tv Elizabeth Economy The Third Revolution CSPAN June 17, 2018 7:01am-7:49am EDT
we won't give you a discount on the the book you're going to buy but we would be forever grateful. a subtle plug. >> i appreciated it, thank you. >> that's my version of subtlety. good evening. welcome to the council on foreign relations, and welcome to a discussion about a wonderful new book by elizabeth economy entitled "the third revolution: xi jinping and the new chinese state." liz besides being the author this under the books is the senior fellow here at the council and she also directs the asian studies program. and what she and i going to do for a few minutes is talk about this book, and then were going
to open it up to you all to ask any questions you might like. but you've already set an important precedent at the council. i think it might be the first time we've matched the third to the subject matter of the book. [laughing] >> that's the most important thing i've accomplished. >> i'm not quite sure how we extend that in other situations, but we'll think about that. okay, so this is the third revolution, so help us understand a few things. let's begin with revolutions 1.0 and 2.0. place this in the river, so to speak, of chinese history. >> let me just start by showing something i learned on my last trip to china about five or six weeks ago. i was there as part of a cfr delegation to try to find areas of common purpose, common ground with a group of chinese scholars and officials. the talks were not particularly
fruitful, but i did for the first time here a senio china scholaffiareferred to s a a superpower. and for the 20 jews i've been going to china, china has always been the world's largest developing economy or its been a merging original power. later it became a major or even great power that this is the first time i heard superpower. superpower to meet -- >> is there a specific phrase in mandarin or they say superpower? >> they say superpower. they get it. i think it signals basically the lease now in china they have not only the capability but the intent to be able to play alongside the united states in terms of shaping the rules of the road. i think it is a real reflection of xi jinping's third revolution because that is at the heart of
the third revolution, reclamation of the position of centrality on the global stage for china, the great rejuvenation of the chinese nation. so to put in that historical context, if you look back at biopsy done nike 49, 1950, the first revolution -- mao zedg, or hated the china communist party state. as xi jinping says that's when china stood up. then you had deng xiaoping in reform of opening up, china's economy began to take on attributes of the market comps of society blossom, they got the internet. he welcomed influences from outside world. that's what xi jinping terms china got rich. then we have xi jinping's era, the first five years up in 2012-17. xi jinping has really upended much of deng xiaoping approach to governing from the collective decionaking, hepoke to consolidate power in his own
hands so truly much more of a single leader model. as a poster with the drawing the markets, withdrawing the party for much of society and the economy. xi jinping has reasserted the power of the communist power in society come in the economy as opposed to welcoming influences from outside the country. xiping has constructed a ki of virtual wall of regulations and restrictions so he can work closely control what comes in the country and what goes out. maybe the most defining feature for people in the united states and elsewhere is that xi jinping has really rejected deng xiaoping was model of brightness and obscurity maintaining a low profile of foreign-policy to embrace a far more expansive and ambitious foreign-policy for china. >> just out of cur, dtys xi jinping speak of himself and what is doing as a third
revolution in order to suggest he is the third great figure of modern china? >> he doesn't speak in those terms but he certainly has done other things that suggest that he views himself on par with mao zedong and deng xiaoping. for example, he had his name and is his thought enshrined in the chinese constitution in a way that only mao zedong has in the past. if he has assumed control all of the most important committees and commissions that oversee government policy in a way that mao zedong mostly did. >> for me the biggest question, and we'll see if it is for you, is what is motivating this? to what extent is this an expression, if you will, of a personal ambition? to what extent is this ambition for china? to what extent is this that out of necessity and to what extent is he doing this out of concern the fear that if he doesn't do it, the third revolution may turn out to be something very
