue and let me ask something with respect to where things stand now. what are the national security implications of giving zte
sanctions relief? >> i'm not up to speed with the sanctions with regards to specifically zte. i will say the intelligence community and law enforcement is on the record with the committee and the american people with respect to the posed threats to telecom. >> but it' as a general proposin giving sanctions relief to a company like this where there's been a bipartisan nonclassified records as a general proposition that strikes me as a mistake from the counter intelligence ce standpoint, cybersecurity standpoint, economic policy standpoint, so just tell me as a general proposition whether you would agree with that. >> i would agree we will continue to provide policymakers and members with intelligence information to have effective
policies. >> setting aside zte as a general proposition, does that raise the concerns i mentioned economic, national security, cybersecurity it seems to me it's pretty low hanging fruit to say yes. >> i not up to speed with the sanctions you've referenced so i would have to continue to advise you with the intelligence threats to the policymakers that want to employ those sanctions. >> what has been learned again from the counterintelligence standpoint since the opm breach? obviously that's a fact that an extraordinary number of americans and i would hope that would be seen as a wake-up call
>> nothing is off-limits from the foreign adversary in our country and government as a whole the intelligence communities are no longer just the targeted victims of adversaries but as a country we need to be aware of our proprietary trade secrets. >> let me ask one other question about encryption. counterintelligence risks are not limited just to classified systems. politically sensitive information conveyed every day by government officials and members of congress over unsecured phones. should the intelligence community recommend policymakers encrypt their unclassified phone conversations? >> yes, senator. >> i hope you will think some more about this matter that has been raised by zte. i understand why you might not
want to comment about his company, but i'm telling you as a general proposition, this ought to be an enormous alarm bell from the standpoint of counterintelligence, cyber security and economics, so i hope you will think more about that. >> would you ever use a zte phone or allow anyone i in a position sensitive weather in commerce or government or contracted use a zte phone? >> note. >> so it's not an exaggeration that this is a hysteria not just unique to zte but it is a fact china utilizes its telecommunication companies for the purpose of espionage even if the leadership may not be open to if they don't have a choice but to become operative. >> we've been on the record of that fact. >> there's another factor at
play and that is china 2025 as an endeavor by the chinese government to nominate the top 21st century many of them into the communications and biomedicine etc. and in fact they achieve this because they are more competitive and have better ideas because they are innovative, that's one thing that's not how they are pursuing it. how they are pursuing is stealing intellectual property can reverse engineering the intellectual property. there's a strategic game on the part of the government to steal the commercial intellectual property of the country in order to advance themselves into the position of dominance in the fields is that not something that is pretty clear clicks that poses a national security threat because the commercial capacity is important to the military hardware and aerospace is our technological capacity in the private sector if we lose the high ground and another nation
is dominant does not pose a direct national security threat to the united states? >> as i mentioned our security. >> i want to talk about a separate topic is atopic i don'n discussed before, certainly not today. as you know we live in an environment where false claims even ones that are preposterous are on social media and often the media under tremendous pressure to deliver clicks on their website or television stations are outraged and quick to jump on it. i erased it because of the concept of something called fakes, the ability to manipulate sound images or video to make it appear a certain person did something that they didn't do. the defense do. these are increasingly rigorous and the quality is rapidly increasing due to artificial intelligence machine learning algorithms paire. with facial mapping software to make it easy to insert someone's
face into the video and produce a very realistic looking video of someone saying or doing something they never did. by the way technology is pretty widely available on the internet and people have used it already all sorts of purposes at the individual level. you can only imagine what a nationstate could do and if we can imagine for a moment the foreign intelligence agency could use these keep me to produce a fake video of an american politician using a racial epithet or taking a ride or anything of that nature they could use a fake video of a soldier massacring civilians overseas in a fake video of a u.s. official admitting his secret plan to do some conspiracy theory of some kind of a fake video of a prominent official discussing some sort of impending disaster that could sow panic and imagine a compelling video like this composed on the eve of an
election or public policy decision with a culture that sovereignty a built-in bias towards believing outrageous things in a media that i the mes quick to promulgate it and spread it and of course the social media can't stop its spread. this is the next wave of attacks against america and western democracies is the ability to produce fake videos that can only be determined to be fake after extensive analytical analysis and by then it's over and millions of americans have seen an image they want to believe anyway because of their bias against that individual. you've never heard of the term but is there any work being done in the government to begin to confront the threats that could be posed or will be posed to produce these realistic looking fake video and audio that could be used to cause all sorts of chaos in our country ask
>> the answer is yes the intelligence communities and law enforcement are working to not only understand the complexities and capabilities of our adversaries but from the predictive analysis we may face going forward particularly with the election coming fall or 2020. >> welcome. the dod recently banned the sales of zte phones in military exchanges and equipment. last month the commerce department and the smartphone makers from using u.s. technology after illegally shipped u.s. goods to both iran and north korea. this comes after numerous intelligence community warnings of zte poses a major cyber security threat yet as we saw this week president trump announced he's working with the chinese president to give zte a way to get back into business.
