tv Scholars Discuss Public Perceptions of U.S.- Russia Relations CSPAN April 8, 2019 2:07pm-3:37pm EDT
spirit of the democratic party and there is more spirit or republicans in my opinion by far we may express it somewhat differently and that is okay. more spirit than i have ever seen and i've now been doing this for a little while. not too long. i am 141. i want to be to four two. [applause] together with the love and prayers and devotion of everyone in this room, incredible people, and the millions of patriots across the land we will make america rate again for all americans greater than ever before. thank you and god bless you all. god bless america. thank you. >> here on c-span2 we take in
life to a discussion that just got underway moments ago on a nurse to a public perceptions of us russian relations the center for strategic international studies. >> you have all learned from each other. so public opinion is often affected by the media and the media is focused a lot of the tensions and we see this in both sides of public opinion and we are talking about key highlights and touch on some of these and then we can expand later through more discussion depending on what the questions are so the russians and americans knew the view that relationship is a rivalry rather than a relationship and interestingly other research that shows both
sides view the american people and the russian people so there is dumb hope for the diplomatic public diplomacy arena and the russian general public pretty much the courts and international foreign-policy of the government think it has helped increase the international profile and the support the annexation of crimea and it's a good thing and have done so since 2016 was the first time you first talked about that in a support independence for parts of ukraine and seem to think that poor relations with the united states is the cost of this increased prominent on the
world stage encountering foreign-policy. americans, on the other hand, also see consider russia international profile to be increasing in the world and are worth right now than they were before about russia but it is not quite extant central level, a fear of international terrorism or nuclear proliferation, or much more urgent threats. something that is interesting on the american side is there are real partisan differences whether republican or democrat influences your views on cooperating or limiting russians influence in the world and that is new. before this recent period of time publicans and democrats both felt similarly about russia because of domestic political issues and now it's become a more polarized issue. finally, there are still areas of shared concern especially in working toward common policies or ways to address terrorism and
nuclear proliferation highlighted by the research we have done on views of the withdraw from the ins treaty were many apples i suppose their withdrawal from that. this was the highlight. >> one of the questions we asked russians and americans is whether or not they perceive relations with the countries in other countries more of a partnership or more rivals. you can see both russians and americans largely see the net states and russia is a more rivals than partners and americans view the relationship with european union as a partnership but interestingly we found from the american perspective this year americans are even more likely to say china is more of a rival than a partner and have been in the past.
do you want to do this? >> yes. i wish to mention of course russian in china things like they support majority of russians but what they see the media to be and to show the corporation when they say russia and china are more [inaudible] this view is formed by comrades in the russian relations with the west. >> let me add here that before this there were more opinions toward china because and certainly smaller than china but
we have this russia china relation and other issues and i think what is feeling for russians because the conflict begins many people and still [inaudible] no other major leaders was a rather satisfying and depends on russia's role in rising china and further here i would like only to mention this rather positive view of germany that you see mostly partners is negative and new you get the sense that when there are
conflicts broke out we saw every magnitude feeling union in general but also towards germany, france and other european countries and this means they have just done many things that some development that [inaudible] receive public opinion warning toward certain countries. of course, much some positive views about russian, german and dialogue and going on [inaudible] at least people can
understand [inaudible] >> i think another point about the russian views toward china is also that while the united states has sanctioned russia they've placed tariffs against china so they have sort of pushed them together in the same mindset. one other thing i want to mention is a little different question but we also add in both countries whether the unity among nato allies has grown further together or further apart or about the same in both americans and russian sense there's been a real rift between europe, europeans and united states, as well. it is interesting to pick up all
these different currents among the public opinion in the news media as well. so, we asked this a few times in a couple of years whether united states should try to undertake family cooperation engagement with russia rather it should actively work to limit russian power and in the past that 5% of americans say we should contain russia rather than actively work with russia and it's that rebel pins were more likely to say that we should try to be friendly with russia which has been a shift from previous debate and on the russian side very similar abuse that 53% of russians believe that russia should try to limit united power
