tv CSIS Discussion on Air Missile Defense - Panel 1 CSPAN November 30, 2018 5:42pm-6:40pm EST
at noon eastern on c-span2's booktv and sunday at 2 p.m. on american history tv on c-- c-span3. working with our cable affiliates as we explore america. >> and now, military leaders on u.s. air and missile defense systems. over the next hour, you'll hear from leaders of the 32nd army, air and missile defense command and the joint air and missile defense organization. >> all right. well, thanks, everybody, for coming out. i'm tom karako, a senior fellow here at csic, and i direct the missile defense project. for the next 90 minutes or so, we're going to have two kind of back to back events. actually, two and a half hours. i'll say real quick we're not going to have any problems, but just in case we have to exit the room for anything, look for me.
i'll flag you down the stairs or to the back or something like that. just in case. so nothing we do at these events is without malice aforethought. and today i would say really a part of a series of events that we're doing on the missile defense enterprise. and i think the first thing -- the first rule about the missile defense enterprise is to recognize that it is, indeed, an enterprise. it's not just about the missile defense agency or the army or navy operations, but a whole lot of institutions that are sometimes overlooked. and our focus today is really from the joint perspective. and we're going to hear today from really five current and past directers of one of the very important institutions here, the joint inte grated air and missile defense office. now, the salience of this conversation is never more important and yet, you know, frankly, the existence of integrated air and missile defense is sometimes all too
present in conferences, but sometimes gets lost in reality. i want to flag a couple documents that have come out over the last couple, couple years. first joint vision 2020 that came out in december of 2013. and then secondly, jp301 on countering air and missile threats in april of 2017. you're probably going to hear about that over the course of the day today. our plan in this first session is to have a conversation with two active officers with direct experience here and then to bring up a second panel with some former directors and a former technical director. so first of all, we have brigadier general clement coward, welcome back, sir. he is currently the commanding general for the 32nd army air and missile defense command in fort bliss, texas. before that he served as the deputy director for force protection on the joint staff,
j8, as well as the director for the joint requirements officer for chem-bio, nukes lahr defense. -- nuclear defense. then we have sean gainey. so if you're counting, each of them have had three hats each. brigadier general gainey's previous job was also very closely related to our business today. he just left as commander of the 94th aamdc which is, of course, very close to the point y end of this business as well. why don't we start off with some intro remarks from each of those, and then we'll have a conversation after that. >> thanks for hosting us. this is always a great event, great forum not only for the people who are here, get an opportunity to continue the conversation even after the discussion we have here. so just a few months ago i, you
know, i read an article -- i think it was back in june -- during my normal morning reading in the early bird, and this was an article that was eau quoting the naval chief of operations at the naval war college, and he was discussing the challenge and the strain that doing the bmd mission was having on the navy. and certainly, what i'm not trying to do here is pit the navy against the army, against the air force or the marine corps. but his discussion was, you know, at some point in time we've got to have a further discussion to decide how much longer can they continue with this requirement which puts a strain on their readiness and other missions and core requirements that they can do. at the same time, we still need to come up with a really good shore solution for ballistic missile defense. and to i brought in dom -- so i brought in dom and a couple of my guys, and i just wanted to say, hey, i want to let you know how i'm seeing this through my own particular lens. and i thought we needed to do an independent study of roles and
missions of joint missile defense. and this is really aside from the ever-awaiting still missile defense review that we're still waiting. i think this is something that we really couldn't lead from a service -- more like an independent study, okay? you get some disinterested personnel out there or a body of work that can put together some type of analysis and assessment. we're not there yet, but right before i left over the summer, i started kind of drawing up this conversation. and what i also didn't want to do is say, okay, it's too small, and we can't do this anymore, and we only have a couple focus areas. that's not the point. the point was at some point in time, we needed to bring this to the fore front. i figured we could come up with a couple vep venues out there to kind of keep this conversation going. as tom indicated up front. i just want to kind of review the bidding a little bit for the last 18 month, you know, while i served as the deputy director
