tv Panelists Discuss European Union Relations with U.S. and China CSPAN April 18, 2019 5:34pm-7:11pm EDT
rochester, minnesota, this saturday at noon eastern on c-span 2's book tv and sunday at 2:00 p.m. on american history tv on c-span 3. working with our cable affiliates as we explore the american story. >> next, a look at the current relationship between the european union, china, and the u.s. and how the eu's relations with the two countries impact trade and cybersecurity. this event was hosted by the huntsman institute. it's about an hour and a half. >> good afternoon, and welcome. i'm ken weinstein, president and ceo of hudson institute.
delighted to see the crowd here and the press coverage for our event today which focuses, as you can see, caught in the crossfire, balancing eu relations with the u.s. and china. china is omnipresent these days from investments to high technology to geostrategy, and it's also become quite a factor in u.s./eu relations as well. the united states under president trump announced a fundamental shift in u.s. policy towards china, a whole of government approach that was announced here at hudson institute by vice president pence in his historic october 4th speech, and now after years of largely benign view in china, of china in the eu, a view that was parallel to largely benign views held here in the united states by leading opinion makers, viewing china as a strategic partner, as an engine for markets and investments,
china is now viewed with shall we say greater nuance in the european union. recent guidelines given by the european commission and european internal affairs service talked about china simultaneously as a country with a partner with whom the eu, i'm quoting, has closely aligned objectives, a negotiating partner with whom the eu needs to find a balance of interest and economic competitor in pursuit of technological leadership and systemic rival, promoting alternative models of governance. this need to have a more nuanced approach to china comes against a backdrop of increased chinese willingness to use various levers against the eu, whether it's from belt and road, its new partnership with italy, through the 16 plus 1 arrangements and others. today, we have an extraordinary -- extraordinarily distinguished group of observers with us to examine the eu
between the united states and china. let me note first and foremost our moderator will be ashley tell tellis. she is of course one of washington's leading observers of asia, served as an american diplomat, senior adviser to the u.s. ambassador in new delhi, specialist to president george w. bush and senior director for strategic planning on the national security council. we are absolutely honored and delighted to have us with us today the secretary general of the council of the european union. he is the top adviser to the highest ranking european official, european council president donald tusk, general mickelson is well known in brussels, a man who has managed an extraordinary array of portfolios from brexit to the refugee crisis with calm, with discipline and with the ability to bring great focus and
eventually consensus on very divisive issue. he's by training a diplomat with a career serving as danish ambassador to china for three years, served as denmark's permanent representative to the european union and there are 2800 people who work for him at the council. next we have the honorable randy schrieber, assistant secretary of defense for indopacific security affairs. randy is well-known as a long-time asia hand with deep insights in the region, extensive contacts, someone who has been responsible for implementing the national defense strategy which certainly handles -- focuses a great deal on changing u.s. -- the free and open indopacific.
randy served of course under president george w. bush as deputy assistant secretary of state for east asia and pacific affairs. we have two of my hudson institute colleagues on the panel as well. tom brewsterburg, senior fellow who focuses on trade. tom was for many years the president and chief executive officer of the manufacturers alliance for productivity and innovation. before that, in addition to being the director of the washington institute of hudson institute, he was assistant secretary of commerce for international economic affairs and chief of staff to then senator dan quayle and afterwards to congressman chris cox. last but not least, the visiting senior fellow here at hudson institute, one of the leading observers of u.s./china/eu relations. she has spent a significant amount of time at the royal
danish defense college and has held visiting scholarships at harvard university, the wilson center and other similar institutions. delighted to turn the podium over or turn the microphone over, i should say to the secretary general. thank you. >> thank you. it's a pleasure for me to be here back at hudson to moderate this panel. that's going to be a very easy task because we have very distinguished speakers who are going to explore different aspects of the european union and the united states and the management of relations with china. i think i ought to say just in the beginning that if there has been anything distinctive about the trump administration's initiatives, the free and open pacific has probably been the most distinctive. there have been many discussions about what that concept entails
but shorn of all the complexity, i think there are three elements worth focusing on. first, the freedom from domination, to create a political order that is essentially not dominated by any single power but sort of chokes out the possibilities of political life for others. second, the maintenance of an open economic system that the united states spent a lot of capital building since the end of the second world war. and third, the need to protect our strategic coupling with key regions of the world to include asia and europe. china is probably one country that challenges these objectives along multiple dimensions, and what our panel this afternoon is going to do is to explore various aspects of that challenge and to explore the possibility of collaborative action between the united states
and europe in dealing with these challenges. since the foundation of this republic, the united states has always benefited from having strong allies in managing its interests in the world. today is no exception. so as we look to managing the challenges in asia, we have to work collaboratively with our allies in europe and elsewhere. that's really what the focus of this panel is about. so without further ado, let me ask you to speak to us on the question of trans-atlantic relations with china. thank you. >> thank you very much for the invitation. thank you very much also for this framing of the debate which i think is a good one. i would also like to thank you for the title, the title of this event which is maybe a little bit provocative, but even so, i think timely and also relevant.
