tv Stanford Hoover Institution - Info Challenge to Democracy CSPAN December 27, 2018 4:32pm-6:04pm EST
former secretary of state, condoleezza rice moderate a discussion on the evolution of communication. and its effect on democracy at stanford university is hoover institution. she is joined by british historian, neil ferguson. and former national intelligence council chair, joseph nye . [applause] >> good afternoon. and you for joining us for what we hope would be a very stimulating and interesting discussion. i am joined by my colleague, senior fellow at the institution, neil ferguson. historian of considerable note and our colleague from harvard university, joe nye who is also, visiting at hoover from time to time and so, we very much look forward to our conversation. i want to start by thinking
secretary schultz and jim, who have, or running this project on the problems of the new era. and i want to thank them for particularly, putting a focus on issues of governance. because it is very clear hathat across the world, and whatever setting, governments are having trouble connecting to their people. they are having trouble delivering to their people. in almost every country, you are seeing a crisis of confidence in institutions. particularly in local democracies. and so are path today is to talk about what aspect of this problem of legitimacy, problems of confidence and that is, what is the impact on the way that we get our information, the speed which we get our information, what is the impact of information technology on
democracy and should we think of as a challenge as well as an opportunity? and so, what will do is for 40 minutes or so, 4045 minutes, the panelists here going to battle around some concepts that they've written very good paper sweat but then we open up to thyou and ask you to join in the conversation. i am saa professor and nobody raises her hand, i will cold call. so please get your questions ready. [laughter] so, let me just say that we just had a very interesting discussion of social media, election interference through social media and cybersecurity. and we were reflecting on the fact that if we have had a discussion tenures on the challenges to democracy, we might have talked about how young democracies have difficulty holding free and
fair elections peter might have talked about how young bodemocracies coming out of civ conflict try to deal with those with part of the concept in other words, how they try to end wars and reintegrate people. women have talked about the problems of democracies when they are democracies when they are faced with the challenges of ethics division. i might have even talked about how democracies do or do not deliver to their people. probably would not have 10 years ago thought to talk about the challenge of cybersecurity and what has happened in elections across the united states and europe with the interference of external powers in those elections through technological platforms.and so, i will start with the question and are like joe, perhaps you will start and will have conversation maybe neil, you can respond. we know that information used,
weaponization of information has been with us a very long time. but we are seeing something different. how is social media, how the technologies that we are employing now, how does that change the information age and the interaction between the states and weaponization of information? >> if you go back to the end of the cold war, the 90s, when the world wide web was just getting really established, what is intriguing is how optimistic we all were. we finally slain the ghost of george orwell and the internet was going to make people free, president clinton famously said that in china, trying to control the internet was like nailing jell-o to the wall. well, the chinese have proven
pretty good at nailing jell-o to the wall! and the asymmetries which we thought authoritarians were at a disadvantage and others added advantage this was similar trees that have been more or less been reversed. the authoritarians have been able to close themselves off relatively successfully. and the democracies have been suffering from penetration of our system, a lot of it through the weaponization of social media. it is the big american companies, facebook, google and so forth which they learned how to turn into a weapon to penetrate our system and had such an effect on the 2016, and the election. so there is a big change.
in the change has been to our disadvantage of democracies. but i think the interesting thing, to put in the context of your question, is information warfare is not new. we have done it, the russians have done it, everybody has done it. i mentioned, in our earlier discussion that since it is 100 years ago that we are celebrating the end of world war i, to notice the british cut the german cables, one of their first acts of war in 1914. and controlled the flow to the united states of information and then they fed us the telegraph which was an intercept of a german communication, slightly the timing and context was slightly
off. and it helped to push the americans into the war on the british side. so there is a democracy manipulating another democracy through information. and we did in the cold war and so forth. but what's really different now, is, if you were going to use information as a weapon in the cold war let's say. as we did, you have to train the spy, you had to get cover from the spy, you had, have you seen the t.v. series, the american. russians that are trained to live with americans, that is expensive! to train all of these people and get them good cover, housing and so forth. and when they get caught, they are shipped back home and you lose your whole investment. if you sent an electronic across the border in a phishing
email and it is rejected, no one clicks on it, you lose electronic. so you send another one. and you can do that at no cost at all! so the cost of this information warfare has gone down very very low. the other thing of course, is, a great example in the 1980s, e the russians in 1983, launche a campaign starting with a little magazine in india. that says the american military, had unleashed hiv virus because they wanted to infect african-americans with aids. and it took four years between that publication in india and when it was picked up in the mainstream press in europe and
united states for that to circulate. when in the 2016 election, you have the so-called pizza gate episode which said that hillary clinton was running some sort of a child sex ring at a pizza restaurant in washington. it was almost instantaneous. and that was all over the internet, right away. and so, there is a fantastic difference in cost, and speed of information warfare in the cyber age and what we had assumed was our natural advantage as a democracy, of being open has actually been used against us. so those are some pretty big differences. >> comments? >> i think this is, fascinating because the changes in some ways even more recently than
joe implies. you don't need to go back to the 1990s. you need to go back to 2008 election. in the election, it was a kind of novelty that barack obama was on something called facebook. it was still a relatively recent thing. and if you look at the numbers, a number of people following him was really quite small. whereas, eight years later, the most striking difference in the public sphere in the united states, was the enormous growth of facebook as a network platform with increased reliance of users on google search, the enormous growth of the youtube, the public sphere in the united states dramatically changed in its structure, and somewhat less than a decade.
