tv Wilson Center Discussion on U.S.- China Relations in 2018 CSPAN December 20, 2018 8:32am-10:06am EST
freedom, the case for hope. >> you make the case for hope. why so important, is her difference between faith and hope? >> we believe that our tomorrow will be better that are today's. we have to fight for it. i think everybody who came on the streets parsing the early days come deeper in hope, and a plea is can't be that this version of this is we got, like we make something. think about the tax bills. if they can rebut the tax bill on the back of a scrap paper, don't come with weight 10,000 wait 10,000 years to end mass incarceration. we can do it correctly. >> watch booktv this weekend on c-span2. >> next, look at just china relations over the past you. speakers include j. stapleton roy who served as u.s. ambassador to china.
from the wilson center, this is an hour and half. >> good morning, everybody. welcome to the wilson center. i want to thank you all for being with us come to her audience in the room those of you watching the webcast live and in the future which i believe currently includes my parents are watching this in scotland, and to our c-span viewers for joining us today. we are delighted to the wilson center ceo jane harman here with us. hopefully have, go to later on. i am thrilled to be a current owner ofrr the wilson center. until early this year i was based in beijing as asia correspondent for the british broadcaster sky news, this
podium from the back of this room, from xi jinping adult trump ornament in the great hall of the people last year and been fortunate to go to look at this from both sides of the relationship. before that is based in russiato were my -- covers only by the current crisis and a coverage to the annexation of crimea. none of which was as daunting as the day i knocked on the door of ambassador stapleton roy. [laughing] as a testament to the wilson center, this is a caliber of person you find yourself working alongside. i'd need network. ambassador roy could not even kinder or more generous with his time and expertise. as i'm sure you know ambassador roy served on the diplomatic front lines of the actual front of the actual cold war with posting to beijing and moscow along and long and storied career before becoming the director of the kissinger institute on china and the united states here at the wilson center where he is now a
distinguished fellow and we're honored to have with us on this panel today. at the far end of the desk, yun sun is director of the china program the codirector of the east asia program at the stimson center, an expert on chinese foreign policy and use china relations, and old friend of the kissinger institute. i i believe this is her third interview today. welcomeut back. robert daly structure of the kissinger institute and a leading authority on china-u.s. relations. i want to thank him for welcoming so warm here at the wilsonso center. fun fact come among as many as a titles in the research for this ii discovered robert was once a producer for the chinese language version of sesame street.la [laughing] true. meredith oyen is associate professor of history and director of the asia studies program at the university of maryland baltimore county where she specializes in history of china america relations. she is the author of the diplomacy of migration
transnational and the make his urges china relations in the cold war and her current focused on the issues of chinese students, visas and exchanges between the two countries so she is very well placed to help us make sense of what's happening now. i said i would take a moment at the start to set out some context for our discussion. so much as happened in the last 12 months, frankly the last 12 days that it can be easy to lose track. our conversation today beyond all of the noise to tease out the really key moment over the last year, when we are now with u.s.-china relations and crucially where this is heading. i want to take you back to federal 25th this year because this was one of those moments. i was working, it was a sunday beijing bureau of sky news where i was meant to ceremony of the winter olympics. when we got a bulletin from the agency journals call a wired truck. it was brief, a couple of lines and assist the communist party central committee was proposing to move the two-term limit on the presidency and vice presidents. i remember getting on the phone
and telling the news editor this was the story we need to be covering. this was the news event today that would really matter in the long run. because it had been signs that this might happen. once a a possible future leader had been arrested, there'd been no clear successor but that it was in black and white, this proposal to change the constitution to remove the only formal barrier to xi jinping staying in power indefinitely. entering of the following month i watched xi and every other delicate in the fall do that. i bring this up because firstly what happens in china's domestic politics matters for u.s.-china relations. it's the background against which these discussions are taking place and we need to understand the point of view in beijing if we want to understand this relationship. secondly because of wonder whether the sense i had that day, that feeling this is happening, this is real, it's how we're going to come look back on this year, on 2018 in
general as the year of the start of the clear eyed reckoning where we begin to understand where china under xi jinping was going and with the coming u.s.-china relations. that this wasn't just another deviation that china wasn't just zigzagging, that china was on its own course. in the years since we've seen the start of the trade with the united states, u.s. warships in the taiwan strait and a near miss in the south china sea and the emergence of questions whether we are now in or this could become a new cold war. american academic walter russell mead called it the cold war two. former treasury secretary hank paulson has warned of a new economic iron curtain. on the chinese side java foreign ministry accusing the the u.s.f having a cold war mentality and defense minister warned against repeating the cold war. i want to turn first to meredith pickett strikes me with seen arguing more serious tensions
over the past decades. we have the straits crisis, the belgrade embassy bombing, but we were not really talking been about a new cold war. i wonder with her historical perspective if you could help us to understand what is to quit now and what we really talking about when we talk about a new cold war. >> i mean, i -- thank you, katie. i think i would preface this by saying i'm not sure i accept that we're talking about a new cold war except of course in the case of this sort of headline making rhetoric. i don't necessarily accept the premise that this this is a ned war bute it would say that, wht i think they're trying to point to, what feelsat different is ty are trying to highlight an idea that there is something longer-term afoot, that we are looking at a status quo of competition or of an ongoing rivalry that they see lasting decades and that this is just
for the next short period of time, during the next administration. there is no longer i'll write up of jinping tenure in office after ten years or so, then you move on to somebody else. or just write up president trump if there's a a sense of their something longer-term and more fundamental happening under think that's what they're trying to point you in this talk of the cold war. that's what they're sort of harkening back to when looking at this rhetoric from the earlier, i think they're pointing to a soviet american stuff cold war and not really the previous cold war between u.s. and china. >> ambassador roy, , usurping te actual cold war. how would you describe what's happening in the moment? do you think cold war, you cold war is appropriate terminology to be using? >> i think using the term cold war is totally inappropriate.