and only 30% think that we should undertake cooperation engagement. >> for me it was frightening that several questions that we asked in this way previous wave two countries are so similar and [inaudible] very different context or different media because we mention at the very beginning and public opinion very much and of course we have different opinions and different channels in the united states and so with russia we dominate the media landscape say with tv
channels and does not a gender and deal with rather similar views and surprises of [inaudible] >> i mentioned earlier that in past surveys americans generally want to cooperate with most countries even with groups like while they consider violent groups like hamas or the caliban and back in the day cuba americans always preferred to talk rather than disregard other countries so it is interesting and a big shift for americans in 201656% thought that we should be friendly toward russia and now that it has reversed with the majority think we should
have containment. >> i would add to in 2016 we asked just before the 2016 presidential election and that was july and then we asked the question again in 2017 this reaction to the election results among democrats and they were far more likely undertake from the corporation and engagement with russia and before the 2016 election and the slip in sentiment toward working to limit russian power. >> what about russia? it is still quite stable and 53% contained and in 2017 was the same number. it did not change. >> [inaudible] we have different
trends which sometimes can be rather opposite because at the same time we have the majority who say that population is needed. cooperation and containment. at the same time operation and not giving in but just doing what you are doing. here we see a problem if you want [inaudible] we are kind of in a deadlock for a sense. both at the same time and without concession. >> we have asked past surveys other russia and americans would cooperate on issues like climate change or nuclear proliferation
the majority say yes should cooperate but they have in mind their own countries version of what they should cooperate on their own country policies. not necessarily [inaudible] >> i think one of the very interesting findings for when looking at public opinion in russia in particular has an increased sense of confidence -- would you say? and russians regaining their status as a global player in this graph you see and i can't see the number right there but the majority is 56% of russians say that russia has increased
and is more important now than ten years ago and americans also tend to think that russia is more important now than ten years ago and and for americans they tend to think our country is less important than it was ten years ago and that russia is often more important. it is not so much that the us is the only player calling the shots and russia has been like that and because the international policy of russian government and put in they have made their mark on the world stage. >> also i can add here that the greatest country as if it power today in russian public opinion is russia china and the united states so russia being the most
important and this is the change from the beginning of the '90s where there was no china and understanding [inaudible] the united states is losing its we must say that that it is still considered the question in russia as well but i think very dangerous moment that the united states is a decline also in the [inaudible] [inaudible]
>> the context of this question is is this role more important than it was ten years ago so that would be also putting the united states and the majority do say it's either as important in russia as important or more important [inaudible] it is interesting context in world dynamics. >> [inaudible] rushing seems like one of the leading military
greater success in the past years of russia they have connected with strengthening military enforcements. >> we asked americans this year and in 2017 which one poses the greatest security threat to the united states and interestingly in 201759% said that was north korea and in the aftermath of back-and-forth tweeting between their leader and our leader and the attention of the moment but cut to two years later and the threat perception of north korea decreased significantly and russia rose particularly among democrats.
republicans are more likely to say that china poses the biggest that to us security. >> another interesting uptick we see recently is the threat russian territorial poses to us interests and and last year the highest percentage we feel that's played a critical threat in us interests and even 2014 and annexed crimea. >> one of the big questions is today's event in the united states whether people believe that russian influence 26 election the blue ball bar represents two thirds of americans believe what the
your faith and stuff like that but well, [inaudible] >> we also did a short study of looking at dennis and stefan's in-depth interview expert on the us russian relationship did an online poll of experts on the us russian relationship and jeff participated in that and there was interesting findings that what you just said that some of the relief was mixed whether people believe that moscow did interfere in the elections or not but even those who do not believe said if they did then they should not have been caught and should have done it in a more intelligent way.