and the difference between our papers, which i think a complementary to one another, joe's looks at tthe ways in which the rapid change has created real vulnerability. for democracies. new opportunities for foreign actors to interfere in the democratic process. and my paper looks at the real failure of domestic regulation to manage this transformation and to create any kind of protection for the democratic system. so i think these papers need .t be read together because we are dealing here with two distinct problems. one of which is how do you protect the public sphere from external threats? like the russian interference in 2016. which as you say, would have been unimaginable 10 years or even eight years earlier. and then the separate set of questions which i think in some
ways, more burning, which have to be, how are nationstates, how they regulate companies that scarcely existed or were just fledglings 10 years ago? >> will come to the question of regulation or regulation or non-regulation of the companies that have fbuilt these platform because one of the differences in this quote - unquote thereto democracies at the infrastructure is not owned by any government. it is owned by the private sector that raises some issues but want to continue to press a little on the question of vulnerability of democracy. to the manipulating of information or to the weaponization of information. however you would like to trace it. one of the things people have been concerned about is that in liberal democracies, dressing the rise of what i call an
recent book, the four horsemen of the apocalypse. -- there is a sense in which the ability to get people to go to their own tribe, if you will, to feel aggrieved because somehow, they've not been treated well economically, culturally, whatever. w it is the way one gets information by the fact that you can stay within your group, you do not actually have two encounter someone who thinks differently when i'm going to now expose my age bit when i was a kid, my family watched the huntley brinkley report. others watch water concrete. essentially, you have e the sam view, sthe same shot, the same vietnam war, the same civil rights movement. now i can go to my website, i can go to my cable news
channel, i can go to my bloggers. in social media, i talked to people who reinforce my views. and there is a sense that this kind of eco-chamber is another threat to democracy because it causes us not to talk bacross our political differences or to engage in what was called by the founders, constant ideas. we don't -- we simply go to our corners. so can't talk about that is one of the other vulnerabilities of democracy. not just in exploitation by foreign powers, but also just as a central vulnerability of the way we organize anourselves. >> one of the fascinating features of american political discourse is this, there really two antagonistic catalysts.
one liberal and one brother conservative. and this goes back a long way. you could've said the same of cable t.v. when it came into its own. and so you have four horsemen of the apocalypse. i can have my four horsemen which would be globalism, multiculturalism, political correctness. you know, perfectly possible to construct the alternative set of demons. i think what happened with the advent of the network platforms is different though because they not only expressed the , polarization, they accentuate and they exacerbated. and they are very good technical reasons for that. which i talk about in the paper. >> might talk a little about that. >> i think it is important for to assist you, nothing new we've seen this before is the same and they pick a decade. the answer is, it is not the
same. polarization in many numbers of ways has increased in the last 20 or so years. it has got especially better in the last few years. jonathan hite has a chart showing that the level of hatred of the other party, the people are willing to say they hunt the other major party has gone up in a relatively recent timeframe. and the reason for that i think twofold. number one, the public sphere is now dominated by a very few companies. 80 percent of americans consume news roughly speaking, via google or facebook. these companies are concerned primarily g with maximizing you engagement with their platforms. because by showing that you are engaged by their platforms, they commence advertise which is how they make money. and you have these vices that seem to be part of the human psyche. more likely to be engaged by streaming views and fake news
then by the boring old truth. and there is now really a substantial body showing that the network and what the employee accentuate the polarization. if you go to youtube and you want to see a video about the pope, then the suggestions bar will give you utter no, nine other videos about the pope. each closer to a crazy conspiracy theory than the one you first wviewed. so the way that youtube functions is to push you out along the political spectrum from perhaps the sense of right or left we began on the far right or far left. i would describe the network platform as presently constituted as engines not just of confirmation bias, we've heard this a lot.
you just deleted to the bubbler eco-chamber. but it's worth that. they'll just put you in the james ec-- in the bubble and ke you there. they want you on the spectrum because the more you are out there the more engaged you tend to be. the most extreme people tweet the most about politics. that is tsomething that is ver striking. i will give you one more example and then i will stop. there are plenty more in the paper. if you're into twitter and tweet about politics, for every one word you use your tweet is 20 percent more likely to be re-tweeted. it shows that we have created inadvertently, the goal was just engagement but we have created in the silicon valley, network platforms that are accentuating the divisions in our society. in a way that i think is profoundly dangerous. because after a certain point,
violence of language starts to create an appetite for actual violence. that is what i find most disturbing about the way that social media and politics interact. and this is a global phenomenon because these network platforms are global. >> i agree with what neil said. that the business models of the social media encourage attention and n what gets attention is outrage. in other words, fake news gets more clicks than real news. because it usually has something outrageous in the title. and people clicked on outrage. it is not as though the heads of these companies say, i really want more anti-semitism. it is very plausible. but the algorithm, after it takes you one step then takes
another step and another step, before you know it, you and an anti-semitic website. so there is something about the machinery, if you want. what we have created financing these connections through advertising, which is created something which can be manipulated by outsiders. and the russians discovered this. but they are not alone. people in macedonia were doing it to make money. so it is not just -- the russians or chinese. we created as neil said, a formula for financing which was based on advertising. which means, how do i get people to click so i can sell more ads? what leads to clicks is outrage. but, you have to realize that
the polarization was there long social media.was i think you can make an argument that when lyndon johnson passed, he signed the civil rights act of 1964. he said, there goes the south. the solid south, which voted to continually democratic, it took several decades to happen but there is a recent book that looked at the 2016 election. it showed that it was a deeply polarizing issue in the united states to this day. and that means that when a russian group in st. petersburg wanted to create trouble, they created a -- a persona. some people call it a sock
