tv U.S.- North Korea Relations Panel 1 CSPAN June 8, 2018 5:38pm-7:13pm EDT
stories from trailblazing women lawyers. watch the c-span networks this weekend. >> sunday on q&a. new york times columnist talks about his book to change the church. pope francis and the future of catholicism. >> he thinks the church needs to change in various ways. particularly, i think around issues related to sexual revolution, marriage, divorce and so on. where prior post basically said, these are changes the church can make. there have been these fraud places where he has clashed with cardinals and bishops and theologians over just how far he can push the church to change. but the church can change without either under coming
traditions or breaking faith with the new testament. the gospel of jesus christ. >> q&a sunday night at eight eastern on c-span.>> now discussions about relations between the u.s. and north korea. including a preview of the presidents planned meeting with the north korean leader, kim jong-un next week. this took place at the heritage foundation in washington. >> welcome. first an admin thing if you have a phone turned off or turn it to vibrate. the event today is the u.s. and north korea summit that was canceled or postponed so i guess we got it right. all they over the weekend one of the panelists tongue-tied said now that trump officially said we are back on, should we change the title? can we said well, it will probably change two or three
times before the event or our event even. but actually, there's a bit of a story behind the event. when i lined up the six panelists, the first three and that we have a second panel focused particularly on japan. i had not got around to sending the notification flyer. i came in one morning and i said, i'm going to do nothing else this morning but get the flyer out. just the slum it and was going to happen in one of the implications. and i was interrupted by a phone call. i said i just want to get the flyer out. i said okay, cnn, i can do an interview. 20 minutes? sure. i'm on the way. cancellation. and then, all of us were running around that they doing interviews. then that night i thought well, rather than being really behind the curve let's talk about the
summit let's talk about the event and change the title what are the applications of a canceled summit? then that way instead of looking at i am hopelessly behind in getting the event flyer out, i'm looking brilliant and have six panelists for an event about a canceled summit. well, then as we are editing the flyers, they said just in case it does come back, why don't we edge on that and it's good either way. that's a bit of a back on how we have this brilliant title on the flyer. anyway, is a great pleasure to have three expert colleagues and friends today to talk about the u.s. and north korea summit. and will follow with three other analyst about the japan aspect. to do a quick introduction and you recognize all the panelists because they are on t.v. so
often. but we have a visiting senior research fellow at the korea peninsula future form. which is a think tank. previously she was an associate in the nuclear policy in asia programs at carnegie endowment for international peace. and we have the professor and korea studies and assistant professor at the fletcher school at tufts university. and formally he was a research fellow at the national asia research program. and we have a senior fellow for korea at the center for strategic and international studies. before that she had a long career in the intelligence community with the u.s. government, she was the director for korea, japan and oceanic affairs at the national security council. she was a deputy national intelligence officer for east asia at the national intelligence council. she was an analyst on issues at ciaa. with that, i will move chairs. i think we will have you go first. and then we will draw straws to
see who the next panelist is. each of them will talk about their views of the upcoming summit. sort of, to have hope or concern as well as recommendations for what we hope to see come out of the summit. because really think there's just a lot of confusion. and then, we may do some cross panel discussion. i may ask some questions and then we will open to the audience. would you like to start? eight or so? what do you want? 10? >> thank you, very much bruce. thank you for this opportunity. thank you ladies and gentlemen for taking the time out of your busy schedules to be here. the last time that the u.s. president geared up, prepared for a summit meeting with this north korean counterpart, great dividends. great things accrued for north korea. in 2000, kim jong-un came out of his antisocial shell and he
engaged the world vigorously by lining up the leaders of the worlds biggest powers for a series of summit meetings. kim jong-un affected a very dramatic image makeover. he went from a reclusive, ruthless, funny looking dictator to a legitimate reasonable global statesman with whom the world could do business. what kind of business? nuclear negotiations. and, kim jong-un also set a new standard for international shakedown, extortion. let me try to explain. in may 2000, he made his first foreign foray, his first foreign visit as national leader. where did he go? beijing, obviously. why? >> because in a format he had a very important summit coming up with the south korean
president. after having profited $500 million, that is half $1 billion in cash, secretly wire transferred by the south korean government to kim jong-un secret personal account, kim jong-un then received president vladimir putin on july 19. it was the first ever visit to north korea by the top leader of russia or former soviet union. after having softened up china, south korea and russia, kim turned his gaze on the united states. and sent for the first time ever in the history of north korea, u.s. north korea relations a special envoy to the white house. vice marshal kim yong-chol came to the white house on october 10. met with president clinton and hand delivered a personal letter to clinton from his boss inviting clinton to come. just 12 days later, secretary
of state, madeleine albright, was there hosting kim jong-un watching the spectacle -- many people do not remember that bill clinton was very keen on making that historic trip. as unprepared and rushed as it was. that temptation, the impulse is very strong today in the white house in the trump administration. i would say. and the only reason that visit by clinton never materialized was due to the uncertainty, the fiasco in the wake of the november 7 election. the vote recount with al gore and george w. bush. it was not until mid-december, the 13th that al gore conceded, defeat and simply time or not. time ran out on planted. even in early january clinton
had not given up hope. in recent days, president trump has told kim yong-chol to take his time on denuclearization. it is a wonderful song by the south korean all girl group, red velvet called make it so. it is a love song and somewhat reminiscent of that. take your time, no rush. president trump also said, that he believes that north korea can change. before its economy under the stewardship of kim jong-un. history suggests otherwise. we see still of course, a persistent tendency on the part of americans to underestimate, patronize, condescend the north korean leaders. and the reasons are quite obvious. because they are so weird. but north korea has been weapon rising its own weirdness since the early 1970s.
under the stewardship of the founder. in 1972, the mood dramatically changed in the region. in the aftermath of the dramatic -- between the u.s. and china. they called on american reporters, journalists, to come see him. in may, a new york times reporter actually, harrison saulsberry and -- sit down. the next month they gave an interview to the "washington post". next month in july, he received a harvard law professor. to all three parties, he said u.s. troops should leave, yes? that they are a hindrance to genuine peace and unification. by the korean people themselves. there is a particular connotation in korean. that japan was revealed to
rising set on making south korea and north korea in economic colony. well, what does kim jong-un seek today after having effective what is in my view, a most dramatic makeover in history. in a few months he has gone from maniac, madman, this is what president trump called him in the past. "rocket man" on a suicide mission to in recent weeks, a veteran honorable man, very smart and very gracious.that is what trump has said of him. pompeo has said of kim that kim was very well prepared and personable. back in the old days, sherman said of his father, that he was very smart, capable, supremely confident and not a lunatic.
