tv U.S. Senate Sen. Markeys Reaction to North Korea Deal CSPAN June 13, 2018 2:10am-2:22am EDT
strong, be strong of good courage and bold in dealing with kim. we are on a path toward an unprecedented agreement, and the united states must not waiver in our demand of complete, verifiable, denuclearization by north ko senator: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. markey: thank you, mr. president. mr. president, i come to the floor today to raise my concerns over the outcome of the summit between the united states and north korea. now, afteritnessing heated rhetoric from both sides, the unexpected turn towards diplomacy by president trump and kim jong-un was, by all account, a very welcome development. as there is no military solution to the north korean crisis, i was encouraged to see direct engagement and i have long advocated for this approach. however, i am concerned that the agreement signed this morning
does little to addresshe t threats and challenges we face. first, the text ofhe statement was the most vague and least detailed of any signed by north korea over the past three decades. despite his claims to the contrary, president trump got a weaker deal with fewer commitments than any of his predecessors. nowhere does the document explain what, quote, complete denuclearization of the korean peninsula means. for example, kim jong-un can easily interpret the language to mean that he will only relinquish his nuclear weapons once the united states does the same. after all, history shows us that north korea interprets the term c.e.p. korean peninsula to be any nuclear weapon capable of
striking north korea. the loopholes in the agreement are big enough to fly nuclear missiles through. by contrast, previous agreements were much more stringent. the992 joint declaration signed by north and south korea, for example, included conditions such as, quote, south and north korea shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons. and, south and north korea shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrich. facilities. unfortunately, neither of those commitments appears in the latest agreement. eage, instead, suggests something worrying. as the administration must have realized that this agreement was not as strong as the previous ones, it appears that it was unable to convince north korea to adopt tougher, more detailed commitments. if true,e should take the hint
that north korea has not yet felt the economic pressure necessary to compel it to accept our definition of denuclearization. one where the kim regime relinquishes its nuclear weapons and its means to produce more. it appears that kim jong-un, having stockpiled a wide range of illicit and dangerous weapons, believes that he is negotiating from a position of strength rather than from a position of weakness. and while the trump administration says that it has imposed maximum pressure, the truth is that we haven't yet reached that level. that could be called maximum pressure. north korea must understand that even if china eases the pressure, we in congress are ready to step in to tighten the screws on the north korea economy.
and president trump appears to have made a second unforced error. by agreeing to curtail our joint military exercises with the south koreans, president trump let kim jong-un dictate our military activities with other countries by proclaiming that our exercises are, quote, provocative, he has adopted the north korea propaganda. by proclaiming that our exercises are, quote, expensive, he showed that he does not grasp our alliance commitments. yes, some military exercises are costly, but as any businessperson should know, the more important indicator is lue. if a high cost is outweighed by even greater benefits, then we should be willing to pay the cost. our military exercises improve the readiness of our forces to deter and, if necessary, defeat north korean aggression.
will north korea be sufficiently deter without u.s. and -- deterred without u.s. and south korean forces standing shoulder to shoulder. will the chance of conflict decrease? it was telling that the south korean government needed to issue a statement asking the prescription drugs to clarify its -- the trump administration to already its statement. it seems the blue house in sth korea was not consulted what. signal does it send to china that our presence in the region, which has helped keep peace and stability for decades, may be sacrificed to save a bit of money? the trump administration might have unwittingly given a green light to china to pursue more aggressive actions in the region. now, i have been warning that we must watch out for the old kim
family playbook, one that has been used throughout the clinton, bush, and obama administrations. well, the kim family playbook was on the field yet again last night, and president trump fell for all of the plays. as it has done in the past, north korea showed that it is trying to, number one, front-load the rewards and delay concessions. as indicated by the postumt statemenromhina's foreign ministry, pyongyang and beijing already appear to be working together to remove sanctions despite the lack of tangible evidence of denuclearization. nuer two from the kim family playbook -- use sleight of hand to make irrelevant actions seem meaningful by supposedly site a missile engine testst stand, north korea is claiming
it has made real progress despite not destroying a single warhead or missile. and number three in the kim mily playbook -- exploit ambiguity. therump-kim agreement is so vague that it imposes no clear requirements on north korea. what we should want is reconciliation, not repetition, of what has happened decade after decade when the kim family uses its playbook to delay concessions. that they make while front-end loading the rewards which they receive. we can all agree that we need a plan to stop north korea's plutonium production and uranium enrichment that suspends and then eliminates its missile program, that permanently dismantles and removes all of its nuclear and biological weapons and that implements a
strong inspection program. most of us agree on what a deal should look like, but the trick is figuring out how to get there. and the hard work lies ahead to successfully navigate the hazards. number one, do not sell out our allies. we must not allow north korea to believe that the alliance framework, which has served as the foundation for regional peace and security, is anything other than unshakable. unfortunately, south korea seemed to be caught off guard by president trump's announcement on military exercises. number two, do not prematurely release the pressure valve. china, north korea's chief enabler, already is easing pressure on north korea. north korean goods already are
becoming more abundant in china despite being banned by united nations security council resolutions. and immediately following the summit, the chinese foreign ministry suggested making adjustments to existing sanctions on north korea. if china wants to be taken seriously as a responsible global power, it cannot shirk its duts to enforce sanctions on serial violators like north korea. and if north korea back slides at any point, china must be tougher on north korea, oil exports to the north o tf korean regime which still flows in every day from china. three, focus on the threat at hand. north korea's nuclear warheads and other dangerous weapons and their delivery systems are real
threats. the administration must not fall for north korea's inevitable theatrics and false concessions, as we cannot afford to be sidetracked. after all, nothing would stopped north korea from conducting another nuclear or missile test if it even believes its warheads and missiles need more testing. and, number four, build american diplomatic capability and infrastructure. diplomacy is a team sport, and no matter what commitments leaders make, it is only through a well-staffed and resourced professional diplomatic corps that it becomes a reality. the state department must have the resources it needs to conduct american foreign policy around the globe, and especially with regard to asia and north korea. the outcome of this summit clearly indicates how much we need the advice of korean
diplomats and technical experts. and, number five, come to congress to a chief a lasting solution to the crisis, the trump administration mustork withgress to shape the contours of any future deal and any final agreement should take the form of a treaty to be ratified by the united states senate so as to increase its shelf life. without following principles like this and without a clear understanding of our previous diplomatic efforts with north korea, we could fail. we owe it to our fellow americans to successfully reduce the threats we face because the threats for north korea are significant. unlike other countries with nuclear programs, north korea already possesses thermonuclear warheads and the ballistic missiles to deliver them. it has shorter-range missiles that cast a dark shadow over our allies, south korea and japan.
pyongyang possesses some of the foulest toxins on the planet and it brutally impresses, imprisons, tors and kills its own citizens. so weusdd these myriad threats. and as it turns out, negotiating with north korea is harder than the presidentught. so we muste to squeeze the regime so that it cannot access the resources necessary to maintain our expand its military capabilities. after all, the combination of direct engagement backed by pressure is the only solution to the north korean threat to the united states, our allies, andp. the presiding officer: the majority leader. mr. mcconnela few hoursgo, president trump, secretary of state pompeo, security advisor bolton and the rest of the delegation ended their meeting with north korean officials. is