different and something he doesn't want to happen? what's behind this? >> the motivations are mixed, probably one, two and four other want you suggested -- >> i can't remember. >> i barely kept eitr but the neity what is one that probably didn't need to be included. look, he is a strong leader. he's the first leader sense deng xiaoping to come in with the vision for what he wanted to take the country, he articulated as he stood on stage national people's congress we first disappointed general secretary. that or get the great rejuvenation of the chinese nation. he set out his primary policy initiative which was anticorruption campaign right from the outset. he said if corruption is not addressed it could be the death of the communist party and a depth of the chinese state. >> did he have a point? >> absolutely. maybe not the death of the chinese state that corruption was endemic, corroding the legitimacy of the communist
party. the party had become nothing much more than a stepping stone for personal, political and economic advancement. he was right to undertake the kind of very aggreeanticorruptie seen. it's been five years end of the year he has arrested more people than the year before. last year 570,000 officials were arrested with a 99% successful prosecution rate, as you might imagine. >> impressive legal training. to what extent does all of this represent, not so much a departure, but more a return to what was the case? you said before that there were big elements of deng xiaoping's philosophy -- don't pick on me for my pronunciation like you always do, please. to what extent does this really,
a a return if you will to previous china, a combination like yes, yes and patient that a but also particularly domestically? does this represent a return to a china much top have become more authoritarian, , and some ways that are familiar? >> sure. one of the interesting things i found when doing research for the book was many of the things that xi jinping has been doing domestically has had long lineage threat chinese history. self censorship, for example, is something that dates back centuries. the chinese were always very concerned about corruption. that was another area where a game where dating back centuries now. and mao zedong also began undertaking anticorruption campaigns every few years. our anticorruption campaigns. i think many of the repressive elements of xi jinping's approach to governance have the
history threat chinese history. there's a kind of choice for any chinese leader makes about which ght of chinese history to adopt. even in the ming dynasty you had periods when china was exploring, the greatest explorer was out sailing with his 300 ships, and then soon thereafter the ming dynasty close back down. down. they burned all the ships in the same dynasty. >> peter the great versus others that you he. >> right. >> to what extent, is it even possible t know, how do i put this? that this is now the reality for the foreseeable future? or to what extent does he the t to put in real roots, or to what extent is there real pushback? >> a lot of questions rolled up in that. i think we can say fairly -- >> that's a -- >> i think we can say fairly he
is amassed institutional power. as i mentioned control all those committees and commissions. he has hand selected the standing committee on the politburo and all the center commit himself. he is at various parts of the bureaucracy pledge loyalty to xi jinping himself as opposed to the party. he's done a a very good job of amassing this institutional authority. the question is how much personal political loyalty does he really have? is within the top leadership, we don't know whether some of the top leaders really agree with all of the directions in which you taking the country. we know there some significant pockets of discontent among the intellectuals, among entrepreneurs, broad swath of society. there's a big feminist movement and lgbt movement. there are many signs of discontent of whether they would
ever coalesce into something that would challenge him, that's a different kind of question. >> will what would be the contet that would increase the odds he were to be challenged? what should keep them up at night or does give them up at night in terms of his ability to pull this off? >> there are a lot of things that probably keep you up at night. if anythg goes wro the signature initiatives, the belt and road initiative here if that's enough stalls and peters out, or you have enormous amount of international backlash. if, for example, there was some kind of military action around taiwan where china did not show well, i think that would also be an embarrassment that would be difficult for him to recover from. he's put out daddy scott three critical issues to address, and five, poverty and deleveraging the economy. there was significant economic slowdown, that would substantially undermine his authority and his popularity.