we asked about the impact of central russian policy and what we see interesting -- for me what was interesting is saying that there is an understanding that [inaudible] and had it costs and i would say and you can see it that we have in through different and other the growing feeling that more and more that the economic crisis but also the pension reform being introduced they are
studying and asking questions it is worth doing. at the same time this is one of the important results that at the same time we see people like russians exit grow in the world and still they have the majority of things that is the right thing to do but at the same time questioning other doing it again is very contradicting trend in public opinion and may be one of the explanations of why we have so many contradicting trends and it is the result of many people
publicly putting these things together because on russia you can hear [inaudible] and not many people speaking publicly about the costs of cost of everyday life and more privately for focus groups we see more and more people questioning but it does not result in public position toward this policy but because there was no public position or no opposition and those who express a position there come from what is credited and there is no credible faces
in public sphere that can express this criticism to gath gather. >> just an intriguing point is that you saw this five previously and eight, ten russia is a rising military power and they partially see that as connecting to the foreign poli policy. >> when we ask about russian international posted general maybe different and best that except for example military is not as popular as in ukraine and so it depends on the context of
question -- >> two more things this question in particular that we talked a little bit about how russians see the negative impact on the economy and standards of living but also registering the large majority say it has worsened an russians relationship within estates but look at pulling on a whole the russian reaction i get the sense that they don't care and it has impacted the relationship with the united states. they have this great question on whether or not they should adjust policy because of sanctions will continue acting in their own interest and largely russians think the country should act in their own interests regardless of what reaction and everything i find interesting is that the majority of russian foreign policy is a benefit to its international
influence and reflection of their hard power capabilities and more split on russian international image. the plurality 44% since improved but 42% say it is worse and that's more a reaction to some people see a degradation in russian soft power abilities. >> this is about crimea and this is not more bad or good but we must also put it in dynamic and we see this is actually the question whether there is some changes because when we ask about should crimea be
[inaudible] no changes but majority say [inaudible] with this economic crisis with sanctions and poor economic performance and reform which is understood as ordinary russians [inaudible] they do not have enough money for pensions but for crimea and syria and everyone else around the world not just russians so in this context and maybe it was not a good thing to do after all in crimea and we see that there is
the country and -- >> what is the percentage of prove to put in first those who do not approve overall? >> overall it is 64%. >> that support -- >> but speaking of approval it is not only about putin but about if you ask about putin i would rather use trust in putin or electoral rating for his supporters but much of this big number and approval and trust in the intellectual rating comes from this attitude so no [inaudible] [inaudible] now
annexation of crimea we asked whether us actions to date to isolate russia have gone too f far, are about right or not gone enough. overall is light blue bars those of which said 49% of americans say it's been about right and that includes 71% of republicans. 49% of democrats say that they have not gone far enough in overall that is 36%. it's another flip between publicans and democrats that still is not necessarily tied so much to their actual awareness and what is in the sanctions and the underlying reasons and more about political preferences and the legitimacy of donald trump which goes to the heart of
interference in the election and it is really the legitimacy of his presidency after falcons agreed that that. >> we also asked in 2017 various takes on pensions that they placed on russia so for americans we asked them what modifications to russian behavior they thought would be most important and sort of illicit using of sanctions and interestingly you will see towards the bottom returning crimea to ukraine is the original source of these is fairly low priority for americans. they are far more interested in some sort of agreement to refrain from using cyber tactics
another countries. the second most significant to americans is the drying support for a sod in syria. again the priority of ukraine in korea is less significant than the other aspects of russian policy. >> russian opinion documents that will limit interference because of cyber attack and is not sensitive for russians but sensitive for americans and they make the common ground and at the same time reunification crimea has very much that is
majority of russians won't accept and deal with it. >> can go back? >> an interesting thing with airstrikes in syria the 40% would oppose it 45 would supported it is interesting there is common perception among americans and russians on the issue syria where neither want to get super involved in domestic dispute and it's more about combating international terrorism and a common goal for russia for a long, long time and americans, too. they want to crush isis but not necessarily help the rebel force in syria. >> speaking about syria [inaudible] [inaudible] in favor
but still the majority where it is exactly that from the very beginning that even without asking a question the references any in russia feared and still fear it will be a second afghanistan so deepening [inaudible] that is why syria can be such common ground of other questions showed that it is more about counterterrorism and also having an agreement on
