tv Experts Testify at Election Security Hearing CSPAN February 20, 2019 1:14pm-4:45pm EST
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c-span is brought to you by your cable or satellite provider. >> the california and alabama secretaries of state were among the witnesses at a recent house homeland security committee hearing on efforts to secure elections. they also investigated the merits of hr-1, a democrat-proposed package of legislation that would change the nation's election and redistricting laws. this is about three and a half hours. >> welcome, members, to the first hearing of the committee on homeland security of the 116th congress. i appreciate your flexibility and that of our witnesses after we rescheduled the hearing into
the services for the former dean of the house, the late chairman john dingell. our thoughts and prayers are with his wife, our colleague congresswoman debbie dingell and their family. today, the committee will hold a hearing on defending our democracy, building partnerships to protect america's election. america's security is a national security issue and must transcend party politics because it requires a unified [ inaudible ]. unfortunately, this hearing is long overdue. during the 115th congress, the republican majority spent much of its time ignoring the intelligence and refusing to acknowledge the threat to our democracy. frustrated by the lack of action on this critical issue, democrats on the committee and the committee on house administration launched a congressional task force on
election security in july 2017. the task force met with dozens of election experts, secretary of state elections and national security experts to assess vulnerabilities and determine how to address them. in february 2018, the task force produced a report that included ten recommendations and introduced legislation to implement them. that legislation is now part of hr-1, the for the people act, which the house is expected to consider in the coming weeks. fortunately, since 2016, progress has been made toward more secure elections. the department of homeland security and election assistance commissions have built stronger, more effective partnerships with state and local election officials, but it is unclear whether each agency has the resources necessary to meet the increasing demand for their
resources. will eac's $10 million budget provide sufficient resources for it to administer additional election security grants to states? does dhs have the resources to provide its services to every state and county that requests them? congress needs to understand the existing capability of each agency and now existing capabilities can be leveraged, grown and augmented. local election officials [ inaudible ] and much depends on the support they receive from federal and state governments. although some dispute about election infrastructure, local officials overseeing it believe it is a credible case. congress must understand the resource constraints of local election officials and partner with them to address vulnerabilities to election
infrastructu infrastructure. the intelligence community has made clear the threats to our elections persist so more work remains to be done. just last month, the director of national intelligence, dan coats, warned russia in 2016 and unidentified actors as recently as 2018, have already conducted cyber activity that has targeted u.s. election infrastructure. he went on to say we should expect adversaries and strategic competitors to refine their capabilities and add new tactics as they learn from each other's experiences in advance of the 2020 elections. i look forward to hearing from our panel of witnesses today about how congress and fellow agencies can support efforts to further strengthen our elections and protect them from attack. i welcome my republican
colleagues' support in these efforts and i look forward to working with all those whose goal is to protect america's elections and defend our democracy. i now recognize the ranking member of the full committee, the gentleman from alabama, mr. rogers, for an opening statement. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i look forward to the opportunity to hear from our witnesses today. the integrity of our elections is foundational to our democracy. all americans should have confidence that voting equipment and systems are secure, their vote counts as they intended, and that election results are accurately reported. last week, dhs and doj released their findings that there was no evidence of any foreign interference in the 2018 elections. i believe that the tremendous work done by dhs, our intelligence community and state and local leaders made that happen. but there is certainly more work that can be done. much of our focus today will be on the work we still need to do to secure the technology and systems behind our elections,
but we can't lose sight of a simple lesson. foreign intelligence services, domestic [ inaudible ] and online vandals do not care what our laws say. they are happy to use our public forums against us. my home state saw liberal activists deliberately mislead alabamans regarding the special elections. they bragged to liberal donors behind closed doors about their success in manipulating alabama voters. hr-1 attempts to address these pressing issues but the bills provision are deeply naive. as it stands, hr-1 is an exercise in regulating everything that moves near a ballot box. the problems facing our election systems are more complex than that. election systems security has long been bipartisan priority for members of this committee. it is my hope that this bipartisan tradition on this issue will continue in this congress. we need a deliberative bipartisan process to solve these issues. unfortunately, it appears our
committee will not have an opportunity to mark up the election security in our jurisdiction. that's unfortunate because the election security provisions in this bill could be improved. i know members of both sides of the committee have some good ideas on how to make those improvements. as it stands now, much of hr-1's 570 pages appear to be a political exercise. that is why i'm very disappointed that election security, an issue where we should have an opportunity to work together to move bipartisan legislation, has gotten caught up in a partisan political grab. i hope hr-1, when hr-1 stalls in the senate as it will, we will revisit the issue of election security in a bipartisan manner. i thank our witnesses for fashion the time to speak to our committee about the work you are doing on the front line and i yield back. >> i thank the gentleman for his comments. other members of the committee are reminded that under the committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the record. i would like to extend a welcome
to our first panel of witnesses. first i would like to welcome chris krebs, director of dhs' cybersecurity and infrastructure security agency, back to testify before this panel. director krebs has been at the helm of dhs' cybersecurity activity since 2017 and has been an integral player in shaping and developing the department's elections security capability. next, i'm pleased to welcome mr. tom hicks, the current chairman of the u.s. election assistance commission and also congratulate him on swearing in a new batch of election assistance commissioners. we had the opportunity to hear from the chairman in 2017 when he came to speak before the congressional task force on election security and i look forward to hearing about his work since that time. without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be inserted in the record. i now ask each witness to
summarize his statement for five minutes beginning with mr. krebs. >> thank you, chairman thompson, ranking member rogers and members of the committee. good morning. thank you for the opportunity to testify regarding the department of homeland security's efforts to secure the vote. first, however, i would like to once again thank this committee for its leadership in establishing the cybersecurity and infrastructure security agency. by creating our new agency in law, congress formally recognized dhs' role as the leader of the national effort to safeguard federal networks and critical infrastructure from cyber and physical threats. on behalf of the agency, thank you. this morning, i want to update this committee on the progress made over the last two years, working with election community. the mission is clear, to support the efforts of election officials and their private sector partners consistent with the constitution, existing law and electoral tradition. since 2016, we have learned quite a bit through partners like the election assistance commission and thousands of election officials across the
country like you will hear in the next panel that know elections. they know their systems and they know what they need to conduct a successful election. over the last two years, in focused oftentimes humbling engagements, we have become partners with the election community. the 2018 election, we worked with all 50 states, over 1400 local and territorial election offices, six election associations and 12 election vendors. our approach is three-fold. making sure the community has the -- the election community has the information they need to defend their systems. making sure the election community has the technical support and tools they need to defend their systems. and building enduring partnerships to enhance resilience and advance security efforts together. in 2018, we focused on building scaleable repeatable mechanisms to dramatically grow our information sharing capability. the elections infrastructure information sharing and analysis center or eiisac had over 1400
members. the fastest growing of any critical infrastructure sector. we share contextualized threat information and actionable information that was enriched through our close partnerships with the intelligence community and law enforcement. more importantly, state and local election officials were sharing what they were seeing on their own networks. we also deployed intrusion detection capabilities to provide real-time detection capabilities on election networks. as of election day in 2018, these sensors offered protections to election infrastructure in voter registration data bases for more than 90% of registered voters. during the 2000 election, we were below 30% of coverage. secondly, we provide technical support and services to election officials and vendors. initially, we offered our standard services including cyberhygiene, scans and risk vulnerability assessments that we offer federal agencies and other infrastructure sectors.
as we refind our understanding of election officials requirements, we shifted to capabilities that are quicker, less intrusive and can scale to more jurisdictions. this scaleability is critical because while our initial efforts in 2016 were primarily targeted at state election officials, we recognized the need to increase our support to counties and municipalities who operate elections as well. our last mile initiative sought to provide information customized to the local county level. this initiative provided no cost tailored information on cybersafeguards, threats and risks and a checklist of cybersecurity action items. the final area of focus has been building enduring partnerships towards a collective defense. while it may seem mundane, governance, communications coordination, training and planning are the critical foundational elements of our nation's efforts to secure our elections. others contributed to a secure 2018 election. the department of homeland security and department of
justice recently concluded there is no evidence that any identified activities of a foreign government or foreign agent had a material impact on the integrity or security of election infrastructure or political campaign infrastructure used in the 2018 midterm elections. while 2018 is behind us, the 2020 election season is already under way. we are clear-eyed that the threat to our democratic institutions remains and we must continue to press for increased security and resilience of our election systems. over the next two years, we will focus on expanding engagement to the local level. we will continue to work with election officials to improve both their and our understanding of risk, and with that better understanding of risk, we can support efforts by election officials and congress to obtain the resources they need to secure their election systems. once again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you for your testimony. i now recognize mr. hicks to
summarize his statement for five minutes. >> good morning, chairman thompson, ranking member rogers, members of the committee. i'm pleased to appear before you today to offer testimony on the pressing issue of how to build partnerships to better protect american elections. today's hearing comes three months after the 2018 midterm elections. early estimates indicate that a record number of eligible americans cast their vote in november. i congratulate the nation's election administrators and their teams for a job well done, inspiring work that staff and i saw first-hand as we traveled across the nation in the weeks around the election. this work coupled with improved lines of communications between federal, state and local officials and federal agencies resulted in no indication of foreign attacks on our nation's election infrastructure. the eac is the only federal agency focused solely on elections and this focus is of great value to election administrators and the voters they serve. the mission and other mandates
are as relevant today as at any time since the watershed bipartisan legislation was signed into law. we commissioners and the staff stand ready to roll up our sleeves to address the unique needs of those we serve. just last week, two new commissioners were sworn in, joining the vice-chair and myself to make up a full slate of commissioners the agency has had in nearly a decade. today's hearing and many of the commission's own efforts focus on election security which is only one key component of election administration. i have attached to my written statement a diagram that illustrates that many different competencies that require election administrators' awareness and attention, knowledge of election law and election technology to vote tabulation and post-election audits, election officials must operate in each of these areas with no room for error. that's why the eac works to provide resources to each of our
competencies and it's why we partner with other federal agencies to leverage their subject matter expertise. some of the federal partners include dod, dhs, department of justice, national institute of standards and technology and united states postal service. this morning, i will briefly address the eac's work to help states secure their elections, including efforts to swiftly and responsibly distribute $380 million in newly appropriated funds to states and the ongoing work to testify and certify voting systems. the consolidated appropriations act of 2018, congress appropriated $380 million to the states and eligible territories for projects and programs to improve the administration of federal elections. within three months of the appropriation, the eac received distributed requests for 100% of the funds from all 55 eligible jurisdictions and states.