here is the point, whenever americans meet with the north korean. and this is true of south koreans and others. they come away impressed. that the north korean dictator is not only not a raving lunatic, but actually quite reasonable. kind of gracious. has a sense of humor, at times they even say strangely pleasing things like, we understand that the u.s. troops will have to leave but they do play a stabilizing role so we are not calling for their immediate withdrawal. and then americans come away totally impressed. uniformly, certain in the belief that they have made some kind of a deep emotional connection with a north korean dictator. by virtue of their own charisma, intelligence and empathy that they cannot trust in. what kim jong-un seeks is a negotiation process. not a final agreement. not an agreed resolution.
with which to buy time and money to perfect his own nuclear posture review. this is more rambo forward -- by the time you've seen the fourth installment you have a good idea of how the movie will end. and not end. time after time they fall for the trap. why? because north korea is dangling before the international community.the tantalizing prospect, possibility of denuclearization. so i believe it was president trump, his first mistake to impulsively agree to the proposition of a date by kim back in march. and i think that president trump is rushing into the meeting. in closing, how to salvage this very ominous situation.
well, the two men will meet in singapore next week. at the meeting, i suggest, i would suggest president trump needs to use the law, u.s. law as a lever. instead of political drama. what do i mean by that? as mr. bruce klingner knows very well as do you, a gradual suspension, and ultimate termination for u.s. sanctions against north korea, are codified into law. sections 401 and 402 calls of sanctions and policy enhancement act of 2016. president trump should tell mr. kim the truth. no one is above the law in the united states. my hands are tied. until you release political prisoners and until you take meaningful steps toward denuclearization of not only the nuclear programs but as stipulated in those sections.
your chemical and biological weapons programs. it is not that much i can do. and i cannot even suspend sanctions for one year until you stop counterfeiting our currency, engaging in proliferation and money laundering activities, and until you abide by the norms of international society, community as a recipient nation and allow for basic transparent monitoring. so, this is the truth. and furthermore, i call on you, mr. kim, to tear down the walls of your inhumane gulags. until you do that, there's not much that i can do. have a nice day. what kim will call for is continual, sacralization of this very basic two act play, provocation and post-provocation. he will call for summits. because as everyone knows, when
you are courting someone, you say, you leave open the possibility of even when you're being courted yourself. you leave open usually, the possibility of another meeting. even if the first date does not work out very well. so kim will say, come to pyongyang. he was even strength things like, -- maybe one year, maybe next year, seek out the un general simply. and mr. trump, he will be engaged, interested in the possibility of continual dialogue. i believe this is a trap. it will not work out. but if mr. trump, president trump can muster up the courage to tell kim the truth, then that will be the summit, that will be political drama worth the visit. thank you. >> thank you very much. just a little more background on the government meetings that
were occurring before it was decided clinton would not go to young young -- i was attending a meeting. it was a plus one. i was the assistant or bag holder for the dci and other cia officials talking about north korea. and after north korea invited president clinton to go into thousand, some in the administration were saying, we should do this. his personality is so strong that if we get him alone in the room with kim will get everything we want. nine months of working its way up through bureaucracies. but the majority view was, wisely against that. and it was predicated on success in meetings in kuala lumpur between u.s. and north korean officials. where they were talking about a potential missile -- u.s.
official said no, that is not how it works but we do not deploy a present to a grip and grin photo. we do not deploy president to negotiate. we deploy the present to sign an agreement where we know every piece of punctuation is on the document. the north koreans were not willing to be forthcoming. in identifying the parameters of the deal. so the decision was not to send the president. obviously, it is quite different now where they will have a top-down approach. where trump sees himself as the negotiator in chief.it is quite a different situation then in 2000. with just a little bit more background. and i do think that the uncertainty of the election added kind of a cloud over the decision that the main reason i think was because the north was refusing to be forthcoming on what the parameters of the missile deal could have been. contrary to secretary of state all brights autobiography, we were not disclosed to a missile agreement.
we were quite far apart. it looks like you more written down. would you like to go next? [laughter] >> thank you, bruce. and the heritage foundation for having us. thank you all of you for having this conversation with us today. it is a very timely event. it is always hard to go after sung-yoon lee. you just want to call a day because you heard everything. but for some of the questions laid out, i'll try to be as brief as possible. first i think the summit will be successful. he will package it and sell it to constituents as such. and it will not matter what we the experts or all of you in the audience, how we view the actual text that comes out of the summit. it is pretty clear that there is a strong inclination that both leaders to have a good show. a good pr opportunity. and this is where it gets risky and dangerous. this is where my concern is.
the two leaders, especially donald trump, would want to declare peace it sounds good and it is unprecedented. but the problem is, even if you declare peace it is not made it is now on the korean peninsula. and you walk and declare peace with north korea. also, president trump clearly is unconventional. and so, the reality is what we have.try to make the best of what we have. because president trump has already broken all conventional diplomatic orthodox, i do not think we can expect president trump to be or try to mold him into a typical lead negotiation to a typical international nuclear deal. i think that is the reality. he is operating like a business tycoon who likes to meet his counterpart first. maybe play golf, chit chat and make a move for a deal sometime
later. we may see something and we may not. i think it is true when the president, we just do not know yet. because he is unconventional think we need unconventional thinking execution for our self as well. and i would offer or suggest a good outcome, even if it is a show, which will become it is still very rare and unique opportunity. a good opportunity for a sitting american president to directly clarify from a kim leader himself, key concepts and fundamental concepts. like what is the relation, which is kim jong-un want? this is a good opportunity that the president really needs to take advantage of. i think it's a good outcome. i would love to see a detailed nuclear deal with you know, he steps on verification and you know, the give and take.
