tv 2018 Roosevelt Reading Festival - Philip Padgett Advocating Overlord CSPAN September 2, 2018 10:10am-11:01am EDT
harbinger of growth and living standard improvements. i think we want to continue to support that. i certainly do. i sorted within not model and overtime china has already been continue to adopt a lot of the western western positive aspects of the western system. >> you can watch this and other programs online at booktv.org. >> good afternoon, everyone. welcome. i'm paul sparrow, director at the franklin was a presidential library and museum. i like to you to the 15th annual roosevelt reading festival and i take like to thank our c-span fans for joining us today. if you're going to ask the question at the end is use the microphone so that your questions come through. how many of you are membership
at the roosevelt library? thank you very much. we appreciate your support. membership is very important. the president to system is a federal private partnership and your support makes programs like this possible. i do hope you'll take a moment to go over to the library and see the exhibit now on the art of work, the poster art of world war ii and relevant to many of the talks would have today, and particularly to the talk about have right now. authors often have unusual areas of expertise, and today's author is really amazing and the crew he has had. he provide analytical support for national security investigations and negotiations for 40 years. he supported teams negotiating five international arms control treaties and agreements and went on to develop integrated analysis of the east-west military ballots. he only knows how militaries peaks works which i think you
can tremendous insight he was looking at the preparation, planning for operation overlord which of course we know today as the day. after 9/11, his endeavors included homeland security, he helped national exercise in creating all hazard national preparedness plans and guidelines, which again is back to how does a government respond to a perceived threat and there's always going to be multiple points of view and multiple agendas in any interdepartmental or international negotiation. upon retiring he served in fema reserve corps cultivating and deployment in new york during the storm supercenter storm. so he understands post-disaster recovery as well. he received a bachelors of arts in master of management services from the university of maryland, and is currently living down in kensington in bethesda where i used to live.
he has been i would say a passionate observer of the way the american military operates and he's describing in this book in this extraordinary book this phenomenal coordination between the british military and the american military which were radically different kinds of organizations. the british military still saw themselves as a global superpower because of their empire, and the american military were really just trying to grapple with the concept that they were about to become a global superpower. this negotiation that happen because they are very different strategies, in hindsight we all think dd was easy, the americans and british got together, invaded the france and ended the war. didn't look like at all. one of the things i found most interesting about this book is his nuanced explanation of how these negotiations took place, the leverage the two sides had and despite the fact we were allies the extraordinary tensions and pressures that were
being put on the military to try to solve this intractable problem, how'd you invade? please welcome phillip padgett. [applause] >> thank thank you, paul, for te very, very flattering introduction. thanks ladies and gentlemen, for coming. a wonderful day here. it's good to think about this nice sunny day in terms of what i'm going to talk about. through most of 1943 the united states and britain struggled to come up with a primary strategy for how to defeat hitler in europe, unless one that is the two countries were also in a concurrent but separate, equally difficult negotiation about reopening the project to develop an atomic bomb to allow the british to participate. that had been closed off to them by the american scientists in
1942. we will go into that. on a day like it's been good to think about this because the story and the book covers the full year of 1943 in its substance but i'm going to focus in on july and august 1943 when these events were really moving closer together and picking up an intensity and urgency, and events that had an important milestone here at hyde park and then within about a week afterwards came to conclusion up and québec. advocating overlord looks at 9043 through the lens of the ever narrowing gap between these two negotiations, strategy and developing the bomb. that convergence quite likely to a quid pro quo between roosevelt and churchill that ran through hyde park to get there.
now, positing a a link between churchill accepting the overlord strategy for europe which would begin with the day, , dd was ony the beginning -- d-day. roosevelt hours later signed a secret agreement to reopen the manhattan project to the british to participate in that. that's controversial and the reason for that is the evidence is circumstantial but the evidence is quite extensive and think it is persuasive. so we're going to focus on things that happened in the summer 1943, 75 years ago. for context let's look at how the allies got to this decision point. 9043 found allies at an important turning point. they had beaten off the threat of their defeat in 1942 with three pivotal battles, midway, alkaline and stalingrad, and now they to face up to the difficult task of working together and going on the offensive and toughest to do that.