100% of the funds were quickly distributed to eligible states and territories to draw down. the eac staff is currently examining the federal financial reports regarding how states spent funds last year, the recent federal furlough has delayed this process. from our early assessments, we believe that about 58% of the funds went towards shoring up election security and about 33% of the funds were used to purchase voting equipment. after we complete our 2018 spending analysis, we will provide more specific details about the expenditures and the state's future plans for using these funds. the distribution of funds is only one example of the eac's work to strengthen election security. the eac serves as a central partner with dhs in assuring that the success of or national security efforts. dhs has stated that the election security government coordinating council was formed faster than any other similar critical
infrastructure sector council to date. the eac took an early leadership role in working towards this accomplishment. building on that success, the eac convened discussions between election system vendors and dhs for the formulation of the scc. both the scc and gcc were formulated before the 2018 election year. less than one year from the critical infrastructure designation by dhs. in addition, ahead of the 2018 midterm elections, eac focused on steps our commission could take to further serve election officials operating in the new threat environment. on multiple occasions, the eac brought together election officials, law makers, security experts, academics and government partners for discussion to tackle this vital issue. while taking -- talking about election security at forums is important, so is hands-on training. the eac staff was involved in the establishment of harvard
university's tabletop exercises which have since been conducted across the country. in addition, since 2015, the eac has presented its election official's i.t. manager, training to those representing hundreds of election jrds acrhe jurisdictions across the country. this training is available onli online. many election officials can easily access it to complete these efforts. the eac has also produced a video and supporting materials to help local election officials explain the many levels of election security to their jurisdictions. the final area i will highlight today during my testimony is the eoc testing and certification program. the help america vote act charges the eac with administering a federal program, setting voluntary voting system guidelines and testing so vendors may choose to have eac accredited and monitored labs
test their voting systems against those guidelines for certification. the guidelines contain requirements for security as well as other important components such as accessibility, usability and operability. these programs are developed in public working groups under the direction of the eac's technical guidelines committee which is chaired by the director and undersecretary of commerce for standards of technology. after development and approval by the tdgc, the voluntary guidelines are submitted to the eac's executive director, provided to the board of advisers, published for public comment and presented to the eac's commissioners for consideration and approval. last spring, the eac conveyed its advisory boards for review and comment on the adoptions of the newest versions of the guidelines. both boards recommended that the eac adopt it.
now that a quorum -- i ask for one additional minute or 30 seconds. >> go right ahead. >> thank you. we anticipate that the vbsg2.0 will soon be posted for public comment and we will hold public hearings on the proposed guidelines. members of the committee, the eac's mission includes supporting election officials across the country as they administer federal elections and the eac is committed to that work, to always seeking better ways to do it. i welcome your feedback and look forward to answering questions you may have. >> thank you very much. i thank the witnesses for their testimony. i remind each member that he or she will have five minutes to question the panel. i now recognize myself for questions. director krebs, given the 2019 worldwide threat assessment, that u.s. adversaries and strategic competitors are
probably already looking at the 2020 u.s. elections, how confident are you that our elections infrastructure as it is at this moment is secured from cyberattacks? >> chairman, thank you for the question. i certainly think that just like any other i.t. system, the election infrastructure bears additional securing and resilience measures, but i will say that compared to where we were in 2016, not just from a fundamental i.t. security perspective but from a collaboration working across the different stake holder groups, we are light years ahead of where we were and most importantly, we have greater visibility both of the threats that are incoming but also how they would work across the ecosystem and across the infrastructure. i mentioned earlier the albert sensor coverage we have, less than 30% in 2016, over 90% in
2018. that gives us near real-time visibility in what's happening across the networks. last thing i will add here, the area that i think we need to invest the most as a nation is ensuring auditability across infrastructure. it's a key tenet of i.t. security. if you don't know what's happening and if you can't check back across the system, what's happening in the system, then you don't really have security. so to the extent that we can focus on an outcome of auditability throughout the process end-to-end, that's the greatest area of need, in my view. >> so is that a matter of software or training or what? >> yes, sir. everything. one area that we can focus on and the good news is from my understanding, i would defer to chairman hicks, every state, if it's not already on a paper type
ballot, whether it's hand-marked or whatever, every state including the five that are on electronic machines right now are moving towards paper. paper helps that auditability process. then you have after-election audits on the back end. but it's not just about the voting day. it's also all the way through the voter registration process, making sure you have visibility and understanding of what's happening in those data bases. >> right. so mr. hicks, are you concerned that so much of what we use is from international sources and the potential for supply chain compromise is there, or has that issue come up in your review? >> it has come up in our reviews but i would like to say that it's difficult to function in a
world economy and not have some form of components coming from overseas. i believe that that's being looked at. but i believe that we can still move forward with a secure election process because the eac certifies voting systems and that's all components within those systems for the voluntary voting system guidelines and standards and we certify the labs that do that as well. so i have very little concern in foreign components overall, because i have great faith in our labs and the overall structure of our voluntary voting system guidelines to ensure that those systems are functioning the way that the american people want them to. >> thank you. mr. krebs, you want to comment on that? >> yes, sir. i mentioned three primary areas of focus for 2020. one is extending to locals but the second piece is better understanding the risk across the election infrastructure.
chairman hicks mentioned supply chain concerns are certainly in that register of risks that we're looking at, but i'm actually at this point more concerned or focusing in on basic cyberhygiene practices. when we looked across a range of sectors and segments, what we saw was the election community still has challenges with basic cyberhygiene. so what our area focus is helping with patching, helping implement multi-factor authentication, helping on phishing campaigns, things of that nature. >> your testimony indicated that all the secretaries of state had participated in some aspect of your resources? >> yes, sir. all 50 states have engaged with the department in one way, shape or form. the election infrastructure, for instance, has all 50 states as members. >> thank you. i yield to the congressman.
>> one other aspect of that i wanted to jump on that mr. krebs was speaking about. one way to ensure systems are functioning the way they intended is through auditability. once we move away from those five states that don't have paper trails associated with them, i believe that all states should be able to audit using some form of paper but also to ensure that we continue on with the help america vote act and ensuring those who have disabilities and might not be able to use that paper can still vote independently and privately. >> thank you. i yield to the ranking member for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. commissioner hicks, in your opening statement, you made reference to the fact that last spring, the eac had distributed $380 million in fy 2018 funds to the states to improve their elections. to date, how many states and territories have been able to spend their allocations? i know you said 100% had been
distributed but have they been able to spend it? >> all the states are spending that money now. they have up to five years to spend the money for additional things. it's basically an infrastructure grant. so if we look towards continuing on with infrastructure, it would be carried on for five years that congress appropriated that money for. >> they're just starting? >> yes. >> hr-1 authorizes nearly $1.2 billion over the next two years to local election security improvements. is it feasible for states to buy equipment, implement the new security measures and get poll workers trained in time for the primaries two years from now? >> i missed part of your question, sir. >> given that $1.2 billion is to be spent, can the states take that money and buy equipment, train poll workers and implement security measures in time for
the primaries for the 2020 election? >> i believe states can do most of that. but again, we can't just -- states can't go to best buy and get that off the shelf. most of the states are moving towards not only purchasing new voting equipment but also other aspects of the election process in terms of voter registration, election audits, security overall. so it's not just purchasing new voting equipment. they are going from registration to election night reporting. >> my point is i don't see how they are going to be able to get that done by the 2020 primaries. you are talking about next march is alabama's primary. some are as early as february. january of next year. finally, you talked about the eac certifying security systems. can you tell me more about that security process? >> it's voting systems overall. basically, for voting systems, when the state decides that they want to fall under that process
of our voluntary voting system guidelines, those systems are sent by the vendors to our test labs, then certified to those standards. it's the same as if computers or iphones or other aspects of that, they are tested to a certain standard. >> can you have your staff submit to my staff, the full committee staff, for that matter, what those certification standards are? i would be interested in reviewing those. >> there are several of them. we just certified 1.1 in 2015 but for the last four years, since i have been at the commission, we have been working on the 2.0 voluntary voting system guidelines and there's a healthy debate going on right now between myself and the other commissioners on ensuring that those get out for public comment relatively soon. >> good. good. mr. krebs, can dhs and eac complete supply chain security and other qualification mandates on vendors required by hr-1 fast enough for states to know what
they're buying is acceptable machines in time for the 2020 primaries? >> i'm not sure, i have to think about the number of systems, the research, the requirements that would have to go into that. i may need to get back to you on the timeliness of that. >> my final question is, these five states that currently have audit concerns, you both made reference to the fact they are moving toward paper. can you tell me more about what they're doing? >> so those states are purchasing, some states are already in line to purchase new voting equipment. but some states are putting bids out to other manufacturers to get some sort of paper so it's basically little things like buying anything, there's different models out there and what works best for those states is what those states are going to purchase. but there are other aspects of
voting systems that are out there. optical scan machines or you know, paper-based systems overall, where states are looking towards getting those so that they can audit those at night after election night and so forth. >> do you have a timeline when they expect to -- >> it's an ongoing thing. the first purchase of voting equipment under the help america vote act was more than 15 years ago. as i say, how much confidence would folks have on computer systems that they purchased 15 years ago. what the eac gives guidance on maintaining aging voting equipment to ensure that those systems are functioning the way they were designed to. i would say that it's an ongoing process so it might not be, you know, fully completed in 2020. but 2022, 2024, as elections continue on, more systems will be mothballed. >> i yield back. >> thank you. the chair recognizes the gentle
lady from new york. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. krebs, i would like to start with you, if i could. i applaud the progress you have made protecting the machinery of our elections but what i want to address now is another part of election protection and that's protecting the campaign and the political party committee from attack. everyone is well affair of what happened in 2016. there was the hacking of the dnc, and the clinton campaign, hacked by russia. we know the subsequent use of the stolen materials having a profound effect on the election. we also know that in 2018, the nrcc was hacked in the midterm cycle. i know that on our side, the deep trip launched unprecedented cybersecurity and disinformation prevention operations, but all of that work was done by themselves. it was not done in coordination
with any federal agency. the federal government at all, even though these are federal campaigns. so i want to ask you, do you think that we should rethink how we are doing all of this? >> yes, ma'am. thank you for the question. during the 2018 cycle, and even to today, we have worked with the major parties. rnc, we have conducted training, dnc we have a very good relationship with the cio, we continue to work with the other committees so it is in our area of engagement. i take your point, though, that we need to expand and deepen and broaden that engagement. we continue to think about the various offerings we have, whether it's capabilities, technical support, information sharing, training. those are all the areas that we are continuing to push out. i would encourage each of you as you are coming up on another cycle, please work with us, your
own campaigns. we have capabilities that we can offer and it is definitely within -- it is an area of priority engagement for us going forward. >> i'm glad to har year you say that. i want to ask your opinion about whether you think using the information sharing analysis center, the isac model that you use for working with sectors like the energy and financial fields, do you think that would be of help here? >> in terms of political infrastructure and political campaigns? >> yes. >> i don't have any reason to believe why it wouldn't work. >> i think that that's something we have to look into, because all of this is about sharing information when you're being hacked and what you do about getting down disinformation and all that kind of stuff. there were three states that did not use any part of the election assistance commission so this could be either to mr. hicks or you, mr. krebs. three states, florida, oklahoma and oregon chose not to use any
part of the eac's testing or certification program and they were all targeted by russian hackers in 2016. i guess my question is, are we encouraging states to participate in a program, and i understand the tension between, you know, states' rights over how their elections are run, but there is, i guess i would ask you, do you think there is a role for the federal government to play and did the federal government do enough to participate states or to encourage states to participate in the program before the 2018 cycle and how many states will be participating in this in the 2020 cycle? >> so i wouldn't use 2016 as the baseline for how states engage, what local communities engage. i would instead recommend we look at 2018. all 50 states worked with the