what i would be happy with a joint vision statement. a very simple joint vision statement. that leaves out key principles and goals. and the and picture for the two sides. ... commitment for the nuclear station and include normalization of relations and other intertwined issues and chart it as such as peaceful resolution to these issues. what president trump should not do this time clearly is not aim for the peace treaty before the nuclear's age and for reasons i mentioned before, but kim
jong-un, his game plan will to be to go to the peace route as another way to get to loosening sanctions and another routes to rid us forces of his influence and rig the south korea alliance , so a lot of these negotiations he doesn't have to go and head on and that band president trump to rid of the truce. and of course president trump should not trade away us forces for north korea's nuclear weapon i will lay those points out for further discussion later and handed over. >> thank you. professor lee and he recommends what president trump should do,
no one is above the law including human rights issue, wondering-- money laundering. i agree with this. the problem is we are dealing with president trump. we have to deal with the reality of what we have and i don't know if president trump is a person who didn't raise human rights issues at all, so i'm concerned that this is-- the ideal goal will not happen. it's interesting. there is a computing narrative out there on kim jong-un and you have been hearing about that somehow he's difference. we heard this argument made that somehow he is different from his father, different from his grandfather and things that we talked about that it's not really kim jong-un.
not that i agree with this assessment. i'm just getting out another narrative that's out there that he is a young man so he has to rule for the next 30, 40 years and he doesn't want to rule a backwards state, he cares what the world thinks of him and that's why when he came in, you know, he wants to be a modern leader of a modern country and he wants to reform and have a fundamentally good relationship with the united states so potentially he could put nuclear weapons on the table. soared to get into why i don't think it's necessary that there is evidence of that. i'm getting out there another narrative out there on kim jong-un. the problem is for all the reasons laid out, i'm concerned-- first of all before getting to this summit i think north korea-- kim jong-un has been playing this really well
and i have to give him credit. after almost seven years of spending the time accelerating to complete the immigrant program he starts-- stops right before-- you know, he didn't go all the way. hurdles he hasn't crossed to complete the program, but stopped right before. then you seen him engage the last few months in diplomacy and that has gotten a lot he had a complete image makeover already. he got to meet with president king twice in multiple meetings twice with president moon and has hosted the russian prime minister. he's quite even popular in south korea. okay, he looks like a normal guy at least. he had a makeover and i'm concerned that all these pressures we are talking about
is already hard to achieve because we are already hearing reports about even in china not really implementing sanctions. reports about seafood surfacing at the border area in china. imports of transfer of fuel. you going to probably see them or from china, russia and even south korea after the second meeting with president moon regardless of how this meeting is with president trump. there is already activity-- [inaudible] there will be more activity and movement, so he has already gained and now by president trump agreed to sit down with him we have given him legitimacy north korea is better off today
than it was a few months ago in november, december of last year. in terms of what to expect from the summit and what a successful outcome will look like i agree with neil completely. or whatever we, they will both sort of spin it as. i don't see the summit failing to the degree that kim jong-un would walk out or trump would walk out because they are invested in spinning this summit as a success, but president trump has set a high bar collie met the ron deal worse than ever , insane, embarrassment so when you look at the ron deal giving up some 90% of their nuclear material. they sought-- shut down thousands of centrifuges and settled with strict limitation on their nuclear program. now calling that dealing same means no-- whatever deal we have
with north korea has to be permanent. iran accepted intense monitoring including putting cameras and all nuclear facilities, not military installations. they had allowed sort of a right to challenge infection for facilities we suspect are involved in activities. my point is, having called that dealing same and, you know, you could argue it's a flawed deal. now whatever deal has to come out with north korea has to be better than that, so i think if he doesn't come away with declaration from kim jong-un and what do nuclear station-- denuclearization means, none of that they north korea--
[inaudible] to allow sort of limited inspections. also, include chemical, biological weapons as well as missiles and conventional forces. if you don't have this kind of agreement then you cannot, i mean, we talked about it already how president trump will call it a success, but then it's going to be all korea watch will be all over it and say that's not successful. i think president trump finally understand this not something that can be done may be a first try and this is why you have been hearing him back away from the initial high bar he set up for himself. what i think could happen are two scenarios. obviously, i don't know and no one really knows. we will find out next week, but number one, just some sort of
joint statement. that's minimal, statement that talks about denuclearization and north korea agrees to denuclearization in return for normalization relations or peace treaty or some sort of statement like that. that is the extent of it or president trump could get something-- i think if north korea is willing to give something to trump so it looks like a success, like look like it even more maybe agreement to take out some aspects of the nuclear program or blow up something, some-- something that looks like that it's big and all the media will hyperventilate and say it's very successful meeting. now, we are headed in the right direction and then north korea buys time. i agree with professor lee that
it's their goal, retracted process to buy time and money, but i think they might put up something to convince the world that this time it's different and they are doing something different and then even president trump says i realize it will take time. he admitted that, so we are allowing that and then north korea can drag the rest of the inspection, everything else drag it out and wait out the trump administration. his administration leaves and then they will be what they do, but there's no question in my mind that this is not-- [inaudible] we can see what might look like sort of headed in that direction we will never know whether something is successful or not successful until many years down the road, but i think it's the
two scenarios. one is very minimal statement, which will be spun as a success or something more if we can. that's as much as i think we can expect from this meeting with kim jong-un. >> thank you. to pick up on some points, kind of this characterizing of kim jong-un s sort of better than expected and we saw that-- i remember 1994 when many including some in the us government described his father as a bold economic reformer and north korea and i think as people made a character chair-- caricature, i think it's heard of undermines the assessment by making fun of all the missiles that failed and then when north korea does have a missile but is successful people are surprised even though experts have said
they had been making progress along the way they learn from their mistake. then people are like why wasn't i told north korea is an actual military threat or cyber threat. well, we have been trying to also, we have seen the cartoons of kim jong-un as the funny little guy with a mushroom cloud shaped hair or like has a baby playing with nuclear weapon toys so then when someone meets with him and he doesn't drool or stumble then they are amazed that he is this great international statement-- statesman and we can do business with him. then, you also see even this weekend when a few defense officials were north korea and there's this automatic jumping into they are replacing the hardliners with the moderates and they must have been resisting kim's bold new direction. moderate north korea is kind of a relative term, sort of replacing core leone with mike