there are a lot of things that keeping up. the fact that he has sort of become theole authoritarian leader means that he's in charge of everything, and said everything kind of redounds to him. so if there's a big fan of some sort, it reflects on him. >> onef the dangers of that kind model is also like the one child policy, if you make a decision and it turns out to be a lousy decision, then you live with the consequences. you can easily be tagged with it. do you sense there's enough i would what people can speak truth to power more than once, or what's your sense in essence how he operates things? >> one of the things that again i learned in my most recent trip was that the move to amend the constitution and to eliminate the two-term presidents limit was understood very poorly by
many in the elite, not only in the liberal intellectuals but also some of the retired officials, very unpopular move. that's the kind of thing that could cause in real problems because people feel as though they can't have an opportunity to voice dissenting views. they feel he's going to be there forever now. they don't feel there's a system of openness. one of the potential pieces of legislation that was put forward within the chinese political consultant conference which is a shadow legislature within china was all decision would undergo some kind of review process a year after they've been put into place. that was tabled here to did move forward if that's the kind of think some people are trying to use because they are afraid that there isn't that opportunity for open debate and open hearing. >> just pardon my -- did he
abolish, two-term limit or use now in a third five-year term? >> he's in the second of his -- >> but once afterwards, but are there still turns, just an unlimited number or just open ended? >> there are always terms because national people's congress will meet every five years. >> technically would have to be renewed. just no limit on the number? >> correct. >> just like distant. how long, you been watching for a while. you know china as well as anybody i know. does any of this surprise you? >> we did know much about them when he first came to power. he was kind of an unknown figure. we knew he had been in charge of the olympics and that was a big success. he had been in charge of the south sea china policy which become more assorted under his direction. but really as he moved up to the provincial party ranks you think you stauffer was anticorruption.
that was the one issue hit always taken on board that he felt very strongly about, that official should not use their position for personal economic gain. when he came to power i don't think people really knew much about him. >> do you think he was underestimated? >> underestimated and people still he got them wrong. there was a lot of discussion around xi jinping waivers came to power about a big political reformer. 's colding at the direction that he moved, and a big -- apart his father had been quite open politically i think we did know much about them waivers came to power, but i read all of his speeches as part of the research for the book and i would say what he says is pretty much what he does get a joy to understand him you can read what he says in his speeches and the party ensured that will be the policies he's going to pursue. there shouldn't be much mystery around at this point. >> do you know what influenced
him in terms of either models to emulate a models to avoid, like is there any sign that gorbachev any such as a i'm not going to be the chinese -- doing anything about it in terms of that? >> not only did he sit to himself he ascended to the communist party, to china, to the world that he thinks the fall of the soviet union is exactly what he wants to avoid. think that speaks volumes in terms of the influences for his political repression as opposed to opening up because he believes there was a loss of the power of the communist party under gorbachev, that it didn't have sense of its own value, of its own purpose, and that when gorbachev opened up, politically that begin the beginning of the end of the subunit. >> let's talk about the implications of this are chinas behave with the rest of the world. you alluded to it before. let's take one issue that is a
bit of a sleeper issue that's getting a little more attention which is taiwan. does this mean, it's not either or, one interpretation is china's tolerance for shall we say changes in america or taiwanese party is even more finding than it was before, or does it mean conceivably the china itself could become the agency that tries to make changes? what is your sense of where taiwan figures in things? >> this is a big debate within the china community, about xi jinping's approach. i don't think it's mysterious. he has a number of occasions essentially said that the taiwan issue needs to be resolved sooner rather than later. the reunification of china is at the heart of his rejuvenation narrative. >> do you think this is more than a slogan? >> absolutely need to because he says it should take place by 2049. easing put out a soft soft date.