there were differing national circumstances that led the two countries to a different view of what that strategy ought to be. of course in the overall sense there's the worldview that comes from empire and the worldview that comes from nation coming out of isolationism, one in decline and one in the sense and there at an intersection. but then there are also three issues that a group at the interwar since the end of world war ii. there was resentment, trade protectionism, a lot of misunderstanding, built my stereotypes and that was pervades to sight in both countries and it affected the military as well and it made it difficult from the military leadership of each country to trust the other. they had to overcome that. the british were struggled with their own internal tensions. the british chiefs of staff
chased as churchill micromanaged them with action this day, memoranda, churchill himself had his own doubts about whether not his generals could deliver victories. the american joint chiefs of staff struggled to understand the political pressures that affected roosevelt, their commander-in-chief. but above all the american chiefs of staff despaired that roosevelt's resolve to stand firm for the u.s. position could wilt under what they called churchill's sunlamps. and in their view fdr already had wilted several times. as the chief of staff, the american and british leadership, had already met twice in 1943 with the participation of fdr and churchill, first in casablanca in january and then in washington in may, but the months were taking by and they still have not come up with
written agreement on strategy that could hold, or oral commitments that would be implemented. in terms of the atomic side, the british have made important early contributions to atomic research but they've they beent of the manhattan project develop a bomb by the americans at the end of 1942. the american scientists privately, deposition from why they were opposed to british participating evolved, but what they said to the british was, well, united states is making 90% of investment. we're doing 90% of the work. there's a lot that you do not need to know to make your contribution to this. need to know is an important phrase that holds today in terms of access to information. from the british i think in today's terms that answer back was you have an obligation to share. that was the point of tension.
the american scientist thought they were doing what roosevelt wanted and he didn't do anything to dissuade them, while at the same time sending vaguely positive messages to churchill. kind of point a good cop bad cop routine which comes out later on. the strategy discussions had become a fierce debate between two different options. the british believed that germany to be induced to collapse internally as the dent unexpectedly in 1918, and ending world war i. so for the british believed that the combination maritime blockade attack all around the periphery of occupied europe, taken in the medic training and aerial bombing, could induce germany to collapse again. it's important to understand the limits of peoples knowledge at this point are you talking aerial bombing. airpower was an instrument and
airpower advocates were promising a lot of think thingy would deliver for another 40 years. nobody dealt with the total dictatorship before. the idea that somehow people could rise up and cause it to collapse was really naïve, but people didn't have any experience with that. so the british strategy was working towards this indirect political economic result which both the british and the americans called an opportunistic goal. the american chiefs desire to click victory and they had three goals. beat the germans in europe, pivot and defeat japan, and then come home. the third goal was going to evolve over the course of 9043 which is a subplot a subplot in the book as the americans realized the meaning of roosevelt rendezvous with destiny and come to grips with being a a permanent presence in the world. to go forward together in
europe, the ally stated agreement on how to define goal. they did a strategy to achieve it. they needed the concentration of forces to put the strategy, and they needed a supreme commander. the summer of 1943, none of that was agreed. in the absence of a plan for an attack across the channel that people could agree would work, it was easy to resist the american option. so the third dynamic going on is, within the alliance, is creating that plan. they were trying to do that in london. they had at least agreed to set up an allied team, planning team in london to develop a plan. although interestingly, cross channel attack was the third of three tasks that they had first was developed than in the sky so we could reduce them.
second, develop a plan for basically a come as you are response, if germany collapses and we can surge in an deliberate the occupied. and lastly develop cross channel attack plaintiff a started with a lot of challenges, very big challenges. most difficult, well, they're asked to plant in military amphibious assault, very, very difficult to do when at the time there were no precedence that this would succeed. sicily had not happened yet. the assessment of north africa landings was that they succeeded against weak resistance by like in both commanders agreed with that. also, they had no define strategic goal. they were not given any knowledge of what resources they would have for this operation, and with nobody named supreme allied commander they didn't have an operation champion.