corley on a. addresses better, but he still from the same family so it's a relative term and we really don't know why they were replaced. it could've been corruption charges or other things. it's interesting when it was talked about that we are hoping for not a detailed joint statement, i mean, one of my big criticisms of every previous north korean agreement was that it was so vague, so short and i worked arms control at cia so i am sort of used to and i like the very detailed arms control treaty with the soviet union and the warsaw pact. we didn't like the soviets or trusted them, but by having a really detailed treaty like a contract where everyone knew their responsibility and then you had very good verification, so if you have detailed text in good verification you can have
treaties with people you don't like or don't trust and i was always critical of the previous agreement because there was so vague so we could have an agreement and everyone got to have their own education, so what i was looking for is more a traditional, i want 100 page arms control treaty coming out of this summit or at least a very detailed thing, but i also see mr. president put the joint statement down, walk away and leave it for the experts. abets another theory, which. >> if i can jump in quick. i am with you on that and i would love to see a detailed agreement as well, but if we put it into context, in the summit so soon with an american president who clearly does not seem to understand the complexity of these issues, so if you put it in that context i think the best-- the safest
scenario would be to have a simple statement so that there are no mistakes or footage or slippage of the tongue or inadvertent giveaways to understand what the implications would be. >> i think another point that sue made was-- well, others have said it's going to be a success and then i think you will have very loud responses and i think it will be very partisan. trump supporters will say i have not read it but i know it's better than anything before and it was-- he's a strong president and will not do something flawed like the iran deal. critics will sort of criticize it because it's trump and he was not well prepared and then they will say well, it was not as good as the iran deal he walked away from so i think the lane in the road in between for analysts and experts is ahead of time identify what we think should be in the agreement or what our
recommendations and then assess whatever comes out of it against sort of the merits or lack thereof of the agreement and picking up on a point that sue said it's because trump has been so critical not only him but iran deal, but all previous agreements. i put it into kind of a math formula of ta is greater than one plus a+ 11 plus b and what that means is the trump agreement has to be better than the one iran deal and eight previous agreements we have had with north korea, but 11 un resolutions which have been imposing penalties on north korea and the verification has to be equal to or greater than that of the bcw treaty. that's i think one of the ways we score it and i take off points for contradictory policy statements. i take off points falling off of
what was a inalienable never going to give in on policy points, but i don't add or subtract points because it's a republican ministration. we should assess it the way we would obama or bush or anyone else, so i think unfortunately it will be in very parse in reaction to wetter-- whatever comes out of it so what we can hopefully do is put some analysis to its. one last point, just as when we saw a lot of experts who looked at the inter- korean summit and pointed out the similarities or even the plagiarism from previous agreements, which north korea repeatedly violated, i think, it's up to us to point out where especially if they are declarations of something new and historic and had never been done before to raise our hands and say paragraph two sounds like paragraph six of the agreed framework so that breaking new
ground. if we have any questions across the panel? >> may i add there will be mitigating factors. there will be factors that would -- even if nothing happens in the next six months in terms of actual denuclearization. what kind of events or factors? pageantry will go on. i would not be surprised if kim jong-un visits vladimir putin in moscow in the next few months. i would not be surprised if he holds a summit meeting with prime minister. japan is concerned its issue priority is being sidelined. lets me remind you that the prime minister, the last time he was president he had that unpleasant personal experience of being marginalized all of a sudden by the us in 2006 and 2007 when the us went back to
reengage north korea in the wake of north korea's major escalation, its first nuclear test on october 9, 2006. kim jong-un as a reformer, of course, we have heard this before he seen power in the wake of his father's death in 2011, and the reasons have always been solely that he was exposed to european culture as a boy, that he had in switzerland unlike his father who had not studied abroad. lived in france during for you-- for four years, but managed to kill about a third of his own countrymen. also, he managed to kill hundreds of thousands of his own people. kim jong-un for speaking a report-- reformer when he visited china in june, 1983 and
then successive-- through the successive years he's been always reborn as a new reformer. i remember in january 2001, so after the flurry of diplomatic activity in 2000, kim jong-un made another visit to china to the southern province. he visited the city january 13. visited some fancy flat screen tv processor making plant and at the next day he visited china industrial commercial banks, software producer and then the next day he visited telecommunication company and the media and everyone said, look, he's trying to follow in the footsteps of so-called
southern tours in january and february of 1992. kim, that is the current one will visit those region special economic zones and that will lend further credence to the wishful thinking that kim jong-un is a reformer, so please , let's be patient. let's not rush to judgment and give it time. that will be the faulty narrative we will hear. >> i wonder if one of the gestures that kim might sort of present is turning over the keys to the pueblo. i think david maxwell sort of thought of that as presenting the american ship that north korea captured in 1968 as kept as a museum and as propaganda tool. if they would just return-- offer to return the pueblo back to the us would be a big gesture. why don't i throw the questions
open to the audience. i'm not sure if we have a microphone going around, but if not if people could announce their name and their affiliation and a question. i guess no microphone. [inaudible question] [inaudible question] [inaudible question] trump doesn't seem to have a problem with that that no one in
europe wants him, canada or mexico. most traditional allies we are at a standstill on trade matters trump has time to do this with kim jong-un. for a second or third summit if this sort of non- test situation continues, the freeze if you will. >> i don't know if that microphone is on. does anyone want to-- >> thank you for the question and if i understood it correctly , you are asking if a long-term freeze is better than nothing. okay. so, the problem i have with kim jong-un's recent announcement that he will no longer test nuclear devices, missiles, sure it's a step in the right direction, the right thing to do, but it doesn't solve the problem and its trying to talk
the talk of an advanced nuclear power he's basically saying i'm an advanced superpower so i don't need to conduct explosive testing anymore. that's the point they don't have to conduct. they can refine their technology in what's called lab scale testing. that is the problem i have any other problem i have with a deep freeze if that's what we want to call it is that-- that just says you can keep your nuclear weapons. there will be a threat to south korea, japan and of course united states, so that again doesn't solve the problem either and if of the long-term-- you know, if this problem is intractable and definitely it would later lead to the potential for south korea and japan to flirt with their own nuclear station, so then it will make beijing react.
it would leave a bad president to new nuclear aspirations and will leave a laundry list of even bigger headaches for the united states in the future, so i think yes, we need to stop testing. but, again, doesn't solve the problem and does not lead to any real progress in the nuclear issue. >> i don't think kim jong-un needs to conduct another underground new toy test. the nation has conducted six as we know to date and the most recent one september 3, last year was the most powerful yielding reportedly over 150-kiloton. india and pakistan have each conducted six underground nuclear tests and at the last time was 20 years ago may, 1998.