puppet. it was called blactivist. it shows black people and white people hitting each other. it could have been anything but it was conflict of black and white. and they got more people liking that then the legitimate american site for black lives matter. so they were taking something, the polarization that is in our society, goes back to the 60s and the cultural changes explain why it is that the people who voted in 2016, the older, whiter mail and less educated were strongly -- this is just a demographic. and those people are people who
lost status from when white males ruled the roost. you didn't have to worry about women, people from another race, gay, all of these things have, have been polarizing for these people who were sometimes called economic voters. it is more cultural, a mix of the two. but that polarization which goes back to the 60s and 70s, created this opportunity for others to then take this new device invented here, and use it as a weapon against us. so you have a problem in american society and the russians decided, hey, i can turn the americans machinery called google and facebook and twitter, into a weapon where i can take their existing problems, and make it look like
democracy ain't so good after all. and therefore, my authoritarian nationalist system in russia is pretty good in comparison. it is very orderly. so when i see is consistent with what neil said about the terms of the analysis of the effect of the social media, but the roots of it go much deeper into our own culture. the polarization was exacerbated by but not created by. >> will be a point i wanted to reveal. in your opening remarks she said, there was a failure to protect democracy from the onset of this new infrastructure and towe're goin to talk about regulation. but joe's comment would suggest that blaming the messenger, in fact, you have this deep
polarization. you've had every deepening polarization that really, what democracy has done is failed to protect themselves from the trend, the political trend, economic trend and others that have actually caused polarization and now, these companies come along and they have their networks, this is how people get their information. so it exacerbates an already underlying trend. and i think that will be the basis on which they would say, the social media companies well, we don't create content. we are not publishers. what we do is, we provide a platform for people to talk, express and this is what you get when you are in a deeply polarized society. why isn't that a proper dissent today if you're a social media company? i'm putting in very kind of black and white terms because i think after recent events, most would say that they do have
some responsibility. but are they really responsible for the content that may simply be expressing a polarization that is very deeply in society? >> number one, the divisions in american society go back a long way. they go a long way back beyond 1960s. it goes right back to the very foundation of the country. but was the united states much more deeply divided in 2016 than in 2012? when barack obama won the second term. no! it could have been that much more divided. in a space of four years. i would clike to simply run an experiment. what if the 2016 election had happened with technology or let's say, 2008. let's take it back to that. first obama victory. and i don't think donald trump would have won.
because the dramatic growth and importance of the network platform in that period created -- it was actually better at exploiting hillary clinton's campaign. the advertising is really the killer. the ones who understand that advertising works, it was as simple as that. see this in all of the various -- in my view, this in the most striking thing was that brad and his team on the digital site were able to bring facebook engineers and work extremely hard at targeting the advertising in a way that you can with facebook it is not just the retargeting demographics. you are targeting individual users, taking to the next level what had begun to be done four years gnpreviously by obama campaign and in a variety of
ways i think would have been a very close election. i think we need to focus not so much on the long-standing polarization of the united states where the division of the united states with racial lines or any other line, we need to focus on what makes 2016 different? what made it different was that this expenditure of money the trump camp he was able to overcome massive disadvantage that it had financial terms that the clinton campaign had doubled the money available. relative to the trump campaign. the trump campaign understood facebook advertising. not to mention the president 's own understanding of twitter as a platform. so he just dominated her on these platforms. the numbers were astonishing. he was far ahead of her on twitter, for ahead of her on facebook, far ahead of her on google search. in the 2016, if you're following numbers as i was, you that the polls were deceiving about what was going
to happen. they were leading you to expect with high confidence that she would win. but no! that was the old model. people were still using the old models had missed the fact that the structure of the public sphere that fundamentally had changed. this is only news if you haven't paid attention to brexit. but i had been on the wrong side of that debate. and realized, the reason remained -- it was simple. the lead campaign had understood facebook advertising and used it very effectively. the big question which i think we might slightly different is how important is foreign meddling in the 2016 elections? and i think it was non-decisive. it is not enough to really have made the difference if only around one percent of content was russian in origin. the overwhelming bulk of content on the internet relating to the 2016 election
was essentially homegrown. it was user generated. it was mostly made in america. i think that is really what you have to look at. you have to ask yourself, which of the campaigns understood th significance of this new political landscape? and i think it is clear that the trump campaign did. and if you're in a bunch of numbers you had it was hard because it was such a close y election. almost any variable could be said to have made the difference. but one thing is for sure. if you imagine the 2016 election without facebook, if you imagine it without twitter, if you imagine -- >> and i think we are disagreeing all that much. i was simply going back earlier to start the polarization. but i say, it's as though they were a fire there and someone came along and poured gasoline on the fire. i think we agree on the sources of the gasoline and but you know one thing -- one thing
worth emphasizing. i think there are lots of false narratives. if you just look at the big shift that occurred between 2012 and 2016. ... that was the kind of thing you could use facebook advertising for two basically portray in a negative light. >> i totally understand not appeared out of your car counterexample. when someone named roy moore ran
in alabama actually facebook notwithstanding african-americans turned out in huge numbers. so we have to be a little bit careful with facebook as the causal variable here appeared i would associate myself more with which you were saying. i don't think it completely contradicts spirit is just a different emphasis. you don't have people -- you don't have disaffection to pour gasoline on if you don't have disaffection. so i think in analyzing the elections it's important to ask, this is made a political scientist, but where the underlying trends that were then exploited by either foreign or my campaign. every campaign tries to exploit underlying trends. it's just that social media allows you to do it much more effect way.