for force protection. i got announced initially as the director of the joint integrated missile defense organization, and that was in february. when i showed up in april, we were going through a reorganization in the jea, and i was tagged and headed at the deputy director for force protection which tom mentioned before which is not only the jamdo business, but it's also the chemical and biological business. i was spending the majority of my time, and i think sean will say this probably as well as he opens up, i spent most of my time dealing with the counter-uas challenge that we were having. it was really emanating pretty heavily in combat operations over in iraq. and so there were some quick solutions and some yeoman's work done by industry, the department bringing capability to the force out there. and so that was combat operations overseas. the other challenge we had in counter-uas was in host nations where we have soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines in permissive environments that -- at bases that we are authorized to stay at. and, and it's different all over. so that took up quite a bit of time as well. and the third part was in the homeland where we have sensitive sites whether they be nuclear bases or missile defense locations. different authorities out there that exist here in the homeland. you're working with interagency, you have ntsb, homeland security, faa. but we found we really learned a lot from working with one another. i think we gained significant traction by doing so. and so just to kind of review again, we had to restructure the organization overall because the department of defense was going through 25% headquarters reductions all across the force. and so you kind of had to determine, okay, what is it you can do in this job here for integrated missile defense. and we picked two focus areas. we said we as a team came up with this, and it was
war-fighting requirements which deals with program development but also -- [inaudible] and we also looked at studies and analysis which is some key demonstrations that we to out there whether it be nimble flyer, the fiscal defense plan five years plus two, or we also look at -- we did black guard which we were actually looking at sunsetting because we've been doing it, the department had been doing this for so many years. just because of the escalation of the concern of the threat out there, we kept it on the plate and successfully pulled off another black dart this year. but the summer of 2017 was very interesting, and sean will certainly get a chance to kind of illuminate some of his experiences over the last year. and with everything going on in the pacific region, we had a presidential -- [inaudible] for missile defense outside the normal. i think in the terms of about 4.6 billion.
so we had to rapidly come up with one that one end list looked like across all services and not just looking at this through a parochial lens of each service. mostly paid for capacity, ground-based interceptors, thad, patriot interceptors and some other things that we probably can't discuss here, but improved capabilities of some of the current platforms that we have today. but preceding was still the bmd, missile defense review, bmdr. and while this was led by domestic policy and the j5 of the joint staff, we still had some input to it as well. we're still waiting on that. i don't have any inside knowledge of when that's going to be out or what's going on in it at that stage. what helped us though was that body of work that came together was able to provide the input for this rapid change to prove our capability as we spent the $4.6 billion.
one thing i tell people, and i really gained an appreciation, was -- in this job, was the jroc process led by the vice chairman. and what you see there truly is the purple world, as i call it, okay? true jointness that does come together. i saw the same passion and energy from a marine corps leader or an air force leader on the patriot thad integration that came through the d., because i think we were all starting to understand that this really is a, you know, a joint concern and a joint problem. but e still go back to my initial point where, you know, do we have, do we have the right procedures in place, do we have the right tactics, techniques and procedures in place, do we have the right programmatics in place in order to set the real foundation for joint with missile defense.
and so like i said, just to be clear, you know, it was really good that the cno, in my opinion from the fox hoel that i sat -- foxhole that i sat, brought this question up. because i think it allows us now to get away from just looking at the joint doctrine, just resting on our laurels and thinking that the missile defense review is going to solve this for us. but to potentially look at with limited capacity out there that certainly does not, you know, the requirements out there exceed the capacity that we have today. if you add up all of the combatant command priority lists out there their need for missile defense between central command, pacific command and european command, you'd find out real quick that we don't have enough. and so how do we work ourselves through this with, you know, through our joint and figure out where -- joint and figure out where are we better postured, are our headquarters structured where they need to be, or do we
need to stay status quo. i think that's kind of where we're at today, and i certainly think it'll be good, you know, sean can give perspective of what that current relationship is with those joint relations. i just came out of the cent-com aor, spent some time over there, but i would tell you i think sean kind of lived and breathed this every single day, so i'll zopp there. take over, sean. >> thank you for the invite. appreciate having the opportunity to come here and talk about what i love to do, and that's air and missile defense. i spent two years as the commander of the 94th aamdc probably during a time, you know, where there was a lot going on when you look at threats that can be employed against some of the assets there in the paycom, aor.