many of those tests were small in yield, some even smaller than 1 kiloton. they were controlled tests. no one said that's not a nuclear test and today no one they would give it up by virtue of not having tested in 20 years. what kim jong-un i believe needs to do and will do at a time of his own choosing will be to follow through on the foreign ministers threat made in new york last year of a nuclear test hydrogen bomb, nuclear test in the earth's atmosphere or outer space. of course the us in former soviet union carried out these tests quite routinely between 1958 and 1962. it would be a serious provocation if north korea did that. would it lead to a response, one
cannot rule it out. i think kim jong-un at that moment of tension can say roll out his equal. hey, i didn't mean it. let's talk and by having done that he would have established full credibility that north korea can nuke any major us city across the united states. then he would be very firmly positioned to extort the us and south korea and even japan and get what he wants, taking us troops from south korea and maybe from japan one day and be able to bully and one day prevail over the richer south. >> i have a different take. i think north korea is done with missile testing and nuke testing. they will be getting-- giving a gift to the trump administration particularly-- i think they might do that.
but, they going to wait out this administration. the play right now is the diplomacy. they play normal guy. they play a reasonable character this is a reasonable country and they will get-- international acceptance. you can trust us with nuclear weapons. i think that will be the play. otherwise, we get back the pressure. [inaudible] back to the preventive strike that does not help north korea. i actually give kim jong-un more credit. i wish if he did that it would make it easier for us to know what to do with policy. it's easier when north korea asked bad. it's harder when north korea activist matter and the whole pressure is against us so we look like a bad guy. so, i understand the rationale.
i just think it will be sometime down the road after the change in administration. >> gerald chandler. why do you think the south korean leaders have been better negotiators than all of the us-- recent us presidents, clinton, bush, obama and their secretary of state's. in particular i recently heard madison albright on her book to her and she didn't admit to any fall, but you seem to think she had some, so i do you think that? cycling, you said the north koreans have benefited greatly by these recent negotiations. what concrete benefits have they gotten? >> i'm sorry, did you say south korean negotiators are better. >> i corrected myself.
north koreans were better negotiators according to you and why are they better negotiators and secondly you said the north koreans had taken great advantage and gains by what has happened recently. >> i didn't say north koreans were great negotiators. i said kim jong-un how he conducted himself in the last few months was smart. after the nuclear tests of 2017, hydrogen bomb tests i thought he would keep going. to my surprise he stopped himself. i thought the test might be a potential possibility, but he stopped himself. then he engage in the olympic participation and diplomacy and he has emerged with a better image. better than the one described during the sony hacking or what bruce was describing like baby with a bomb. he has emerged himself as a much
more likable even person. even myself when i was watching the inter- korea summit when he have him over the dnc back and forth with a smile and laughter, i mean, he appears to be more normal. what's i'm saying is not that he's an unbelievable negotiator, but he's positioned himself right now better than the fall and winter of 2017 the. >> i believe kim jong-un-- [inaudible] talking about denuclearization, that is a mere utterance or extension from prohibited activities, activities prohibited by over 10 un security council resolutions, so to say i will hold off on missiles a nuclear tests and the
wind then dined for that statement is absurd. this image makeover has limitations. over the past several months by making gestures meaningless gestures like decommissioning the underground nuclear site, by releasing three us detainees who should have never been the tate in the first place and by coming out of his shell. he has not only transformed himself from an international pariah, but he's basically reshaped the geopolitical page on which he is now being courted by the leaders of the biggest powers in the world and this trend, i think, will continue. i don't take the view that south koreans are better negotiators and americans-- >> he corrected.
>> okay. >> whether it's north korean negotiators or us negotiators are bad i would define it more as the agreements have been flawed in that again if you compare with the arms control treaties we had with the soviets and the warsaw pact-- i was the chief of the cia arms control pack in part of the treaty delegation. if you compare the detailed documents we had with them with the very vague, short, not detailed agreements we had with north korea, i think those were flawed because they were so short and lacking the detail we needed. if you try to buy a car from someone eight times and they had cheated you every time, what you need to do if you go back to negotiations is make sure you define what a car is, four wheels on a carburetor etc. you need to make very very clear for all sites what the requirements are and in talking
with some us to go shaders when some of the talks were underway, when i would talk about arms control treaty, they would say north korea's different. we won't have a thousand page document. we have to do it one page at a time. i said well why are we treating north korea differently from every other country we've negotiated with innate say well if we do one page at a time make sure each page is good and i would ask about certain provisions and they would say well, north koreans will not let us have that so we won't ask for it. that's not how you do negotiations and also when i asked about verification it would be like well, are we going to ask for some of the provisions we have an arms control treaties and the response was like they won't let us have that. they are proud nation. soviets would let us have it, but north koreans won't let us have those measures. what would you have us do, bruce, kill the scientists and
destroy the buildings down to the ground and i was like no, i just want a handful of short notice challenge inspections every year. i think the way we went into it was allowing fake text, allowing short text, allowing north korea to create a separate category for itself so that we agreed to. nonproliferation treaty, all nations that are in it have a server-side ability except north korea where we carved out special exemptions for them. >> i would characterize your question has north koreans are savvy negotiators and the reason for that and the simple answer to your question is look at the results. better nuclear weapons. you see american democracy, changing american administration , changing american policies, changing personnel in america and that is
one way they gain the system. they try negotiations, but they waited out-of-state if you don't want to deal with us and give us what we want we will wait till the next administration and in that time they could have nuclear capability. >> one other thing, whether it's negotiations with the text, i mean, the previous attempts have failed because north korea kept cheating on the agreements even as they were signing it, they were already in violation, so whether we blame the negotiators or just i think the underlying factor that north korea kept doing what they agreed never to do even as they were signing the documents, so i think that's been the theme that they have violated it. >> stephanie cook, nuclear
intelligence weekly. you mentioned how north korea is changing the geopolitics of the region and i wondered if you could look at south korea, japan and china and even russia and talk about what their expectations are of these talks, in other words what they actually see coming out of them versus what they would like to see coming out of them. >> different expectations. i think south korea expectation is president moon was so invested in this in bringing everyone to this point that they want the summit to occur. i think obviously our japanese counterparts, japanese are the most concerned about what could come out of the meeting and potentially even a deal that could-- that does not serve their best interest.