thank you also for the master general's presentation of me. let me say that while i too represent a european perspective based on where i'm coming from, i'm here in a personal capacity. the first remark i would like to make is that in my assessment based on what i see in my day-to-day work, the eu is in the process of adapting -- adopting a more serious approach to its relations with the rest of the world and to its global role. why is that happening? first of all, because after ten years of crisis, we are now again beginning to have the capacity to look to the future and to look beyond our borders. we have been through a serious economic crisis which took on some very specific aspects in europe, but we have now had
growth for six years and we have the highest employment we ever had. secondly, the migration crisis that dominated politics in europe for the last couple of years and which exploded in 2015, there we are back to pre-crisis levels in terms of irregular migration. in terms of the numbers, we are back to the situation before the crisis. third, brexit, which is still an ongoing issue and which still takes up too much of our time, we think. but i would say that that is no longer a political crisis on our side of the channel, where there is clearly still a political crisis in the uk. so for these reasons, the union has been able to begin to look to its future, for example, also the future construction of the euro and look more to what the
rest of the world. the second thing is not just our capacity but also the reality keeps creeping in that the rest of the world, it's very difficult to ignore and that as we begin looking a little bit beyond our own borders, we discover that during those five, ten years where we were navigating, the world changed and it changed in china, it changed in the u.s. and indeed, also the relationship between china and the u.s. has been changing. so what is it that is sinking in, what is it that is provoking a rethink also in europe these days? about china, while we were finding our way out of the crisis, the gdp of china doubled so it's not the same world we're coming back to. it's a different world. it's also a china that is increasingly at the cutting edge when it comes to the most
important technologies of the future and that is also -- was also not the situation, say, ten years ago. it's a china that very clearly is pursuing a long-term strategy that is not new, but it is a strategy that also in certain aspects raised some security issues and it is a development where, as we see it in europe, we are confronted with some unfair practices in the trading relationship which we need to address. the eu in its relationship with china sees china very much as a partner and as not just a challenge but also an opportunity. but i would say that in looking at those challenges and opportunities, the challenges have become more in focus most
lately. then what also happened during those years was the political climate changed in the u.s., that we had a new american president and that has also made an impression in europe, in particular the current administration's approach to the international rule-based order which, as we see it, deviates from what has been a traditional american approach and where our approach still continues to be a firm commitment to that rules-based international order. i will come back to that. secondly, a u.s. that is very insistent on its own interests and as we have seen it, not always taking into account in our view sufficiently the legitimate interests of its
allies. that is also reflected in public opinion and the best analysis of that is coming from this city. the pugh institute to which i would refer you. finally, the relationship between u.s. and china is also changing, taking on maybe a new character that increasingly puts us on the spot so that's why i said that the title is not, while it may be a little exaggerated, is not without relevance and is quite timely. so what consequences do eu member states draw from all of this? of course here, i cannot claim to speak on behalf of every eu member state, but based on what i see in these meetings of the leaders of the european union and the european council, i would claim the first is the
recognition there are no big states left in europe. that has been more difficult realization, of course, for some than for others, in particular the biggest of our medium sized member states, but i think that that has sunk in today that when we look at this global world, this global picture, individual member states cannot really exercise their sovereignty as they used to in this world. it's either joint exercise of sovereignty in this world or it will not happen. the second realization i think is that while the union has always been strong in values and will continue to be strong on values, we also need to be a little bit more serious about our interests. we have to take into account the world we're living in and we cannot be naive. we have to be, not shy away also from using leverage where we have it in order to pursue those