department of homeland security and it's also important to keep laser focus on what the department's mission is. that's cybersecurity technical assistance. the election capabilities, that resides with the eac. we are very focused on cybersecurity capabilities. we have all 50 states, 1400 jurisdictions, a number of election equipment vendors all playing ball with us. the difference between '18 and '16 and i hope you will hear this in the next panel, was trust. '16, there was no relationship between the department and eac. there was no relationship between secretary padilla or secretary merrill. right now, those relationships are strong and growing stronger. i am very confident in going forward that we have the baseline of engagement partnership in place to only continue to improve the security resilience of the voting system. >> thank you for the question, congresswoman. there are two aspects i would like to point out for two states
that i went to last year. i went to oregon and i did go to florida as well. in oregon, i saw the wildfires that were going on and they were looking to the eac to get some sort of guidance in terms of overall aspects of running their elections. they are on all paper today. they do everything by vote by mail. so they were i think on top of things in terms of moving forward. florida, i had the honor of going down to visit with the county devastated by hurricane michael, and to see their election folks basically in tears, but being happy that the eac was there to document their concerns and get others to see that, and i hope that our staff will be able to have the videos that we took up relatively soon so folks can pay attention to that. and not forget those folks as
well. i think that there are different aspects that the states have gone to to use our services so we do touch all 55 jurisdictions, the 50 states and the five territories and the district of columbia. so i believe that as undersecretary krebs talked about, there was a lack of cooperation -- not cooperation, but communication with federal partners before that. but i think since the eac's founding in 2003, that we have helped states to improve the process and so i think that as each election goes on, that we will continually improve that process. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you very much. the chair now recognizes the gentleman from new york. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to congratulate you on becoming chair of this committee. i'm looking forward to working with you and mr. rogers, and i know based on past experience with you that we will continue the fine bipartisan work on this
committee that i wish the rest of congress would engage in. mr. krebs, it's nice to meet you. i'm now the ranking member of the cybersecurity subcommittee and in that capacity, i think we will become well acquainted with each other going forward. i was heartened by what you said in your testimony today and what you said in your written testimony that there's been no evidence to date that any identified activities of a foreign government or foreign agent had a material impact on the integrity or security of election infrastructure or political or campaign infrastructure in the 2018 midterms. that's a great thing. but i also kind of took pause by what you said that election security's come a long way but it bears additional measures, and one of the things you mentioned was auditability. i want to make sure i understand a little more in depth, what are some of the additional measures you think we should be taking to make sure that we do the best we can to secure our elections? >> so i continue to believe that
secretary nielsen has been consistent with this as well, voter verifiable paper trails are critical elements of auditability and after-election audit processes and i don't want to stipulate to any specific type of audit. there are a number and variety of audit thas that can be implemented based on the systems that are in place but those are two elements. >> mr. hicks? is there anything you want to add to that? >> i believe that the states in 2018, when they submitted their request for funds to us, allocated over $20 million to go towards the auditability of elections. there are many ways to audit elections and then as we move forward, the eac has done a paper on six ways to do audits. i hope that states take advantage of those resources. >> now, mr. hicks, you also mentioned that as part of the process of review, you look all the way through the voter registration process. could you explain the different steps you would like to look at as far as doing your audits of
election security? >> so it's basically to go -- it's not just depending on audits, it's basically to go from voter registration and list maintenance to ensure that the folks who are on the rolls are the people who are assigned to that. many states are going towards online voter registration through the dmvs and other aspects. some states have gone to automatic voter registration, then you go towards polling places to ensure that people have access to the polls, to make sure that the ramps for those who have disabilities and wheelchairs and so forth can still get in there, and the height of the machines and so forth, to poll worker training. i think that's a vital part. they're the front line of defense that we have in terms of federal elections. there's over a million requests for poll workers in each presidential year. it's always coming up short and i would like to see for more people to actually volunteer to
boater act from 2018 did not just go to machines but went towards title i which give states a lot of leeway into improving the voting process whether or not there was voter registration, audits, indication and other aspects as well. >> so, mr. chair and mr. hicks, i don't know if you answered whd [inaudible] do you know why? >> i don't know why. i believe they were going to one aspect of the process in terms of -- i have to be back to the airport but i'm assuming it was one aspect of what they were looking at as opposed to overall with hr one. i believe they were looking to certain scenes but i believe that maybe hr one covers a lot
more than the one aspect. >> thank you, sir. i yield back my time. >> thank you very much. i want to clarify one point. 8 billion was over ten years and it was not just a one shot deal. it was in anticipation of upgrading will be a constant rather than static for one time. i recognize the gentleman from rhode island and former secretary of state. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. hicks, director, thank you for being here and for your testimony. mr. krebs, i want to thank you for the work you're doing. the agency has been reorganized and properly test and we look forward to working and
supporting you and your work. obviously this is the most important issues facing as a country administrating our elections and from adversaries want to undermine and so discord and they have a pretty well organized campaign and we have to get better organized and i know that we will. i want to thank you and the director for their support. thank you from my home state of rhode island. we have planning meetings before the election and sector stately know you're there and you testified before the committee along with you. also, the dhs personnel in the room made contributions to that discussion. someone who has overhauled an entire state election system and
i understand the challenges of having the best equipment and making sure that it works wel well -- when i reorganized and overhauled our election system we did not have to deal with the issue of cyber security and threats from foreign adversaries trying to undermine us. let me one of the topics that came out of that meeting was coordination with media. we have seen how effectively the russians, for example, target ukraine elections when the media and trying to so discord and confusion and election process. how do you engage with the local, state and national media outlets to ensure unofficial loading, vote reporting is protected from malicious interference? >> couple of examples of our
progress with the national media and local and state level media. two things. one, in advance of the election we held a media tabletop exercise just like we did with the state and local election officials and brought in a couple dozen media representatives. we sat in the room, four hours, or through a scenario that included both technical network effects as well as social media influence operations and walk-through here is what you see here's what we hear from state and local election official and here's what you hear from the federal government and what the federal government would do with dhs, fbi, it does community and help them understand what is going on in the background so that if something did happen they would have a basis of understanding and know who to call but also rather than there was a denial of service attack against an election at reporting website we would have a conversation and say it is not that but instead
it simply a configuration issue and that website drop. second thing on election day every three hours over the course of the election we had a conference call with national media. same thing. we work through issues that popped up with the course of the day and often times you referred them to the local or state election official to address the question but where we could to fed and provide clarification and the important thing was getting ahead of issues and dispelling any sort of doubter questions about what may be happening in the background. we found it to be beneficial in terms of cutting ahead of problems before they started. >> another topic as mr. hicks mentioned in his testimony and i know the representative has touched upon this as well. you see public confidence in the integrity of our elections is a vital component of our democracy
following the 2016 elections. voters voted a decrease in confidence in the election systems and outcomes and explain into the hand of what our adversaries want to accomplish here. election security and cyber security is an important aspect of increasing providence but not sufficient. so, right now in the inter- agency who has the role of coordinating protection of election integrity and perception thereof and cyber security is just a part. >> in terms of the interagency process the fbi and the department of justice have response ability to lead on
countering foreign influence. that the social media campaigns. that is the direct response. as things bubble up or pop up they work with partners to address immediately address head-on. the department of homeland security role here is in terms of more on the lines of educating awareness, building, taking cased aces teddies we saw in 2016 or even before that scene the chinese and russians do in pushing awareness and information out. these are the things you need to look for in here is the things you can do to ensure you are getting the right information. going back to the election system that the chairman mentioned you need to listen to your state and local officials and they are the ones that have the official information and the one that will tell you where to go and wanted to vote for don't listen to the text messages or the treats or posts or whatever. >> do you believe that you talk about the leaders but you
believe the whole of government approach or should it be -- should be based on experience? >> it is cliché but it's a whole nation approach. there's a specific role for a number of agencies including the thousands committee using their specific authorities for whether it's the bureau or law-enforcement capabilities or department of homeland security and one thing i will note is that when some of the social media companies over the course of election took action and took down other iranian activity or whatever we were able to work with the fbi and work with social media companies, convene the state local election officials in a call or a classified briefing and have them walk through what they need to look for. there's a role for everyone. there's a role for every american and it is upon us in
the department to give the awareness and tools to be smarter consumers. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> the turnout recognizes the gentleman from tennessee. >> thank you, mr. chairman. extensively reviewed hr one in my previous committee hearing on oversight and government reform. i certainly believe election security is critical and they did a nice job of saying or speaking about it and i am impressed and have to tell you i'm very impressed with what you have done in the 2018th cycle. essentially there was no penetration that we are aware of and we have to be able to do that. our democracy rests on one person, one vote. but with regards to this hr one i will be completely upfront and say i'm disappointed by the majority party because it seems that to have disregarded our constitution.
they claim the purpose of the bill is to protect our institutions but they are promoting a bill that fails to improve security all while thumbing the no's or its nose to federalism. our country was not made for a few hundred people in washington dc to dictate from my state in tennessee how we do everything. including our elections. our founders, constitution, or thought process have been grounded in federalism this bedrock is the foundation of our country. it has to be protected. when power is concentrated in the hands of a few, tyranny inevitably follows. our founders knew this and that's why they created three branches of government and created separation between the federal government and the states and the local government. we were call the tenth amendment, i want to thank you again for the hard work that resulted in such success in 2018 and i from the previous
questions asked i assume you're not rat red hr one, is that correct? >> i have reviewed it. >> okay. can you tell me done in a more global sense how far should the federal government be able to go in telling tennessee how we run our elections considering specifically what was read earlier from my colleagues about what the constitution says. >> so, every state, every jurisdiction is different. every said agreement will be different. i would defer to the secretary to decide what is best for the citizens of tennessee but whatever i do to make his job easier but the thing i will note and spend part of the conversation the other morning the threat landscape is different today in 2019 that wasn't 2001 and even before that. back then we focused on the department of anti- terrorism. today we have the most active nationstate adversary landscape
in my lifetime and that means that individual states and individual counties and precincts cannot go it alone against a full frontal assault of the russian gru. i need to apply whatever capabilities i can so we can assure a collective defense across election security. >> as you have reviewed hr one you know it tells tennessee we can't have voter identification. it tells us we can allow voter legislation to happen on the day of election with no way to verify. that seems to me to be a violation of the constitution. it's been read and clearly articulated in the tent the moment. that is more than just security. that is dictating how we run our elections in tennessee and quite honestly, that is offensive to us down in tennessee.
for mr. hicks, i do have a question. you said there's about 8000 jurisdictions and how many of those jurisdictions are identical? they do elections identical to one of the other. >> that would be a difficult lesson to answer. i believe each individual jurisdiction conducts their elections the way they build up of those constituents in their jurisdiction. the election assistance commission goes to the states and jurisdictions to offer our assistance whether or not that the 380 million that congress appropriated or other aspects to our clearinghouse or other aspects of it. those jurisdictions may not know techniques or things being done in other jurisdictions but we bring that to them so they can from their elections effectively. >> thank you for that answer. i appreciate it. my issue is not so much with
your help but we want your help. it's essential to protecting or dictating how we run our elections in tennessee. that's different. that is my point. thank you very much. >> the turnout wreck arises the young lady from texas. >> mr. chairman, thank you for this hearing and the ranking member. we are appreciative for a hearing that indicates one of the strongest elements of democracy is the independent right of every american to cast a vote unimpeded, unsuppressed and unimpressed. let me ask you, commissioner hicks and thank you for the commission but in 2016 i believe that secretary johnson joins with eckstein other agencies as i recall the fall of the election to indicate a conspicuous engagement of russia into the election and let me
just read a sentence -- [inaudible] electronic privacy but they however talk generally about what deceptive campaigns or attempts to misdirect targeted voters regarding the voting process or in some way affect their willingness to cast a vote deceptive election activities include full statement about opening, imposing times, voter identity rules for eligibility requirements, i think the intelligence reports are focused on targeting voters and misleading information on social media. based on those intelligent reports are you aware of those reports? >> i am aware. >> do you believe the reports first of all?