nuclear preference which is had majority in both countries and inf treaty and it is interesting that big portions trying to agree on an approval what government is doing that may be current agreement is outdated. that but still the majority say some agreements because of a big problem about nuclear and still feel that this is not a [inaudible] >> just a general observation is that even if there aren't strong
institutional ties between russia and the united states, especially now that we have withdrawn from some of these agreements, the relationship between american presidents has been what has driven us russian policy forward in positive ways and american context with the investigations into trump administrations ties to russia and congress strong hand on whether trump can even maneuver trying to relieve some of the sanctions in this particular moment the role of the president interactions is pretty irrelevant in this situation so it is interesting to note that in contrast to past
administrations. in terms of public administration as you saw him a few slides americans and russians still don't seem to have much room to negotiate especially in crimea and they are at the same time there is no domestic pressure in either country to change the current environment and there are interesting internal differences with republicans being more willing to cooperate with russians and democrats and people who support putin and having differences on crimea and generally majority of each country's each other as a rival and that their influence and power should be maintained. so it is not even though we have endeavored to be a peaceful
cooperation and move to improvement is a pretty depressing reality of where we stand. >> okay. on that cheery note. [laughter] i will open it up to questions. we have a little more than half an hour. let me start with a couple brief observations and maybe things to kick off the discussion. to start with the last point there i think one of the challenges in the us russian relationship has long been lack of for better term called ballast that lack of the colors on either side in that relationship people who benefit or have a personal stake in some way to having a better relationship at the political level so consummately little ties have always been subject to pretty dramatic swings based on things that happen whether crisis or invasion or something
out. that doesn't seem like it will change anytime soon. that is both good and bad. good aspect of it is that the relationship is subject to change and with political [inaudible]. i remember during the obama reset one of the figures that we in the us like to sound off is that russian perception and the united states have improved dramatically over the course of a couple years because greater emphasis is placed on operation. of course, now we are where we are. on the one hand we don't have this grassroots pressure on the inside and on the other hand if there is and what that does shift public opinion follow
pretty quickly. true on both russian and us side. as far as the survey is how your into tuitions work together to spite the biggest challenges despite the russian militia for now it has been doing this work now for a couple of years and what is some of the biggest surprises you notice in terms of how things have changed over time or what are the results that maybe you did not expect on the work you've done the course of the previous years? >> i think this is just a two-year project that opinions on foreign-policy and united states that we do not people quickly i don't think that the shift toward interesting the parallels views so there's a
slide -- the question about continuing and limiting was nearly identical to americans and russians played a part in world affairs was nearly identical as well. it is interesting the mindset are similar to spite been on opposite side of a lot of issues. russians and americans don't know much about the other country. another survey the very few russians have ever met and some americans have met the present of americans have met a russian was here either working or luthier. i think there's a lot there's a
soft power on both sides both american and russian highly successful in science and technology in particular so it's data showing some opportunities. most of the time they tend to be stable and there is one other interesting shift that when donald trump did get elected wasn't there a shift upward, i believe -- you see there was a spike and -- yeah, in 2016. the helsinki summit again. i think trump actually there
were high expectations in russia and it's been another disappointment in that is one of the most volatile points. >> that is a question we don't have a figure for what we asked russian -- there is a trend and whether or not they think relationship will change who is president of the united states and russians were largely hopeful that relations would improve and then after about a year of trump being an office that they thought the relationship had changed and quite disappointed. >> they were rather high expectations that the government had more expectations than the general public because the expectations were little more about obama's first term as president and focus groups
people talk to me about it and said yes, well, all these politicians promise golden mountains at the beginning and then they amount to nothing. >> we wanted the best but it turned out the way it always does. >> yes, in the sense there were expectations for people thought that maybe it will be all politicians and trying to figure it out the formula for russian us russian relations i would say that again, many people in focus groups say we will never be friends. [inaudible] [inaudible] formula
can be very important with public opinion because guess, we see the dynamic of russian and yes, it is very dynamic and the maybe dependent on their political agenda genuinely for politicians who need it but overall was estimates for the us world role in the world is negative since the end of [inaudible].
