tv Michael Mandelbaum The Rise and Fall of Peace on Earth CSPAN April 17, 2019 3:28am-4:28am EDT
and later the american enterprise institute takes a look at modernizing the foreign agents registration act which requires lobbyists working on behalf of another country to disclose the relationship and finances to the federal government wednesday book tv and primetime futures books on health and medicine. we will hear from stephanie and thomas on their book, the perfect predator. jeremy brown on influenza, matt richter and elegant defense, charles graber, the breakthrough and all experiencing, tell your children. book tv and primetime start to 8:00 p.m. eastern here on c-span2. next a former foreign policy advisor. at the 9/11 memorial and museum he argued that the period of peace around the world after the fall of the soviet union is being dismantled today by
russia, china and iran. this is just under an hour. [applause] >> thank you all for coming. and thanks to cspan and it's important audience as well. my new book, the rise and fall of peace on earth revolves around a particular question that question is, what are the prospects for peace? that is a timely question at any point and i will give my answer in the course of my remarks. but it does presuppose another question not often asked but one that is also relevant to the book. that question is what do we mean by peace question how do we define peace? the obvious definition is peace is the absence of war and that
is always welcome but it is not very rigorous after all the world has not spent its entire existence and continual war, war is not continual is episodic. so i propose a somewhat more rigorous definition. peace or if you will deep peace is absent of imminent threat of war. of the likely prospect of war, of urgent preparations it's the absence of foreign policy conducted under the cloud of war. and that is an unusual circumstance. indeed by my reckoning as they say in the book, we really only have one period of deep peace as defined in that way. that. it's a 25 years following the end of the cold war.
the 25 years after the opening of the berlin wall. those 25 years were reminiscent of a no parking signs that a once all. and maybe some of you have seen as well. it said don't even think of parking here. in the 25 years the major countries and the world really went thinking or at least not thinking seriously and urgently about going to work. to be sure there is plenty of bloodshed and death during those 25 years, but most of it was a consequence in the balkans in central africa, syria, a civil war or militias and mistreating civilians. but the confluence that we saw, the death and dying that we saw were not the result of clashes between and among powerful armies using the most advanced weaponry of world wars one and
two in the first half of the 20th century. it is words like that that are by far the greatest creators of destruction. we did not have those in retrospect as a golden 25 years and we really did not have any serious prospect of such a conflict. why was that? why were these two and half decades so peaceful. in my view, it was not at all accidental. we had a deep peace because of the unusually robust presence of three peace promoting features of the international system. the first of these was the benign germany of the united states. america was the big kid on the block and even those countries that were particularly happy about this didn't dare challenge us in a serious way. the second major piece for many
feature was economic interdependence. this was after all one of the great ages of globalization. we know that countries that trade with and invest in one another on a large scale are very reluctant to go to war for no other reason than war cost them a lot of money. the third peace promoting features of international politics between 1989 in 2014 was democracy. this was a great age of democracy and the first time in human history when democracy was the most prominent form of government around the world. by democracy i mean two things, democracy is i believe a hybrid form of government. it involves sovereignty, free, fair and regular elections. but it also necessarily involves
liberty. and liberty comes in three varieties. economic liberty, private property, religious liberty, freedom of worship, and political liberty the rates incorporated in the first ten amendments of the united states. democracy promotes peace and a variety of ways. democracy gives the people some control over their leaders who are sometimes bellicose and it gives them at least the possibility of exercising restraint. moreover, democracy is preeminently a system of government in which disputes, and disputes are notable role in any society. the peaceful resolution of conflict within countries were carried over to relations between and among them leads to
peaceful foreign policies. now, it has to be said that these three futures, individually together do not, by themselves guarantee peace. the reason is nothing can guarantee peace. there is no iron law of international politics like the law of physics. think of these three features of the international system as modular building blocks. and when put one on top of the other they created in these 25 years very large -- we don't want to call it a wall, let's call it a barrier, keeping out work. so this was a golden age of peace, and age unlike any other but it is now at an end. we no longer live in a world in
which war isn't thinkable. the prospect of war, not the certainty or eminence, but the possibility of war has returned in three crucial parts of the world. in europe, east asia in the middle east. and it has returned because three important countries, one in each of the regions has embarked on policy designed to give it dominance in the region using force. in europe, russia invaded and occupied ukraine. in east asia, china has claimed virtually all of the western pacific contrary to international law, has built artificial islands in the western pacific and has installed military facilities on them. and in the middle east, i run has paramilitary groups who