the premise or comes again-- when is he coming? a meeting with president trump again one of the last persons to see president trump again. [inaudible] i think japan is most concerned i think south korea, i think they just have a lesser expectation, i mean, they are saying the way they have-- i'm not sure if they need a specific-- i think it's a joint statement. i think south korea will accept and still pushing along having president moon has a famous saying like he says dealing with north korea is like a delicate crystal ball that you have to move delicately impatiently and so on because they are so invested.
i think china and russia, china it's interesting because i think china would gain from some agreement like peace agreement or any kind of reduction of us troops. it would be helpful to china and in fact when can jonathan raised the joint exercises i think it was really china's ask. i don't know if kim jong-un was okay with joint exercises a couple months ago and he raised it recently. of course china does not want-- is complicated because they don't want overly like us and north korea to really get that are spaced because china's interest is still to have the most influence over north korea. i think that's their number one interest more than anything else >> i agree and to add he really needs the summit he needs it for the very basic reason of the diplomatic process to stay alive
in the months and years going forward because he needs to achieve and drive the process and in order to do that he needs progress. progress will lead to 15 of the sanctions and in order to completely achieve president moon's cheek agenda he needs sanctions lifted because he can begin to implement other elements like the cultural and humanitarian exchanges. he's going to hit a roadblock with economic cooperation to create economic cooperation if there are still sanctions in place. for china, i agree with what was said to her china we seeing beijing tried to influence the process because now you have president moon and trump talk about peace and so peace is a regional border issue. that's where china has the
biggest stakes and do so china will want to try to get a seat at the table for that and that's why it's trying to rias-- research itself into the process and eventually with russia later on. i will just leave it at that. >> at the heritage foundation, fundraising is a high-priority as it is at the university-- >> we will pass around a half later. >> when it comes to international fundraising north korea is brilliant. you have to look at the scorecard in america. you look at the scorecard on nuclear diplomacy over the last quarter-century, very conservatively i calculate over $20 billion for north korea. between 1994 and 2010, south korea-- this is all on the public record, south korea gave north korea $11 billion.
about 70% of that in cash. between 1995 and 2008, according to the congressional research service the united states during the clinton and bush years gave north korea in excess of $1.3 billion, so that a hundred million a year and you might think it's not a huge is some. in the '90s north korea underwent famine. in the '90s-- late '90s of north korea's total export earnings from north korea was a few hundred million dollars, less than half a billion. that was a lot of money from the us as well. as of 2005, china has each year given north korea-- now this is a rough guess, but about 1.5 billion a year, so what about team america and its allies, what are they gained? approximately less than nothing for nuclear icbm armed north korea.
>> excellent question and another thing we see or signs we see now with the reports that assad wants to go to meet with kim jong-un, it appears kim jong-un is not only trying to level up the playing field in north asia, he seems to be leveling the entire world including the middle east, so whenever heard reports about assad, this poses to problems. diplomats to the north could lead the north to proliferate easier and it could build north korea into becoming wmd walmart of the world. the second problem is that and this is a geopolitical question i'm asking, you know, when the summit happens between moon and kim first and we saw beijing wanted to assert itself and we saw a russia also, so that leveling out the playing field
and building leverage before kim walks into a meeting with trump. the other element we see with assad is maybe gaining more leverage, bringing in more like-minded countries to join team north korea before the meeting with trump, so that has implications going forward especially when kim jong-un is clearly trying to build up his image as the leader of a normal country, leader of a peaceloving country and to eventually get to a point where it is accepted like india and pakistan, that it wants to be treated in that manner. >> the missile cooperation between iran north korea, so i wouldn't be surprised if that's the other elements.
>> thank you for coming. this is excellent conversation, all of you, really great. heritage foundation. north korea, it seems like north korea they want this summit with trump more than the other way around. it seems that way. now, what do they want? do they want a peace agreement somehow because they dangled the back ^-caret already. they released to the three hostages. they signed a treaty with south korea, i mean, he can come in and say that and how about peace treatment. what is he willing to give up? trump already said what do you want, but kim has not said what
he wants. so, my question is, what do you think of that? >> why is north korea so insistent on a peace treaty when north korea is a country that has without fail violated every major international agreement it signed, but it's been on another paper agreement? china in the us never signed a peace treaty. china and japan never signed a peace treaty am a butt normalized diplomatic relations. china and south korea never signed a peace tree for japan and russia never signed a peace treaty. the peace treaty is good as long as there's genuine intent on the part of both adversaries to pursue peace. what is north korea's gain? everyone knows it that a peace treaty would call into question the jester of us troops in south korea and in the new peaceful environment they will most
likely be withdrawn, so that is a plus for north korea in changing that balance of power in the north peninsula. i think north korea wants more. if you sign a peace treaty, if there is one along the us china north korea, south korea constitution will come under revision. in particular, articles three and four, article three defines koreans are okay territory at the korean peninsula. article four stipulates that south korea will pursue a policy of peaceful unification on the principle of freedom and democracy, a free democracy. that word is maximum, the word free or freedom.