>> i have no reason to believe that was false. >> mr. krebs. >> yes, ma'am. i agree with the intelligence community. >> we know there is among others and certainly we know russia looms large as having intentions to interfere with our elections and that means federal elections and they are held in state. we are a collective of 50 states we know that would be impacted. in that report and the efforts you all have do you see states willing to accept your assistance and in what way is the best way you are helping states acknowledge their own plates, if you will, susceptibility to this kind of intrusion. >> thank you. i believe states have come to the federal government more so than they were before because there was a little bit of a hesitation.
i believe munication has improved to the point where states are giving their input through the government for donating counsel and working with vendors and other aspects for the specific counsel to ensure the election integrity remains high. >> because my time is short let me go to the cyber security question. ... >> yes, ma'am. i briefly touched on those that have modem or other telecommunications connectivity, best is generally speaking is to disable or remove that sort of capability. someday not the time or
transition out. it is something across the risk profile something we were gone. we work with the state and local officials that have that equipment and transition in an roadmap into systems. >> do each of you feel in spite of your good works that your election system are still in jeopardy of intrusion? >> i believe there can always be improvements to be made and i believe the work of the eac can help with those improvements. >> do you fill it before and intrusions? is always progress to be made. >> web we asked the chairman submit into the record a study on securing elections from foreign interference. i ask unanimous consent. in unanimous consent for receptive campaign practices by the electronic privacy information center. unanimous consent. without objection. >> two witnesses, yes or no in there appeared the committee and
legislative effort to improve your work on the funding come or that help you, mr. hicks? >> yes. >> mr. krebs? >> yes. >> the chair now recognizes the gentleman from texas, mr. taylor. thank you, mr. chairman. appreciate the opportunity year. in 2011 i carried the move act compliance legislation for the state of texas. in 2009 on a bipartisan effort commerce passed law that allowed states to do -- requires states to do a better job of helping men and women or men in uniform outside the united dates be able to vote. and that was a four year compliance. one of the reasons for that is that logistically we had to change our election schedule in texas. and so i'm sure my colleagues from texas recalled of the sudden they were filing an set of january and december and i
required a constitutional amendment that had to be passed by the citizens of texas. and so common working on not on a bipartisan basis it took a lot of lifting to comply with that piece of legislation. this legislation is far more ambitious than what it matters to do. has there been -- have you done a study, mr. krebs on laws that would have to change and amendments they would have to comply with h.r. will -- h.r. 1. >> no, sir appeared were focused on the technical aspects. >> mr. hicks, have you analyzed what changes would you necessitated by h.r. 1? >> we have not. >> okay, i certainly hope that this is a serious bill, something that will be passed into law that we've thought about at some level what we're going to have to do at the state level because we cannot comply with this at the state level unless we've really thought about it. i hope this isn't a show bill.
commissioner hicks, in terms of balance testing of yesteryear, so we had paper ballots, would not return us to the system of paper ballots? is that what we're doing, kind of going back in time? >> i guess i would need to because i don't interpret it that way. >> the way i read it if it requires paper ballots. >> for audibility. >> right, and i think this is an important distinction we should lay out here. the time now in my county we have the electronic machines that print out on an individual machine by machine basis of that can be gone through and done with audits. so the machines are auditable or a paper trail. not the ballot health, and put
on that particular machine if that makes sense. so as i understand this bill, everybody's got to stop using those machines and start biting their machines that are all paper ballots. that's my understanding. >> that's not my understanding. some machines might have a paper trail associated but it would be the verifiability in two verify that piece of paper. >> are there enough machines that would be manufactured between now and the beginning of the primaries in less than a year that we can implement this bill? >> i would need to talk to the vendors to say their capabilities and manufacturing those machines. >> so we don't know if it's even physically possible to generate the number of machines required with this. i know there's funding this legislation, but i'm unclear whether or not it's impossible to logistically in place. [inaudible] >> mr. krebs, do you have any
idea? >> i don't know but i assume there's money to be made. >> well, and in my home county, collin county, texas i was an election judge before i was elected to the legislature. in that process i saw what happens when there's not enough voting machines. people get discouraged and they don't vote and so you have a reduction in participation, which is really disappointing. it's a very sad day when people show up to vote. they wait for an hour and they can't because there weren't enough machines. what provisions to be having in this legislation that would attack from that scenario? it seems like we are setting up in this rush to get a bill out the door to provide funding with very limited amount of time to put it together so to speak that we would make sure we have enough voting locations that we don't have people lining up and saying i'm not going to participate. i'm not going to vote. >> dates have been a great job
of moving towards election day be in the last day to cast their ballot. some states have moved towards early voting or absentee voting as well to alleviate the charge of having election day were 100 million people are trying to show up at the polls. thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> thank you very much. let me for the record indicates that the members and the witnesses we are technically here on section three of the h.r. 1 bill. some of the questions have gone to other sections of the bill and i would like for us to talk specifically about section three, which is our jurisdiction. i understand the interest, but i don't think the witnesses are prepared to address some of the questions that have been offered by the committee at this point. let's just make sure we are all on track.
we now recognize the gentleman from new york. >> chairman, thank you [inaudible] >> there's a difference. >> mr. krebs, how you doing? i look forward to working with you and i think you hit the nail on the head earlier. it is clear that there is state actors, nonstate actors that are proving the homeland across the board to figure out where our vulnerabilities are. as they conduct that probe, our electoral systems are one of the things they are analyzing. in line with that, i want to get a sense of working with local and state not there is, who are you talking to? is that the terrorism task force come in the fusion center, secretary of state, governor, long force than entities. if it is all of the above, how do you do that and what systems are in place to coordinate that
type of multifaceted action? >> it is all of the above in adjutant generals and things of that nature. my team, cyberinfrastructure security agency rightly point out the selection security is not just about cybersecurity threats. also physical security threat, access to machines, manipulation machines on device we need to be thinking about. we approach this as a cyberand physical security. but more broadly from a counterterrorism good, the thing over the last couple years as secretaries of state are natural risk managers. they have to plan for the hurricane, the panhandle in florida in the last election cycle. they've got to anticipate any nature of threat. and so as we work through, we do active shooter training and other sorts of activities. we have mechanisms in place including my team has over 140
security advisers in the field that work day in, day out with infrastructure and officials that conduct training. they do walk-throughs. they do security facility assessment in a lot of cases they provide reports back to the facility owner operator. >> just a push you for a second, my understanding is you don't have an entity that you're reaching out to to coordinate this at the state and regional level that it's incumbent upon you while to be reaching out and the local wendy's and it seems this is rather does for it. >> specific to elections, we have developed communications protocols after some of the missteps of the 2016th -- post 2016 notifications or we have a coordination protocol where we work with the chief election official, homeland security advisers. and so, that is typically our point of entry specific to
elections. >> it would be great to see that. and just lastly, at the federal level you mentioned that you have a convening a one's ability. but who is actually in charge of this interagency process? who's at the head of the table when all the folks are gathered together and who has the statutory authority to make sure that we are getting the job done? >> a couple different levels of this conversation. policy piece of the national security council. there has been a number of convening meetings and whatnot out where to the principals committee meetings that the president. and that the operational level, there is a working group that brings together the department of defense, dni. >> are you in charge of the working group? >> no, sir. i'm in charge of the technical support to election officials. >> who would be in charge of the
working group? >> a range of responsibilities. law-enforcement actions is naturally the fbi. intelligence assessments naturally the director of national intelligence. cybersecurity pieces me. this again goes to the whole of nation, the whole government approach. no one agency has the tools and capabilities needed to push back on this. >> thank you. i yield back the time. >> chernow recognizes the gentleman from texas, mr. crenshaw. >> mr. chairman, thank you both for being here. we discussed the integrity of our elections and how the strength in the cyberof our elections infrastructure. i will say that election integrity is multifaceted. there's a lot of aspects to it. it's not just the cyberside, but also the voter fraud side and how to vote by mail. it's unfortunate this is not a
markup process and is also unfortunate that this part of the bill, which i think we could reasonably calm to bipartisan solution on is attached to a much larger bill that is poisonous and will certainly not make it past the senate. i want to ask you both, could you clarify what role you had in crafting this particular legislation? >> in the last congress we certainly provided technical assistance on aspects that got rolled into it, the suggestions on what dhs does. >> i spent 11 years at the committee wants to come and ask my opinion i more than willing to give it. >> the you are not consulted prior to this hearing on what should be in the section of the bill. >> chairman thompson and chairman brady invited me to speak before the task force on
various aspects. >> is there anything missing from the section of the bill you would recommend. new authorities are capabilities and this is directed at you mr. krebs, that are currently not in it. >> at this point the department has generally speaking the authorities we need to engage and support the election officials. >> one of the key provisions in this bill includes the expiration date on funds. asking us to spend a lot more money very rapidly. i want to get a sense of how realistic that is for you all and given the slow pace of upgrading election infrastructure, do you think states would name her time and flexibility on this given your experience working with them? >> i believe that the chairman talked about that this would go over for 10 years and in that
cycle there would be five federal elections for states to make improvements overall. i believe that the provision was put in there because of the provision that allowed states in perpetuity, so this gives them a deadline to actually spend the money similar to the 2018 provision in which only allowed for five years. >> do you have anything to add? >> durables to help the election officials spend the money and the most risk-based security manner. >> thank you, gentlemen. i yield. >> thank you very much. the chair recognizes the gentlelady from illinois, ms. underwood. >> thank you chairman thompson for this important hearing. it essential to protect in our democracy and your testimony here today pic male state of illinois was targeted during the
2016 presidential elections for the information of 76,000 illinoisans were compromised by russian hackers. i'm relieved to hear from you that there are no known harm from 2018 to the midterm elections by nationstate actors. for me and those on this piano is critical that state, federal local governments continue to strengthen election security in the landscape of these ever evolving threat. my colleague pursued a line of questioning with you regarding social media and some of the threat you have recognized. at the end of your response, and mr. krebs cummings said the enemy was changing tactics. what should we be looking for in 2020 to ensure we are continued preparedness particularly at the state and local levels. >> that is exactly the question. what do we need to be prepared
for? we have a habit of defending against the last attack so we can close out the last avenue and patch vulnerabilities. we can configure systems more securely. if we seen anything the adversary gets ahead of us anticipated. what we are working through right now is what could an advanced actor do? this is a personal gift, but i tend to think they can look back and exploit we were in that system, that they might not really be there. one way to look at it as the russians in some cases are living rent free in our head. so how are they going to take that to their advantage without actually being on network am abusing their social media tools come influence campaigns. staying ahead of them. this work in a social media, working with the traditional media in a content neutral way, but getting ahead in anticipating the things they may try to push.