it's good when we talk jointness because one of the things i always highlighted when i commanded the 94th was you won't find many organizations more joint than the 94th army air and missile defense command and our overall missile defense portfolio. it's a sunergy that the other -- synergy that the other services normally come together especially when you're dealing with an add adversary with the capability that they have. in my role, you know, i had three roles as the 99 4th -- 94th commander, probably i spent 70% of my time working directly with the joint partners as the deputy air air defense commander working directly for general shaughnessy who was the commander in the area, air defense commander for the entire indoe-paycom aor. and essentially in that role, i
would leverage the joint capability of all the services to, essentially, get after the air missile defense problem set. and in that role, why it's important for me to highlight that here is because it ties into my current role, the force protection directorate you should joint staffing -- under joint staffing. the requirements piece. as the defense commander, i had a lot of say in the requirements, filled in the capability gaps that we did have in the theater while using my other role as the senior air defense commander in theater and the theater army air missile defense coordinator working directly with the army in going after army capability gaps that would directly influence, potentially, the fight inside of the aor. in my experience in pay-com, i
often participated in several conferences. and when you talk joint synergy, every conference that had a service four-star, one of the common themes was being integrated from a air missile defense viewpoint. so essentially, the theme would always be how to we get to a joint sensor, shooter, agnostic architecture inside the theater that would maximize our capability, because at the end of the day, i'm a firm believer that's the only way you're going to get there. and how you develop that integrated fire control from a joint perspective to synergize all those capabilities. and being the commander of the 94th, although i would add advoe for capability because of, for capability gaps that we had in theater, i also had to balance fighting with what i had in
theater, in optimizing the capability. so some of the things we did, you know, we did with the help of the air missile defense community was, you know, we took joint capability like the aegis bmd, you know, and synergizing it with the army radar to maximize the capability, once again, extending the range of our current systems without any new type systems. we used the army and the joint force to leverage current army capabilities that in patriot, in being able to get the interoperability between to so you have intergration between that and patriot to maximize the capability of those two systems, once again using existing capability to maximize against an increasing threat in the theater. and then prioritizing the
upgrades that were planned for some of the systems in theater whether it's army or joint and then accelerating those upgrades to be able to get after more advanced threats and in using everyone on the joint team whether it's air force being in the counter-air fight, to the navy being in a ballistic missile defense fight. and one of the things i found being as the 94th commander, i couldn't just stay in my regional focus inside. i had to reach out to the entire enterprise. and is one of my -- and one of my reach-outs was to jiamdo when i came to the building and they briefed me on the study, which was enlightening. we take a holistic view of the regional threats and the capabilities and lay out, you know, where we can move forward
with. and one of the things that provided was the opportunity to look at other capability out there that can assist in theater. and then leverage in our partners in theater to utilize their capability and maximize their capability in whatever they can provide was important. so after two years of commanding the 94th and doing it, i would say successfully, my reward was to come to the joint staff and fix everything that i identified as a problem from a regional commander. [laughter] ..
me talk about things like integrated is one of those initiatives and looking out advanced combat id and then just using our analysis and game to identify future capability whether non-kinetic capability to move forward and get after the threat and some of these events that they face today. having said that i have my best over to you >> you both put a lot on the table. i appreciate you taking the time to come out here from where i'm fascinated with the work you all do. seems like one of the most important institutions more popular when nobody knows about. let me pick up a couple things that were just put down. how are you mentioned the cua as focus of late. just to abstract a little from matt also the army's emphasis on to ensure the last year year
and change. in the post-cold war mystery we got taken air superiority for granted. to what extent do you see that culture truly changing to where folks are looking up more. has what extent that the culture that locating arrow missile defense, arrow muscle battle is really important? how has that changed? >> we don't like to say that we don't have air superiority anymore. that's a question that you can take back and think about or ponder but that came up from pretty senior leader during a session i had in the pentagon and it was pretty profound during the senior sessions. the other point is i don't think you can fabricate each of these short range air defense
and high mad i think it's all-inclusive. that's a culture change because we have a generation that grew up and saw that split and we saw the split get neglected for a long time in short range defense and now we are trying to rapidly get our short rains air defense capability back on the street, back in the units but at the same time we have to bank in the requirements and you have the perfect example that we can't allow that to be a segmented problem and sean and i were talking about this in the back that's something that there is tension there right now because at some point and time it has to go back as protection and may be the services but this is still a joint problem. >> i think you've covered it very well. you can never neglect a threat out there and you have to constantly find ways even if perceived as a strength or
dominance within your force to be able to react and especially when you start getting after multi-domain battle and habit forces in certain locations where you may not have that superiority we have to tailor our systems and our task force to be able to provide capability against any type of threat and the counter air threat continues to grow and with the advance threat out there it will continue to be a problem. >> it might come back to some of that. global integrations the chairman sees himself as the global integrator and so i wonder if you could from your perspectives talk a little bit about how the joint staff has and is currently supporting that particular mission, i know you talk a lot about the ambition and the vision but the day today and the requirements
how is that the joint staff do that? >> i will tackle that one and i will tackle from a perspective of my previous tour in the pentagon when i served in the j3 and served as the division chief of global force management and we were starting to touch the fringes of global integration with the dfm process because essentially we are putting the chairman and the position to recommend tough decisions and accept some tough risk recommended to the secretary to accept health risks on how we allocated forces across the combat commands. as you look at threats and how they've evolved and how is you look at a fight it's highly unlikely that it's going to be a single cocom and that fight will be multiple combat
commands in that fight. the concept of global integration essentially emerged from that is how you look at the chairman in his current role maximizing forces across the global force allocation to be able to meet the threat without allocating forces or overly allocating large amount of forces to one combat and commander to be able to allocate it across the force to where they can share these forces and find an integration where there is no seams between the two combat commanders. and given the chairman the ability of what that's going to cause the chairman to have the ability to look at the combat commanders and really allocate based off where he sees the greatest threat is globally.