expand and influence throughout the region and has pursued nuclear weapons. now, the heart of the rise and fall of peace on earth is three chapters that describe and explain how and why peace came and disappeared from each of these three regions. it is a complicated story in each case. but all three cases have one thing in common. for each of these countries that have disturbed the peace, the aggressive foreign-policy that ended the piece had a domestic cause. each of the three governments is a dictatorship. so each of them depend for the continuation of its rule openly on corrosion and depression. but for a variety of regions
each one wants as much public support as possible in each conducted these aggressive foreign policies as a way of trying to amass increasing public support in its own country. the reason is, the most reliable source of public support suddenly looked very dice. this is especially true for russia and china. both of these dictatorship gained such support through economic progress. but in the second decade of the century the prospects for economic growth in each of these countries suddenly dipped. in russia prosperity depends almost entirely on the export of energy. when vladimir putin was first president of russia the price of oil skyrocketed $225 a barrel and money poured in and he
distributed some of it to the russian people will keeping a lot for himself and he earned considerable popularity. but when he came back to the presidency the price had fallen by half and showed no sign of increasing substantial. that meant that he had a political problem and he turned to an aggressive foreign-policy to try to solve it. in the chinese case, the chinese communist party presided over a remarkable, unprecedented period of economic growth. three full decades of annual double digit growth. in the party was able to do so by relying on a three-part formula. that formula included the massive movement of chinese people from the countryside to the city. enormous investment on infrastructure and
ever-increasing export. again, in the chinese case by the second decade of the 21st century that formula was looking thread there. indeed, over the last couple of years and as far as we can tell from chinese statistics, the growth rate has been cut in half. they have been great at only, and only in quotations. at five or 6%. year. that is a good personal performance for any other country with a western democracy. but it is not what the chinese people have become accustomed to. they have a problem comparable to the one vladimir putin face. the third disturber of the pie piece, i run is a different case because the clerics that seized power in 1979 and have government ever since for the last four decades, he never presided over a good economic reform. they never produced economic
growth. but that has made them all the more unpopular and given them a greater need for some other source of popularity. the dictatorships conducted their aggressive foreign policies toward their neighbors with an eye toward generating popularity but they justify these policies to their target audience for people that they govern on the ground that such policies were actually defensive. that they were necessary to ward off the west led by the united states which is bent on weakening and perhaps even destroying them. in these three dictatorial governments also justified their foreign policies to their own people as mechanisms for restoring their countries to the rightful positions as a dominant power in their respective each.
each dictatorship to in the piece as a strategy of preserving its own role. that is where we are today. >> well, this analysis or this narrative, raises an obvious question. how, if at all, can we restore peace? in the rise and fall of peace on earth does provide an answer although i fear it is not an entirely satisfactory one. of the three piece promoting features of international politics that create what i see in retrospect as the golden quarter century of peace. by far the most potent in my judgment is democracy. there are many studies by political scientists that find that democracies in the modern
era have a powerful tendency not to go to war. at least not with one another. therefore, the way to restore peace is for russia, china and around to become full-fledged democracy. incorporating both popular sovereignty and the protection of liberty. but, as you all recognize it is far more easily said than done. indeed, one of the lessons that we have learned over the last several decades is that while countries to become democracies all the time they really cannot be made to be democracies from the outside. democracies which requires customs, experiences, values, institutions cannot be imported. it cannot be delivered like a pizza. it takes time to develop it has to be ultimately the creation of
the people of the country themselves. so democracy in russia, china and iran depend ultimately on the people of russia, china and iran. so the central message of the rise and fall of peace on earth is optimistic and pessimistic. there is good news and bad news. the good news is we have a formula for peace. the bad news, we do not know how to implement. and that leads to one final question. given that we cannot make the distributors of the piece, democracies and thereby restore democracy, what can we, by we i mean united states and other democracies do, to increase the
chances that these desirable outcomes will come to test. what can we do tonight she's countries in the desirable direction. in my view, there are three initiatives. three policies if you like. the united states and other democracies can and should undertake to try to push the world in a desirable direction. first, you can and should adopt a refurbished version of the cold war policy of containment. during the cold war the united states and the democratic allies opposed the political design and resisted the military initiatives of the soviet union. in the 20s first century there is a very powerful case in the united states in its friend and allies in these three regions to carry out a similar policy toward russia, china and iran.