most importantly in this goes to the whole of nation approach, what can we do to better inform the american people the risks being presented to them, again to make them more informed consumers. >> more concretely come you perceive social media to be a significant threat heading into 2020? >> i see from the cost-effectiveness and risk due that is probably cheap to do, highly affect his in terms of broad impact and its comparatively low risk compared to on network activity. i think it is going to remain a tool in their toolkit and what's more concerning the factors including the iranians and others are getting into that game following the lead of the russians. >> sure. one of the trends we've seen in illinois is the rise of early voting taking and manage a vote by mail or as we call it soda at
home. wondering about any specific threats obviously social media is probably less relevant in that stage of voting in an election. just wondering if you had in the civic thoughts you might want to make this committee aware of. >> i'm not aware of any specific threats to early voting. early voting provides opportunities through the auditing process and other security fallback measures. in some cases it advantages the defender. >> in your experience, every jurisdiction is engaging in the auditing process or a early though. >> i'm not sure i have enough information. >> where would we go to find that out? >> we need to work with eac through similar mechanisms. >> thank you so much. i yield back, sir. >> the chair now recognizes the other gentleman for mississippi. thank you, mr. chairman.
follow up a little bit to a congressman taylor had talked about earlier. section 3001 of this act says that it amends the help america vote act for 2002 to create a grant program for states to replace current voting machines with paper ballot systems for security improvements before the 2020 general federal election. mr. krebs, do you know what percentage of voting systems would have to be replaced to meet that requirement? >> specifically now, but i know that five state in 83% of another very large state need to go through that process. >> with the other 45 of the state that is not in compliance, with those current voting systems comply with what were seeking to do here? >> i would have to do a little bit deeper research, but i do
know that the other states that may be anomaly in compliance they are promised a legacy machines outdated and some may not be supported by the vendor. it is a good thing to refresh and retire legacy systems. >> as far as a percentage of systems that would need to be replaced, you do not have a percentage to give us today? >> not with me, sir. >> mr. hicks, do you have any idea? >> i can talk to her staff to figure out the percentages but i don't have a direct percentage right now. >> two calls to comply with section 3001, mr. krebs? >> in earlier testimony before the senate rules committee, the question is asked about replacing aging voting equipment in noncompliance for this bill. i believe to be between $500,000,001,000,000,000.
>> and i know there was previous testimony that at least 45 states currently use paper ballots and this may have been testified to early or it may have missed it outside of georgia what would the other four states that do not currently use paper ballots. >> south carolina, louisiana and i would have to get the rest of that. in delaware, yes. >> you said there was another state that was partially with using paper ballots. >> i would have to get back to the specifics. all five state are on a path towards any paper trail. this is a good trend. >> of those states we just
talked about on that path, would we have any ideas whether or not they'll have paper ballots for 2020 election cycle? >> i don't know if all five of those will be, but they are on that path to comply with that. but i would also say that whatever path they take to ensure the folks who have disabilities can vote independently and privately as prescribed by the law. >> finally, mr. krebs in your report on page six come you say that her voting infrastructure is the first subject to local control and has many checks and balances. do you believe, mr. krebs that election should remain under local job? >> yes, sir. >> gossiping collection chairman under local control? >> states and localities run elections. he might thank you good i yield back. >> the chair recognizes the gentleman from texas, mr. green.
thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for your leadership and allowing me to serve on this committee under your leadership. i am a person who loves this country and i love my state. but i heard this 10th amendment argument before. a dentist in houston texas who wanted to vote. smith versus all right, 1944 and to the supreme court of the united states of america that ended primaries. tenth amendment arguments been used consistently by some states do not write. texas is one such state.
i love my state, but texas has been a bad actor for decades. i love my state. my state currently has a poll tax the 24th amendment to the united states of america. talk about this photo i.d. and will give you an idea if you can afford it if you're indigent. i tested that this time. i voted without proper i.d., hunt some time to secure the ide. the state of texas will accord you an idea and will cost if you're from texas because in my case i'm from louisiana. i have to get my birth certificate from louisiana to get my i.d. in texas and i had to pay a fee for that.
clever ways to disenfranchise. so i thank god for the federal government in the stand that has been taken over the years to protect the rights of people and state. now, to my question coming youth said, mr. hage, and that the states are moving toward some sort of component i believe is the phraseology you utilize. paper trail is that people at my level of life would probably say. why are they doing this? >> it's a little bit of two things. one i believe it is confidence to ensure that if there is an odd it being done that there is some sort of physical trail that
people can point to and do a physical calendar event. the other is just moving back towards confidence as well. >> confidence. the level of confidence that we aspire, that we desire to have, is that one that would give us a believe that if there has been some sort of intervention will be able to detect it in the verifiable paper may be of assistance? >> there could be. >> and if this is the case the verifiable assistance by way of paper is something that is of value, can you give me a good reason why we would oppose having verifiable paper if the states are moving toward it and given if there is a value in it, why would we oppose the? what is a good reason to desire a system that doesn't have this
type of verification. >> the biggest reason that i've heard over the years is those folks with disabilities who may not have the dexterity functions to handle that paper and to verify it. if i am without site can verify a piece of paper visibly. i think the technology is moving towards allowing folks who have site disabilities to be able to verify that. they still would have to physically use that paper. i believe we've come a long way since the 2000 election in terms of technology and moving forward. for instance, in 2000 everyone in this room probably has a smartphone. no one have those issues. as we move forward with technology to allow for people to cast their ballots and so forth. the other aspect of that is people who live overseas and are
in combat areas where they might not have backed us to a fax machine to facts that back or the ability to get that piece of paper back, but to ensure that our military and overseas folks have a way to cast their ballot for the rights they are defending us all. >> persons who need assistance in polling places that we currently allow that to need some sort of repair, we allow you to be assisted and there are ways to deal with humanitarian personnel in places. the empirical evidence as to indicate that there is more value in having it and not. is that a fair statement? >> yes. thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> the chair now recognizes the gentlelady who comes from a state that has some minor experience in coding issues.
>> thank you so much, mr. chairman and thank you again to her witnesses for being here with us. everybody in this room clearly understand the comment dark, ugly history that our great nation hans as it pertains to voter suppression. i would think that this committee would lead the effort in making sure that we have a system that allows citizens of this country to be able to exercise their right to vote. i would believe in this country that we would ensure that race, gender, economic status or zip code would never again be
barriers to a person's right to vote. so i want to thank you, the two of you for what you do to make our process fair. im from florida. let me just say i am not offended when florida people all over this nation question what in the hack is going on in florida. i am not offended by it because i am committed to making sure that we get the process right. we can never under estimate how important the cooperation is between federal, state and local governments are scenic ensure that this process is right. 20 states including my home state of florida you like it new governors. while several other is elected or appointed new secretaries of state. so as we prepare for the 2020
election in using what happened in 2016 kind of as a tool that we will not forget looking at the vulnerabilities and the experiences of 2016. what outreach have you participated in two secretaries of state to new executive officers or governors to make sure they are prepared for the 2020 process. >> thank you, congresswoman that the great question. we work very closely with the national association of secretaries of state and participated in their conference two weeks ago where he met several of the new secretaries myself and we also work with the national association of eight election direct yours who also had their conference a couple weeks ago where he met several of those new folks.
we work very closely with them to find out what sort of assistant the eac can have. in 2018, we held a summit at the national press club was well attended, broadcasted on seized and where we talked to people about preparing for the 2018 election one month before the 2018 election in october we held another summit where members of congress and others were ever to kick the tires on voting machines in here from election officials themselves about how they were preparing for the election coming up. i believe the eac is looking to hold additional forums this year and next year with disability groups and state election officials and others so that we can continue our partnership. i believe we've come a long way when folks who are not looking favorably upon the eac and i would ask that you talk to and
ask the question the secretaries of state and they might be a little worried about this, about how we are doing and moving forward. are there other things we can do to improve the process. at the end of the day this is a partnership where we hope to do what best for the american people and ensure the confidence remains high. i journey to your state in december to go down to bay county and talk to folks and find out what actually happened and how they prepared for the election since things were destroyed. they were cleaning out voting equipment with toothbrushes but they still pulled the election off. we want to provide them resources not just monetarily, but it vice on how to prepare for 2020 and move forward. >> thank you. director krebs. >> by the vantage of 140 folks in the field.
a top priority is secretaries are being sworn in was to get meetings on the books. some of those were disrupted by the shut down, but those are back on the books here we are engaging full speed ahead. thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> thank you very much. the gentleman from missouri. thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for being here today. this is not a church question, but you think that we have an election process that sql in this country? >> could you repeat the question? >> are the elections of the united states of america equal? we have a presidential election. are all those sql?
>> every vote counts equally. >> do you agree with that? >> so everybody who votes should have equal access to the voting booths? >> every eligible voter should have access to the ballot. not necessarily into a voting booth. >> that's good. i don't think -- [inaudible] i think i can prove it. rather easily. if you live in oregon, you can vote on sunday as. you can register all the way up to the election. if you are in south carolina, you can vote souls to the polls
or you can vote on sundays. in missouri you can't do that. the neighboring state of kansas you can't do that. in iowa you can't do that. so, something is not right in terms of having equal access to the ballot. to the voting precinct. some people have a greater opportunity to vote than others. thank you. >> i was going to say that i believe if congress wants to give the eac more direction on how to improve the process and we are more than willing to help it. i believe that states are moving with the 380 million to refine voter registration processes and will continue a work was taped to improve the process. the u.s. postal service does a
great job in terms of vote via mail, but i think there other aspects we all can improve upon. >> there are some dates fighting it. >> yes. >> am i right or am i wrong? >> circa my job whatever the system is that vote is being cast and counted in a secure neighborhood. >> i appreciated. >> okay, i'll declare. i am right. and i think i can prove it empirically. we don't all have equal access. i am wondering, we all have been
told by intelligence agencies that vladimir putin ordered interference with our elections. this is a direct quote. they will be back in 2020. in your opinion, how the russians paid a price for interfering with our elections? >> there's been a significant amount of pressure and pain put on the putin administration sanctions other diplomatic actions, a number of indictment. we will continue to push them. we will continue to defend. my mission is to help state and local officials protect their networks, defend their networks and also a on every single day. >> our middle name as assistants and so we want to help as much as we can.