>> to go back to the results ofc the 2016 election if it was really determined by 80,000 votes in three states in the electoral college, that is such a small difference but it's what we call over determined. we could go on listing a half a dozen things that hillary hasn't had a problem with private server, if comey hadn't brought it up when he did come you could go on and on like this. but among the things that could've turned 80,000 votes was the russian intervention. i don't think you can say that the russians elected donald trump. jim clapper, the former director of national intelligence thinks, that the case. somebody like several other intelligence officials think there's too many other determinants. the point is the russians did
accomplish one thing, which as they played on our divisions to downgrade her reputation as a successful democracy in them to undercut our soft power. >> let me just turn to that question. twe have a conversation that would make democracy very vulnerableo , not quite up to te task of dealing with the new public square and the authoritariann 10 feet tall and having figured it out here let's talk a little bit about the chinese and the russians. not in terms of interference in the american election, but our authoritarians simply better structured to win this fight. the chinese have taken a completely different approach to the internet. they are very clear that what they see on the internet from
their citizens there is no privacy. what they see on the internet is going to determine your social score and patriotismm score. they've been very clear with chinese companies that you're on the team or you don't operate. so they were very different view and approach to the internet. do you see vulnerability is in that or are they playing the right game? >> well, i think in the short run both the chinese and the russians learned to have a degree in over the internet which going back to my joe wall example shows they can do it. they have the great firewall, team companies which they can manipulate and if that fails they can go knock on the door to the citizen whose tweeting or reach out in the wrong thing and lock them up. we don't have that. fortunately. w
there is a vulnerability in in the long run with that which is the centralization of information leads to vulnerability is which you might think of as large categories. so the view that china has ideally perfect date the orwellian world i don't think so. i was in beijing a few weeks ago when i was interested in some of the people i talk to you privately. obviously not for any attribution felt that xi jinping had made a big mistake in reversing ping efforts in orderly procession and that also because he wasn't listening to now and mishandling the american relationship this means that if some event at coors, untoward event, did, a ship is sunk in
the battle of the simpatico iowan or something really does go wrong but the chinese banking system. cuthese are not high probability events, but if they occur, it not clear that the system they developed in china is going to be properly adapted for that and xi may find that while he is now in strong control there've been situations in the past in south korea was in very tight control. he was assassinated by his intelligence chief and over the next eight years the generals who followed him basically opened up the system. so i'm a little bit reluctant to say they have the answer. right now they have a tactical advantage. they learned how to exploit some of ourpl vulnerability. i still vote forag openness in e end. >> i think i agree with that. it's worth reminding ourselves
that if euro years ago during the revolution that they were arguing the internet favorable to democracy is and it looked that way as mubarak and others were ousted from power. i think we've kind of, almost too far to the other side in the last couple of years with the increasingly popular line that the internet favor the authoritarian democracy. vote for these analyses are wrong. hi's very interesting to notice the benefits, but also the cost of the chinese system. this is a regime that spends more on domestic security. the investment is staggering. you don't do that if you don't't have some level of fear your own
people. what's fascinating about the way the internet networks in china is very successfully they kept the american companies out. the great firewall of china, the schematic discrimination against the silicon valley companies has worked. there is this parallel ecosystem. that china is a tech superpowern was the only rival silicon valley has. that's a pretty impressive achievement. europeans can only look on enviously. but when you look at what happens on china's social net, for example the conversations on the chat. you're always struck by how much criticism there is. the last time i was there which wasn't so long -- this is at the time when xi jinping had just appeared at military exercises
in superior alongside vladimir putin. a meme was going around on the chat, which was a lengthy analysis of all the things the russians have doneia to china or the years and all the good things that the united states has done for china. in that sense, no matter how much they may have nailed a cello to the, it's still jell-o. i'm not sure that it's right to say they have come up with orwell to plano. everybody carries around their telescreens the well volunteer for surveillance. i'm not sure that necessarily gives the chinese regime as much power as some in the west bank. xi jinping centralization of power and increasing surveillance technology seems to speak of a weakness. >> there is an extraordinary
allowing us about that news. when you talk to somebody, you find -- how did you find that? i didn't see that. so the great wall has lots of holes through. >> returning to the challenges of democracy and i just want to alert that will go out from the audience here after some conversation about this question. what is then how we think about dealing with the challenges. what is the responsibility of the companies? what's the responsibility of the citizen and then perhaps since for all interested in the international side, is there anything to be saidd for some level on cybersecurity and
issues of this kind. niall w. been writing quite a bit on network organizations and you have some thoughts about responsibility as those regulations in the government. >> i'll just focus on what i'll call the domestic regulatory peace. the status quo can't have the public sphere dominated by a tiny number of d companies incentivize to sell ads byer maximizing user engagement and it certainly cannot be right that they can expect content relating to our election for all foreign actors. if you think that's been fixed in the last two years, i have bad news for you because facebook groups have continued to circulate content relating to american politics right away through the midterms are in the
subject by jonathan albright showing that the arms race on the right way to think about it has advanced new techniques have been used, but there's still a fundamental problem that the system is open to foreign meddling in a way that must be corrected. my suggestions in the paper are slightly distant from the usual arguments that get made. i'm skeptical about antitrust. i have my doubts about the viability of breaking up the big tech companies that are not standard data in the standard oil by analogy. some regulation leads to change and i think it needs to focus on a number of quites narrow poins because we mustn't get into a situation where a federal agency is deciding what can and cannot appear on the internet.