so, this will cause friction in south korean society. south koreans will bicker among themselves and this is only plus for north korea because north korea will insist that all of this-- it's concerned with this piece. north korea on multiple levels. they are not one dime mention of encircling a crazy. >> quickly on peace treaty. it's actually one of my biggest fears because we know kim jong-un wants it for the reasons articulated. because president trump even before he came into the office kind of question why do we even need troops there, it's too expensive. i'm concerned and i don't think north korea will bring up to the president at all because they are too smart to bring it up and they know it's a sensitive issue. just a peace treaty, that
translation peace treaty and eventually the rationale-- cannot evolve-- [inaudible] in theory it sounds good, so technically we have it included the world-- war because we don't have a peace treaty. i'm concerned this is one of the gifts president trump thinks he could put on the table. on the very concerned about that, actually. >> to be clear and i think i can speak for everyone here that we all want peace, but the sequence is what's most important and the reason why, if you look at the negotiations and even the text, they made it they as bruce said, but they said relevant parties will discuss peace regime at an appropriate time. the understanding for that was relative parties can begin discussing the issue peace regime that conclude a peace
treaty after the third phase called the dismantlement face, after there was blue prints drawn up then the relevant parties could start talking informally or formally about peace treaty. so, that's where it's important. you want to have formal negotiations, piece to go shows after enough dismantlement is in place. >> what does north korea want, and a lot of what we are going against is what others say that north korea wants according to south korean delegation, i met with kim jong-un is this is what they has said or according to chinese press after kim's visit this is what north korea says. it's like we are not getting a lot straight from the horses mouth, but also north korea has announced things, it's not that it's codewords but it's using phrases that people have been following for a long time no what they mean. so, even in the south korean
delegation readout of the meeting with kim, i mean, he's willing to talk about denuclearization and a return for security assurances. they did not use end of us hostile policy. but, we know what they meant. security assurance of which they have been provided many times including september, 2005, document all to no avail and the end of the us hostile policy is a long list of security and diplomatic and economic demands, even sort of demanding for telnet of south korea's constitutionally protected freedoms of assembly and expression. you know, when they talk about that we know what they mean and even yesterday's imposition-- emphasizing denuclearization as part of global arms control and we a lot with members of the nuclear club will go to zero
when everyone else goes to zero. we all knew that, but last month where he made the statement that he basically said north korea's position for years the white house was surprised because they were like incredulous that wait a minute kim said he was willing to talk about denuclearization, which we think means this. well, they have a different meaning, so when we saw the white house talking points of the reasons why they were calling off the summit and it was a series of broken promises not only well they didn't show up and we sat in singapore for three days, but also the broken promise of going back on what they pledged to do with denuclearization. they didn't go back, they have their own interpretation, so if you follow it for a while you know what they mean, but i think folks who don't follow it have been surprised. on the peace treaty, i think they are both kind of legal and decide zero impacts. the legal would be if you sign a
peace treaty it removes the basis for united nations. it doesn't have an impact on combined forces command or us forces or the level of us troops on the peninsula. that's a result of the us south korea bilateral defense treaty. if you have a non- binding peace declaration like was agreed to, that has no legal ramifications for anything, but in society both south korea and i could see in the us including congress you would have a sense of the war is over officially, it took longer than we thought, but bring the boys home. if the boys-- if the wars over why are they there? if you don't address the north korean conventional threats to south korea, then you will have reduced the allied deterrent the fence keep ability without taking care of the threat that they were there for.
>> real quick. in the late '90s into 99 when they were negotiating peace treaty, these are formal negotiations for a peace treaty and they eventually broke down basically for two reasons. one, the north did not want to south korea as the process a number two north korea kept demanding withdrawal of the us troops. in that process, china was also -- my understanding from negotiators in the process was china was demanding withdrawal of the united nations command during the process. so, when we hear-- we are now hearing the formal declaration to and the korean war will be a
three party process and they have defined it as the two koreas, peace treaty afterwards including china, but that's an interesting statement to make and the secular nation behind that is probably because of precedence that in the talks before china has tried to get in the way and spoil the process and demand the withdrawal of united nations command and other issues, so that is the speculation the assumption made now why south korea might want only three parties as part of the declaration. >> great presentations from everyone. a quit-- the plum blow would be a symbolic and a lot of people might like that.
>> i was just saying it would be a gesture that would go over very well. >> my question for all four of you and to put it bluntly i think you all talk to to this, but have we seen-- we have seen savvy, diplomatic action with a charm offensive. we have seen the regime get something for nothing in the last two months, stature, legitimacy, but have we seen any evidence the north is changing its fundamental strategy? you know, strategy regime survival, but unification of the peninsula under the north's control through subversion, so urgent-- subversion and the key is the splitting of the alliance and getting us forces off the korean peninsula, so does anyone believe that that foundational strategy has changed and that
the north's objective to unify the peninsula under its control has actually changed? a parallel question, is there any sense that kim jong-un really believes in a peace process any indication process in accordance with president moon's relationship, you know the federal process and the like or would it be part of its subversion efforts to end up dominating the peninsula? >> no. [laughter] >> the unification, i mean, that also got into sort of the preventive attack discussion and justification for it. you know, i would see it as when people are talking about preventive attack and they get into why does north korea have nukes i might see three schools of thought. one was the benign
interpretation, they only have it because response to the us policy. it's a small nation assaulted by us or threatened by us. they didn't even though they promised never to do it because of us, you know. i would say it's more than just this benign reason. they do have military plans. kim jong-un when he came into office directed that the military come up with a new war plan to unify the peninsula within seven days and that requires going nucor bio and chem early so there are plans, not just the benign. sort of the other extreme would be those that say we have to do a preventive attack as opposed to preemptive mortality are because they to unify the peninsula. they are heading south or some of the reasons. if it's a yes, they have the plan, but i would say the third
school where i would be is that they are not coming as long as they understand the current correlation of force, which is why we have a treaty, why we had the other things. it's not the benign interpretation and it's not that they are coming tomorrow and therefore we have to hit them and initiate a war to prevent a war, but they are not coming as long as they stay the same. i don't think we have seen a change in strategy, but i don't see that they are coming anytime soon. i think even sort of simpler than that is, is there any evidence that north korea is willing to abandon its nuclear weapons in the sense that we think of it given all the statements by north korea, given the history and all of that when you have kim jong-un on january 1, and april 20, saying we have made it and cross the finish line and now, we will increase exponentially for
production of nuclear weapons. really calls into question that they are willing to put them all on the table, so you know, i'm hopeful, but i'm pretty skeptical as we going to the summit. .. >> we would presume that pyongyang is simply content to muddle through, say crazy things, and then say i change my
mind let's talk and repeat that cycle in perpetuity. i don't think so. it's worked wonderfully for north korea over the past decades. because they are risk averse. they are simply too much on the line to escalate with north korea. even in the face of egregious little attacks there has never been an instance of the u.s. or south korea resulting to military retaliation. that is the simple truth. but how long can that go on? if you are the kim regime, do you take satisfaction, reassurance in that status quo when the income disparity between the two koreas are increasing each year. south korea is conservatively speaking 50 times richer than the north. this is a problem. it raises the very thorny question of why is the continued existence of the dprk really necessary? when your own people are
crossing the border into that other korean state, you have a problem. so you need one day to be able to not only censor the south but obliterate it and that's the ultimate game plan and i think they are making progress. >> i think we have time for one or two more questions before we shift to our second panel which will be focusing on japan and the impact all these mind boggling changes in the last several months the korean peninsula have had on japan as well as prime minister abe. we will bring up our second panel at about 3:00. but i think we have time for another one or two. woman way in the back? >> hi. thank you very much for the session. i was wondering if you could talk a little bit more about u.s. south korea relations through this as you have mentioned, moon is obviously very invested seems very confident in this process to
what extent has the white house kind of relied on this mediation and how much of that is a good thing? if the process is eventually deemed a failure as many skeptics think it will be, what is to potential for u.s. south korea gap in that? >> why don't you address it first? >> why did kim jong-un change his tune [inaudible] on new year's day? there are four plausible explanations in descending order -- ascending order of relevance. first he woke up on new year's day, had a change of heart and decided going forward he's going to be a nice guy.