>> may be dig down to a couple things where they were surfaced. he mentioned the provision of integrated fire patrol and not just within a service but we are still working toward that. but true integrated fire control across joint force. that's a big lift. when congress said to forthcoming administration go to a missile defeat the interoperability and integration so we will see whether the missile-defense review gives milestones but i guess another way of asking this is how far are we from realizing that vision of vision 2020? vision 2020 very concise document lays all this stuff out but it still is a vision.
how far away is that? >> we have to approach this with very incremental fixes and what i mean by that is all use dts as an example. we can't allow dti us to be the panacea that we have to let the entire program go from birth to end or if we see some opportunities to provide intermittent fixes to it we have what's called deployable icc and i think that gives us flexibility to instead of waiting in a shelter, waiting on a vehicle if you don't have that we still can take at least the systems, the quick components of it and deploy it forward out there. the patriot immigration right now we don't need a joint vision 2020 to really figure
out we have to focus on integration issues. we better joint margin operation statement that was crafted up very smart within the pay calm region but we have to figure out how do we bring in the three combat command statements probably more closer to each other, that's an approach of trying to move away from just having a vision out there that goes back to sean's point about global innovation fees. the chairman can help drive and shape that with sector secretary of defense who makes the final decisions on forces retained and forces assigned. >> just to add onto that, in pieces it's been successfully field-tested and conceptually
in virtual war fighters that's one of the areas we tackle as we implement that into some of our advance wall fighting capability to try to validate some capability and see what type of results we get from that type of capability. >> staying a little bit only not quite the division 2020 level but a little bit lower down one of the things that diane noted a couple years back was to put together put down on paper what should the operational architecture look like? the kind of set the interoperability requirements for the services to go and do this stuff. it's still there. if i'm not mistaken. i wonder who is stewarding that? is diane bill stewarding that? is anybody taking the role what is the status of that. >> i had to pull away from that.
what we try to maintain at least through couple other areas like identification integrated fire control problematic milestones was where can we keep those topics joined at the hip with a couple major programs. it goes back to the point earlier it can't be independent. we need to get that from our independent look from all forces services out there. the f 35 north missile-defense that could be capabilities there.we have a full complement of understanding of what was each provides to the dy to or vice versa. we have a full understanding of what this is army at patriot so if we can if the problems are hard even within the services
and more challenging to do them joint perspective. >> let me continue with that a little more specifically and that was i think a week or so ago the national defense strategy commission had a specific recommendation set a couple things on maybe there needs to be a single dot official first up and then implement an integrated long-term plan for arrow missiles. it sounds a little bit like some of the things were just talking about. first of all, your thoughts on that recommendation? in my words it's not immigrations. any thoughts on that recommendation? >> right now just as you
highlighted in the next panel highlighted how it was previously done but you now have unless you have several entities that contribute to the portfolio that no one real in repeated stands up as the integrator i think the joint staff will continue to have a responsibility of capability and joint capability. >> what works over the last time there was missile-defense director board. when i first came on board to a degree the last one we went to we had the vice chairman, john root, doctor griffin.