interests. finally, indeed that the eu must define its role in this relationship between the u.s. and china. that's of course not the only defining elements in our role but we need to find our role in this context. how that ultimately plays out of course does not only depend on us. that depends very much also on china and on the u.s. we are seeking cooperation with both. we want to preserve, as i said, the rule-based international order but we also want to reform it. we recognize that the world we are living in has changed and that those rules that have been created a long time ago are not always fit for purpose any longer, and in particular, do not always take account of the changing role of china so we
need to reform that order to make it more resilient and more fair and better fit for purpose. i would also like to underline that the european natural inclination is of course to align as closely as possible with the u.s. the trans-atlantic bond is not just words. the trans-atlantic bond is very deeply rooted in history, in democratic values, in alliance. that's a reality and i think that it is also very much present among the leaders when they meet in the european council. they want the trans-atlantic bond to continue and they want to strengthen it. it continues to be a key factor in how we see how to place ourselves in this world. that also means that we need to build on what we have in common. we need to maximize the positive
agenda and that is by bilateral relations, for example, in trade, but it's also about that rule-based international order, in the first instance about the wto, where there is sufficient commonality of interest to push, we believe, a common reform agenda. at the same time, we need to minimize the frictions. there have always been frictions in the trans-atlantic relationship and we have always been able to manage them. we have to be a little bit careful that they don't proliferate too much and because of the impact that that has in a broad political sense which may influence the room to maneuver of the leaders when they want to strengthen the ties with the u.s. here. so in short, i think that we as
europeans are ready and i hope that the same is the case as far as the u.s. is concerned. >> thank you. that is both clear and brief. randy? >> well, thanks. ken, thanks for having me in your house this afternoon. thanks for inviting me to join such a distinguished panel. i know we are somewhat judged by the company we keep so surely my reputation is enhanced today. thank you for that as well. ashley, in your opening remarks, you captured very well where i was going to lead off so no need for me to repeat it, but i do think developing a better understanding of what we mean in this concept of free and open endopacific is something we're pursuing. your articulation is very good. we are going to be producing a defense strategy report that
will give a dod perspective on what we're doing to pursue this concept. i see a few veterans, patrick cronin, remember the east asia strategy reports, it will be along those lines. so it will be a public articulation of these concepts and we hope that that will resonate well. we do seek a free and open order and as patrick -- pardon me, as ashley said, protection of sovereignty no matter how large or small a country may be, promoting international law and international norms, promoting free, fair, reciprocal open trade. those are the sort of foundational principles. we don't want to see any coercive approaches to resolving disputes but rather, peaceful diplomatic approaches, and we do see a number of challenges to that. it's not limited to china. of course we have russia as a country seeking to up-end that
order base order international law norms. we have continuing dangerous behavior from north korea. we see non-state actors, transactional threats. so there's a wide range of challenges that are familiar i think to everybody in this room. but i do think we are particularly concerned about the trajectory of china. china with a different vision, different aspirations for the region. if those goals are achieved, if they are realized, i think we could see a very different indo-pa scific region, one wher sovereignty is eroded, where there's backsliding in terms of human rights and religious freedom. everyone should be concerned about what's going on in tibet. we should take every opportunity to talk about it because it is underreported. the human tragedy that's unfolding right now. we can see more attempts to resolve differences through other than peaceful means. so i think it is a very
different regional architecture and order if china is successful in its model of governance is an ascendant one. we are in somewhat of an idealogical battle as i think vice president pence pointed out in his speech here, when he talked about the promotion of certain enduring values that china doesn't really pursue in its own relations. in fact, many times, just the opposite. their predatory economics leads to greater corruption and weaker governance. so this is a serious period for us, a very consequential period. we do look for partners and allies. i think ashley rightfully said it's one of our great advantages is we approach challenges, security challenges to be included in that with the idea that we will have partners and allies alongside us operating from a foundation of shared