the spirit of u.s.-china relations, even when we are in sharp disagreement on issues does not approximate the spirit of the types of negotiations that i was either participate in or on the sidelines of drawing actual cold war. but there's a second reason why i fundamentally disagree with the term. i thought it was wrong to refer to the war on terror. crime is a crime to the human condition, so is terrorism. the bible is full of examples of terrorism. you do not win fmp or lose when you're combating terrorism. it's like crime. you try to manage it to keep it at a level so that civilized societies can function properly. our relationship with china is marked by strategic rivalry, but strategic rivalry as part of the historical experience of all major countries deal with other
major countries. so managing this strategic rivalry isic the essence of managing u.s.-china relations under conditions where china now has an economy approximating hours in size with its military is rapidly modernizing in ways that affect our, erodes our traditional military dominance in the western pacific. so to put it in terms of war is misleading on a variety of factors. with the soviet union, because of mutual assured destruction, we were deterred from getting into direct conflict with the soviet union. there's much too much cavalier talking about war with china. i'm sorry, the same mass mutual assured destruction considerations apply in the u.s.-china relationship. we cannot get into an all-out war with china because neither party would be ablee to come out in such a war in a way that would justify the costs of being
in the war. we are both too powerful. so that's not the right way to think about the issue, and the used to describe relationships actually affectional behavior. and, therefore, it seems to me that talking about a cold war mentality between china and the united states obscures the very many areas where we had to cooperate with each other and as much as we will cooperate. >> i know you've traveled five times to china this year, most recently in october. can you give us a sense of what is the perspective? to chinese officials believe then sold to be in or enter into a new cold war? >> sure. i remember going in 2013 for a conference. back then there was cooperation between u.s. and china, backed k into a chinese scholars talk about the new cold war emerging between u.s. and china. the focal pointnt back and was e south china sea with the obama
administration. i would say it was narrative are almost hostile mintel has always existed. whenever there's any problem between u.s. and chinana there's always been problems. those narratives and those red recs emerge. however, in china today i would say that, that of course everybody recognize that china policy wasn't difficult position to actually the trade for an almost impossibility to negotiate, with the chinese perceive as rebuilt dealit out f this predicament. there's a lot of recognition of that but i think also the issue of a new cold war, i think the chinese would like to remind people that it takes two sides to fight a war. and yes, indeed the xi jinping administration has demonstrated certain foreign policy stealthy strategic personality but coming to practicality of really putting china in a collision course with the united states i
think any practical consideration in china was to draw conclusions this is not a war china can really win. so given that precondition, i think that adds a lot of nuances to the interpretation is whether a new cold war has already begun. if the result of this interaction really depends on how china reacts to the united states, how xi jinping reacts to the trump administration, there's a pretty good chance china will take a more conciliatory posture in order to de-escalate the tension because that would be conducive to its domestic stability for china and its economic growth for china, and also as a pragmatic constellation. >> robert daly, think it also reject the term cold war, but what should we call it? let me ask you, is there a danger was any intention of getting there, that's what we stumble into? >> i do reject the cold war framework for reasons that stapleton articulate.
also were looking at a new rubric or framework project as what does it help us to understand what does the clarify as opposed to does it just grabbed headlines? in the case of cold war i don't think it helps us clarify u.s.-china relations at all. it misses the complexity and the rapidly evolving nature of the relationship one of the characteristics of the previous cold war, and i was not a cold warrior as stapleton was, i was a cold squire at most laughably i served briefly under presidents reagan and bush the first but it was at the tail in. certainly alienation of the citizens of theas subunit from united states was one of the major features of the cold war and chinese are not alienated from each other even remotely. you can tell the speaker look at the trade relationship, you can tell by looking at the valley of students and scholars going back and forth, the cooperative relationship not only between beijing and washington but
subnational and states and counties throughout the united states and china. one of the interesting data point of the past year was the positive use of china, a poll reviewed, top 50%, 53% 53%, license before tiananmen square. there's been a recovery of american popular views. we're not alienated from each other in thatt way. nor are the blocks that the united states and china is setting up. there were some signs that each nation would like to set up the kind of sphereup of influence tt they could but there's also been a great deal of pushback. neither china nor the united states has done very well with soft power development over the past year. there's been blowback internationally to vote trumpism and she is him in ways i been quite helpful. we saw the tpp proceed without the united states. we saw malaysia and the maldives and sri lanka, pakistan to
degree pushback on aspects of china's long-term strategy of developing influence through investment. this was done at the united states instigation. this wasn't with foreign players pics of other nations, their interests are constrained as we don't have blocks. what do i suggest instead of a cold war? i say we stick with u.s.-china relations. [laughing] >> that's not ever good headline. >> but it admits complexity. it is balance. it seems to me that it is still a very useful phrase and it doesn't ties into a framework. the last part of your question was are we heading there. >> could we get there? >> there's some worrisome signs coming from both capitals. one of which we saw just last week when the american administration announced a new africa policy and instead of printing it in terms of american inches vis-à-vis african nations or the needs of africa, it was face in terms of countering china in africa. i think this is first that
africa policy on and secondly, it implies a desire to set up blocks. we also do see in china diplomacy a tendency to want to spread chinese influence which is illiberal and his counter international best practices, as desire to have nations that receivehe chinese investment be less critical of china. and this requires nations to silence their own media, their own civil society. so while it's true china unlike the soviet union isn't trying to spread and ideology in an evangelical way, the terms of trade withl china, the trends ae receiving chinese investment often involve a degree of silence which over time has effect of an ideology. i think that our worrisome trends and we haven't seen the bottom of this contentious relationship yet. we haven't reached it, neither
side has defined it. so it might have a different discussion a year from now. but as of today but stick with u.s.-china relations and forget about cold war. >> let me ask professor oyen if you want respond to robert a little bit. i know you're doing a lot of research on the people to people side of the relationship if we the of the headline, top level that what this means in terms of chinese students coming to the united states and vice versa. >> it's interesting that one of the foundations and one of the reasons why we have this manageable or workable long-term relationship is this movement back ands forth and the profound number of chinesese students coe to the united states, but there's a lot of development this year that are troubling on this score. so alongside the trade war, you have the talk of stopping student visas for chinese students wholesale which stephen miller made a comment to that
effect. that's even a proposal is a little concerning. the ship from one year visas for chinese students, that's problematic in a lot of ways. it takes away the source of resources and intellectual capacity and international exchange between american universities and chinese universities and chinese students. there's the review of h-1b visas that we don't really talk about with the context of china. it should shut off into india policy but china is the second largest recipient of h-1b visas and some of the ways the trump p administration is reconsidering h-1b visas could've long-term allocations for how chinese students and scholars in the property and work in the united states and whether they stay long-term, coming short-term for study, graduating and going back instead of choosing to stay and become part of the intellectual community and the united states. and then there's this other whole o subcategory within the