we had key ost players sitting at the table and of course we have the mba leadership as well.talk about some hard issues and transfer from nda to the army we had the body of work coming together to look at that. i think it's the right place to be. we look at this to myopic we don't have policy folks in there. we will have scientists in their we don't have engineers in their we don't have ãin charge of logistics collectively. i think where we are about where we need to be, minus a belly button to do this. our plug is chair of the vice chairman represent joint force. >> tech integration authority but fits the need for a single belly button.
this is something that has a lot of attention. any particular texture to that conversation about services, all that sort of thing. it's in a good spot is for is testing the nda is putting out that's coming from the direction of the ust leadership. there are countries out there that are increasing rapidly increasing the capability here. i would say we are not neglecting it. we the department of defense having a good stop in the priority where it needs to be as far as testing goes looking for analysis the alternatives and moving in the right direction. >> let me ask one more question and we can open up to the
audience. my test on experience with the 94th as well that is the mix of active defense and passive defense. he mentioned in the ãbdeal there's not enough out there. we had a single brush capacity last year but even with notwithstanding that there's just not enough. how do you see the appropriate mix of active and passive coming forward? >>. >> i believe he maximize and that goes back to my original comment of maximizing the capability that you have at your disposal in to the point where it's an education process for me it was an education process to the area defense commander that you can't cover everything you won't have the capacity to cover everything she have to look at the passive defense measures. you have to look at leveraging your partner capacity.
then you have to look at leveraging other ways to get after the problems that you hear us talk a lot about. getting after the non-kinetic pieces and then getting after the left of launch type of capability. but you can have from an offense of attack. when we open up to some questions from the audience. how about some mics going around raise your hand to get my attention and if you wouldn't mind stating your name and keeping it short and the interrogative sense and will go from there. >> gentlemen, thanks for coming from your comments.grant roselle, georgetown isd. in the mindset tonight you
mentioned pickup theater. the potential for high end conflict kicking off over our friends in north korea. do we have air defense needed to project logistics lines if we had to go down tonight would we be able to keep the logistics lines running the kinds we had used or do we have a gap in capability? if there's a gap can you characterize what our horizon is to resolve that? >> i think what most everyone in this room may or may not know there's a lot of effort that went into building the flight tonight capacity. for that type of threat and really it's capacity. from a joint perspective we
eliminated a lot of the gaps for that type of threat. leaving there i felt very comfortable in where we are logistically it's a tough fight when you look at time and space. in the ability for the threats use of ballistic missiles. it's a short timeline for the resupply so that's why it's important you have maximum capability forward but i was very confident with our set and with the plan resupply rate and routes we have in place to be very successful. for that contingency.
>> here in the front. >> i'm russell reed, sometimes national security ãb everything in the sense that missile-defense is also missile offense, you don't want them fired. his overcapacity improves has there been any thought given to how china will react in the sense there was a cold war everyone had the same giant missile. now the missiles have gotten a lot smaller, faster, china tends to go locate you see the escalatory given the sense that we do defend by destroying their missiles sensor so tightly colocated with nuclear
defense is escalatory or becoming the standard quote? >> can i reformulate the question a little bit? >> you may. >> given the incredible quantity of offense and strike missiles that china has, respect to the question, are we doing on the active defense side anything approximating what would begin to degrade their thousands of strike missiles? not to mention their own air defenses and own missile defenses but i think the action reaction question begs the question of one of scale. they got a lot of stuff. he mentioned capacity, extremity, what 143 for the world or something like that but is it really getting to that point you think? >> i think it goes back to the point i started off with, was the true role of mention of
limited capacity, i don't want to call it limited capacity but the capacity we know exists today to sean's point of the reason why we have to make sure this is a joint construct. we have to understand what the attack operations look like we have to be embedded into that plane. we have to be embedded into that conversation in order to reduce the capacity if we have to go missile be missile. and we can't just sit back and say, here's what we have years our stance, here's the missiles that are in our msas storage areas and that's what we have to have folks that are tied at the hip with the combined force air component commanders that whoever is running and prosecuting that who's the joint force commander because here is our maximum limitations or capabilities, here's an order to neutralize where it needs to be at and then our joint partners say i have to be