do you assess that zte represents an economic or security threat to the united states? >> i believe the intelligence community and law enforcement is on the record about in the public and classified settings with a threat from the chinese telecommunications companies. >> are you concerned a that froa counterintelligence perspective does it make sense to overrule the national security committee and to offer zte a way to get back into business fast? >> i believe our role in the community is to provide the relevant facts of the issue in the investigations to the policymakers to their decision-making process. >> how are you raising those facts in the white house? >> and the regulatory community i think we've been meeting [inaudible] >> if we are willing to use national security matters as bargaining chips and trade
negotiations, how do you think that will impact their behavior moving forward? >> i'm not an expert on the process that i ca but i can telt national security is first and foremost in our perspective into the whole approach makes it difficult for us to bifurcate the issues. >> dhs and the fbi issued a public alert about a large-scale cyber campaign targeting the u.s. power grid and other critical infrastructure with the intent to extract information for the future operations this alert went further in the past alerts confirming russia as a corporate including indicators that compromise the list of detection and prevention measures. what's happened since may of 2018 gram2018 were in sorry mars year and the alert went out and as this campaign ongoing?
>> i would agree that pervasive threat continues today and well into the future. the federal government specifically the intelligence community and law enforcement and the work in the private sector every day as a matter of fact you can see we brought in but only the department of energy that major companies with fuel, gas into the perspective to give them a classified brief of the threat and so we can help them navigate. >> did that include utilities as well? do you see a greater sense of urgency and other institutions to utilize the information? >> are we giving leadership to the process fast enough? >> i would have to get back to you with the speed of that debt is occurring. >> i know the senator brought up the overall issue on one of the
things we've heard on the resources committee is that even former members of congress who served on the intelligence committee can't get through the process. they can receive this on a primary basis. >> the government honestly has not done a good job. industries are able to conduct the continuous evaluation of the employees. why is it then occult to do so and what can we do about that? >> it's been a constant bedrock
in the committee for years and we've been asked to deal with the auspices of the committee for years to provide a continuous evaluation program for the rest of the executive branch and we've done that. we are probably 80% complete ahead of schedule and complete by the end of the year we are expecting to have 20 plus agencies and 100,000 federal employees outside of the committee rolled into the plan. >> thank you mr. chair. >> mr. chairman, thank you very much and for going through the process and thank you for your years of service leading up to this. it is valuable for the country. we make several statements in the opening statement and within statement to ask you to drill down deeper. you made this statement a growingrowing sense of threat as are capable of using cyber operations to remotely access the intelligence targets as well as a broad set of u.s. targets including critical infrastructure and supply chain attribution. what are you recommending in
making a statemen statement buto making the recommendation? >> i believe that we as a nation that actually make things and know things annothings in the as and the telecommunications financial networks that are the bedrock of the nation, the government needs a partner in a very close matter so they can understand the threat and provide efforts to help mitigate. >> what does that look like in the public-private partnership are you talking about the government dictating how this would work in the industry and if the private industry sets the standards for what eve for whats maybit may bethis is the dhs, wu think that happens most efficiently collect duties to >> is a combination with the dhs and we provide that sliver of counterintelligence not only to the dhs, department of energy has the muscle those companies so they can understand how and why what is happening in help of
their provide medications to those. i believe those companies providing the services don't understand this is how it manifested it can't be in the position of defending. >> what is the best way to get information about the threat to determine the threat coming at me? >> for that organization we work closely to provide a threat information and the process is pretty effective. >> talk about the retaining of individuals for the team. you've had a lot of competition getting some of the best folks we have a set of patriots because of their respect and the love for the rule of law. what do you see now for these individuals in the future? >> thing you, senator. i am aware that the intelligence community continues to attract the right type of amazing u.s. citizen or the jobs. i believe that our mission in
the intelligence committee will win the day. the challenge is getting them in fedora, but the mission will keep them in for a long period of time. the security clearance process has been with the undergoing business process reengineering will help get the individuals in the door quicker, more expeditious not only for the government with the private sector including the law. >> you have a nice long hesitation on the security process with all of these frustrations with it and those that are doing the hiring what is the right length of time to get to a security cleared because we will do a good security clearance, but right now it is a ridiculous amount of time. what is the right amount of time backs >> of a secret clearance is primarily the department of defense i think in the end state we should be able to clear 80 to 90% within 30 days. >> to use six how long will it take to get to that spot, do you
think? >> with my partners watching closely i would have to say within the next two years as an official policy and implementation. it's a little more complicated as you are aware of what we are working on those metrics as well. >> most people are not going through the clearing. i think a 38 and 45 day even is a reasonable amount of time to go through a secret clearance. what is the time right now? >> is closer to 100 days. >> for many people in excess of that is a major issue for us. you also make interesting comment about the security in your written statement. your concerns continue to rise above the russian threat towards the security and we are partnering with dhs. my question to you is not about the threat of how we are responding to it that is the bue current level of cooperation? because dhs has the lead. >> they've been a great partner found only witdone only with the
cyber but also the director interface with respect to the election process which are local. we've been working closely with bringing the intelligence community to serve as the dhs and provide up to date information. like we've never done the force of the dhs can manifest for all at the local level. >> tsukuba privation between the dhs or consistent right now. >> that's correct. >> thank you. i yield back. >> welcome. we are delighted to have you today and appreciate the service that you've provided. first i want to associate myself with the senators, and give you rethink to emphasize one point, he talked about the idea of being able to create an alternative reality and if you add to that the powers of social media it is the perfect storm of disinformation because you can
create the false reality and circulate it in a way that is easy to counteract and see. if somebody puts a negative ad about you on television you can put up your own to rea read of t and in this case you are chasing smoke all over the place, the e-mails, twitter, facebook. it's very difficult, so this is a very serious challenge and that brings me to your comment on question 16 of the hearing question. you said i remain concerned we still may be estimating the russian capabilities and plans to influence the midterm in future election. that is chilling statement can you elaborate? >> i don't think anyone in my profession or the committee will underestimate the potential of the russian privation, putin or the capabilities, plus their intent and i think what we saw in the last cycle, the intent and the capability is there.