principles. ken, i appreciate your comment on the real pivot but i've got to say the obama administration did a terrific job in developing some of our emerging partners, india, vietnam, indonesia, very strong partnerships that were handed off to us and i think we have stood on their shoulders and strengthened those relationships even further. i think more and more, we are looking to the trans-atlantic relationship, our relationship with the eu and individual european countries to help us address these challenges in the indo-pacific region. if i was to sort of lay out maybe four or five things i think we can do together as partners, that i think would be mutually beneficial but also promote these concepts, i would mention things such as the following. i think number one, we need to continue in information sharing, intelligence sharing, on the strategic landscape because it
is very dynamic. now, i can say, having been involved in china policy, asia policy, for a couple of decades, we have really made a lot of progress and the convergence is significant. when i was spending time as a deputy assistant secretary of state, we were talking as partners but an eu that largely saw just the economic opportunity and a u.s. that saw largely a security challenge. we talked about the export ban on arms and things of that nature. we're much closer now. i think there are some differences that remain, but we are much more close in our views on both economic challenges and security challenges. but it's a dynamic environment, so that conversation needs to be continued and strengthened not only on the intelligence and information but on our policies and how we approach the region. on that, i would say another thing we should be doing is really comparing notes and trying to learn from one another
on best practices. when we look at our mil to mil engagements, the chinese are very smart and opportunistic. they will choose the type of engagement with a particular country based on what they can learn from that country and what they can extract from them, maybe a country has a niche area of excellence. that's where china's going to want to engage. and with us, we have seen repeated requests in certain areas. so how we engage china is another area where i think we can benefit from exchanging information, comparing notes. i think number three, thinking about how we can, over time, develop operational approaches in the region and i would put that into several sort of subcategories. in some instances, it might be actual operating. we have challenges in the south china sea to ensure that china's
militarization of the south china sea doesn't result in the erosion of international water there, and that the dream of operationalizing and making meaningful the nine dash line is realized, that no country can change international law and claim it as their own. we see more and more european countries willing to operate alongside us in joint patrols and presence operations, if not ultimately freedom of navigation operations, so that's sort of one subcategory in that area of operational cooperation. ...
>> so the capacity building area is another area. you see this fusion from china with their security interest in people refer to the initiative with certain security and military objectives, showing up the relationships with other types of engagement that gives those individual countries alternatives and conveys to those countries they have
supporters and allies is another way we can cooperate with one another in that category. shifting now to another area where we need to continue our cooperation with our own technology and critical infrastructure, looking first and foremost internally looking at reform with extensive studies of our own defensive supply chain with her own vulnerabilities, if we take that task on for themselves but then to discover best practices again a very dynamic environment where these challenges will continue to evolve perk i don't think one round of reform will frankly do it for us. but being able to trade best practices is critical of
course we are looking right now at a particular challenge with networks and communication systems. we recognize we all don't start from the same place. some countries have four g infrastructure but we need to end up in the same place with confidence to continue to close relations as partners and allies and to do that without compromise perk with individual decisions as a look at these issues to stay in close coordination but our side continuing to explain where we have concerns and also appreciating are all starting from the same place on the eu side and individual member states and
understanding those decisions made, need to be made with that and stay in mind to share the most important information with our partners to. so i will stop there. >> and looking at those economic dimensions. >> thank you. let me start by expressing my solidarity with the european on the great tragedy of western civilization that was destroyed in paris i am a long time student of french and european history it was painful to think about. i am a longtime advocate of us
extensive study due to the chinese juggernaut of 2 million jobs in the united states. president trump skillfully exploited the problems associated with that decline of the industrial sector the ability to work closely together despite the many positive reasons and this is disputes on the trade front with europe and also to be a little bit concerned with china has gone to a very slow start united states is at the tip of the spear taking on china bilaterally. europe has joined us with the