able to take out x amount of threat right here in order for you to be able to at least provide the protection we need. tough problem out there but it's not slowing down but it's not also massively increasing. it certainly goes back to the whole died model of diplomat information and economic we have to watch where the levers are being pulled. >> that's why the flight highlighted earlier the joint integration is critical because he don't have in most cases when you're talking nucleotide competitors, it's tough to have the capacity missile for missile. it's just very tough. you work closely with the joint air component commander and to highlight where potential gaps and how you're going to leverage the rest of the joint force from an offense of
standpoint to be able to degrade or trick to make it more balance. but for the assets that are in theater, they are prepared for the initial fight but then it's a total comcast has to be developed to get after holistic problem. not just an error missile-defense officer problem. it's an entire force problem. >> we have to provide the best military advice to whether that be the chairman or secretary or whatever level you are at, risk of force, where the leverage is not that allows them to pull in either direction based on overmatched or under match. >>. >> back here. >> with the growth ã >> who are you with? >> lauren fraser sophomore in
georgetown. with the growth of branches like ada how do you see that shifting the role of traditional combat armed branches? >> i was also deputy commander for cadet command. engaging with cadets is one of my best jobs in the army. the air defense branch is a growing branch so hopefully as you get to commissioning and branch selections one of the branches you will look at closely. but when you see the example i use to always give cadets and some of our young officers when i would talk to them, especially from my experience in global force management, when i was running global force management we would have tanks where essentially you bring in
all the four stars and get after tough decisions and in that form my two years that i ran it there were three capabilities we were normally walking into that form to walk through. we always work through the tough carrier issues of carrier presence. the other one would be our views. the combat commanders wanted them that bad. so you are talking a branch with young officers and we are not talking ãbwe are talking a battery where there is a captain commanded the organization about 80 ã100 soldiers out there representing the branch and the branch has continued to grow because of
that. looking at a number of batteries and now when you talk in a short outgrowth significant growth across the branch and opportunities really all the way up to battalion. we just added another brigade in pacific 3888 brigade so i think the army specifically the entire joint force understands the importance of the ada branch and amongst the other combat arms i would argue that when you looking strategically at the importance of that capability it's probably unmatched at that time right now. >> i'm biased because i'm a defense guy but i would tell you it's combat arms role and i think we will see it increase once again as we put our short range air defense shoes back on. and it won't just be for males
only just like we were able to bring women through the army and all these other initiatives. giving the opportunity there as well. we will integrate with forgetting combat teams. that will be just as important because at the end of the day it still going to be well protected in protecting land. and terrain out there. i think you will have great opportunities out there. it's a competitive branch now. it's the most recent numbers that just came out of just the west point selection i think 50 5s 58 was the first choice for air defense. i think that's what brian gave as of last week. but the same comparison can be set for rotc as well. >> i don't want to say anything that diminishes recruit for ada but that optimism, let me just say, that optimism about the future, i hope that's well but
i can't be a little pessimistic that they love the air defense is getting right now i worry it's going to be short term that i wonder whether the army has really to our extent has the army big army going to make air defense a core service competency mission. the threat is there. the need and the importance of it is there. i sure hope that it will resound and persist. patriot off tempo and personal temple was the highest. i don't see anymore patriot battalions. maybe integration to commit redefining the fire unit and increasing some flexibility for forced deployments.any thoughts? >> the only thing i would add it is ãbif you look at the evolving threat that we are faced with right now in any adversary's ability to reach out and touch any forces, it's
going to start with some type of defense. defense capabilities. i think the air force branch has done a great job of reinventing itself even when we lost all the short range battalions in the room with patriot battalions in group that and now the opportunity has come back because of the growing threat of some of the maneuver forces where we are starting to bring that capability back into the maneuver force. i think with the growing threat that is always going to be a requirement for the air missile defense. >> is a tough balance, i would tell you that just as a general officer we have to be cognizant of all joint capabilities, particularly army capabilities. not oversell ourselves too much at the degradation of other offensive capability out there. to include logistics. in other neighbors we have for
the joint force. >> this gentleman and then right here. >> michael box, industry side. two weeks ago undersecretary griffin sat where you did it while he said a lot of things ã >> is a lot smarter than i am. >> to have his big food stamps were the hypersonic threat and essentially delivering faster, don't do the ponderous decades long acquisition you're used to. as the external material and policy folks, how can we help deliver those things to you and get you less headaches as opposed to more? >> i would flip it around and say we've got to do a better job of informing industry and not be adverse in thinking that we are bad guy or that person out there. or that we are not supposed to have a conversation with you.