there was one thing that they did know, which was sunk by their superiors really didn't want them to succeed, and they were right in that. however, the name of this organization was comprised of younger british american and canadian officers who were eager to work together and take fight back to the continent, and they could and it did set aside the frictions and suspicion that affected their seniors to work together. at the first all hands meeting their commander, lieutenant general morgan, purposely ended his remarks with what the british chief of imperial general staff said to him after giving him order sticky said there it is, it won't work but you must bloody well make it. well, morgan's officers took up that challenge. as july 1943 was indica all of these issues were converging, and so, too, increase the alyssa
what is of the consequences of their dithering about strategy. so that would be another allied conference quadrant of in québec in august. at that point all sides agreed to going to have to saddle the strategy. the cost of indecision of the date was start and appeared to everybody. the united states had 452,000 troops in europe, but that was 76%, 1 million men, short of where they wanted to be by late spring 1943. those troops were divided equally between britain and the mediterranean. so the allies didn't have the concentration of forces in either britain or the mediterranean to beat the nazis. and in britain there was only
one u.s. combat division in the summer of 1943. selectee overlord advocate in the united states, major general thomas handy, warned the most important and urgent was to pick a strategy and stick to it, and failure to do so wrist stalemate, or quote, complete victory indefinitely postponed. an exasperated -- a close advisor to churchill wrote to his opposite with fdr, harry hopkins, and he declared quote, if we're not prepared to accept the risks, face the difficulties difficulties, suffer the casualties, then let us concentrate exclusively on production of heavy bombers and think in terms of 1950. now, i don't want to think about the war going on until 1950. i don't think we will be living in the same world today. in london cossac was making good progress at converting operation
doubters to their approach to things and producing a credible plan for the operation which by this time had been officially named overlord. but in washington without cossac plan some of the u.s. military staff were undergoing a crisis of confidence despite the commitment to overlook. maybe some of the early u.s. proponents of cross channel attack were saying, maybe the british mediterranean strategy should be the priority as the bird in hand. meanwhile on the atomic side of the british high-level appealed to restore cooperation were ramping up with accusations led by churchill a broken american oral commitments. in july the as secretary of war henry simpson visited this one. among his meetings had a very, he got a briefing from cossac
which later told fdr was most important meeting he had. and a very confrontational to partnering with the churchill. out of the first part came a proposed draft solution on atomic cooperation. it had five points, which goes beyond just develop a bomb which is important because churchill wanted to work the trend towards a postwar bilateral alliance -- work the united states. it was free exchange of atomic information for each government agrees not to use the invention against each other to each agrees not to give atomic information of the parties without the others consent. each agrees not to use it against another party without the consent of the other, and then lastly, kind of interesting one, we can to go into in quess if you want, british industrial and commercial use should be limited by the u.s. president in
the manner he considered equitable. in a a sign of how close the proximity had come between atomic issues and strategies, churchill and stimson been sent atomic advisors out of the room, closed the door and took up alone, the second part which was war strategy. as stimson later reported to fdr, the two of them had quote hammer and tongs. partly through stimson in london, jcs and the white house were along to learn the church was going to come early to north america from the quadrant conference. they knew that he wanted to influence fdr to the british position before the conference could happen. the jcf supported by stimson and harry hopkins all intent on winning you strategy option quadrant they really needed fdr on their side.
so while the jcs was confronting the strategy doubters within the pentagon, the white house scrambled to take action to limit churchill's opportunity to meet fdr. angrily the events were really multiplying and getting closer and closer to proximity. as an example, on friday, july 30, 1943, all of this was going on. winston churchill was preparing to sales in north america. prime minister was intent on his arrival early to win over roosevelt to british position on strategy before quadrant. churchill's head of atomic research was flying to washington from london to negotiate for british participation in the manhattan project. the new government that had replaced mussolini only less than a week before was dispatching emissaries to find
without of the conflict with the allies. joseph stalin was pondering whether he could lead moscow in the near term to meet secretly with roosevelt. you secretary of war henry stimson was flying back to washington from his meetings in london and north africa determined to persuade fdr to insist that churchill exit the as militaries position on strategy to win the war in europe aced on a cross channel assault into normandy. further insist that an american serve as the supreme allied commander. and roosevelt focused the hopes of each was quite leaving town to go fishing. so fdr's nine car train was on its way up to the tiny hamlet of birch island ontario in the canadian shield country 706 miles northwest of washingt, about 580 miles west northwest of us.