university setting of backlash against confucius institute and concerns about the chinese students and scholars associations, which have both come under increased scrutiny as sources of chinese influence in the united states. and that, there's important questions that can be raised about the use of chinese dollar to support this activity and whether their consulates were dictating actions of students but there's also i think some of these concerns can get very easily overblown anything to see some examples, sort of the ricocheting out of this concerns in theth wilson center report ts year on chinese influence from the working group on chinese influence. >> those are two different things. >> but there's a section of the support on chinese influence, their sections of the talk about education but there's a section the talks but chinese americans
what you think is incredibly closely linked to the problems with the visas and exchanges. because the language in the report is incredibly. >> caller: in terms of how thinks about, uses overseas chinese and chinese americans sometimes interchangeably in ways that adi concerning. >> there are two things. the wilson center, the kissinger -- >> the hoover -- >> no, no. we did do a report. [laughing] >> you did a a panel and they d a report. >> no, no. we did a report on issues related to chinese students and scholars associations by one of our fellows over the past year that, a lot of attention. then there was a joint task force sponsored primary by the asia society and the hoover institute which was much broader which is your also referring to. >> which you were also on. >> i was a member of that task force, that's right but they are distinct. >> i apologize. i was referring to the hoover institution report. mylo concern is you she
ricocheting out from these kinds of problems with the visas and concerned about chinese influence is that you see ways in which therere could be a new kind of suspicion of chinese in the united states, regardless of the background and that's not going to do anything to support or bolster this strong foundation necessary foundation and the sino-american relationship. >> just wanted at something onip that. this report came out on november institute. i think many of your characterizations of it are fair and reasonable critiques of that report. at the same time it has to be mentioned it was really xi jinping of the chinese government who repeated statements that say what your chinese are always chinese. all chinese all over the world, combined with an increase in funding for the organizations
within china, including but not limited to the united front that have raised some of these concerns, as have thein plank ot of those methods in smaller, less powerful countries, including within the five eyes, new zealand and australia in particular but also the uk and candidate. this i think if we look back at 2018, it has become a feature of china's relationship with a number of nations, this new concerns about chinese communist party influence within communities and institutions abroad. i seeoa these reports have been mostly about in the subset of the report remotely constructive vigilance, which is a major concern of american universities and colleges. but the danger of it being overblown is clear. >> it's also an old concern. it's something that's long historical roots and it was overblown in the 1950s when there was a great deal of concern about chinese influence and chinese american community in the u.s.
my concern with some of the language in the report is that it conflates three groups of people. it conflates chinese living in the united states. it conflates that with ethnic chinese american nationality who maybe have close personal ties to china and are recent immigrants, and the language would also include everybody has any ethnic chinese heritage believes in the united states, and that becomes too arduous. >> i don't think we want to spend too much time on this but theis report notes this danger, there's a number statements that the report that said well, thiss is a problem, if you don't take thee disclaimer seriously, , yol take the other side seriously, that there could be an issue as well. >> butbe ask yun sun, is there a sense that the united states is becoming a less welcoming place
for a chinese student to come and study and p live and work? >> i think especially for the families of chinese students for chinese students who want to commit to the united states for study. i think it does create a concern because there were rumors about chinese students visas and put on a more stringent review process and whether they can actually have a diesel long enough to finish the study and what it means for them, for the families financial that they have to pay. so all those questions it does create pressure in china about concerns coming to the united states as a student. but i would say over all if you compare the openness of the american academic environment or if you compare how the u.s. government has treated the chinese in thisy country, i am originally from china. i studied att the four affairs university in beijing, and you
compare how for example, foreign scholars are being treated in china, i would say the difference is pretty distinct. i tell my chinese friends, i from china, i work in washington, d.c. i'm able to be in this community, to be a member of this community. can't imagine a white blue-eyed american inan beijing working -- >> hazel. [laughing] >> mention a of blue-eyed amern being the head of, , say, being ahead of american studies institute at the china academy of social sciences. that's really unthinkable, right? i think the distinction in terms of the openness is still there. but in terms of the competition between the two political ideals are this influence, the chinese will say that american attempt
to influence chinese the metropolitan have always been the. look at u.s. id, look at state department, look at the national economic for democracy. the accusation for united states for meddling has been consistent and persistent. but what has changed there is really china's model, as china's power rises, , china is gatherig the competence and also the inspiration or the power of the countries to replicate the china model. that's the difference compared maybe five years ago to know. chinese are more confident about the modelk and more confident about applicability of the modei in other countries. but i must say that this process reveals a lot of hypocrisy on both sides. because we do believe that if the u.s. is genuinely confident in the superiority of its
political ideals, initiate recall that the repeal of political ideals like openness rather than closeness, and if the chinese to do believe that it's governance and department systemop or model represent not only a viable but also a desirable path for the world, it should be at the minimum comfortable to compete with the united states on a level playing field. .. > >> that depends on how you define meddling. >> does china have a--
>> the short answer is, i recall, i think it was secretary of state albright and i think hillary clinton herself may also have referred to the u.s. desire that there be a more liberal representative form of governance in china. i don't think you can suppress americans from expressing that type of an attitude because we believe that representative governance, which requires an electoral process of some sort and which requires that the powers of the governance is derived from the consent of the governed, the sense that power corrupts and you have check and balance power are the characteristics of all modern systems of governance and china's system of governance is pre-modern. it falls in the categories of kings and czars and those who claim the power in their own
hands. that's the pre-modern form of governance. in many ways china's big contradiction, created giant new middle classes, heavily exposed, both through studying abroad and through the influence of people who have studied abroad in china, and they have altered the economic base of the country. and they won't modernize the political system. so americans are going to speak out on such subjects and say, we think it desirable that china have this. but in terms of promoting it, let's look at the examples. do we have good democratic governance in haiti? why do we have so many refugees out of el salvador, it's on our doorstep. if we could wave a magic wand in the areas of governance, why don't we do it in areas that are so close and we have influence. the answer is we're highly
limited in influence in changing the governance in other countries, but when we set a standard of governance in our own country that other countries see as better than their own, then you have an enormous impact, and i think we ought to pay more attention, for example, to what's been going on in europe. although there's some backward movement now. we saw that there was an ability to influence political development in other countries because the eastern europeans eager to get into the european union couldn't do so unless they met certain standards of governance and then they, on their own, began to change their domestic institutions in order to qualify for entry into the european union. that is the most effective way of influencing how other countries handle their own affairs. you leave the details to the countries themselves, but you set examples of how good governance can function and then others choose to try to emulate it. and quite frankly, we see that
process underway in china right now. all we are seeing here in terms of reporting is that there's a move toward using suppression in china to suppress western ideas. how come they're trying to suppress western ideas? when i was in china in the 1970's and '80s, western ideas had no purchase in china and now they have influence on the way the chinese think of the political affairs. not that they want to emulate the system. but they see the role that a free press can play and an independent judiciary can play and you don't have these in china and these are what i would call having modern governance and those forces in china are upwelling and we see a desire to hold down those forces because of a governance system that does not want to introduce what i would call modern concepts of governance. so do we interfere in china?