>> i was just going to say yes, the research pitted among the experts even in the united states and many experts were reflecting on some of the agenda items that the us has nato expansion and global sanctions in many different steps along the way that aggravated the relationship. >> actually, [inaudible] dips in the attitude with the georgian war annexation of crimea. >> almost to the month, too. >> lots more questions but i want to open it to the audience. ... popularity of the united
states in russia and the united states but i want to ask a question that's a little different, in a different way. to what extent do you think having a great power opponent is conducive for maintaining your own power in one country , i'm not singling out any country but having an enemy that is big and scary and you can wave the flag and mobilize a lot of resources by having that enemy to keep
yourself in power for the foreseeable future, to what extent do you think that is playing into this equation? >> we don't have enough data to quantify this but i know from more anecdotally, in the us i certainly got the sense that very many people were in sort of a perverse way thrilled to have russiaback as the enemy . it's just this sentiment towards russia snapped right back in terms of how we talk about russia in the media and in particular, i rather got the sense to that it's the same way in russia, that putin benefits from having the united statesas an enemy . >>. [inaudible] we will see spikes with putin in approval
of his actions because of course when they have confrontation with a powerful enemy, you need a strong leader,strong hero to save you . that's why you need an authoritarian leader. >> the same time it's not a cold war scenario where there's these ideologies combating each other and also, americans are more likely to see russia as an enemy but it's not to the same level as a lot more pressing, urgent matters. i think in 2002 the first time we did a survey after september 11 and that was the point where the public was so mobilize to take action, the
american public but then after the war in iraq, after several years in afghanistan with a sustained effort, so much blood and treasure, they weren't able, the government wasn't able to maintain that support. so yes, it might work for a while but if the public is not, does not see any success within a reasonable amount of time and at a low cost, then the public will not necessarily. [inaudible] to. >> i would also say it's the most important point of putin's personality is this point that no alternatives and i would say that the qualifiers to having anenemy , for example is to discredit your opponent. so it's not exactly to mobilize but just to help to, or to explain your actions
because if there is no united states, it may be harder to explain why are you doing this? so. [inaudible] but it's not the maininstrument of boosting support . >> andre. >> first of all, could i challenge your assessment of the result of your report as depressing. it seems to be prettypositive and optimistic , if it comes to resolve that american public opinion is in. [inaudible] in support of assad or maduro, it could be
a lot more depressing and that's why it's some ray of hope. two questions, one, [inaudible] again, how would you describe such a huge discrepancy between republicans and democrats in the union of russia which would not seem to be areas of policies in the united states and for instance, you have not seen, you have shown here these numbers but you definitelyknow from the result , this famous race of 84 to 60 or 86 to 14 in support of crimean annexation and against. [inaudible] it's slightly different but it doesn't
matter but we come to such events like who killed or tried to poison, these russians who think who hit mri 17 is one percent. all others would be ukrainians, americans, british, foreign agents and so on. how would you describe this unthinkable low percentage of russians that follow these events and similar, even much smaller than crimean annexation, why such a small portion of russians think this way? >> i'd like to challenge your version back that since the