and in just ten days the white house had taken this idea for the trip off the shelf and put it together which was pretty incredibly fast for going to a was been a very remote area and is still remote. all of wartime of a churchill's wartime trips out of the capital were secret. but this one was unusually secret. normally, the white house would quietly inform a couple seen reporters generally about the trip so rumors arose they could kind of deal with that. not this time. so by monday morning the fact that the the president was notn the white house was becoming known, and the rumors started to build and get crazier and spread farther and farther around the world. the press secretary, steve early, he was desperate to
release release that roosevelt would not let it. on receiving the latest batch of rumors to cables, fdr was her to tell his military aid well, i guess we gave them the slip good this time. although fdr told churchill about the fishing trip in a somewhat mischievous way, he also had given the prime minister the slip in the white house had cut ten days off churchill's when opportunity to meet with roosevelt and influence him before quadrant. fdr's absence also led sir john anderson, the head british atomic scientist, with no one to negotiate with on atomic sharing but the presidents cite advisor vannevar bush which mgr new would maintain a hard line. returning from overseas, by the president, secretary of war stimson immediately set to write a trip report to fdr and stimson
was emphatic that fdr take leadership of the anglo-american alliance which up to that point he tended to describe as a partnership of equals. ed champion, the overlord strategy and it should be under an american supreme allied commander. and on churchill stimson wore fdr to be quote, constantly on the lookout against mediterranean diversions. stimson wanted to deliver his report to roosevelt in canada in person but the army chief of staff general george marshall who control the airplanes with not letting go. face-to-face meetings with fdr often went off on tangents that defeated their purpose. and marshall on the other hand, like this . edit some years of experience come had learned from his successes and his failures with fdr a way to get a firm decision out of roosevelt, that was to put a well argued paper to the president when he was
away from the white house and its distractions, preferably when harry hopkins was present to discuss it with him. stimson so stimson and marshallo advocate overlord to roosevelt yes, senator trip report by eric couch were hopkins was soon going to join fdr. they did so while the staff revolt against norm overlord which is that it is described in official history still rumbling just down the hall in the pentagon. helped to resolve that was expected soon from cossac. after the war general eisenhower observed that plans for nothing the plan is everything and there is a lot of truth in that. but cossac's overlord a plant which is now ready in london presents an exception to that. the existence of a credible plan had the potential to change the allies debate from whether to go cross channel attack strategy to
how to implement it. committed to following churchill's direction to advocate the mediterranee strategy and the british chiefs of staff certainly knew this. they also knew that on strategy the jcs in washington was facing a crisis with their staff, with the quadrant conference by then only two weeks away. so cossac was ordered by the british chiefs to bring churchill on the prime minister's transatlantic crossing to north america, but told to not share their overlord plan with washington just yet. and within cossac the american planners were outraged and the british comrades shared that feeling. cossac's british command of lieutenant general morgan risking his army career acted to do the right thing by sharing the plan with his countries allies. morgan 17 of three american officers carrying the overlord
plan to catch a transatlantic conference from scotland to washington and the team slip out of london in the night aboard a properly and unscheduled train called the ghost train. although seriously delayed by atlantic weather i got up there and nobody was flying because of the big storm comes to try to think about three officers sitting here drinking bad coffee trying to get out of the airport with the greatest secret that they knew of sitting there in a briefcase between their legs. they eventually did get there and take other as he reported back in nick of time. stimson paper reached canada to become the first of three communications that would abide within a few hours that ultimately would lead fdr to take up overlords advocacy. as roosevelt and hopkins were discussing stimson papers, the radio operators on his train were decrypting another long message from churchill, chewing up there was another mediterranee diversion. this time churchill ginger up
his situation in italy after mussolini fall and recommended a prompt allied intervention. but on the heels of churchill's message came the third message from the u.s. ambassador in london, john gilbert when it would sit the masterson u.s. embassy at churchill's request but he was troubled by the content and he couldn't sleep that night so the next morning he checked with british foreign secretary anthony eden and that revealed churchill's exaggerations to the extent provided a copy of the messages that come in via portugal from the italians of what was happening there. >> so with the three communications comparable side-by-side churchill's logic was looking pretty thin. roosevelt subsequent actions suggest he took the decisions champion overlord under an american commander of the