that includes the south china sea hong kong, macau and taiwan. that issue of sovereignty is paramount. >> he will be 90 years old? >> he's 65 now. >> so mid-90s mid-'90s, okay. >> i don't think he is planning to see it all the way through, but he is put that out as a target. you can already see see the cha has adopted a number of both inducements and more coercive policies to try to push taiwan closer to china. i think that's clearly on his agenda. >> what about two or three of the foreign-policy things, one is the south china sea. in recent years some of us have been a bit surprised, we noticed the island filling and the base building and the rest. to what extent is that his policy? is that something you decide he would let the pla and others
have their way with that? what's going on? how should we interpret that? >> i think that is entirely xi jinping, supported by the pla of course but again he eastern controlled south china sea policy in 201040 became general secretary of the communist party and we begin to see more assorted this then. the land reclamation and the beginning of the militarization did not start until 2014. but xi jinping has been a big supporter of the pla from the very beginning. he went and visited all of the various regional commas. >> clearly reciprocated. >> yes. he restructured the military so resembled the american military more with peter commands. he promoted people to support his vision. he has pushed people out he believes to be corrupt. it's been huge restructuring of the chinese military under xi and the assertiveness you see in the south china sea is a very
much a joint partnership to realize that 80% of the south china sea that they claim. >> let me raise a few of the things than i will stop. a lot of expertise and talent just in the seat of vesicle and, a lot of expertise and talent. the one belt, one road, what do you think is, what's the chinese gold? what the definition of success with this? >> one belt, one road began as a grand scale infrastructure project in part to export overcapacity as well as to set the technical and technological standards for the next 50-100 years. this is a plane to connect china to 68 countries for the rest of asia, the middle east, europe and out to africa. there's an overland route and there's a route through the sea. it began as a infrastructure
project but it has morphed and evolved into something much grander. it became a digital belt and wrote so if china wants to have control over the gps and satellite systems, e-commerce and fiber optic cable, there's a polarized route to connect china to europe more quickly. there are security implications. china now has a majority stake for controlling stake in 76 ports in 35 countries even though they say they are for commercial purposes, we see the navy ships have gone to see many of the sport after china has taken control. there's even a political component. the idea of a china model while there's no exact definition of what a china model would be, certainly there's an effort on the part of chinese officials now in africa to train officials on how to maintain political stability, to develop propaganda. there's a political security and economic effort. what does success look like?
i think a success looks like not having protest the most of this country is against chinese influence which is what they're facing right now. that's a problem. they're going to have to change the way to doing business a little bit but again i think the success will be there going to set the technological standards throughout much of the world. >> let me ask one career related question. to what extent did the chinese he and xi jinping see korea and what's going on is something that serves everything you're talking about? to what extent do they see it as a potential problem? >> talking about the negotiations right now? >> what's in play now, given all that, how does that, again, priorities which are talking about, the consolidation of the political situation at home, his general outward expanse of chinese power. suddenly thinks in the korean peninsula have moved faster and in certain directions that i i would expect a you go he could
anticipate any more than we could. do they see this as opportunity, as a nightmare come as a problem? how do you think they'd read this? >> they agreement shall president trump's announcement of the meeting, the similar kim jong-un as a bad surprise, because they felt marginalized. when i was in china one of the people said you have to hold the meeting in beijing otherwise nothing important was the accomplished. this took them by surprise, and they were not happy as well because kim jong-un basically put on the table that he would freeze testing without asking for the united states and south korea to freeze their military exercises. that is been the chinese proposal, freeze for freeze. not only had kim jong-un agreed to meet with president trump but done on terms but didn't the chinese interest. that was a concern. the chinese rebounded pretty
quickly though. very soon after president trump announced that he's going to meet with president kim you at the first meeting between xi jinping and kim jong-un. for five years these leaders have never met and then just a few days later -- >> do we know exactly how that came about, like did the chinese basic a real in the string at that point and say you better show up or what? >> i don't know exactly but imagine that is as good an analysis. i would set this point it's even possible, and of late president trump suggested this today, that the chinese are in some way responsible for kim jong-un's decision to cancel the meeting with the south korean president and to threaten the summit with, the less on the grounds we just had these military exercises. president xi and a group of north korean officials just met right before.