issues of wto reform to take on china with technology transfer with ip are theft and the like but the typical european-style has moved fairly slowly. so the best chance for the us eu agreement frankly was under the new obama administration when politics were on our side to get a deal done. but internal politics in europe, especially in germany were so opposed to a deal that it didn't get done. now under the trump agreement we will try again but it has
taken europe nine months to get a mandate to negotiate and for that the french voted against it. so it will be tough to assemble a coalition in europe even if the negotiators have the agreement. and also in cooperation with tough issues like the huawei g5 dispute to push back against the chinese initiative. italy, hungary, greece are all active participants with the chinese and it is affecting politics as well. i also note europe is somewhat slow to respond to the wto decisions pointing to the
iconic case of boeing and airbus where the dispute started out on the west side our complaint has been judged three separate times in 2011 wto panel concluded airbus had benefited from $17 billion which was contrary to the wto rules. they appealed that decision and with that wto process people like donald trump are not especially patient with
this delayed tactic. and then there was a decision recently that one out of the 29 charges boeing was guilty of not screening those support rules to the tune of $100 million per year. and now retaliate to the tune of $22 billion. now this sort of aid to boeing is not atypical of the united states. and just to give two examples in alabama with the package totaling $154 million and when
bmw went to south carolina it was 130 million plus 900 acres of land so there has got to be some sort of reciprocity. and with their sector in europe with the wto and the efforts by the united states and then to the benefits they receive back in the fifties and sixties and seventies the united states is not perfect
with the levels of tariffs i would also note that trade surplus in germany between 70 percent of gdp and despite that rhetorical criticism of the european commission misses a problem not only for internal convergence and cohesion but a problem that contributes to the trade deficit with the united states which president trump points
out. 's on this trade surplus of famous economist noted a couple years ago when there is no example in economic history since the beginning trade statistics of the 19th century when a country of this size experienced a comparable level on a long-term basis not even china or japan has not risen above two or 3 percent of gdp. the informal eu rules suggest the net should not be tolerated. with a special irritant to
president john. with the flexibility on the part of the eu of the trump dialogue that i point to agriculture but they have all noted without some attention to agriculture, any agreement is a dead letter in the united states it took a long time to get a mandate and my understanding of france and germany and italy in parts of eastern europe are not that
sympathetic to doing a free trade deal of any sort with the united states. it's not a formula for rapid action with the free trade agreement. i was not a part of section 232 but i am perhaps on five g technology or supporter of the uranium that is so clearly in the national interest. that president trump will look out over the horizon to see these lingering problems with europe with a sense of
how europe can and is contributing in the us and china and has pointed out recent challenges to europe that makes europe stronger with the european union but when it comes to traditional centrist trade that has demonstrated and that we cannot be bypassed with those repercussions forever there are other issue areas they have not played such a big role of security issues of the chinese industrial policies.
common eu policies to have greater freedoms of those initiatives that would be followed up in practice and such efforts and with those allies to come from an independent decision with the europeans with the priorities to address multilateral institutions to link up those european initiatives with that conductivity plan adopted by a
2018. to have a more specific example of how this works and that has taken place that was mentioned in the talk and the europe of the indo pacific security between india and china china has ensure long, that in challenges the position in the indian ocean. and other issues such as the south china sea but the eu can only have a general policy to
have more specific action. on - - oriented policies that the eu has addressed these problems and to see the indo pacific as strategically linked to africa and the middle east indicated by the first summit taking place and seen as an opportunity to protect against growing russia chinese influence at a time the us has not addressed the grouping very much and the eu has for closer relations to be compatible values and it has been able to do that with that
economic partnership and then to facilitate security cooperation and a long-standing partnership from india has turned into a common security dialogue a common interest in the indian ocean and has approached singapore with a free trade agreement as a precursor so that is a general frame that has made for other countries to take action in this policy is supplemented since 2016 has been joined by an increasing number of european member states one --dash to enable