the answer is, we express ideas that can be viewed in china as interference because we believe in these modern concepts of governance, but in fact we do very, very little to actually try to promote these ideas inside china because we can't do it on our own doorstep. why do we think we can do it in china? >> and because the chinese won't allow it. [laughter] >> and that's an additional factor. [laughter] >> but yun they have allowed the penetration of western ideas for decades and now the problem is, they find that those ideas have become what president xi jinping in his work report referred to as chinese have an ideological problem. he didn't develop that idea, but acknowledges that china has a problem of ideology and you can interpret quite easily the problem is these subversive
western ideas are subverting the ideology in china and there's pressure back against it and we see that as repression. i see it as an upwelling of what the influence of western ideas. so, in other words, it's a -- you've got to -- you've got it look at both sides of the question. >> let me just bring in a couple of voices from outside the room because i think there's a danger of all agreeing with each other on the stage. james palmer, from policy wrote is takes one side to start a war and ccp believes in ideological and power worldwide. the u.s. government affects the way that ccp thinks and american's cultural probably reaches far more. the long time china observer, academic orvil shell wrote a
wistful sadness, that china has been torpedoed by xi's -- call it what you will. does anyone on the panel admit to changing their views over the last year and change their mind about where china is now heading? >> this has become a major part media and narrative about u.s.-china relations and you see it in washington as well. the paragraph two or three notion that the goal was to make china more like us, and china is it not more like us, therefore it's failed. i reject that. i think all of us are thinking about china and the u.s. and it continues to change because of the relationship changes, but the notion that it's nay naivete and disillusionment and
i like your reckoning. the idea that china has taken under xi jinping and the united states has taken under trump, this was not in the cards, through the decades of engagement. this was in no way written or forseeable beginning in 1979 and up through 2010. yes, in retrospect, of course you can find antecedents and you could see a gradual build, but in no way coming. there have been changes. yes, my views have changed, but i wouldn't say it's because the scales from fallen from my eyes, it's because the world turns and the world changes. and so i think we need to reject this motion of engagement as having been naive, disillusioned. we still need to engage with china closely albeit in a different way under different circumstances, so i'm a little wary of the changed views narrative as expressed
popularly. that said, of course our views change and know the speaking for everybody on the panel, but that would be my response. >> do you want to come back on that? >> sure. a lot of at tri attribution and blame placed on xi jinping. but there was national brewing in china for elevated or higher status of chinese nationally. i was living in beijing at the time and the complaint was that china was becoming rich, but not more respected. so i would say that xi jinping represents a domestic sentiment in china that as china's power rises chinese deserves more. so you could say that xi
jinping would lead that campaign or pushed in the chinese society and i would say both, in the fundamental reason, china's power has increased and we assume that china will be like us. i think that china has selectively identified with certain norms that we promote and also, certain norms that they've rejected. so the assumption that china would embrace everything that represents our norms may be erroneous and china is different. >> what would 19 7 70 stapleton roy make of the situation now? >> i think that the u.n. has made some very important points. i would be stunned to see china today based on the china that i lived in in the 1970's.
the rate of progress in-- as i say, modernizing the country in everything except the institutional nature of its political system, has been breath taking. but even in terms of the political system, there was enormous political change in china over the last 40 years and now we're seeing some movement back. joined in the 1970's, especially during the cultural revolution period there was a total absence of personal freedom. total. you could only show certain rough -- revolutionary operas. you couldn't travel from one city to the other. and when you went to great wall, it was empty of chinese because they didn't have the
rations of food to travel to the great wall. and under what they implemented the communist party got off the backs of the chinese people in a whole wide range of areas so that they began to have better access to outside ideas. they could read more freely. they could talk about issues more freely. they could travel freely around the country. over 100 million chinese leave the country every year and come back. all of this did not exist during the '70s and the early part of the '80s. so in other words, china was changing in very important ways. but we make a mistake when we try to assume that there is a quick jump from here to there. it's what i call proving the grass doesn't grow. it's easy to prove the grass doesn't grow because you can simply take the skeptic and take him out in the yard and have tea for a couple of hours and you look and there's no growth in the grass. what's wrong? the time frame for the change you're trying to measure is
wrong and that's the mistake a lot of us make in looking at china. we do not see change because we're trying to measure change within a period of months, years, et cetera, whereas the process that we're looking for change requires decades. and that's a mistake that we're now making about china. you see, that's why i tend to look at where others derepression. i see repression, too, but i see a struggle going on in china in terms of what their future will be like and that process hasn't played itself out. so, i don't know whether china is going to have a more representative form of government 20 years from now, or 30 years from now, but there's going to be a struggle over that issue and the question is can we relate to china in a way that's conducive to the changes in china that we would like to see happen? and i think this over emphasis on strategic rivalry and failure to understand the many, many common interests that we
share with china and can work together on cooperatively, is in many ways, undermining our ability to provoke our volumes, which has to be done, i would argue by setting a good champ rather than by preaching to others. >> if the u.s. is promoting that example and speaking up for individual rights, does it not have a responsibility to call out and draw attention to what's happening in china at the moment? >> well, let's apply that in personal relationships. do you like it when people come around and say that's not a pretty dress, you ought to wear green? i don't particularly like those characteristics. the reason why americans are outspoken on many of the issues is because from the very founding of our republic we've had to struggle with issues of slavery and inferior position of women and other things like that. we didn't give votes to women
in 1919 because we suddenly realized that women were human beings just like men. it took 40 years of suffraget struggle to the united states and the same thing with slavery. we tried to deal with slavery over 70 years and failed. and we had to fight a bloody civil war and a hundred years of jim crowe until we got the legislation in the 1960's. that's how you advance. so that i think there's lots of possibilities for china to, as it becomes more prosperous and as it -- and it's a lot better educated now. i mean, this is an enormous change in china. the number of college educated people, people who have completed their high school is much greater and china faces a fundamental contradiction and this is related to this cold war issue because the soviet union was a closed system.