two points are worth noting about 21st century containment. first, it is not going to be a carbon copy of a 20th century containment. because the world has changed in important ways. second, the heart of any policy of containment must be the establishment and maintenance of correlations of like-minded countries in all three regions. that is to say, in this era, allies remain very important for american foreign policy. that is the first thing that we can do to push the world back toward peace. second, the united states and its friends and allies can take whatever modest steps are feasible to reckon the dictatorship of russia, china and iran at the margin.
you cannot topple them but as during the cold war, we can take steps to make them less powerful than they otherwise would have been. third, we as americans and citizens and other democracies need to do whatever is necessary to ensure that the united states and other countries were made powerful examples of the benefits of democracy. in a book i wrote a few years ago called democracies good name, i argued that democracy spreads largely by force of example. we do the best we can for democracy is a good example. now in conclusion, none of these three steps or policies or initiatives by itself will ensure democracy in russia,
china and iran in their by restore peace to the world. that is they said is up to the people of russia, china and iran. but these three things are what i believe the united states and other democracies can and should do to create the circumstances in which peace having risen and fallen can rise again. thank you. [applause] >> the floor is open for questions. please, when you raise your hand and they recognize you, wait until someone brings to the microphone and not only the people in this room but the c-span audience can hear it as well. the floor is open. >> hello professor.
i wonder because obviously during this time of peace, america was the flag bearer of capitalism. i wonder how socialism factors into your equation in the new era in the world? >> of course it all depends on what you mean by socialism. i don't think you will see a return to full-fledged communism which calls itself socialism. it involves the government control of all the memes of production and distribution. it involves running the economy through central plan. that simply is not coming back. it is too difficult and it blocks to valley in the soviet union and in other countries. including china which junked it and opted for more free-market style of economy. what we will have instead and what we do have is social democracy. we have a market economy but also social safety net to
provide, old-age, pension, medical care, child care in the central debate in the democracy certainly since 1945, if not since 1919, has been around the question, how generous a social safety net we ought to have. europeans have for various reasons opted for a relatively more generous safety net than we have. but there's always a debate of how generous you should be in the debate has taken place in the united states for a variety of reasons coming to the floor. when people in all corners of the american political system proclaim themselves socialists, they don't mean they want a soviet style command economy. they mean they want a more generous safety net which gives
people more and more generously the memes that they need to have the kind of life that we believe they ought to have. that debate will probably get more intense in the years ahead but it never ended and it never will end. >> it seems that there is a qualitative and quantitative difference between china and iran and russia. the iran in russia economically are somewhat rotten at the core. much more heavily dependent on natural resource to sustain themselves. and why they can create a headache within the media region that they are located in strikes me that their ability to become
a global threat or a trigger to a global conflict is much less than china which because it is not rotten at the core and while it has issues is strictly that their ability to close a global threat starting in asia and the china sea, it's a fundamentally different nature than the russian. i wondered if you can, on that ? >> it is certainly true that china is qualitatively different from russia and iran and very important race. in qualitatively different from every other country in the world except for the united states. it is different in the sense that only china has a prospects of becoming a global power. i think it is also the case that is as far as one can judge that
the chinese regime has greater legitimacy and greater popularity than mr. prudence russian regime or the islamic republic government by the clergy. but, at the moment, china is not showing signs of trying to become a global power. at least not in security terms. it's economic tentacles do reach far and wide in the initiative is a very ambitious. but in security terms, china is focused on east asia and the western pacific. at this point, in particular way it is, i believe comparable to russia and iran. it is much more powerful, it will be more powerful, far more important in the global economy than russia or iran can hope to be. but in the security challenge
that opposes at this point, i think it is fair to compare it to russia and iran. gentlemen over here. >> hi we talked about containment as one of the ways to go about having peace. in the containment argument was, you needed good allies. i wonder if you can assess the state of the united states allies in each of the three areas. >> that is a very important question. i should say i have an article in the march 8 issue of foreign affairs on a new containment which goes into precisely the point you raise in some depth. but let me give you a brief overview first of all. it has to be said that an
alliance is in some ways a contradiction of terms. they're interested in, but also different trips. in leading an alliance of the united states will have to do because no one else can do it is an exercise. it is frustrating in the best of circumstances. in europe, there is a solid framework for an alliance in the north atlantic treaty organization. the problem there, the familiar problem that the europeans do not pay their fair share. >> that has been a problem since the beginning of data. every president since harry truman has complained that the europeans are not complaining and off. but the sentiment that he has expressed is not original with him. it goes all the way back to the beginning. i think that comes with a territory. you can get somewhere with
europeans by nagging. it is worth nagging them but in the in the united states is going to have to pay more than its fair share and rea in europ. i don't think the cost need to be prohibited because it is not the soviet union but there's always going to be a grievance on the american side as long as the alliance continues. east asia is a little bit different. the countries in east asia are friend of china. they are expending or unlike europeans. and although there has never been european security organization, security and east asia has always involved bilateral relations between the united states and other important east asian countries, notably japan and south korea. now we see the beginnings of greater cooperation across the
region including india and with australia at the center. there is more cooperation. but the problem in east asia is all the east asian countries, on the one hand are frightened of china, on the other hand depend access to the chinese workers. they do not want to say anything that would offend the chinese. they want the united states to undertake the burden especially the rhetorical burden of containing the chinese while they in effect hold her coat. we will get some help from them in contributing to a joint military effort. they want to make good relations with china even as we do the hard work of containing it. in the middle east, there are two problems. one is that the internal differences within the coalition are very short.