diplomacy in the indo pacific. and this year the group will sail from the eastern mediterranean through the suez canal to the horn of africa at human and across the indian ocean to singapore. there will be a and those that will participate to demonstrate the transatlantic unity concerning the french initiative and during the deployment the group will participate in maritime exercises with the japanese
navy through the suez canal through singapore. this was exercised with the egyptian and indian navy with the forces at a time when the europe is seeking to strengthen security cooperation with the arab league and also with the asian democracy to open a new air base since 2019 to counter china's increasing presence in the indian ocean and japan has supported india's strengthened military presence there. so the french tour supports these efforts and also the promulgation of the general eu approach meant - - reproach
mont so this kind of division of labor with the grouping of the member states where the eu defines a general policy and then individual countries translates the initiatives and i would argue that is a division of labor because it seems as i said in the beginning and not as an individual country but this grouping to take action also has greater freedom to work out those initiatives to be followed up. so that actually allows europe to play that little power role between us and strategic rivalry because on the one hand demonstrating support for core values shared with us and
allie allies, plus from an independent position to allow europe to take action on a strategic perspective and priorities such as the importance of the arab league. of course these initiatives serve the interest of individual countries such as french arms sales but at the same time to contribute to common transatlantic and indo pacific. and this kind of division of labor which is the common transatlantic challenges is seen with the eu commissions liberal balance robust defense policies which provide the member states because of
cross-border cooperation and industrial policies the undermining with the data security and so on. although it is important these initiatives are coordinated between allies and partners that is essential so for example us participation and diplomacy with development is important with the various infrastructure projects in asia are coordinated so we can ensure they work within the same limit and if that kind of action takes hold and becomes more pronounced, i do believe transatlantic relations will be seen as a united front
against the chinese challenges that others were describing and that will be a sufficiently powerful force that china cannot just ignore and will have to take note and comply with more us and european demands with the indo pacific and other areas. thank you. >> so now we will open the floor to questions but i want to make two points. the challenges that we face in the indo pacific are fundamentally transatlantic
project the united states does not have the capacity to do this alone, nor should it because the allies are across the atlantic with a common mission so we are condemned the one no matter what the political situation of the day maybe but the fact we have common values is no guarantee we will not have disagreements. from the national perspectives but there is a huge difference to cause a threat to security that is something we ought not to forgettable sides of the atlantic and going forward.
so those remarks i want to open the floor to explore the issues. identify yourself and keep your interactions brief. >>. >> and was very nice to see a number of friends on the panel but i want to expand on one of the points that was made of constant discussion that the us needs to work more closely with allies on the problem that is what we have been
talking about today. so how do you best work with the member states that the commission level? the last speaker talked about a division of labor. could you elaborate with the role of brussels and the member states especially at a time when clearly there is a difference between some of the southern member states and others? spin i thank you for the question that is highly relevant. and with the description this is a little complicated it is not a state but they have certain state like qualities so the cost of trade they
disagree with the council has decided about how that was brought about and if the union is relatively effective. there are areas where it was almost absent when it comes to the other end of the spectrum. this being said is also very much aware of because first of all to help build capacity and the union does have that initiative lately but hoping member states and now there is the discussion of the amount of spending and that we spend
much less efficiency in the us like 40 percent of what you do but there is six times as many as you do and that is not particularly efficient and for their it is relevant but it is also relevant to reach out but also in asia we may be less visible because of the military dimension. but we are focusing on relations with a number of the countries so i think unfortunately but that is who we are.