iraq war, there have been growing divisions between republicans anddemocrats on foreign-policy .not just in russia, but i would argue is more a reflection of them domestic politics and foreign policy but we see huge divides on immigration, on climate change between republicans anddemocrats . i'm trying to think of some other issues that we have. defense spending, a lot of , it used to be that the differences stopped at the water's edge. to some extent, before the iraq war but didn't stand up and had big differences. >> so russia in particular, we have a similar question, we asked in an attempt how americans feel about an individual country since
1982, we've been asking soviet union and then russia, and then russia is an interesting case right now because americans used to be fairly cohesive on how they viewed moscow. it wasn't until after the election in 2016 we saw the split and interestingly enough, you think about republicans typically as being hawkish on russia and the soviet union. we saw a republican official opinion of russia improve between 2017 and 2018 whereas democrat opinion has deteriorated. it's a very interesting case and i think it is a reflection of rallying support behind thepresident . we asked in this particular survey, there are very few questions where there wasn't a difference, so the one most notable was arms control. we asked whether americans or
russians were coming to an agreement to nuclear weapons, for the united states, 90 percent of republicans favored coming to an agreement and 89 percent of democrats also favored coming to an agreement so that was really it in terms of cohesion americans for both parties in this one.we asked a series of questions on russia and syria in 2018. and we found that on a very niche issue, russia's involvement in syria there was a lot of democrats and republicans in sort of foreign-policy. but if you take trauma out of the equation, which is hard to do sometimes, we do find their united but as soon as there's even ahint that trump , we see these gaps in democrats and republicans. >> the gaps were all about the election interference
because sanctions, there were very big differences. it's all because of democrats tend to say if russia interfered, then she pulls ahead, that if the election had been tampered with, then trump was illegitimately elected. so that really is what that impetus is his support for trump and some 80 percent, 80 something percent of republicans now have a positive opinion of trump. so it's become a partisan debate. on the broader foreign-policy issue regarding russia, is not as great but basically, as i said at the outset, it's really a reflection of domestic politics. >> the rest of us over here.
i've got to let you guys answer the question about russian views. >> it depends on the question . yes, sir no, no enrollment. we've asked who actually was in but the most common answer is 55, 53. and it seems when we asked focus groups it's much more people are willing to admit the russia's involvement. that russia is responsible. but they choose an open question, the front question, they choose not to answer. so because it's kind of a situation.
>> thank you, my name is the first, i'm a journalist. it's clear there in the american response there's a divide between republicans and democrats area and the russian respondents, one of you when you were talking about the crimea question talk about the divide between those who hadn't had not benefited from his policies. is that or is there another consistent divide in the russian answers comparable to the partisan divide in american politics? >> one group is anti-putin so other prominent groups with a different relation of putin's policies for example, [inaudible] still there's
some differences in terms of people following independent news regularly or not. and whether they, another group is against it but the criticism of putin is divided into groups, those who are following independent media and those who are not. >>. >> there is some differences but not very big. >> the one thing we were talking about before this comment would be interested to see that as a generational divide. >>. >> they also have left over a
view and they traditionally bulk operation and slightly more than other age groups. you ask about questions about crimea, and it seems like they have maybe less ideological frames, maybe they're kind of, have , they're not very interested in politics at all and such issues like crimea or the eastern part of ukraine, they're not interested in the official line.