>> i'm not sure that they pay a high enough price for doing what they've done. my suggestion here is that they'll come back again because the price wasn't high enough in all of this people have been indicted, and all they have to do to avoid going to jail is never come back to the united states or not be caught visiting another country which we can have access to the rest. anyway, mr. chairman, i appreciate it. i yield back. >> thank you are you much. i think the witnesses for their testimony. i now call the second panel.
california secretary of state to the panel a leading voice on security and has done a number of innovative things in california to train officials at the local level, raise public awareness about misinformation and make the most of the federal partnerships. secondly, we are here -- [inaudible] praetz. there is an issue with mississippi and alabama he pronunciation. who very recently served as director of election for polk county, illinois in one of the largest counties in the u.s. third, i am excited to hear mr. jake brown, executive or in
the cyberpolicy initiative at university chicago public policy and also cofounder. the world's only public third party inspection voting equipment. the research we've seen come out has been instrumental in helping us understand our vulnerabilities to help us move the conversation on election security forward. finally, in a now recognize their ranking member, mr. rogers, to introduce our minority witness today. >> i'm very happy to have secretary with us today. he's in his second term if not one of, he is the hardest working politician in alabama and he's done a fine job and i'm happy to have him here today. >> without objection, the witness falls day that will be
inserted in the record. i now ask each witness to summarize his statement for five minutes, beginning with mr. padilla. >> thank you, mr. chairman, ranking member rogers and members of the committee. the defense of our nation's elections must be a top priority for all of government. federal, state and local. after all, our democracy is under attack. they have taken the warnings from intelligence agencies, our elections have been and will continue to be targeted by bad actors, both foreign and domestic two-seat to undermine public confidence in our democracy. we know these threads to be real because we see them every day. before you agree that defending the integrity of our elections
as a matter of national security, then we must act accordingly and despite the warnings and advice, our national response i've been asked to discuss with the federal government can do to help and share what were doing in california to better secure our elections. i'll begin by recognizing that both dhs director krebs and senior adviser masters in our tremendous way viable partners. they have honored their commitment to timely communication with us when issues or concerns arise. i will note that the importance of this partnership underscores the danger of unnecessary government shutdown. the 2020 elections quickly approaching, our collaboration must not be interrupted. this partnership is only one component of a comprehensive defensive strategy. we must also invest in election administration.
the last time congress approved new funding for elections with 17 years ago through the help america vote act. investments made as a result were by and large in equipment and technology that are now 20 years old. today it is not uncommon for election officials to be searching online for replacement parts for voting systems that are no longer supported by manufacturers. others are operating systems that cannot be patched or updated with the latest security stop her. if we truly value our democracy, then we must commit consistent administration and security. and yes, congress to appropriate $380 million last year in grants to state. that wasn't new money and certainly wasn't enough. the last of the hanging chad money that was never intended
for modern-day cyberthreat. next, congress has the opportunity to make the best practices for election security the national standards. among them, rigorous testing and certification of our voting systems, logic and accuracy test team of systems before every election. acquiring paper ballots in a paper trail acquiring buttering systems to be kept offline in postelection audits after every election. this is a proven framework for securing elections in improving voter confidence. if they think that their vote may not be counted and cast and they choose to not participate in an election as a result of that out, that is a form of suppression. these policies have served california well for years.
we've established is partnerships with dhs, fbi as well as state and local agencies to better coordinate the threat. we've engaged in security training, tabletop exercises, information sharing and technology infrastructure that is help cybersecurity and office of enterprise risk management. with dedicated staff to monitor and social media and information about voting. we wants public education campaign to raise awareness about election misinformation and we created a web portal with resources for voters including the ability to verify their registration status, find their polling praise. finally, a voter status alert tool, which notifies the voter whenever their voter registration record is up dated and plan to deploy this tool statewide in time for the 2020 elections.
thankfully, the 2018 elections went smoothly. but we know that those who seek to undermine our democracy will continue to try to increase frequency and sophistication. it's not enough for the various actors. we must stay ahead. this requires us to continue to work together, to implement the best standards and to make the necessary investments. thank you for this opportunity. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much. next we will hear from mr. praetz who until very recently served as the direct drug elections were put county, illinois. >> thank you, chairman thompson, ranking member rogers. i was direct your actions in cook county in a speech you fanatics. today and it's a real honor to do so. when election officials certify results, dave bestowed not just power, but legitimacy that comes from the essential american belief that our elections reflect a trusted and true count
of votes. we secure the legitimacy by protect dean to virtues, truth and trust and two different front, infrastructure and information. truth can be protected with policies and practices and ensure a fair and accurate count. trust is protected by continuing to deliver services to our voters does expect it. election officials have been securing both for a very long time. when i started prior to 2000, we served mostly as logistics managers, wedding planners making sure the ripest of people came together at the right place with the right stuff. after bush v. gore, a whole new area with voting technology and rules and we became i.t. managers in nelson's 2016, we must become cybersecurity managers. spurred by the need to defend against or not for sirius, federal and good officials have been working successfully to find a good talent to federal
involvement elections without trampling on authority that this date guard. state election officials to protect statewide voter registration everywhere and more system to some states and were often the spokespeople defending our institution deserve great credit. particularly lead walking in 2016, but also leadership up to 2018 by expecting the premise that were on target and wonderful. federal agency led by director krebs charge of providing direct support in this area is also meant the continuing demand for information and for services. election officials remain committed to the security effort, even though there were no known impact all attacks against us in 2018 because we believe that good news is probably more a function of our adversaries not engaging than it is a result of our significant effort over the last two years and at the risk of being overly
broad and wish to underscore officials are the ones who control secure run elections. 108 in illinois in over a dozen nationally are on the frontlines. we deploy a variety of systems, voter registration systems, information websites come elections results website come election and command centers, not to mention voting systems. each of these are a target. most local election officials were city accounting officers, two or three people facing down shadowy, powerful adversaries like sensory pal an invading army locals needed by his, support or resources for defendable technology and routine hand-counted audit with a digital result is accurate. more critically today they have a pressing need for a top-notch personnel who navigate the current cyberbattlefield. we enter significant efforts at securing the infrastructure and
helping raise awareness in the ecosystem. to decrease the likelihood of successful attack him-ish local election official must have access to an election security officer. we suggest this be handled by a cybernavigator, supporting local election officials. these navigators would adopt the mantra of defend, detect, recover. to help improve defenses following specific recommendations already out there for the center for internet security for the defending digital democracy program at harvard. they establish breach detection techniques and they helped develop recovery plans for when attackers do penetrate the first or second line. to accomplish this, navigators secure free support on homeland security, state government like google and microsoft. they work with state i.t. staffing critically will work at the deeply embedded election vendors who were strategic partners and provide locals up much of their current support. incidentally, illinois lawmakers
spent on a navigator program with $7 million allocated to support each county, 108, more or less equally with human expertise. nine navigators each supporting about 12 counties and serving as their election security officer. the remaining were to be sent for some recognition of bigger counties that cook county are likely more high-value target. voters should feel broadly confident that we have resilient systems in that election officials are taking this very seriously. they should also understand without continued investment in people and products the possibility of a successful attack increases. some candidates already have to call their defeat into doubt. a new digital breach, no matter how far removed from the return sore losers to disbelief, even revolt and reaction our adversaries are looking for. the bottom line is we cannot
eliminate every chance of breach. we can make sure the successful attacks are rare and we can provide assurances that we are prepared to recover quickly when they happen. we do this for support at the local level. thank you. >> thank you very much. with much excitement we've been anticipating the testimony. >> chairman thompson, ranking member rogers and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today on this important issue. i want to think i co-panelists, secretary padilla, krebs, secretary merrill, they lead this nation in securing elections and become a model for others around the country to follow. and so with that, i am jake ron, executive director of the university of chicago cyberpolicy initiative.
i am neither a technologist nor election administrator. however, i've been working with this issue for about 15 years from three kind of distinct vantage points. a few years ago i worked on voter protection issues for multiple presidential campaign. then during my time at dhs i worked on this issue from a homeland and national security if. most recently i cofounded the devcon voting machine hacking village. the voting village as we like to call it is the only public third-party assessment of voting equipment on the planet that we are aware of. one thing that has become clear to us, clear to me as i worked on these issues from these very different is over the years is that this is a national security issue. this is not an election administration nuisance. what i would argue the committee is solving for here is they are
not solving for dangling chads. they are solving for how to stop an existential threat to the united states from elections. let me give you a few key findings that help elucidate that point. so, in the supply chain for the equipment, both the software and the machine is global. many of these parts are made in places, nations that are unfriendly to the united states like china. nationstate hackers could put now where on firmware for these machines and other devices used to implement elections and whole classes of machines all across the united they thought once and never have to leave. that is not something that any local election official can be expected to do with him around. dust is a national security issue and never congress must act to support it. secondly, both devcon, senate intelligence committee and the
national -- global head of website security of identified nearly identical threats across the country. on top of that, as was stated previously in this hearing, there were multiple states that don't have paper trails, much less audits in place to re-engender trust if there was an attack on their elections. and so it may be simply an attack on election reporting website that undermines trust in an election, especially in dates like those without paper trails and audit. on top of that, there is an report since 2016 the russia has had websites in the united state already. and on top of that, we know in the ukraine where they coupled their attacks on websites with fake news they put out, saying that their candidate had won when in fact he had not. all of this together, fighting
back an onslaught of tax but the cybera media give from the nationstate is something that no local election official can be expected to do. i was a national security threat and therefore congress must act to help state and local steel at that. finally, the cyberindustry itself -- sorry, the election industry it self is cyberimmature as we may say. ..
attack that can take over a machine completely. and by the way, this only sounds very hard. however, most of these attacks were done by hackers generally with no previous access to machines, no knowledge of machines and no specialized training . so that's all the bad news . there's a few good things to highlight here. one of those things is the security measures in this bill. they are very good. i'd like to thank my
colleagues who put in incredibly important things like audits, paper trails, readiness to state and locals who desperately needed to improve their cyber hygiene posture but there's also a few other things. number one, there's money for rnd. the current state of the machines nationally are such that they are essentially unsecure and we desperately need new machines around the country. however, the market for machines is such that the margins are so slim for the vendors they would never be able to foot the money needed into rnd to create machines of the future that's can secure our elections. so our research needs help with that. there's an innovative program in their which i think creativelyhelps solve the second workforce problem, a various serious problem and finally there's vulnerability disclosure . thank you very much and i'm happy to answer questions thank you for your testimony, i now recognize mister maryland for five minutes.