no other middle eastern country, few other middle eastern countries want iran to be the dominant power in the region but they also are very wary of each other. for example, for the egyptians, their bugaboo is, they govern for a while and were repressed for the army. while the turkish leader, is a great champion of the muslim voters. the internal contradictions are very short. moreover, in the middle east, many of america's partners and friends are pretty people militarily. the turks have a serious military in our part of nato and they become extremely unreliable and israelis have a really good
military in our reliable friends of the united states and just as close to iran. but they will not use the military to defend their country. these other countries want uncle sam to defend them and maybe willing to pay, at least the gulf states are generally in the form of buying more and more military equipment. but they do not have the social basis for putting up substantial military to confront iran. the lady here. and then the lady in the back. >> the 25 years is very definitive starting point at the end of the cold war and the berlin wall. why is it 25 years, is there something we can point to as this is where it ended, this is how it ended. or has outfitted out. >> that is a very good question.
i will give you three reasons that i ended the rise and fall of peace on earth in 2014. first, that was the year that russia invaded ukraine. it was the first instance of textbook international law, aggression of a country crossing the border of another against his will since the 1930s. it was a dramatic episode. it was also the moment when she asian pain in china had taken power a couple years ago began to demonstrate a more aggressive foreign policy than any of its root assessors that he had. second, 1989 to 2014 for 25 years. that's a nice round number. third, i had to ended somewhere. and to tell you the truth i wanted to ended before the current occupant of the white house had come to power because
i did not particularly want to write about him and it's not as if there is a shortage of commentary about this particular individual. in fact, i thought i succeeded. but when the galleys came back i discovered in the index there is a couple of references to him. i solid and i thought, do i really want this? and my wife who is among many things says you can take it out, and put in your leave out anything of the index that you want. so by that i left it in. those of the reasons. in the back. >> my question may be a little nitpicky but you describe the invasion of georgia in 2008 as a dress rehearsal to the ukraine. i was wondering why a dress rehearsal was different from the
invasion of georgia and the invasion of ukraine. >> good question. it was a dress rehearsal in the sense that russia sent its troops across the border of a sovereign country. it used to be a republic of the soviet union. but it differed from the invasion of ukraine in a number of ways. first the russians pulled back, they did not invade georgia properly. they did not invade and remain in the part of georgia that is not under dispute. they did remain in a hosea which is under international law part of georgia but which is in dispute. which georgia did not control. so it was not quite the same in that sense. second, ukraine is a more important country is more
squarely in europe, importers on a nato country mainly pulling, it was a much more serious breach of the peace. in the russian forces have remained in ukraine. so those are the differences that led me to it put the invasion of ukraine in a different category from the assault on georgia. gentlemen here. >> and probably speaking to brown at the moment. but the exception of the middle east which is different with the case of iran from china and russia. it strikes me that both sides of the ledger whether that be u.s. allies or potential u.s. allies, as well as adversarial
countries. there is a very different demographic situation that existed in previous times in which there was not peace or potential for war. whether aging demographics rapidly demographics in some cases whether just booming demographics with young men between the age of 18 and 25 years old. does that dynamic impact how you think about this and how it should play out over time? >> very good point. over the medium-term it does bear on the prospects especially in regards to china. it is in the midst of graphic and mike transition. because the one china policy, china is entering a period in which the number of people outside the workforce retire will increase in the number of people will have to support them in the workforce will decrease. that has profound economic
consequence. a book of a few years ago had the title, will china get rich before gets old? but it also has foreign policy implications because as you know, wars are fought by young men. there will not be as many young men in china or in most parts of the world in the future as there used to be. that is a pacifying element although it has to be said that the wars of the future may not necessarily be the wars of mass army. but you need lots of young men to fill out the ranks. indeed, the computation with china on the one hand and united states on the other hand and the other countries of u.s. asia is an evil one. that is the less effective by the demographic shift. i should mention, one other difference between the world of