>> okay, thank you. >> sometime counsel general, [inaudible] one other category that you asked about is there a split between nonbelievers and believers? crimea was a great step forward for that patriarchy in constantinople as a great setback and this had considerable influence on all of us here. >> if i understood right, but of course, the it's very different views and it depends on the question. because while crimea is a more, there is more concern, about the status of crimea, but if you look at the difference of questions like
syria, syria is already a big portions that don't know how to relate to this. and it depends on the issue but opinion is always important in the states policy and actually, because of this, russia has benefited much in propaganda because even with the ukraine we had before the majority were people who were again against russia. they say no troops, no money, to let them be and in other countries, that they been a benefit and russia has to, what we saw is the change of how the news was delivered
through kind of a raw state mode of activation of the media. so they had to convince the people that russia has to get involved and they've done so through huge methods of propaganda programs and also using these issues of threats to the russian population and the ukrainian government so just to convince people that it's right to intervene. >> she was asking about religious divides and whether there are certain questions where there's a difference between people are, who identify as being believers and those who don't or between orthodox and other
forms. >>. [inaudible] >>. [inaudible] different religious views but it's much different. >> maybe there should be differences in big believers. but for me it's tough to say. >> there certainly was a different with the overall hierarchy and they kind of led what was said in every church in russia. >>. [inaudible] in your surveys will you take into account the millions of russians who found themselves living in independent states after the breakup of the soviet union as for instance in wachovia,
in estonia combined 1 million but who are still affiliated emotionally, culturally with russia and if so how does their opinion differ from the opinion of russianswithin the russia proper . >> we usually deal with russiaonly . if the only project in these countries. >> there are research organizations still in the baltics do study and break it down by the different nationalities. >> okay, back there. >> thank you, [inaudible] i wonder if you measured the data and dynamics, the concessions that russians in order to lift thesanctions, can you tell us anything about the dynamic ? >>.
[inaudible] >> it was the result of this project, looking at these questions and what it caused us to think about this way. >> we only had again because it was just really to your framework, we didn't expect things to shift that much, especially since the deal in crimea has been super statewide. >> there's not much dynamics in the question whether russia should give it or not, or whether russia should make concessions of the majority. >> jack, is it even clear what exactly the concessions would have to be? >> get the sanctions listed?
>> others may have different views but that us policy has been models on this issue because there have been different rounds of sanctions in response to different activities and some of them are linked to specific policy choices, for example getting out ofcriteria . others aren't, they're in response to things that happened in the past, the us and as a way to impose costs for different methods and to my mind it's less clear what the pathway towardsmoving those kind of sanctions would be . >>. >> my name is alexandriawells . so in regards to your i guess conclusion that americans and russians you each other as rivals, that need to be contained, what you think
would need to happen organically hour by putting work on either side that could change that mentality of both americans and/or russians. >> as i said earlier, on the piece of positive news is that among the republican there is some goodwill to work on for a lot of symptomatic exchanges and exchanges of experts which have happened a lot and in previous decades. as that's really where things should start so that made it maybe some grassroots healing . or pressure to improve things, but one area of potential as i said before was working on arms control so even though we would move from the imf treaty, the both public, many think that it was a mistake to do so.
and this is one area where we had working level experts having a dialogue all the time you and we're still having some dialogue on syria for example so i think having communities maintaining the dialogue and waiting until there's a better time when the united states massive political situation is intense and partisan way. maybe we could take on the lawn but i think i used to work for the state department and the public diplomacy armed and i think there's a great, that's how we met. that's how my team had met and an exchange program, not the state department but an exchange program, but their kinds of interactions are really important, especially in this environment now. >>.