>> why would the chinese caremore about u.s. south korean exercises in the north koreans seem to care about the? >> because one of the objectives for the chinese any set of negotiations moving down the line with north korea and south korea is that the united states move out of south korea. >> they better be careful what they wish for. last question i want to open it up, which is you and i talked about this several times before. i am taken aback by the direction and speed with which the u.s. debate towards china has changed over the last six months, year. we see it in official documents but we see it including in pages of the houseagazine,oreign affairs. a pretty broad consensus even if you don't agree with mr. trump's remedies, his critique of chinese behavior is not wildly off the mark, happiness with south china sea, one belt, one
road, look at the illiberalism show us a what's going on internally but a dissolution that much greater concern or worse than some. one, what's your reaction? was this predictable? do you think i'm missing it? do you think slightly different take on china is accurate or something of a mistake, no pun intended? how do the chinese see this? we don't really care? >> i think you're right. there's a broad sense of disillusionment among almost every sector of the business community, the government officials and the sort of china scholarly analytic community as well in terms of what they had hoped for china and what is emerge under xi jinping. i think to some extent as people
who have this big sense of unhappiness or surprise and calling for a complete rethink, misunderstood what the role of the united states could ever be with regard to china. this idea that somehow we could be determinative in the future of china, what china which are not to look like, can't even accomplish that with regard to china. why would we think we could get with regard to china? we have influence china and we've influenced positively to the process of engagement. i look at an area i've worked on a long time, the environment, the u.s. embassy tweeting the air pollution statistics plays a fundamental role in ginning up chinese environment are activen the country. american ngos and european in just the way involved in china and in private were funding 90% of chinese society with regard
to the environment, we played an enormous role in terms of capacity development in china. that's another element they seem to have forgotten. third, chinese history isn't over. xi jinping is in power now and he has put in place his own model and own approach to governance but the will be another chinese leader and it's not necessarily the case that the will not be political reform and opening up in china's future. >> someday write a book called the fourth revolution? >> i'll try to be more creative than that. >> okay. as you can see with one of this countries real authorities on china come so let's take advantage of the opportunity. first question comes from one of this countries other real authorities on china, professor? with microphones, just quickly wait for. let us wr and make liz feel uncomfortable. [laughing] >> this is a terrific conversation, and i just want to
supplement it, as the chinese would say, with 1. one of the signature policies of xi jinping as you well know is increased repression. arbitrary detention, the use of incommunicado detention, denial of access to lawyers, family, friends, whatever, the recent constitutional amendment establishing a new branch of government which is the first innovation in communist country has made in the soviet model. this investigatory commission will have greater powers than the prosecutors and the courts. we know quite a lot about that. we are watching it, but what we have watched until recently is what's taking place in shen jon, the western area of china, populated mostly by weaker
people. and there we have something unknown to even specialists were chinese in china, the extraordinary repression of perhaps 800,000 people who are currently locked up in so-called patriotic education concentration camps that invoke the word concentration camps evokes. it would be good to hear your comment to alert people in this country is not in china what's going on? it's the most horrific repression of human rights since chairman mao that. >> what is going on and begin why? what is motivating this leadership to take measures of this sort? >> i think as much as 10% of the adult population of shen jon at this point in four to be under arrest and undergoing this kind of reeducation effort. but be on that we've seen the
chinese government has called it all passports from people in shen jon. they force students have been studying abroad to come home. they had put very repressive thinking at the peoples phones so if you search f related to religion or anything else, it will alert the public security bureau here there's an enormous amount. people will determine it a -- term it a police state at this point. why are you doing this? shen jon is, they are uighurs here there's been a small, very small secessionist movement in shen jon here that goes far beyond going after the people of my be interested in secession. some uighurs have joined isis, been involved in terrorist acts and there have been some acts of domestic terrorism as well that
it emanated from sin jon. so for those the reason i think the chinese government has been more repressive and shen jon dennis is elsewhere, i think there's no doubt the level of oppression and the breadth, the scale far exceeds the threat that is posed by the people in this region. >> talk about the phenomena more broadly. let me put it this way. you mentioned the number of people being arrested teacher for corruption is going up, significant and growing. i get every one of them is uniquely guilty of committing corruption. either you to rest a lot more people assume these people, the make a little selective prosecution, shockingly enough. you got great use of technology to gain much more knowledge of what the population is doing. the pressure against civil society. so what is this, so afraid of? >> i think the government is afraid of people a been infected by western liberal ideals. i think they're trying to