it was not dependent on imports from outside the country and it did not depend on foreign markets for its economic prosperity. china has to stay open enough to make it difficult to manage these intrusions from outside ideas that is causing such a problem for xi jinping and maintain the legitimate communist party rule. china can't afford to close its doors because it could have an economic development. should we be beating on china and that we should have a cold war with china? to me that's exactly the wrong way, but i come from a missionary background. now, mind you, missionaries try to get heathens into the church. but there are other commissions just as legitimate as missionaries that thinks that
h heatens should be-- >> i have two points, one is that i never wear green. two points. [laughter]. >> my second point related to the american understanding and critique of china i think is currently undermined by our lack of-- i mean, it's a much more open society, but we have a-- it feels like a lack of access for economic work. in the 14 years that i've been making research trips to china the ability of archives, the availability of economic resources and connections and ties, they've varied a lot, but the archives have been especially increasingly closed and inaccessible and so, you know, at the same time, during the same-- in the last few years, at least since 2013 there's been a sleep
drop off in mad rin so we have a danger going forward of a lack of americans who are sort of developing the kind of understandings that we need in order to build those relationships and keep our eyes open ap keep that kind of engagement that i think you cited very important, in order to keep that alive. >> yeah, you've made -- you've had two sort of interesting discussions about moralism and american china policy. one is we do have this city on a hill desire to see all nagses trying to get their people to flourish, but you're cautions us against hypocrisy, lack of self-awareness and preaching to china which i agree with in general. at the same time as china is more powerful and xi jinping,
china is trying to do what any country wants to do, create an international atmosphere more conducive to its ends, in this case to the ends of the ccp, which does raise real questions that often have, you know, a moral character for us. in the case of the reeducation camps or china's development of surveillance state, or its now worsening human rights records. china would be this would not be raised at all. someone should raise this, should they not? do we leave this entirely to debates in china? you do impact debates on china. when i first got to china there was little discussion of the phrase human rights at all, except in reports about how the americans were once again arrogantly criticizing our so-called human rights record and this ends up introducing concepts.
so what is the right balance given the difficulties that you phrase and i would say the same thing with reference to what's broadly called the influence question in the united states. there's a real danger of framing it wrong, of dies -- disproportionality, and what we know and can demonstrate about the party. >> we're americans, we cannot remain silent on certain questions. >> we're that obnoxious. >> i don't advocate that we should ignore what we consider to be bad behavior elsewhere. but at the same time, i was ambassador of china when i had to go into the foreign ministry and tell you, look, we're going to attach seven different human
rights conditions on your ability to get-- treatment, and i had to persuade them this is a good idea. it wasn't easy. and i can't say that anything particularly good qaim came out of that, but it was instructive to me that after 9/11 every one of those seven areas of human rights i was telling them was so good for china, we violated in the united states. we hid prisoners from the international committee of the red cross. we denied habeas corpus, we wouldn't tell people we were holding prisoners, et cetera, et cetera, i could run through the list so when we get scared, we behave in ways that are not consistent with our own values and china's scared. they have upwelling nationalism on the part of a local population. we don't have these large concentrations of ethnic populations in their traditional homeland security
except on indian reservations. >> and not like to hear in russia, what about the most-- well, you criticize this, but this aspect of your own country is not perfect. i think can we not speak out while still acknowledging that there are areas? >> yes, and i think you can-- we're all intelligent people up here, hopefully in some fashion, we can switch from moralistic mode to analytical mode and when i look at at that and when i'm moralistic i can criticize. i do the same thing looking at the border. is everybody satisfied with taking children from their mothers. is the way to handle immigrants on our borders. what should other countries be saying about that. it's helpful in some of our european friends would say, hey, guys, come on, there must
be a better way to handle this. the problem is, many of the european countries have the same problems in their own areas. illegal immigration has become an issue now. serrion refugees flooding into europe create political problems with countries dealing with it and i think that's the problem that we have here. so we have both an analytical and a moralistic play, but what bothers me is when the moralism denies you ability to understand what's going on and i think when we look at this, the way that china is dealing the right way and my answer is clearly, no. you don't want to put a vast number of your population into reeducation plan. but why are they doing this, why can't china do a job of dealing with the restive ethnic groups in china? china is struggling with a real
issue and not a phony issue. >> do you want to come back on that? >> no, no, let's move on. >> let me ask you about the case, two weeks ago, an arrest in canada of the huawei's cfo and detention of two canadian citizens on allegations serious allegations of endangering national security. you say this is hostage taking. >> yes. >> how concerned are you that this could escalate? >> i think there are a couple of different aurs, -- areas, and in the case of the canadians it's tit-for-tat, and we don't necessarily have to prove that in court to say we know what we know and this is one of these. like the argument whether mbs ordered the killing of jamal khashoggi. the smoking gun-- sometimes you have to make a
call. and here it's clear they've been taken hostage. on the other hand, we-- the president has now declared that he might be willing to intervene in the case if we get a better deal on trade with china. this looks to me like ex-post facto hostage taking of a different sort, in what initially we looked like a judicial process that a decision was made to keep separate, but now we can be, i think, accused by folks in china who had regarded it as something of that kind from the beginning, as also a form of hostage taking. i don't know where this goes. if we look to the previous case, which was the arrest of the canadian couple, the garretts, evangelical christia christians near the bridge that carries chinese goods. kevin was detained for almost
two years in the case that u.s. asked canada to extradite a businessman to the united states. he was there for two years. in this case we've got the two canadian under what we know not o one-- and miss mung is living in a mansion and we have a debate about the meaning of the case and people in vancouver, demonstrate for her and free her. this i'm not suggesting there's a parallelism between the two, but we see different kinds of hostage taking in both nations, and that this is a very bad sign on a number of fronts. it does seem to me that there's a way to make a point to huawei and to let miss mung go and to try to walk this back.