highly unlikely; right? second kim jong-un was so overcome with gratitude towards president moon for his patience through that in 2017 he decided to reciprocate and send athletes and cheerleaders to the south for the winter games, probably not true. and third this is the trump administration's take, kim jong-un was compelled by the tough rhetoric and the threat of the use of force and tough sanctions enforcement to change course. i see no evidence to support that. it could be true. probably partially it's true. but when you think of the statement by president trump on august 8th, fire and fury, which the world has never seen before. three weeks later, on the 29th of that same month, which is known in the north and south as national humiliation day, for it was on that date, august 29th, in 1910, that the korean peninsula colonized and kim
jong-un fired a missile over japan on that day. that came total destruction, rocket man on a suicide mission at the u.n. general assembly in mid september. two months later, kim jong-un fired an icbm, the most powerful to date for his nation. it does not strike me as the behavior of a terrified man. so my take is all this has been preordained, preplanned because north korea has shown it goes through cycles of provocations and then peace ploys. in 2018, after that banner ballistic year in 17, after having established his credibility was simply too good to pass up on with the winter games and so on. so i would say the trump administration should ask itself a very simple question of logic, at what point between february 9th and march 8th, between mike pence's invalidation of north korea's outreach to the south at
the opening ceremony of the games on february 9th and march 8th, when president trump impulsively agreed to the summit proposition, by kim jong-un, at what point during that month did north korea's intentions go from fake to genuine? we're being played again. >> what about the alliance relationship? >> i will just say in 15 seconds, president trump, i assume, he's using the troops the card. we know president nixon used the troops card against south korea withdrew an entire division 20,000 troops in 1970 and 1971 and in 1974 before he was forced
to take a job elsewhere, he actually seriously considered he had made up his mind to withdraw u.s. troops and then jimmy carter talked about it of course and then in the bush years george w. bush more american troops were redeployed. so in let's say withdrawing 5,000 or 10,000 troops, president trump will likely calculate, he is sending a stern message to both seoul and pyongyang. seoul you keep cozying up to the north like that, you are on your own, fend for yourself, as he himself said during the campaign. to north korea, president trump will think this is sending a very strong message, we are removing our troops from the south, thereby we will no longer allow our troops to stand in harm's way within the range of your artillery. thereby we will be more prone to strike first. now, it may work, but i think
that is a false hypothesis. probably it will work in north korea's favor, not u.s. interest. >> just to quickly answer the second part of your question, about the alliance if the summit fails. i worry about potential decoupling, not in the way that -- not in extreme decoupling, but i do think president moon has invested himself so much, that if the summit fails, which i don't think it will, you were just talking about that scenario, i do worry because i think the the momentum is already there and president moon will want to continue that. that puts him in a difficult situation to balance u.s. and north korea. i worry about us being on the same page if the summit fails. >> i think the relationship right now is complicated, i mean, it's been strained because of president trump's comments, both during the campaign and
after entering office. it's been strained given the comments about the alliance, you know, kind of free riding ungrateful allies, you know, particularly a lot of criticism of japan and south korea. sort of during the campaign seemingly making alliances a business relationship. we should get reimbursed 100% or we walk which is not what alliances are based on. they are based on shared values and shared history the u.s. korean alliance which was forged in blood. those of us who have children in the military don't see our children as there as a money-making operation or mercenaries. they are there for principles and shared values with our allies. you know, and then when it comes to inner korean relations, there was concern about president moon because he's progressive and how far left would he go, but during the campaign, his campaign as well as once he came in office, he really shifted more to the
center. we saw him reverse his policy on -- [inaudible] -- admitting it would be a violation of u.n. resolutions if they were to reopen it without prior approval. he was saying now is the time for pressure not engagement with the north because his open hand of dialogue was rejected several times by pyongyang. so there was no strain on the inner korean aspect. now that moon has sort of taken the bit between the teeth many moving very quickly -- in moving very quickly in trying to improve relations with the north perhaps due to concern of a u.s. preventive attack, now he's sort of strained further from where we have been. so i think right now president trump is on board with this positive momentum. but if things don't progress as well, either in the summit or subsequent negotiations, then there could be i think growing u.s. criticism or suspicion of moon, if he continues moving
quicker than the path than the u.s. would be willing to. so i think moon is like his progressive predecessors, less willing to sort of demand high conditionality and high reciprocity from north korea, you know, more so than the u.s. so if the more we diverge on inner korean relations, then i think even the tensions that were coming out, but largely papered over over the special measures agreement negotiations, then they may start coming out. if the south koreans see the u.s. as being the impediment or the reason for a failure of the summit, then i think we may see more south korean domestic criticism of the u.s., as the u.s. is getting in the way of improved inner korean relations and maintaining peace. with that i think we're going to have to bring it to a close. we're going to bring our second panel up. as we do that, if you could join me in thanking our first panel. [applause]
>> vice president mike pence speaks tomorrow at the faith and freedom coalition conference in washington, d.c. our live coverage begins at 6:30 p.m. eastern on c-span. >> sunday on q&a, new york times columnist talks about his book "to change the church, pope francis and the future of catholicism". >> he thinks the church needs to change in various ways particularly i think around issues related to the
revolution, marriage, divorce and so on, where prior popes basically said these are changes the church can't make, and so there have been these sort of fraught places in his pontifficate where he has clashed with cardinals and bishops and theologians over just how far he can push the church to change, what the church can change without either undercutting its own traditions or breaking faith with the new testament, the gospels, jesus christ. >> q&a, sunday night at 8:00 eastern on c-span. >> right now president trump is in canada for the g-7 summit. before he left the white house today, he spoke to reporters and touched on a number of topics, including north korea.