i think we need to make sure the network.form are held to the same standards that all publishers and televisions are held to when it comes to political advertising. there is still political content going out on the internet are not the kind of thing we have regulatory agencies to combat. the date argument to make in the paper are twofold. we need to look at the exemption from liability if that the network platforms have enjoyed since 1996 under section 230 of the telecommunications act. that seems anachronistic given that these companies are some of the biggest in the world in the increasingly used their powers to access the platforms. argue that the first amendment applies in cyberspace and there is not and should not be a regime of censorship by facebook, google or any other
network platforms. we've got to do the following. we have to protect our political system, our public sphere of foreign intervention, foreign hacking and that's the kind of thing you should be working to do. but we also have to make sure that there is free speech and other domains apply on the internet. you can't go into the newspaper and threaten an individual with dad. you can do that still on the internet, but you should be able to debate all the controversial topics of the day without threats or facebook or google. these are the recommendations i make in and they do involve changes >> i wonder if there is an internal contradiction here because you are right that a newspaper to threaten ands
perhaps cost people, that there is an intermediate step that called the editor. "the new york times" or "the wall street journal" will absolutely have people they've hired to write the content. they have editorial pages that do the content. if you put in an op-ed or i put inin when they can discuss it or not. they have control over their content. and they should be liable for their content. in social media the content is not construct did by facebook or by twitter. so how can they be held liable. i'm asking you address the contradiction because you also don't want them to pick and choose. you don't want them deciding what is hate speech or whatever. "the new york times" can make
that decision. are they fundamentally different than the traditional media and if you give them a liability for the content but don't give them the right to control the content, is not a contradiction? >> in the recent hearings in washington, mark zuckerberg acknowledged he has entails responsibility. >> and i think they are changing on that. >> 2016 has been a wake-up call for the whole silicon valley. the fact they want additional people to start monitoring content acknowledge that they need to do much more. it's not transparent on what basis this occurs because the community standard they invoke are not transparent. on which this moderation goes
on. i think we need to try to create a balance. not a contradiction, a balance strike. it's the samewe balance that rao had to start from the newspaper said thean strike. it's a balance of the public sphere that you need to allow if you believe increased age as i do come a hateful things to be said for what you can't allow this things that lead directly to harm individuals to be disseminated. the supreme court has repeatedly ruled them out. there's a body of law that defines what goes and what doesn't go. not's acceptable and what's acceptable except that this doesn't seem to apply in the internet which is making up its own rules and somehow exist in a parallelwh universe. my argument is let's stop pretending they're not publishing content. for heaven sakes because there's a lot of it doesn't mean -- just because it's written by a large number of people doesn't mean it's not content. the responsibility is very
great. mark zuckerberg now likes to compare himself to caesar addressed us. with great power comes great responsibility. it's not just american democracy. you're doing a good job of doing nothing in places like me and mark. you needbi to be firmly asserted that democracy in another democracies on these people. you're responsible for content and you need to make sure the death threats to individuals don't appear in the low cost your money and hurt your bottom line, too bad. >> so just to be clear, you would allow them to say if i wish to post something on facebook that you believe is incendiary and likely to lead to harm that doesn't get posted. they have the right to do that.
if you're a content provider you have an editorial function. you want to make sure that it doesn't somehow spill over into speech not just talking about incendiary speech i'm increasing the definition of what might be incendiary speeches. to determine hate speech has been stretched in every direction in anything anybody find slightly upsetting and that is something we have to be very wary of, especially those kinds of criteria is influenced into the big technology companies. there is a clear distinction between my writing to face the post that threaten somebody with harm, that's the kind of thing these companies should be accountable for in my same
something you find objectionable about politics that doesn't lead directly. these are thehe kinds of lines that have been drawn ever since the press came into existence. when i make in the paper is the problems that arose from the printing spread through europe in the next 15 century are not new problems. but the idea because you're a technology platform you're somehow held to different standards from traditional newspaper publishers are tvs patients. i think it wasn't defensible all along. it only got bush because of the feeling we should have a relatively light regime for these fledgling startups in the 1990s. the biggest corporations in the world. they should be held to account. they can't operate on a different playing field from the people putting together "the new york times" or "the wall street journal."
>> so let me ask you this to the international side. is there any hope of some kind of international cooperation on those issues when you have really two very different paradigms, two sets of values, is there any help for the chinese and the russians won an international regime. we're just not sure we like that idea. >> they first proposed a u.n. in 1998 and we have that there was unverifiable. we didn't agree with the idea that they would use her they would control speech. what happened is we agreed to a proposal for the secretary general to set up a group of government experts and in 2004 a u.n. group of government experts was created 15 countries with no negotiating authority.
the task was reconvened and met several times. by 2015 they had come up with quite an interesting stat of the norms for the internet and for reducing conflict on the internet and it was approved by the g20, which is the 20 largest economies in the world and also by the u.n. general assembly. among the most interesting norms was you can't ban any particular programs. you can't ban weapons because they are meaning less. but she can ban certain target and data civilian targets. we are to do that. we have norms. even when you're in a war you don't own the hospital. though assad does that. most major state do obey these
norms. so they afforded these norms which you might call the laws of armed conflict and got agreement from 15 states. the problem was the russians immediately violated their actions in ukraine. s.the chinese were little better on this. just this past week there was a resolution passed at the u.n. to reconvened a group of government expertss which in 2017 has failed. they try tod reconvene in 27 ad it failed. now they give it another two years. what's interesting about this is our general view is often w. w. w. stands for wild west. there are some norms just as in
the wild west there were certain norms when you went yard the boundary you got into trouble. so there is a prospect for norms which states will obeyey out of self-interest. the interesting aspect of it you asked why two states sometime agreed to norms and hold down by then and it comes out of prudence. it comes out of reputation. it comes out of internalization of norms in different publics, which is how we've seen the number of norms. so i think there will be gradual development norms. right now the major problem is the russians and the chinese are fixed on sovereignty as the basic norm. what you're going to wind up with is that there will be areas
of the internet like russia, china and other authoritarian states where they will control things. the question is will they be able to use their systems to interfere in hours. niall mentioned earlier about the westphalia treaty. i don't think you ever get a treaty, but you can imagine development of certain norms in different states will run their internet in different ways. you're seeing this with a lot more legislation causing the so-called splinter net. but it doesn't mean you won't still have connections. china has a great firewall, but we connect with china lot and it's very important for commerce. we can work with china on criminal cases. people using bank fraud or cards and so forth.