>> you have concerns how this could escalate and how the huawei case is being seen in the general case in china? >> well, again, there's a lot of nationalism related to huawei. although the discussion here, of course, everyone is thinking about the political specktation, whether it's intervention, at least here the discussion of the arrest is based on the iran sanctions, so it's know the about huawei being a technological rivalry to the u.s., and the popularity of the huawei's 5-g technology, but that it's huawei is targeted because it's better than american company. so i think there are different narratives here and over there, the focus is completely different. we focus on the iran sanction issue and they focus is this a part of american campaign to
con strain china or suppress china's rights. but i think if both governments look at a statement and lock at progress or ongoing trade negotiation, i would posit that both beijing and washington is to have a successful negotiation over their trade dispute, over the trade war and hopefully have a deescalation of the tension and the deal somewhere early next year so that the two economies will have some sense of stability. so to what extent that either government is willing to let huawei rest to interfere with the trade negotiation, i just don't see that happening. i see both governments are prioritizing the trade talks. >> do you almost think we need to put the trade talks in one bucket or is there potential at this time next year, there's been a deal on trade, but this underlying strategic rivalry
and competition is ongoing. >> host: do you think there's essentially two separate issues to deal with? >> and now i recall what we had last year. we were talking about this transaction, mentality, the trump visit to china and the national security strategy that came out and the year that we had last year. and we talked about the trade dispute. about a year ago i don't think anyone was expecting or predicting that a trade war would escalate to where it is today. so i find the prediction where we will be on this trade war, in another 12 months is-- but i think one thing is relatively clear, over the chinese debate whether there's bipartisan conferences here in the united states about this new cold war, or about this hostile relationship that had been formed or been forming or is being formed between u.s. and china.
but i think the chinese -- and the policy community is gradually coming to the conclusion that this american attitude towards china, hostile add attitude is not just the trump, it's got broader support from the society either based on unfair trade practice or lobbying china to change and refuses to change and goes on its own way. so, i think that is to say that either going to be a deal over the trade issue or a lot of people fail to see what that deal would look like, especially coming to the restructuring in the chinese economy and whether china can abandon not only rhetorically in china 2025. also very difficult perhaps impossible to answer. even if we have a temporary deal over the trade issue, i do think that the strategic
rivalry will go on. >> and we want to get to questions from our audience here, i want to maybe get some best case and worst case scenarios from our panelists here. we had this morning, china xi jinping speech, mentioning the communist party 128 times compared to five-- and the reaction on social media is this is not going to get easier, that the u.s. and chinese relations could be-- could i ask about best case on the scenario ahead. want to take that first? >> i've been through good times and bad times in u.s.-china relations and my sense is that the strategic rivalry between china and the united states is
real that we need to pursue a continued engagement strategy with china. i reject the concept that engagement has failed. it is a totally phony concept, based on the fact that we justify many of our actions in terms of our values, but we actually do the things for national interest reasons. just to drive the point home. difference between the first gulf war and the iraq war, the first gulf war was justified in terms of getting saddam hussein out of kuwait. it was carried out for that purpose, and when we had accomplished the purpose, the war ended. the second iraq war, i think most of us would agree, was designed to complete what had
not happened after the first gulf war, which was to get rid of saddam hussein. so we didn't have a reason and we came up with weapons of mass destruction, and they clu collu, and the shias had been there for years, and the sunnis were disentran franchized. did we go to iraq for bringing dakt democracy? no, that's not why we went in. and i'm reading article, and justified our policies of china know terms of bringing
democracy to china. how come i sat as princip presi clinton's ambassador in china and sat in on meetings and never mentioned to me that i should be bringing democracy to china. think what would have happened if he mentioned it to me. i would have had a mandate to do it. [laughter]. i don't see any problems with china any more difficult than the pass if we use the full capabilities of the united states in order to try to engage with china in ways that defend our interests where they have to be defended and i think many of the trade issues that we're dealing with china, there's broad support in the united states, and myself. for stronger tactics, in order to deal with those issues, but we don't want to neglect the areas where we need to cooperate with china. if we look at what happened the last year, two big things have happened.
one is the trade war and one is the north korea issue. and north korea issue, we cannot handle effectively if we are not respecting the fact that china has major interests on north korea and we need to cooperate with china and take their interests into account. so i am-- i'm pessimistic about the way we're handling china, but optimistic about the ability to handle china if we're intelligent in understanding the pros and cons of different approaches. >> who wants to offer us a worse case scenario? how could this go wrong? what are the trip wires? >> i'm an optimist. [laughter] >> and i definitely see one in the form of visas, and access and, you know, this idea of cutting off all access and exchanges of cutting off our ways of understanding each other. i mean, the steven miller proposal hopefully doesn't get
any more ground than when he first floated it this summer, but there are some dangers looming sort of underappreciated in our-- in our visa and exchange policy here that could undermine the relationship. >> we had a russian delegation in about a month ago and one of the russian interlock tors told a joke. the pessimist said, things couldn't possibly get worse and the optimist said, yes, they can. [laughter] >> i guess i'm an optimist. it's hard to see these issues precede trump and xi, they'll go beyond trump and xi. they're historical as we've discussed on this stage many times. it's hard to see a fundamental change over the coming year for a number of reasons and again, it's not really the 90-day trade war. so we have the 2017 national
security that we mentioned that names as china's longest term security challenge. and china sees the united states and i'm going to foe consist on the american side and the trump administration called for defense supply chain resilience and seem to take this extremely seriously. that would mean a restructuring of the american economy if they're serious about that. we have the sifius reform bill and we'll look at subsequent investment. we are probably going to see new rules on export controls. we may be seeing rules limiting chinese student visas, which would be telling maybe the greatest talent pool that they're a despised glass in the united states and harm our ability to -- because of china we're working on a free and open indo-pacific and we're
opposing china 2025 and belton road and framing that in terms of china. it seems we're looking at chinas cyber intrusion and that's even if china starts buying the same amount of soy beans. i don't see any deal that rolls that back. i think we're looking at deeper suspicion bye i look at the optimism and it's within our ken, and i don't know if it's in china's ken, i don't know if we will. >> i think it's very difficult it say that what will be worse. of course, and i think the cold war was definitely a very bad scenario, but how many of us really believe that it's going to happen between u.s. and china? it seems that we're looking at directions that are different the communications between the
two countries, the bevel of-- level of exchanges and the key word seems to be decouple the two economies, whether that's realistic and whether that can be done. that remains to be a question. i think what the u.s. might want to consider is proportionality of its reaction to china's problematic behavior. and china's policies have a lot of problems, and i think even the chinese know that. and there are also debates in china about what is the best strategy moving forward and i think it's also understandable that all of these years in the u.s. society there has been accumulated grievance about china failing to fulfill their commitments or fail to meet the international norms. but that that warrant a cold war? is that really the best answer that we can come up with? i do believe that where china