do the best you can do's thank you mister chairman, i will . i'm honored to bewith you . ranking member rogers, thank you for the invitation to share with you all today, i'm john merrill and i've served as secretary of state and in our state is in 35 was other states in the union, secretary of state is responsible for the election system in that particular jurisdiction and i think it's important for you to know some of the things we've done in alabama and some of the follow-ups with some of the people i represent that have similar positions to the one that i hold. the florida secretary of state's role is we have reelection, election day and postelection activities we are responsible for. we report all voter registration efforts, we also monitor campaign finance laws
. we ensure participation through awareness campaigns, we have election day and election night reporting systems we've created and we compile, certify election results. we also engage partnerships with public and private partners and independent partners in different ways. we have our counties and municipal governments as well as federal agencies including but not limited to the elections assistance commission, department of justice, national guard, department of homeland security and our relationship with each of these has improved over the last three years since we had this type of situation. and our preparation for the 2018 election cycle, we
concentrated in areas of cyber security, election integrity which includes enforcement of laws and we use paper ballots in alabama and we will continue to do that and by federal law anybody has to retain the federal ballots for not less than two years, that federal law. voter confidence and voter participation is extraordinarily important. we've heard a lot of different things but the important thing that so important for us to remember and to acknowledge is this has come from the department of homeland security's most recent report that there was no breach of any incident in the tabulation that occurred in the 2016 general election. that has been researched, it's been documented and no breach has been occurred and no tabulation in any state in the union in the 2016 cycle. also i think it's important to note that there are serious concerns and issues with hr one in our opinion. number one, significant federal overreach has been indicated through the
introduction of this legislation and it appears to provide certain things that need to be done but the lack of resources in order to be able to do those effectively so there's currently underfunded on or unfunded mandates. number two, many prescriptive requirements that states that would accept these funds would face significant difficulties in an acting those new programs without the resources necessary to do that. they include but are not limited to some things that are ongoing in our state which are electronic toll books, paperballots, automatic voter registration , those things are strictly prescribed and they need to be adhered to you regardless of what local jurisdiction would like to do. number three, the amount of time that the states have to make the requirements is not something that's going to be able to met and one of the questions was asked earlier is that to answer that
question is no, if you want to know why it's because the federal level and in most state levels, they move it to governments, if you move it to state government, you know why it's not going to be done. we can talk about that later if you're interested. as far as the most important thing that i can share with you about the good election security bill would be one that would create the necessary resources to the states without creating unfunded mandates and straining restrictions that would introduce federal overreach. i yielded back the balance of my time. >> thank you very much andlet me dangle the witnesses for their testimony . we have about 20 minutes to kind of run this week so we're going to move fast. miss braun, who did you bring to the attention of the
vulnerability in equipment going back later that was still there, who did you make aware? >> we put it in a report that we relate both to the press and we actually released it here on capitol hill in the heart building and it to multiple stakeholders and in government. as well as through private sector. we dispersed it widely. >> did you make it available to dhs? >> we settled advanced copies . >> did you get a comment that? from them. in any way? >> i did not serve. >> miss merrill, if you apply for any of the funds from the election of this commission?
>> yes, sir, to get our balance from appropriation we did self. >> how much did you get? >> $6.2 million. >> did you have done what you did without that money >> we have congressman, we have not spent a dive a dime of that money yet because the things we are depending on introducing , the continuation of the purchase of toll books which would have 30 or 67 counties currently using it and the introduction of additional politics procedures that would be in place that will cost us resources and other things we're doing in the area of cyber security where we have to provide appropriate match for that. everything that we've done so far and we've done a number of things as a matter of fact, we just mentioned some of these. >> if you just answer my question. you've got 6.2 million's correct. >> you anticipate spending? >> we don't. >> that's what i'm trying to get. so you saw the need for additional resources. >> i always see the need for
additional resources. >> could you tell us how much california received? >> californiasheriff, laster's appropriation was $34 million . and it is pretty much being spent, it's not already been spent to the fiscal year budget and in a number of areas, some of it is in hardware, software updates or locales, the nutrition database, others for security improvements, to that same database, for the ac recommendation on training, cyber training and cyber security, make sure staff understand that a local level are practicing all the best insider hygiene, practices as well. and i want to make a special comment about the timing of this because i've heard from the first panel, is there enough time?
it sounds like an argument to not go forward with offering state additional resources. there always expedite how that money gets from the federal government to the state government, not for locals who need it most. florida 2000, triggered almost 17 years ago and the final disbursement of the dollars just last year, the federal government can move more quickly and appropriate, not just improving but appropriating the money to states. 2016 election revived a lot of these conversations and it wasn't until 2018 that this final part was removed so the federal government can move quicker at the state level to accelerate that investment streaming at the local level entering into contracts with counties, moving the money through that reimbursement base but the fact that the check is not enhanced should not be able to make the
investments that they need to make, so that they can count on being reimbursed by counties to more quickly bring those security benefits to the elections. >> thank you very much, mister braun, supply chain. import also. i mentioned that for the last panel, and i was given this assurance that we will globally refine. i heard a little something in your comment, can you elaborate on that? >> sure. this is kind of an unknown thing that russian hackers as well as other nations packed parts in the supply chain all the time. anybody who questions whether supply chain or remote possible just look at
stockinette, those centrifuges were very in concrete vaults on the ground in the desert. and you know, folks were still able to get in there and take those out. anybody who thinks that undermining our institutions and our democracy is any less of a strategic accordance portal and taking out the iranian nuclear program was to those who did that is very mistaken. >> i've heard it, so we have paid close attention to who provides the equipment for our elections. >> without question. there needs to be parts and where they came from and the inspection of all these overseeing. >> i yielded to the yet ranking member. >> mister chairman. what i've been making the point in my earlier question in trying to emphasize this
is what secretary merrill said, he hasn't spent any of his money yet and secretary donna said he started spending it, take time. invested. this might not going to fix anything in one year. it's going to be processed and in most cases it's going to take several years. that has been my only point. >> secretary, part of this hearing is to review hr one. is there anything in hr one that you find helpful to you in securing elections? >> no punishment, there's things that we find restrictive because we would have to do to adhere to certain guidelines that are in thebill that are associated with the allocation . >> if we were marking it up, what would you suggest we do to improve it? >> one of the things i would encourage the members to do is to make an appropriation that establishes some level of guidelines but did not have strict adherence that had to be met so that the local state or local jurisdictions would be able to purchase equipment or the
able to purchase services or be able to purchase types of products that were necessary for them to administer their elections in a way that they saw fit . because in my mind, it's always best to make those decisions at the local level as opposed to the national or state level going down to the local jurisdiction. >> same question, what would you do if we wanted to improve if anything -mark i appreciate the opportunity. >> there is and other state that establishes not just timetables for the h testing and certification of voting, prior to their being used. that element fails to recognize a handful of the state of california being one that has testing and certification at the state level where we statutorily require state vendors to meet or exceed the federal guidelines. those dates to test that the state requiring duplicative
senior certification and all the timetables to success in terms of properly assessing the election to allow flexibility. >>. >> mister indiana question, the previous panel emphasized there are scores of thousands of voting locations. when you get to this is for the secretary or mr. merrill, do you prescribe standard that counties must adhere to for you to fund their purchases? >> actually, that's done in the legislation that we approved when hava was first adopted. that is not one to adhere to when the corporation came and it wasn't approved at the state level so we made sure that we had training and provided training to our local districts as well. >> you just don't write a check to the local. and you say that the federal
requirements? >> yes sir, there were guidelines established in appropriation that said these are permissible expenses and if you go outside of that , that should be allowable, that is not happening in the past and the frustration we've experienced is when those additional dollars came, they were complemented by what happened in 2003. what happened in 2003 was that there was no deadline on how much funds had to be expended at the state or local level. we have a number of areas in our state that it achieved appropriation years ago and that money is still in the back and that looks good to those people that live in that county but those resources are not spent. they're supposed to be used for the benefit of all constituents that live in the county and in that jurisdiction and in , there's 2100 400 individual jurisdictions.
>> if i may, it's similar and in that agreement that the guidelines are at the federal level, let me tell you earlier how this contract reimbursement came earlier. it also applied to the contracts renewed from the initial point of compliance or verification. indeed the expenditures being made are consistent with the federal requirement . >> mister from, we all know russia's been meddling in our elections with this information for decades and in countries all around the world for decades, particularly in western europe. you made a few minutes ago that the chairman addressed but you said there have been instances from my understanding, no instances of acting in the 2016 and 2018 elections but you said
there have been someincidents prior to that where russia had hacked machines in this country . >> it was a website i was referring to, fox media reported in 2017 an instance where russian bots took down election reporting website. multiple federal resources were cited. >> thank you very much. >> thank you very much, the chair yields to the gentleman from new york. >> thank you all for coming today. over the past few weeks we've heard people refer to hr one as a federal takeover of our elections but i hope that everyone on panel would agree the federal government as a constitutionally protected role on advising and helping to administer elections and i think 2016 should establish that once and for all. i think the previous panel
with mister hicks laid out about the fallacy about claims by showing that they were able to build relationships in these localities, work together without infringing on the ability and rate to set election standards in their own state. my concern is what, and this is to everyone in the panel, what are states doing to work with social media companies to combat widespread disinformation campaigns targeting our elections. what do you think the congress and the federal government can do to better prepare state and local election officials for these dynamic hybrid attacks? >> outstanding question. there's nobody at this table that had a high profile situation than we did in alabama when senator jones in
2017. there's a presentation made by facebook and twitter in 2018 talking about all they had done to help foil this, how they had made it easier for people to understand when biases were removed and how helping the electoral process and i said to them after i waited patiently in line, i said let me say this to you, if you'll tell me what you did to help us in alabama, we both know because they were talking about what they had done and specifically they didn't do anything to help us, not substantively. we came to washington and had a meeting with facebook and talk to them about what they could doand how they could be more helpful and one of the things is that whenever you get ready to purchase and add on facebook , the communicate with you directly through a card that is mailed to a
particular location so you know if the individuals making purchases as a united states citizen. there are other mechanisms put in place that are appropriate. we have got to have some cooperation with people at the social media level that will enable us to be more ability. we will have to have ads removed from youtube and google because of the work that we did but we had a difficult time, twitter was also verysupportive . >> micro remarks i made reference to the creation of an office of election security area as well as an office of enterprise management. and my written remarks expand on that a little bit. some of the initiatives within the election cycle security efforts, were branded a specific web portal with a lot of different tools and verified registration. a dedicated email address for the public to report
misinformation and in addition to that, some of our state funding allowed us to hire staff strictly dedicated to social media monitoring. not for campaigns but to look for information about the election and the voter process. a lot of secretaries, a nasa conversation with representatives from facebook and others, i think we have the benefit of california so we had a little bit of access to them. the specific protocols for being able to approach them for these this specific complaint jump to the front of the line for review because if you say something onelection day, you can't wait for seven days . we ended up coordinating with who we felt were inaccurate, those to etc. and 98 percent of which social media companies themselves took down in violation of their