the cold war and the world of today which does on the war and peace. during the cold war, the western bloc, the democratic block in the communist bloc were all mostly entirely separate economically. because they were governed by an economy according to the principle of central planning. it was not a fit between two kinds of economists. now, all three strippers of the piece are fully paid up members of the global economy. all of them depend on the global economy. economic interdependence includes them as well and that is of course particularly the case with china. russia and iran are nearly energy exporters don't have anything else to offer the world and they don't move very largely in the global economy. china moves very large and indeed. there isn't going to be any
separation between china and the rest of the world. that complicates the policy of containing china, because china is not only a geopolitical adversary, it's also an economic partner. so other countries of the world, notably the united states have to pursue a two track policy. but because of economic interdependence, there is an increasing reluctance to go to war on the part of china and the economic which is not there in the cold war. i said, the book or the foreign affairs article and the collapse of the chinese military would be an enormous benefit to the rest of the world. the collapse of the chinese economy would be a disaster for the rest of the world. the existence of economic interdependence especially between china and the rest of the world complicates the task
of containment but also serves as one of the modular talks preventing more. >> i wonder where you put the 25 year decline era of peace that middle eastern source violence i would call, starting in 1991 with the iraq invasion in kuwait and then we get into the arab of spring. which was a regional issue and then finally, the rise of international terrorism. by all accounts, this is a non- peaceful event but how do you see it sitting in in your definition? >> let me begin by saying that in the rise and fall of peace on earth, i distinguish the degree of peace between and among the three regions. europe was the most peaceful
because at least for a while it was home to all three piece promoting features of international politics. russia embarked in a democratic course which followed haphazardly for decades. east asia, was somewhat less peaceful because it had two of the piece promoting features but not all three. it had the non- american, the interdependence, but it did not have democracy. china was not a democracy and never has been a democracy. the middle east was the least peaceful of all because of the three piece promoting features, it had only one, benign american hegemony. it weakened in the middle east. because of the second iraq war. united states was not out of the
region but the disappointment that ensued from the conduct of that were made the united states visibly less willing to carry out a policing function in the region. now, there is plenty of disorder in the middle east in these golden 25 years. that is why say, they were less golden for the middle east dan for the other two regions. still, the middle east did not witness a large scale war. the wars they came close, the two american wars in iraq terminated relatively quickly and did not cause large scale casualties. nor in fact do the arab spring with the exception of syria where quarter of a million people were estimated to have died and several million were refugees. so the middle east was the least orderly part of the world at
least the least orderly of the three regions i explore. and, it has seen a considerable amount of violence and death but not on a scale caused by major work. that is what is built into my definition of peace. yes, sir, over here. >> i wanted to ask a little more about your inclusion around and what led you, what were the factors that led you to include in your analysis. based on the model you describe a fast-growing and strong economy in the invasion of local neighbors in a large-scale war. it sounds like saudi arabia is more apt example of that. in terms of iran and economy slowing down on prices?
>> saudi arabia is not a model citizen but it is not seeking to dominate the region in iran is. enron has made considerable progress not because is particularly powerful but because the surrounding countries are weak. therapist has served as a golden opportunity for our own to extend its influence in using proxies what is going on in the middle east is a conflict between sunni and shiite islam. iran is the largest share countrshiehcountry especially i, iraq, yemen and limite. it is attempting the same thing in the middle east that russia
is attempting in europe, china is attempting in east asia. although i run is not judge or not has very many serious problems. because of the weakness of the surrounding countries it is made real progress. >> in the cold war we had both an ideological conflict between western democracy and communism and authoritarianism. how could and how should american policymakers justify what is called containment 2.0.