has problematic behaviors, a harsh reaction a warranted. but that doesn't mean we'll define this relationship and throw the baby out with the bath water and that seems to be the question na the u.s. needs to answer and the question that china needs to answer, what is the west strategy. what kind of power china aspires to be. i was thinking this analogy and i was thinking a more comparable analogy, china sees it's been an isolated, weak kid, this pariah kid in school that was never a part of the main school, popular kids. and china feels that throughout the years that it was bullied by everybody. and there's some to it if you look at their narrative. now china has become strong so what is the really the proper or normal mentality for china
to be a member of this community, is it i win, i w-- or you win. it's my rights or-- they're the same. and the dichotomy based on that china was victimized and therefore we need to get back to you. if we're going to rise to the top of the world, everybody else must be secondary. everybody else must be subject to the terms that we dictate. i don't think that's a normal mentality and i don't think that china will be able to join the international community as a member as long as as it holds on to that. i feel for both countries there's a lot of soul searching to be done. >> i want to make sure we have as many questions as possible. this is broadcast live. if you can wait for the microphone and name and affiliation and keep your
question short in the interest of getting to as many people as possible. yes, in the back there. >> michael davison. i 'm a fellow at the wilson center and the kissinger institute. and how the u.s. and china are dealing with each other and i read this in foreign affairs that the view is widely shared, there's a kind of competition between them more broadly in the world where china's belden road is involved and trade with other countries and its financial support is, and then in that context, there's an argument that the trump administration, while i agree that both sides of the aisle in washington are sort of into getting tougher on china at the moment, but yet, that the trump administration's way of doing it is headed in the opposition direction, the wrong direction,
that the u.s.'s strength is in the multilateral institution and so on that the u.s. has its fingerprints all over. are we headed in the wrong direction in this broader global order? and are we in so doing neglecting our partiers, especially around china, in asia in general, by that, making them nervous and do they finally wait until the trump administration is gone? is that the only solution for them if they're nervous about the u.s. direction at the moment? >> who wants to comment on are we headed in the wrong direction? >> i'll be happy to weigh in quickly. there is competition in the world. all over the world. john bolton has talked about it's in africa, but china, unlike the soviet union is having a big impact globally because of their economic relationships are global. and huawei is an important port
of that that we're concerned about it. but it's unfair contest. because we are funding our military and we are totally not funding all of the other components of our comprehensive national strength to get virtually no money. so, china can pour billions into an asian infrastructure investment bank and we can't buy our way in because we can't come up with a few hundred million dollars, you know, to pay our share of the way. we don't have the money. china is funding both their military modernization program and they are pouring money into the other components of their comprehensive national power and exercising this on a global basis and we're getting upset because we have to use our military for every purpose ap we are discovering that there are not military solutions to a
lot of issues. i recall when we had the ebola outbreak last year and who do we send the army medical corps. where was -- they don't have the funding. and we have essentially kept our military budget up and cut everything else and this is not a satisfactory approach to the type of comprehensive national competition, international competition that we have to engage in with china and we have to think about that. do we have the economy capable of generating the resources necessary to engage in a vigorous competition with china globally? and my answer is no, we don't and it's something that we ought to be thinking about. >> and to the side here? >> hi, brendan mulvaney from the china institute. try that point into the point that robert daley made at the
beginning and is there a link there. the cold war construct is not helpful, it's harmful, but it sells, and sells in china retorically, but in your point it sells to defense contributors, and helps to fund the pla as well. so the question is, how do we frame it and how do we look at this competition? you mentioned ideology at the beginning and you said, well, it's not really ideological as it was with the soviet union, but some of the trade components might have the flare to it. >> the effective ideology. >> there's a debate in the pentagon or national security circles, do we see this as a cold war, is it that china is out to supplant or topple the united states? or a rivalry between great powers and a realistic approach and it doesn't have ideology because i think when people in the national security realm look at it ideologically. >> it's far easier for them to
sell the cold war and more weapons and use of the military, just narrative, and so, is that constructive or is there just another way and/or evidence to say, no, this is just great power relationship and it's not ideological? >> well, i think you didn't quite get to it, but i took it to be part of your argument. there are indices of power in which china is gaining greatly and some of which it leads overall china likes some of the trend lines, but some of the indices in which we lead are soft power. big attractive ideas and our alliance system, and the link between those two things is diplomacy. and so, we need to be-- you know, not only to have an economic answer to having pulled out of tpp, but we really need to reinvigorate our diplomacy and which i took to emphasize the strengths in the ideas and build up alliances
which doesn't mean we don't fund anything in the military, brendan, but that's what i take to be one of our major ongoing missteps is neglecting diplomacy which could emphasize these strengths. >> and about chinese exporting-- and we look at what the chinese government is doing, and since there is a pretty big community whether they call the subpoenases of governance and development. governance is political and development is economic. so there is a conscious push from the chinese government about promoting the china model. and honestly looking at the more countries aspire to china's models of the more secure. i think beijing feels about legitimacy and that democracy is not a value system and chinese model tends to stay and is viable.
there's a logic to it, but i think the key question is not whether china is promoting its ideology, but why its ideology is appealing. i think that's a question that we don't look here, we criticize china for providing state financing in also well off countries, but what viable opportunities are we offering them? don't take chinese money, for a long list of reason, but are we giving them the alternative financing source to develop in their country. but i think the beauty of the-- power inspirations not positions and that's the question, what if the china model is appealing in certain countries and our effort to promote our model has not
gotten the countries where they want to be and that's an essential question here. >> just to clarify this issue, corrupt countries need infrastructure just as much as uncorrupt countries. but our model doesn't enable us to deal with infrastructure in corrupt countries and china is putting them aside and providing the infrastructure, which approach is better? >> i leave it to the audience to answer that question. [laughter] >> i've been here-- and the lady in the second row here? >> yeah. >> thank you, a report from voice america. i have a question related to xi jinping's new speech, he promised that china will press ahead with economic reform and opening up, but he also said china will maintain one party system. so my question is, i'm wondering whether you guys think he can succeed in doing
that? because it seems to me it's against the conventional wisdom, thank you. >>. [laughter] >> meredith. would you like to take that on? >> i really wouldn't. [laughter] >> i'll be happy to answer, but i don't want to dominate the answers here. the short answer is, undered one party system, china's policies produced dramatically pft results in terms of rates of development. i don't see anything inherently couldnntradictory of having -- is reform and openness and particularly reform, which was set out so dramatically in the third mren plenum of the party
congress and years later, it's moved in the opposite direction to save those enterprises. so it takes more than xi jinping saying there will be openness. where it has not moved forward over six years, even though you have reform and openness identified high officials, close to xi jinping in positions of responsibility and still reform and openness has not moved forward. so we need to understand whether those factors are going to be changed. does xi's speech indicate he's going to give more reform to openness in the way he hasn't in the past five years. we can't answer. >> this is a different discussion than we set out today.