the first statement regarding the fake serves as an opportunity for us and analytical governmensome analytd training and awareness. maybe also an opportunity to partner with the private sector and social media companies to understand the capabilities on our own social media networks. >> the ultimate defense is to understand when they are being conned's resources are important. you mentioned the capability of the russians and their intent. do you have any doubts about the accuracy about the 2,016th election? >> i do not. >> i also want to emphasize a poinpoint that has been made sel times about clarence backlog.
my problem is i can't find out a single point, the single point in the united states government in charge of solving this problem. and i know it's not you you are in a key position and i believe that in order to solve it, it's going to take the whole of government whenever i are the whole oawhole of government, ths none of government. somebody's got to be charge and i hope that you will urge the administration to take charge of this issue so that it's not scattered all over the government, because we've got to solve it. we had somethin have something 0 security cleared as and backlog and we are losing good people. there's an opportunity cost and it's just unacceptable in the ability tinability to defend th, so i hope you will take on as a part of the mission pushing for an organizational response to this where there is a central responsibility and accountability for this.
>> thank you, senator. the government will look at the national intelligence as a security executive agent for the process, and i believe that the government believes that he is accountable for the policies on how we conduct investigations, by virtue of these programs i believe the responsibility of leadership wise with me. >> when i was in business i tried to formulate contracts and relationships so that you had one throat to choke and that's the way that you could get things done. on this question of cybersecurity and the attacks on our country, in my view and in the view of many of us in the committee and other committees one of the fundamental problems with our response to this is that it is purely defensive that we are simply trying to patch our way out of the problem and there is no deterrent to. there is no cyber strategy that
will deter our adversaries and make them think twice. we had testimony from the head of the nsa but nothing we have done wha with changed the calcus of the adversaries. do you think this is an area that we need to do more work and develop a public deterrent strategy so that those that intend to attack us through cyber just as they work through connectix believe that they will certainly pay a price? could you expand on that a bit? >> the adversaries need to know that deterrence policy is real and it will manifest itself in a way to understand it but we owe it to the american people to understand that the government has policies and continues to protect them and private industry from these threats that we face so i concur that we need to be more effective and efficient with our policies. >> i hope you will help us
develop strategy because otherwise we are going to continue to be chipped away at it again or looked at as a free one chin this regard. >> i appreciate your testimony. >> i just want to echo what senator mccain has said. we need to and again i was disappointedisappointed it appee national security council is now trying to eliminate the position in the white house that we had before the president that doesn't send the right signal to thank you for your testimony and we look forward to working with you. >> i have to admit i was questioning whether there were the quotewouldbe quotes about ae or one throat to choke. [laughter] i have a feeling i know which way it is going to go. >> i realized i was taking a risk when the words were leaving. [laughter] i think we've exhausted questions director.
thank you and your family for the willingness to serve. let me note for the members that it is my intent to move the director out of the committee next week so that we can get this to the floor as quickly as we can. thanks for your service in the outcome of the hearing is adjourned. [inaudible conversations]
organized man in every respect that is how he ran the white house. he was extremely organized especially the young senator future president john kennedy and he was stodgy to be so predictable but for eisenhower it meant he had a plan and how to respond and those working with the planning but and then thinking about it in the way that he governed it with the national security council and to trust the process the federal government could work well.
>> that committee only and security transportation will come to order i will apologize for my delay my third or fourth meeting already today i am running behind i apologize. we will assess the transportation security administration preparedness for the summer travel period. and then to see an increase in aviation travel with a record