>> i think you asked two different questions. i thought you were going to ask what events going forward would be similar to those crises but you then asked how the unity states can justify containment which is an important question in the porton question is for pulse. let me answer that one and we can come back to the other one. i don't think it goes without saying that the united states will conduct a policy of 21st century containment. it is not terribly expensive, the problem is not the impact on the budget. se. for example, i do not think the united states needs anything like the size of army deployed in germany during cold war to contain post- communist russia. and i don't think ground troops
are needed in east asia or the middle east. excuse me. any american foreign policy will be sustained over the long-term that requires the support of the american public. the american public supported a foreign policy of global reach like the policy of containment that i am recommending beginning in 1942 in carrying all the way through to the present. but the circumstances that persuaded americans to support the kind of policy do not exist anymore. it began because the united states entered world war ii because it was attached. that policy continues and was renewed in 1945 in 1950 because of the cold war.
there is a global adversary and american policymakers were persuaded, and persuaded the american public is alternative to the policy would be for growth three. which nobody wants to buy. the communist threat disappeared in 1989 or as you will, 1990, 1991. but the american global presence continues as anything else. it was not expensive and other countries wanted us in europe, east asia and the middle east. with the return of challenges of security in the return of what political sizes call it. this kind of policy is not going to be as easy or inexpensive as
it was during the golden 25 years. the question arises, will the american public he willing to pay for it. i think there are very good arguments in favor of conducting such policy. it is a way to guarantee peace. it is a way to prevent disorder, war, nuclear proliferation, and economic cost. it is an insurance policy. but will the greater american public be persuaded? i don't know yes, sir. >> if you would wait for a moment. >> following up on what you decide. with the current occupant of the white house, and his not so friendly relationships with our allies and others. i am sure you know what i'm talking about. is he likely to call or is he likely to be movement for the containment until the end of his
term? >> mr. trump has not made the maintenance of america's reliance is the centerpiece of the foreign policy. but the policy does continue for a number of reasons. one, we arty do have deployments in these three parts of the world and they have not been pulled back. they have not been pulled back because the number of the people that this president appointed do not agree with him that alliances are not important. they think they're very important and they have done whatever they can to maintain them. third, given ongoing american policy, it would take a strong american initiative to reverse those policies, to bring americans back and that does not seem something that he is inclined to do. on the other hand, you cannot
conduct of foreign policy by a nurse shift forever. at some point, whoever's present is going to have to make the case that the american public, this kind of foreign policy is in america's interest. it may not be mr. trump but if it is not mr. trump and will probably have to be his successor. we do not know who his successor will be or when it will take office. but, at some point the case does, in my opinion, have to be made. yes sir. >> if it is the case that the incentive for these three specific countries, foreign policy, was economic crisis at home. and i should say i've not been to any of these countries. but i've never worked in a developing country where economic crisis you can appease people by nationalism or foreign policy. i am wondering, is there
evidence in given it's only been five years of bc 2014. is it possible that this idea of seizing the citizens among economic crisis doesn't work and eventually the people come around to see that this is not working democracy can be promoted from the grassroots week? >> one would hope that the tactic for creating external enemies is a way of reinforcing internal role would not work. but i'm afraid there's a pretty long history of that being a successful tactic. in russia, it is happening ever since the 19th century and russian rulers were quite explicit about it . . .
have taken territories that belong to other countries. iran seems to be functioning differently. iran's danger and the domination of the region have an instrument of domination that the other two do not. prussia has no allies in europe. china has a lot of willing economic partners but it doesn't have allies or countries that would like to see it become the dominant power in the region. iran does have allies in the person of the population spread around the region and it has sponsored and trained the military forces such as
hezbollah and lebanon which has basically taken over that country so iran exercises that proxy control in lebanon and considerable control through the militia and iraq and he's become kind of an honorary shia and exercises a certain amount of leverage in yemen through its sponsorship the mechanism is different. the aim is the same, the goal is the same and as i said, iran has achieved some success for extending its influence. thank you all for coming and thanks to c-span for joining us.
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up next on booktv "after words" georgetown university professor angela examines russia's relationship with the u.s. and the world. interviewed by democratic representative deana titus of nevada. a member of the foreign affairs committee. "after words" is a weekly program with relevant guest hosts interviewing top nonfiction authors about their latest works. as a political scientist i missed this kind of discussion that your work certainly informed me for what i do on the foreign affairs committee. i was looking at your resume which is most impressive. you're a professor and scholar at georgetown, a published author with highly acclaimed work from the u.s. russian relationship a