it is not true that there are no norms. right now the hard part is that the russians -- putin is a spoiler. the russians have found a way to misuse our system to do their spoiling. what i propose in my paper is don't try to write a treaty that not going to work. but you can get something like the rules of the road to prevent escalation. we did this with the soviets in 1972. we got agreement called incidents at sea in which the two navies agree as they shadow each other they were going to come closer than a certain range. the russians and the americans each made a unilateral declaration in here are the limits of what we think is legitimate interference in your political process and then we set up a consultative process
cannot win over the limit. if you keep that up we will use different measures against you by closing down certain russian bank account in money simply vanishes. there were things we can do to punish them across the lines. working on this process of gradually developing norms -- shared by a lot of states. but these norms takes sometimes twot. decades or more to really take root. not just in the u.n., the private groups. i'm a member something called the global permission on stability in cyberspace, which is chaired by the former foreign minister and mike chertoff, our
former chertoff, a former secretary of homeland security, the deputy chairman. trying to establish this nongovernmental group to supplement. this is what the process is goingg to be. thereen will be many more entrepreneurs. it will take quite some time but it's not going to be w. w. w. meaning wild west. it's going to be gradual, but there's one particularan bad guy in town and we've got to say to him, you cross this pasture or river. let me tell you it's going to happen to your bank account in switzerland or something like that. >> all right. come to the time where we open up the discussion and so there will be microphones. i see a hand right beside you and that of someone get a microphone here. yakima student within the master of international policy programs here. i'm a french man. one of the things that surprised metr the most when i write to te
country with the fact that people spoke of communities in the plural and not as a society when speaking about politics. social media and network platforms even further isolate these communities online. i was wondering whether you think itit is desirable and if u ask whether this trend makes the political landscape into single element that don't really speak to each other, whether this trend can be reversed. because i think one of the biggest importance to democracy the people speak to each other within a single society. thank you. >> fragmentation of american identity politics has become some are more acute even in the
time that i've been working and living in this country. i'm afraid that the advent of network platforms has made this tendency worst. it is a paradox, though that after the not work platforms do something even better than the national society is justat spokn out which is rather a french idea and not as a global community. mark zuckerberg's favorite phrase for a time as global community in east argued that global mission was to build a global community. it seemed at the time very persuasive. wouldn't it be wonderful if the whole world was connected and we would be able to communicate with everybody, even with our friends in china. what 2016 dead was to root you the ambiguity of a connected
world and this is one of the central themes of my book on the subject the square and the tire that precisely because of the existence of giant online social networks, we exposed the divisions more clearly than perhaps have been the case before. it's not that surprising because of the phenomenon which is just the phenomenon of birds of a feather flocking together. even a network the size of the people in this room if we were to graph the network we would find some elements of pluralization and self-segregation in the loosest sense. that is the way social networks operate. we've know not since research by so she always just on networks of friends in american high schools back in the 1970s. so what happens when you build giant online networks is you reveal in reality divided into clusters whether they be
ideological or even racial. what the internet has done andth particularly with the network platforms do is they accentuated the reason we've been discussing and that happens in france, too. it happens in every european country. itt happened in brazil. one thing that most strikes me when i look around the world is a t phenomenon we experienced in the united states in 2016 and continued to experience are happening elsewhere. even places with quite cultural, quite distant cultural histories from mars, europe has its populism. europe has its abuse and use of facebook and twitter. asia is the place where warfare is being used in ways that are often extremely harmful. i don't think that this is a peculiar american phenomenon.
identity politics is the standard form of politics in almost every country. >> you are absolutely right that the american philosophy of government is different. the concept of a general will in the united states. we have tradition from james madison which is vested in the federalist papers in which he says faction balances faction. we don't try to get everybody to bebe exactly the same. we want divided government. we want to preserve liberty. so the general will, the one community has not been part of our ideology as the government right from the start. so there's nothing new about that. what is different is when the internet made it possible to connect everybody it didn't
create a global village. it created connections, some of which are good and some of which are bad. if you were a gay in utah before the internet. you felt isolated and nobody was like you. and after the internet you could get a support group for somebody in toronto or paris and elsewhere and you suddenly felt not so isolated, not so lonely. that's a good thing. but it's also true that a connected very bad as someone put it throughout history every village has an. now the internet is connected all the village. >> right here in front. >> thank you so much for this engaging conversation. i'm a first year masters international policy from afghanistan. my question is we can think of facebook in the publication that
should be regulated and held accountable. in the u.s. you would want fox news or "new york times" to regulate everything that's been published. now with facebook if you think of it internationally, do you want an algorithm developed in californiaoo to dictate what free-speech looks like an afghanistan or other countries? how do you make sure this is not a new form of colonialism quote, unquote. how do you deal with this? >> well, it's a great question because if you think facebook has played a problematic role in the united states is politics over the last couple of years, let me. show you some really troublingwo rings. the story that relates to afghanistan relates to burma, denmark were indeed what one sees is the weaponization of social media to promote
political violence along religious lines. the recent report on facebook's role not least in "the new york times" has made some pretty disturbing reading not least because they highlight the company's relatively sluggish response to the complaints by society and foreign groups observing what was happening. so i think there is a global problem here. you're right to pose this question of this kind of new imperialism. that's the right question to ask of people who liken themselves to seize their assets. this now extends into more or less every country with the notable exception china. it operates not only as a global community and reality is a u.s.