approach island but he kept that to himself. in québec the british and american staff were arriving to set up the quadrant conference. washington vannevar bush and sir john anderson had concluded their atomic negotiation but far short of churchill's goal. at bushes insistence, which was the american position, they had agreed on a process for cooperation but they left the substantive points of the agreement to be settled between fdr and churchill. and across the potomac stimson and general marshall were waiting anxiously to learn how stimson said written case had feared up in canada and whether or not to persuade fdr to support overlord. fdr's sent stimson on we took in the said i hope you'll of lunch met tuesday. glad to have your memorandum. the fishing point pointer retuo washington monday morning, went
back to work harry hopkins cross the potomac to break sector stimson on his long conversation with the president but he didn't know whether or not roosevelt had decided on overboard -- overlook it after sleep is that stimson wrote a second memorandum to make the same points more forcefully. to his delight at his oval office lunch with fdr on tuesday august 10, roosevelt told the secretary as you read the memo .5., i've already agree to that. the marshals strategy of making stimson center case for overlord had worked. going straight from lunch to a meeting with the joint chiefs, fdr declared his intent that overlord the ally strategy for liberating europe and an american commander at the commander-in-chief then directed the jcs to 18 u.s. divisions in britain ready to fight before d-day. fdr further made it clear that he understood the purpose of the strategy, that it was to achieve a direct military result, not an
indirect political economic result, deuce at the time and place of the allies choosing. stimson and jcs were elated. the united states was going to get into the quadrant conference with a unified team, if only fdr could remain firm we met with churchill here at hyde park in two days time. now, the date of his oval office meeting churchill arrived in québec where he dined with the canadian prime minister william mackenzie king. the dinner at the citadel if you've been up in québec you understand, beautiful place, it was an eventful dinner. sir john anderson arrived from washington. he reported to churchill on his negotiation with bush. messenger arrives to install request a meeting the big three. in the course of this dinner church was very candid with mackenzie king about his intentions for quadrant and atomic sharing and about
roosevelt. nearly on the eve of meeting with the vice president at hyde park which makes it a very interesting 12 page memo, which you can read online if you go to library and archives candidate. he left us a very detailed account. in the context of negations with roosevelt, churchill said quote i can do more with the president by not pressing too hard at once. he is a fine fellow, very strong in his views but he comes around. walking mackenzie king to the door as evening ended, churchill said of fdr, he really is the one friend that we have and we must as close touch as we can. churchill arrived at hyde park on evening of august 12 with his daughter and only his personal staff which was a rather small contingent for churchill to bring fdr understand which are to be alone churchill's sunlight. eleanor roosevelt was there before leaving on a trip to the pacific and hyde park was full
of roosevelt family, friends, white house staff, including harry hopkins, and ambassador averill harriman who nurture children will. fdr at pictures hung up in the main hall of springwood that he hoped would remind prime minister how far they've come together that maybe this would soften the discussion and also he hung the one painting the churchill made during the war. i don't know -- [inaudible] >> the next day august 13 roosevelt took the churchill's to homeowners idyllic college, val-kill for swimming and a picnic. fdr drove the churchill's up in his blue ford convertible. churchill war a tropical suit but a suit nonetheless a day when temperatures were going go up in the '90s. after lunch fdr churchill it off under a tree to talk alone and each man needed something from
of other at this point in this time they needed it in writing. fdr wanted churchill to go first. fdr expressed firm commitments to confirming overlord as as a principal allied strategy for europe, with the u.s. provide most of the. >> translator: insensitive allies must be commanded by an american. as i talk, both menu that intel signed, the agreement to resume u.s.-uk atomic cooperation is not going to take affect. on returning to springwood, churchill in the afternoon, churchill and a note to roosevelt on number ten downing st., station and under date he wrote with an exclamation point, plain and day. it anniversary of his ancestors successful defense of vienna in 1704. in an appeal to after to return to to québec. churchill wrote in the note quote, that if much progress will be made until we are on the
spot. this was a direct attempt to get wartime alone with fdr and persuade this fine fellow to come around. but roosevelt refused saying only that he had to be in washington, without any further explanation. that hot still might churchill couldn't sleep. he left the house, walked out under the sleeping roosevelt out to a bench above with the ground slopes down to the hudson river. you can see that out there now it's not the same bench i don't think but they're still a bench in place. you try to visualize in there with made a cigar, cigar smoke to fend away for mosquitoes, listening to the trains on both banks of the hudson caring the material and the youth of the united states down to the ports of new york and new jersey to go to war. he had a lot to think about. this day have not favored the churchill's. from québec with the combined chiefs of staff were meeting, he