develop a model citizen of sorts. a number of the steps they are taking, for example, this social credit system which combinesn e payment system so your actual credit scores with political credit kind of thing. who are you interacting with, how do friends behave, degenerative in a protest, did you default on a loan? there are different parts of the country at this point have different sets of criteria. >> so your citizenship rating. >> exactly, your social credit score. then you are either sort of penalized. for example, if you default on the loan and you have paid about then youan take an airplane ride or take a ride on high-speed rail. if you purchased it in the protest and then these other things, and you can't send your children to some of the expensive private schools. there are a whole range of
things they are experimenting with but it's in many systems at this point. they can combine that with the surveillance system, voice and facial recognition that's becoming much more aggressive and intrusive right now. they of 176 millionas. the want of more than 600 million cameras by 2020. the want to listen in a peoples conversations and no who a person speaking with. it's pretty extorted. when you look at it that we can understand this is in many ways despite it. as a very strong government, quite a fragile government as well. >> interesting. next to the last row. >> willa thompson, nyu graduate student. australia has raised red flags about china interfering financially in the election process. i am wondering if you foresee
chinese using sharp power to interfere or? anything is possible. we have not seen evidence of that happening here. i think australia, their funding of political campaigns is less restrictive than ours is. that's part of the reason they have suffered from this more than we have. certainly there is enormous amount of interest in congress about chinese influence in the united states and whether that influence is coming to confucius institutes are chinese scientists who may be taking technology back, or even in think tanks. i think this is something that congress is looking at but buti think they need to be looking at it in a very finely grained way because we don't want to unleash some kind of very ugly and
negative campaign against all chinese. i think xi jinping has to some extent done chinese people globally at the service by calling on them every year, chinese every year to be in service of the great rejuvenation of the great chinese nation. i think that puts a target on chinese peoples backs to some extent. there are issues. clearly and australia and i imagine here as well, but but i think we need to be really careful about how we approach these issues, how we address them, policy recommendations that we make. just sort of eliminating confucius institutes i don't think is a right way to go, for example. there are issues but i think we want to be very careful about them. >> thank you for this discussion. from the issue of taiwan, where do you see the future of taiwan playing out? if current trends continue, use
taiwan being can rejoin with the mainland or use the current status being prolonged past 2049? >> my hope would be that china will move forward with a degree of political reform in the future that will make the taiwan issue a nonissue. that's my distant hope. i am concerned because i think that china, i gain, is undertaking a number of inducements. so, for example, offering chinese businesspeople national treatment for the first if they locate on the mainland, so they will treat them the same way they would treat chinese firms. at the same time as they have coercive measures, for example, refusing to meet with officials in taiwan's government so there no negotiations taking place, or telling chinese tourist agencies to decrease the number of chinese tourist going to taiwan
and taiwan economy benefit a lot from those tourists. i think they're fully just a plan to grow china's military capability to the point where they could take military action against taiwan. i think the future of taiwan depends in part on how the united states decides to work with taiwan, and whether or not we are willing to do more than have the taiwan relations act and say where committed to the defense of taiwan but i was willing to potentially go to war over taiwan? i think that something we need to be thinking about in the future at the rate and the direction that a think xi jinping is moving. it's tough. i think the united states, we put our foot in the taiwan
issue. we side with, the president signed a time when federal act promote ties and b's in exchange between senior u.s. officials and senior taiwan officials. we've agreed to license taiwan technology so they can build their own attack submarines. we've moved ourselves along the direction with taiwan that suggests that we willing to do more. i just don't know whether the president actually has thought this all the way through, the implicio ot w are doing -- [laughing] far enough down the line. >> behave. >> that's a rhetorical question. >> let's behave. [laughing] >> i have a question regarding the internet. you talked about the great firewall. can you tell us more about the great canon? >> the great canon, which is their ability to sort of divert information that is coming in and send it elsewhere.
china has many different techniques for preventing information from getting to the chinese people. they have the technological fixes like the great firewall and the great canon. they have sensors, millions of chinese sense to go after information and delete it at any given moment and their relationships with chinese technology companies like ten sent where they will actually simply not allow certain terms or words to be transmitted and seen or forwarded in any kind of e-mail or blog or check. so i think the great canon is simply one part of a much broader range of tools that china has at its disposal to increasingly constrained information that is being transmitted via the internet in china.