company. the europeans have a response to this which is worse vital. european responses we are going to regulate in the european commission has lived a great deal back in the united states to create some regulatory framework. mistakes arethme being made in europe, increasingly the mentality of the german view is that the german government is going to saygo what he speeches and facebook doesn't prevent it appearing in germany then they're going to hit them with fines. what you then do is give facebook the role of censorship and that's not the way we would want that i think to happen in theed united states, which is wy i'm trying to argue for the regime when they really are in the position of acting ascents or on behalf of anybody. i think every country in the world is going to have to create
standards applicable to its own needs. in that sense we are going to have to shatter the illusion of global community. what facebook can do in an emerging market in the developing country cannot be strongly destabilizing. even latin america we see this kind of phenomenon because of the way it was used. considerable effect that by the campaign. it's a very hard thing. so this isn't a problem for afghanistan. every country that is trying to hold elections. the domestic political entrepreneurs can figure out the technology have an advantage, especially if they're unscrupulous enough to use it in the ways i've been describing.
you also have a problem of foreign actors can play in your politics way more easily than used to be true. it's important in this discussion made in silicon valley but they're not global problems and they confront pretty much every country. >> we keep saying that they spoke -- it was a brazilian system that has over the last several years produced governments that were unable to deliver. governments by the way that i was quite fond of. the governments that were tainted by corruption and government and were therefore very susceptible and very vulnerable to a populist push from the right. now, the argument that these platforms make it much more efficient to comepo to power i
think we have to be very careful to get the causal arrow going in the right direction. we can regulate what facebook does and twitter does until the cows come home. but if the underlying problems are told they are, people will find a way to exploit them and to exploit them affect delayed. by the way, the idea that we want each country to set its own standards makes the hair on the back of my neck pull up just a little bit. there is i think an american, and maybe uniquely "american idol" thinks they'll come a preference for people around the world having the ability to govern themselves be to themselves in the degree you start allowing the turkeys of the road to set their own standards for the internet, you are empowering a certain kind of
regime in those countries. this, is a very complex set of problems. by the way, i'm very glad to see you here from afghanistan. i have to say that. so arguing for a more complex argument then is really the i technology. it's clearly an accelerant exacerbating there, but that is not what caused the election in brazil. >> let me respond to that because it's a really important point. i don't disagree with you. it's just that i see people around the world underestimating the dramatic change in the public sphere that has occurred. i was in san pablo in april and i gave a talk in which i said they're going to in your election and everyone said what do you know. just some kind of maverick. don't worry. we've got it figured out. so did in the second run. i said no, you don't understand.
if you look at the following numbers already in april on offacebook and on twitter, he's out of sight. between then and the election, he added followers on those platforms than any other candidate. you've got to recognize the mouse is shipped has occurred in every democracy. this is only a story that applies. it doesn'tre apply to north kor, but practically everywhere else. so i think we need to accentuate and emphasize the scale of the ships of people done under a debated. i'm struck by how many people link on around the world. a shift in new zealand. it could happen here. forget it. of course it's going to happen. >> of course it's going to happen because i have the lady
right here in the middle. can you get a microphone to her. there we go, thank you. >> i'm also a first tier international policy student here. it seems likee from everything you're saying one of the main issues is facebook business model of engagement and i'm ndndering if either of you have any alternative ideas. >> well, let's not focus quite so heavily on faith book. there is a study recently done in germany of youtube, which is part of google and it found the same algorithms which means the more clicks the more advertisement, the more advertisements for more money. those algorithms took a series of events unbeknownst or
unintended by somebody sitting in california and throughout a very, very far right conclusion. so you're fed material to take you further and further to the right. so let's not blame mark zuckerbergrg alone. the point is that the model which emphasizes getting attention produces algorithms, which by their own working will drive towards the extremes. one of the things i suggested my paper, the idea suggested by the london economist is that the companies, social media companies ought to be responsible for the algorithms. you don't have to give the whole algorithm which paves the way yourbu secret sauce, but you
should have the advisory board with public representation which can check on these algorithms and there should be also a right of appeal when things are taken down the wrong way. so it's a little bit different. my answer is a little bit different from the ills in the i don't think it's a badle thing that facebook and google and twitter takes things down. i want them to take things down and just like a private university doesn't have to be bound by all the details of the first amendment that can choose to do there. i'd like to have the companies take down incitement in germany and other such things. but i'd like to have some process in which this is more transparent or more accountable. you might have to set upso something like the fisa court
the very procedure which on the intelligence information that is composed of judges for ordinary court, but i think my view is i don't want the government censoring, but i don't object to facebook or google or twitter taking things down, but i don't want them to do it without some form of accountability and invite to have them have to act the way university will act as if we were governed by the first amendment. we had this years ago in which we said we're not first amendment. willou act as if we were. it gives us a degree of leeway. >> can i decide a quick word. i know are running out of time. there are other business models. wikipedia doesn't they'ller add.