>> sarah ocho, professor at university of maryland and a wilson fellow here. thank you for a fascinating presentation, lots of important information. i have a point your question, as i've been teaching russian politics for 25 years and i've never been more positive so i think the good news not just for me maybe is that my students, my undergraduate students are much more interested, more people are interested in learning russian so i think there if there's a silver lining it there. my question is of course to hammer, everything the nail. it's asking about media use, because i think that's the part. >> nine this project but we will publish, i usually took difference, media we see we come together for a coupleof years . and another round will be in
a month or so. >> on how tv is going down, internet going up. >> i was talking about online in fact, i did my dissertation research 25 years ago the other point i want to quickly was media might be an intervening variable for some of the american, the difference in everybody's opinion because you know not all republicans are. but almost all supporters are republicans and we know that some supporters tend to live in a media file. and their much father of media outlets such as fox news and breitbart and there's good research on that so i'm wondering if the coverage of russia is different on those outlets in some way that might be driving these exchanges that the research project forme . >> it may not have changed that much , but in those outlets on the left winning outlets, they become more
negativeand more prominent . >>. >> we have got time for maybe two more questions so the here and then back here. >> you very much, fascinating conversation. i did work on ice is surveys a lot so i apologize for the methodology of my question. since you do parallel into countries such as exquisite survey, how much is controlled for exact language to get a questionnaire, pulling each other open-ended, closed ended questions like that. i know the sentiments, i don't know if you had trends, thank you very much. >> so we started out with some of the topics we wanted to cover and sometimes we
started with one of our trends and we started one of the other trends and we had to adjust the language around annexation but reunification of crimea. but we tried to mirror other questions as much as possible so that they could be a direct comparison but you notice some of this side only had russian data and another only had american because the context wasdifferent questions were appropriate . >> we have a little bit of back-and-forth translation and we're working on it. especially stefan and i, they would email back and forth and out go into the right word to use, we quite a lot of thought when we do parallel questions tomake sure they are as close as possible . >> we did leave based open-ended for this
particular study because we had budget constraints but another survey that will be coming out soon, we had many open-ended questions on different personalities that people recognize from each country, so that should be coming out soon. >> and if there's another hand in the back. >> johns hopkins. i was just wondering regarding, first of all, thank you for this excellent survey, but regarding the potential election, i see very high numbers there, on the part of democrats think a great deal likely that there was russian involvement in the 2016 election. i'm wondering how much will the investigation factor into that very high come out and do we think it might change
now that the mueller investigation is coming to an end? >> it's hard to say what that would have affected. certainly those people who follow news about usrussia relations , how they had hoped that there would be a more solid outcome from that. but yes, we will have to see how it has changed things although the mueller report did pretty much endorse what the intelligence community findings were on it. again, i only know a few summaries. so we will have to see if there has been any impact but that will be interesting to see.
we did see over time that there was a little bit of an inequity from 66 percent saying russia interfered so there was a little bit before the recent highlights that have come out. >> but it was around time that mueller was arresting russian nationals, that's the interesting thing about how it's been reported on in the us or talked about in the us but there were, the mueller report did find that there were russian involvement in the election, it just happenedearlier , that's the result of the most recent report. >> we are out of time so i want to thank you all for joining us . please take a copy of the court from the back of the room and please join me in thanking all of our panel.
>>. [inaudible] and that wraps up this program on us and russia public perceptions of each other. if you missed any of this live broadcast it will be available to view online shortly at c-span.org. taking a look at the weekend in congress, the house will debate a bill to restore neutrality standards in place before the fcc made changes last june. members may also consider it to your federal budget setting discretionary spending limits, watch the house live on c-span. here on cspan2 the senate returns at 4:00 eastern or
speeches, no votes are planned. lawmakers will spend much of the week on nominations, majority leader mitch mcconnell filed motions to limit the debate on six nominations including john amazon to the us ambassador to saudi arabia. watch both chambers streaming live c-span.org. the rules committee looks at those measures restoring neutrality and the other dealing with the deficit in a balanced budget, that's live at 5:00 eastern on c-span3. >> technology watcher tim will talk about his book the person. >> facebook is the poster child of the first of bingham, they got extremely large, they only care about money and growth, they didn't take their position responsibly. they ended up being effectively instagram to which they controlled during the 2016 election. a kind of had this terrible
effect on what passes for news so the social effect on the political effect of facebook are in norma's. >> tonight at eight eastern on cspan2. >> ones, tv was simply three giant networks and the government supported service called pbs, and in 1979 a small network with an unusual name rolled out a big idea. letting viewers decide what was important to them. c-span open the doors to washington policymaking for all to see, bringing you unfiltered content from congress and beyond. in the age of power to the people, this was true people power. in the four years since the landscape has changed. but no monolithic media, broadcasting as a way to narrowcasting, youtube stars are anything but c-span's big idea is more relevant today than ever.