i think that xi jinping correctly identified a new era. there were no new ideas in yesterday's speech. >> next question. >> this side here on the left. on our left. >> thank you. [inaudible] the mic is on. formerly of the federal government now wilson center. and what's the china have an obligation to fill in. contradictory that was created for chinese policy and law to get china an invitation to a conference in 1955. speaking personally, if i have to juxtapose the strategist
against xi jinping as a strategist, i'll take joe li. that's a quick aside. you asked for worse case scenarios. i've heard almost nothing about the south china sea and everyone on the panel could do a scenario where a true naval war even inadvertently in the south china sea at any moment. if you're sitting at the command in honolulu you have hult multiple scenarios you're working through. and i guess the question i would pose, can we imagine a real military conflict in the south china sea how being managed and contained within a broader trajectory of u.s.-chinese engagement? >> thank you.
yun sun do you want to take that? >> sure. a couple years ago, the two militaries reached a preliminary agreement in terms of air and naval. i think the -- what that agreement does is that if there is going to be a military conflict, the decision was made much higher up, that it would be a political decision, that would the know just be a skirmish in the south china sea that escalates into a full scale confrontation between the united states and china. so if that were to happen, then i would say that a decision will have been made that a military conflict is inevitable and either u.s. or china is willing to take on that path. >> unless anyone else wants to come in, more questions? >> i want to come in on that question. there are no impediments of
freedom of navigation in the south china sea. if a conflict occurs in the south china sea it is a collapse of adequate command and control at the very pop in both countries. i'm very blunt on that issue. all the parties to the conflict down there have signed the declaration on the conduct of the parties in the south china sea which provides for freedom of air, freedom of sea maneuver. we run freedom of navigation operations there. sure, we crowd the chinese a little bit and they crowd us. these are not war fighting issues and if that is permit today turn into a conflict, then there ought to be some high level court martials in both militaries. >> i just want to collect another three questions and we'll try to have very brief responses. so three brief questions, gentleman, the side there. >> yeah, richie coleman retired
from custom and border protection. taiwan, when are the kids going to realize that the parents aren't really legally wed, united states and taiwan had this illicit relationship, pretend, wink-wink, nod-nod and how intef -- inevitable and china made their intentions clear and buzzing and military flexing. how long down this pretense will survive? >> thank you. lady in the center here. >> just one -- published last week in foreign affairs saying that china's ambitions for the following years are way much narrowing than the western
society estimated so there are always those misunderstandings from the two sides. so my question is for each panelist, what is the biggest misunderstanding that you worry the most for the following bilateral ties? thank you. >> and maybe from this side of the room, gentleman here? >> thank you. my name is win tal from washington university. it's more important to keep communication and i think one good example is illustrated by ambassador stapleton roy when you critique on chinese characteristic, and-- so you drive home the point immediately and more important elegantly so there's generation shift in the state department when the old generation of
diplomates are retiring from the stage, onto the stage a new generation. what are your suggestions for new generation of diplomates and china-- are you considering writing is book? because i'm personally looking forward to reading it, thank you very much. >> i'm also campaigning for him to write his memoirs. three on these questions, taiwan, biggest worry you the most and suggestions with china-- >> with taiwan the midterm elections brought us time. and the head of the dpp, so that returns us to a little bit more of a previous status quo where it's still very much an issue in flux, but there's a -- there's a little bit of an easing of tensions as a result
of that. i think not a revisionist. i don't think she's a revisionist in terms of looking at the relationship. so i think that we can be hopeful the status quo will remain. >> with relation to the china hands question, it's related to diplomacy with china studies. ... isciplines which do not always speak very well to each other. at the colin jost maryland, -- college of maryland, it could be different, but broadly speaking, i think a lot of young americans with real interest in china and talent in the language are not getting a broad education, and so they do not bring to their study of china, their diplomacy the kind , of synthesis that we really need. and you saw this in the older and you saw this in the older
generation that is retiring or had retired. they had a very broad background in china studies whereas now with fairly narrow technically competent quantitatively very good specialists of the doughnut generalists or people with the broad background that is needed for diplomacy. >> i think there's been a misunderstanding. the biggest misunderstanding on china's part is the type of the chinese believe americans believe china everything says. so, yes. china's ambition is much less significant. we hear xi jinping saying while we aimed at building an investment that covers all of mankind, so it most, what is says is there are different things in china, and it least it could be, or at a minimum, there could be one way to tone down or posse iswhat china a
over assertion of its ambition, -- china's over assertion of its and we talked about the president, that he will listen to his words and also observe his actions. i think to coming to how the u.s. views china today is the same thing. it is not just about what china tradebecause in the negotiation, china said a lot of bad things, but it is about what china delivers in the end. just want to make a very brief comment. taiwan is an acutely sensitive u.s.-china relations. americans have a propensity to forget that every few years and then rediscover it the hard way. we have done relatively well. we have a policy framework that removes it as an area of conflict. it is to agree with policy
framework that could cause a problem. that is where a big misunderstanding could occur. the chinese like to think that because chinese interests and chinese views are so much more important with respect to taiwan that, therefore they can , bluff the americans down in a confrontation over taiwan because our interests are less compelling than theirs. i think that is a very dangerous way of thinking about the issue. finally, i think the new crop of china hands emerging are very , very capable, and i look forward to reading their memoirs at some [laughter] point. >> in the interest of balance, the question about the misunderstanding, i'm afraid we in the past year have a new misunderstanding on the american side. we are speaking
increasingly as if every broad aspect of china's rise is and always has been nefariously aimed at the united states interests. this is not true. the china rise in the main is about chinese flourishing and we seem to increasingly have the idea that we can and should stop -- staunch china's continuing flourishing. what yout to balance said. i think that is probably our biggest misunderstanding. i want to thank you for your time. i want to thank the kissinger institute very hard-working. ,thank you to our panelists. we look forward to seeing you back here in the new year. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> a busy day on this thursday on capitol hill as the 115th congress is winding down. house republican leaders are holding a news conference here to talk about their policy
agenda before they had off for their winter recess. members working to be automated to extend government funding beyond friday's deadline. that and in order to avoid a government shutdown. some of the other items are a set of past criminal justice reform bill and a tax bill. this is live coverage on c-span2. c-span2. we do expect this to start in just a moment. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]