policies so that's one example of monitoring, reporting. >> if i might, we've looked at the sort of defending our institution on two fronts, one in disinformation fronts, this telus as election officials, we don't have a tremendous amount of sprawl and then there's the other front, the infrastructure which is the place where we have 100 percent control so that's where a lot of our focus has been. there's a bit of overlap and it comes in the form of information about where people vote, when you vote , what you need to vote, requirements, things like that so it's key that the election officials and far more folks drive voters back to trusted sources like us and we remain trusted sources providing fully accurate information. that means that we've got you up the knot again on the
infrastructure that we are protecting. one other note is that we got to expand the services we provide. so media steps in where they think there are gaps in terms of writing registration, driving, showing up at the polling place outreach. there filling gaps they perceive in the administration. to the extent that we don't fill those ourselves, there are going to be third-party providers will continue to do so and that can result in challenging relationships because sometimes the information they rely upon can be inaccurate. >> mister from. >> a question because it hits on kind of how this is such a national security problem and at the university of chicago we spend time trying to update concepts like nuclear deterrence and cyber utterance that has not happened yet in national
security world and i think that the point that you're making, it's nearly impossible for us to stop russia from doing something like they did it in the ukraine where 12 state websites went down as they act the website and russian media announced their candidate won the election, it would be chaos. and that's not in place yet. i think it's something that national security steps can get through and. >> i couldn't agree with you more and let me end with this thought, everything i've heard today over the past three hours and 15 minutes is established in all of our minds the need to address this issue from its nonpartisan stance because we skipped to the very heart of maintaining the democracy whether republican or democrat, you want to maintain and i really hope that thanks to smart brains like you and the prior panel,
hopefully the commitment of everyone on this committee and throughout this body, we recognize how important it is to maintain the integrity of our democracy, thank you mister chair. >> care recognizes the gentleman from louisiana. >> it's interesting that my colleagues mister rice mentioned that the smartest brain in the room mentioned the smartest brain in the room. gentlemen, thank you for your service area the question to both secretaries of state, secretary of state party on the narrow. i had mentioned earlier around of questioning that there were 74,000 precincts, mister chairman, voting precincts in america the actual number is 178,217 and 216 to 2016 voting cycles. this is a tremendous endeavor, our goal in this
committee is shared on both sides of the aisle and when every legal vote to have access to the polls, easy and fair access to the polls, we want the pole to be accurate. whether they are democrats or republicans or anything in between. we have that same goal and you gentleman at the incredible task of ensuring that that happens in your individual states. the, your colleagues in the state of texas secretary of state has stated that in texas, we've now identified 50,000 non-us citizens legally in the country voting in one way or another. elections over the last two decades. i'm going to remind all of us that sometimes even federal elections are determined by very few, our colleague will heard at a tax in 2030 and
his election was determined by 900 and six votes so to say that it's a small problem is not. i don't think it's intellectually sound when that response is measured against elections that are determined by the review. >> secretary of state, it seems to me since we're dealing with title iii and election security and outside jurisdiction, security phases you to establish abrother , run full access to that parameter. and then you control action within that perimeter. so how you serve of california, are you guaranteeing the citizens of your state that access to a controlled voting environment present is limited to a legal vote and sir, i'll be asking
you the same question. this is a spectrum beyond control of the action. we spend a lot of time talking about how to determine the accuracy of a boat, cyber, etc. how do you control legal access to that voting parameter? >> i very much appreciate the question and i know congress times, this is a public safety issue and it's not between public safety and civil liberties. i put that out to consider when it comes to elections, we value security, we value accessibility. those two are not mutually exclusive. so when it comes to the security of the voting process and actions taken within, just look at the data. there have been numerous
reports, numerous investigations that when it comes to baseless allegations of massive voter fraud, showed that voter fraud is exceedingly rare. so we are working by and large, does that not mean that we seriously? we take allegations very seriously but. >> let me give times your colleagues in alabama. and before he answers, let me state that what we see is reassurance at the state and local level that we're dealing with 170,000 precincts that legal action to that voting environment is recognized and the securities concerns that were talking about, jurisdiction over securityand the section of our elections in america , certainly any reasonable man or woman would recognize. >> 2401 of those are in
alabama.and let me share this with you too. and i want to be perfectly clear about this. >> you're going to have 10 seconds. >> the only people that need to be voting in us elections areunited states citizens . >> would identify a legal access. >> thank you, ideal. >> the reason i said that secretary of state, we're trying to finish a, that's the good news. the bad news is all the questions going forward. we nearly 2 minutes, let's go ahead. >> mister chair, quick question. so for mister mr. merrill, with hr one help or not help voter system integrity. >> there are additional resources on the table that are needed . >> in our previous question had to improve upon the language, maybe this could be
more strategic for state investment. >> has the potential to but not in the current form. >>. >> thank you, the chair yields the gentle lady from arizona. >> thank you mister chair and briefly appoint asked one other question and it will be an aside to you. >> section 1302 of this bill criminalizes.'s or misinformation regarding election candidates. much of how in this bill it determines that the person is in violation of these provisions is to their intent. the penalty written in the bill is defined by the hundred thousand dollars or the amount in prison or both. my question is, and how are we going to determine who's going to be the arbitrator in
determining something as vague as information or not and in my collection, my opponent get a lot of misinformation about me. are they going to be a criminal now as well? >> congresswoman, i want to make sure you know this. we voter fraud which that would be a part of this problem very seriously in the state. we had six convictions and reelections that have been overturned. prior to the time since i became secretarywe've not had any incidents of occurrence reported , identified, investigated and prosecuted and i promise if you like to have it, i'd be happy to share it with. >> this was reported and in our office and all that for have been fully taken care of in one way or the other and i'm happy to show you what we got on that. i think it's important to know that we have a number of prosecutors in our state who are not really interested in advancing investigations into
voter fraud because they think the penalties are too stiff so the penalties outlined in the code section you just identified, i don't know if they are really commensurate with what the crime rates would be self a number of people who may be concerned about implementation at any level. >> thank you mister chairman. perhaps i had gotten misinformation on the information i got was on that particular section and also included misinformation like you put out on facebook or something like that and they criminalize it so perhaps i'm wrong . >> thank you very much. would the gentlemen come in? thank you very much. you have to minutes, gentle ladyfrom california . >> thank you mister chairman and i first want to thank everybody for being here.
thank you secretary buddy off for everything you're doing. in 2016 several media reports claimed 21 states and then targeted or hacked. was california one of them and if so what happened? >> california was not, it was a specific type of breach. that brings to mind another valuable lesson that local election officials have learned, cyber security or cyber hygiene, cyber vocabulary is also specific. when there's an incident, you have to be specific and precise about what has or has not happened. i don't want to downplay incidents , that would make me responsible for account ability to the public but i also can't blow it out of proportion. there's thing that came out
in 2015 about 21 states, to my understanding california was on this list of states that were scanned by entities with the russian government. what is scanning? scanning can be described as coming into a neighborhood, checking doorknobs to see if there's a lot. you're looking for vulnerabilities. the scan isn't in and of itself a hack. it's not compromising a system. so frankly, scanning is very very common and it's something we all depend on now not just in the elections but across industries though that's a long way to answer your question. california is on that list but we know what it was, we know what it wasn't. >> thank you, i'll yield back my short time . >> thank you very much and i'm sure the congressman will appreciate , you have to minutes . >> thank you mister chair, the short answer if you can,
were you suggesting that there were a lot of much more voter fraud in the state of alabama? there was another attempt to prosecute because the penalties were too stiff?>> i have two incidences that i can share with you briefly. one of 119 absentee ballot applications were mailed to one location and nobody lives in that home. in another jurisdiction, 109 absentee ballot applications were mailed to mayoral candidates mothers homes and neither one of those had been licensed yet. >> were there many more? >> yes sir. we have been frequently and they're not just related to certain parts of our state either . >>. >> most of the studies show we didn't have a mass. >> but the main account
abilities we see are in the area of absentee ballots, not walk up in person voting. >> my follow-up question, >> our elections, we had the thousand statistics in this. 8000, three states use electronic voting machines. that i don't miss a lot of things that are different? i'm having difficulty, i went to some of the schools and when you do, you have to make action so i can't do it all these things, all these different states and territories are doing things differently, how can we be equal? >> am i right or am i wrong? if your premise is that the united states of america, and citizens with minimal exceptions exercise that right to vote and without any
obstacles, then how we achieve those in each state? some states have rates to be a registered voter if you're eligible, some states do some states offer more options for how to about? unfortunately yes some states do better than others. i tried to make california the leader of the pack to yes, being secure, and being as friendly as possible. >> second for the gentleman from alabama. >> there are several things i want to share with senator, in 2015 we registered 1,199,000 new voters. we now have 3,473,030 registered voters. we have exceeded and surpassed any voter registration and voter participation records and history of our state.
and in that time, we have done more per capita than any state in the union. to ensure that all of our eligible citizens are registered to vote and have an id. >> thank you very much, thank you: from missouri for the question. let me thank allyou witnesses for your expert testimony . we will probably have some additional questions for you to respond back to you i'd like you now to enter into the record, the final report on the democratic congressional task force on election security and article on voting participation. >> without objection. >> i think the witnesses for their valuable testimony and for their questions and members of the committee, as i indicated have additional questions for the witness and we ask you respond expeditiously in writing to those questions. hearing no further business, the committee stands adjourned.
to the white house this coming friday with massachusetts democratic senator elizabeth warren. she'll be speaking at a new hampshire democratic party dinner in manchester, yet live on friday starting at 7:30 p.m. eastern on c-span. and this weekend it's the national governors association annual winter meeting in washington dc. we will be live on saturday with a discussion on criminal justice reform and we'll also hear from j.p. morgan chair and ceo jamie diamond. and the forum on state child welfare systems. the national governors association winter meeting, live coverage begins saturday at 9:15 on cspan2. >>. >> there are over 100 new faces in the us capital, after last year's election, including misery senator john hawley, he previously served two years as that state attorney general . earlier in his career, he worked for a nonprofit that
does legal advocacy for religious freedom issues and taught at the university of missouri law school. he's now the youngest member of the u.s. senate. kansas representative charisse davis is often described as a former mixed martial arts fighter but she's also an attorney work on economic and travel issues. she the first openly gay person to represent kansas in washington dc and one of the first two native american women elected to congress along with new mexico's jen holland. the second district of kansas elected republican steve watkins, a former us army captain and military contractor who suffered both a dramatic brain injury and posttraumatic stress disorder from his service in afghanistan. the congressman took up dogsledding while stationed in alaska, participated in the iditarod twice. he also attempted to climb mount everest, six members of the team died in the 2015 nepal earthquake stopping the ascent. representative kevin carr
joins congress slightly ahead of most other house presidents, last year replacing his predecessor jim eisenstein who resigned to become a nasa administrator. harassment burn also have an interest, he was pursuing a phd in astronautical engineering with a 1986 challenger explosion changed his career plans. instead, he purchased a mcdonald's restaurant and eventually led to buying making more mcdonald's in the tulsa area. representative kendra moore also has strong ties to the aerospace industry. she's a former executive and a nonprofit and advocate for the industry. earlier in her career she was a secretary for former punishment brad carson. she's also been an attorney in private practice. before herelection , representative horn was a consultant for communication technology companies. new congress, newleaders , watch it all on c-span. >> next, lawmakers, former