knew that the americans were being firm on their position and also that they from a resolute fdr he knew that they were indeed united. the overlord plan briefed to him as a cost overrun the queen mary had made an impression on him, and by accepting it he knew he could get the resumption of the time and cooperation he thought was vital to britain's postwar independence, interdependence was his work. first step towards a postwar bilateral alliance with the united states, if you could get that. there was a lot of resistance to that idea. he retained the hope that maybe germany would collapse in the meantime. he returned to the house not until morning but refreshed. a new day brought a second swimming and picnicking at val-kill, and other people particularly fdr's cousin daisy
noted a more relaxed churchill and that evening at dinner churchill spoke passionately about the close relationship between the united states and britain as the only hope for postwar world. that alarmed eleanor, and she stood up to them. she said that his vision would weaken the united nations concept, and he was already impressed by her imminent trip to the south pacific and he told others in response that she had steel. so that night returning to québec on his train without roosevelt, churchill wrote to fdr and dropping their usual pretty casual salutations, he wrote in my dear president, the letter recap their discussion and on allied commands churchill acknowledged that the plan you have in mind is the best. then he went on to say that he had a a copy of the atomic agreement ready for the two of them to initial. so it was still pending at that time. in québec combined chiefs blocks
for days and hot debate over strategy in europe and final general book of the british and general marshall for the american stage openly quote the problem is we are not trusting each other. each side gave a little and finally came to an agreement, overlord starting with an invasion in normandy and then continuing with the defenses into germany would be the primary strategy in europe. hours later roosevelt and churchill signed a secret agreement to resume cooperation to develop an atomic bomb. and cooperation on the decision for its use and protection of the information. even as quadrant was winding down in québec, talk turned to action. british atomic scientists probably showed up in the united states ready to go to work and that was a surprise to the american scientists who would not been told the agreement had been signed. the first of 12 past troop
convoys departed the united states in the movement over 1 million u.s. troops in the space of eight months, and to reduce without using, without losing a single soldier to enemy action. fdr and churchill would meet again in cairo and with stalin in tehran, and despite the quid pro quo charge would often -- author arguments against the tiny but the momentum of the build in britain had sealed the allies strategy and, of course, d-day in normandy. thank you. [applause] any questions? >> if you have a question, one up to the microphone so the cameras can capture you. >> how did your research tell
you about the friendship between churchill and roosevelt, or with a friend over the just allies? what did that do as far for ust in their agreement was concerned? >> that's a good question. they were very cordial towards each other and friendly, and i think most people would look at that relationship and say they were friends. yet churchill didn't come over for fdr's funeral. later he regretted not coming, but both men were very firm and protection of the countries interests, and they were not giving a lot. the jcs was proceeding that fdr was getting into churchill, but often there were larger factors in the scenario of the war or in politics that affected roosevelt decision. he had his goals. for example, he very much wanted to get united states troops in action against the germans
before the end of 1942. because, out of isolation and mobilizing the united states, under the keynote speaker will go into this a lot, and building up this massive force in the united states was beginning to get momentum and yet those forces were still there. he needed to keep the people behind the effort and keep the basic u.s. british decision that germany was a great enemy and, therefore, had to be defeated first. then turn to japan. that was a strong intellectual argument but the emotional argument in the united states was defeat japan who had attacked us. he didn't want to lose the people's support that idea because it was the correct sequence. so he would make decisions that sometimes will proceed as getting into churchill or vasily in some way which may or may not have been so. in terms of the friendship they were grounded on the practical
needs of their countries. they were cordial to each other, something in short supply today. another question? >> after listening to the presentation as well as the presentations for the last several years we've been attending and reading, seems to me that i think the presidents who followed roosevelt, none of them had commanded the breadth of the office like you did except for maybe obama. what do you think about that? >> well, keeping in mind that roosevelt had 12 years plus a little bit to command the office of the presidency and they didn't, they are all different and i think from the -- i think