i think we can do a better job of transparency and identifying just our broad gaps out there. i think that's a good thing. not one company or organization over the other. so it's a well intended and it's good for you to tell me where can we help you i think we got something like flip that around. i like where the army is heading right now with the modernization command. we haven't taken enough repetition to see how this is going to work at. and pretty optimistic there is opportunity because now it allows single leaderships out there like ours, to the air missile defense, mcintyre, he has the ability to now work across the full matrix of organizations within the army as well as industry and not through the methodical process of the acquisition process to potentially work things a lot sooner and a lot quicker.
that's one angle. >> right here? >>. >> good afternoon. john vaughn, for a xeon company. i know that the army has allocated the force structure for fire unit eight and i was wondering if you could provide insights on the procurement of equipment and anything you know about that. >> when i left i know the decision was not made not made to purchase that equipment but i think it's good we are getting ahead at least on the personal side. to back it up a notch i will tell you that we are also struggling we struggled this past year on recruiting. that's just a bigger picture of we can allocate what the now we have to reach that bar and to a degree we been doing some
things inside the army to try to change our recruiting methodology. that's a little bit more to the left of the problem out there. i think that's just where we are at when it comes to the actual capacity of growth. i don't know if you have anything else. >> if nobody else has a question i've got a couple more to close us out. one of them is back to vision 2020. as far as some of those goals may be it still seems like the right vision. but it's been just over five years about five years almost exactly since that came out. does it need an update? maybe a waypoint or whatever it is. do we need some near term but says milestones of sorts. thoughts on that?
>> i would say the answer is yes. i think five years ago we weren't having the conversation about our intelligence, we were talking about man-to-man teaming of capability out there. we were having conversations of the concerns we were having with the systems that can now tie into the smart phones out here. do we still need to have the same number of folks in each battery out there same number of crews out there? if we can use some of the technologies that are current today and either reduce them or get back to the four structure questions, maybe we can reduce force structure, crew size, spread either the personnel out to wider degree so those elements really i don't think i've kept up with the joint vision 2020 contract. it goes back to five years ago we were just coming out of two
high intensity fights out there not to say that we were neglecting the capacity growth of adversary missile-defense or booked missiles but also their capability. he completely washed it out but i would tell you that it has to remain consistent with chairman's guiding documents as well. and the secretary of defense. the secretary of defense certainly provides very clear direction on where the department needs to head and his guidance from the nbs to the nms in my opinion was what guided my process sitting in ã ãit wasn't necessarily joint vision 2020. >> and the near pier wasn't quite as big of a conversation either. i think we are going to leave it off there. we will take about a 10 minute break i will buy you all a couple coffee outside. asked the panelists to come up
and we will let you gentlemen go. if you all would please join me in thanking them for coming up for their thoughts. [applause] coming up this weekend on book tv, sunday at 7:30 p.m. eastern senator bernie sanders talks about his book "where we go from here, two years in the resistance". >> you can watch, you can watch television from morning to night for years, the question will not come up, is it appropriate that the top 1/10 of one percent owns more wealth than the bottom 90%? is it appropriate that in the wealthiest country in the
history of the world we have the highest rate of childhood poverty? of almost any other major country on earth. are we concerned that handful of media conglomerates control what we see here and read. >> on sunday 9:00 p.m. eastern on "after words", national review executive editor ry han salong discusses his book "melting pot or civil war, a son of immigrants makes the case against open borders". he was interviewed by doris meisner, former commissioner of the u.s. immigration and naturalization service. >> when you think about the next several decades partly because of falling birth rates among nativeborn americans, immigration really is a big driver, a composition that immigration is thus important not just as a discrete matter of immigration policy but in terms of human capital policy character of our schools, over
future workforce and much else it really is a very important issue touching on many different sectors. >> watch this weekend on c-span2's tv. >> the selling thriller author brad meltzer will be our guest on in-depth, fiction edition. our light-colored program on sunday at noon eastern. his most recent book, the escape artist, debuted at number one on the new york times bestsellers list. his other books include the inner circle, the book of fate and the first council. +8 other best-selling thrillers. join us for in-depth fiction edition with author brad meltzer. live sunday from 12 pm to 3:00 p.m. eastern on book tv on c-span2. >>