sorry. >>. >> can you talk about how large a role between us and china and the chinese military aircraft were in taiwan recently were they taking actions to maintain stability? >> with the second question the responsibility to respond to those incursions rest with the military as they did they intercepted the two aircraft that you mentioned so our approach is more long-term to help taiwan have a self-defense capability yesterday we notified a very large case to congress a $500 million for sustainment and training of the f-16 so we
have a security partnership through the taiwan relations act to assist in responding to those particular incidents but more broadly for taiwan's deterrent capability. with respect to cooperation we do have a strong history of industrial cooperation in the high-tech space. but just to repeat we have a dynamic environment where the risks are willing and as china in the high-tech area we had parochial concerns of protection of intellectual property and a growing security concern with china's trajectory of their power that we have to be mindful of so
>> in the union we are very conscious of this issue and part of that is that initiative and from the eu side we see those opportunities the pr waking up to this in a more comprehensive strategic long-term and the complication with conductivity and in the crystal ball with public procurement and things like that on our own within the
union and for us to be able to face up to that and it's also about offering alternatives you can go a little further south and the investor by far is the biggest so that is also part of it and to say no to the connectivity and two others along the way that doing that in a way that is compatible. >> and i just add if you look
at the case where they signed up with this memorandum they stayed within the confines of the eu china agreement that was just made. that hasn't alienated from that position and also insured that the investments were rely on usaid so you can see some evidence. >> thank you to the panel for an interesting discussion. how would you respond to the criticism that is more preoccupied like others on privacy issues than it is over security of its own nations
like china and the infiltration of the european market? >> i am a defender of the policy. [laughter] going after american companies come i don't think that is how i would describe. but the way we apply through the nationality we appreciate the decision of the commission that as you know did not go down so well that's how we go about our rules and it is true this very much becomes a matter of the american companies that was because all
the big it companies and the perception that trying to move into regulating something for what we already have and that is very different. over the question of five g and huawei and the european council that the commission was asked to come out and again it is a little complex because it cannot be with a particular company or deny national security but i think with the union they can
especially coming out as a response with the conclusion of the european council setting out a framework with all of them to do this by the end of june but that the union is not acting on this for what it is capable of doing and those member states. >> thank you very much. the chinese government with the eradication with those
that have died there we got the news last month my question is why does the eu think their cooperation with china help china? and with its power? thank you. >> your concerns about the situation the union has also been acting with a delegation on this recently and also calling for opening up for others to go in there without
going into details i would say this is being discussed. >> i am sorry for what has happened to your family and we as citizens should take any opportunity i don't know how 3 million people being thrown into concentration camp conditions is underreported but it is. but the second part of your question is, if you are doing business with certain companies that you are an enabler, we can't ignore that and we shouldn't. huawei and other companies are themselves enabling the ccp
and if you are associated with this activity i am sorry we should take full - - take that into account to be mindful of that. >>. >> i have been working for reuters in europe and i'm currently in washington doing a fellowship. i have a question for the broader panel. i am curious if you think the us can be helpful to the eu to address the divisions on china particularly in eastern europe? do you think there is a need for different forms of
cooperation in those areas that you have outlined and there is a basis for that type of cooperation i'm not sure we need new forms or instruments for that. >> i would have the same comment when i look at the us and europe, sometimes relations have gone sour lately and we criticize each other but the base of objective to me is much the same that sometimes we prioritize the instruments but that isn't necessarily a problem it could be seen as a strength working through different channels towards the same thing. so there isn't so much a need
for more dialogue but more coordination and alignment is actually good because if you do this i can do something else toward the same objective for example with the arab league the europe works with them than the us can work with other instruments toward the same goa goal. >> i would add from the us perspective looking at why italy or greece or hungary has latched onto the initiative they have that economic need that is not fulfilled otherwise. united states shouldn't try to lecture the europeans how they
handle their internal economic problems but there may be ways for some sources of cooperation with the development activities that the examples that we are responding to and in one example we have been critical of huawei but we don't jointly or individually, the us or the eu have a really good economic alternative yet for huawei. they have technology, they come in with low-interest loans, loans, construction companie companies, it is an attractive package that they offer. we could work together on one side to challenge the
procurement policies but we must learn how to work with the remaining providers that we have in the united states and in europe to help them offer better packages. >> i am in a trade where formerly of the china commission. when i was a general counsel of the senate banking committee writing the cvs legislation and the 1998 trade bill the assistant secretary said we need another round of reform would be interested to know what he means by that but i never clearly understood was
it at the commission level or at the member state level because i wasn't clear on that point. >> thank you. nice to see you again. i think what i said maybe it's that i need a second round , but i think, i hate that as an official in your words. [laughter] i think it is a reflection of the dynamic of how challenging it is. the assistant secretary of defense was in los angeles last week from the entertainment industry why would i show up as something like that? because from china the information space is part of the comprehensive competitive space for them and they are
using that information space for perception management , influence and everybody around the table had a story of the chinese was affecting script content and actors that could be used. so the original cynthia's one - - did not envision such a comprehensive challenge across all these domains not just hard-core military or high technology but our universities and entertainment. so the nature of this competition will require us to be equally dynamic how we respond so i will be claim that sentence to say we will probably need that reform.