the judgment of history is still pending on a lot of those men. so we will see. >> i assume that churchill and roosevelt also didn't always see eye to eye on how to deal with stalin. can you say something about that? >> yes, that's interesting. roosevelt had developed this relationship with churchill and he very much wanted to develop a similar personal relationship with stalin, because he believes that would go a long way towards dealing with a lot of the difficult problems in how the war would end and in the postwar issues. so he set out to develop that by sending the ambassador sequel to moscow one is negotiating with churchill at the white house in
may 1943. to offer stalin a personal meeting, just the two of them, their translators -- is a sound familiar? at the place to be determined without churchill. he specifically did not want churchill there. he was working both of those. churchill had a very low opinion of stalin and the communists, was fearful of what was going on there. although he was suppressing that, as he said he would at least say good work about the devil the devil was attacked by hitler, or some words to that effect. they did have different views, and fdr's attitude changed as the war progressed, and you see this happen over the course of 1943. in early days of the war when roosevelt did not have an army to project to meet the united
states didn't have very much anything else except for the navy, was more friendly to churchill's view about the work could be ended through air power but that shifted as the army was built up and he gave the tools do the job away he thought, and his attitude towards churchill also changed. after quadrant and roosevelt had made this point to take leadership of the alliance, his relationship with churchill subtly changes. so when churchill wants a second major conference in cairo, roosevelt puts him off and holds it down to a minimum. when they get to tehran, roosevelt is playing churchill and stalin together. and although he was churchill and fans don't take this seriously, he makes some jibes
at georgia to get stoned to come out to his attention and churchill texas seriously. this would hurt because they have come a long way to get a taken a lot of risk and he's not sure what's going on. that relationship changes over time. anymore? >> can we get a round of applause? [applause] >> thank you very much. great presentation. >> philip will be out in front of the store where he will be signing copies of the book. i strongly encourage you to get it. it's a great read, and we will see you again in 15 minutes. [inaudible conversations] >> this year booktv marks our 20 year of bringing the countries top nonfiction authors in the latest books. find us every weekend on c-span2
or online at booktv.org. >> seventy-two hours a booktv booktv on c-span2 continues on this labor day weekend. today genital author jacqueline woodson joins us live on "in depth" special fiction edition. our books include the national book award winner "brown girl dreaming," "this is the rope" and her most recent "harbor me." she will answer your questions from noon to 3 p.m. eastern time. booktv continues on labor day with encore broadcast of yesterdays national book festival. you also see a profile profile of the publisher all points books and a discussion between the library of congress and the national archivist on collecting in the digital age. that's all this weekend, three days a booktv. for a complete schedule visit booktv.org.
>> at a recent judicial conference, chief justice john roberts shared his summer reading list. >> as for his things to read i can tell you what i am looking forward to reading. i don't, there is, i got as a christmas present a book called why bob dylan matters. it's written by a harvard professor who has studied his poetry and i think it sounds like it's going to be very good. that would be sort of at a serious level, not the entertaining level. and jeff rosen has written a new biography of william howard taft but here is good but its light. it's not a hick town that come and to think it's quickly paced enough, you will not get bogged down in it. and joanna bryant has written a
book called, i think it's when your child is sick, or something like that. she has worked in pediatric area with children have serious diseases, cancer and all that, and i think it's a very important book. your child doesn't have to be sick to read it. it makes interesting connection between i think good parenting advice and things like how you tell a sibling that their brother or sister is seriously ill, what you can do to make that process go better. i've started and on that and i think it's going to be a great book one seconds. >> booktves wants to know what you're reading. send us your summer reading list @booktv on twitter, instagram on facebook. booktv on c-span2, television for serious readers. >> c-span, where history unfold the daily.
in 1979 c-span was critter as a public service by america's cable-television companies and today we continue to bring you unfiltered coverage of congress, the white house, the supreme court, in public policy events in washington, d.c. and around the country. c-span is brought to you by your cable or satellite provider. .. "after words" is a weekly interview program with relevant guest hosts interviewed top nonfiction authors about their latest work. >> so, dambisa moyo, grt