you've a got to decide as a citizen where you want to get your news from. if you want to get it from facebook newsfeed, my strongest vices change your business model because that is not a good source for news. >> hi, i'm an undergraduate. cyberwarfare and w information warfare by nature of its intangibility and her particularly prone to misunderstanding about exactly whatpo has happened. can you talk about how government can adequately communicate to their citizens about cyberwarfare, in order to avoid the partisan manipulation we've seen for example in something like the 2016 election. >> thank you. i'll take a couple questions here. the young lady right behind y y. and then we'll wrap up after the
iquestion. >> my question is your opinion on the dark web in the political sphere and if we had too many anregulations and if they will turn to these much more unregulated technologies will happen. >> i'm going to take one final question. the gentleman here in the middle. a scarf that is taking off. >> we talked about in offline societies and people do things that violate o our norms, even f they're not of the goal we have recourse if we can shun them and drive into the edges edges of our society. that tends to not work as well with online societies in ashley seems to work not as well when people in very influential position exercise norm violation
without consequence. i wonder if you think there's something more that society needs to be doing to preserve the norms that we have left with regard to the expression online. >> let neo go first on this one. >> okay, but the question on cyberwarfare how government might respond to it that it sends. >> well, i think it's essential that you get not just government, but a broad taste effort to educate about what these problems are. organizations that are working on this and harvard has a group training election officials.
there are groups who are working with the press. the more you can increase consciousness of what's going on, the better you can inoculate. the french did this to relatively well before the macron election. this election in the mid-term was to -- they didn't want to interfere in the election as much as they wanted the reputation. if you want to corrupt democracy, you don't have to actually do anything. you just have to get everybody to believe the system was corrupted. every time a newspaper posted an article for printed an article about how the russians had corrupted the 2018 election, that was what the russians
wanted. what is interesting is because the press had been schooled on this, they didn't fall for it and you didn't find a lot of articles about the russians corrupting the election. we've been working across the board. it can be just the government on getting a better consciousness about how this cyberwarfare works and not falling for debate. it's never going to be perfect. it will take constant monitoring and the government as a part of it in the government campaigns are part of it, but it's got to be out in civil society. in the efforts to try to get attentionto to it, get people to start thinking about it is so
important. it's got to be much broader base than it is now. >> niall. >> the question of the dark web is a good one. the reason that i strongly favor a first amendment or first amendment like regime on the network platform is precisely that if there is more systematic censorship. community standards mean anything silicon liberal and for sure if all end up in places but it still going to be accessible. it's not like alex jones disappears when they decided a whole bunch of different ways by pages and groups.
so this is an extremely important point of a general nature. there is clearly some regulatory tweeting to be undertaken when it comes to securing the political process from outside interference. i don't think regulations should get into the question of what is content. as far as possible, we want the public sphere, whether it's online or what we're doing here to be ais place where there is free speech and i will defend to the death anybody in this room to say something i completely disagree with. that's what an open society is about. this brings me to the third question that wassk asked about violation in online communities. it does feel particularly on twitter as if a vast wall has been created in which people can say the worst things that occur to them that they would never previously had said anywhere.
pre-internet and for the younger members of the audience i'm now going to invite you to take a trip on my time machine. pre-internet if you made a statement you would get a few letters written in those people often wrote in capital letters on the a terrible things in their letter and you throw it in the bin. those people now have twitter and they cover as many accounts as they like and they can see the pellet things that are even more repellent. it's almost as if twitter is the violation. this is a place you go to violate norms. presidents can participate in this process. what can we do you asked.
i think what we can do and are nonvirtual academic communities and the students and indeed faculty the correct mode of discourse in a civilized open society, which there should not be more topics off-limits, but modes of discourse and we have an example of this here is civil debate on all the issues including and perhaps particularly the most sensitive issues. we're not going to get that on twitter. i doubt were going to get that on facebook, but we can at least get back to stanford. >> with that i will think niall and jolt for a stimulating discussion. i will thank you all for attending and for your
saturday, 8:00 p.m. eastern, conversations with three members of congress. peter, john and mike coffman, all discussed losing the reelection bids and reflecting the time in congress. >> on our devices and want things quickly. jefferson wrote this, 14 years after he wrote the declaration of independence. he said the ground of liberty is to be gained by inches. we must be content, what we get from time to time and eternally press forward. it takes time to persuade when even when it's for their own good. we need to step back and say, these things take time. take small steps. >> to think we spent trillions on these borders and to learn
afghanistan is going on 18 years, i think it's ridiculous. these wars and for policy, to have more enemies than we would have had. they've done more harm than good. >> in the congress, i believe in the house of representatives, simply still even with the reforms that need to losey is pledged, based on my counterparts, too much power in the hands of two little getting done. i fear it's not going to change. >> watch conversations with tiny members of congress saturday 8:00 p.m. eastern c-span.org. listen with the free c-span radio app.
one of the orders 14 congressional districts will send new representation to the u.s. house of representatives. lucy, delta airlines employee for more than 30 years, elected to represent george's six jerked in the next congress. she defeated republican karen. during one of their debates, she talked about how the shooting death of her son in 2012 spurred her to run for office. >> i am lucy. 2012, my son was killed in what people have considered the national outlaw case. i started questioning our leaders. why were these kinds of tragedies continuing to happen? as i continued to ask more and more questions, why were our legislators not willing to keep our families safe? there was silence. when he began too understand is that no one would be willing to do anything. that's why i stood up. that's why i am taking action. what i notice over and over again is that karen and other
republican legislators refused to do anything about this unnecessary gun violence. they will not take action.n. in the end, the only thing i am beholding to and this district is the people that i talk to everyday in my son's legacy. i'm running because i'm a mother on a mission. to represent everyone. >> watch it all on c-span. up next, trade ministers discussed the u.s. china trade relations and with impact on the asia pacific region. this is hosted by the global business dialer. one hour and a half.