terms of what they know what they don't know and in some areas with the security council's up to the member state and then the fact there is an organization that clearly helps. >> my question is for either of european experts we expect more to sign up and how does the eu feel about that? >> [laughter]
we have no position we are happy to engage with china when it comes to conductivity but we have to make sure it is based only on the interest of one party so therefore we need to engage in that not as individual member states but having a more comprehensive rules i would refer you to the commission with the country's approach that what we built brings together china and our part of the world that has no
undue dependence and that changes naturally from what i said about our interest whether to be more critical. >> i think more countries will sign up but that's not necessarily a bad thing because eri will not go away but the way that we sign-up it is important. if you look in other parts of the world, japan is starting joint projects on infrastructur infrastructure, that is necessary to try to ensure that we can work with china not at any cost but if there are certain rules, that's a
way forward because we cannot say no to all chinese initiatives because it sends the wrong signal but we can insist on rules for china to stand up to with our organizations. >> thank you for the opportunity to ask secretary shriver and that you commissioner. however the eu operate in the south china sea and with vietnam to talk about international norm because that is an issue that compacts all domains with information sharing.
so with the code of conduct , can we make that a global concern to apply the code of conduct through the south china sea to be a global achievement? i think the key position and this is tremendously important because the us alone cannot do it and especially that vietnam is reaching out in many different ways and asking for the eu to support vietnam especially in the infrastructure away from the proposal from china is that is picking the chinese proposal in many infrastructures especially with importance to the south china sea is that
something to be put on the table with the eu and the us? >> yes i think i addressed some of this but quickly , through diplomacy and continued suppor support, and environment another underappreciated story is how many fisheries were destroyed with the reclamation of the outpost. the operations from the member states it is my view with china claims everything within that line the presence of operations and capacity building i think all these countries have a need to sense to share their securities to
help these countries as an organization to build capacity building but that's a great place to start with vietnam. >> this is another case of the south china sea to have a very general policy because of internal divisions but it does have diplomacy with those individual groupings of countries so france has taken the lead but even denmark has been happening with capacity building . . . .
on apology with the invitations in terms of the union actually, it's a policy in any solution here has to be based on international law for opportunities and respects of operations and decisions in this respect. at the end, the amount is one of the countries in which eu is reaching out and an agreement on the agreement that would be ready for this summer. we want to reach out to the
concentrates, you know prison population is the highest in the world. instead of focusing on the incorporation of business or some kind of development, this is rather serious, the minority. it really reflects serious for all crimes and justice network. the highest and also people to have secure interests and everything is impossible and increasing it and the constitutional rights and people
and their small businesses. it's one they can work on in the humanity and the population to develop the general peace and programs rather than just every time they use the security or initiative or department. can we work on this? it's very serious. >> thank you. >> maybe i will just say something about the gentleman from gw. say that in terms of companies well, companies can express themselves on the issue of china for instance, the u.s. china business council, is a big presence in china, european wide china business council, a german
one, the uk and china. they can express their opinions in two ways, to their own home government and also directly to the chinese. they're not shy about doing that. whether or not it can be unifiel but we've talked a lot about values and interests, companies more often have interests rather than values so i will just leave it at that. >> just one brief comment and also on the question from the gw about unitary and this both being a strength and a weakness.
today and yesterday, we in europe are trying to be more coherent than we have been in the past on this. being realistic and what we can achieve into the spectrum. we believe it makes us a more critical and useful partner and also for the u.s. and the discussions on the issues we had yesterday so i hope that that is the message that will be taken in this. >> i want to thank all of you because of anything in this conversation, it highlighted, the stakes are high. we need to continue this conversation because we are obviously not going to reach a single round in this conversation. this is the beginning of the conversations of both sides.
want to thank all of you for your attendance here for penetrating questions and many special things to our guest here to lisa. for having put this together. i hope we will meet again in some not-too-distant future. to continue this discussion. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]
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