>> going back to the discussion of the west influence on china's development, hindsight is 2020 but turning the clock back 18 years. we perhaps too accommodating with regard to the terms of their succession in the world trade organization? >> i don't think we were too accommodating at the time. i think china was still very much a developing country. i think our hope was that they would dash at the time pushing to dismantle state-owned enterprises. there was a sense that china was embarking on a process of increasing the role of the market in the chinese economy. it was a reasonable bet at the time. we were bringing them into a rules-based regime that would allow us to hold them accountable if they didn't adhere to the norm.
so i think it made a lot of sense at the time. as you say hindsight is 2020. the question is should we've done more along the way to try to push china? many instances where companies were free to take china to the wto, to bring them before the wto. they what his stint. that's less the case now than it used to be. we could've been more aggressive. we do point to which we should consider trying to amend some of the rules of the wto in some way? maybe. right nowhi is trying to get market economy status. this is a huge issue in the wto. they've taken the european union and the united states now for the wto. the european union is right in the midst of negotiations over this. that is something where implicitly we promised them they would have that, and now we are somewhat reneging. but by the same token i think it's fair to say they have not actually lived up to the part of
the bargain. this is a moment in time when i think we can push back using wto and say you have not lived up to your part of the bargain so we will not live up to our part of the bargain. but but i don't think it was a mistake at the time. >> liz, you talked a a little t about the areas in which there might be some dissatisfaction and unhappiness with xi jinping, but i wonder if you could talk a little bit about the ways in which xi jinping is liked by the chinese people. i think here and the united states we often get sort of lost in the idea that maybe the chinese, that the chinese people feel that, or longing to be liberated somehow, freed from the oppression of the communist party. i wonder if you could shed more light of that, talk about that a little bit? >> sure. the anticorruption campaign by
large has been enormously popular among the chinese people, in large part because they with the victims of all sorts of petty corruption policies and practices at local levels by chinese officials or it could be chinese doctors overcharging them for medicine or chinese teachers charging you for putting their child next to a heater in the cold classroom. about their daily lives the chinese people have been subjected to this kind of petty corruption. i think that's one area. it's borne out by some polling data that the chinese people appreciate xi jinping. i i think a second is a sense of national pride. xi jinping for himself in his first five years, i didn't finish in the very first question that you ask, richard, you said china has become strong. the period of -- that decade as a lost decade by some and a
sense china had failed to capitalize on all of its achievements, and under xi jinping there's a sense that china stands tall and proud. the belt and road initiative, xi jinping stand talk about china as a defender of globalization, making progress on the south china sea. so i think that's another area in which the chinese people very much appreciate what xi jinping has done. >> liz, we could go on for hours, but we won't. one of our very am one of the few principles we try to live by is to be roughly and on time. clearly this is a book not just worth buying but -- >> but it is worth buying. [laughing] >> worth reading, and encouraging others to do both. i also want to bracco not just liz but our colleagues. this is the latest in a string of extraordinarily good books that come out from senior
fellows, recently about history, about china, about george marshall's frustrate first in y to negotiate an end to the civil war. i see max boot, recent important book on vietnam. an important book on the marshall plan. we are publishing more books than ever and it's a chance for our senior fellows tuition what they're made of, and they're made of a lot and this is really important contribution to the literature about china and about u.s.-chinese relations, and it couldn't come out i believe anymore critical time. so two things, one, part of your reward is a reception here, but first let's congratulate liz for what she has done. [applause] >> thank you. [inaudible conversations]
[inaudible conversations] >> over the years booktv has covered hundreds of books on foreign affairs such as american university sarah snyder on america's inclusion of human rights activism and foreign policy. >> sees been going about the cities literary scene. up next to speak with professor and first female two-time recipient of the national book award, jesmyn ward.